WINE

the production of wine has not under- gone any drastic changes. since the world war, small motor ploughs have appeared in the vineyards, better machinery has been devised for removing the stalks (a valuable part of the crop), fertilisers and germicides have been improved, and the chais and cellars have become more cleanly and orderly under the influence of modern hygiene and factory methods. but the vigneron, while diligently using saccharometers, hydrometers, etc., still trusts primarily in his eye and nose and palate. chem- ists and engineers, however, have not slackened in their attempts to find rapid methods of “‘ ageing ” wines. for example, prof. charles henry, of the sorbonne, claims that he can both “age” young wines and purge them of defects by placing the cask in an electro-static field of 60,000 to 120,000 volts. other inventors have applied themselves to the familiar problem of maturing and clarifying large quantities of sparkling wine in strengthened vats, wherein the juice is first raised in temperature and then chilled for five or six days. as this process is much quicker and cheaper than the traditional method of mellowing the wine in bottles for years, and then shaking down and disgorging the sediment from one bottle at a time, it is said to be a commercial success in the making of vins mousseux for the less fastidious markets; but no champagne house with a reputation to lose has looked with favour upon such mass production. the effects of the war—world politics and economics rather than novelties of viticulture and vinification explain the great changes in the position and prospects of wine. so highly did the french military authorities rate wine as a food and medicine during the war that a full litre became part of every poilu’s daily ration. by 1918 the daily issue of wine to the french armies amounted to 27,000 hectolitres, or about 3,500,000 ofdi- nary wine-bottles. beer-drinkers of picardy and cider-drinkers of normandy were thus turned into amateurs of wine. at the same time, wine consumption increased in great britain, largely because of demands from soldiers who had acquired the taste in france and, as wine imports were severely restricted, the care- fully graded stocks of the wine merchants were eagerly bought and consumed long before they could mature. this keen demand absorbed even the mauvais vins authentiques (genuine wines from famous vineyards, but of poor vintages) which had been hanging 1038 on the bordeaux market for decades. in germany, also, most of the hoarded wines were consumed. hence, throughout west- ern europe, the shrewdly chosen bins by which prescient mer- chants had hoped to maintain the succession of old-bottled wines were scattered, mostly among undiscriminating purchasers. after the war, the financial needs of war-strained states de- manded heavy increases in wine taxes. as such imports are payable in advance, any post-war wine merchant who tried to reconstitute the stately old sequences of wine by accumulating successions of bottlings on the pre-war scale, was faced by the need for a vastly increased cash capital, most of which would have to lie locked up in duty-paid cellars for many years. in most cases this was impracticable, and therefore the public is reconciling itself to wines (especially ports from the wood and french white wines) with little or no bottle-age. changes in consumption.—the lowering of wine standards thus imposed on gastronomy by politics and economics has been intensified by social and ethical revolutions both in the old world and in the new. russia’s aristocratic patronage of fine wines has ceased. american prohibition further discourages superlative viticulture, because the wine imports of the united states (where more than 50,000,000 gal. of californian and other national wines used to be annually produced), were mainly vins de luxe. british consumption, however, has increased. in 1924, great britain and northern ireland consumed 15,334,346 gal. as against only 11,367,549 gal. taken by the whole of the united kingdom in 1913; but even with this increase the annual enjoyment of wine in great britain is at the rate of less than three bottles a head, mostly port. treaty provisions-—the treaty of versailles explicitly en- gaged germany to obey the conventions of washington (1913) and madrid (1891), protecting ‘‘ regional appellations ” of wines. in france, from 1908 onwards, many decrees have delimited famous districts, such as sauternes; but these decrees are inop- erative outside france and one still hears of spanish burgundy, algerian chablis and even rumanian champagne. a notable advance, however, was made by the anglo-portuguese commer- cial treaty acts of 1914 and 1916, whereby true port and ma- deira are guarded by british law against false descriptions. but delimitation has its drawbacks. it gives prestige and market value to the bad as well as the good wines of a delimited area, and thousands of pipes of low-strength, doctored consumo (rough table-wine) are shipped from oporto every year under the protection of the treaty. but diplomacy and commerce are co-operating to rid the sound principle of delimitation of this defect. the warmly discussed action of spain (1924) in requiring iceland either to relax her prohibition of spanish wines or to lose the spanish market for her fish at least had the advantage of emphasising wine’s international importance. british empire wines——as empire wines enjoy a substantial preference in great britain, ‘“ regional appellations ” are of enhanced urgency for the vinedressers of australasia and the cape. the sweet australian dessert wine which is becoming popular with britons cannot be called australian port because of the anglo-portuguese treaty above mentioned; but the commonwealth is still far from “ the complete abandonment of european geographical wine names,” for which the australian, professor wilkinson, and many others have pleaded. the wem- bley exhibition gave a stimulus to empire wines, for which there is a bright future provided they cease to put themselves in suicidal rivalry with the historic wines of france, germany, portugal and spain. after a disaster in 1920, through over-pro- duction, cape wines are prospering under a fostering act passed by general smuts’ government. a sum of £100,000 was devoted to a south african experiment of maturing. australian exports are also increasing at a fairly rapid rate (see australia; france; spain; etc.). (e. j. o.) wingate, sir francis reginald (1861- y, british ad- ministrator (see 28.729). in dec. 1916 he was appointed high commissioner for egypt and relinquished the governorship of the anglo-egyptian-sudan, after a successful administration during 16 years. at the beginning of 1919 sir reginald wingate was wingate—winter sports summoned to london to report on the situation which had arisen in egypt, and he remained there many months at the disposal of the government until his resignation on oct. 1919. he had re. ceived the g.b.e. in jan. 1918, and was created a baronet in june 1920. winnington-ingram, arthur foley (1858- ), angli- can divine, was born in worcestershire jan. 26 1858. educated at marlborough and at keble college, oxford, in 1884 he wag ordained and became a curate at st. mary’s, shrewsbury. ip 1885 he became private chaplain to the bishop of lichfield, and in 1889 head of oxford house, bethnal green, london. in 1895 he was appointed rector of bethnal green and in the follow. ing year rural dean of spitalfields. in 1897 he left bethnal green to become bishop of stepney and canon of st. paul’s cathedral. in 1901 he succeeded dr. mandell creighton as bishop of lon- don, becoming at the same time dean of the chapels royal. dr. winnington-ingram achieved great popularity, not only within the confines of his diocese, by the ready sympathy he displayed to all who appealed to him for help and by the tireless energy with which he championed social causes. among his published works are banners of the christian faith (1899); the church in time of war (1915); the potter and the clay (1917); rays of dawn (1918); victory and after (1919); the spirit of peace (1921); rebuilding the walls (1922). winnipeg, (see 28.731), the capital of the canadian province of manitoba, the third city of the dominion, the great commercial and wholesale distributing centre for the middle west, and the largest grain market in the world, had a population in ro21 of 179,087 (283,852 with suburbs), and an area of about 24 square miles. the importance of the city was enhanced after 1911 by the completion of the grand trunk pacific railway, which be- came later a part of the canadian national railways system. winnipeg is now on three trans-continental lines, and has ex- tensive railway shops, and a fine new union station in addition to the large c. p. r. depet. a large new legislative building has been erected. winnipeg has also increased in importance as a manufacturing centre, and had 1,200 industrial establishments, including very large flour-mills, in 1922. fur auctions are held on a large scale. two extensive hydroelectric systems, both de- riving power from the winnipeg river 100 m. distant, have been installed, one of which is owned and operated by the city. a fine agricultural college with extensive grounds has been erected on the outskirts of the city. st. boniface, on the opposite bank of the red river to winnipeg, is a separate municipality, with a population in 1921 of 12,816, largely french and roman cath- olic. st. boniface is the roman catholic headquarters of the western provinces, and contains a cathedral, a convent and hos- pital, an archiepiscopal palace and st. boniface’s college, in addition to large flour-mills and stockyards. winter, john strange (1856-1911), british writer (see 28.734), died in london dec. 13 1911. winter sports.—since 1910 the development of winter sports has been more marked than during any previous period. until 1913 winter sports in the alps were a pastime of the leisured classes chiefly, but after 1919 increasingly large numbers of persons from all grades of society went to switzerland for periods varying from one week to the whole season, and this develop- ment in no way resulted in decreased interest of the leisured classes. norway and sweden, also, became increasingly popular on account of good travel services and the first-class sporting facilities afforded. sports in swiizerland.—in switzerland, the post-war develop- ment was due in a large measure to the electrification of the swiss railway system; in 1912 a committee of experts examined the question of electrification as a means of coal economy, and in 1913 electrically propelled trains were introduced on the engadine express route from coire onwards. during the years 1914-8 the work was necessarily suspended, but in 1019 the engineers of the swiss federal and rhaetian railways resume operations, and at an approximate cost of 18,800,000 fr. the whole system was electrified. this opened up a good many small resorts which had been previously inaccessible. in 1910 wireless telegraphy and telephony there were approximately 45 resorts to which people went for organised winter sports, but in 1924 the number had been in- creased to 89, with an approximate increase of 150% in the number of passengers travelling from great britain to swiss resorts direct. with the development in the number of resorts, the various snow sports became very highly specialised. ski-running, skat- ing, curling, bobsleigh riding and skeleton running were all developed. ski-running, skating, ice hockey and ski-jumping are included in the programme of the olympic games—though of necessity held at a time and place distinct from games not dependent on snow conditions. the alpine games at the eighth olympiad were held at chamonix in feb. 1924, and it was arranged that those of the ninth olympiad should be held at st. moritz, when skeleton running was to be included in the programme. women began to take part in all winter sports organised at the swiss resorts, but comparatively few women ride the cresta run. skeleton running is generally considered a sport more suited to the physique of a man. on the cresta run, the total number of riders of both sexes in one season rarely exceeds 30. on the other hand, bobsleighing has become very popular; at most swiss resorts there is a specially constructed run, the one at st. moritz and the schatzalp run at davos being among the better known. in bobsleighing, the wentre a terre position was revived and is now almost universal. the develop- ments in ski-running are largely due to the test system insti- tuted by the ski clubs of great britain, and the standard of running has greatly improved in consequence. ski-jumping among english people is still practically confined to experts, but the performances of the swiss and scandinavians at this pastime are gradually inspiring the people of other races to participate; many english people go annually to oslo, norway, to witness the holmenkollen ski-jumping championships, which, indeed, provide a thrilling and wonderful spectacle. the united states —snow and ice sports are popular in the united states. the natural resources of the adirondack moun- tains, allied to the enterprise of the american sportsman, have provided winter sports which challenge comparison with those of switzerland. at lake placid, one of the largest american resorts, the season opens early in dec., and about 1,000 people can be accommodated. the inter-vale ski jump, which is the principal sporting contest, takes place on the anniversary of washington’s birthday, feb. 22. ski-ing is the favourite winter sport, although skating is popular, and skaters are very well provided for. there are special rinks for curling, figure skating and ice hockey. bobsleighing, ski-dering and tobogganing—on the flat american type of toboggan—are all sports subsidiary to ski-ing at lake placid, which is becoming one of the most popular resorts for families during the christmas holidays. in new england several resorts are available, such as picketts, new hampshire and toy town, winchendon, massachusetts. within 30 m. of new york city there are various smaller places, such as briarcliff lodge, catering for week-end visitors; an annual ski-jumping contest takes place here on washington’s birthday. in the winter of 1924 snow had to be imported from upper new york state to make this contest possible. in the west, skating is perhaps more popular than in new york state. chicago, for instance, has skating contests which attract a large number of contestants and visitors. (vi. necs canada.—in canada climatic conditions are more favourable to snow and ice sports than those existing in the united states. the season is longer, the temperature much lower and steadier and particularly in ontario and the maritime provinces, the snowfall is greater. snow-shocing, tobogganing and skating have been popular winter sports for years, and in manitoba and eastern canada can be enjoyed usually without a break from nov. to march. ice hockey enjoys a great vogue with the younger element, and contests between the leading clubs attract enormous crowds. ski-running and jumping is of com- paratively recent introduction, but is becoming increasingly popular. curling is extensively played, interest in it being periodically stimulated by the visits of representatives of t1039 prominent scottish curling clubs. the centre of winter sport is montreal with its magnificent physical surroundings, the slopes of mt. royal affording every opportunity of indulging in snow- shocing, tobogganing and ski-ing under ideal conditions. the annual winter carnival at montreal offers a unique spectacle, though that held at quebec is a close compctitor in point of attendance. the annual curling bonspicls held at montreal, toronto, winnipeg and other centres attract competing teams from all parts of canada and contiguous territory of the united states. wireless telegraphy and telephony .—this article is arranged with three main divisions, since the three periods—(1) from rgio to 1914, (2) the war period and (3) the post-war pe- riod—each have special features. i. period 1910-aug, 1914 1. wireless shipping report.—the first wireless shipping re- port was published by lloyd’s in tg10, the importance of wireless to the mercantile marine having become well recognised by this date, and shore stations for communicating with shipping were becoming general in all parts of the world. the ship transmitters of r910 included induction coil and small gencrator sets from 150 watt to two kw. plain spark, rotary spark and quench gap sets, direct or inductively coupled to the aerial and tuned to 300 metres or 600 metres. the receiver comprised an adjustable tuned circuit and a mag- netic detector, crystal detector, or a barretter, with, in many cases, an additional circuit or circuits designed specially to mini- mise interference, particularly from atmospherics. 2. post office stations.—by the autumn of the same year the transfer to the british post office of all the wireless coast stations in the united kingdom established by the marconi company for shipping communication and others belonging to lloyd’s had been completed, their technical equipment being as set out in the following table:— ‘ nominal station power of transmitter station caister. ; 13 kw. | rotary converter and plain spark. north foreland 3. ikw. | motor generator and plain spark. niton . : 4 kw. | coil and plain spark. lizard. : z kw. | coil and plain spark. seaforth . 3 kw motor generator and plain spark. bolt head 3 kw motor generator and plain spark. rosslare . iw coil and plain spark. tobermory 1; kw rotary converter and plain spark. lochboisdale . 12 kw rotary converter and plain spark. crookhaven malin ileact hunstanton skegness . 4 n. ronaldshay 50 watts sanday 50 watts motor generator and rotary spark. coil and plain spark. motor generator and plain spark. motor generator and plain spark. coil and plain spark. coil and plain spark. catlett te mel it eo — & a 3. naval and other stations.—at this date also there were na- val stations equipped with 100 kw., 250 cycle rotary spark trans- mitters at hornsea, cleethorpes and gibraltar; and when in the following year the 14 kw. stations at aberdeen, ipswich, pem- broke and finally whitehall were completed, the power to control the movements of warships in distant or foreign waters direct from the admiralty became possible. in 1913 with 30 shore stations and 435 ships fitted with wire- less this direct control was an accomplished fact. the hornsea roo kw. arc commenced working in 1912, and in 1913 the two-kw. arc transmitter became standard for naval use on board ship. in 1912 there were 250 stations in different parts of the world engaged solely in ship-to-shore traffic, and nine high power sta- tions were also available for this work. 4. thermionic valves and valve circuits.—at this period the use of the fleming thermionic two-electrode valve as a detector was steadily growing, but the possibilities of the modifications introduced by lee de forest, consisting of the three-electrode valve patented in 1906, and its amplifying circuit in 1907, were 1040 not fully realised for several years. the 1907 circuit is shown in fig. 1. <a filament made incandescent by the battery br is in- dicated at f, a metal plate maintained at a positive potential by the battery b2 is shown at p, and an electron current flows from. fto.p. , between them is interposed a metallic grid g, to which is ap- plied the high-frequency potential of the signal tuned in by the circuit lc. when the grid is made more positive by the signal the electron current tlowing through its meshes is increased, and when it is made more negative the current flow is reduced, so that the potential changes due to the signal are thus able to cause variation in the current drawn from the plate circuit battery, and in this way the signal is amplified. in 1913 c. s. franklin coupled the plate circuit to the tuned grid circuit of the valve with the object of reducing the decrement in the grid circuit by feeding energy into it from the plate circuit battery, which operation is called ‘* retroaction ” or “ regenera- tion,’ and the same year a. meissner, using a licben-reiss three-clectrode valve with a lime-coated platinum filament, car- ried this operation one step further by employing a coupling of such a value that the energy fed back into the grid circuit com- pensated for all the circuit losses, so that oscillations once started tended to continue until one or other of the battery circuits was broken, and he thus produced the first valve oscillation genera- tor. in the meissner circuit (fig. 2) the oscillation frequency was controlled by the constants of the circuit lpilgic, but it can be understood that the arrangement may be simplified if neces- sary by leaving out that circuit altogether and coupling lg direct to lp, the oscillation frequency desired then being obtained by connecting a condenser of the necessary capacity across one of these coils. a) = = dy) ee s. te fit = cu fic, 1.—the lee de forest amplifying circuit. fic. 2.—the meissner valve oscillator circuit. s. direction finding. —the practical application of the bellini- tosi system of wireless direction finding—partly based on re- searches carried out by a. artom—now commenced to receive attention. most systems of direction finding are based on the wireless telegraphy and telephony principle that for maximum signal) intensity the plane of the receiving antenna, or pick-up circuit employed, must lic in the direction of the propagation of electromagnetic waves. bellini-tosi in 1907 used two triangular aerials erected in verti- cal planes at right angles and on the same axis, and with free ends at each apex. in the base of each aerial fixed field coils were in- troduced, also mounted at right angles, and on the same axis as a search coil. the direction of the resultant field of the signal currents in the two field coils was found by rotating the search coil—to which was attached a pointer moving over a scale—until strongest signals were obtained, when the scale deflection which actually indicated the angle between the axis of the fixed and moving coils also gave the angular direction of the signals relative to the two aerials. the open top antennae confined the utility of the d.f. equipment to short wave lengths and com- plicated the tuning. the system was adopted and modified by the marconi com- pany in 1912 for ship use, when the antennae were altered to closed loops, each of which was tuned at the base by an adjustable condenser. 6. wireless telephony—the employment of the poulson arc generator from 1906 onwards gave an impetus to the develop- ment of wireless telephony, and an appreciable advance was made by the invention by majorana in 1908 of a heavy current liquid microphone which enabled speech to be transmitted from rome to sicily, a distance of 300 miles. in 1909 the colin-jeance arc apparatus was in use from toulon to a french cruiser 100 m. away; in 19to successful tests were carried out in the united states over a distance of 490 m., and in 1912 the vanni liquid microphone used with an arc transmitter enabled speech to be carried on from rome to tripoli—6oo miles. development along new and more practical lines followed the invention by meissner in 1913 of the valve oscillator and its use as a carrier wave generator for communicating between berlin and nauen, and the necessity for a heavy current microphone also disappeared with the arrival of the valve amplifier. in ro14 marconi carried out a number of tests with valve transmitters and receivers on italian war vessels up to a range of 45 miles. the outbreak of war brought european long range telephone tests to a temporary standstill, but the american tests were con- tinued, and in oct. r915, by employing 300 valves in the oscilla- tor and modulator circuits, speech communication was effected when transmission conditions were favourable from arlington to eiffel tower, paris, a distance by great circle of 3,080 m.; also during the same serics of tests long distance telephony from new york to arlington by land line and arlington to hawaii by wireless was achieved, the total distance being over 5,000 miles. 7. wave propagation theories—to explain the propagation of electromagnetic waves such as are used in wireless telegraphy to great distances round the earth, oliver heaviside in 1901— reviving a theory first advanced by g. f. fitzgerald in 1893— discussed the possibility of the existence in the upper atmosphere of a conducting and reflecting shell of ionised gas, and the name “ heaviside layer’’ has since been given to this hypothetical region. electromagnetic waves are guided by the surface of a conduc- tor, and many attempts were made from 1909 onwards by poin- care, nicholson, macdonald and love, taking the ideal case of a perfectly conducting carth, to show that diffraction accounted for the intensity of the signals received at a distance. but the calculated results always came out very much too low. the influence of night effect, first noticed by marconi in 1902 when, on the s. s. “ philadelphia,” he found a daylight range of goo m. extended to 1,500 and 2,000 m. at night, was further dem- onstrated by him in 1911 by charts showing the daily variations of signals received at clifden from glace bay over a period of 12 months, an average example being given in fig. 3. w. hi. eccles in 1912 advanced the theory that the presence of free ions of atomic dimensions at some considerable distance above the earth’s surface would have the effect of increasing the velocity of those electromagnetic rays in the wave which passed through the region occupied by these ions, with the result that the top of the wireless telegraphy. and telephony 1041 43 2 might over whole atlantic w 2 > _ scale of is . sg during which signals are 3 = sa signal strength 9 w very variable in strength. 4 3% a) daytime over a cio ee fromvery weak to qs s me 7 ~ 3/3 very strong. oc} gy whole atlantic al? ngs storms have adecided f a als effect and moonlight may : very .__ have an influence. strong p> 7777 treen neer rtcleete ngs pn ee es eee ee t ' \ t gtigig) oe sen ote jn nenensenennnnenenns ' . ' medium| 7000 metres strong sls ve ate aera acs " medium|-- -- ~----------------- ~~} ------------- 2-22 -- weak ae ee ‘ — ee oe ee oe oe ow ae zero ae me noont 23 45678 8 0h l241 2 3 4 fic. 3.—2q4 hours’ strength of signals’ chart. wave front would be given a lean forward, and this would cause the direction of propagation to bend down again towards the earth. as an example, about 16,000 gascous ions per cubic centimetre would be required for a wave length of 6,000 metres. it was suggested that this ionised region disappeared during the night, leaving the more clearly defined heaviside layer above, to act as a reflecting surfacc. asa result of tests carried out from rg10 to 1913 by the united states navy, transmitting from brant rock to cruisers out in the atlantic up to a distance of 1,000 m., the well known austin-cohen empirical formula for daylight range was deduced, namely:— hyhe a ls pee eo vd transmitting and receiving antenna currents respectively. h; and he= transmitting and receiving antenna heights in km. respectively. a= wave jength in km. d= distance between stations in km. a= dissipation constant = o-oo15 in daylight over sea. 8. imperial wireless (1.).—proposals for long distance trans- mission between outlying parts of the british empire had meanwhile been taking definite shape. the first scheme for imperial wircless communications was submitted by the marconi company to the british colonial office in 1906, and the experience gained in running a trans- atlantic service between clifden, ircland, and glace bay, canada, which was opened to the general public in feb. 1908, led this company to ask for powers in 1910 to erect within three years, and subsequently maintain and operate entirely at iis own expense, a chain of 19 stations throughout the british empire. the practicability of the proposal received additional support from the results of the tests made by marconi in sept. of that year, when, on a voyage from italy to the argentine in the 8.8.“ principessa mafalda,” he was able to receive messages from clifden by day and night up to a range of 4,000 statute m., and night signals up to 6,000 m.; and also by the successful tests carried out towards the close of the same year by the italian govt., partly over sea and partly over large stretches of desert between coltano and massauna (italian eritrea), a distance of 2,400 miles. where j, and i, in 1911 the question was discussed at the imperial conference and in 1912 the marconi company entered into a contract to erect six stations in england, egypt, east africa, south africa, india and singapore for the british and dominion governments, the chain to be completed by the marconi company’s own stations which would be crected in australia and canada. germany, america and france followed the lead of what was being done in england and italy, each devising and commencing the constructions of its own national network for world-wide radio communication. as regards the british scheme various delays ensued. <a government committee under lord parker was appointed “ to consider and report on the merits of the existing systems of jong- clistance wireless telegraphy and in particular as to their capacity for continuous communication for the distances required by the impcrial chain.” poulson arcs were said to be working over long distances in america. r. goldschmidt in germany had produced in 1908 a high frequency alternator which was in effect a rotary frequency multiplier, depending largely on the principle of resonance; and e. f. w. alexanderson in 1909 had made a practical success in the united states in the direct generation of electric waves by means of a high frequency alternator of the inductor type, employing a high rotor speed, anextremcly small gap and the maxi- mum possible number of coil elements on the stationary arma- ture, the current generated being suitable for energising an acrial tuned to the same frequency. the report of the commiltee was issued on april 30 1913. it stated: * the marconi system is at present the only system of which it can be said with any certainty that it is capable of ful- filling the requirements of the imperial chain ”; and, although this remark applicd to tuned spark or damped wave trans- mission, the committee also reported that “ the only continuous high frequency generator we have yet seen tried with success over long distances is the marconi continuous high frequency machine to which we have already referred.” this machine produced continuous waves by the “ timed spark ” method, introduced by marconi in 1912, and was the first successful commercial attempt at the production of continuous wave impulses of high power in the aerial. the result was obtained by the successive superimposing, correct in phase, of a number of trains of waves of identical amplitude and damping, which produced the effect of continuous 1042 wave oscillations of a constant amplitude; and this system, having an available power of 300 kw. is still used commercially at stavanger, norway, for communication with the united states, and was the one employed during the first transmission of wireless messages from england to australia in 1918. the outbreak of the war stopped all further work on the con- tract in december ro14. ii. wireless during the war 9. field army wireless —at the outbreak of the war the british military equipment had its spark transmitter and crystal detector and pack and wagon sets suitable for army purposes; but from oct. 1914 wireless had to make fresh begin- nings in order to adapt itself to the special conditions of trench warfare, which called for efficient short distance services and extremely portable and unobtrusive apparatus. the company or battalion headquarters signalled brigades by power buzzer employing earth currents; brigades signalled divisional head- quarters by 50 watt spark set; divisional headquarters signalled corps directing stations by 120 watt spark set, and corps direct- ing stations signalled corps headquarters by 14 kw. light motor set. later on the french army developed with much success a small frame acrial set with valve receiver for use in dugouts. 10. direction finding ut.).—british army d.f. stations were erected at abbeville and blendccques, and several british navy d.f. stations along the east coast of england. under the charge of captain i. j. round, they were used as position finders of german transmitters on board ship, behind the lines and in the air, the position of land and sea stations being ascertained by simultaneous measurements of the angles to the objective iransmitter from the base lines of known length between two or more d.f. stations, which allowed the position of enemy stations to be found by triangulation. the bellini-tosi tuned aerial system proved suitable for locat- ing spark stations of fixed wave-lengths, but c.w. arc stations required constant and rapid searching not only for direction but also for wave-length, and an aperiodic acrial sysiem, consisting of two closed loops of wire in vertical planes and at right angles connected to suitable field coils in the radiogoniometer, was intro- duced for this purpose, the only tuning necessary being in the circuit of the search coil, thereby cnabling the d.f. stations to give very satisfactory results during daylight. the removal of wave-length limitations enforced by the tuned aerial system was an important improvement, and the introduction at the same time of an efficient and robust valve and multi-stage ampli- fier in a metal screening box very greatly increased both the range and utility of the apparatus. the movement of a well-known german wireless control vessel a few miles to the northward on may 30 1916, detected by d.f., led the admiralty to the correct deduction that the german fleet had left wilhelmshaven for a position in the jade river ready to put to sea. this decided admiral jackson, then first sea lord, to send the grand fleet out to mect it, and the battle of jutland the following day was the result. the traffic handled during the war by the admiralty d.f. stations and the marconi stations controlled by the admiralty amounted to some 80,000,cceo words infercepted and some 8,000,000 words transmitted. 11. naval and other stations (77.) —within to months of war being declared all german colonial wireless stations had cither been destroyed or taken over, and by the end of 1915 the admi- ralty had 14 additional strategic stations, 11 of 30 kw., 2 of 100 kw. and one of 150 kw. rotary spark type working in diffcrent parts of the world. by the year 1917 arc transmitters were in general use in the navy, and valve transmitters in the following year. wireless was of the greatest value in keeping submarincs in touch with their parent ships, and the routine of rising to the sur- face, erecting mast and acrial, sending code signals, and lowering mast and acrial and then submerging was reduced to a minimum. a notable achicvement was the picking up of signals on a frame aerial by a submarine while submerged in the baltic. wireless telegraphy and telephony 12. royal air force.—the royal air force, working in con- junction with the royal artillery, found wireless invaluable for gun-spotting. thus in a sample month for 1,562 shots fired the calls received from flash-spotting machines were 74,201, while the percentage received to those missed from all causes was 86°; and this m spite of intense activity in the ether, and with as many machines crowded in on the front as possible, undue mutual interference being avoided by a careful selection of wave- lengths and by note tuning. just before the armistice there were 600 aeroplanes transmitting one-way from machine to ground by means of spark apparatus, working in conjunction with some 1,000 ground stations, but two-way transmission was employed to assist the work of the long range guns, which neces- sitated flights to a distance of 15 m., so that communication might be maintained with aeroplanes when over the targets. the transmitting range from machine to ground. increased to 100 m. jate in 1917, when c.w. valve transmitters were employed by night bombing squadrons. 13. slircraft wireless telephony (ii.).—aircraft wireless tele- phony was developed during the war by the royal air force at brooklands. the first satisfactory aircraft valve transmitter, which required a special form of microphone suitable for respond- ing to speech close to the mouthpicce but insensitive to machine noises, was in use for transmission from aeroplane to ground in 1915, and in 1916 two-way working was obtained by the use of a three-valve receiver in the aeroplane, and an cfhicient screening system which stopped interference in the receiver from engine ignition impulses. in 1917 inter-machine wireless was in use for formation con- trol, and at the time of the armistice the equipping of all squad- rons with the new apparatus was well in hand. the working ranges were 20 m. from. machine to ground and three m. from machine to machine. the aeroplane acrial was a single wire with a metal bob at the end which was run out from a winch so that it trailed below the machine, and the fuselage was employed as a counterpoise. 14. the armistice -—tvhe historic message sent out from the kiffel tower at 5 a.m. on nov. 11 1918:— “marshal foch to the allied commanders: hostilitics will cease at 11 a.m.’’—was delivered to more than half the troops by wireless. ill. wireless since the war 15. direction finding (11i.).—it had been noticed that posi- tion finding at night often proved to be unreliable, particularly at about sunset, and the results obtained by searching with suitable frame aerials led t. l. eckersley in 1918 to express the view that the error was due to rays reaching the earth from the upper atmosphere. a vertical aerial picks up signals from all directions. a rec- {angular or frame acrial gives strongest signals when its plane lies in the line of propagation of signals, but it does not indicate the bearing of the direction; and the scarch coil of a bellini-tosi d.f. in the same way shows direction but not bearing. by combining a vertical aerial with a bellini-tosi system both direction and bearing can be found, the polar diagram of recep- tion having a heart-shape, with one position only for the search coil at which signals vanish, and this is 180° from the true direc- tion of the transmitting station. however much the heart-shape may be distorted by the vertical rays of night effect, it is found that the position where signals vanish remains unchanged, so that it can be used as a reliable indication of bearing. _ the heart-shape arrangement came into use after the war, and is now employed on all ships fitted with marconi apparatus, and also at the receiving stations of the marconi transatlantic and continental wireless services at brentwood. 16. aircraft wireless telephony (11t.)—with the advent of commercial tlying the power and range of the wireless telephone cquipment of r.a.f. type was increased, and in this improved form was given its first air test early in 1919. the first commercial machine to be fitted was the handley- page gealx which made the journey from cricklewood to wireless telegraphy and telephony paris on march 4 1920, when part of the route was foggy, and the information received by wireless that there was clear weather ahead proved of value. during 1920 and 1921 every british machine regularly flying on the london-paris route was equipped with marconi too watt air-driven generator, five-valve receiver wireless telephone sets; and the landing at croydon, the london air terminal port—which gives aeroplanes their bearings en route —is entircly controlled by wireless telephony. the latest apparatus adopted as standard for commercial air- ways includes r50-watt air-driven double current generator, one oscillator and two modulator valves and five receiver valves, and works normally on goo metres. 17. wireless and long distance flights-——the use of wireless for long distance flying was illustrated by the transatlantic voyage of the airship “r34” in 1919 from east fortune, 20 m. from edinburgh, to mineola, long island, n.y., taking four days 12 h. 15 min., and mineolato pulham, norfolk, three days, onc h. 56 min., during which she was in touch by spark and c.w. telegraphy with clifden and glace bay and many ship stations for the whole period of her cruise. the transatlantic flight of commandant franco from spain to south america on the dor- nier scaplane “ ne plus ultra,” in jan. 1926 is another instance. this was an all-metal machine fitted with a bellini-tosi d.f. equipment, by which it obtained its bearings to las palmas at a distance of 7oo km., and navigated with accuracy through mist and cloud solely by this means. at the end of the ocean flight of 1,440 m. the plane, relying on d.f., made the small island of fernando noronha with great accuracy. during the amundsen- ellsworth polar flight in may 1926 the airship ‘‘ norge ” was in communication with europe by wireless when over the pole, and by the same means obtained its bearings and received meteorological reports from stations round the polar basin. 18. thermionic valve development—thermionic valves de- pend for their operation on (a) a free supply of electrons, (6) an electron current through the valve drawn from this supply. the first requirement is met by means of an incandescent filament, from the surface of which under suitable conditions the clectrons evaporate; or the filament may be used simply as a heater of an alkaline earth material which emits a very plentiful supply of electrons when red hot. the second requirement is met by removing practically all gas atoms from the valve and by imposing a positive potential on the plate or anode, when, on completing the electric circuit exter- nally from the plate to the incandescent filament which is made the cathode, an electron current flows through the valve. the filament was first made of carbon, then platinum; later the platinum was coated with lime and barium oxide; tungsten superseded platinum; and now thoriated tungsten is employed by one manufacturer, and lime-coated platinum alloy by another for the filaments of an important group of valves known as dull emitters. the dull emitter allows emission to take place when the filament is only dull red, and therefore calls for only a small current and iess filament battery volts than 1s necessary for a bright filament. the recognition that stable opcration over a wide range of working conditions could only be obtained by removing every particle of gas possible from the valve—as demostrated by the research work of irving langmuir in 1915, employing tungsten filaments—brought about improvements in the methods used for obtaining a high vacuum, and the successful maintenance of a high vacuum under load conditions made possible all the later advances in thermionic valve enginecring. a valve containing an appreciable quantity of gas is said to be “‘ soit.”” as an example, the licben-reiss valve contains mer- cury vapour at a barometric pressure of o-or mm. a “hard ”’ valve should have a lower gas pressure than 0.0001 mm. the sprengel and toepler types of mercury pump originally employed, although efficient and suitable for exhausting to 0-00001 mm., are too slow in operation and require too much attention for commercial use, and it is now the general practice to use a combination consisting of a rough pump and a fine pump. thus a geryk piston pump may be employed to reduce the 1043 air pressure to o-25 mm. and a gaede piston pump to reduce this further to o:o0005 mm. or, the rough pump may reduce the air pressure to romm., and a gaede rotary mercury pump, or gaede oil pump, may carry on the exhaustion to 0-co0007 mm. with an additional gaede oil pump in series the pressure can be lowered to o-co0007 millimetres of mercury. the gaede molecular pump—which works on the principle that in a partial vacuum gas friction on a moving surface will cause the molecules of gas to travel with the surface—allows a fine pressure of 0-0000003 mm. to be obtained if the rough pump first reduces the pressure to o-o5 mm.; and finally, if a gaede oil pump is used as a rough pump to reduce the pressure to 0-007 mm., a langmuir condensation pump can then carry on the ex- haustion to any desired extent, a typical value measured by an ionisation gauge being 0-co0000007 mm., or 10“ bar. the gas atoms absorbed or occluded by the various parts of the valve—the lead glass or lime glass employed, the metal of the grid and of the plate—must all be removed if the vacuum is to be retained under working conditions. for this reason the valve and fittings are heated during exhaustion, and by the application of a high potential to the plate and grid these parts are also bombarded by high speed electrons drawn over from the incandescent filament, the gases expelled in this way being water vapour, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and hydrogen. the last remnants of gas in certain cases are also removed by chemical absorbents such as calcium, magnesium or red phos- phorus, which impart a blackened or silvered or a yellow appearance to the glass bulb. platinum, copper, aluminium and nickel have been used at various stages of receiving valve development as the metals for the grid and the plate; and for transmitting valves which in cer- tain cases work with the plate red hot it has been found best to make these parts of nickel or molybdenum. the grid may be of an open or close mesh of wire, or a wire wound spirally or zigzagged. if a resistance is connected in the plate circuit of a three-elec- trode valve, a change in voltage applied to the grid results in a certain change in voltage across this resistance, and the ratio of these two values is called the voltage magnification of the valve circuit. ‘this value increases with the plate circuit resistance, but when the resistance is sufficiently large tends to becomes constant, and it is then called the magnification constant or m value of that particular design of valve. thereceiving valves in use to-day have m values from 23 to 20, and transmitting valves from 8 to 200; in each case higher m values are obtainable, but they are not called for. filament filernent fig $. fic. 4.