AFRICA

africa, and for details transvaal). in his negotiations with president kruger one masterful temperament was pitted against another. mr chamberlain had a very difficult part to play, in a situation dominated by suspicion on both sides, and while he firmly insisted on the rights of great britain and of british subjects in the transvaal, he was the continual object of radical criticism at home. never has a statesman's personality been more bitterly associated by his political opponents with the developments they deplored. attempts were even made to ascribe financial motives to mr chamberlain's actions, and the political atmosphere was thick with suspicion and scandal. the report of the commons committee (july 1897) definitely acquitted both mr chamberlain and the colonial office of any privity in the jameson raid, but mr chamberlain's detractors continued to assert the contrary. opposition hostility reached such a pitch that in 1899 there was hardly an act of the cabinet during the negotiations with president kruger which was not attributed to the personal malignity and unscrupulousness of the colonial secretary. the elections of 1900 (when he was again returned, unopposed, for west birmingham) turned upon the individuality of a single minister more than any since the days of mr gladstone's ascendancy, and mr chamberlain, never conspicuous for inclination to turn his other cheek to the smiter, was not slow to return the blows with interest. apart from south africa, his most important work at this time was the successful passing of the australian commonwealth act (1900), in which both tact and firmness were needed to settle certain differences between the imperial government and the colonial delegates. mr chamberlain's tenure of the office of colonial secretary between 1895 and 1900 must always be regarded as a turning-point in the history of the relations between the british colonies and the mother country. his accession to office was marked by speeches breathing a new spirit of imperial consolidation, embodied either in suggestions for commercial union or in more immediately practicable proposals for improving the "imperial estate"; and at the diamond jubilee of 1897 the visits of the colonial premiers to london emphasized and confirmed the new policy, the fruits of which were afterwards seen in the cordial support given by the colonies in the boer war. even in what mr chamberlain called his "radical days" he had never supported the "manchester" view of the value of a colonial empire; and during the gladstone ministry of 1882-1885 mr bright had remarked that the junior member for birmingham was the only jingo in the cabinet--meaning, no doubt, that he objected to the policy of _laissez-faire_ and the timidity of what was afterwards known as "little englandism." while he was still under mr gladstone's influence these opinions were kept in subordination; but mr chamberlain was always an imperial federationist, and from 1887 onwards he constantly gave expression to his views on the desirability of drawing the different parts of the empire closer together for purposes of defence and commerce. in 1895 the time for the realization of these views had come; and mr chamberlain's speeches, previously remarkable chiefly for debating power and directness of argument, were now dominated by a new note of constructive statesmanship, basing itself on the economic necessities of a world-wide empire. not the least of the anxieties of the colonial office during this period was the situation in the west indies, where the cane-sugar industry was being steadily undermined by the european bounties given to exports of continental beet; and though the government restricted themselves to attempts at removing the bounties by negotiation and to measures for palliating the worst effects in the west indies, mr chamberlain made no secret of his repudiation of the cobden club view that retaliation would be contrary to the doctrines of free trade, and he did his utmost to educate public opinion at home into understanding that the responsibilities of the mother country are not merely to be construed according to the selfish interests of a nation of consumers. as regards foreign affairs, mr chamberlain more than once (and particularly at leicester on 30th november 1899) indicated his leanings towards a closer understanding between the british empire, the united states and germany,--a suggestion which did not save him from an extravagant outburst of german hostility during the boer war. the unusually outspoken and pointed expression, however, of his disinclination to submit to muscovite duplicity or to "pin-pricks" or "unmannerliness" from france was criticized on the score of discretion by a wider circle than that of his political adversaries. during the progress of the boer war from 1899 to 1902, mr chamberlain, as the statesman who had represented the cabinet in the negotiations which led to it, remained the object of constant attacks from his radical opponents--the "little englanders" and "pro-boers," as he called them--and he was supported by the imperialist and unionist party with at least equal ardour. but as colonial secretary, except in so far as his consistent support of lord milner and his enthusiastic encouragement of colonial assistance were concerned, he naturally played only a subordinate part during the carrying out of the military operations. among domestic statesmen he was felt, however, to be the backbone of the party in power. he was the hero of the one side, just as he was the bugbear of the other. on the 13th of february 1902 he was presented with an address in a gold casket by the city corporation, and entertained at luncheon at the mansion house, an honour not unconnected with the strong