—"“r” receiving valve. fic. 5.—‘“ v 24" receiving valve. the marconi r (bright filament), (fig. 4,) which can be used as a rectifying or an amplifying valve, has plug-in contacts, is suitable for anode voltages of 30 to 100 and has an m value of o. it resembles in appearance the french valve used during the war. except that its filament is a dull emitter, the marconi d.e.r. valve has the same form and characteristics as the r. 1044 the marconi v24 (bright filament) (fig. 5) is a compact and robust type of amplifying valve which is held in position by four spring contacts. it is suitable for anode voltages of 20 to 60, and has an m value of 6. this was one of the brit- ish valves used during the war. the marconi d.e.v. has the same form and characteristics but is a dull emitter. the marconi mt 9 valve (fig.6) is suitable for working on a four kw. transmitter with anode voltage up to 12,000. it is able to dissipate up to t-s kw. at the anode, and has an m value of go. the power valve inten- sifies the problems con- nected with sealing me- tallicconnectionsthrough glass, the difference in expansion of the materi- als employed, glass clec- trolysis and current leak- age. quartz, which is able to stand high temper- atures without fractures, has been used to a con- siderable extent instead of glass for the bulbs. the quartz valve is more difficult to make and its cost is high, and the necessity for it disappeared with the invention of the water-cooled valve this valve (fig. 7) represents an important new departure in manufacture, as the wall is half of glass and half of metal. the metal part is the anode, and is fitted into a container through which a stream of water flows, taking away with it the heat gencrated at the anode. | in one method the anode in- sulation is maintained by using distilled water—which is a non- conductor—led through a length of rubber hose 1o and from the valve container; and in another method by employing a spray to break the water circulation into filament fic, 6.—" mt 9” transmitting valve. »<ffilament grid ne faz \ " anc out of the valve container, the == | p water insulation of the spray being such | outlet that with 10,000 voltson the anode h ae the current through this channel se e to earth has the order of a few milliamps only. water-cooled valves of 10 kw. and 20 kw. capacity are the sizes in general use, although valves to =: 3 fee 57s | metal water | ya take up to 100 kw. are also made. (niet the actual loss in a rokw. valve ra is of the order of 15 to 20%. renee aia ees j where maximum insulation, min- fic. 7. -— marconi bhat imum plate to grid capacity and minimum loss are of first impor- tance, as in short wave work, the transmitting valve may be cooled by an oil circulating instead of a water circulating system. 19. post office stations (iit.).—in 1926 there were in great britain and ireland twelve nost office stations engaged in ship and shore service. these are wick, cullercoats, grimsby, north cooled transmitter valve, wireless telegraphy and telephony foreland, niton, land’s end, fishguard, seaforth, port patrick, valentia and malin head being spark stations of from 13 kw. to 10 kw. power, keeping watch on 600 metres; while the rath, devizes, with its recelving station at burnham, somerset, is fitted for long range working to ships installed with contin- uous wave sects. in the year 1925 distress calls from 84 ships were reccived and dealt with, and the total shore station traffic for 1925 amounted to over 4,000,000 words. post office stalions engaged in point-to-point traffic are stone- haven, leafield, near oxford, caister in norfolk, northolt and rugby, the control and operating being done at the central telegraph office, london. 20. commercial point-to-point stations —commercial point- to-point high speed duplex radio telegraphic services working at go to 150 words per min. were opened by the marconi company in 1922 to 1923 between their centralised operating station at radio iyouse, london, valve transmitting stations at ongar and carnarvon, receiving station at brentwood, and the correspond- ing continental stations at paris, berne, madrid, vienna, bar- celona, belgrade and moscow on wave-lengths ranging from 2,950 metres to 5,045 metres; the same english stations also working across the atlantic to glace bay, new brunswick, marion, tuck- erton, rocky point and coram hill on wave-lengths from 5,000 metres to 14,000 metres, and receiving on wave-lengths from 7,700 metres to 17,500 metres. a valve telegraph transmitter of 1926 design is shown in plate fig. 4. directional reception is employed at brentwood, and the tuned-in signals then pass through a high frequency filter of several stages, being afterwards heterodyned as described below to pro- duce a frequency of about 2,500 cycles; they are next rectified and passed through a low frequency filter to a valve bridge cir- cuit, then on by land-line to radio house. the operating speed of the marconi wheatstone automatic transmitter is adjusted to traffic requirements, and may be any- thing up to 150 words per minute. the recording apparatus in- cludes (1) a high speed creed receiver, which makes perforations on a tape identical with those on the tape of the wheatstone transmitter, and a creed printer which converts the perforations into printed characters on another tape; and (2) a marconi undu- lator or trailing syphon recorder, capable of working up to 200 words per min., which is employed in place of the creed apparatus when atmospheric conditions cause printed messages to be muti- lated. the total traffic of the marconi services for 1925 exceeded 20,000,000 words. ar. ‘ heterodyning ” continuous wave (c.1w.) oscillations. — to detect continuous wave signals the current is “ heterodyned,”’ that is, another current is superposed on either the transmit ter— or, more usually, the receiver circuit—of almost identical fre- quency, so that by suitably adjusting the difference of the two frequencies a “ beat ” note having a pitch within the audible range is produced. thus if the signaf current has a frequency of 10° cycles (3,000 metres), to give it an audible frequency of c”-s12 the heterodyning current must have a frequency of 10° plus or minus 512= 2,985 metres or 3,015 metres, being a differ- ence of o:5°% or 15 metres plus or minus in wave-length. but if the signal current has a frequency of 107 cycles (30 metres), then the heterodyning frequency to give the same audible note of c”-512 would differ from it by only 0-005 %;, corresponding to wave-length difference of only plus or minus o-oo1s metres. for a note of two octaves higher, namely 2,048, and a signal current frequency of 107, the wave-length difference would still only be 0-000 metres. such adjustments on short waves would be too critical, and the practice is to use two stages, the first giving a beat note having a frequency well above the audible limit and the second a beat note within the audible limit. 22. warve-lengih allocation and the number of channels possible for radio communications.—the ether is becoming con- gested with radio traflic over a considerable range of wave-lengths, and it becomes necessary to consider the number of possible channels obtainable by the use of different wave-lengths. wireless telegraphy and telephony those in use at the present time are:— i'requency wave- length, ace metres kilocy cles service 5 to es 000 to ee. obe te | beam “] ighthouse”’ 7 peat : re ea 333 to 4) short wave military stations 13 to 23,07 beam stations including transoceanic 100 3, 000 stations on this system ee =, seo trawlers, aircraft and other small ee 12900 mobile sets 220 1,364 240 to i,250 ‘ - ‘ a 154 lighthouses and lightships 300 to 1,000 ns one 350 857-1 british broadcasting 300 1,000 450 666-7 a a cas : fae 500-0 ships with spark scts 700 428-6 800 375-0 850 to 352°9 lone sllrcralt 950 3158 1,000 300-0 beacon stations 1,000 300-0 military fixed stations, aircraft and 1,550 193°5 broadcasting 190 1,600 187-5 high power british broadcasting 2,100 142-9 : 2'650 113-2 ships using c. w. sets . 2,650 113-2 medium power transcontinental 8,000 37°5 stations 8,000 37°5 high power transoceanic wireless upwards stations the allocation of wave-ilengths may be made on the basis of a definite percentage difference between them, or what now prom- ises to become the accepted method, on separations of a definite numbers of cycles. this will give many more short-wave chan- nels than long ones. for instance, if steps of 5,000 cycles are chosen, then 5 metres difference in 100 metres or 3 x108 cycles, would give 30 channels; whereas 5 metres difference in 1,000 metres or 3x10° cycles would only give three channels. the whole working range of wave-lengths for all purposes is likely to extend from 5 metres to 30,000 metres, which gives a possible number of channels on the above basis of 11,998, of which 95° would be on shorter wave-lengths than roo metres. but as it is possible to work on narrower limits and with greater steadiness on long wave than on short, the tendency will be to limit the band at 5 metres, for instance, to something like 100,000 cycles, or within 0-16 %, sil at 30,000 metres the width of band may be confined to 200 cycles, or 2%.! 23. wave propagation theories i1.)\—the influence of diffrac- tion on the propagation of electromagnetic waves to a distance was further examined by g.m. watson in 1918, and the mathe- matical solution put forward by him is now accepted as correct. he showed that the received current in the austin-cohen formula should be inversely proportional to vsin@ \7’—where 6 is the angle at the centre of the earth subtended by the distance d—and the index of the exponential factor should be d mas ie als at distances of 6,000 0:0037 m. were still found to be much greater than the values calculated on this new basis, watson in 1rotg concluded that refraction and reflection of the rays carthwards were also involved, such as would be obtained if at a height of 100 km. above the earth the specific resistance of the atmosphere per centimetre cube were 6:95 x 10° ohms. larmor in 1924 continued the discussion of the refraction theory, and pointed out that, to account for the bending of elec- tromagnetic rays without extinction, all action by conduction or other dissipation must be excluded, and that the influence at work must be purely diclectric in character. 1 recent measurements of the wave-length of light give a value of 2:9982 x 108 metres per second instead of 3 x10 metres per second. this figure should therefore be used in effecting conversions where necessary. 1045 eccles has shown that by postulating the existence of heavy ions in the middle atmosphere caused by incident ultra-violet radiation, which have a limited free path, the bending of the waves can be accounted for; and larmor extended this theory by showing that the finite free swayings of electrons or light ions without collision in the ultra-rarefied gas of the upper atmos- phere must augment the speed of the exciting waves. such a layer, in which a sheaf of horizontal electric rays, provided they are long enough, will travel without loss by absorptiona] scatter- ing, must be high up within the auroral domain, concentration in this stratum being due to the potent influence exerted on the velocity of long waves by the free ions of small inertia interacting with them. by this theory, electric radiation to great distances involves a sheaf of rays whose breadth may be only a fraction of one of its long wave-lengths, which travels along a surface of constant index, while it has to remain concentrated without spreading cither by refraction or by diffraction. 24. ware propagation tests:—measurements made by l. f. fuller in 1915 between the arc stations at san francisco and honolulu, by g. vallauri in 1919 between annapolis and leg- horn, and particularly by licut. guierre for the french govt. in 1919 to 1920 during the cruise of the s.s. “aldcbaran”’ to the antipodes receiving from nantes and lyons, showed that the austin-cohen formula ceased to apply for distances exceeding 2,000 miles. the marconi company having devised a portable instrument for accurately measuring in absolute units, micro-volts per metre, the potential gradient of signals, sent out trained observers in 192t~2 to all parts of the world to measure the strength of signals received on wave-lengths from 5,800 metres clifden to 23,450 metres bordeaux, on known power from the principal european and american stations, the intensities of atmospherics and the direction and bearing of both signals and atmospherics being also noted; and from the information obtained, much of which has been published, reliable world transmission formulac covering all the requirements of the impcrial stations for working on long waves have been evolved. the assumption made by marconi so long ago as 190s, in a lecture before the royal institution, that signals would strengthen at the antipodes of the transmitting station, was confirmed, and it was also noticed that they always travel on a great circle round the earth, but that the direction of arrival whether by the shortest or longest path alters according to the wave-length, position of the sun and, in general, the conditions of the upper almosphcre. 25. imperial wireless (i1t.).—the imperial wireless chain again came up for discussion at the imperial conference of 1921. the british and dominion govts. were urged to erect the neces- sary stations. a government committee reported in 1923 that the post office should own and operate directly all wireless sta- tions for communicating with various parts of the empire. in the case of canada the present competition between the post office and the marconi company might be continued. as re- gards continental europe and the rest of the world, it was recom- mended that private enterprise be given all reasonable facilities to devclop wireless communication. the post office then ac- quired a site at rugby and proceeded with the erection of the first imperial transmitting station, and this has been completed. the intention was to provide worldwide radio communication throughout the whole of the 24 hours, and the design is an ex- ample of the most recent long-wave practice (plate fig. 3). the aerial for telegraphic transmission, which has a capacity of 0-032 mfd., is supported by cight 820 ft. towers, while the aerial for telephonic transmission has a capacity of o-o2 mfd. and is supported by six such towers, two of which are shared with the tclegraph aerial. the power amplificr—consisting of three 18-valve units, cach valve having an output of ro kw. —feeds 500 kw. to the acrial valve through a coupled circuit. the constancy of the wave-length is controlled by a valve- maintained tuning fork vibrating at 1,777 cycles per sec., which 1046 is made to excite continuously a valve circuit tuned to the same frequency, but so constituted that it has a pronounced ninth harmonic, namely 16,000 cycles. this frequency is picked out, amplified, and finally acts as the control current of the power amplifier, and the aerial, therefore, radiates on the equivalent wave-length, namely 18,740 metres. the total power used in the station for transmitting and auxiliary services is at present (1926) about 1,400 kw. when in operation for both telephony and telegraphy. 26. marconi short-wave beam transmission and imperial if ireless.—in 1916 marconi returned to the study of short wave transmission as used by him in 1896, employing reflectors and three-metre damped waves on italian war vessels, and under his direction further exhaustive tests were carried out by c. s. franklin in 1917, 1919 and 1920, first at carnarvon and later over 97 m. between hendon and birmingham, using reflectors on wave-lengths up to 15 metres, a valve transmitter being intro- duced in 19109. a revolving beam spark transmitter 6-3 m. wave-length was fitted at inchkeith on the clyde, and demonstrated to the com- missioners of the northern lights in 1920, a permanent revolving reflector on the same wave-length being installed at the south foreland in 1923. in april, may and june 1923 marconi on the s.y. “ elettra ” at madeira, and later at st. vincent, received such strong signals comparatively free from atmospherics from ao7 m. reflector transmitter at poldhu, working on one kw. to 12 kw. valve input, that he was convinced short waves could give reliable commercial services for the greater proportion of the 24 hours up to 2,300 nautical m. on one kw. power, this being the distance between poldhu and st. vincent. following the publication of the government report on im- perial wircless, the marconi company therefore opened nego- tiations with the post office for the employment of short-wave beam transmitters for the imperial stations. marconi’s tests were continued on the same wave-length but with power up to 20 kw. in the autumn and spring of 1923-4, observations of signal strength also being noted at montreal, new york, rio de janciro, buenos aires and sydney, n.s.w. the first direct message by short-wave wireless telegraphy from poldhu was received at sydney on april 30 1924, and the first direct speech by short-wave wireless telephony on may 30 1924. in july 1924 an agreement was concluded between the post- master-general and the marconi company for the construction of wireless stations on the beam system, capable of communicat- ing with canada and of being extended to south africa, india and australia, the transmitting station to have an input of at least 20 kw. and the receiving station to have an aerial designed to focus received waves within an angle of 30°, the stations to be worked by remote control from the central telegraph office, london, and to be capable of working at roo words per min. each way for an average of 18 hours per day. following the publication of the agreement, work commenced on the erection of beam stations in south africa, india, australia and canada, which, except for the hours of working—south africa 11, india 12, australia seven—are required to be identical in performance with the english beam stations. the poldhu transmitter having been modified to work with 15 rw. on 902 m., 60 m., 47 m. and 32 m., the range trials were resumed in aug. 1924, when marconi on board the “ elettra ” found the daylight range increased very rapidly as the wave- length was reduced. also on 32 m. and 12 rw. input, signals were received at new york, rio and buenos aires when both terminal stations were in daylight, and sydney, n.s.w., was able to read signals for 235 out of the 24 hours. in oct. 1925, using 200 watts and 15 metres, transmission from chelmsford to buenos aires was of such strength during day- light that a speed of 30 words per min. would be used, reaching a maximum with the sun at its zenith on the great circle track, while during darkness signals disappeared altogether. exhaustive tests have since been made by the marconi com- pany of the daylight absorption factor of all wave-lengths down to one metre. wireless telegraphy and telephony the english beam transmitting stations now in process of erection (1926) are bodmin (plate fig. 2), to work with canada and south africa; grimsby, to work with india and australia; and dorchester, to work with the u.s.a. and south america; the three corresponding receiving stations (plate fig. 1) being at bridgewater, skegness and somerset. 27. wireless telephony ut.) —transatlantic one-way wireless telephony was carried out in 1919 between the marconi bally- bunion station, county kerry and louisburg, cape breton, a distance of 1,800 m.; and in 1920 the first land-line to wireless and wireless to jand-line duplex telephone service was opened to the public when the californian and santa catalina island systems were connected by a wireless link from los angeles to avalon, a distance of 315 miles. further transatlantic one-way transmission tests using 300 kw. to the aerial and a special valve circuit radiating only “ side- band ” frequencies from the aerial were carried out in jan. 1923 between the rocky point station, new york, and new southgate, london, the speech being picked up on a 6 ft. frame aerial con- nected to special filter amplifer and wave-form correction cir- cuits having the effect of restoring the carrier wave removed at the transmitter. transatlantic two-way tests on single side-band working du- plex, between the british post office station at rugby sending on 5,769 m. wave-length (s2 kilocycles), and the rocky point station, new york, sending on 5,263 m. wave-length (57 kilo- cycles), and the respective receiving stations connected to sub- scriber lines, were begun in feb. 1926. the audible frequencies are comprised between 20 and 10,000 cycles per second. in wireless telephony currents having fre- quencics between these limits are superposed on the carrier wave frequency x. | if clear speech only is required, and not music, the essential audible frequencies lie between the narrower band of 100 to 3,000 cycles per second. then it can be shown that for clear speech the total band of modulated carrier wave frequencies involved lies between the limits (x—3,000) and (x+ 3,000); the frequencies below x are classed in one group as a side-band, the frequencies above x are classed in another group as a second side-band, and the speech wave-form is completely outlined by either side-band. if one of them is filtered out before transmission the total width of band employed will be halved and the power transmitted will be halved, and there need be no loss of quality or distinctness if the correct frequencies can be again inserted at the recciver. this is what is done, and a further economy is also obtained by treat- ing the ineffective frequencies between x and (x+100) in the same manner. 28. broadcasting —while the technical development of wireless telephony was proceeding with success, its commercial future, apart from its use as a link across water between two land-line systems, appeared to be problematical, as for accuracy, speed and number of channels available for messages it was considered that wireless telegraphy would always have preference. the general public were led to take an interest in it as a novel form of communication which could be used by anyone able to talk into a telephone, and this interest was fostered by using it as a source of entertainment to transmit songs, musical items and speeches by public personages between recognised stations ashore or afloat which could both transmit and receive. feb. 23 1920 saw the opening of the first wircless telephone broadcasting service in the world, when a programme of vocal and instru- mental music for two half-hourly periods each day for a fortnight was transmitted on a 15 rw. valve set from chelmsford on 2,800 metres, the wave-length used by poldhu for the ship telegraph news service. amateurs and the shipping companies were advised that this would take place, and many reports of good reception at 1,000 and 1,200 m. distant on crystal sets, and up to 1,400 m. on valve sets, were received. the hague concerts commenced on april 29 of that year, and in june and july other concerts by well-known artists took place at chelmsford, which in northern europe were received by wireless and put through the telephone wire less telegraphy plate i. no.! receiver | no.2 receiver 4 = a = ; } "drive & 38°f hag. 4 circuits in screened, i - ay egy , af box i |. =) . a t a | approx. 26m. wave drive : med magaitier | no0.223 magnifiers panel \ fane! l { ' 4 ! | fic. 1. marconi short wave beam station receiver. panels ae. 7, ae. 2, ae. 3, ae. 4. feeder coupling units of 26m.,60m., 26 m.and 60 m., waves respectively. panel a. input tuning circuit: ist rectifier and ist oscillator. 5. 1st filter amplifier. c. 2nd rectifier, with listening point, and 2nd oscillator, d, 2nd filter amplifier, e. main rectifier and listening point, f. control switchboard. fic. 2. marconi short wave beam station transmitter, under test. (courtesy of marconi’s wireless telegraph co., ltd.) plate ii. wireless telegraphy lg zena pg et — 7 yo | 7% anode bus.“ gri pai 4 pane! fatin if , sh pg . bar, ee te : | filam ent. voltmeter filament con rut handles water cooled valves * * fe - aoe mt ea ’ e | & mt eter 2 rows of 9°18 total | ie i 14 i |: {i | | ee: . | id panel , overload relays m 44 oe in each valve sesets st? | circuit—_ i 7 =— ‘= | safaty . . #: ; h ¢ water flo i pitmmnn, nolay overload relay operatin handle for (solatitig switch filam dy etanect : | ij 2 buctance | ” perial => tuning > inductance aie i 4 ish " / ; it | cabinet with 9air cooled j -_ a — — ; n ) \ ’ j ; u ip get , 2 ot h dit’ os hal 2 { § - a 7 we bat : i ny ; ay e e3 ie yee ; ¥ ' ' al pit) a) ail ae at = ei es = e nee et : < be = “4 ° ee ee ze iu 2 s —— as —_ . ” ~ wh ee, wi ree ha | rd ree ui uf * mb : & dite bre er td z + 4 , bs oa | g : a i ps | hed ¥ | keyin | rela yr | all | variometer -ilament & feed meters ” cloke _ circuit ammeters ued: orive couplin ing & | coupling coil closed circu/t variometer aerialammeter i guaplia sa + | til dantro) fag ou et ier _ fic. 3. post office long wave valve transmitter, rugby, fic. 4, marconi 15 kw, wireless telegraph transmitter under test. (courtesy of marconi’s wireless telegraph company.) wireless telegraphy and telephony exchanges of the large scandinavian towns and thence to the subscribers’ lines. the musical items encouraged a great deal of unofficial listening-in, the amateur movement grew apace, and manufacturers in the united states discovered that a vast trade in receivers only was springing up, which they proceeded to encourage by the erection of stations solely for transmitting to, and entertainment of, the general public. the publicity afforded and utilised brought an income to the transmitting stations from advertisers, the number of listeners-in officially recognised and catered for rapidly increased, and the united states 1921-2 boom in broadcasting arrived. broadcasting, however, developed more slowly in great britain. the postmaster-general finally gave permission for vocal and gramophone selections and calibration signals for amateurs to be broadcast from writtle, essex, and the first transmission on 700 metres and 250 watts took place feb. 14 1922. the first station of the british broadcasting company, 2lo, at marconi house, london, commenced its transmission on 360 metres and 14 kw. to the aerial on nov. 14 1922, and, with the issue of a formal licence by the postmaster-general to the british broadcasting company in jan. 1923, wircless telephonic reception, with all the possibilities it implied now fairly well realised, received every encouragement from the government, and is now an ineradicable habit of millions. broadcasting demands an unvarying frequency for the carrier wave in order that no readjustment of a receiver may be neces- sary during the course of a programme, and also to allow sharply tuned receivers to be used, so that there may be the minimum interference between broadcasting stations working on slightly different wave-lengths. ee ee ae i d fic, 8.—lay-out of broadcast transmitter. the essential equipment of the transmitter is a circuit p.a., (fig. 8), the power oscillator or magnifier, which is a valve oscil- lator circuit of carrier wave frequency of which the open acrial forms a part. d, the drive circuit, a complete sclf-oscillator having a closed h.f. circuit and, therefore, an invariable oscillation frequency which controls the magnifier and compels it to run at the same invariable frequency. m, the modulator, which is so connected to the magnifier as to modify the amplitude of the carrier wave according to the speech frequencies to be broadcast. sometimes another panel is provided if the eh.t. supply is alternating current, in order to rectify it and smooth out the ripples before the rectified current is supplied to the anodes of the valves. x is the microphone in the studio s$), which is connected to the input of the microphone amplifier x.amp., the output of which goes on to the line. on arriving at the transmitting station t, the line currents are put through asecond orline amplifier l.amp., the output from which is connected to the input of the modulator panel m, to build them up to the values required to work the first stage of the modulator so that it controls to its full capacity. the modulator panel may contain the circuits of several stages of amplification, in passing through which the control currents, which originate in the microphone circuit, finally reach such a magnitude that the maximum modulation possible is finally applicd to the carrier wave current. a typical method of modulating the carrier wave, known as ** choke control,” is illustrated in fig. 9. when speaking into the microphone m, changes in potential take place on the grid 1047 of the modulator valve x, as this is connected to the secondary of the microphone transformer t. owing to the presence of the choke lx in the modulator plate circuit, corresponding changes in the plate potential of x also take place, and as this plate is connected to the plate of the main oscillator valve o, the fluctuat- ing potentials originated by speech are thus made to control the amplitude of the aerial current. i fic. 9.—choke control. by inserting the microphone m, with its circuit and trans- former t, in the oscillator grid circuit in place of the resistance r, the modulator valve and choke can be dispensed with, the modu- lation then being obtained by “ grid control,” which is a good, but less effective, method. for simultancously broadcasting, or “s.b.”, the output from the microphone amplifier in the studio s, (fig. 8) is connected to the input terminals of two or more land-line amplifiers at two or more transmitting stations, such as 7; and ts». while it is always necessary that the carrier wave should have an unvarying frequency, it is much more vital with short waves than with long. 3 short-wave amplification is more difficult than long-wave, as the condensers in the closed tuned circuits are so small that the capacity between the plate and grid of the valve becomes of im- portance in regard to the capacity coupling between the grid and plate circuit, so that reaction effects tend to take place. for this reason the incoming short-wave speech-bearing cur- rents are first heterodyned in the receiver to produce long-wave currents well above the audible range; this long wave is then am- plified up in the normal manner and finally rectified, thus leaving only the speech frequencies, which are dealt with in the usual way. this is the method usually employed for the relaying of transatlantic short-wave telephony before it is put on to the land- line feeding a b.b.c. transmitter. this is the superheterodyne method which is sometimes used for the “ wireless link ”’ between studio and transmitting station in place of the land-line. it cuts out interference, gives greater sclectivity to the receiver and permits more amplification to be used than with the original short- wave unheterodyned. when retroaction is employed in a receiver which is being tuned in to a given transmission, the coupling between the grid and plate circuits may be increased to such a value that the valve circult becomes an oscillation generator, and its current then heterodynes with that of the carrier wave received, thus causing a variable beat note of diminishing pitch to be heard in the telc- phones as the resonant point is approached, and of increasing pitch as the adjustment passes the resonance point and puts the circuit more out of tune. this variable note produced when searching for the in-tune adjustment is called “ howl.” in many such receivers the self-oscillation involves the aerial circuit. radiation then takes place and the heterodyne note is 1048 heard on receivers connected to neighbouring acrials. this inter- ference trouble caused by the faulty adjustment of listeners’ receivers is known as “ oscillation,” and spoils the clear reception of many programmes. 29. future progress—-an enormous field of development lics ahead. navigation by sea and air will be aided by the installa- tion of rotating wireless beams which signal a different code for each point of the compass; by special beacon stations automati- cally transmitting known code signals on reserved wave-lengths for direction-finding purposes; and by the use on board ship of automatic call devices for s.o.s. signals. point to point wireless telegraph communications for economic and interference reasons are likely to be established to a rapidly increasing extent by short wave beams, transmission on alterna- tive wave-iengths being provided if propagation absorption con- ditions make this necessary. automatic operating speeds up to 2,000 words per min. if called for can be achieved, and if traffic becomes heavy enough multiplex transmission by applying different modulating fre- quencies to the same carricr wave may be employed. it is expected that the british post office trans-atlantic wireless telephone service wil] be operating commercially within a year or so. transmission of line drawings and photographs and whole pages of messages by wireless is already an accomplished fact, and is being adapted for commercial use to trans-atlantic cir- cuits by the radio corporation of america working in conjunc- tion with the marconi company. the invaluable aid that a popular broadcast service, compris- ing distributed transmitting stations under a centralised control, can render a government at a time of national emergency, was effectively demonstrated in great britain during the general strike of 1926, and the experience then gained is likely to intlu- ence future broadcast regulations. finally reference may be made to wireless television, which is still {in 1926) in the laboratory stage, and must take several years to develop; but when mature will prove to be a very useful and popular extension of the art of broadcasting and radio trans- mission in general. autuorities.—h. d. arnold, l. espenschied, ‘‘ transatlantic radio telephony," convention a.j.e.e., june 1923; e. h. arm- strong, ‘some recent developments of regencrative circuits,” proc. inst. kadio engineers, aug. 1922; if. 11. beverage, e. w. kellogg, c. w. rice, ‘ the wave antenna,"’ convention of amer. ile.f. new york, feb. 1923; 5. dushman, ‘ the production and measurement of high vacua,”’ gen. elect. review, june.-oct. 1920, vol. 23 (no. 610); t. l. eckersley, f. c. lunnon, h. j. round, k. tremelilen, “ report on measurements made on signal strengths at great dis- tances,” journal of [.1.e., oct. 1925, vol. 63, no. 346; c. s. frank- lin, “ short wave directional wireless tclegraphy,” journal of l.e.e., 1922, vol. 60, p. 930; i. langmuir, “* fundamental phenom- ena in electron tubes having tungsten cathodes,” general electric review, june-july 1920, vol. 23, no. 617; idem, “* the pure electron discharge and its application in radio telegraphy and telephony," prac. inst. radio fugineers, 1915, vol. 3, pp. 21 > 383 larmor, “why wireless electric rays can bend round the earth,” philo- sophical magazine, dec. 1924, vol. 48, no. 283; g. marconi, ‘ radio communications,” journal royal society of arts, 26th december 1924; id., ‘“ radio telegraphy,” proc. inst. radio engtnecrs, aug. 1922; id., “ results obtained over very long distances by short wave directional wireless telegraphy, more generally referred to as the beam system,”’ journal of royal society of arts, 25th july 1924; id., “ racdiotelegraphy,” proc. of the roval institution of great brita, 2nd june 1911; 1d., “* the progress of wireless telegraphy,” transactions of the new york electrical society, 17th april 1912; h. j. round, “ direction and position finding,” journal lee, march 1920, vol. 58, p. 24; e. h. shaugnessy, “‘ the rugby radio station of the british post office,”’ journal of the tde4£., read 14th april 1926; 5. b. smith, g. m. wright, “the heart-shaped polar diagram and its behaviour under night variations,” radio review, aug. 1921; b. van der pol, jr., “ over electronenbewe- gungen in trioden,” physica, vol. 3, pp. 253-75 (1923); g. n watson, “‘ the diffraction of electric waves by the [earth,”” prec. royal society, a, vol. 95, p. 83, 1918; id., ‘‘ the transmission of electric waves round the earth,” proc. royal seciefy, a, june 1g1g; h. m. dowsett, jfireless telephony and broadcasting (1924); w. h. eccles, wireless telegraphy and telephony, 3rd ed. (1920); j. a. fleming, the thermionic valve and its devclopments in radiotelegraphy and telephony, 2nd ed. (1924); r. keen, direction and position find- ing by wireless (1922); h. j. van der bijl, the thermionic vacuum wir th—wisconsin tube and its applications (1921); j. zenneck and h. rukop, drahtlose telegraphic, stuttgart (1925, 5th ed.); g. marconi, “‘ recent advances in wireless telegraphy,’’ proc. royal institution of great britain (3d march 1905); “transatlantic wireless telegraphy,” proc. royal institution of great britain (13th march 1908); nobel lecture, royal academy of science at stockholm, 1911; “‘fenomeni non spicgati e problemi insoluti attinenti alla radiotelegrafia,”” reale accademia dei lincei, 12th nov. 1916. (g. mar.; h. m.d.) wirth, karl joseph (1879- ), german statesman, was born at freiburg, baden, sept. 6 1879. educated at freiburg university, in 1908 he was appointed professor of natural science at the technical college in freiburg, being shortly afterwards elected to the municipal council of that city. in 1913 he ob- tained a seat in the diet of baden and the following year became a member of the reichstag. in 1918 he was appointed minister of finance for baden and in 1919 was elected a member of the constituent assembly of the reich. in march 1920 he was given the portfolio of finance, which he continued to hold until feb. 1922. in may rg2t he was called upon to form a new ministry, on the occasion of the allied ultimatum regarding reparations. in aug. and sept. of that year he came into conflict with von kahr, the bavarian premier, who refused to apply to bavaria the state of national emergency which wirth had proclaimed consequent on the murder of rathenau. wirth stood his ground, and von kahr was compelled to resign, but two months later the decision of the league of nations on the partition of upper silesia between germany and poland led to wirth’s own resig- nation. no one was found capable of taking his place, however, and he resumed office on oct. 26. in nov. 1922, owing largely to party dissensions, wirth again resigned, and dr. cuno, manager of the ilamburg-america line, was entrusted with the formation of a new ministry. wisconsin (see 28.740), a state of the united states of america. the population in 1920 was 2,632,067, as compared with 2,333,860 in ro1o, an increase of 298,207, or 12%. the density of population in 1920 was 47-6 per sq. m.; in 1910 it was 42°2. the proportion of urban population increased from 43% in 1910 lo 47°3% in 1920. the following table shows the popu- lation in 1920 of the principal cities. milwaukee 457,147. madison 38,378 racine 58.593 oshkosh 33,162 kenosha 40,472. green bay 31,017 superior 39,071 ‘sheboygan 30,935 government.—a constitutional amendment in 1912 regulated the borrowing capacity of cities and incorporated villages; anoth- er of the same year gave the slate government power to create a park system. amendments in 1911 and rot2 regulated the pay of judges; and one of 1922 related to trial by jury. a law of rors allowed absentee voting, and one of 1918 voting by soldiers. commissions play an important part in the government. the following have been created since 1905: accountancy (1913), compensation insurance (1917), conservation (191s), engineering department (1915), grain and warehouse (1905), health (reor- ganised 1913), highways (1911), industrial (1911), and market- ing (1923), besides boards of examination for licences for archi- tects, boxers, barbers, plumbers, etc. and ex-officio boards. a workmen’s compensation law for the state was passed in rortr. a law of 1917 provided for the sterilisation of defectives, and laws of 1913, i915 and 1917, for the ante-nuptial physical exam- ination of men. ifistory—the progressive policy inaugurated by governor la follette was continued by his successors, governors david- son and mcgovern. in 1914 there was a political reaction which resulted in the election of emanuel phillip, but the governmen- tal policy underwent but slight change. the state was strongly divided in r9t7 on the question of the entry of the united states into the world war; senator la follette opposing such action, and senator husting favouring it. the death of the latter in 1918 resulted in the election of irving l. lenroot (rep.): he was re- elected in 1920. in 1920 john j. blaine, supporter of the views of senator la follette, was elected governor in succession to eman- uel phillip. he was re-elected in 1922, and in 1924. wister—women, diseases of agriculture —the total land area in cultivation in 1910 was 21,060,000 ac. of which 11,908,000 was improved; in 1925 it was 21,851,733, of which 13,666,709 was improved. the value of farm property in ro10 was $1,413,118,785, and in 1920 it was $2,677,282,097. the following table shows the quantities and values of the chief crops in 1920 and 1925:— value a a pg corn 44,547,398 | $64,593,729 | 99,556,000 | $71,680,000 oats 68,296,223 58,051,788 | 126,246,000 47,973,000 wheat 7,328,444 16,489,016 5,196,000 3,234,000 barley 12,191,861 16,459,014 16,965,000 11,197,000 the total value of cereal production in t910 was $73,141,919; in 1920 it was $170,196,910. livestock on farmsin 1925 consisted of 626,000 horses and mules, 5,050,000 cattle, 351,000 sheep and 1,580,000 swine. manufactures —manufactures and agriculture are closely bal- anced in their importance to the state. in 1920, 308,038 persons were listed as engaged in agriculture, and 339,578 in manufac- turing. the value added to materials by manufacturing in 1914 was estimated at $277,756,928; in 1921, at $486,919,679. the greatest increase in the output of manufactured products was in the region of lake michigan. water-power resources have been partially developed, and are used chiefly for lighting and trans- portation purposes. the most important manufactures are of farm products. the following tables give details of the manufacturing industries of the state:— 1909 i9i9 1923 | total no. industrial es- tablishments 9,721 10,393 7,832 wage earners, average number ; p 182,583 263,949 247,851 wages. $93,904,808] $290,440,561| $297,160,064 cost of material 346,356,583; 1,127,274,961| 1,001,501,870 total value of products |590,305,538| 1,846,984, 307! 1,720,198, 349 butter, cheese, condensed milk cheese. ; : ; condensed milk. a foundry and machine shop products automobiles, including bodies and parts slaughtering and meat packing : . $56,642,000 91,463,000; $221,447,000 73:342,000 ‘ 198,644,000 119,381,000 104,201,000 leather , ; 94,762,060 lumber and timber products . 88,883,000 paper and wood pulp : 80,328,000 flour mill aud grist mill products . 58,304,000 boots, shoes and shoe findings 45,699,000 ship and boat building 44,164,000 agricultural implements . 43,623,000 furniture and refrigerators 43,522,000 hosiery and knit goods 40,778,000 car construction and repairing , & 36,791,000 copper, tin and sheet iron products. : 2,443,000 iron and steel, steel works and rolling mills 28,393,000 printing and publishing ; 26,097,000 confectionery ; ee 24,389,000 electrical machinery and supplies . 23,636,000 natural resources-——the following table shows the devel- opment in the value of mineral production from 1909-19:— 1909 $2,972,584 1,989,907 1,433,105 842,116 200,236 21,456 igig $3,826,872 3,816,911 1,484,979 1,107,790 231,078 113,203 iron ore : lead and zinc granite lime stone . sand stone . all other in 1904 wisconsin stood first among the states in lumber prod- ucts; in 1922, fourteenth. in 1925 the development of forest re- serves and fire protection were helping to stabilise the lumber industry. the earliest wisconsin industry, the fur trade, pro- 1049 duced goods to a value of $669,005.20 in 1918. the development of the fisheries included the establishment of new hatcheries at spooner for pike, at sturgeon bav for white fish, and at sheboy- gan for blue fin. the commercial fishing was mostly in the great lakes, but this was less important than the sport fishing under licence in the rivers and streams. transportation and commerce.—the steam railway mileage in 1924 was 7,657, and the mileage for electric railways, 989. an interurban electric system covers the southeastern portion of the state. the highway system has been widely developed with the assistance of federal and state aid, and in 1925 the state trunk highways totalled 10,257 m. in length. this has been fol- lowed by an extensive development of lines laid to carry busses and. trucks. finance.—state finance is managed under a budget system with certain continuing appropriations, and an ex-officio com- mission has power to make emergency grants. in 1922, $19,784,- 872 was raised for state purposes. in 1922, $22,265,693 was raised for county purposes, and $43,506,660 for local purposes. this included proceeds from the state income tax, $12,661,352 in 192r, most of which is turned over to localities in licu of a per- sonal property tax. educalion.—a state board created in 1915, with powers modi- fied in 1917, correlates the educational undertakings of the state. in rors a board was created to provide vocational instruction; in 1920, 32 cities provided for continuation schools. the total expenditure for public schools in 1921 was $50,385,853, of which over $30,000,000 was raised by school taxes. brp.iograriy.—h. c. campbell, etc., wisconsin in three centuries, 4 vol. (1905); e. b. usher, wisconsin, its story and biography, 8 vol. (1914); f. c. howe, wisconsin, an experiment in democracy (1912); c. mccarthy, the wisconsin idea (1912); j. b. winslow, the story of a great court (1912); f. merk, economic hts- tory of wisconsin in the civil war decade (1916). (c. r. f.) wister, owen (1860- \, american writer, was born in philadelphia july 14 1860. on graduating from harvard in 1882 he intended to devote himself to music. he went abroad for study; but family reasons forced him to return, and he spent several years in arizona and new mexico. he then entered the harvard law school, graduating in 1888, was admitted to the bar in 1889 and for two years practised in philadelphia. thereafter he dovoted his time to literary work. his novels, the virginian (1920) and ludy baltimore (1906) in particular, established his position as one of the foremost american writers of his genera- tion and won for him a wide popularity. wister’s other publications include the afodern swiss family robinson (1883); the dragon of wantley: ilts tail (1892); lin mclean (1898); u. s. grant, a biography (1900); philosophy 4: a story of harvard university (1903); the seven ages of washington: a biography (1907); afembers of the family (1911); the pentecost of calamity (1915); a straight deal: or the ancient grudge (1920); neighbours henceforth (1922); and watch your thirst (1923). wolseley, garnet joseph wolseley, viscount (1833- 1913), british soldier (see 28.777), died at mentone march 25 1913, the title going by special remainder to his only daughter, frances. he was buried in st. paul's cathedral, and an equestrian statue of him on the horse guards’ parade, whitchall, london, was unveiled in 1920. wolverhampton, henry hartley fowler, rst vis- count (1830-ro11), british statesman (see 28.781), died at woodthorne, wolverhampton, feb. 25 1911. women, diseases of (sce gynaecology, 12.764).—during recent years gynaecology has advanced chiefly in the direction of greatly improved operative technique, and in the application of radiological methods. papers:have been published on various points, particularly on the functions of the ovary and the duct- less glands, but no experimental work of outstanding importance has appeared and most of the publications are clinical. at puberty the uterus and ovaries begin to undergo each month a complex and correlated series of changes, which contin- ues throughout the whole reproductive period of a woman’s life, normally is arrested only by pregnancy and lactation and ends at the menopause. its double purpose is to liberate an ovum from 1050 the ovary and prepare the endometrium for its reception if fer- tilised. the cycle of change in the endometrium is concerned with the renewal of the so-called menstrual decidua. if fertilisa- tion occurs, the ovum becomes embedded in the prepared endo- metrium where it develops into a child, and further menstrua- tion is arrested. if fertilisation does not occur, the menstrual decidua is cast off and the cycle of changes in the uterus and ovaries 1s repeated. the menstrual flow recurs about every 28 days, lasts about five days, and consists of a discharge from the uterus of 4 to 6 ounces of non-coagulate blood with fragments of decidua and mucus from the cervical glands. the complete cycle in the endometrium thus consists of alternate phases of building up and breaking down initiated by ovulation, for if the ovaries are removed the endometrium remains permanently in the resting phase. during ovulation an ovarian follicle ripens and ruptures, liberating an ovum; at the site of rupture a tempo- rary yellow body (corpus luteum) forms, and recent work has shown that the internal secretion of this body provides the chem- ica] stimulus to the uterine cycle. the time-relationship between the events in the ovarian and uterine cycles is as follows: the ovarian follicle ruptures about 14 days before the onset of the menstrual flow, the corpus (uteum reaches its full development about seven days before the flow, and begins to decline after the flow has begun. common disorders.—the usual disorders of menstruation are: (1) amenorrhoea (absence of now), (2) menorrhagia (excessive flow), (3) too frequent, irregular or scanty flow, (4) dysmenor- rhoea (painful flow). amenorrhoea may be physiological (preg- nancy, lactation, menopause). delay in initial onset may depend upon developmental error in the uterus or vagina. pathological amenorrhoea may be due to error in growth or development or to constitutional disease. thus menstruation may occur, but es- cape of the fluid be prevented by presence of a membrane ob- structing the vaginal orifice (“‘ imperforate hymen ”’) or by the absence of the vagina or imperforation of the cervix uteri (con- cealed menstruation)—or the uterus may fail to develop beyond the infantile state or may be completely absent and in the latter case the amenorrhoea is permanent. amongst constitutional causes are chlorosis, secondary anaemia, tuberculosis, mental shock and strain, acute illness and defective function of the thy- roid or pituitary glands; in most of these the amenorrhoea is usually temporary. menorrhagia —this signifies excessive bleeding at the time of the menstrual flow, but no irregular bleeding during the interval. amongst uterine causes are fibromyoma, polypi, excessive thickness of the endometrium, fibrosis and chronic sub-involu- tion and inflammation of the fallopian tubes; general causes are, (a) diseases associated with plethora, ¢.g., chronic cardio-vascular disease, chronic rena] disease, (b) primary blood diseases, e.g., pernicious anaemia, leukaemia, purpura and haemophilia, (c) endocrinous diseases, especially hyperthyroidism, (d@) at puberty and menopause there may be, for a time, excessive menstrual haemorrhage; but haemorrhage at the menopause is often asso- ciated with a new growth of the uterus. irregular haemorrhage independent of menstruation always indicates uterine disease. after the age of 30, and especially after the menopause, it sug- gests cancer of the uterus. irregular haemorrhage during early pregnancy usually means either threatened abortion or extra- uterine gestation. treatment demands careful diagnosis. amongst drugs which relieve certain forms of haemorrhage are ergot, pituitary extract, calcium salts and parathyroid gland. too frequent or irregular menstruation is common and, if not pro- fuse, is unimportant; since the ovary is the ‘‘ pacemaker ”’ of the uterus in menstruation, the cause probably lics in irregular ovu- lation. dysmenorrhoea.—the varieties of dysmenorrhoea are (a) spas- modic, (5) congestive. spasmodic dysmenorrhoeu is due to painful contractions of the uterus beginning with onset of the flow and lasting a few hours or a day; the pain is believed to be associated with the shedding of the menstrual decidua and the entire mem- brane can often be discovered in the discharge. usually no uter- ine abnormality can be detected. the treatment consists of rest, women, diseases of hot baths and such anti-spasmoadic drugs as phenazone, phenace- tin, aspirin, atropine. if this fails dilatation of the cervix often cures. cases which arise in later life are usually due to a submu- cous hbromyoma of the uterus. congestive dysmenorrhoea.—this condition is a severe aching which begins about a week before, and is relieved by, the flow; it is due to chronic inflammatory disease of the fallopian tubes or of the uterus, or to uterine fibromyoma. infections of the reproductive organs about 60% of infections are puerperal, about 20% are gonorrhoeal, and the remainder are fortuitous infections, often secondary to a primary focus elsewhere, such as in the bow- el (appendicitis, diverticulitis), the tonsils or the teeth; about two per cent are due to the tubercle bacillus. in most puerperal in- fections, and in all gonorrhoeal, the infection ascends from the vulva, vagina or cervix uteri to the uterus, fallopian tubes and peritoneum. jn other cases the bacteria are carried to the or- gans by the blood stream (haematogenous infection). the in- fection may remain localised to the various parts of the genera- tive system or invade the blood stream, producing the very grave condition of septicaemia. usually, especially in puerperal and gonorrhoeal infections, the condition is widespread. syphilitie infection of the reproductive organs is considered elsewhere. diseases of the external genital organs the vulva comprises several structures grouped together for convenience of description, types of affections.—(1) injuries occurring during parturition, or accidental; the commonest is rupture of the perineum. (2) in- flammation (eilvitws). simple vulvitis is due to want of cleanli- ness or to irritating discharges, and in children may result from threadworms. severe infective vulvitis is usually due to gonor- rhoca. the symptoms are heat, itching and throbbing, and the parts are red, swollen and bathed with discharge. in the gonor- rhoeal variety local inflammation 1s very severe, the discharge pro- fuse and purulent and there is scalding pain on micturition. the treatment of simple vulvitis is rest in bed, cleanliness and bathing the vulva with warm, antiseptic lotions. gonorrhoeal vulvitis is almost invariably associated with infection of the urethra, vagina and cervix; the treatment, which is prolonged and requires an expert, consists chiefly in the precise application of a special an- tiseptic, such as two per cent acriflavine, to the sites of infection. (3) cutancous infections, the most important of which are ecze- ma, erythema, herpes, furunculosis, tubercle, elephantiasis, leucoplakia and kraurosis. these affections present the same characters asin other parts of the body. in leucoplakia the sur- face of the vulva becomes thickened and covered with white patches, and later cracks and ulcers appear; the discase is im- portant because it is often the forerunner of cancer. (4) tu- mours. any part of the vulva may be the seat of new growths, simple or malignant; cysts of bartholin’s gland and vascular carusncles of the urethral orifice are the commonest. pruritus of the vulva (persistent itching) is a symptom more than a disease, and accompanies vulvitis and most of the conditions given above under (4), as well as diabetes and cancer. diseases of the vagina the vaginal walls are kept moist by a thin, acid, opalescent fluid containing desquamated epithelium and cervical mucus; when excessive the condition of feucorrhoea results. malformation—the vagina may be absent in whole or in part, or may present a longitudinal septum. occlusion of the lower end by a membrane prevents escape of the menses and leads to gradual distension of the vagina with blood (‘° haemato- colpos ’’). prolupse.—this is a hernial protrusion of the pelvic contents, e.g., bladder, rectum, through the opening in the pelvic floor muscles, the vaginal walls forming the covering of the protrusion; there is usually concomitant prolapse of the uterus. vaginal pro- lapse can be permanently cured by operation; the palliative treatment is by vaginal pessarics. » women, diseases of fistulae.—these may form between the vagina and bladder, or vagina and rectum. they are usually the result of parturition or malignant disease. vaginitis—(a) simple catarrhal vaginitis is due to the same causes as simple vulvitis; occasionally in children itis important from a medico-legal aspect. (8) in gonorrhoea the vagina is in- fected together with the vulva, urethra and cervix; the vaginal walls are intensely red and covered with profuse yellow discharge. (c) chronic vaginitis may follow the acute variety and may per- sist for a long time. the vagina is rarely the seat of tumours, but cysts are not uncommon. diseases of the uterus errors in growth and development.—t he organ may becongeni- tally absent, may remain in the infantile state, or may fail to reach full maturity; these conditions cause amenorrhoea, scanty menstruation, dysmenorrhoea or sterility. it may also be com- pletely or partially double. dis placements.—normally the uterus is bent forwards (ante- flexion) and turned forwards (anteversion). the chief displace- ments are prolapse and retroflexion. in early prolapse the uterus remains within the vagina; later the cervix lics outside the vulva and the vagina is completely inverted (procidentia). the symp- toms are a “ bearing down ”’ feeling, great discomfort and fatigue on walking and interference with micturition and defaecation. prolapse is very rarely met with in nulliparae, and its essential cause is stretching,and tnjury of the fasciae and muscles of the pelvic floor owing to parturition; an inborn tendency doubtless exists in some women, but in many cases too hasty delivery of the child by midwifery forceps is blameable. the palliative treatment is by vaginal pessaries; but cure by operation is far preferable. the modern operation consists of a plastic repair of the pelvic floor, vaginal vault and perineum. retroflexion is al- ways combined with retroversion (rotation backwards through a transverse axis); it may be congenital, but is nearly always ac- quired as the result of childbirth or abortion or of pelvic inflam- mation. thereis much difference of opinion concerning the symp- toms and effects of retroflexion and the indications and methods of treatment. if the displaced uterus is healthy, and not fixed by adhesions, it is, with the occasional exceptions of dyspareunia and sterility, symptomless and harmless, and requires no treatment. but when it is the.subject of chronic inflammation or subinvolu- tion and is fixed by adhesions, it requires treatment for the relief of associated symptoms. palliative treatment is by re- placement and the insertion of a pessary, which is only possible when the uterus is not fixed. curative treatment consists in suspending the body of the uterus to the anterior abdominal wall. i nversion.—inversion of the uterus is possible only when the cavity is dilated, either after pregnancy or by a tumour. most cases are acute, follow immediately on delivery and are accom- panied by much shock and haemorrhage and a very high mortali- ty. chronic inversion either results from the acute variety in un- treated patients who have survived, or is due to the gradual trac- tion of a fundal intrauterine tumour (usually a fibroid polypus). the symptoms of chronic inversion are haemorrhage and bladder troubles, and on examination a swelling is found in the vagina. reduction of the condition is often difficult, particularly when it has lasted for a long time. inflammation.—this may affect the cervix or the body of the uterus, and may be acute or chronic. most cases are due 1o in- fection at labour or to gonorrhoca. a secondary infection by the bloodstream, especially by streptococci, may occur from a prima- ry focus elsewhere. pessaries in the vagina may cause infection, especially if not kept clean by douching and removed at intervals. chronic inflammation of the cervix (cervicitis) is predisposed to by unhealed tears resulting from labour, is commonly associated with a red congested annular patch of glandular mucous mem- brane (erosion) and has a muco-purulecnt discharge as its chief symptom. in acute cervicitis the part is red and swollen, and a discharge of pus, in which the infecting germ may be discovered, pours from the cervical canal. its danger is upward spread of the infection to the uterus, fallopian tubes and peritoneum. the io5i treatment of acute infection is rest in bed, vaginal douches and the application of strong antiseptics to the cervical canal. chronic infections may be cured by the direct application of antiseptics and in cases associated with unhealed tears and erosion, by exci- sion of the diseased portion. inflammation of the body of the uterus, usually the result of puerperal or of gonorrhoeal infec- tion, affects chiefly the lining membrane or endometrium (esdo- metritis). acute puerperal endometritis is a very serious condi- tion, due usually to streptococcal infection, and lable to spread to the tubes, peritoneum or blood stream (septicaemia). gonor- rhoeal endometritis 1s alwayssecondary to infection of the cervix; it is scrious as infection of the fallopian tubes may follow. chronic endometritis may be either interstitial or glandular, and results from bacterial infection. the chief types of interstitial endometritis are senile and tuberculous. senile endometritis af- fects women after the menopause and causes a foul-smelling dis- charge, sometimes blood-stained; if the discharge cannot escape the uterus becomes distended with pus (pyometra). tuberculous endometritis is extremely rare and is usually due to spread from the tubes. chronic glandular endometritis is characterised by very great thickening of the endometrium due to proliferation of the glands; the symptom is profuse menorrhagia, and relief can be obtained only by curetting. inflammation of the whole uterus (metritis) if acute, is nearly always the result of puerperal infec- tion, and the symptoms and complications are similar to those of acute puerperal endometritis. chronic metritis is the sequel to the acute variety or to puerperal subinvolution; the uterus is en- larged and fibrous, and the chief symptom is menorrhagia. the menorrhagia, in this case, cannot be cured by curetting, because the endometrium is not thickened; the intrauterine application of radium, however, acts like a charm. new grrowrtus non-malignant.—the uterus is the commonest seat of new growths. the innocent new growths comprise adenoma, fibromyoma, adenomyoma and polypi of various kinds; the malignant are carcinoma, sarcoma and chorionepithelioma. ade- nomata usually become polypoid, and occur both in the body and cervix; their symptom is uterine haemorrhage and their treatment is surgical. fibromyomata or “ fibroids” occur especially in women between the ages of 35 and 50. they are believed to affect about 25% of women over 35 years of age, but commonly are small and cause no symptoms. it is doubtful if they ever origi- nate after the menopause. they are solid, round or ovoid tu- mours, usually multiple, sometimes becoming enormous, and composed of a mixture of fibrous and muscular tissue. according to their position in the uterine wall they are divided into intra- mural, subperiloneal and submucous. the two latter may as- sume a polypoid form. submucous fibroids and, to a less extent, intramural fibroids, give rise to severe menorrhagia and may lead to dangerous anaemia. at the menopause they share in the gen- eral atrophy of the uterus and may almost disappear. secondary changes are common and include calcification, mucoid degenera- tion, cyst-formation, fatty changes, necrobiosis (red degencration), septic infection (sloughing fibroid), and sarcomatous change. the modes in which fibroids imperil life are haemorrhage, septic infection, impaction, twisting of the pedicle by rotation and intestinal and urethral obstruction. during pregnancy they share in the growth of the uterus; but interference with preg- nancy, such as abortion, is not common. if growing from the cer- vix or lower part of the uterus they may obstruct labour and ne- cessitate caesarean section. small symptomless fibromyomata, often discovered by accident, require no treatment, but should be watched. fibromyomata of a certain size, or causing symptoms, require either hysterectomy (removal of the uterus) or myomecto- my (removing the tumour and leaving the uterus). hysterectomy is the easier, and usually the safer, operation; myomectomy is pref- erable when the patient is young and it is desired to preserve the function of child bearing. treatment by drugs or by electrical currents is, rightly, a thing of the past, but x-rays and radium have an important place. the insertion of radium into the uterus is the ideal treatment for menorrhagia due to sali submucous 1052 fibroids, but is not suitable for tumours of any size. haemorrhage from fibroids often ceases after several applications of x-rays; but this treatment is too uncertain in its action seriously to com- pete with surgery. malignant new growths.—the varieties of malignant disease met with in the uterus are carcinoma, sarcoma and chorion-epi- thelioma malignum. the age at which women are most subject to carcinoma of the uterus is towards the decline of sexual life. of 3,385 collected cases of cancer of the uterus 1,169 occurred be- tween 40 and 50, and 856 between 50 and 60. in contradistinc- tion to fibroid tumours it {frequently arises after the menopause. it may be divided into cancer of the body and cancer of the neck (cervix). cancer of the cervix is almost exclusively confined to women who have been pregnant. predisposing causes are tears of the cervix, erosion and chronic cervicitis. the symptoms which induce women to seek medical aid are haemorrhage, foetid discharge and, later, pain and cachexia. an unfortunate belief amongst the public that the menopause ts associated with irregu- lar bleeding and offensive discharges has prevented many women from seeking medical advice until too late. it cannot be too widely understood that cancer of the cervix is in its early stages a purely local disease, and that removal in this stage usually re- sults in cure. the modern operation is that perfected by the late professor wertheim of vienna, and consists in removal of the whole uterus, upper third of the vagina and as much of the sur- rounding tissues as possible. the operation is severe, but freedom from recurrence may be expected in 30% of early cases. preoperative treatment by radium is usually advisable. in ad- vanced cases treatment by radium and x-rays may be relied upon to palliate, if not to cure. cancer of the body of the uterus is rare before the 45th year and is most frequent subsequent to the meno- pause. the majority of the patients are nulliparae and may be the subjects of fibroids. hysterectomy is the only treatment. chorion-epithelioma is a malignant disease presenting micro- scopic characters resembling the cells of the chorionic epithelium. it occurs in connection with recent pregnancy and particularly with the variety of abortion termed hydatidiform mole. it quickly ulcerates and infiltrates the uterine tissues, forming met- astatic growths in the lung and vagina. in many cases it de- stroys life with a rapidity unequalled by any other type of growth. clinically it is recognised by the occurrence after pregnancy of vio- lent haemorrhages and progressive cachexia. the growth is usu- ally primary in the uterus but may be so in the fallopian tubes and in the vagina. a few cases have been recorded unconnected with pregnancy. immediate and wide removal of the affected organ is the only treatment. sarcoma of the uterus may occur in the body and in the cervix, occurs at an earlier age than car- cinoma and may originate either in the wall or endometrium of the healthy uterus, or as a secondary change in a fibromyoma. uterine enlargement and haemorrhage are the symptoms. the differential diagnosis is microscopic. ilysterectomy is the only chance of prolonging life. diseases of the fallopian tubes the fallopian tubes or oviducts are liable to septic infection (acute and chronic salpingitis), tuberculosis, innocent and malig- nant new growths and tubal pregnancy. salpingitis is nearly al- ways secondary to septic infection of the genital tract following labour or abortion, gonorrhoea, infected fibromyoma and cancer of the uterus. the right tube may be affected by appendicitis. in some cases the infection of the tubes appears to be accidental, probably the result of an infective focus elsewhere, such as the tonsils or respiratory tract. when the pus escapes from the tubes into the peritoneal cavity it sets up local or general peritonitis. i:ven mild cases of salpingitis result in gluing together of the fimbriae and sealing of the ostium (the abdominal opening or mouth of the tube) and matting together of the tube and ovary by peritoneal adhesions. if the inflammation continues after the ostium is sealed, fluid accumulates in the tube (pyosalpinx, hy- drosalpinx). distension of the tube with blood (iaematosalpinx) is nearly always due to tubal pregnancy. acute salpingitis is a very severe illness, and is accompanied by high temperature, ab- women, diseases of dominal pain and tenderness and much constitutional disturb- ance. the symptoms may become merged in those of general peritonitis. in chronic salpingitis there is a history of puerperal infection or gonorrhoea, followed by chronic pelvic pain, profuse menstruation and sterility; on examination the enlarged tubes may be felt. acute salpingitis requires rest in bed in a propped up posture, sedatives, hot fomentations and skilled nursing. urgent symptoms and signs of spreading peritonitis may call for opera- tive interference, chiefly for the purpose of peritoneal drainage. chronic salpingitis, or pyosalpinx, renders a woman an invalid and permanent relief can only be afforded by surgery. tubercu- lous salpingitis is usually secondary to tuberculous infection in other parts, such as the lungs or peritoneum. the fallopian tubes may be the seat of malignant disease; this is rarely primary but usually an extension of cancer of the uterus or ovaries. in tubul pregnancy the fertilised ovum becomes embedded in the tube instead of in the uterus. the chief cause of this ab-- normality is kinking and adhesion of the tube is the result of former salpingitis, and this state of the tube is found in 75% of cases of tubal pregnancy. the tubal ovum has a precari- ous existence, because of the eroding action of the villi surround- ing it upon the thin tubal wall. either the ovum becomes separa- ted and surrounded by blood, and in consequence dies, forming a tubal mole; or, the eroding villi perforate the tubal wall, resulting in rupture of the tube and profuse intraperitoneal haemorrhage. after the formation of a tubal mole the tube undergoes spasmodic contractions and attempts to expel the mole through the ostium; this process (tubal abdertion) is accompanied by violent attacks of pain and the escape of blood into the peritoneal cavity. the bleeding is usually localised by adhesions and forms beside the tube a swelling of varying size (pelvic haematocele). tubal preg- nancy usually comes to an end at about the 6th week. rarely the ovum continues to develop after rupture of the tube and may even continue to full-term, the placenta gaining attachment to the pelvic or abdominal structures. the uterus undergoes slight enlargement and always develops a decidua which is expelled when the pregnancy is disturbed. the signs of tubal pregnancy before rupture are amenorrhoea, pelvic pain and the presence of an enlarged tube. when rupture occurs there is sudden and severe pain with great shock and collapse, and the haemorrhage is usually so severe as to imperil life. the more common event is, fortunately, mole formation with tubal abor- tion and production of a haematocele; the symptoms of this are spasmodic attacks of severe pain and irregular uterine haemor- rhage and, sometimes, the passage of a decidual cast from the uterus; on examination the haematocele is felt as a swelling in the pelvis. in all forms the only treatment is abdominal section and removal of theaffected tube. in those rare cases in which the placenta and foetus continue to develop until full-term, the child may be removed alive by abdominal section but is often deformed and rarely survives for long. if the foctus die it may become the seat of calcification (/itiepuedion) and be retained within the ab- domen indefinitely. diseases of the ovaries and parovarium congenital absence of the ovaries, except in association with some foetal monstrosity, is unknown. prolapse or descent from its normal position into the pouch of douglas, is usually associat- ed with backward displacement of the uterus or salpingitis and pyosalpinx but it may occur from elongation of the utero-ovarian ligament. a prolapsed ovary is tender and painful and is one cause of dyspareunia. inflammation (odphoritis) is commonly dependent on infection of the tubes or peritoneum or, on the right side, on appendicitis; but the tuberculous variety may be primary. the causes of odphoritis are the same as those of sal- pingitis. if the condition becomes chronic the capsule is thick- ened, the follicles cannot rupture and the ovary becomes con- verted into a collection of tiny follicular cysts (small cystic or cirrhotic ovary); ovarian tumours (generally cystic) are common. the two commonest are the multilocular pseudomucinous adeno- matous cyst, which may arise at almost any age and attain an enormous size, and the unilocular epoephoric cyst which arises women, education of from the tubules in the hilum of the ovary; both are innocent and occasionally bilateral. the so-called dermoid cvst, really a teratoma, along with sebaceous material, may contain bone, teeth, hairs, skin and many other tissues. the papilomatons cyst may be semi-malignant and often gives rise to secondary im- plantations on the peritoneum; it is usually bilateral. broad liega- ment cysts are unilocular and may reach a large size; they origi- nate from the rudimentary wolffian tubules. ‘ chocolate ” or ‘“‘ tarry cysts ” arise from implanted endomctrium (cndometrio- ma); they are usually bilateral and are associated with dysmenor- rhoca and sterility. ovarian cysts seldom cause pronounced symptoms but are liable to such grave complications as torsion of the pedicle, rupture and suppuration; they are all hable to under- go malignant change. fibroma is the commonest innocent solid tumour. malignant disease (carcinoma and sarcoma) may be primary, or more commonly, secondary to cancer of the gastro- intestinal tract or breast. the treatment of all varieties of ova- rian tumour is removal by operation as soon as possible. diseases of the pelvic peritoneum nearly all of these infections result from childbirth or abortion or from gonorrhoea and become localised to the pelvic part of the peritoneal cavity. pelvic peritonitis or perimetritis may procecd to abscess formation, the most common situation being the pouch of douglas; from thence the abscess may either burst into the rectum or the bladder. evenii pelvic peritonitis resolves with- out abscess-formation it always leaves adhesions, of greater or less extent, between the uterus, tubes, ovaries and adjacent coils of intestine, resulting in abnormal position of the pelvic organs, sterility, dysmenorrhoea and other pelvic pain. general peritoni- tis of genital origin is comparatively rare; it may follow puerperal infection, but seldom, if ever, is the result of gonorrhoea, h ydro- perifoneum, a collection of free iluid in the peritoneal cavity, may be due to many general causes but also to papillomatous or can- cerous ovarian tumours. connective tissues —pelvic cellulitis or parametritis, a septic inflammation of the pelvic cellular tissue, chiefly at the bases of the broad ligaments, is usually preceded by labour, especially if difficult or instrumental and accompanied by tears of the cervix uterl. the symptomsare rigours, rise of pulse-rate and intrapelvic pain, with tenderness and swelling on one or both sides of the pelvis beside the uterus, which becomes fixed in the exudate as if embedded in plaster of paris. the inflammation may undergo resolution if appropriately treated or may go on to suppuration, forming an extraperitoneal abscess which may point in the vagina, rectum or bladder and occasionally in the groin. if the pus can be localised an incision should be made and the abscess drained. references.—t, w. eden and c. lockyer, new system of gynaecology (1917); f. h. garrison, an introduction to the itistory of medicine (1921). (e. hp.) women, education of.—“ the growing demand for higher education ”’ referred to in the article on education (q¢.2.) has been most marked in the sphere of women’s education. on both sides of the atlantic this movement has caused a great deal of pressure on the existing schools for girls and colleges for women. i. in great britain as. regards england and wales the report of the board of i;ducation for 1923-4 states that in grant-aided secondary schools there were in 1910 72,447 girls; in 1924 171,176. schools generally are larger than they were. in 1909 361 girls went to the universi- tiles; in 1921 the corresponding figure was 1,214. the reform movement in women’s education began about 1850. colleges came first, then high schools, and between 1875 and 1900 these developed, though under financial stress and many limitations. the local education authorities, under the act of 1902, established new schools and took over, transformed or aided existing ones. the board of education grant and regula- tions from 1904 unified and encouraged growth, while the foundation of the civic universities widened opportunity for women more even than for men. all this reform justified itself 1053 during the war; it had made possible the extraordinary contri- bution of women to national service. simultaneously women, hitherto supported by their families. became self-supporting, owing either to choice or to need; parents, who had never desired secondary or university education for their daughters, learnt its value. hence the pressure felt most seriously at the colleges for women at oxford and cambridge. hostels at civic universities are thronged also. no demand appears for any general change in the existing plans of work or of life, though greater freedom and variety for individuals is urgent- ly claimed, and the competition and overpressure to enter are strongly deprecated. the outstanding characteristics of the movement since rort are unity and standardisation among schools, and the develop- ment of boarding schools. two forces caused the former. the first is the action of the board of education, which acts, not only through grants, regulations and inspections, but through exam- ination schemes. the state has never made any difference be- tween boys and girls in education; the same grants are paid, the same state scholarships offered, the same standards required. women appreciate this equality, but they demand freedom for the individual, a longer time of preparation for examinations, and the wider recognition of music and art. the second force, more vague but as effective, is the spread of the tradition formed in the older schools into the new council schools. that tradition was itself derived from the best ideals of english colleges and public schools. the new secondary schools for girls were staffed by women themselves true to such traditions. head mistresses often fought hard to establish and maintain this tradition against that derived from earlier and meaner forms of public elementary education and they generally succeeded. today there are council schools with fine buildings, good tone, and high intellectual standards of which the country may be proud. the free place system has made little difference to the high schools for girls. free and fee-paying pupils blend and share social life and self-government. ‘the system may be responsible for the increased popularity of the new boarding school. the boarding school has always suited certain english families who send their boys to the public schools. this new type has attrac- tions; games, college women as mistresses, marked physical care and comfort, kindly methods of discipline, intellectual standards of work. the initiative for this type was made at st. andrews by miss lumsden and miss dove in 1885. new boarding schools have been opened, and older ones extended, but women have kept together in one professional body the heads of schools of every social type. the association of headmistresses, founded in 1874 by miss buss and seven other heads, now contains 510 members, representing probably 120,000 girl pupils. (.-ae bo il. in the united states the movement to supply facilities for the higher education of women in the united states developed rapidly in the latter half of the 19th century through the action on the part of a number of the state universities in opening their doors to women students. it was realised that the theory of free public instruc- tion prevailing in the schools should be extended to collegiate institutions, and by 1875 14 state universities, in addition to antioch, cornell and boston, had admitted women to their membership. doubts had been expressed as to the intellectual capacity of women to undertake curricula which had been formu- jated solely for men, but such doubts were at once dissipated by the women students themselves. the year 1861 witnessed the foundation of vassar college, the first privately endowed college for women, and by 1900 a number of institutions had grown up, such as smith (1871), wellesley (1875), bryn mawr (1880) and barnard (1889), all independent of state aid. the success of these colleges warranted the president of bryn mawr in rgoo in pointing with pride to what had been accomplished up to that time in respect to the higher education of women. the average standing of the women, it was demonstrated, was better than 1054 that of the men students, and the thought that a course of study, modified especially for women, might supplant the men’s curricu- lum had proved unwarranted. the best academic traditions of men’s education had become thoroughly accepted as the stand- ard in women’s colleges. there is evidence that the movement has lost something of its brilliance, and the satisfaction resulting from things achieved is not so complete as formerly. there are indications that a modification of curricula in the intercst of women may be near. vassar, in july 1926, opened a course in cuthenics, which it defines as the science of home making, rearing of children and bettering of the community. smith college, with the financial aid of the laura spelman rockefeller memorial fund, founded, in 1925, the institution for the co-ordination of women’s interests, which seeks to relieve the dissatisfaction among college graduates caused by a lack of harmony between their college education and their home life. there were other indica- tions of this tendency in spasmodic attempts at substitutions for, or additions to, established courses. the teaching of technique in music and art hasin some cases been added to that of theory. “xperience, however, scems to show that the older courses tend to reassert themselves. at the close of the first quarter of the 2oth century the out- standing feature of the women’s educational movement was the amazing increase in the number of women students. the follow- ing table shows the progress of the movement since 1890:-— women enrolicd in universttics, colleges and professional schools: 1890 1900 igio 1920 1924 preparatory 22,219: | 2v471 |}, 233426 | 20,015: |.23,033 collegiate . | 20,624 | 36,051 | 61,139 | 128,677 | 196,482 graduate . 409 1,719 2,866 5,:775 | 10,355 professional o77 2,144 5,688 3,336 5.651 total. <p ahh 22 61,385 | 93,119 | 159,203 | 235,521 degrees conferred (a.b.) 9,547 | 15,267 | 23,272 | 36,258 in 1926 it was stated over one-third of the total number of students enrolled in the colleges and universities of the united states were women. women, legal position of (sce 28.782).—during the years 1911-26, and especially after the world war, there was a gencral movement throughout the civilised world towards the emancipa- tion of women from legal disabilities. it was particularly strong in great britain, where legal discrimination between men and women has, broadly speaking, ceased to exist, and where women not only exercise the franchise, both parliamentary and municipal, but sit in the house of commons, where one or two have even attained ministerial rank. i. great britain civil rights —by the representation of the people act 1918, which swept away all the old franchises, the parhamentary suffrage was granted to all women, whether single, married or widows, not being less than 30 years of age (sce woman suf- frage). there are three qualifications for women as parlia- mentary electors under the act—residential, university and as the wife of a local government elector. in her own right a woman may qualify by residence in the electoral area and may in addition have one or more university votes. as the wife of a local government clector she may also have a parlia- mentary vote, but she may not vote more than once in the same election nor for more than one ordinary constituency in a general election. in addition she may have one university vote at a general election. to qualify as a local government clector she must have (a) attained the age of 21, be resident in the arca on the last day of the qualifying period (jan. 15 or july 15), have occupied some land or premises in the area for the whole of the qualifying period, or, in the alternative, (4) must have attained the age of 30 and be the wife of a man who is entitled to be registered as a local government elector in respect of the premises women, legal position of in which they both reside. to qualify as a parliamentary elector she must have attained the age of 30 and must be entitled to be registered as a local government elector in respect of the occupa- tion in the electoral area of land or premises of the yearly value of not less than £5, or of a dwelling house, however small the value, or be the wife of a husband entitled to be so registered. this means that the husband must own land or premises in the area of the yearly value of not less than fs. a pecress in her own right can be an elector, and so cana peeress by marriage. there are certain offices, chiefly in scot- land, which if conferred on a woman would incapacitate her as a voter. the wife of a person serving in military or naval forces of the crown who would, if he were not so serving, be entitled to be registered as an elector is not disqualified. in the case of a university vote the woman elector must be 30 years of age and must have fulfilled the same academic conditions as a man elector. . within a year of being admitted to the franchise women were declared canable of holding any public office not being eccle- siastical or military offices. the sex disqualification (removal) act 1919, which applies to the whole of great britain and ire- land, provides that no person shall be disqualified by sex or marriage from the exercise of any public function, or from being appointed to or holding any civil or judicial office or post or from entcring or assuming or carrying on any civil pro- fession or vocation or for admission to any incorporated society (whether incorporated by royal charter or otherwise), and a person shall not be exempted by sex or marriage from liability to serve as a juror. the act further provides (u) that his majesty may by order in council authorise the admission of women to the civil service, and reserve to men any branch of, or posts in, the civil service in h.m. possessions overseas or in any foreign country; (6) that any judge or other person before whom a case is heard may in his discretion on application (in both civil and criminal cases) by either party or at his own instance make an order that the jury be composed of men or women only, or may on her application exempt a woman from scrvice on a jury by reason of the nature of the evidence or issues to be tried. section 2 provides for the admission of women as so- licitors. section 3 enables any university to admit women to membership or any: degree notwithstanding any statute or charter of such university. the act overrides all previous statutes, orders in council, royal charters or other provisions inconsistent with it. in the viscountess rhondda’s claim (1922, 2 a.c.339), however, it was held by the committee for privileges of the house of lords that the act did not affect existing patents so as to en- title women to sit in the house of lords. a peeress in her own right, therefore, is under a double disability: her sex excludes her from the itouse of lords and her rank from the house of com- mons. attempts to remedy this anomaly by legislation have so far (1926) been unsuccessful. property.—the principle of equal rights for both sexes was embodied in the new english law of property which came into force on jan. 1 1926 (see proprrtty, law of). since then in england and wales a woman, whether married or unmarried, may hold and dispose of property, both real and personal, on the same terms as a man. as regards unmarried women this was little more than a consequence of the assimilation of the law of realty to that of personalty, but the legislative scheme went further: so far as the law of property is concerned the old doc- irine of the legal personality of a married woman being merged in that of her husband has disappeared entirely. under any dis- position operating after 1925 husband and wife take as separate persons. formerly upon intestacy real estate was subject to dower and courtesy and a widower was entitled to the whole of his wife’s personal estate, whereas a widow was entitled only to £500 and a third of the remainder of her husband’s personalty (or a half if there were no issue). under the new law dower and courtesy have been abolished and widower and widow are placed on the same footing, 7.e., the surviving spouse takes {1,000 absolutely and, as tothe remainder of the estate real, and personal, women, legal position of a life interest in one-half where there is issuc, or in the whole where there is no issue. afarriage.