feeling recently aroused by his firm reply (at birmingham, january 11) to some remarks made by count von bullow, the german chancellor, in the reichstag (january 8), reflecting the offensive allegations current in germany against the conduct of the army in south africa. mr chamberlain's speech, in answer to what had been intended as a contemptuous rebuke, was universally applauded. his own imperialism was intensified by the way in which england's difficulties resulted in calling forth colonial assistance and so cementing the bonds of empire. the domestic crisis, and the sharp cleavage between parties at home, had driven the bent of his mind and policy further and further away from the purely municipal and national ideals which he had followed so keenly before he became colonial minister. the problems of empire engrossed him, and a new enthusiasm for imperial projects arose in the unionist party under his inspiration. no english statesman probably has ever been, at different times in his career, so able an advocate of absolutely contradictory policies, and his opponents were not slow to taunt him with quotations from his earlier speeches. as the war drew to its end, new plans for imperial consolidation were maturing in his brain. subsidiary points of utility, such as the formation of the london and liverpool schools of tropical medicine from 1899 onwards, were taken up by him with characteristic vigour. but the next step was to prove a critical one indeed for the loyalty of the party which had so far been unanimous in his favour. the settlement after the war was full of difficulties, financial and others, in south africa. when mr arthur balfour succeeded lord salisbury as prime minister in july 1902, mr chamberlain agreed to serve loyally under him, and the friendship between the two leaders was indeed one of the most marked features of the political situation. in november 1902 it was arranged that mr chamberlain should go out to south africa, and it was hoped, not without reason, that his personality would effect more good than any ordinary official negotiations. at the time the best results appeared to be secured. he went from place to place in south africa (december 26-february 25); arranged with the leading transvaal financiers that in return for support from the british government in raising a transvaal loan they would guarantee a large proportion of a transvaal debt of l30,000,000, which should repay the british treasury so much of the cost of the war; and when he returned in march 1903, satisfaction was general in the country over the success of his mission. but meantime two things had happened. he had looked at the empire from the colonial point of view, in a way only possible in a colonial atmosphere; and at home some of his colleagues had gone a long way, behind the scenes, to destroy one of the very factors on which the question of a practical scheme for imperial commercial federation seemed to hinge. in the budget of 1902 a duty of a shilling a quarter on imported corn had been reintroduced. this small tax was regarded as only a registration duty. even by free-trade ministers like gladstone it had been left up to 1869 untouched, and its removal by robert lowe (lord sherbrooke) had since then been widely regarded as a piece of economic pedantry. its reimposition, officially supported for the sake of necessary revenue in war-time, and cordially welcomed by the unionist party, had justified itself, as they contended, in spite of the criticisms of the opposition (who raised the cry of the "dear loaf"), by proving during the year to have had no general or direct effect on the price of bread. and the more advanced imperialists, as well as the more old-fashioned protectionists (like mr chaplin) who formed an integral body of the conservative party, had looked forward to this tax being converted into a differential one between foreign and colonial corn, so as to introduce a scheme of colonial preference and commercial consolidation between the colonies and the mother country. in south africa--as in any other british colony, since all of them were accustomed to tariffs of a protectionist nature, and the idea of a preference (already started by canada) was fairly popular--mr chamberlain had found this view well established. the agitation in england against the tax had now blown over. the unionist rank and file were committed to its support,--many even advocating its increase to two shillings at least. but mr ritchie, the chancellor of the exchequer, having a surplus in prospect and taxation to take off, carried the cabinet in favour of again remitting this tax on corn. mr chamberlain himself had proposed only to take it off as regards colonial, and not foreign corn,--thus inaugurating a preferential system. but a majority of the cabinet supported mr ritchie. the remission of this tax, after all the conviction with which its restoration had been supported a year before, was very difficult for the party itself to stomach, and on any ground it was a distasteful act, loyally as the party followed their leaders. but to those who had looked to it as providing a lever for a gradual change in the established fiscal system, the _volte-face_ was a bitter blow, and at once there began, though not at first openly, a split between the more rigid free-traders--advocates of cheap food and free imports--and those who desired to use the opportunities of a tariff, of however moderate a kind, for attaining national and imperial and not merely revenue advantages. this idea, which had for some time been floating in mr chamberlain's mind (see especially his speech at birmingham of may 16, 1902), now took full possession of it. for the moment he remained in the cabinet, but the seed of dissension was sown. the