—the doctrine of the subordination of the wife and her identity in law with her husband remains opcrative to some extent in matrimonial law (see marriace laws). a married woman’s domicile is that of her husband, and she cannot acquire a domicile of choice even when living apart from him under a decree of judicial separation (aflorney-general for alberta 2. cook [1926] 42 t.l.r. 317). the husband is legally entitled to the wife’s obeclicnce, though the extent to which the courts will aid him in enforcing his right is extremely limited. on the other hand, even in the marriage laws, the modifications have been made in the direction of sex equality. thus, as a corollary to the sex disqualification (removal) act, the guardianship of infants act 1924 was passed, whereby the guardianship of infant children, which formerly belonged to the father alone, has been vested in the parents jointly, and, in event of the death of either, in the survivor. if the parcnts disagree, either may apply to the court, and the court in making an order is to be guided solely by consideration of the infant’s interest. another important change in the english law of husband and wife was made by the matrimonial causes act 1923, which relieved a wife petitioner for divorce of the necessity of proving cruclty, desertion, etc., in addition to adultery. (no change was necessary in the law of scotland, which has always recognised a husband’s adultery as in itself a sufficient ground for divorce.) a wife can obtain a maintenance order from a magistrate if she separates from her husband on the ground of his assault on her, or his desertion. orders made abroad can now be enforced in england, and, if made in england, can be enforced against the husband abroad. maintenance of the children can also be obtained up to ros. per child. the sentiment in favour of sex equality has also resulted in amendments of the english criminal law, but here the modi- fications have deprived women of some legal privileges that they formerly enjoyed. thus at common law a married woman living with her husband was deemed incapable of stealing from him, but that immunity was taken away by the larceny act 1920. again, the common law presumption that a woman who commits a crime (other than treason or murder) in her husband’s presence does so by reason of his coercion was abolished by sec. 47 of the criminal justice act 1925, though coercion by the husband remains a good defence—that is to say, the burden of proof has been shifted from the prosecution to the defence. (d. ca.) ii. the united states with the progressive breaking down of the legal conception of the household as an entity ruled from within by a head, and as an agency of social control, it becomes necessary to give legal recognition and protection to individual interests of women in the domestic relations, which at common law were supposed to be secure through the internal economy of the houschold, or were. left unsecured in view of a paramount social interest in the houschold as a social institution. summarily, these may be put as parental interests—interests of women in the relation of parent and child, and marifal interests—interests of women in the relation of husband and wife. parent and child.—at common law the father was entitled to the custody of his minor child and the mother had a right to custody only after the father’s death. in form this still stands in the books as law, but in substance there has been a complete change within a generation. equity long ago refused to give effect to the father’s common law right of custody as against the interest of the child, and by taking the equitable doctrine of regard for the interest of the child over into the law, the courts have been able to put father and mother upon an equality for practical purposes in almost all jurisdictions. yet the common law doctrine remains theoretically in force in the absence of legislation, and legislation halts. one decision, as late as 1903, holds that as between father and mother the former has a legal right to control the religious training of the children (hernandez v. thomas, 50 florida reports, 522, 536). to55 husband and wife.—marital interests of women include claims against the world at large growing out of the relation of husband and wife, and claims of wives against husbands because of that relation. as interests of personality a wife has claims to the society of her husband, quite apart from any economic advantage; to the affection of her husband, analogous to the legally recognised claim of the husband to the society and affec- tion of the wife; and to the chastity and constancy of the husband as involving her self-respect and honour. these interests, however, are not yet recognised to their full extent and are not fully secured even in legal theory. the first and second are now protected by an action for alienating the husband’s affections, which hascometobeallowed by the overwhelming weight of ameri- can authority (turnerv. heavrin, 182 kentucky reports, 65,1918). the third was recognised recently in new york (oppenheim z. kridel, 236 new york reports, 156). generally it is at most but partially recognised and indirectly secured; but it should be said that the obvious inutility of the husband’s means of redress, which should be applied by analogy to make the law logically complete, has had much to do with the apparent backwardness of the law on this subject. | as an interest of substance the wife may claim to be secured in the marriage relation as an economically advantageous relation, providing her with support and shelter. where the husband is enticed or induced to abandon his wife or to divert earnings which should be devoted to her support, the courts are coming to recognise this intcrest directly. (the wife’s action was allowed in flandermeyer #. cooper, 85 ohio state reporis, 327, 1912; it was denicd in brown »v. kistleman, 177 tudiana reports, 692, t912.) on the other hand, in case of physical injury to, or abduction of, the husband, the wife is still usually denied an action, although the husband may recover in the converse case for “loss of service.” the claim of the wife to support was recognised fully and secured adequately at common law. legis- lation setting up domestic relations courts and providing for criminal prosecution in case of non-support has only put more effective administrative machinery behind existing legal duties of the husband. the most scrious inequalities in this connection were in the procedural diflicultics encountered in enforcing the wife’s legal rights. domestic relations courts, which have had a consider- able development in the united states, are adapted especially to removing these obstacles (sec smith, justice and ihe poor, chap. ii.). modern legislation, although taking away from the husband all control over the wife’s property and earnings and committing it solely to the wife, has left untouched the common law duty of the husband to support the wife even if she has property and he has none. some courts go so far as to allow a wife possessed of means who has supported herself out of her separate estate to sue the husband and obtain restitution of the amount thus contributed. (de bauwere v. de bauwere, 203 new york reporis, 460, 1911). a few western states, however, now im- pose upon a wife of means and ability a duty of supporting an indigent and infirm husband, and allow an action by the husband to enforce this duty (hagert ». hagert, 22 north dakota reports, 200, 1911). american courts now recognise the separate domi- cile of the wife substantially to the full extent of her individual interest 1n free self-assertion (williamson »v. osenton, 232 u.s. reports, 619, 1914). so also with respect to actions by the wife against the husband. the older married women’s acts, which in form merely removed disabilities as to property and contract, were long construed as not allowing such actions since they did not do so expressly, and a policy against aggravation of domestic troubles by dragging them into court was taken to be in the way. this sacrifice of the individual interests of the wife to the supposed exigencies of a social interest has now definitely given way, and conservative courts are allowing such actions even under statutes in terms dealing with property rights only (brown v. brown, 88 connecticut reports, 42,1914). the more recent type of statute, providing that a married woman shall have the same legal existence and personality after marriage as before marriage, necessarily 1056 permits such litigation (fielder v. fielder, 42 oklahoma reports, 124, 1914). as to capacity to own, acquire, use and enjoy property, little remains of the old law, and there are but few jurisdictions where icgislation might still accomplish anything. in one respect, however, improvement by judicial decision is still going forward. a number of states, by derivation directly or indirectly from spanish law, have the institution of “ com- munity property,” in which with respect to certain property, and especially property acquired after marriage, husband and wife are treated legally as a sort of property-owning entity. the older view was that the husband was the administering agent of this collectivity during their joint lives, and hence could dis- pose of it, alter its form, and charge it with his personal debts; and that it could even be taken in execution for his wrongful acts. recent decisions in some of these jurisdictions, recog- nising the individual interest of the wife, hold that the com- munity property is not liable for acts done by the husband outside of the reasonable scope of his authority as agent of the community (schramm 2. steele, 97 washington reports, 300, 1917). yet even there a claim for an injury to the wife, being an acquisition after marriage and community property, she is not allowed to sue therefore if her husband rcfuses to join (hynes 2. colman dock co., 108 washington reports, 642, 1910). . protection of women in industry.—american courts have been reluctant to give over, or to construct, legislation as abrogating common law privileges or disabilities which protected married women to uphold legislation restricting freedom of contract on the part of women in industry with respect to hours and con- ditions of iabour and minimum wage. when such statutes were first enacted, they were held unconstitutional as being arbitrary and unreasonable interferences with liberty of contract by a court which had had no hesitation in keeping alive common law disabilities that had long ceased to secure any individual or social interest. that decision has been overruled (ritchie 2. wayman, 244 illinois reports, 509, 1910), and it seems to be settled that legislation may take account of the facts of women’s physical make-up and secure the social interest in a healthy womanhood by regulating the hours of labour of adult females (muller v. oregon, 208 u.s. reports, 412, 1908; bunting 2. oregon, 243 u.s. reports, 416, 1917). but it is now held that this may not be carried to the extent of fixing a minimum wage for women employees (adkins v. children’s hospital, 261 united states reports, 525). the political and legal emancipa- tion of women is urged asa reason against such legislation, asif the removal of political and legal disabilities had any relation to, or effect upon, the physical handicaps upon women in industry which are the occasion of these statutes. women on juries—in 1917 california provided for the draw- ing of women upon juries (laws of 1917, p. 1283). since the adoption of the ninctecnth amendment of the federal consti- tution providing for women suffrage, t920, it has been assumed that women are to sit upon juries everywhere. but in some jurisdictions, out of caution, it is felt that the courts should await express legislation, and in other courts have felt compelled to wait until courthouses and jury-rooms could be adjusted to the novel situation presented by juries of men and women. (r. po.*) women, professional.—the period ro1o—26 was marked, both in the british empire and in the united states, and to a less- er degree in other countries, by a general opening of the learned professions to women. the article herewith deals with this aspect of the movement towards sex equality, firstly in great britain, and secondly in the united states. i. in great britain medicine-—in oct. 1925 women in the medical profession celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of its opening to their sex. honours granted to medical women include that of o.b.e. to a woman doctor and a surgeon. four important meclical works were published by qualified women in 1925. about 200 medical women hold honorary hospital appointments in great britain, of whom 75 are stationed in london. the major appointments women, professional held include the following: professor (university of london) of anatomy; associate examiner in obstetric medicine for m.b. and m.s. examination; the representative appointed by the ministry of health to the central midwives’ board; honorary gynaccolo- gist to the plymouth infirmary; surgeon to the royal edinburgh hospital for sick children and edinburgh university; lecturer on the diseases of children; and honorary physician to the british hospital for mental disorders and nervous diseases. the academic successes gained by women in medicine are too numerous to individualise, but the brunton memorial prize, the highest award glasgow university faculty of medicine can offer, was gained in 1925 by a woman. many medical women serve on the various committees and sub-committees of the british medical association. there is a medical women’s federation for great britain, which has voiced the corporate opinion of medical women upon a number of public and pro- fessional topics, including the defence of married medical wom- en; regulated prostitution in the crown colonies; the reversal of the policy of co-education of students at st. mary’s hospital, london, and unequal salarics as between men and women employed as officers of health. inequality between the sexes is almost as rampant in the pro- fessiona] as jn the industrial world. in 1921 there was a recrudes- cence of the policy of dismissing married medical women begun. by the metropolitan borough of st. pancras dismissing, upon her marriage and unashamedly because of her marriage, its woman assistant medical officer of health, regardless of the fact that her work largely consisted in child welfare and maternity work. the example of st. pancras was widey followed and the position of the married women in the public health service is at present (1926) most precarious. lower salaries are constantly offered to women health officers than to men by the municipal authoritics—fortunately many medical women are public- spirited enough to refuse them—and the unfair principle of unequal payment is embedded in the government system where, because unequal pay prevails as between men and women in all grades of the post office, exception is not made with regard to women working for it. a good proportion of medical women cdo really well in private practice. two women doctors have stood for parliament and several serve upon local government bocties. the legal profession —the sex disqualification (removal) act admitted women (7#ter alia) to the legal profession on dec. 23 1919 and on dec. 24 1919 the middle temple enrolled the first woman bar student in england. early in 1921 ivy williams, ll.d., became the first woman barrister and in nov. ro21 ten other women were called. as dr. williams does not practice, the senior in precedence in date of studentship of these ten, helena normanton, b.a., became the senior practising woman barrister in england, in accordance with the bar council regula- tions then in force regulating seniority. four women barristers have passed with first-class honours. several have gained prizes -and studentships. four have had written legal work published. about 12 are in actual practice, out of some 50 who have been called. the number of women students is well on to 100. several barristers have made really creditable appearances in courts, where judges take no apparent notice of the sex of the advocates before them. three at least have been highly commended by judges for their conduct of cases. the senior practising woman was the first of her sex to appear in the high court (both divorce and chancery divisions), the central criminal court, london sessions, and, in 1925, was briefed to appear before the u.s. secretary of state at wash- ington. the early appearances of women barristers in practice has caused more press comment than was at all desirable; this led to a certain degree of male resentment, and a little friction which now appears to be lessening. however, at least two bar messes have refused election to candidates ostensibly upon this ground. most circuits now admit women but many male bar- risters still refuse to share chambers with women barristers or to take women pupils. men solicitors have not yet got into the habit of briefing women, other than a few, and an enormous prejudice still remains to be overcome. the newcomer, if a women, professional woman, cannot yet, at the english bar, reckon on a safe liveli- hood. aspirants should have at least £1,000 to live upon after call whilst building up practice. the majority of women with a legal vocation should carefully consider the greater opportunities open to them in becoming solicitors. direct contact with the lay client should ensure a livelihood to a capable woman solicitor. by the end of 1925 there were 134 women articled clerks, and 34 women had been admitted as solicitors, of whom 24 had taken out practising certificates. eight women had passed with honours and 2 had won important prizes. miss carric morrison is the senior woman solicitor in england. the training and examinations for women barristers and solicitors are respectively identical with those of men. marriage is an asset in ordinary professional practice, but it is a bar to the employment of the woman lawyer in the govern- ment service. the church.—in the church of england the order of women deacons has been canonically restored by the joint action of the convocations of canterbury and york, following the proposal of the lambeth conference of 1920. this diaconate is on the model of the primitive diaconate rather than on the lines of the present diaconate, which for men is regarded almost entirely as a stepping stone to the priesthood. women deacons do not at present officiate precisely as the men; neither have they the same sphere of service. convocation has recently authorised a service for the making and ordering of deaconesses. marriage is permitted to deaconesses. there is no specific place for deacon or deacons in the national assembly of the church of england, neither in the house of clergy nor the house of laity. women can sit for the b.d. degree at most universities and for the archbishop’s diploma— the s.th. to the national assembly 49 lay women have been elected. admission to the priesthood and episcopate of the church of england does not seem to be within very easy dis- tance, owing to the effect of lambeth conference (1920) resolu- tion no. 5. the established church of scotland has not yet opened its ministry to women. the ministry of most of the free churches is now open to women and the only remaining difficulty is for women to obtain calls to pastorates of responsibility and dignity with adequate remuneration. politics and diplomacy—perhaps representation of one’s fellow citizens is a vocation rather than a profession, but the technical side of political work is now practically a new profes- sion. speakers and organisers are the principal types of workers. the speakers are graded according to merit. the organisers are divided into missioners and organisers. the former go round from door to door explaining the party’s policy, and for this they must have a wide knowledge of the political questions of the day; the second weld the units into a whole, create and main- tain an organisation. the higher posts are those of central office district agents who are placed in charge of areas varying from about 30 to 75 constituencies, and who are responsible, not only for the organisation of women throughout the area, but act in an advisory capacity for other positions. above these again comes the central office staff, controlling and directing the women’s activities throughout the country, and finally the post of chief of the staff. diplomacy, a profession opened in 1925 to women in both france and the u.s.a., remains closed to british women by an order in council under the sex disqualification (removal) act 1919. miss gertrude bell, however, did outstandingly good work in mesopotamia in a quasidiplomatic position and drafted a remarkable state paper upon political matters associated with that district. the consulate is expressly closed 1o women under the above-mentioned act of parliament. other professtons.—miss harris smith in 1918 was elected an honorary member of the incorporated society of accountants. in 1920 the institute of chartered accountants opened its doors to her. the society of incorporated accountants and auditors admitted women in 1919. there is now a small batch of women accountants in actual practice, some of whom are reported to be doing very well. miss ethel watts, b.a., was the first woman 1057 who passed the final examination of the institute of chartered accountants (1924). in 1918 miss l. charles was admitted a.r.i.b.a. and in 1900 miss b. charles. the school of the society of architects has been training women since 1918 and there are now several other wom- en architects. miss irene martin is the first woman member of the surveyor’s institution. the auctioneers and estate agents’ institute and the land agents society have both admitted several women. in dec. 1922 miss aileen cust became the first fully qualified member of the royal college of veterinary sur- geons. journalism.—the profession of lobby correspondent in the hfouse of commons was opened to women by the appointment of miss stella wolfe murray in 1924. equal minimum pay is at any rate the rule now in fleet street, but opportunities for women journalists of getting upon the more serious sides of their papers are still very restricted. the editorships of weekly and monthly magazines are the most lucrative spheres for women. | engincering—kin this profession women are making consid- erable headway. miss v. holmes, b.sc., a.m.i.m.e., was the first woman to be admitted to the institute of mechanical engineers. the institution of civil enginecrs has one member, that of automobile engineers two, of electrical engincers eleven, of marine engineers two; whilst the institute of metals has about twelve members and the society of engineers has one. a large manchester elecirical engineering firm has two women as college apprentices, this being the first occasion in which women have been allowed to serve an apprenticeship in the same way as collegiate men students. a decision of the international acrial navigation commission forbidding women pilots to be employed by commercial aircraft firms, or even by their own private enterprise to take up passen- gers for hire, was rescinded early in 1926 by international agree- ment. (h. nor.) il. in the united states the ratification of woman suffrage in 1920 following the spirited discussion of the rights of women and the widespread utilisation of the service of women in the world war, stimulated the en- trance of women into all kinds of professional service. this is noticeable, not so much in the increase in the total number of professional women, which grew from about 734,000 in 1910 to 1,016,498 in 1920 (11-9 % of all gainfully employed women), but rather in the increases in the newer types of work such as chemists, draftsmen and designers, social workers, college pro- fessors, and especially positions in the government service. the federal women’s bureau in bulletin no. 27, of the occupational progress of women, has pointed out that the two groups making the largest gains during the decade 1910-20 were teachers and nurses, although the number of men! in these fields declined both actually and relatively. librarians, both male and female, showed a considerable increase, the women’s group more than doubling. these was a decrease in the numbers gainfully employed in the following groups: artists, sculptors and teachers of art; musicians and teachers of music; and physicians, surgeons and osteopaths (both sexes). of the more unusual professions the following showed great increases: chemists, assayers and metallurgists; clergymen; law- yers, judges and justices; college presidents and professors; ostcopaths, theatrical owners, managers and officials; charity and welfare workers; teachers of athletics and dancing; and draftsmen and designers. on the border line between the pro- fessions and the “ trades ” should be noted increased numbers of bankers and bank officials; insurance agents, real estate dealers and agents; accountants and auditors; dentists and assistants; and telegraph and telephone operators. out of the thousands of women in the various professions, 1,582 were listed in who’s who in america for 1920-1. of these, as compiled by prof. s.s. visher, 714 were writers, 244 educators, 127 social workers, 117 artists, 63 actresses, 46 singers, 34 editors, and 28 were physicians. other professions listed included law- yers, scientists, musicians, explorers and politicians. the great 1058 majority of these lived in or near jarge cities, one-third residing in new york state. of the 88° who attended college or uni- versity one-half reported training in women’s colleges, and 53% of all those listed were married. with the exception of the large groups of teachers and nurses this picture is possibly fairly de- scriptive of the entire body of professional women. in several of these professions women have won highest honours, including jour of the leading prizes for novels offered in 1925, three of the four prizes offered by harpers magazine for short stories, and a notable prize in poctry. women have also done outstanding literary work in biography, criticism and social politics. in painting and sculpture, fewer women have reached leading positions, although two or three artists have won highest honours in sculpture. in architecture, landscape gardening and interior decoration there has been a great influx of women workers, and the rapidly increasing devclopment of suburban villages offers to the woman with a combination of artistic and business ability an excelicnt opportunity. probably the most notable development of professional service among women has taken place in the fields of political and social welfare. in federal employment, although women were technical- ly given equal] opportunity with men in civil service examinations, there still exists discrimination against them in the matter of appointments and entrance salaries. however, the number of women holding public office cither as expert, as administrator or as politician has greatly increased. the outstanding positions held by women in the federal service include a third secretary in the legation at switzerland, a vice-consul in holland, an assistant united states attorney general, members of the u.s. civil service and of the workmen’s compensation commission, heads of the women’s and the children’s bureaux, and many positions as experts and administrators in the various government bureaux. congress has had one woman senator (temporary appointment) and seven members in the house. in the state service women are found in practically every branch from sheriff to governor, texas and wyoming being the two states claiming the latter distinction. there are nearly 150 women in the various state legislatures; several state super- intendents of public education; and hundreds in city and county offices, including the important position of secretary of state in new york. the highest paid women in state service is the registrar in new york county who receives $12,000 a year, and one of the most honored positions is that held by the woman member of the ohio state supreme court. municipal or district courts have opened their doors to women jurists much mote [re- quently during the decade (1915-25) and the number of women with a private law practice has been a notable development. the more intelligent treatment of delinquent children and erring girls has developed in the last decade an almost new profession, juvenile courts have been established with women officers to study the child and its home condition and make recommendations tothe judge. also in connection with municipal police departments, women’s divisions have been established in about 120 cities and villages and a national organisation of policewomen has been formed. in the 1910 census this occupa- tion was not listed but in 1920, 236 were so recorded. religious, charity and social workers, according to the 1920 census more than trebled, and keepers of charitable and penal institutions more than doubled. (132a) the league of nations —the charter of the league of nations contains a clause rendering women eligible forall its appointments, including those on the secretariat. this clause did not remain a dead letter. besides a large number of women in less responsible positions, dame rachel crowdy was made director of the section dealing with the white-slave and opium traffic, with the care of women and children. at the first assembly of the league (geneva, nov.~dec. 1920) sweden appointed mrs. wicksell and norway dr. kristine bonnevie as alternate representatives of their respective countries; and in sept. 1922 great britain appointed mrs. coombe tennant as substitute delegate, mrs. swannick received the same appointment under the labour govt., and mrs. alfred lyttelton under the conservative govt. women, war work of of 1924 and the duchess of athol in 1925. miss forchhammer, of denmark, brought forward in the full assembly the subject of the white-slave traffic, and was successful in carrying her proposal to appoint a commission of three persons, one of whom must be a woman, to prosecute a special inquiry on the subject in the near east. miss sophie sanger was made head of the legal section of the international labour bureau. women, war work of.—it is impossible here to attempt to describe the special work done by women of all the belligerent countries in 1914-8; this article, therefore, is confined to an outline of women’s war-work as organized in the united king- dom and the united states. i. in great britain on aug. 3, before the official declaration of war, the executive committce of the national union of women's suffrage societies decided to suspend political action and devote the organising capacity of the union to mect the changed conditions. the london branch started a free bureau under the name ef “ wom- en’s service” to direct the efforts of the thousands of non- professional women eagerly desirous of finding useful work. many young women began at once to prepare themselves for nursing, joined voluntary aid detachments and worked in auxiliary hospitals. the raising of funds and making of comforts for the units of the original expeditionary force absorbed others, and the arrival of the belgian refugees in england before the end of aug. caused the formation of 2,500 local belgian relief committees, of whom the members were mostly women. clubs to help the wives of soldiers and sailors were started. the women’s united services league co-ordinated and registered the work done by war clubs throughout the kingdom. <a _ large number of women devoted themselves to the work of the sol- diers’ and sailors’ families associations, and to the work of the officers’ families fund. in the early months of the war it became evident that the abnormal conditions arising from the quartering of large num- bers of soldicrs in barracks and camps, and of convalescents in hospitals, would give rise to social dangers, and that steps should be taken to deal with the situation. <a militant suffrage society, the women’s freedom league, formed the women’s police volunteers in sept. 1914. this corps was reorganised shortly afterward as the women police service. to cope with the same evil the national union of women workers called an emergency mecting and as a result a corps of “ women patrols ” was formed to work under the official sanction of the commissioner of police in the metropolitan district, and of the chief con- stables in the provinces. voluntary organisations and corps.—a corps of women called into existence to meet war conditions was the women’s emer- gency corps. in addition to rchef workrooms, and the registration of voluntary offers of service, schemes were started under its auspices which developed independently, after the parent corps had met the “ emergency ” conditions of dislocation of labour and refugee relicf. the collection of surplus food from the london markets for the unemployed and for belgian refugees developed into the national food fund, which raised £163,615 in gifts of food and money before the end of the war. the women’s volunteer reserve, founded in 1914 as a branch of the women’s emergency corps, “to provide a trained and dis- ciplined body of women ready to assist the state in any capac- ity,” did military drill, wore khaki uniform and saluted their officers. the founders’ idea that, as signallers, despatch riders, telegraphists and motorists, they might set free men for-the firing line, was premature in 1914, but anticipated the need actually met later by the women of the army service corps and ©. moawsc. by the spring of 1915, when the country began to feel the drain on its man-powcr, the marchioncess of londondcrry founded the women’s legion, which from the first was intended to be a corps of paid women replacing paid men. a khaki uniform was worn and the women were subject to regulations and discipline. ultimately over 40,000 were enrolled. this corps was the link women, war work of between the independent voluntary associations of women, such as the emergency corps, formed on the outbreak of the war, arid the official women’s services, two of which were sections of the women’s legion. work on land.—throughout 1915 and 1916 efforts were made by voluntary organisations, such as the women’s legion and the women’s defence relicf corps, as well as by the govern- ment, through the war agricultural committees of the board of trade, to induce women to offer their services on the land and to persuade farmers to accept them. the women’s farm and garden union, the most important of the bodics which had dealt with women’s work on the land before the war, started a system of training farms in the autumn of rors. early in 1916 the government provided a grant, and the women’s national land service corps was launched as a war off-shoot of the farm and garden union. by the end of the year the demand for women had become greater than could be met by a small voluntary association, and the women’s land army was in- stituted early in 1917 as a women’s branch of the ministry of agriculture. the corps continued to act as the agent of the land army for organising the supply of women as scasonal workers. munition making.—by the spring of 1915 shell work for women was beginning; in march women tram conductors started work at glasgow, and girls were employed as telegraph operators in liver- pool. but women were impatient at the slowness of the progress of industrial substitution and at the uselessness of the women’s war service register compiled by the board of trade in march r915. in connection with the demand for skilled workers, the london socicty for women’s suffrage, which promoted the introduction of women into occupations hitherto reserved for men, started a munitions and aircraft department in july 1915, and arranged the first training classes in oxy-acetylene welding. the pupils were the first women welders to enter the engineering trade, and after two years the ministry of munitions assumed financial responsibility for the school. messrs. beardmore in glasgow and messrs. vickers at barrow-in- furness and at erith employed women on shell-making in the spring of 1915. in order to ease the strain due to sunday work, a band of women relief munition workers, educated women of the ljecisured class, were trained in the rough turning and boring of 4-5 shells and 18-lb, shrapnel at erith; they bound themselves after training to undertake week-end shifts for six months. enrolicd and non-enrolled women—the women’s services were of two types. first came those composed of enrolled women in the legal sense, who were in the direct employment of the war departments, and whose contracts brought them within the regulations of the defence of the realm act. the women could be enrolled as mobile workers for home service only, or for service at home and abroad; or as immobile workers, re- cruited for local employment, who could not be required to move away from the district. secondly came those composed of non-enrolled women in the legal sense, who did not render them- selves liable to penaltics under the defence of the realm act and might be engaged on an annual or weekly contract. some services enrolled their women for a year only; others for the duration of the war. the enrolled women consisted of the various army nursing services, the military massage service, which started its career in aug. 1914, under the name of the almeric paget massage corps; the women’s forage corps; queen mary’s army aux- iliary corps; the women’s royal naval service, commonly known as the “ wrens ”’; and the women’s royal air force. (see nursing.) in queen mary’s army auxiliary corps which was at first the women’s army auxiliary corps or familiarly the waacs, the women were enrolled as mobiles for home service only, or for home or foreign service, and for the duration of the war; they received a special rate of pay, not civilian or military, and were not enlisted under the army act. at first substitution overseas only had been contemplated, but by march the number of women recruited by the department of national service was so great that home commands were included in the scheme. recruiting was afterwards carried on through the employment depart- ment of the ministry of labour. in dec. 1917, owing to the shrinkage of available woman power, an immobile branch was 1059 formed. women employed in the ordnance army pay depart- ment and record offices at home were not made to join the corps. a khaki uniform with distinguishing badges was worn. in all there were 1,200 officials and 56,000 women, of whom 9,500 were the outside number employed in france at any one time. this figure was made up of women working in the calais, boulogne, etaples, st. omer, abbeville, dieppe, rouen and havre areas and on the lines of communication, chiefly at army schools, and in certain offices at g.itl.q. : in the women’s royal naval service the officers, other than those engaged in the organisation, welfare and discipline of the women, replaced naval officers for the following work: coding and decoding, intelligence work, confidential books, secretaries, telephone exchange, paymasters, accountants, gas mask work and observation station. the ratings were employed as ledger clerks, clerks, shorthand typists, victualling store assistants, telephone opcrators, postal sorters, stewards, cooks, gencral domestic workers, orderlics and messengers, porters and store- women, bakers, tailoresses, gas mask workers, gardeners, fitters, turners, boiler cleaners, boot cleaners and painters, wiring hands, net mine workers. as regards the women’s royal air force, 566 officers and 31,764 other ranks passed through the service, the strength at the time of the armistice being rather over 25,000. the service consisted of mobiles and immobiles in approximately equal proportions. in addition to the administrative, clerical and domestic work common to all the services, the women were employed on meteorological work and as despatch riders, dopers, painters, acetylene welders, carpentcrs, magneto repairers, photographers and drivers. fabric workers did dutics of all kinds from the covering of acroplane wings to the mending of the finest balloon silk. non-enrolled women included the anti-gas department, the army pay corps, the army remount department, and the navy and army canteen board. practically the whole of the work on gas-mask manufacture was performed by women. there were 34 factorics employing 12,0c00 under the immediate con- trol of the anti-gas department and 160 contractors employed a further 90,000 on work for the department. in aug. 19017 a number of educated women were trained for inspection work on the mask of the respirator and drafted out to the factories. they wore an indoor uniform of scarlet and were called ‘ red-coats.” ultimately 800 to 1,000 of these were appointed, and 100 were promoted to the duties of check inspecting, formerly performed by sergeants of the anti-gas department. they were also known as sergeants, and, as regards their dutics, were interchangeable with the men. army pay corps —the army pay department was one of the carlicst in the army to substitute female clerks. in july rors, 479 were working and by jan. © 1916 there were 4,556 female clerks and 13 lady superintendents. the engagement was a weekly one and there was no form of contract till aug. 1917. by that time the demands made for women by the w.a.a.c. and other organisations were so insistent that a form of agreement to serve for the duration of the war and three months afterwards was signed by the superintendents and a portion of the women doing skilled and semi-skilled work. these wore a badge but no uniform, and by march 1918 there were 5,171 of them out of a total of 17,500. navy and army cantcen board—when the navy and army canteen board (then called the army canteen committee) started operations in april 1916, only 20 women clerks were em- ployed. during 1917 the board’s activities were enormously expanded to include catering for the imperial overseas forces and for the american and allicd troops. it was decided in march 1917 to institute a n.a.c.b. women’s corps in mobile and immobile sections, and by the date of the armistice the women employed in connection with canteen organisation in the mobile corps numbered r0,c00 and the clerical staff in the im- mobile corps, 2,000. another branch of women’s work was concerned with pro- viding supplies for the fighting forces. 1060 il. in the united states when the united states entered the world war in april t917, but one organisation depending mainly on the efforts of women was officially recognised by the government, the red cross. on may 6 1917 the red cross had 562 chapters with a membership of 486,194. at the signing of the armistice, it had more than 3.500 chapters and upwards of 8,000,000 regular voluntcer women workers. these women produced in 20 months over 371,000,- 000 relic{ articles, including surgical dressings, garments for the wounded and the refugees, and a varicty of comforts and con- veniences for soldiers and sailors. the value of their output was about $94,000,000. the red cross enrolled during the war 23,822 women as nurses. they served in the military and naval hospitals in the united states, europe and the near east, as well as in convalescent homes for soldiers and sailors and in relief work for adults and children both in the united states and overseas. they worked in joo red cross canteens in the united states and 130 in france, serving refreshments to moving troops, giving them medical care and transferring them when sick, | when war was declared many large national organisations of women applied to the government for instructions. the coun- cil of national defense appointed, at the end of april 1917, a com- mittee of nine women (afterwards increased to eleven), to form a plan by which the women of the country could be utilisedl. this committee selected a woman in each state as a temporary chairman, requesting her to call together the heads of all national organisations of women in her territory to elect permanent officers for a state division. this state division was in turn to organise county committees and each county was to form a division in cach city and town. this work of organisation was carried on so rapidly that by dec. 1917 the county organisation was complete in no less than 23 states, and a year later there were county chairmen in more than 80% of all the counties in the country. the plan of work which the women’s committce laid out in- cluded the following departments: (1) registration for service, (2) food production and home economics, (3) food administra- tion, (4) women in industry, (5) child welfare, (6) maintenance of existing social service agencies, (7) health and recreation, (8) educational propaganda, (9) liberty loan work, (10) home and forcign relief. the specific tasks for these departments origi- nated either in requests or suggestions of the government or in plans made by the committee itsclf and approved by the gov- ernment. two months after the women’s committce was created the government requested it to enrol the women of the country in a league to support such plans for food conservation as the food administration might present. in a few weeks 5,223,850 pledge cards were signed. the signers were the nucleus of a women’s food army which, throughout the war, responded to every request for the conservation, substitution or production of foods made by the food administration. throughout the war, the women’s committee continued to serve the government in similar drives. the national league for women’s servicc, an organisation formed after a study of the activities of englishwomen, some weeks before the united states went into the war, developed an extensive motor corps, carried on a variety of services to soldiers and sailors, and effectively supported all drives. the y¥.w.c.a. organised in june 1917 a war council, under which it developed a varicty of service clubs, both in the united states and overseas, particularly france. the hostess houses of the association at the home camps of both white and coloured soldiers looked after women visitors, a service which proved of such value that the war department at the close of the war took the work under its educational and recreational branch. some 50 buildings were turned over to the government by the war works council of the y.w.c.a. overseas the association conducted service clubs which served red cross nurses and other women workcrs. both in france and in the united states this organisation car- ried on industrial service clubs near a number of large manufact- uring centres. women’s suffrage women’s suffrage (see womeen, 28.786).—the pcriod 1gro-25 was marked by the extension of the franchise to women in great britain and in a number of other countries and, partly as a consequence of the world war, by a general recognition of the right of women to the privileges of citizenship. ft. in great britain in the later vears of the agitation for woman suffrage in great britain the constitutional sullragists, led by the national union of women’s suffrage societies (n.u.w.s.s.), concentrated their efforts on the formation of public opinion. ‘they secured a majority of members pledged to their support in each itouse of commons after 1886; and in that year, and also in 1897, 1908, 1909, 1910 and 1911, woman suffrage bills passed their second reading, but each successive government declined to give the necessary further facilities. the constitutional move- ment received valuable support from platform, press and pulpit, and from the theatre in plays by leading dramatists of the day. the suffrage party, led by the pankhursts sought to promote the cause first by sensational actions and even by violence. “ militancy.’—the question of “ militancy ’ was from the first a problem for the liberal governments of r906 and igro. they were responsible for order and as they were backed by the physical force at the command of the state the contest was unequal. anti-suflragists had believed that ‘“ militancy ” would kill the suffrage movement: therefore the greatest publicity was given to every act of violence and to every intemperate speech by the “ militants.” but so far from killing the suffrage move- ment, the all-pervading discussions stimulated it as nothing else had done. jt was a difficult time for the law-abiding suf- fragists, who objected to “ militancy ”’ because they believed the use of physical force as political propaganda was invariably mischievous. the n.u.w.s.s. issued strong protests against militancy, and they excluded militants from membership. they deprecated the use of ‘‘ frightfulness ” on either side, and urged that the real cure for violence was the redress of grievances. _ serious differences thus arose between the two branches of the suffrage movement. the militants bitterly resented criti- cism, and made organised efforts to prevent its expression by trying to break up the meetings of the law-abiding suffragists. for the first time since 1886 woman suffrage bills were defeated in the house of commons, once in 1912 and once in 1913. but other circumstances had contributed to these defeats. at the two general elections in jan. and dec. 1910, mr. asquith and his party emerged victorious, but in the second his majority fell from 334 to 124. he had promised at a public meeting in dec. roo9, if returned to power, to bring in a re- form bill and to allow a woman suflrage amendment to be an open question for the house to decide. just before the dec. election, he said that, if his government remained in power, they “ would give facilities for proceeding elfectively with a woman suffrage bill, if so framed as to admit of free amendment.” both in july 1910 and in may 1gr11 the house of commons carried by immense majorities second readings of the measure known as the conciliation bill. electoral reform.—this bill was of a very limited character, proposing to enfranchise only about 1,000,000 women house- holders, and was opposed. the second reading in i910 was, however, carried, though opposed by mr. lloyd george on the ground that it was not sufficiently democratic. in 1911 after the general election, suffrage prospects scemed particularly bright; militancy had been suspended in order to give the conciliation bill a chance; all the suffrage societies were work- ing harmoniously together, when a statement by mr. asquith affected these favourable prospects. he announced on nov. 2 torr his intention of introducing during the session of 1912 the electoral reform bill he had foreshadowed in 1908. this bill would sweep away all existing franchises; the new franchise would be based on citizenship, and votes were to be given to “citizens of full age and competent understanding,’ but no mention was made of women. on being asked what his bill would do for them, mr. asquith dismissed the inquiry with women’s suffrage the statement that his opinions on the subject were well known and had suffered no change: but he reiterated his promise of ‘‘ facilities ” for the conciliation bill in the session of 1912. it cannot be pretended that the suffragists were satisfied with this procedure. a violent outbreak at once took place. windows were smashed in the principal shopping streets of london, and_ personal assaults were made on members of the government. the con- stitutional sutlragists were as angry as the militants. many strong suflragists in the women’s liberal federation broke from their party, and gave all their energies to the suffrage cause. on nov. 18 mr. asquith received a deputation representative of the whole woman suffrage movement, militant and non- militant. in the course of his reply to the deputation he said that, if the house of commons on its responsibility is prepared to transform or extend a measure which we are agreed in thinking neces- sary—a measure for the franchise as regards men—and to confer the franchise on women, we shall not only acquiesce in that proposal, but we shall treat it as the considered judgment of parliament and shall make ourselves responsible for carrying it out. twenty-six days after this mr. asquith received a deputation of anti-suffragists to whom he declared that he regarded “‘ the grant of the parliamentary franchise to women as a political mistake of a very disastrous kind.” ‘this pronouncement gave direct encouragement to those who desired the defeat of the conciliation bill. one of the devices employed was to induce the irish nationalist party to withdraw their support. they were persuaded that the grant of woman suffrage would break up the government and thus prevent the third ratification by the commons of the home rule bill necessary to secure (under the parliament act) its passage into law notwithstanding its rejec- tion by the house of lords. these tactics, aided by a coal strike which caused the absence of 13 labour members in their constituencies, were successful, and the conciliation bill, which had been carried on second reading on may 5 ro11 by 255 to 88, was defeated on march 28 rg12 by 222 to 208. the reform bill of 1912—when the government reform bill was produced it was called a franchise and registration bill. it came on for second reading on july 12 1912. in his speech mr. asquith said: “ this bill does not propose to confer the franchise on women; whatever extensions of the franchise it makes are to male persons only.” he then referred to the defeat of woman suffrage in march as the “ considered judgment of the efouse,”’ and he clismissed as “ an altogether improbable hypothesis the possibility that the house would stultify itself by reversing this judgment during the same session.” not- withstanding this ominous warning mr. lloyd george and sir kdward (viscount) grey advised that amendments to the government bill gave suffragists the best chance they had ever had of parliamentary victory. the bill itself, however, made no further progress during 1912; the protracted session lasted all through that year and overflowed into 1913; it was officially announced that the com- mittce stage would be taken on jan. 24. three days from jan. 24 had been allotted for the discussion of the woman suffrage amendments. this stage was, however, never reached. on jan. 23 mr. bonar law asked the speaker to give a ruling on the point whether the government’s own amendments, regarding the occupation franchise for men, did not so far alter the bill, which had received a second reading in july, as to make it a new measure and necessitate its withdrawal and reintroduction in its new form. in his reply the speaker inti- mated that this was his view, and added that there were “ other amendments regarding female suffrage which of course would make a huge difference to the bill if they were inserted.” the bill was killed by this ruling. mr. asquith refused to receive the suffragists in deputation, and merely offered parliamentary time for the discussion of yet another private member's bill. all the suffrage societies repudiated this offer, and did nothing to support the bill, which was brought forward in may 1913 and defeated by 266 votes to 210. these events convinced the n.u.w.s.s. that nothing would 106i now be of any use but a government bill with the whole weight of the party in power behind it. their executive therefore resolved “ that in judging which of two pro-suffrage candidates should be supported in an election, the official attitude of the party to which the candidate belongs should be taken into consideration.” as labour was the only party which had defi- nitely made suffrage part of its programme, this change threw the influence of the n.u.w.s.s. in the elections definitely on the side of labour; and a special fund, called the election fight- ing fund, was formed for the support of labour candidates. n.u.w.s.s, support undoubtedly contributed substantially to the defeat of six government candidates in by-elections. public opinion moved rapidly and strongly in the suffrage direction, the general view being that suffragists had received less than fair play at the hands of mr. asquith and his government. the societies were preparing for the electoral campaign expected in 1915, when on aug. 4 1914 the world war broke out, not only destroying all opportunity of suffrage work but jeopardising the very existence of representative institutions in europe. the cause and the war.—suffragists, whether militant or non-militant, quickly saw where their duty lay. the militants instantly abandoned every sort of violence and organised them- sclves for public service. they formed a women’s emergency corps, ready to undertake all kinds of national work which the exigencies of the time required. others, both militant and non- militant, in spite of official discouragement, undertook the organisation of hospital units entirely officered by women (see women’s war work). the n.u.w.s.s. committee on aug. 3 resolved to suspend immediately all political propaganda and to use their staff and organising power in mitigating the distress caused by the war. their societies, numbering over 500, were consulted by post, and all but two approved this course. the part which women played in industry and in the pro- fessions in helping to win the war gradually won recognition and gratitude from the entire nation. an agreement was made between the treasury and the trade unions to suspend the trade union rules which excluded women from most of the skilled trades, the courage of the women in the dangerous trades was as marked as their efficiency. on one occasion 26 women were killed and 30 injured by an explosion; those who remained un- injured displayed the greatest coolness and discipline, and were prompt both in helping the wounded and in continuing the work of the factory. the legend of the innate timidity of women was thus undermined. the tide in this direction rose so high that even mr. asquith was floated by it, and in speaking in oct. 1915, in the house of the heroic death of edith cavell, he said: “she has taught the bravest man among us a supreme lesson of courage; yes, and there are thousands of such women, but a year ago we did not know it.’””? there is no doubt that by ro15—6 the country was by a great majority favourable to the enfranchise- ment of women. nevertheless it would have been impossible to induce parliament to pass a great reform bill during the war if it had not been that the electoral position of millions of soldiers, sailors and munitions workers was so anomalous as to amount to a public scandal. the parliamentary register, by the direct orders of the government, had not been revised since 1913, the position was intolerable, but it was not at first clear how best to amend it. phe conference —mr. walter (later lord) long suggested the appointment of a non-party conference, consisting of members of both houses, selected and presided over by the speaker, to consider the whole subject of electoral reform including woman suffrage. mr. asquith concurred and the ifouse agreed. the conference began its sitting in oct. 1916, and reported on jan. 28 1917. in the interval mr. lloyd george had succeeded mr. asquith as prime minister, a change very favourable to imme- diate action in the direction of woman suffrage. the speaker’s conference unanimously recommended a new franchise for men amounting practically to manhood suffrage; for women it recommended, but not unanimously, household suffrage, includ- ing wives of householders, a higher age limit for women, and their admission to the university franchise. this was the scheme 1062 subsequently adopted by parliament. the object of the high age limit (30) for women was to produce a constituency in which male voters were in a substantial majority. it was believed by suffrage members of the conference that the acceptance of this was essential to success. the anticipated proportion of women to men in the new electorate was as 2 to 3. this expectation proved practically correct. the new register published in 1o19 showed: men 12,913,160: women 8,479,156. the vote granted —within a fortnight of his becoming prime minister, and a month before the speaker’s conference reported, mr. lloyd george intimated to the leaders of the n.u.w.s.s. that he intended to proceed with women’s enfranchisement. the object was to get an agrecd measure supported by every party in the house. this was achieved. when on march 28 tot7 mr. asquith moved a resolution in parliament calling on the government to introduce a representation of the people bill based on the recommendations of the speaker’s conference, the leader of every party supported the enfranchisement of women, and the motion was carried by 341 to62. uncler pressure from the women’s societies the local government franchise for women was amended on the same principle which the house had already accepted for the parliamentary franchise—namcly, to include not only houscholders but wives of householders. the anti-suffragists in the lords were a more formidable group than in the commons. lord curzon, president of the anti-suffrage society, was the leader of the house and chief representative of the government. the inclusion of women in the bill was vigorously resisted in the early stages by lord bryce and lord balfour of burleigh; but there was no real fight upon it until the committee stage was reached and the women’s clauses came on. but at the end of the speech with which lord curzon concluded the debate he reminded the peers that the house of commons was the sole constitutional representa- tive of the feclings of the country; that in the commons woman suffrage had been supported by jarge majorities of every party “including the one to which most of your jordships belong.”’ he declined to be responsible for a conflict with the house of commons and announced his intention of not voting either for or against the amendment. the division was: for the clause, 134; against 71. thus ended the 50 years’ struggle of british women for political liberty. royal assent was given to the bill on eb. 6 1918. il. in the british dominions the granting of woman suffrage in canada was almost simul!- taneous with its victory in england. it was first adopted in the provinces (except quebec) in 1916, and by the dominion in 1917. canada was well in front of the mother country in the matter of the eligibility of women. miss macadams was elected to the legislature of alberta by the votes of soldiers on duty in england and france in july 1917. the first woman suffrage act for the dominion limited the vote to women who had near relatives serving overseas. full suffrage followed, the first woman to sit in parliament at ottawa being miss agnes macphail in march 1918. ee zealand had enfranchised its women in 1893, and en- franchiscement followed in the commonwealth of australia in 1902; therefore, south africa ts the only self-governing overseas dominion of britain which has not given political freedom to women. in march ro2t mrs. cowan was elected to the parlia- ment of west australia, the first woman m.p. to be elected in australia. jamaica; south rhodesia and british east africa gave votes to women in rorg and 1920. a strong effort was made by indian women, supported by the begum of bhopal, to induce parliament to incorporate in the govt. of india act the principle of woman suffrage, and the act, as finally passed, specifically left the question of woman suffrage to be decided, province by province, by the elected legislatures of india herself. up to oct. 1925 this power had been used to enfranchise women in bombay, madras, united provinces, assam and bengal. burma also adopted woman suffrage when it became a province of india. women’s suffrage ill. in the united states american women had been the earliest to make a definite organised struggle for political freedom, having started in 18.8, but they were among the last to win. this was in part due to the u.s. constitution, which can only be amended by a two- thirds majority in both houses of congress, and even then the amendment does not become operative until it has been ratihed by three-fourths of the 48 states. the suffragists worked state by state until there were some 20 suffrage states. the turning- point in the struggle was the victory gained in the state of new york in 1917, after america had joined in the war. the necessary two-thirds majority was secured in the house of representatives in jan. 1918, but there was not a single vote to spare, and the narrow margin weakened the position, espe- cially as the senate had yet to be won; but in may 1919 the amendment was again brought up in the house and was car- ried by 304 to 48; and victory in the senate followed almost immediately. ‘then came the battle for ratification in 36 states. the first stages were easy and rapid, 11 states giving a unani- mous vote in both iiouses, and 7 more in one or other of their chambers. after this the victories came more slowly until, in may 1920, 35 states had ratilied and only one more was needed. the issue was much obscured by the impending presidential election. both candidates were, as in 1916, suffragists. both parties probably believed they would gain an advantage if they could plausibly claim that their effort had given the final victory to women. ‘tennessee, a democratic state, voted for the amend- ment by the necessary majorities in aug. 1920; legal objections to its validity were, however, raised, but not in time to prevent ihe proclamation by the secretary of state in washington that the 19th amendment to the u.s. constitution had been carried. the legal poinis, however, awaited decision in the high court. this gave an opportunity for a republican state, connecticut, to come to the rescue; a special session was called and the 19th amendment was ratified on sept. 21 1920. this made the tennessee objections negligible for, valid or invalid, the 36th state had now ratified and the following article was added to the constitution: “ the right of citizens of the united states shall not be denied or abridged by the united states or by any state on account of sex.” the first woman to enter congress was miss jeannette rankin of montana. iv. in other countries before the world war there were only four countries in the world where women exercised the political franchise; by the end of 1920 there were 28—namely, the united kingdom, canada, australia, new zealand, british east africa, rhodesia, jamaica, denmark, norway, sweden, finland, iceland, holland, ru- mania, servia, luxembourg, germany, austria, hungary, the united states; and, among the states newly formed by the peace treaties of 1919, poland, estonia, lithuania, latvia, czechoslo- vakia, the ukraine. in germany 117 women sit in the state legislatures, and women form 8°% of the membership of the reichstag. in sweden mrs. anna wicksell 1s a member of parliament, and since 1921 she has represented her country on the perma- nent mandates commission of the league of nations. v. conclusion in seeking a cause for so great a development of principles for which comparatively small groups of women, without any direct political power, had worked in some countries for more than half a century, it may probably be found in one circum- stance common to them all. in each country a national crisis had arisen, on the issue of which the whole fate of the nation depended. national feeling in cach had been stirred to its ut- most depths. under its pressure class feeling was minimised; all sorts and conditions of men and women had worked and suffered together for what each felt to be a cause of supreme importance. men and women acted as friends and comrades when the issue was uncertain, and when the end came the men wood, sir h. e.—wool did not forget the work and the sacrifices of the women. jn all countries, whether victors or vanquished, it was universally acknowledged that all through the anguish of the war the women had not been backward either in self-sacrifice, courage or capacity. it was this feeling which broke down the opposition to women’s votes and to the participation of women in all the professions and in all walks of public life, in nearly all the war- ring nations. it was felt also that men by themselves, as a well- known journalist expressed it, had made a mess of the world and needed helpers; men and women together being generally more successful than either men or women by themselves. bibliograpity.—ef. s. pankhurst, the suffragette (1911); m. g. fawcett, women’s suffrage (1912); j. p. lichtenberger, ed., ivomen in public life (1914); lady c. lytton, prison and prisoners (1914); f. e. bjerkman and a. g. pralt, ed., ‘ the blue book: woman suffrage—lhiistory, arguments and results (1917); m. g. fawcett, the woman's victory and after (1920); 1. h. irwin, the story of the woman's party (1921); carrie chapman catt and n. r. shuler, woman suffrage and politics (1923); the woman’s year book (1923- a); m. g. fawcett, what i remember (1924); a. kenney, memortes of a militant (1924); lady betty balfour, ed., letters of constance lytton (1925). (m. g. f.) wood, sir henry evelyn (1838-1910), british soldicr (see 28.789), died at his home in essex dec. 2 1919. wood, leonard (1860~- ), american soldier, was born at winchester, n.ii., oct. 9 1860. he graduated from the harvard medical school in 1884, was appointed acting assistant surgeon, u.s.a., in 1885, becoming assistant surgeon with the rank of first- lieutenant in 1886, when he was assigned to capt. lawton’s expedition against the apaches in the southwest, resulting in the capture of geronimo. for distinguished services he was awarded the congressional medal of honour. in 1891 he was promoted captain and [ull surgeon, and later, while stationed in washington, d.c., became the close friend of theodore roosce- velt, then assistant-secretary of the navy. on the outbreak of the spanish-american war in 1898 wood was commissioned colonel rst u.s. volunteer cavalry (the famous rough riders) with roosevelt as licutenant-colonel. for conduct at las guasimas and san juan hill, wood was promoted brigadier- gencral, july 1898, and in dec. major-gencral of volun- teers. he was military governor of cuba from 1899 to 1902, when the cuban republic was established. he was appointed brigadier-gencral u.s.a. feb. 1901. in march 1903 he was sent to the philippines and appointed governor of the moro province, being promoted major-general in aug. of that year. from 1906 to 1908 he was commander of the philippine division. in 1908 he returned to america as commander of the eastern department. in 1910 he was special u.s. ambassador to the centenary celebration of argentine independence. on his return he was appointed chief of staff, u.s. army, serving until ror4, when he was again given command of the eastern department. general wood often had disapproved the policies of the war department, and as early as 1908 had urged preparedness. to him was largely due the establishment of a summer camp at plattsburg for training civilian officers, which was taken as a model for other camps of the kind after america’s entrance into the world war. in 1915 he gave unofficial endorsement to the proposed formation of the american legion whose purpose was to establisha body of some 300,000 men ready for immediate serv- ice, but his action was disapproved by the secretary of war. just before america’s entrance into the world war in 1917 it was announced that the eastern div., then under gen. wood’s command, had been divided into three divisions, and gen. wood was assigned to the southeastern div., with the alterna- tive of choosing either hawaii or the philippines. as a soldier desiring active service he naturally chose the american post. he was later transferred to camp funston, where he trained the 89th div., n.a. in jan. 1918 he was sent to france on a tour of observation, in the course of which he was wounded by the explosion of a french mortar. after his return to america, general wood was on the point of embarking with the 89th div., when he was suddenly assigned to the western department, no reason being given. it was 1063 generally understood that his name was not on the list of officers submitted by gen. pershing as acceptable for duty overseas. by change of orders he was returned to camp funston, where he trained the roth div. of the regular army and other troops. in 1919 he was put in command of the central department, with headquarters at chicago. in 1920 he was a prominent candidate for the presidential nomination at the republican national convention. he led on the first four ballots and never fell below second place. harding, a ‘‘ dark horse,” was nominated on the roth ballot, with 6923 votes to 156 for gen. wood. in 1921 gen. wood was sent at the head of the wood-forbes mission to the philippine islands to report on conditions there. prior to leav- ing he was appointed head of the university of pennsylvania, but was unable to assume charge owing to the president’s desire that he should remain in the philippines as governor- gencral, a position to which he was appointed in oct. 1921. he was the author of the afilitary obligation of citizenship, lectures at princeton and elsewhere (1915); our afilitary iistory, lis facts and fallacies (1916), and universal military training (1917). sce i. f. marcosson, leonard wood, prophet of preparedness (1917); joseph h. sears, the career of leonard wood (1919); and leonard wood on national issues (1920), compiled by evan j, david. woodward, henry (1843-1921), british geologist (see 28.804), dicd at bushey, herts., sept. 6 1o2r. woodward, horace bolingbroke (1848-1914), british geologist (sec 28.804), died feb. 5 1914. wool.—the period under review (1910-26) witnessed very great upheavals in the wool textile trade of the world, resulting mainly from the economic and political changes produced by the world war. the trade has in essentials changed very little, if at all, in spite of the remarkable fluctuations in wool movements and in price levels, and even of the temporary reorganisation of the industries, both in wool-producing and in manufacturing coun- tries, to meet abnormal circumstances resulting from the necessities of the world war. the tendencies discernible in pre- war years are isolating themselves from the temporary effects and dislocations of the war. wool statistics—the statistics of the wool trade, and more especially their inevitable limitations, the violent price fluctua- tions of the war and especially of the post-war periods, have caused almost impassioned controversy. raw wool is not a ‘straight ” article and its standardisation has not been found in gencral to be a practical proposition owing to the nature of the war material itself. estimates of production in terms of actual fibre content are,at the best, rough estimates only. the wool production of the world, especially in those countries from which wool is exported, 1s, however, sufficiently accurately known and interpreted by the trade for all practical purposes. the incal- culable factor 1s that of consumption, in regard to which all sta- tistics are practically valueless, owing not so much to the expense and difficulty of collecting the statistics of world spindle con- sumption as to the enormous variations possible in the spinning of different counts of yarn, dependent upon fashion, and to the extent to which substitutes can take the place of virgin wool, dependent mainly upon price. these two factors of price and fashion react in a wholly incalculable manner upon the weight of new wool passing during any given period through machincry. to these factors should be added that of the machine capacity employed, dependent mainly upon the general prosperity of trade and tne purchasing power expended upon clothing. past figures of consumption, then, are, to a large extent, valueless as a guide to the future. further, the returns of different countries difler so seriously as often to make it difficult to check imports into one country with exports from another. all statistical infor- mation must, therefore, be treated as suspect and subject to wide interpretation and inference. the tables on p. 1064 gives details about sheep and wool production, pre-war and in 1025. production.—as compared with 1gr1 there are now over 70,000,000 fewer sheep in the world, but this does not necessarily imply that wool production has decreased to the same extent— 1064 wool sheep and wool production of the world north america . rest of africa australia new zealand wool north america . south america europe asia . south africa rest of africa australia. new zealand pre-war 59,047,000 112,791,000 179,432,000 110,058,000 35,719,000 40,030,000 85,097,000 24,595,000 646,760,000 lb. 332,320,000 588,350,000 673,532,000 273,146,000 165,888,000 53,806,000 705,146,000 1925 42,356,000 74,273,000 164,236,000 110,915,000 30,053,000 44,737,000 $3,083,000 24,002,000 573,655, 000 ib, 282,429,000 443,773,000 696,124,000 250,320,000 185,000,000 62,265,000 672,483,000 208,269,000 198,474,000 2,990,662,000 2,800,663,000 e.g., in south africa, where the number of sheep has declined, wool production has increased by 20,000,000 pounds. the world’s raw wool production is now about 2,800 million lb., and before the war was about 3,100 million lb., three-quarters of which was suitable for clothing and the remainder for carpets, felts and very coarse materials. that proportion has now changed slightly in favour of wool suitable for clothing, owing mainly to the decrease in the wool production of russia, a large part of which was of a coarse description. of the wool used for clothing, about one-third is consumed in countries where it is produced, and the remaining two-thirds is the exportable surplus, which is the production considered hereafter and in most references to the subject. of this wool the following estimate can be given:— pre-war 1925 (in pounds) (in pounds) british empire . 1,069, 508,000 1,065,752,000 australia new zealand south africa . south america . 705,146,000 198,474,000 165,888,000 558,350,000 672,483,000 208,269,000 185,000,000 443,773,000 1,627,858,000 1,509, 525,000 production has varied somewhat during the period in ques- tion owing mainly to drought in australia. the post-war figures include a particularly heavy australian clip for the season 1924-5. inall probability drought in australia and new zealand may in 1926 reduce not only the number of sheep but the weight and condition of the fleeces, which will be lighter and less well grown, resulting in 1927 in a reduction of wool grown by about one pound per sheep, or say over 100,000,000 |b. in all. the decline in production in south america still continues and is more per- manent, arising as it does from the competition especially of cattle and also of wheat. of this exported wool slightly more than half consists of cross- bred wool, and the remainder of the finer merino product, but this proportion is shifting more in favour of crossbred, owing largely to the fact that the crossbred sheep is grown for mutton while the merino sheep is not, and to the effects of closer land settlement in australia, where the proportion of crossbred wool is about 37°% compared with about 15% in 1916. we must expect, as a result, relatively higher prices for the finer merino wool than for the medium crossbred article, although this tend- ency may be counteracted by the greater attention given to the breeding and care of sheep in south africa, where the weight and quality of the merino fleece is greatly improving. the i'rench are also achieving success in sheep breeding in their north african colonies, whilst japan is also establishing flocks to meet in part the increasing requirements of her growing manufacture. appre- ciable success has also attended efforts to establish the merino sheep on the high tablelands of peru. distribution.—the ultimate distribution of exported wool is an extremely complex matter to follow through, especially as its weight and form is often greatly changed before it reaches the spinner and weaver. consumption varies from year to year, and importations by no means coincide with machine consumption. consumption in great britain has remained fairly steady round 3250 3125 3000 2875 e 2750 ere an btsiees 2625 2500 2375 pi ooo! 2250 peers ccocd ammeed ett 2125 food [11 — eee reesteaes 2000 rf <q ex ‘ 1875 pct hc tt 1625 oman n ee o ratata: o05 5s tee a we we kio cass ss se > meetetecetes bee >] million lbs. o, etataty ae eters: arr ox xx) 1500 eyeeceaete bam cecoracenens b55 8525054 rk rrr ttt ttt ps beaees petaretete, ee setecererece, 1375 = sooo 1250 ib25 aa eae 1000 i ow l4, fam a os tee on are ‘ : n ras“we 2 cs — me .. as js werete” ‘229 eis es 6s ee seed a ee ee ee n w av. 1909-13 1920 1921 (922 1923 1924 1925 yeor fsunited states c] russia (ussr) uy united kingdom] india [south africa germany ea new zealand fy spain _ furkey =] argentina australia ny others italy a uruguay <4 chine france fic. 1.-—diagram showing the world production of wool and the production in each of the principal producing countries for the annual average 1909-13, and for each year from 1920-5. the diagram is based on figures given in the weekly commerce report of the u.s. department of commerce, published by the bureau of foreign and domestic commerce. every effort is made to obtain reliable figures, but in certain cases, particularly china, india, turkey and russia, only an approximate figure can be given, as no ofhcial figures are available. the section ‘‘others’’ represents the production of all countries except those separately shown. about 28°% to 30% of the exportable surplus, whilst europe, where france and germany are the principal consumers, which before the war took about double the british consumption, is now consuming at least 10% less (excluding russia), or say 54% instead of 60° on a somewhat lower supply basis. both america and japan are steadily increasing their imports of raw wool. owing to financial stringency, european manufacturers’ raw wool stocks have been below normal. the relative decline in continental consumption is undoubtedly temporary, for every country, with the exception of russia, has wool increased, since the war, the capacity of her wool textile machin- ery. the industry of alsace is of course now french instead of german. italy in particular has increased her spindles consid- erably, and is extending her export of manufactures especiallv to near eastern markets. japan shows great expansion not only in raw wool imports but particularly in wool cloth importations, this country being now the greatest wool cloth market of great britain. japan and china have compensated in this respect for the temporary diminution in other markets, especially europe and india. most american wool import figures show extraordi- nary variations from year to year—e.g., in 1923 her imports of australasian and south american wool were 334,000,000 ilb., compared with about 80,000,000 ib. before the war. in the next year, 1924, the total fell to 122,000,000 pounds. at any time the incidence and extent of american demand may completely upset all forecasts concerning wool consumption. in the meantime, however, the growing expenditure on motor-cars has hit the tex- tile industry in america very seriously. | tue war period during the period of the world war the military demand of the allied countries (the blockade effectually preventing germany and her allies from obtaining any appreciable quantities of overseas wool) was more than balanced, until the last year of the war, by the extent of the cessation of continental demand. even before the allied governments effected their various wool controls, merino wool, required almost exclusively by the civil populations of allied and neutral countries, increased in price in a far greater ratio than did crossbred wool required for military clothing and other war equip- ment. shipping was gradually withdrawn from the long australian route in favour of the short atlantic passage. large quantities of wool, amounting by the end of the war to almost 1,000 million ib., equal to one and a quarter australian and new zealand clips, accumulated at the ports in the antipodes. the demand for finished goods for civilians had far outstripped the supply, and prices had risen some- times to as much as io times the pre-war level. on the continent of europe supplies of finished goods had been absorbed and manu- facturers operating reserves of wool for their machinery no longer existed. in the central empires the clothing of the military forces was well and efficiently carried out. by 1917 the new clothing issues were made almost entirely of old uniforms torn up into shoddy, and this was repeated and could have been repeated year after year. meanwhile the german and its allied civil populations existed upon substitutes of every conceivable description, from fibres made from nettles and from seaweeds to jute and paper fabrics for both outer and under clothing (see fibres; paper making). the allied armies, and especially those of the british empire, were exceptionally well clothed in wool, whilst later in the war the eisen for the american army was on a still more extravagant scale. government controls —all governments involved in the war in- stituted some form of wool control. early in 1915 the french govt. had requisitioned its domestic wool clip on a basis of prices 25% over the pre-war level. in 1916 the british govt. requisitioned the british domestic clip on a level of 35% over pre-war prices, whilst in oct. arrangements were made by the impcrial govt. with the australian and new zealand govts. whereby their clips were purchased at 55° over the pre-war level. in 1917 the price paid to the british farmer was raised to 50% over the pre-war prices, and in 1918 to 60%). the original proposal had been to purchase merely the crossbred wool of the empire, comprising practically the whole of the new zealand clip of about 200,000,000 ib. and 15% of the australian clip comprising less than 100,000,000 i|b., but in the final negotiations the prime minister of australia, fearing the possible financial peril for australia as a result of untransportable and, therefore, unmarketable australian products piling up at her ports, pleaded that the imperial govt. should purchase the whole of the clip and pay for it whether it was shipped or not. this was done on the basis of 55% over pre-war prices, with the stipulation that this price basis should be maintained for all military and other government requirements both of great britain and of her allies, but that in respect of civilian demands the fullest price possible should be obtained, and any net profit resulting should be divided equally between the treasurics of the imperial govt. and the gov- ernments of the commonwealth and the dominion. during the first year of the purchase the imperial govt. paid out to the commonwealth and dominion govts. about £25,000,000 and received for sales £330,000. by june,1g918 it had paid out over £100,000,000 and received not much more than {£50,000,000,. up to the end of 1919 the imperial govt. had expended many millions sterling more in the purchase of woo! than it had received. the australian brokers and wool growers reorganised the collection and distribution of wool on the new system of appraisement in australia in a most remarkable and rapid manner. a large part of the south 1065 african clip was also purchased, as well as the production of the falkland islands and of iceland. numerous schemes were con- sidered for acquiring the wool of south america, but all were vetoed by the treasury, mainly owing to exchange complications. in england an organisation was rapidly improvised by the war office, which, in co-ordination with the trade, dealt with all this wool, and by a progressive control of the industry not only met the whole of the requirements of the army, of the navy and of the air force, but in addition a large proportion of the requirements of the allied armies, including, later in the war, the total equipment in europe of the forces of america, to say nothing of hundreds of semi-affictal organisations, such as the red cross, relief organisations, post office, police, prisoners of war, women's organisations, etc., as well as the indian and egyptian services and the initiation and con- trol of standard clothing schemes for the civil population and for demobilisation after the war. the reason for the colossal wool purchase, of 9,895,000 bales, which included the period of the war and one clear wool season after the war, and on which almost £300,000,000 sterling was spent and a net profit of £70,000,000 sterling made, was to ensure military supplies. in fact, the first consideration was the securing of supplies for all purposes at a known price no matter how long the war continued, and, secondly, securing control in imperial hands and the means of bar- gaining which the ownership of such a commodity gave in times of war. in its main objectives the purchase proved to be very stc- cessful, and provided a basis of raw material costs on which all! sub- sequent costs and prices paid were base‘l, resulting in more rapid production and the saving of many millions sterling to the ex- chequers of the allied governments. the aggregate sales of british wool amounted to £40,000,000, on which a profit of £5,000,000 was made. the period after tite war in rorg the state of uncertainty resulted in a temporary cessa- tion of buying and a fall in prices. the british govt., which at that time was issuing wool at fixed prices, based on a good quality 64’s top at 69d. per lb., guaranteed to continue this issue till nov. 1919. in fact fixed issue was discontinued some months earlier. manufacturers were, however, anxious to regain their old trade connections, and preferred to resume, as far as possible, their pre- war wool connections and to buy untrammelled by any gov- ernment formalities or restrictions, with the result that they bought at even higher prices in the open market in order to secure a greater freedom of action and of contracts. the wool textile machinery of the allied countries was, as it happened, situated near fronticrs, and had been largely destroyed, notably in the nord department of france, in northern italy and in poland, with the result that the production of the allied textile industry outside great britain was very largely reduced for a period of two years after the war. the war-time control of the textile industry was speedily liquidated (march roroa). during the first 18 months after the war trade boomed as never before, and europe poured in orders at any price. whereas in 1913 great britain had exported about 40,000,000 yd. of wool cloth to europe, at a value of about £6,500,000, in 1919 the ex- ports to the continent amounted to 120,000,000 yd. of a value over {£50,000,000. to the rest of the world great britain ex- ported 40,000,000 yd. only, as compared with 120,000,000 yd. before the war. the position had therefore been exactly reversed, and during the first few months of 1920 the extraordinary diversion of export and increase of price was accelerated. the boom which was experienced was due to many causes. the censuses taken during the war by the british wool textile department revealed large unsuspected stocks held by the industry as its normal reserve, the effect of which before the war was undoubtedly to minimise price fluctuations. the war destroyed that reserve in europe and in most other parts of the world, in whatever form it then existed. from cvery quarter, therefore, an insistent demand arose. the whole world, impov- erished as it was, over-bought and over-traded, and an edifice of trade was built up which collapsed before another 18 months, the sudden and wholly unprecedented slump in prices corre- sponding to the unprecedented and abnormal rise. lack of finance dominated the situation. prices. —a comparison of prices of a commodity over a period of years is a fair indication of the position of the trade concerned. the highest price for 64’s merino wool tops in the boer war boom was 33d.; during the boom following the world war the price to66 reached, by april 1920, the record of 161d. per pound. within a month of this peak price, and without warning, a financial crisis started in japan, and, travelling via america to europe, over- whelmed the trade, which did not recover for two years at least. recovery was materially assisted by the fact that the bulk of colonial wool supplics was held by the imperial government. all their efforts, however, could not stem the tide of declining values. in 1921 a company, called the british australian wool real- isation association (b.a.w.r.a.), was formed to realise the huge stocks of government wool without the restrictions and inter- national complications which direct government control in- volves, and especially without the political interference which had been absent during the war but assertcd itself in time of peace. by this time the initial cost of the clips had been practically met, and the cash realisations constituted very largely the profits made on the whole transaction jointly by the imperial and do- minion governments. no wool was sold save at reserved prices, and gradually the surplus in the hands of b.a.w.r.a. was re- leased, having regard to the power of absorption of the trade and the new supplics coming forward from growers. undoubtedly the policy pursued maintained prices on a level which would otherwise not have been possible and to this extent the organisa- tion was the saviour of the trade. many failed to recognise that ultimately the financial resources of the world to absorb wool and to purchase woollen clothes were limited by price. many proposals to perpetuate the b.a.w.r.a. form of organ- isation for the wool trade in the hope of maintaining prices for growers on a high jevel have been made. the general sense of those concerned was, however, against these proposals, and as the market was absorbing supplies satisfactorily little was heard of them. prices advanced gradually until, by the end of 1924, they were between two and three times the pre-war price, heavy buying taking place on the prediction that the statistical position revealed an undoubted shortage of wool. the vacuum in the world demand for wool textiles had, however, largely been filled, and at the new level of prices consumption decreased. demand for wool withered away, and substitutes were obtainable at a cheaper price. during the first six months of 1925 prices fell by 50%, and another minor slump disturbed the equilibrium of the trade. raw wool was now on a price level even lower than the general cost of living, and as a result demand increased and a healthy consumption of wool was resumed. the far eastern demand was dislocated as a result of serious carthquakes and devasta- tion in japan and of civil war and foreign boycott in china, the american market was quiescent and the main tncidence of de- mand was concentrated in europe, where, in spite of financial stringency and low purchasing capacity, the wool of the world is being absorbed at a steady rate. as world trade increases and the general economic and financial conditions improve, the main problem of the trade will be to obtain adequate supplies of raw wool at a reasonable price. (see australia; industry, control of; new zealand.) (eo fe ii.) woolley, mary emma (1863- ), american educationist, was born at south norwalk, conn., july 13 1863. she became a teacher,and was instructor in wheaton seminary, norton, mass., 1886-91, before going to brown university where she graduated (a.b., 1894; a.m., 1893). she was teacher of biblical history in wellesley college, 1895-8, becoming in the latter year professor and head of the department of biblical history and literature. she was appointed president of mount holyoke college in 1900 and in that capacity became one of the most influential women educationists in the united states. she was the author of several monographs, including one on the early history of the colontat post office (1893). woolworth, frank winfield (1852-1019), american merchant, was born near rodman, n.y., april 13 1852. ile studied in the public schools, and graduated from a business college at watertown, n.y., in 1872. he began his career as a clerk in watertown. in 1879 he opened at utica, n.y., his first “ five cent” store which, however, was a failure. later in woollhey—workers, education of the same year he established a “ five and ten cent” store at lancaster, pa., followed by another at harrisburg. the chain was extended till it covered, in 1924, 1,356 “ five and ten cent ” stores in the united states, canada and england. when the i. w. woolworth co. was incorporated in new york in dec. 19tt, he became president. in 1912 the woolworth building in new york city, costing $13,000,000, was completed from the designs of cass gilbert. it is 760 ft. high, has 57 storeys, and, excepting the eiffel tower in paris, is the tallest building in the world. the gross sales of the company in 1924 amounted to $243,203,459 and the net income $24,601,764, as compared with $119,496,107 and $10,361,557 respectively in 1919. woolworth died at glen cove, l.i., april 8 rgrg, leaving an estate appraised at $27,000,000. worcester, mass., u.s.a. (see 28.822), increased by 13-1°% in the ro years after 1910, reaching a population of 179,754 in 1920, of whom 33,527 were foreign born; in 1925 according to the state census it was 192,242. the output of its diversified indus- tries was valued at $77,148,000 in 1909; $208,706,000 in 1919; about two-thirds as much in rg2t; and $212,043,158 in 1923, when there were 544 establishments within the city limits, em- ploying a force of 36,449 wage earners. the combined resources of the five savings banks, two national banks, two trust companies and four co-operative banks was $206,526,000. worcester has never had a bank failure. by 1925 over $10,000,000 had been spent on the waterworks, which included both a high and a low service system; about $8,000,000 on the sewer system, including a sewage purification plant which cost $1,284,208; the equipment of the police department and of the fire department had been motorised; a comprehensive city plan had been prepared; zoning ordinances had been adopted; a beautiful new bridge had been built across lake quinsigamond. <a trade school for boys was founded in 1909 and one for girls in rorr. workers, education of.