first public intimation of his views was given in a speech to his constituents at birmingham (may 15, 1903), when he outlined a plan for raising more money by a rearranged tariff, partly to obtain a preferential system for the empire and partly to produce funds for social reform at home. on may 28th in the house of commons he spoke on the same subject, and declared "if you are to give a preference to the colonies, you must put a tax on food." considered in the light of after events, this putting the necessity of food-taxes in the forefront was decidedly injudicious; but imperialist conviction and enthusiasm were more conspicuous than electioneering tact in the launching of mr chamberlain's new scheme. the movement grew quickly, its supporters including a number of the cleverest younger politicians and journalists in the unionist party. the idea of tariff reform--to broaden the basis of taxation, to introduce a preference, and to stimulate home industries and increase employment--took firm root; and the political economists of the party--prof. w. cunningham, prof. w. ashley and prof. w.a.s. hewins, in particular--brought effective criticism to bear on the one-sided "free trade" in vogue. the first demand was for inquiry. the country was still bearing an income-tax of elevenpence in the pound; it appeared that the old sources of revenue were inadequate; and meanwhile the statistics of trade, it was argued, showed that the english free-import system hampered english trade while providing the foreigner with a free market. mr chamberlain and his supporters argued that since 1870 certain other countries (germany and the united states), with protective tariffs, had increased their trade in much larger proportion, while english trade had only been maintained by the increased business done with british colonies. a scientific inquiry into the facts was needed. by the opposition, who now found themselves the defenders of conservatism in the established fiscal policy of the country, this whole argument was scouted; but for a time the demand merely for inquiry, and the production of figures, gave no sufficient occasion for dissension among unionists, even when, like sir m. hicks beach, they were convinced free-importers on purely economic grounds; and mr balfour (q.v.), as premier, managed to hold his colleagues and party together by taking the line that particular opinions on economic subjects should not be made a test of party loyalty. the board of trade was set to work to produce fiscal blue-books, and hum-drum politicians who had never shown any genius for figures suddenly blossomed out into arithmeticians of the deepest dye. the tariff reform league was founded in order to further mr chamberlain's policy, holding its inaugural meeting on july 21st; and it began to take an active part in issuing leaflets and in work at by-elections. discussion proceeded hotly on the merits of a preferential tariff, and on august 15th a manifesto appeared against it signed by fourteen professors or lecturers on political economy, including mr leonard courtney, professor edgeworth, professor marshall, professor bastable, professor smart, professor j.s. nicholson, professor conner, mr bowley, mr e. cannan and mr l.r. phelps,--men of admitted competence, yet, after all, of no higher authority than the economists supporting mr chamberlain, such as dr cunningham and professor ashley. meanwhile, the death of lord salisbury (august 22) removed a weighty figure from the councils of the unionist party. the cabinet met several times at the beginning of september, and the question of their attitude towards the fiscal problem became acute. the public had its first intimation of impending events in the appearance on september 16th of mr balfour's _economic notes on insular free trade_, which had been previously circulated as a cabinet memorandum. the next day appeared the board of trade fiscal blue-book. and on the 18th the resignations were announced, not only of the more rigid free-traders in the cabinet, mr ritchie and lord george hamilton, but also of mr chamberlain. letters in cordial terms were published, which had passed between mr chamberlain (september 9) and mr balfour (september 16). mr chamberlain pointed out that he was committed to a preferential scheme involving new duties on food, and could not remain in the government without prejudice while it was excluded from the party programme; remaining loyal to mr balfour and his general objects, he could best promote this course from outside, and he suggested that the government might confine its policy to the "assertion of our freedom in the case of all commercial relations with foreign countries." mr balfour, while reluctantly admitting the necessity of mr chamberlain's taking a freer hand, expressed his agreement in the desirability of a closer fiscal union with the colonies, but questioned the immediate practicability of any scheme; he was willing to adopt fiscal reform so far as it covered retaliatory duties, but thought that the exclusion of taxation of food from the party programme was in existing circumstances necessary, so long as public opinion was not ripe. at the same time he welcomed the fact that mr chamberlain's son, mr austen chamberlain, was ready to remain a member of the government. mr austen chamberlain (b. 1863) accordingly became the new chancellor of the exchequer; he was already in the cabinet as postmaster-general, having previously made his mark as civil lord of the admiralty (1895-1900), and financial secretary to the treasury (1900-1902). from the turning-point of mr chamberlain's resignation, it is not necessary here to follow in detail the discussions and dissensions in the party as a whole in its relations with the prime minister (see