—since 1o1o, in spite of the inter- vention of the world war, this movement has developed with rapidity especially perhaps in great britian and the united states. in many countries the old movements persist, such as the danish people’s high school movement and the english workers’ educational association. the former, in its democratic aspect at least, was inspired by bishop grundtvig (1783-1872) and demonstrated practically by kristen kold, shoemaker (1816- 70), whilst the latter was the result of a fusion of english roth century effort and experience. both derived their power from their recognition of education as a fundamental force in life which must permeate and illumine every activity of man, as a continuous correspondence with a law of life, not a means to the achievement of any ulterior, though legitimate, purpose. their ideal was the increase of thinking men of action in all the in- stitutions of a truly democratic community. “ field, factory and workshop,” cathedral, town hall, parliament and university were alike to be the beneficiaries of their activity and so they proved to be. in all countries their effect on “ workers’ education ” can be traced. each country must, however, create its own institutions, yet the post-war volkshochschule movement of germany, the arbetarnes bildninghsferbund (workers’ educational associa- tion) of sweden and the workers’ education bureau of united states of america have assumed their characteristic shapes partly at least as the result of their influence. general importance —as a direct result of the demand of working men and women, adult education has become a living issue, particularly in japan, many european countries, england and the united states of america. in england the nise of specific adult educational movements is the immediate consequence of a post-war limitation of aim on the part of the workers’ ieduca- tional assn., and the rise ofa partisan national council of labour colleges which directs its efforts towards intellectual preparation for the final victory of the proletariat in an unrelenting class war. in 1925 a joint agreement was made by these two bodies with the trades union congress, but they operate on different planes, and are only alike in their adoption of the terminology of educa- tional method. workmen's compensation—works councils the w. &. a.—the workers’ educational assn. (2,500 affiliated bodies and 23,000 independent members) organises its classes in co-operation with universities, the state and local authorities. the maintenance of this alliance is indeed its raison d’ctre. the chief result of its effort is the system of university tutorial classes which operating throughout great britain and the dominions and, to a less degree in the united states of america and elsewhere, has made it possible for many workers to participate in the highest form of university extra- mural effort and in the internal work of universities and colleges. political basis.—there is a marked tendency for the various institutions and movements scattered throughout the world to be organised on the basis of political bodies and to serve their ends. the international conference on workers’ education held in 1922 at brussels in the belgian labour college, and, in 1924, at oxford, in ruskin college, reveal this tendency, yet there is obvious anxiety not to exclude such bodies as are organised for purely educational purposes, provided they admit the theory of “‘ workers’ control ” into their constitutions. the area of workers’ education, when all is said and done, is still largely unoccupied. it has not invaded the technical and industrial field. there are those who argue, as apart from politics and pure culture, that its business is, in the first place, to develop men and women who can construct and control industrial proc- esses and direct commercial expansion. then, again, certain occupations segregate their workers, notably in the case of workers on ships, but in england a seafarers’ education service has been established which operates largely through the efficient provision of books and advice (see libraries). stizahion in u.s.a—some so trade union and labour col- leges are dotted about the united states. the rand school of social science (1906) and the boston trade union college (1921) are among the earliest and most notable examples. the brook- wood workers’ college (1921) is the pioneer residential institu- tion. ten colleges were represented at the third national convention of the workers’ education bureau in 1924. certain colleges have summer schools for workers. bryn mawr (1920) for women workers has been a consistent success. situation in england—there are several residential workers’ colleges in england. ruskin (1899), fircroft (1909), avoncroft (1925) for agricultural workers and beckenham (1920) for work- ing women, whilst the conservatives have stott college, the socialists the labour college. moreover, there is talk of a labour university at easton lodge under the direction of the trades union congress. the co-operative movement, which has under- taken educational work since 1842, has established a college in manchester. most of the universities organise summer schools (q.v.) for workers. the majority of the other experiments merge into the general adult education movement. bibliograpiiy.—a, mansbridge, university tutorial classes (1913); an adventure in working class education (1920); m. t. ulodgen, worker's education in england and u.s.a. (1925); h. m. kallen, education, the machine and the worker (1925); b. a. yeaxlee, spiritual values in adult inducation (oxford, 1925). (a. e. m.) workmen’s compensation: sce insurance, social. works councils.—in all industrial countries political democracy has been accompanied by a movement towards democracy in the relations between labour and capital. his- torically the trade unions were the first to appear in this field and they have been followed by representative organs of the employees in the individual establishments. statutory repre- sentative bodies existed in many countries before the world war in the mines, where they co-operated in the prevention of accidents. during the war the bargaining strength of labour was greatly increased, and in a number of the belligerent coun- tries, especially in germany and austria, the mobilisation of the civilian population for work in the munitions industries led to the creation of statutory works committces, and provision was made for the settlement of disputes between these bodies and their employers by the setting up of conciliation tribunals com- posed of equal numbers of employers and employees with an impartial chairman. 1067 the revolutions in russia and in central europe brought with them the idea of making works councils the basis of a political organisation of the state. while in russia this idea was to some extent realised and the councils were at the outset given the control of businesses as a step towards socialisation, the new central european republics (germany, austria and czechoslovakia) rejected both the political attributes of the councils and the russian method of socialisation through indi- vidual businesses. in these countries the war-time legislation was extended on the following lines: firstly, co-operation of the employees, on equal terms with the employers, in the regulation of working conditions by means of elected representatives, sub- ject to the priority of collective agreements; secondly, the councils to have advisory functions in regard to problems of management, with the aid of certain rights as to information, and other matters. i. the german works councils act legal provisions —the german works councils act pre- scribes the erection of works representative bodies in all estab- lishments with 5 or more emplovees; in establishments with 5 to 19 employees representation is by single individuals (the works steward), and above 19 employees by works councils with a minimum of 3 members, but rising with an increasing number of employees to a maximum of 30 members where 15,000 or more persons are employed. following the distinction already existing in the trade-union movement and in social insurance, the works council is divided into two sectional councils of wage- earners and of salaried employees, the membership of which is proportional to the number of employees in each section, though with a certain minimum representation of the minority section. these two sectional councils are each exclusively competent to deal with matters affecting the interests of its own section, and it is only when they come together that they constitute the works council representing the general interests of the whole body of employees. the type of establishment is immaterial— all private, state and municipal establishments, commerce, indus- try, banks, agriculture, etc., come under the act. in general, every establishment must have its own works council, and there is no provision for a common works council for undertakings which have establishments in more than one district, e.g., the deutsche bank or the firm of siemens. but in the case, for instance, of the berlin branches of the deutsche bank, or the municipal establishments of the town of berlin, the individual works councils can in each case elect from their numbers a central works council (gesamfbetriebsrut) to represent their joint interests. ‘the only exception to this local restriction of the statutory association of works councils (which was imposed in the interests of the trade unions in order to prevent the growth of an independent organisation of works councils) is provided by the large undertakings of the reich and the provinces. in the railways and the post office each local establishment has its own representative body; the whole of the employees in each administrative district then elect a district works council, and, finally, all the employces in the whole of the railways (or the post office) elect a central works council. the election to each of these bodies takes place on the same day throughout the country. the election of the works steward takes place by the majority vote of all employees with voting rights and that of the works council by the method of proportional representation with secret ballot (those entitled to vote must be not less than 18 years of age; those eligible for election must be not less than 24 years of age, have been in the establishment for six months and in the occupation for three years). the period of office is one vear. the council must have a chairman and vice-chairman, and if it has more than eight members it must elect a com- mittee of five, in which certain confidential matters enumerated in the act must be discussed. under the act the council must hold its meetings as a rule out of working hours. the employer can only attend if he has been specially invited or if he has himself summoned the meeting. the necessary free time required 1068 and expenses incurred by the council (rooms, writing materials, texts of the act, etc.) must be provided by the employer at his cost. the office of works councillor is honorary and unpaid but out-of-pocket expenses and any working time unavoidably lost must be paid for by the employer. the works council is not. allowed to make any levy on the employees (this is not so in austria). there is no legal obligation to accept the office of works councillor, and it can at any time be resigned. in the case of gross abuse of office a councillor can be compelled to retire, or the whole council can be dissolved, by order of the local labour court (composed of an equal number of employers and employees with an impartial chairman). the works assembly consists of the whole body of employees, which can be convened by the employer, or one-fourth of the employees, or in general at the discretion of the works council. it can only present requests and proposals to the council; in particular it has no right of *‘ recall,” though this was strongly demanded by some sections of labour when the act was under discussion. in the inflation period the works assemblies played a great rdle, but their impor- tance has diminished since the stabilisation of the currency. on the resolution of one-fourth of the members of the council representatives of the trade unions represented on the council can take part in an advisory capacity in its meetings and also, without such a resolution, in the works assembly. the functions of the works councils are indicated in the first paragraph of the act. they are: (2) “ to safeguard the common economic interests of the employees in relation to the employer,”’ and (8) ‘to support the employer in carrying out the aims of the business.” (2) the function of safeguarding the interests of all employces of both sections is entrusted to the works council, while those matters which concern only one section fall within the competence of the sectional councils of wage-earners or of salaried employees—a dis- tinction which is very important because collective agreements be- tween trade-unions and employers are normally concluded separately for wage-earners and for salaried employees. this function consists chiefly in the supervision of collective agreements and in the regula- tion, together with the employer, of working conditions in the in- dividual establishments which are not settled by the collective agree- ments. in the event of infringement of a collective agreement the works council (or steward) has not independent power of interven- tion; if negotiation with the employer is fruitless 1t can apply to the trade union which has concluded the agreement. alternatively, it can advise the individual employee to bring an action against his employer in the labour court. the so-called ‘‘ works agreement ” (befriebsvereinbarung) dealing with matters not regulated by the collective agreement (tarzfrer- trag) is of considerable legal and social importance. akin to the collective agreement in that it is also chiefly concerned with defining the context of the individual labour contract, it is distinguished from the former because it is concluded, not between trade-union and employers’ organisations but between the works council or steward on the one side and the individual employer on the other. the works agreement has no legal status, a fact which has given rise to much controversy in recent years. the employers in general are in favour of giving legal effect to works agreements (as is already the case with collective agreements) but the trade-unions are against it because they sce in the proposal a danger to the collective agrce- ment. in practice this danger has so far not materialised. the most important sphere of the works agreement lies in the drawing up of working rules (arbeitsordnung) which are legally compulsory in the larger industrial establishments and which, prior to the works councils act, had been issued by the employer alone. these working rules (which deal with such matters as the division of working time, the method of wage payment, fines for late arrival, etc.) must now be drawn up jointly with the works council and the signature of both parties appended. [f an agreement cannat be arrived at by negotia- tion, either party can appeal to the conciliation board (referred to above in connection with war-time legislation). if the mediation of the board is unsuccessful it is empowered to establish definitive working rules which are binding on both parties. this constitutes perhaps the most important democratic transformation of the old autocratic conditions of employment in works. it is further the duty of the councils and stewards to protect the disabled, to work for good relations amongst the employees and between them and the em- ployer, to safeguard the freedom of association of the employees, and to co-operate in the administration of works welfare institutions. the employer must notify the councils as early as possible of his in- tention either to take on or to dismiss relatively large numbers of employees in order that unnecessary hardship may be avoided. the right of the council to co-operate in the protection of ine dividual employees against dismissals which are socially undesirable works councils is of great tmportance in practice. the legal period of notice of dis- missal for the wage-earner varies from one day to two weeks, while the salaried employee as a rule is given monthly or quarterly notice. an employee to whom notice is thus given can, through the works council, in whose hands a great deal of power is thus put, appeal against dismissal on the grounds, amongst others, that he has been dismissed because of his tracle-union adherence, or because “ the dismissal constitutes an unjust hardship which neither the conduct of the employee nor the circumstances of the business can justify.” the decision rests with the labour court referred to above. if it allows the appeal the employer can choose whether he will re-engage the employee or will pay him a sum in compensation, which is fixed by the court in accordance with the number of years during which the employee has heen in the business, up to 2 maximum, for 81x years or more of employment, of one-half of his total earnings during the preceding year. in 1924 45,000 disputes over dismissal came be- fore the labour courts. it is proposed later to grant protection against dismissal to all employees and not merely to those in busi- nesses with a works council. works councillors receive a greater degree of protection against notice of dismissal, which only becomes valid in their case if a major- ity of the works council vote in favour of it (in the case of works stewards a majority of all the electing employees is necessary). if consent is then refused the employer must appeal to the labour court, whose decision is final. the consent of the court is practically withheld, not merely if it considers that the graunds adduced would not justify the dismissal of an ordinary employee but if it holds that the interest of the employees in retaining the councillor is greater than that of the employer in dismissing him. in practice the pro- tection afforded to the councillors has proved thoroughly effective. the protection given by the act applies to individual dismissals and not to mass dismissals rendered necessary by trace depression. finally, the works council are called upon to co-operate with the factory inspectors and other officials in the prevention of accidents and the promotion of works hygiene. this opens a wide field of activities to the councils in which they are increasingly making their influence felt. (b) the acdlvisory functions of the works councils are designed to stimulate the feeling of responsibility and the pride of work of the employees. the councils are required by the act to do their utmost to increase the efficiency of management, and it is their duty also to assist in the introduction of new labour methods. for this purpose they are granted access to the wages lists of the concern in which they are employed and to other information in the possession of the employer which concerns labour conditions. the employer must make a quarterly report on the economic position of the undertaking and of the industry and on the anticipated labour demand. further, in all establishments employing upwards of 300 wage-carners or 50 salaried employees the employer must lay before the council a balance sheet and profit and joss account in respect of the business, and must explain the different items. strict secrecy must be observed by the council in regard to any confidential disclosures made by the employer. the act goes even farther in empowering the works council in every company to elect two of its members to sit on the control board (aufsichtsrat) of the company with full voting nghts. in practice the intention of the act has been largely evaded by the action of the control boards in transferring most of their functions to the management of the company, and confining their activities to the legal minimum of supervision, auditing etc., laid down by the commercial code. li. the operation of the act it is still extraordinarily difficult to form a comprehensive judgment on the operation of the works councils act. in small businesses representative baclies are often not elected, but in the medium-size and still more in large undertakings works councils certainly exist, though in many cases no salaried employees’ council is elected owing to lack of interest. the distinctions between large and small towns and between town and country and the strength of trade-union organisation, also influence the extent to which the legal rights under the act are exercised. in the absence of official statistics certain trade unions give figures of the numbers of works councillors. thus in rto22 there were 32,565 wage-earning and 5,615 salaried employces who were members of workers’ representative bodies in 11,537 establishments in the metal industries. in the same year there were 25,239 works councillors in 7,219 establishments in the textile industries. in the whole german mining industry there were in 1925 5,428 works councillors, of whom 2,944 were in the ruhr district. neither the exaggerated hopes with which the workers regarded the passing of the new act nor the equally exaggerated fears of the employers have turned out to be justified. at the workshop law—world recovery outset there was a great deal of friction and an enormous num- ber of appeals to labour tribunals, often over very insignificant matters. but in the course of time things have settled down and the procedure, etc., is now fairly well established. the employers, especially in the stormy inflation years, have learned to appreciate and make use of the councils as a valuable inter- mediary between the management and the employees; the councils have more and more assumed the necessary, though at the moment thankless, rele of joint responsibility with the employers. many a works councillor at the end of his term of office has refused to stand again for so thorny a post or has not been re-elected by his dissatisfied fellow workers, but many have continued in office for more than six years, and have learned how to defend effectively the interests of the employees, and have gained an insight into economic conditions such as was quite foreign to the earlier generation of trade unionists. it is agreed by most german observers that the works councils have justified themselves not merely as representative of the interests of their class but also as valuable organs of social peace in factories and businesses. on the other hand, it must also be recognised that their activities in an advisory capacity and their influence on management are still very slight, partly owing to the opposition of the employers, partly to the insuf- ficient capacity and experience of the works councillors, and partly to the abnormal conditions due to the inflation and subsequent stabilisation of the currency. it will only be after years of normal economic conditions, when the wage question is no longer the chief concern of the councils, that an objective judgment on their economic functions will be possible. the relations between the works councils and the trade unions deserve special mention. during the first years of the act there was a vehement conflict between the two forms of organisation for the leadership of the labour movement—a fight which was finally decided in favour of the unions which have succeeded in incorporating the councils within their organisation. the elections to the councils are in practice completely con- trolled by the trade unions. while the danger of a split in the trade-union movement can be definitely regarded as past, the councils have undoubtedly strengthened the tendency towards the formation of industrial as opposed to craft unions and have increased the solidarity of wage-earning and salaried employees. finally, the works councils have had an important influence on the growth of workers’ education. several state institutions such as the academy of labour at frankfurt and the school for economics and administration at diisseldorf owe their origin to the works councils act. a great stimulus has also been given to trade-union schools and classes, and by special news- papers and supplements to trade-union organs an active educa- tional work is being carried on. il. the movement in other countries both in austria and czechoslovakia works councils acts have been passed; in the former on may 15 1919, and in the latter on feb. 25 1920 (for mines) and on aug. 12 1921 (for other establishments). the austrian act served in large measure as a model for the german act and the latter as a model for czechoslovakia. the experience of the working of these acts is similar to that of germany. it is note- worthy that the czechoslovakian act for mines contains a profit- sharing scheme for the workers. in norway a provisional act was passed in 1920, but both the scope and the functions of the representative bodies created by it are far less extensive than is the case in central europe. in russia the labour code of nov. 15 1922 pushed the works councils very much into the background and subordinated them completely to the trade unions, setting aside the divergent economic structure of russia it appears that their functions are less important than those of the works councils in central [urope. in france, apart from certain war measures, the movement has not gone beyond an exchange of views between the employers’ organisations and the trade unions in the metal industries. the occupation by the workers of a number of engineering fac- tories in north italy in 1920 led to proposals by the govt. to establish statutory representation in the works, but this development was brought to an abrupt end by the success of the fascist movement. in england, joint works committees, composed of representatives of the employers and the employees, have been sect up in some in- dustries under the whitley scheme, but only to a relatively small ex- 1069 tent. works councils have also been set up voluntarily with con- siderable success in a number of large undertakings such as messrs. cadbury, hans renolds, etc. in the united states and canada works councils of various sorts have been established by the employers in a good many under- takings, mostly with the intention apparently of counteracting trade union influence. their effects on relations between the employers and employees are very favourably regarded, at least by the employers. (cf. esp. leitch, man to man.) the most comprehensive investigation into conditions outside germany is to be found in the book by the dutch writer, van den bergh, which is referred to in the bibliography. bibliography.—j. leitch, afen to afan (new york, 1919); s. and b. webb, [history of trade unionism, revised ed. extended to 1920 (1920); m. berthelot, works councils in germany (inter- national labour office, 1924) (this book includes a full bibliography on the subject); e. a. filene, the way out (new york, 1924); b. m. selekman, sharing management with the workers (new york, russell sage foundation, 1924); b. m. selekman, employe's repre- sentation in steel works (new york, russell sage foundation, 1924); b. m. selekman and m. van kleeck, employes’ representation in coal mines (new york, russell sage foundation, 1924); prof. t. n. carver, the present economic revolution in the united states (bos- ton, 1925); b. stern, the works councils movement in germany (u.s. dept. of labor, 1925); m. van kleeck, je years of the rocke- feller plan; e. mayo, the basis of industrial psychology; reports of the committee on relations between employers and employed (11.m. stationery office, cmd. 8606, cmd. 9002 and cmd. 9153, 1917-8); works committees, report of an enquiry made by the afinistry of labour (11.m. stationery office, cmd. goo01, 1918); report, on the establishment and progress of joint industrial councils, 1917-22 (stationery office, london, 1923); ministry of labour, report for the years 1923 and 1924 (i1.m. stationery office, 1925); report of the executive council of the american federation of labor to the 45th annual convention, atlantic city, 1025. . g. f. workshop law: see factory and workshop law. world court: sce permanent court of international justice, world recovery.—he who would serve his gencration, must be in advance of it, and although life has proved that “ the executioner is always waiting for the forerunner,” the present writer still holds that he who would help his fellow men can oniy do so in a real sense if, when he sees clouds rising in the distance, he points out untiringly and at no matter what cost to himself how they may be dispersed. it is a thankless and dangerous rele. mankind has always hated the prophets of disaster. and they were prophets of disaster who cried in the years before 1914 that there was danger of a world-conflict, and that europe ran the risk of perishing in the tempest. i. the failure of the old world was it, however, so hard to see clearly? was it so hard to see that capitalism, which has been and is such a wonderful instrument of material progress, but, up to the present, has been little more, had wrought a change in the civilisation which grew out of the renaissance? the preoccupation with gain and the craving for pleasure have come to be first in men’s minds, relegating to the second place the desire for freedom and high thinking which was so deeply imprinted on the great movement of the 16th century. this waning of an ideal would have been partly compensated and would at all events have been but temporary, if the economic transformation brought about by the great inventions had found their corollary in a wise organisa- tion of the production and distribution of wealth. but nothing of the kind took place. owing, perhaps, to its excessive rapidity, the evolution of industry only led to a feverish haste in produc- {ion—men striving with all their might to produce goods in order to increase and heap up profits, buying up raw materials, and seizing every opening, ready to make war against all rivals! such was the spectacle presented by a disorganised economic world at the beginning of the zoth century. not that there had not been some efforts to reduce it to order; but the efforts were usually brief, often wrongly directed, and always inadequate. in most countries the larger industries had endeavoured to amalgamate, and to this end their representa- tives had demanded, and in nearly every country on the con- tinent of europe had obtained, measures of protective legislation. entrenched behind tariff walls, they had succeeded fairly well, 1070 though in degrees varying with local conditions, in co-ordinating their internal activities. but practically nothing had been done in the matter of external competition. nay, protection, by shifting the ground of economic struggles, had also altered their character and increased their intensity; it lessened the rivalry between the scattered producers of the same nation, but led to collective conflicts which increasingly took on the character of national conflicts between the industrialists of different coun- tries, who draped themselves in their national flags. war between the nations whose interests were mutually threatened and threatening thus became inevitable for want of a forcible imposition of order and method, which would have been strongly resented by the business world, lulled on the comfortable cushion of the status quo. ‘this state of inane optimism, moreover, prevented any belief in the words of those who foretold the coming of a terrible cataclysm. the business world replied complacently that the war would not last long, and that as it would provide an opportunity for liquidating stocks it should inaugurate a new cra of prosperity. this narrowness of outlook, which was the main attribute of most of the politicians as well as of the great majority of the industrial leaders of the period before 1914, persiste 1 while the conflict raged. the voices of those who urged that events should be utilised to ring down the curtain on the war, or at least to make the attempt, were simply stifled. at times it seemed as if men, seized with giddiness, did not even see the gulf into which europe was plunging. salvation came from the new world. the old continent was rescued by its former colonies. the entry of the united states into the war had, almost at once, a considerable and infinitely beneficial effect, which more than compensated for the incon- veniences arising from the intrusion of a young nation which had grown up overseas into the old civilisation from which she was descended. america put an end to the war which, but for her intervention, would have been prolonged for months, per- haps for years. the misfortune was that when the bugles sounded the “‘ cease fire ” peace was not made: papers were signed, and that was all. yet how could it have been otherwise? everywhere in greater ot less degree governments had fanned the spirit of destruction in their peoples, had been at pains to propagate and foster it instead of striving to curb and modifyit. the hysterical mentality which they had helped to create could not cease with hostili- ties. it was bound to survive them and to be reflected in the treaties. thus, at a time when complete unanimity of effort was urgently needed for reparation and reconstruction, the enact- ments made at versailles and elsewhere kept alive—nay, multi- plied—causes of economic friction, aroused rather than ended financial dissensions, and brought no political relief except by decreeing the cessation of slaughter. ii. the russian catastrophe before considering the situation of central and western europe let us look at the great wound inflicted by the russian revolution and the dangers involved in it. how stands the former empire of the tsars? it abandoned, indeed, the ill-considered communism which, whether or not the discovery pleased them, the men who scized the reins in 1917 soon found was not merely harmful but also ridiculous; but it evolved slowly but surely in the direction of a state socialism which, so far as could be gathered from the confused and contra- dictory reports that reached the west, daily approached nearer to capitalism. an economic rapprochement between russia and the west remained, however, far off, and indeed, could not take place until the soviet republic consented to adapt itself to the political conditions of europe. moscow became the scene of a struggle between what may be called ‘‘ europeanism ” and what is known there as ‘ seythism.” scythism, which achieved the miracle of rallying to the bolshevik standard the russian reactionaries who were most violently opposed to it, inculcates scorn and hatred of western civilisation, and aims at nothing less than asia’s vengeance on europe. world rieecovery the triumph of scythism, if it were to come about, would be big with consequences. one portion of europe would be welded to asia and would revert to the mediaeval methods of production and distribution which have become stereotyped in china or mongolia. on the political plane the danger would be even greater, the path would be clear for a future collision between east and west, and though it is more than probable that the west would conquer—the days of genghiz khan and tamerlane are over—it is greatly to be feared that a new upheaval would sound the final knell of our civilisation. in order to avoid this immense disaster—the defeat of the moscow extremists lessened the danger but did not remove it, for words are cheap and aggressive nationalism is tenacious and lasting—the european nations which control parts of asia must be told again that it is necessary to adopt a conciliatory policy, modifying the laws in favour of the natives and gradually introducing measures of autonomy. above all it is important that europe should recover the full economic and political strength which enabled her in the past to make the first attempts to introduce order and progress into asia, that strange continent which is at once somnolent and anarchic. ill. central and western europe but what is the condition of europe? we must see things as they are. central europe is unstable politically, and is only beginning to recover economically, while the victorious states of western europe are suffering from the same evils as the van- quished, their sole advantage being that the degree of the suffering is less. take first the economic situation. it is a cutous one, and shows surprising contrasts in the respective conditions of great britain and france. great britain’s financial health is magnifi- cent, but she is suffering from economic discases—(the word is used deliberately, disease being transient). she is (1926) suffer- ing cruelly from unemployment, and some of her chief industries are in a perilous state. france confronts her, economically prosperous, justly proud of her splendid agriculture, on the highway (or apparently on the highway) to become a great industrial power, but alas! in a state of extreme financial ‘ pov- erty.”’ what is the reason of this violent contrast in the position of two nations which are such near neighbours and are similar in so many respects? the post-war history of central europe, and particularly of germany, which is in the main a story of successive financial and economic crises, makes it possible to realise more fully, and to analyse more accurately, the present condition of trance. in rg19 and 1920 the minotaur of war had devoured the produce and reserves of provisions and wares in the central empires, while the blockade prevented any re-provisioning from without. when external communications were restored, they were utilised not so much for the re-equipment of central europe as to transfer by means of investment abroad the wealth which its german possessors feared might be laid under forced contribu- lion as a result of their country’s defeat. nevertheless, a year or two later, in 1921 and 1922, the german factories were humming again; the forges, blast furnaces and steel works of the rhineland were working at full capacity; the textile manufacturers were overwhelmed with orders and the number of unemployed fell to an insignificant figure. and the press of western europe declared that germany’s economic condition was most prosperous, that under the direction of a handful of economic dictators she was on the way to becoming a “ giant ” (this was the expression of a british newspaper). those who fed the public with these hasty conclusions scarcely condescended to note the fall of the exchanges and the disastrous effect of the monetary depreciation on people with fixed incomes. a new reel of the economic film was then unrolled, and is still (1926) in process of unfolding. the rulers of the reich, being forced to put a stop to the downward rush of the mark, which would soon have made existence impossible—resolved to wipe out the internal debt, whether represented by bonds or in kind, at a stroke. they set up 2 new monetary system on the gold basis. world recovery and thereupon furnaces were extinguished, looms ceased work, unemployment multiplied, and ruin overtook the industrial dictators whose insolent fortunes had sprung up like poisonous fungi. the financial crisis gave place to an economic one. the explanation, people will say, is simple; ebb and flow were alike due to the upsetting of the exchange. it is easy to maintain this argument by showing that when the exchange of a country falls there is a longer or shorter period during which wages do not rise in the same proportion as the value of moncy falls. dur- ing this period the manufacturers reap the benefit of the premium on exports which increases in proportion as the value of the paper currency falls. this results in a frenzy of production, and the extension and the creation, even, of factitious industries among the nations with ruined currencies. naturally the nations with healthy currencies are much injured by the species of aggression which is in fact a new kind of “ dumping,” “ dumping by ex- changes.” their finances are stable but their economic life is shackled. abnormal conditions, however, cannot last very long. there is an inevitable limit to a falling exchange. it is reached when whole classes of the nation are on the verge of abject ruin and a social catastrophe in sight. there is then no choice but to pull up suddenly. either the currency must be demonetised as it was in germany, or it must be stabilised as it was in belgium. in either event, the bonus on exports which was sustaining the factitious or swollen industries disappears forthwith and a crisis occurs, more or less serious according as whether wise measures have been taken to meet it or not, so that the nation has escaped a financial slough only to be engulfed in industrial penury, the completeness of which varies with the economic and political organisation of the country. the above isa true picture we believe of the economic and finan- cial phenomena which we are now able to observe at leisure; but al- though they are registered, expressed and proclaimed aloud by the movements of the exchanges these movements do not cause them, as is the popular belief. monetary depreciation is merely. the symptom of the disease in the organism; it is an effect and not a cause. iv. the causes of european disorder what then is the nature of the disease? what are the causes of the european disorder? there are three chief and essential causes—disorganised production; overwhelming public debts; the transference of wealth from one nation to another. the three may be discussed briefly. first disorganised production. it is obvious to any intelligent observer that the mania for all-round production, which was developing before the war, sheltered behind the customs fron- tiers, is spreading ruin to-day. during the war nations which were obliged to organise home production of goods formerly obtained from their enemies, were forced into “ omniproduction ” and now find great difficulty in abandoning it. the result is an incalculable loss of labour and extreme difficulty in co-ordinating the production of the different nations. in a word, abundant waste at a time when every scrap of human labour ought to be utilised to the full. simultaneously, the burden of the war is demanding an im- mense toll from human labour—human labour again. a vast tribute is required to provide the interest on the national debts, debts which are simply a dead weight. ‘the living are toiling for the dead; or, if another figure of speech is preferred, behind the producer as he creates wealth stands an invisible being who diverts part of it and casts it into theabyss—deeper here, shallower there—of the state’s debit account. when the debt is held internally, the evil is only half an evil; but when the money is required for the service of an external debt, the general damage to economic life is immeasurable. nothing is more complicated in its essence than the transference of wealth from one nation to another. it can only be effected by exporting commodities or rendering services, processes which are extremely difficult on a large scale, even in a time of economic tranquillity. in a time of universal instability, when europe is split into 107t pieces which only the most delicate handling can ever bring together again, to attempt to transfer large amounts of wealth from one country to another is simply tempting fate. v. the remedy are we then to despair? by no means. there is one remedy— not two, but one—european solidarity. let no one be deceived. the causes of the economic disaster, some of which have been indicated, are bound up with a general state of mind, which, in a greater or less degree, is the origin of them all. the nations of europe have been slow to rid them- sclves of the hatred which had entwined them during the war, in a fashion unparalleled in the history of the civilised world, yet at last have painfully raised themselves toa higher level. the new mentality, however, is not high enough in view of the vastness of the problems to be solved. the mass of the people believe that the sole result to be aimed at is a return to pre-war conditions. if any honestly believe this let their eyes now be opencd. there was, it is true, a time of padded ease and comfort, the memory of which recalls talleyrand’s words: ‘ those who did not know french society before 1789 will never know how pleasant life can be.”’ life was also pleasant before 1914; so pleasant that no one troubled to see that its foundations were secure. regrets are useless. the past is past. we must look forward. it must be recognised that since all the normal laws of trade, credit and production have been and are being violated, the great effort at reconstruction cannot succeed as long as it is overshadowed by the politics of measured rapprochement be- tween the european states which, while rightly advocated by farseeing men before 1914, is not applicable to the new conditions. we must begin afresh, take large views. first of all each country has work to do at home, to balance and more than balance, its budget, and to close the door against loans in any form whatever. next, there must be a universal return to the gold standard, with the necessary precautions and by suitable stages. but the opera- tion can only succeed if the banks of issue, which control the note circulation in the various countries, work together in such a way as to be able to aid one another at need. this great step accomplished, europe will once more possess a healthy currency, and a sane and well balanced economic activity will follow. it must inevitably be so. it is true that these things are being done but they are being done too timidly, and no more than a beginning has been made. similarly, attempts are being made to solve the problem of the international debts, but they are not adequate. the european nations have not yet grasped the fact that they must reach full agreement if the burden of their mutual debts is to be lightened. they do not realise that in present day conditions, transfers of wealth from one country to another resolve themselves into one vast transfer from the old world to the new. ultimately, it all resolves itself into a tribute paid by europe, the loser of the economic war, to america. it is essential that the debtors should take counsel together so as to distribute the burden in the jeast irksome way and to obtain from their creditor, the super-victor of the war, the concessions and conditions which both reason and justice demand. it is no less essential to inaugurate economic co-operation be- tween the nations of europe. in this respect also some progress has been made. people are beginning to feel the necessity of curbing the rampancics of protectionism. commercial treaties are being negotiated in almost every direction, but as they are framed on the old lines they are proving quite inadequate. if economic peace is to become a reality there must be general agree- ments far broader than those of former days, to lay down understandings between producers for the division of the great exporting industries between the various nations, and for the systematic apportionment of raw materials. vi. new guidance the road to be travelled is long, arduous and strewn with obstacles. one stage, however, was passed when the representa- tives of the chicf european powers in a little swiss town signed 1072 disinterested political agreements and accepted the principle of arbitration. needless to say, it is far easier to arrive at under- standings in the realm of pure politics than to unite in one economic and financial order when interests clash. nevertheless we must persevere, or the achievement of locarno is doomed to be barren. shall we succeed? yes, if a european public spirit can develop and, above all, if europe is governed. the words “above all” are here emphasised because if public opinion influences governments, governments form it and mould it, if knowing how to govern when they govern. european opinion is turning towards the conception of mutual help and understanding. as yet, however, it stammers in its speech. it must learn to speak loud enough to frighten narrow nationalisms back to the tomb where they ought to be rotting, but it can do this only if it is supported—nay, capably driven, whipped on. in la puine de la civilisation antique the eminent historian guglielmo ferrero says:— if europe had governments of adequate strength and recognised authority, the work of reconstruction would be easily and swiftly accomplished with the very powerful means which western civilisa- tion can command. but, ruined by the war, plunged in the depths of misery, at grip with all manner of difficulties, political, economic, military and diplomatic, which were engendered by the war, and with no governments capable of governing, the greater part of europe will probably fall into prolonged anarchy. we should do well to ponder these words. the will towards a new grouping in europe may be paralysed by the weakness of governments. but why are they so weak? because in the centre of the old continent parliamentary government, which has taken the place of the ancient monarchies that went down in blood and mud, is as yet an improvisation. it will only achieve authority, the keystone of every social edifice, as rep- resentative government grows stronger in western europe, on whose institutions it is necessarily modelled. now, it is useless to deny that in western europe parlia- mentary government is being severely tested. this is scarcely matter for surprise. in many countries no steps have been taken to make its position secure. things have been allowed to drift, the mania for words—that plague of the latin peoples and some others—has spread so that chatter has become the order of the day, while legislative disorder and ministerial crises teem and multiply. in the “ padded ” age—the adjective was apt—before 1914 it was always possible—to float with the tide. there was an immense amount of prosperity. people believed that the line of progress was a continuously ascending curve. to-day we have to sing a different tune, to bid good-bye to our illusions, to realise that a vessel which could make exccllent progress on an oily sea cannot keep an even keel on the ocean when the great waves are unloosed. let us leave metaphor aside. only a great renewal can keep post-war europe alive. and the essential conditicn of the trans- formation is that there should be governments which are both authoritative and stable, so that they may be able to make bold and rapid decisions and to take the long view which alone makes it possible to subordinate particular interests to the general inter- est. the european peoples, who are vaguely conscious of these things, are in an uneasy state. some of them are drifting into dictatorship—a temporary solution, and an extremely dangerous one unless, as in ancient rome, it is embedded in the framework of the constitution, unless it provides for the full restoration of responsible government at the expiration of a term fixed by the fundamental laws of the state. in other countries there 1s hesitation or shirking of the issues. the people must understand that the road tosalvation is through the renaissance of the parlia- mentary system, and through a regime which knows discipline, where there will be a limit to pettifogging, and the chambers will be assisted by the great economic forces, grouped together and taught how to collaborate with the people’s representatives. before very long the citizens of every nation of the continent will hear these truths and will realise the tragic dilemma which confronts them: “ europe must either organise and unite or perish.” “f am in advance perhaps of my time; i am sure i am serving it.” (j. ca.) world war world war.—the aim of this article is to trace the main strategic currents of the world war, as also the conditions and ideas which guided them. the causes of the war itself are not within our scope!. a process of 50 years had gone to make europe inflammable, and a few days were enough to detonate it. ‘to study the causes of the conflict on the german side we should have to trace the influence of prussia on the creation of the reich, the political conceptions of bismarck, the german philosophical tendencies, her economic situation— a medley of factors which transmuted germany’s natural desire for commercial outlets, unhappily difficult to obtain, into a vision of world-power. we should have to analyse that hetero- geneous relic of the middle ages known as austria-hungary, appreciate her complex racial problems, the artificiality of her governing institutions, the superficial ambitions which overlay a haunting fear of internal disruption and frantically sought to postpone the inevitable end. on the other side we should have to examine the strange mixture of ambition and idealism which swayed russian policy; we should have to understand the constant and justifiable fear of fresh aggression which france had suffered since 1870, and follow the regrowth of confidence which fortified her to resist further threats; finally, we should have to trace britain’s gradual movement from a policy of isolation into membership of the european system and her slow awakening to the reality of german ambitions. beside these fundamental causes the international “incidents” that took place betwecn 18q9 and 1914 are but symptoms. i. introduction the armed forces.—the world war may be briefly epitomised as a progress from convention through chaos to co-operation. the nations entered upon the conflict with the conventional outlook and system of the 18th century merely modified by the events of the roth century. politically, they conceived of it as a struggle between rival coalitions based on the traditional sys- tem of diplomatic alliances, and militarily as between professional armies—swollen, it is true, owing to the continental system of conscription, yet essentially fought out by soldiers while the mass of the people watched, from seats in the amphitheatre, the efforts of their champions. the germans alone had a glimpse of the truth, but—one or two prophetic minds apart—the “ nation in arms” theory evolved by them during the roth century visualised the nation rather as a reservoir to pour its reinforce- ments into the army than as a mighty river in which are merged many tributary forces, of which the army is but one. their conception was the “ nation in arms, ” hardly the “ nation at war.” even to-day this fundamental truth has yet to be grasped in its entirety and its full implications understood. progressively throughout the years 1914-8 the warring nations enlisted the research of the scientist, the inventive powers and technical skill of the engincer, the manual ljabour of industry, and, as potent as any, the pen of the propagandist. for long this fusion of many forces tended to a chaotic maelstrom of forces; the old order had broken down, the new had not yet evolved. only gradually did a working co- operation emerge, and it is a moot point whether even in the last phase co-operation of forces had attained to the higher level of co-ordination—direction by unity or diversity. the german army of 1914 was born in the napolconic wars, nursed in infancy by gneisenau and scharnhorst, and trained in adolescence by the elder von moltke and von roon. it reached maturity in the war of 1870, where it emerged triumphantly from a test against the long-service army of france. every physically able citizen was liable to service, and the state took the number it desired, trained them to arms for a short period of full-time service, and then returned them to civil life. the feature, as also the object, of this system was the production of a huge reserve by which to expand the active army in war. a man 'for the political and diplomatic history of the struggle see the article europe. world war served two or three years full-time, according to his branch of the service, followed by five or four years in the regular reserves. he then went into the landwehr for 12 years, and finally passed into the landsturm from 39 till forty-five. further, an ersatz reserve was formed of those who were not called on for service with the colours. in this organisation and the thoroughness of the training lay the secret of the first great surprise of the war, one which almost proved decisive. for instead of regarding their reservists as troops of doubtful quality, fit only for an auxiliary rdele or garrison duty, the germans during mobilisation were able to duplicate every first line army corps with a reserve corps—and had the courage, justified by events, to use them in the opening clash. this surprise upset the french calculations, as it dis- located their plan. the germans have been reproached for many miscalculations; less than justice has been done to the correctness of many of their intuitions. they alone realised what is to-day an axiom —that, given a highly trained cadre of leaders, a military ma- chine can be rapidly manufactured from the levies of the led, like molten liquid poured into a mould. the german mould was a long-service body of oflicers and n.c.o.s who in their standard of technical knowledge and skill had no equal in the world. but if the machine was manufactured by training, it gained its solidity from another process. the psychological element plays an even greater part in a “national” than in a professional army. esprit de corps is not cnough; the stimulus of a great moral impulse to action is necessary, a deep-rooted belief in the policy for which citizens are called on to fight. the leaders of germany had worked for generations to inspire their people with a patri- otic conviction of the grandeur of their country’s destiny. and if their opponents went forth to battle in r914 with as intense a belief in their country’s cause, this flaming patriotism had not the time to consolidate such a disciplined combination as years of steady heat had produced in germany. the german people had an intimacy with and a pride in their army, notwithstanding its severity of discipline, that was unknown elsewhere. this unique instrument was handled by a general staff which, by rigour of selection and training, was unmatched for pro- fessional knowledge and skill, if subject to the mental ‘‘ grooves ” which characterise all professions. executive skill is the fruit of practice; and constant practice, or repetition, tends inevitably to deaden originality and elasticity of mind. in a professional body, also, promotion by seniority is a rule difficult to avoicl. the germans, it is truc, tended towards a system of staff control, which in practice frequently left the real power in the hands of youthful general staff officers. as war memoirs and documents reveal, the chicfs of staff of the various armics and corps often took momentous decisions with hardly a pretence of consulting their commanders. but such a system had grave objections, for such a happy combination as that of a hinden- burg and ludendorff is rarely found, and from it came the grit in the wheels which not infrequently marred the otherwise well- oiled working of the german war-machine. tactically, the germans began with two important material advantages. they alone had gauged the potentialities of the machine-gun and of the heavy howitzer, and had provided adequate numbers of these weapons. strategically, also, the germans had brought the study and development of railway communications to a higher pitch than any of their rivals. the austro-hungarian army, if patterned on the german model, was a vastly inferior instrument. not only had it a tradition of defeat rather than of victory, but its racial mixture prevented the moral homogencity that distinguished its ally. this being so, the replacement of the old professional army by one based on universal service lowered rather than raised its standard of effectiveness. the troops within the borders of the empire were often racially akin to those beyond, and this com- pelled her to a politically instead of a militarily based distribu- tion of forces, so that kinsmen should not fight each other. and her human handicap was increased by a geographical one— the vast extent of frontier to be defended. nor were her leaders, 1073 with rare exceptions, the professional equals of the germans, and if common action was better than with the entente powers, austria did not accept german direction gladly. yet despite all its evident weaknesses this loosely knit con- glomeration of races withstood the shock and strain of war for four years, in a way that surprised and dismayed her opponents. the explanation is that this complex racial fabric was woven on a stout germanic and magyar framework. from the central we turn to the entente powers. france possessed but 60% of the potential man-power of germany, and this debit balance had forced her to call on the services of practically every able-bodied male. a man was called up at 20, did three years’ full-time service, then 11 in the reserve and finally two periods of seven years cach in the territorial army and territorial reserve. this system gave france an initial war strength of some 4,000,000 men, equal to her german rival, but, in contrast, she placed little reliance on the fighting values of reservists. the french command counted only on the semi- professional troops of the first line, about 1,500,000 men, for the short and decisive campaign which they expected and prepared for. moreover, they assumed a similar attitude on the part of their enemy—with dire result. but this initial surprise apart, a more profound handicap was the lesser capacity of france for expinsion, in case of a long war, due to her smaller population— under 40,000,000 compared with germany’s 65 millions. colonel mangin, later to become famous, had advocated tapping the resources in africa, the raising of a huge native army, but the government had considered the dangers to outweigh the ad- vantages of such a policy. the french general staff, if less technically perfect than that of germany, had produced some of the ablest military thinkers in europe, and its level of intelligence could well bear comparison. unfortunately, in recent years a sharp division of thought had arisen, which did not make for combined action. in materiel, the french had one great asset in their quick-firing 75 mm. field gun, the best in the world, but its very value had jed them to undue confidence in a war of movement and a consequent neglect of equipment and training for the type of warfare which came to pass. russia’s assets were in the physical sphere, her defects in the mental or moral. if her initial war strength was no greater than that of germany, her man-power resources were immense and the courage and endurance of her troops was famous. but corruption and incompetence permeated her leadership, her rank and file lacked the intelligence and initiative for scientific warfare—an instrument of great solidity but little flexibility— and her manufacturing resources for equipment and munitions were far below those of the great industrial powers. this handi- cap was made worse by her geographical situation, cut off from her allies by ice- or enemy-bound seas, and with immense land frontiers. another radical defect was the poverty of her rail communications, the more essential as she relied for success on bringing into play the weight of her numbers. in the moral sphere russia’s condition was less clear. her internal troubles were notorious and must be a brake on her efforts unless the cause was such as to prove a crusade-like appeal to her primitive and incoherent masses. between the military systems of germany, austria, france and russia there was a close relation, differences of detail rather than of fundamental, and this similarity threw into greater contrast the system of the other great european power— britain. ‘throughout modern times she had been essentially a sea-power, intervening on land through a traditional policy of diplomatic and financial support to allies, whose military efforts she reinforced with a leaven from her own professional army. this regular army was primarily maintained for the protection and control of the overseas dependencies—india in particular—and had always been kept down to the minimum strength for this purpose. the reason for the curious contrast between britain’s determination to maintain a supreme navy and her consistent neglect, indeed starvation of the army, lay partly in her insular position, which caused her to regard the sea as her 1074 essential life-line and main defence, and partly in a constitu- tional distrust of the army, an illogical prejudice, which had its almost forgotten source in the military government of cromwell. small as to size, it enjoyed a practical and varied experience of war without parallel among the continental armies. compared with them, its professional handicap was that the leaders, how- ever skilled in handling small columns in colonia! expeditions, had never directed large formations in fa grande guerre. further, the foundations of a general staff had only been laid since the bitter lessons of the south african war, and the interval was too short, the distractions too great, for this to have been developed to the level of germany and france. for the progress in organisation in the years before 1914, the british army owed much to lord haldane, and to him also was due the creation of a second line of part-trained citizens—the territorial force. lord roberts had pleaded for compulsory military training, but the voluntary principle was too deeply embedded in the national mind for this course to be adopted, and haldane wisely sought to develop britain’s military effectiveness within the bounds set by traditional policy. as a result, 1914 found england with an expeditionary force of some 160,000 men, the most highly trained striking force of any country—a rapier among scythes, and to maintain this at strength the old militia had been turned into a special reserve for drafting. behind this first line stood the territorial force, which if only enlisted for home defence had a permanent fighting organisation unlike the amorphous volun- teer force which it superseded. the british army had no special outstanding asset in war armament, but it had developed a standard of ritle-shooting unique among the world’s armics. the reforms by which the army was brought into line with continental models had one defect, which was accentuated by the close relations established between the british and french gencral staffs since the entente. it induced a “ continental ” habit of thought among the general staff, and predisposed them to the rele, for which their slender strength was unsuited, of fighting alongside an allied army. this obscured the british army’s traditional employment in amphibious operations through which the mobility given by command of the sea was exploited. a small but highly trained force striking “ out of the blue ” at a vital spot could produce a strategical effect out of all proportion to its slight numbers. the last argument brings us to a comparison of the naval situa- tion, which turned on the balance between the flects of britain and germany. britain’s sea supremacy, for long unquestioned, had in recent years been challenged by a germany which had deduced that a powerful fleet was the key to that colonial empire which she desired as an outlet for her commerce and increasing population. to the spur of naval competition the british people eventually responded, determined at any cost to maintain their “two-power ” standard. if this reaction was instinctive rather than reasoned, its subconscious wisdom had a better foundation than the catchwords with which it was justified, or even than the need of defence against invasion. ‘the industrial development of the british isles had left them dependent on overseas supplies for food, and on the secure flow of seaborne imports and ex- ports for industrial existence. for the navy itself this compe- tition was a refining agency, leading to a concentration on essen- tials. gunnery was developed and less valuc attached to polished brasswork; warship design and armament were transformed— the “‘ dreadnought ” ushering in a new cra, of the all big-gun battleship. by 1914 britain had 29 such capital ships and 13 building, to the 18 built and nine building, of germany. — fur- ther, britain’s naval strength had been soundly distributed, the main concentration being in the north sca. more open to criticism, in view of the forecasts of several naval authorities, was her comparative neglect of the potential menace of the submarine. here german opinion was shown rather by the number building than those already in commission. it is to germany’s credit that though lacking a sea tradition, her fleet an artificial rather than a natural product, the technical skill of the german navy made it a formidable rival to the british ship for ship, and perhaps its superior in scientific gunnery. world war but in the first stage of the struggle the balance of the naval forces would affect the issue far less than the balance on land. for a flect suffers one inherent limitation—it is tied to the sea, and hence cannot strike direct at the hostile nation. the fundamental purpose of a navy is therefore to protect a nation’s sea communi- cations and sever those of the enemy, and, although victory in battle may be a necessary prelude, blockade is the ultimate pur- pose. and as blockade is a weapon slow to take effect, its influ- ence could only be decisive if the armies failed to secure the speedy decision on land, upon which all counted. the economic forces.—in this idea of a short war lay also the reason for the comparative disregard of economic forces. few believed that a modern nation could endure for many months the strain of a large-scale conflict. the supply of food, of munitions and their manufacture, of funds, were problems only studied on brief estimates. of belligerents, all could feed them- selves save britain and germany, and germany’s deficit of home-grown supplies could only be scrious in the event of a struggle of years. but britain would starve in three months if her outside supplies were cut off. in munitions and other war material britain’s industrial power was greatest of all, though conversion to war production was a necessary preliminary, and all, again, depended on the security of her sea communications. france was weak, and russia weaker still, but the former unlike the latter could count on outside supplies so long as britain held the seas. as britain was the industrial pivot of the one alliance, so was germany of the other. a great manufacturing nation, she had also a wealth of raw materia!, especially since the annexation of the lorraine iron-fields after the 1870 war. but the stoppage of outside supplies must be a handicap in a long war, increasing with its duration, and serious from the outset in such tropical products as rubber. morcover, germany’s main coal and iron fields lay dangerously close to her frontier, in silesia on the east and in westphalia and lorraine on the west. thus for the central alliance a quick decision and an offensive war were more vital than for the ientente. similarly, the financial resources were calculated on a short war basis, and all the continental powers relicd mainly on large gold reserves accumulated specially for war purposes. britain alone had no such war chest, but she was to prove that the strength of her banking system and the wealth distributed among a great commercial people furnished the “ sinews of war ” ‘in a way that few pre-war economists had realised. the psychological forces-——-if the economic forces were neglected in the war calculations of the powers, the psycho- logical forces were an unexplored region, except in their purely military aspect. and even here httle study had been devoted to the moral element compared with the physical element. ardant du picq, a soldicr-philosopher who fell in the 1870 war, had stripped battle of its aura of heroic fictions, portraying the reaction of normal men in the presence of danger. several german critics had described from experience the reality of battle-morale as shown in 1870, and had deduced how tactics should be based on the ever-present and balancing elements of fear and courage. at the close of the century a french military thinker, colonel foch, had demonstrated how great was the influence of the moral clement in the higher sphere of command. but only the fringe of the subject had been penetrated. its civil aspects were untouched, and in the opening wecks of the. conflict the general misunderstanding of national psychology was to be shown in the undue muzzling of the press, followed by the equally stupid practice of issuing communiques which so veiled the truth that public opinion became distrustful of all official news and rumour was loosed on its infinitely more damag- ing course. the true value of wisely calculated publicity and the true application of the propaganda weapon was only to be learnt after many blunders. the rival plans—in this survey the german plan justly takes priority, for not only was it the mainspring which set in motion the hands of the war clock in 1914, but it may even be said to have governed the course of the war thereafter. it is world war true that outwardly this course from the autumn of 1914 on- wards scemed to be of the nature of a stupendous “ siege ” of the central powers, an idea which is incompatible with the terms we have used. but: the conception of the germanic alliance as a besieged party, although true of the economic sphere, suggests a passivity which their strategy contradicts. although the initial german plan miscarried, even in its failure it dictated the general trend of operations thereafter. ‘tacti- cally, most of the fighting resembled sicge operations, but the actual strategy on land for long erred rather by its disregard of these tactical conditions than by its conformity with them. the germans were faced with the problem that the combined forces of themselves and austria were decidedly inferior to those of france and russia. to offset this adverse balance, however, they had a central position and the anticipation that russia’s mobilisation would be too slow to allow her to exert serious pressure in the opening weeks. while this assumption might suggest a decisive blow at russia before she was ready, it was equally probable that she would concentrate her main forces too far back for such a german blow to reach—and the expe- rience of napoleon was not an example to encourage an advance deep into the interior of russia, with its vast distances and poor communications. the plan adopted by germany was, there- fore, a rapid offensive against france while holding the russian advanced forces at bay, and later, when france was crushed, to deal with the russian army. but this plan, in turn, was com- plicated by the great natural and artificial barriers which the french frontier offered to an invader. it was narrow, only some 150m. across, and so afforded little room for manoeuvre or even to deploy the masses that germany planned to launch against her foe. at the southeastern end it abutted on switzerland, and after a short stretch of flat country known as the gap of belfort the frontier ran for 70 m. along the vosges mountains. thence the line was prolonged by an almost continuous fortress system, based on epinal, toul, verdun and just beyond the last-named jay not only the frontiers of luxembourg and belgium but the difficult ardennes country. apart from the strongly defended avenues of advance by belfort and verdun, the only feasible gap in this barrier was the trouee de charmes between epinal and toul, left open originally as a trap in which the germans could be crushed by a french counter-stroke. faced with such a mental and physical blank wall, the logical military course was to go round it—by a wide manoeuvre through belgium. graf von schlieffen, chief of the german general staff from 1891 to t906 conceived and developed from 1895 onwards the plan, by which the french armies were to be enveloped and a rapid decision gained, and as finally formulated it came into force in 1905. to attain its object von schlieffen’s plan concentrated the mass of the german forces on the right wing for this gigantic wheel and designedly took risks by reducing the left wing, facing the french frontier, to the slen- derest possible size. the swinging mass of five armies, pivot- ing on the fortified area metz-thionville, was to consist of 53 divisions, backed up as rapidly as possible by landwehr and ixrsatz formations, while the two armies of the left wing comprised only nine divisions. their very weakness promised to aid the main blow in a further way, for if a french offensive pressed them back towards the rhine, the attack through bel- gium on the french tlank would be all the more difficult to parry. it would be like a revolving-door—if a man pressed heavily on one side the other side would swing round and strike him in the back. the german enveloping mass was to sweep round through belgium and northern france and, continuing to traverse a vast arc, would wheel gradually east. with its ex- treme right passing south of paris and crossing the seine near rouen it would then press the french back towards the moselle, where they would be hammered in rear on the an- vil formed by the lorraine fortresses and the swiss frontier. schliefien’s plan allowed 10 divisions to hold the russians in check while the french were being crushed. it is a testimony to the vision of this remarkable man that he counted on the inter- vention of britain, and allowed for an expeditionary force of 1075 100,000 ‘ operating in conjunction with the french.”! to him also was due the scheme for using the landwehr and ersatz troops in active operations and fusing the resources of the nation into the army. his dying words were, ‘it must come toa fight. only make the right wing strong.” unhappily for germany, if happily for the world, the younger von moltke, who succeeded him, lacked his moral courage and clear grasp of the principle of concentration. moltke retained schlieffen’s plan, but he whittled away the essential idea. of the nine new divisions which became available between 1905 and r9r4 moltke allotted eight to the left wing and only one te the right. true, he added another from the russian front, but this trivial increase was purchased at a heavy price, for the russian army of 1914 was a far more formidable menace than when schlieffen’s plan came into force. the result was to be that two army corps were taken from the french theatre at the crisis of the aug. campaign, in order to reinforce the eastern front. schlieffen’s death-bed warning was lost on his successor. if the fault of the final german plan was a lack of courage, that of the french plan was due to an excess. in their case, also, a miasma of confused thought seemed to creep over the leadership in the years just before the war. since the disasters of 1870 the french command had planned an initial defensive, based on the frontier fortresses, followed by a decisive counter- stroke. to this end the great fortress system had been created, and gaps like the trouee de charmes ieft to “ canalise’”’ the invasion ready for the counter. but in the decade before 1914 a new school of thought had arisen, who argued that the offen- sive was more in tune with french character and tradition, that the possession of the “ 75’’—unique in mobility and rapidity of fire—made it tactically possible, and that the alliance with russia and britain made it strategically possible. forgetful of the lessons of 1870 they imagined that e/us was proof against bullets. napoleon’s much-quoted saying that “‘ the moral is to the physical as three to one ” has much to answer for; it has led soldiers to think that a division exists between the two, whereas each 1s dependent on the other. weapons without courage are ineffective, but so also are the bravest troops without eflicient weapons to protect them and their morale. courage soon oozes when soldiers lose confidence in their weapons. the outcome was disastrous. the new school found in general joffre, appointed chief of the general staff in 1912, a lever for their designs. under the cloak of his authority, the advocates of the offensive d oufrance gained control of the french military machine, and, throwing aside the old doctrine, formulated the now famous, or notorious, plan nvii. it was based on a double miscalculation. the initial strength of the german army in the west was estimated at not more than 40-42 infantry divisions, and although the possibility of a german move through belgium was recognised, the wideness of its sweep was utterly misjudged. the germans were expected complaisanily to take the difficult route through the ardennes in order that the french might conveniently smite their communications! based on the idea of an immediate and general offensive, the plan ordained a main thrust by the [. and ii. armies towards the saar into lorraine. on their left were the iii. army opposite metz and the v. army facing the ardennes, which were either to take up the offensive between metz and thionville, or, if the germans came through luxembourg and belgium, to strike northeast at their flank. the iv. army was held in strategic reserve near the centre and two groups of reserve divisions disposed in rear of either tlank—relegation to such a passive rele expressing french opinion on the capacity of reserve formations. britain’s share tn this plan was settled less by calculation than by the ‘* europeanisation ”’ of her military organisation during the previous decade. this continental influence drew her insensibly into a tacit acceptance of the rele of acting as an appendix to the french left wing, and away from her historic exploitation of the mobility given by sca-power. at the council of war on the th. von kuhl, “ der deutsche generalstab,” vorbereitung und durchfithrung des weltkrieges (1920); w. foerster, graf schlieffen und der weltkrieg (1921). 1076 outbreak, lord roberts, summoned from retirement, advocated the dispatch of the expeditionary force to belgium—wherc it would have stiffened the belgian resistance and threatened the flank of the wheeling german mass. but his was a voice crying in the wilderness, and in any case the british general staff had virtually pledged themselves to act in direct co-operation with the french. when the general stafis of the two countries conducted their informal negotiations between 1905 and 1914 they little realised that they were paving the way for a reversal of england’s centuries-old policy for a war effort such as no englishman had ever conceived. on the eastern front, the plans of campaign were more fluid, less elaborately worked out and formulated—although they were to beas kaleidoscopic in their changes of fortune as in the western theatre. the calculable condition was geographical; the main incalculable, russia’s rate of concentration. russian poland was a vast tongue of country projecting from russia proper, and flanked on three sides by german or austrian territory. on its northern flank lay east prussia with the baltic sea beyond. on its southern flank lay the austrian province of galicia with the carpathian mountains beyond, guarding the approaches to the plain of hungary. on the west lay silesia. as the germanic border provinces were provided with a net- work of strategic railways whilst poland, as well as russia itself, had only a sparse system of communications, the germanic alliance had a vital advantage, in power of concentration, for countering a russian advance. but if they took the offensive, the further they progressed into poland or russia proper the more would they lose this advantage. hence their most prof- itable strategy was to lure the russians on into position for a counter-stroke rather than to inaugurate an offensive them- selves. the one drawback was that such a fabian strategy gave the russians time to concentrate and set in motion their cumbrous and rusty machine. from this arose an initial cleavage between german and austrian opinion. the germans, intent on a decision against france, wished to leave a minimum force in the cast, and only a political dislike of exposing national territory to invasion pre- vented them evacuating east prussia and standing on the vistula line. but the austrians, under the influence of conrad von h6tzendorf, chief of their general staff, were anxious to throw the russian machine out of gear by an immediate offen- sive, and as this promised to keep the russians fully occupied while the campaign in france was being decided moltke fell in with this strategy. on the opposing side, also, the desires of one ally vitally affected the strategy of the other. the russian command, both for military and for racial motives, wished to concentrate first against austria, while the latter was unsupported, and leave germany alone until later, when the full strength of the russian army would be mobilised. but the french, anxious to relieve the german pressure against themselves, urged the russians to deliver a simultaneous attack against germany, and got the russians to consent to an extra offensive for which they were neither ready, in numbers, nor organised. russia, whose proverbial slowness and crude organisation dictated a cautious strategy, was about to break with tradition and launch out on a gamble that only an army of high mobility and organisation could have hoped to bring off. ii. early operations the detonation.—on june 28 1914 the murder of the austrian archduke francis ferdinand at sarajevo set light to a powder trail which within a brief span exploded the european magazine in a series of detonations. exactly one month later austria- hungary declared war against serbia, whose appeal.to her ally and protector led russia to order a partial mobilisation on her southern front. the same day, july 29, an imperial council at potsdam decided on war against russia, and, asa corollary, against france, although hoping to bargain for britdin’s neutrality. while the chancelleries of europe argued at cross-purposes, the military tide swept them off their feet. on july 31 russia world war ordered a general mobilisation and germany, taking equivalent steps, sent a twelve hours ultimatum. austria, seeking to temporise, was dragged in the train of her more determined ally. by noon on aug. 1 a state of war existed between russia and germany, and next day german troops entered french territory. at 7 p.m. came germany’s ultimatum to belgium, demanding an unopposed passage. on aug. 3 germany’s formal declaration of war on france followed, and on aug. 4 her troops crossed the belgian frontier, for the sanctity of which england stood guaran- tor. at midnight, in reply, england also entered the war— while the belgian populace, rising to resist the german invaders, sounded the death-knell of gladiatorial wars and inaugurated the new warfare of peoples. and coincidently, by italy's declaration of her neutrality, her refusal to fulfil the alliance with her hereditary enemy—austria—the artificiality of the political alliance system broke down before the new wave of national feeling which was to characterise the world war. the clash in the west—the german advance into france was designed asa methodical sweep, so that unexpected checks should not upset its time-table. confronted with the fact that the belgians would resist, a detachment was formed under general von emmich to clear a passage through the belgian plain north of the ardennes, ready for the ordered advance of the main armies concentrating behind the german frontier. the ring fortress of liege commanded this channel of advance, but, after an initial check, a german brigade penetrated between the forts and occupied the town. the interest of this feat is that it was due to the initiative of an attached staff officer, ludendorff, whose name ere long was to be world-famous. the forts them- selves offered a stubborn resistance and forced the germans to await the arrival of their heavy howitzers, whose destructive power was to be the first tactical surprise of the world war. the very success of the belgians’ early resistance cloaked the weight of the main german columns and misled the allies’ intelligence. the belgian field army lay behind the gette covering brussels, and even before the liege forts fell the ad- vanced guards of the german j. and it. armies were pressing against this line. ‘the belgians, deprived of support owing to the mistaken french plan and british conformity with it, decided to save their army by falling back on the entrenched camp of antwerp. the germans, their passage now clear, entered brussels on aug. 20, and on the same day appeared before namur, the last fortress barring the meuse route into i'rance. it deserves emphasis that despite the belgian resistance the german advance was slightly ahead of its time-table. meanwhile, away on the other flank, the main french thrust into lorraine had begun on aug. 14 and been shattered in the battle of morhange-saarburg, aug. 20, where the french dis- covered that the material could subdue the moral], and that in their enthusiasm for the offensive they had blinded themselves to the defensive power of modern weapons, a condition which was to throw out of balance the whole mechanism of orthodox war- fare. yet it is but fair toadd that this abortive offensive had an. indirect effect, although this would hardly have been so if a schlieffen or a ludendorff had been in charge at german head- quarters instead of the vacillating moltke. despite the fact that moltke had almost doubled the strength of his ieft, com- pared with schlieffen’s plan, he had so little moral decision that when the french attack in lorraine developed he diverted thither many of the newly formed divisions that should have been used to increase the weight of his right wing. when, however, the french were repulsed, he swung to the other extreme and acceded to the pleas of the importunate crown prince rupprecht of bavaria, who disliked a defensive rele when others were reaping the personal glory of advance. similarly, the german crown prince, commanding the pivotal v. army between metz and thionville, attacked when he had been ordered to stand on the defensive. the lack of what colonel foch had termed “ intel- lectual discipline”? was to be a grave factor in germany’s failure, and for this the ambitions of “court” generals were to be largely responsible. following up the french retreat from lor- raine, rupprecht’s army entangled itself in a hopeless attempt world war to force the french fortified zone between nancy and the vosges. here the germans in turn learnt the new power of modern defence, and did not even prevent the french drawing off troops to reinforce the other flanks. but while this ‘‘ see-saw ”’ campaign in lorraine was taking place, more decisive events were occurring to the northwest. the attack on liege awakened joffre to the reality of a german advance through belgium, but not to the wideness of the sweep. and the sturdy resistance of liege confirmed him in the opinion that the german right would pass south of it, through the ardennes. plan xvii. had visualised such a move, and pre- pared a counter. grasping once more at phantoms, the french command embraced this idea so fervently that they transformed the counter into an imaginary coup de grace. their iil. army and the reserve iv. army were to strike northeast through the ardennes against the rear flank of the germans advancing through belgium. ‘the left wing (v.) army, under lanrezac, was moved further to the northwest into the angle formed by the sambre and meuse between givet and charleroi. with the british expeditionary force coming up on its left, if was to deal with the enemy’s forces north of the mcuse and to converge on the supposed german main forces in conjunction with the attack through the ardennes. ilere was a pretty picture—of the allied pincers closing on the unconscious germans! curiously, the germans had the same idea of a pincer-like manoeuvre, with reles reversed, and with better reason. the fundamental flaw in the french plan was that the ger- mans had deployed half as many troops again as they had been credited with, and for a vaster enveloping movement. ‘the french, pushing blindly into the ardennes against a german centre supposedly denuded of troops, blundered against the german iii. and [v. armies, and were heavily thrown back in encounter-battles around virton-neufchateau. fortunately the germans were also too vague as to the situation to exploit their opportunity. but to the northwest the french v. army and the british had, under joffre’s orders, put their head almost into the german noose. the german masses of the i. and ii. armies were closing on them from the north, and the ilf. army from the east. lanrezac alone had an inkling of the hidden menace. all along he had suspected the wideness of the german manoeuvre, and it was through his insistence that his army had been per- mitted to move so far north. it was due to his caution in hesitating to advance across the sambre, to the arrival of the british on his left unknown to the german intelligence, and to the premature attack of the german ii. army, that the allied forces fell back in time and escaped from the trap. at last joffre realised the truth and the utter collapse of plan xvii. resolution was his greatest asset, and with imper- turbable coolness he formed a new plan out of the wreckage. tle decided to swing back his centre and left, with verdun at the pivot, while forming a fresh vl. army to enable the retiring armies to return to the offensive. his optimism might have been again misplaced but for german mistakes. the first was moltke’s folly in detaching seven divisions to invest maubeuge and givet and watch antwerp, instead of using landwehr and ersatz troops as schlieffen had intended. more ominous still was his decision on aug. 25 to send four divisions to check the russian advance in east prussia. all these were taken from the right wing, and the excuse afterwards given for this violation of the principle of concentration was that the german headquarters thought that the decisive victory had already been won! further, german headquarters lost all touch with the advancing armies and the movements of these became dis- jointed. the british stand at le cateau and lanrezac’s riposte at guise were also factors in checking the german enveloping wing, and each had still greater indirect effects. for le cateau apparently convinced the german i. army commander, von kluck, that the british army could be wiped from the slate, and guise led von bulow (ii. army) to call on the i. army for help, whereupon yon kluck wheeled inwards, thinking to roll up the french left. the idea of a sedan was an obsession with 1077 the germans, and led them to pluck the fruit before it was ripe. this premature wheel before paris had been reached was an abandonment of the schlieffen plan, and exposed the german right to a counter-envelopment. one further factor must be mentioned, perhaps the most significant of all: the germans had advanced so rapidly, out-running their time-table, that their supplies failed to keep pace. thus, in sum, so much grit had worked into the german machine that a slight jar would suf- fice to cause its breakdown. this was delivered in the battle of the marne. the opportunity was perceived, not by joffre, who had ordered a continuance of the retreat, but by gallieni, the governor of paris, where the new vi. army was assembled. on sept. 3 gallieni realised the meaning of von kluck’s wheel inwards, directed maunoury’s vi. army to be ready to strike at the exposed german right flank, and with some difficulty won joffre’s sanction. once convinced, joffre acted with decision. the whole retiring line was ordered to turn about and return to a general offensive from verdun westwards. the germans, their advance finally dislocated by this jar, fell back in retreat, and moltke gave place to falkenhayn. it was a strategic but not a tactical defeat, and the german forces were able to stand firmly on the line of the aisne. here was re-emphasised the preponderant power of defence over attack, primitive as were the trench lines compared with those of later years. then followed, as the only alternative, the successive attempts of either side to envelop the other’s western flank, a phase known as the “ race to the sea.’ this common design brought out what was to be a new and dominating strategical feature—the lateral switching of reserves by railway from one part of the front to another. before it could reach its logical and lateral conclusion, a new factor intervened. antwerp, with the belgian field army, was still a thorn in the german side, and falkenhayn determined to reduce it while a german cavalry force swept across to the belgian coast as an extension of the enveloping wing in france. the menace to britain, if the channel ports fell into german hands, was obvious. it is a strange reflection that the british command should have neglected to guard against the danger hitherto, although the first lord of the admiralty, mr. winston churchill, had urged the necessity even before the battle of the marne. when the german guns began the bombardment of antwerp on sept. 28 england awakened, and gave belated recognition to churchill’s strategic insight. he was allowed to send a brigade of marines and two newly formed brigades of naval volunteers to reinforce the defenders, while a regular divi- sion and cavalry division, under rawlinson, were landed at ostend and zeebrugge for an overland move to raise the siege. eleven territorial divisions were available in england, but, in contrast to the german attitude, kitchener considered them still unfitted for an active rele. the meagre reinforcement delayed, but could not prevent, the capitulation of antwerp, oct. 10, and rawlinson’s relieving force was too late to do more than cover the escape of the belgian field army down the landers coast. yet viewed in the perspective of victory, this first and last effort in the west to make use of britain’s amphibious power applied a brake to the german advance down the coast which just stopped their second attempt to gain a decision in the west. it gained time for the arrival of the main british force, trans- ferred from the aisne to the new left of the allied line, and if their heroic defence at ypres, aided by the french and belgians along the yser to the sea, was the human barrier to the germans, it succeeded by so narrow a margin that the antwerp expedition must be adjudged the saving factor. this defence of ypres is in a duel sense the supreme memorial to the british regular army, for here they showed the inestimable value of the dis- ciplined moral and unique standard of musketry which were the fruit of long training, ancl here was their tombstone. ‘ from failing hands they threw the torch ” to the new national armies rising in england to the call of patriotism. with the continental powers the merging of conventional armies into national armies was a hardly perceptible process because of their system of 1078 universal service. but with britain it was clearly stamped as revolution, not evolution. while the little professional army sacrificed itself as the advanced guard of the nation, the truth of the new warfare of peoples was beginning to come home to the civilian population. lord kitchener, a national symbol because of his imperial achievements, had been summoned to the post of war minister, and with a supreme flash of vision had grasped, in contrast to governments and general staffs alike, the probable duration of the struggle. the people of britain responded to his call to arms, and like an ever-rising flood the “‘ new armies ” came into being. by the end of the year nearly 1,000,000 men had enlisted and the british empire had altogether some 2,000,000 under arms. perhaps kitchener was wrong in not basing this expansion, from a professional to a national scale, on the existing territorial foundation. it must be remembered, however, that the territorial force was enlisted for home defence and that initially its members’ acceptance of a wider rele was voluntary. perhaps, also, he was tardy in recognising their military value. the duplication of forces and of organisation was undoubt- edly a source of delay and waste of effort. kitchener has also been reproached with his reluctance to replace the voluntary system by conscription, but this criticism overlooks how deeply rooted was the voluntary system in british institutions, and the slowness with which lasting changes can be effected in them. if kitchener’s method was characteristic of the man, it was char- acteristic of england. ifit was unmethodical, it was calculated to impress most vividly on the british people the gulf between their ‘‘ gladiatorial ” wars of the past and the national war to which they were committed. while a psychological landmark, the battle of ypres is also a military landmark. for with the repulse of the german attempt to find an open flank the trench barrier was consolidated from the swiss frontier to the sea. the power of modern defence hac triumphed over attack, and stalemate ensued. the military history of the entente during the next four years is a story of the attempts to upset this deadlock, either by forcing the barrier or by finding a way round. the see-saw in the east—but on the eastern front the greater distances and the greater differences between the equipment of the armies ensured a fluidity which was lacking in the west. trench lines might form, but they were no more than a hard crust covering a liquid expanse. to break the crust was not difficult, and once broken, mobile operations of the old style became possible. this freedom of action was denicd to the western powers, but germany, because of her central position, had an alternative choice, and from nov. r9r4 onwards her com- mand adopted a defensive in france while seeking to cripple the power of russia in the east. here, the opening encounters had been marked by rapid changes of fortune rather than by any decisive advantage. the austrian command, emulating their allies, contrary to the principle of concentration detached part of their strength in an abortive attempt to crush serbia. and their plan for an initial offensive to cut off the polish “ tongue ” was further crippled by the fact that the german part of the pincers did not operate. it was indeed being menaced by a russian pair of pincers instead, for the russian commander-in-chief, the grand duke nicholas, had ordered his i. and ii. armies to invade east prussia instantly, in order to case the pressure on his french allics. as the russians had more than a two-to-one superiority, a combined attack had every chance of crushing the germans between the two armies. on aug. 17, rennenkampi’s i. army crossed the fast prussian frontier, and on aug. 19-20 defeated prittwitz’s viii. army at gumbinnen. on aug. 21 prittwitz heard that the russian ii. army under samsonov had crossed the southern frontier of east prussia in his rear. in panic prittwitz momentarily spoke of falling back behind the vistula, whereupon moltke superseded him by a retired gencral, hindenburg, to whom was appointed as chief of staff ludendorff, the hero of the liege attack. developing a plan already initiated by colonel hoffman of the viii. army staff, ludendorff concentrated some six divisions world war against samsonov’s left wing. this force, inferior in strength to ithe russians, could not have been decisive, but ludendorff, finding that rennenkampf was still near gumbinnen, took the calculated risk of withdrawing the german troops from that — front and rushing them back against samsonov’s right wing. this daring move was aided by the absence of communication between the two russian commanders and the german’s ability to decipher samsonov’s wireless orders to his corps. under the converging blows samsonov’s flanks were crushed and his centre surrounded. the outcome of this military masterpiece afterwards christened the battle of tannenberg, was the destruc- tion of almost the whole russian il. army. then recelving two fresh army corps from the french front, the german commander turned on the dilatory rennenkampf and drove him out of east prussia. away on the southern front, however, the scales had tilted against the central powers. the offensive of the austrian i. and lv. armies into poland was nipped in the bud by a russian onslaught on the ii. and iii. armies which were guarding their right flank. these armies were heavily defeated round lemberg, and before long the whole austrian line was in re- treat, falling back almost to cracow by the end of september. austria’s plight compelled the germans to send aid, and the bulk of the force in east prussia was formed into a new ix. army and switched south to the southwest corner of poland, whence it advanced on warsaw in combination with a renewed austrian offensive. but the russians were now approaching the full tide of their mobilised strength; counter-attacking, they drove back the advance and followed it up by a powerful effort 1o invade silesia. the grand duke nicholas formed a huge phalanx of seven armies—three in the van and two protecting either flank. allied hopes rose high as the much-heralded russian ** steam- roller’ began its ponderous advance. to counter it the german eastern front was placed under hindenburg and ludendorff, who devised yet another master-stroke, based on the system of lateral railways inside the german frontier. while the russian ad- vance was slowed down by the thorough destruction of the scanty communications in poland, ludendortf switched the german [x. army back from southwest poland and thrust it, on nov. 11, down the vistula against the joint between the two armies guarding the russian right flank. the wedge, driven in by ludendorfi’s mallet, sundered the two armies, forced the i. back on warsaw and almost effected another tannenberg against the ii., which was nearly surrounded at ledz, when the v. army from the van turned back to its rescue. as a result, part of the german enveloping force almost suffered the fate planned for the russians, but managed to cut its way through to the main body. 1f ludendorff was balked of decisive tactical success, this manoeuvre had been a classic example of how a relatively small force, by using its mobility to strike at a vital point, can paralyse the advance of an enemy several times its strength. the russian “ steam-roller” was thrown out of gear, and never again did it threaten german soil. within a week, four new german army corps arrived from the western front, and although too late to clinch the missed chance of a decisive victory, ludendorff was able to use them in press- ing the russians back by dec. 15 to the bzura-ravka river line in front of warsaw. this set-back and the drying up of his munition supplies decided the grand duke nicholas to break off the see-saw fighting near cracow and fall back on winter trench lines along the nida and dunajec rivers, leaving the end of the polish “ tongue ” in the hands of the enemy. thus, on the east as on the west, the trench stalemate had scttled in, but the crust was less firm and the russians had drained their stock of munitions to an extent that their poorly industrialised country could not make good. . the grip on the seas —we deal third with the operations at sea, which actually occurred first in chronological order. the reason is that sea-power only came to exert a dominant, perhaps the dominant, influence on the war after the initial plans on land had miscarried. if the quick decision expected by the world war military leaders had been reached it is questionable whether sea-power could have affected theissue. how narrowly germany missed decisive victory, and by what a combination of hardly conceivable blunders, is in the light of history now clear. while it is possible that britain could, and would have carried on the war unaided, we need to remember that in aug. 1914 the con- dition was still that of a professional war with popular backing rather than a truly national war; that british intervention was still regarded as a chivalrous effort to succour violated belgium and challenged france than as a life and death struggle for britain’s existence. and when a friend lies prone jn a tiger’s claws it is mistaken friendship to engage in a tug of war for the fragments if there is any chance of enticing the tiger from his prey. _ but, fortunately, in 1914, the tiger was held at bay, and with this breathing space gained, britain had the opportunity to exert her traditional weapon—sea-power. its effect on the war was akin not to a lightning flash, striking down an opponent suddenly, but to a steady radiation of heat, invigorating to those 1t was used in aid of, and drying up the resources of the enemy. but if its effect was extended and cumulative, its application was instantaneous, comparable almost to turning on an electric switch. this simple act, yet perhaps the most decisive of the war, took place before the actual outbreak—on july 29 when at seven o’clock in the morning that greater armada, the british grand fleet sailed from portland for its war station at scapa flow. few eyes saw its passage, fewer minds knew its destina- tion in those northerly orkney isles controlling the passage between north britain and norway, but from that moment germany’s arteries were subjected to an invisible pressure which never relaxed until on nov. 21 1918 the german flect arrived in those same northern waters to hand itself inte the custody of a force of whom it had seen no more than a few flecting glimpses during 47 years of intangible struggle. the fundamental cause of this unprecedented type of conflict lay in the recent development of new weapons, the mine and the submarine, which reproduced in naval warfare that same pre- dominance of defensive over offensive power which was the key factor on land. the immediate cause, however, was the strategy adopted by germany’s naval command, partly through a mis- calculation of britain’s probable strategy. appreciating their own inferiority to the british fleet as well as the impossibility of a surprise blow in face of its preparedness, and believing that their enemy was obsessed with the nelsonian tradition of seeking battle, the german command adopted a fabian strategy. they aimed to refuse conllict until their mine-layers and sub- marines had weakened the strength of the british navy, until the strain of a close blockade began to tell on the superior fleet and perhaps provided the chance of a surprise stroke, and until the conquest of britain’s allies on land made her position more difficult. the plan had at least a sound geographical basis, for the nature and configuration of the german coast lent itself to this strategy. the short north sea coastline was heavily indented, the estu- aries a maze of difficult channels, and screened by a fringe of islands—of which heligcland formed a strongly fortified shield to the naval bases at wilhelmshaven, bremerhaven and cux- haven. best of all, from the estuary of the elbe there was a backdoor into the baltic sea, the kiel canal. by this the naval forces in the baltic could be rapidly reinforced, while an enemy advance into that land-locked sea was not only hampered by the neutral possession of its approaches but could be imperilled by submarine and destroyer attack while passing through the narrow channels between the danish islands. the natural defensive power of germany’s sea-srontiers made attack almost impossible, and conversely gave her an ideal base for raiding operations. the one obvious defect of this fabian strategy was that it involved the immediate abandonment of germany’s foreign trade and reduced the possibility of her interference with the sea-borne supplies of britain and her allies. moreover, the german pfan of progressive attrition was vitiated by the strategy adopted by the british admiralty, 1079 which abandoned the direct doctrine of seeking out the enemy for the indirect doctrine of ‘ the fleet in being.” realising how the mine and submarine, combined with germany’s natural advantages, had made a close blockade hazardous, the admiralty adopted a strategy of distant surveillance, keeping the battle fleet in a position which commanded the north sea and in instant readiness for action if the enemy appeared, and using her light craft for closer, but not close observation. this strat- egy was not as passive as it seemed to a critical public, eagerly expecting a new trafalgar. it appreciated that britain’s general command of the sea was the pivot of the allied cause, and that to hazard it by exposure to uncompensated losses was the negation of this supreme requirement. therefore, while desiring battle and being ready for it, the admiralty quietly set about 1ts primary duty of maintaining the security of the ocean- routes, dealing with the sporadic threats to those routes, and thirdly, ensuring the safe passage to france of the british expeditionary force. the idea of economic pressure exercised by sea-power was still in embryo, and not until a later phase did it crystallise into a formal doctrine, and the term “ blockade ” assume a new and wider definition. the attack on sea-borne commerce was deep-rooted in the tradition of the british navy, and thus the transition to an indirect attack on the life of the enemy nation— her supplies of food and raw material—was an almost imper- ceptible progress. when this pressure was exercised against herself in a novel form and by a new weapon—the submarine, it was human if illogical that she should decry it as an atrocity. it was not easy for a conservative mind to realise that with the translation from a war of governmental policies into a war of peoples, the indefinite code of military chivalry must be sub- merged by the primitive instincts let loose by a struggle for existence. but in 1914 this “ absolute ” war was still only a latent conception, and had no influence on the opening opera- tions, great as was to be thcir influence on it. the history of the naval struggle must be dated from july 26 1914, when the admiralty, in view of the clouded inter- national situation, sent orders to the fleet assembled for review at portland not to disperse. if the review was a happy chance, the use made of it was one of the decisive acts and wisest judg- ments of the war, for while free from any of the provocation of an army mobilisation, it placed britain in automatic control of the situation at sea. it was followed on july 29 by the unnoticed sailing of the fleet for its war stations in the north sea, and warning telegrams to all squadrons abroad. to students of war and politics the lesson should not be lost, for whatever its other limitations, a professional force has this power of un- provocative readiness which a national force inevitably lacks. ‘““ mobilisation ” is a threat, creating an atmosphere in which peaceful argument withers and dies. between negotiations and mobilisation there is a gulf, between mobilisation and war an imperceptible seam, and the act of any irresponsible can draw a nation across it. . adml. jellicoe, the new commander of the grand fleet, had one initial weakness to contend with; his base at scapa was without defences against torpedo attack, and the fortified base being prepared at rosyth was still incomplete. the historic concentration of british sea-power had been on the channel coast, where lay the best prepared and defended harbours, and the government had been slow to provide funds for bases on the north sea to accompany the change in the concentration areas. the danger compelled him to take his meet west of the orkneys, although it came down as far as the forth during the transport of the expeditionary force to france, which was directly pro- tected by the older battleships of the channel fleet, and by a layered system of patrols in the southern waters of the north sea. this safe passage of the expeditionary force was the first direct achievement of the navy. the next followed on aug. 29 when beatty’s battle-cruiser squadron and tyrwhitt’s de- stroyer flotillas made a swoop into the bight of heligoland, sank several german light cruisers, and achieved the much greater io&8o indirect effect of confirming the germans in their strictly defensive strategy—not an unmixed blessing, for it led them to concentrate on the development of submarine attack. apart from this engagement the story of 1914 in the north sea is a record of unceasing vigilance on the one side; of minor submarine and mine-laying successes and losses, on the other. the war in the mediterranean opened with a mistake that was to have far-reaching political consequences. two of germany’s fastest ships were there, the battle-crutser “ goeben ”’ and the light-cruiser ‘“‘ breslau,” and received orders from berlin to steer for constantinople. they evaded the british efforts to cut them off, partly owing to inelasticity in applying the admi- ralty instructions. on the high seas the chase was more prolonged. germany had not been allowed time to send out commerce-destroyers from home waters, but for some months her few cruisers on foreign service were a thorn in the side of the british navy. it was not easy to reconcile the needs of the north sea concentra- tion with the duty of patrolling and protecting the tremendous length of sea-routes along which supplies as well as troops were flowing from india and the dominions to the support of the mother-country. by the destruction of the “ emden ”’ on nov. 9 the indian ocean was finally cleared, but this success was off- set by disaster in the pacific, where cradock’s cruiser squadron was crushed by the heavier metal of von spee’s armoured cruisers, ‘‘ scharnhorst ” and ‘* gneisenau.”” this set-back was, however, promptly redeemed by the admiralty, who dispatched sturdee with two battle-cruisers, “ inflexible ” and “ invincible ” on a lightning dash to the south atlantic, while another battle- cruiser, ‘ australia,” swept down from fiji on von spee’s rear. trapped on dec. 8 at the falkland isles, by this finely con- ceived surprise, von spee was sunk, and with him the last instrument of german naval power upon the oceans. from this time onwards the ocean communications of britain and her allies were secured for trade, for supplies and for the conveyance of troops. but as to all ocean routes there must be a land terminus, the development of the submarine made this security gradually less effective than it seemed on the morrow of sturdee’s victory. one result of britain’s early established command of the sea was that it gave her the opportunity to sweep up germany’s oversea colonies with little hindrance or expenditure of force. their seizure was valuable in that it gave the allies important assets to bargain with in case of an unfavourable issue to the war. in aug. a new zealand expedition took possession of new guinea and samoa, and the australian navy cleared several important german wireless stations in the pacific isles. japan, entering the war on england’s side, sent a fleet and army to besiege the german fortress of tsing-tau in china, which capit- ulated after a seventy-six days’ siege. in africa, togoland was occupied in aug.; the cameroons were a sterner obstacle, and not until the end of 1915 were the german forces conquered by joint british and french forces after a prolonged but economically conducted campaign. general botha, the south african pre- mier, once in arms against england, now for her, organised a force which conquered german south-west africa. almost concurrently botha rendered a still greater service to the british cause by putting down the rebellion of a section of disaffected boers, which save for the irish rising of easter 1916 was the only revolt within the borders of the empire during these four trying years. only german east africa, the largest and richest of germany’s colonies, remained. and that, owing to the difficulties of the country and the skill of von lettow-vorbeck, the german com- mander, was not to be completely subdued until the end of 1917 an expeditionary force was sent thither in nov. to support the local british east african forces, and was repulsed at tanga. not until late in 1915 could the british govt., occupied with greater problems, spare either the time or the force to deal with this hornet’s nest. submarine v. blockade—-the nature of the war at sea began to undergo definite changes early in 1915. during the world war first phase britain had been too busy in clearing the seas and maintaining the security of the sea-routes to devote much atten- tion to the use of her sea command as an economic weapon against germany. in any case her naval power was fettered by the artificial restrictions on blockade embodied in the declara- tion of london of r909, which the british govt., with singular blindness, announced on the outbreak of war it would accept as the basis of its maritime practice. their release from these self-imposed fetters was aided by germany’s action. on nov. 2 ror4 a german battle-cruiser squadron made a raid on the norfolk coast, as a reconnaissance to test the scope of britain’s naval defence. another followed on dec. 16 against the yorkshire coast, bombarding scarborough, whitby and the hartlepools. each time the germans slipped away safely, but when they attempted a third, on jan. 24, the english battle cruiser squadron, under beatty, trapped them off the dogger bank, sank “ bliicher ” and badly damaged ‘* derfflinger ” and “* seydlitz.”? although the stroke missed full success, it con- vinced the germans of the futility of their attrition strategy, and von ingenohl, the commander of their high sea fleet, was replaced by von pohl, who proposed to falkenhayn an offensive submarine campaign, which for success must bz unlimited. as a result, on feb. 18, germany proclaimed the waters round the british isles a war zone where all ships, enemy or neutral, would be sunk at sight. this gave britain a lever to loosen the dec- laration of london, and she replied by claiming the right to intercept all ships suspected of carrying goods to germany, and bring them into british ports for search. this tightening of the blockade caused serious difficulties with neutrals, america espe- cially, but germany eased the friction by torpedoing the great liner “ lusitania ’”? may 7 r915. the drowning of 1,100 people, including some americans, was a spectacular brutality which shocked the conscience of the world, and appealed more forcibly to american opinion even than the desolation of belgium. this act, succeeded by others, paved the way for the entry of the united states into the war, though it was to be later than scemed likely on the morrow of the tragedy. the beginning of air attack—the same period witnessed the dawn of another new form of war which helped to drive home the new reality that the war of armies had become the war of peoples. from jan. 1915 zeppelin raids began on the english coast and reached their peak in the following winter, to be suc- ceeded by aeroplane raids. the difficulty of distinguishing from the air between military and civil objectives smoothed the path for a development which, beginning with excuses, ended in a frank avowal that in a war for existence the will of the enemy nation, not merely the bodies of their soldiers, is the inevitable target. the psychological situation —the first psychological symptom of the world war, as it seemed to many, was an immeasurable sigh of relief. had the peoples of europe sat on the safety-valve too ieng? the war-weary mind of to-day cannot reconstruct the tension and anxicty, the strain and stress of hope and fear of the long years of the peace that was no peace and yet was not war. it may be read as a revolt of the spirit against the monotony and triviality of the every day round, the completion of a psy- chological cycle when the memories of past war have faded, and paved the way for the emergence and revival of the primal “hunting ” instinct in man. this first phase of enthusiasm was succeeded by one of passion, the natural ferocity of war accentuated by a form of mob spirit which is developed by a “ nation in arms.” the british army was immune because of its professional character, whereas in the german army, the most essentially “ citizen,” it gained scope because of the cold-blooded logic of the general staff theory of war. with the coming of the autumn, a third phase became manifest, more particularly among the combatants. this was the momentary growth of a spirit of tolerance, sym- bolised by the fraternisation which took place on christmas day, but this in turn was to wane as the strain of the war became felt and the reality of the struggle for existence came home to the warring sides. world war iii. the events of 1915 the deadlock on land.—well before the end of 1914, the reality of the deadlock on the western front was clear to the governments and general staffs of the warring countries, and each was seeking a solution. the reaction varied in form and in nature according to the mental power and predisposition of the different authorities. with the central powers the opinion of falkenhayn was the decisive factor, and the impression derived not merely from his critics but from his own account is that neither the opinion nor the direction was really clear as to its object. he was too obsessed with the principle of security at the expense of the principle of concentration, and in his failure to fulfil the second he undermined the foundations of the first. on his appointment after the marne reverse, he still adhered to the schlieffen plan of seeking a decision in the west, but he did not follow the schliefien method of weakening his left wing in order to mass on the vital right wing. the oct.-nov. attack round ypres was made largely with raw formations, while war- experienced troops lay almost idle between the aisne and the vosges. general groner, chief of the field railways, even went so far as to submit a detailed plan to falkenhayn for transferring six army corps to the right wing, but it was rejected. when we remember how close to breaking point was the allied line at ypres, it can only be said that for a second time the german supreme command saved the allies. at this juncture, too, lud- endor{ff was pleading for re-inforcements to make his wedge- blow at the russian flank near ledz decisive, but falkenhayn missed the chance by delaying until the ypres failure had passed from assurance to fact. convinced at last of the strength of the allied trench-barrier, falkenhayn took the momentous decision to stand on the defen- sive in the west. but his object in so doing seems to have been vague. his feeling that the war must ultimately be decided in france led him to distrust the value, as he doubted the possi- bility, of a decision against russia. hence while he realised that the eastern front was the only practicable theatre for operations in the near future, he withheld the necessary reinforcements until forced to do so by the threatening situation of the austro- }tungarian front. and even then he doled out reserves reluc- tantly and meagrely, enough to secure success but never in the quantity and the time for decisive victory. it is to his credit, however, that he realised a long war was now inevitable, and that he set to work to develop germany’s resources for such a warfare of attrition. the technique of field entrenchment was carried to a higher pitch than with any other country, the military railways were expanded for the lateral movement of reserves, the supply of munitions and of the raw material for their manufacture was tackled so energetically and comprehensively, that an ample flow was ensured from the spring of 1915 onwards—a time when the british were only awakening to the problem. here were laid the foundations of that economic organisation and utilisation of resources which was to be the secret of germany’s resisting power to the pressure of the british blockade. for the scientific grasp of the economic sphere in war germany owed much to dr. walter rathenau, a brilliant captain of industry. she was also a pioneer in the psychological sphere, for as early as the autumn of 1914, she launched a vast scheme of propaganda in asia, to undermine british prestige and the loyalty of britain’s mahommedan subjects. the defect of her propaganda, its crudeness, was less apparent when directed to primitive people than when applied to the civilised peoples of europe and america. the same period witnessed also the one great success for ger- man diplomacy, the entry of turkey into the war, although this was fundamentally due to a combination of pre-war causes with military events. since 1909 the country had been under the control of the young turk party, to whom traditions, in- cluding that of friendship with britain, were abhorrent. ger- many, filled with her own dream of a germanic middle east— of which the baghdad railway was the symbol, had skilfully exploited the opportunity to gain a dominating influence over the new rulers of turkey. their leader, enver pasha, had been io8i military attache in berlin, german instructors permeated the turkish army and fleet, and a definite understanding existed between germany and the young turk leaders as to common military action—urged by the common bond of necessary safe- guard against danger from russia. the arrival of the “ goeben ” and “‘ breslau ” reinforced the moral pressure of von wangen- heim, the german ambassador, and eventually on oct. 29 the turks committed definite acts of war, at odessa against russia, and in sinai against britain. falkenhayn has shown “ the decisive importance of turkey joining in the struggle ’—first as a barrier across the channel of munition supply to russia, and secondly as a distraction to the military strength of britain and russia. under german dictation, turkey struck as early as mid-dec. against the rus- sians in the caucasus, but enver’s over ambitious plan ended in disaster at the battle of sarikamish. turkey was no more for- tunate in her next venture; to cut britain’s suez canal artery with the east. the sinai desert was a check on an invasion in strength, and the two small detachments which got across were easily repulsed, at ismailia and el kantara, although allowed to make good their retreat. but if both these offensives were tactical failures, they were of great strategic value to germany by fixing large russian and british forces. as an offset, perhaps more moral than material, to turkey joining the central powers, italy definitely threw over the arti- ficial ties of the old triple alliance, and joined the entente. on may 24 she declared war on austria—hcr hereditary enemy, although avoiding an open breach with germany. if her main object was to seize the chance of redeeming her kinsmen in trieste and the trentino from austrian rule, there was also a spiritual desire to reassert her historic traditions. militarily, however, her aid could not greatly affect the situation, for her army was unready to deliver a prompt blow, and the austrian frontier was a mountainous obstacle of great natural strength. on the entente side the reality of the trench deadlock pro- duced different and diverse reactions. if the desire to hold on to her territorial gains swayed german strategy, the desire to recover her lost territory dominated french strategy. it is true that their mental and material concentration on the west- ern front, where lay the main armed force of the enemy, was justified by military tenets, but without any key to unlock the barrier they were merely knocking themselves to pieces. winter attacks in artois, on the aisne, in champagne and the woevre afforded costly proof, and against the germans’ skill in trench- fighting joffre’s “ nibbling ” was usually attrition on the wrong side of the balance sheet. as for any new key, the french were singularly lacking in fertility of idea. britain’s trouble was rather an excess of fertility, or rather an absence of concentration in choosing and bringing to fruition these mental sceds. yct in great measure this failing was due to the obscurantism of professional opinion, whose attitude was that of blank opposition rather than expert guidance. british-inspired solutions to the deadlock crystallised into two main groups, one tactical, the other strategical. the first was to unlock the trench barrier by producing a machine invul- nerable to machine-guns and capable of crossing trenches, which would restore the tactical balance upset by the new preponder- ance of defensive over offensive power. the idea of such a machine was conceived by colonel swinton in oct. 1914, was nourished and tended in infancy by mr. winston churchill, then first lord of the admiralty, and ultimately after months of experiment hampered by official opposition came to maturity in the tank of 1916. the strategical solution was to go round the trench barrier. its advocates—who became known as the “ castern,” in con- trast to the “‘ western ”’ school—argued that the enemy alliance should be viewed as a whole, and that modern developments had so changed conceptions of distance and powers of mobility, that a blow in some other theatre of war would correspond to the historic aitack on an enemy’s strategic flank. further, such an operation would be in accordance with the traditional am- phibious strategy of britain, and would enable it to exploit the 1082 advantage of sea-power which had hitherto been neglected. in oct. 1914 lord fisher, recalled to the office of first sea lord, had urged a plan for a landing on the german coast. in jan. 1915, lord kitchener advocated another, for severing turkey’s main line of eastward communication by a landing in the gulf of alexandretta. the post-war comments of hindenburg and enver show how this would have paralysed turkey. it could not, however, have exercised a wider influence, and it was antici- pated by another project—partly the result of churchill's strategic insight and partly due to the pressure of circumstances. the dardanelles expedition.—this was the dardanelles expe- dition, about which controversy has raged so hotly that the term just applied to churchill may be disputed by some critics. this is answered by the verdict of falkenhayn himself: “‘ if the straits between the mediterranean and the black sea were not permanently closed to entente traffic, all hopes of a successful course of the war would be very considerably diminished. rus- sia would have been freed from her significant isolation... which offered a safer guarantee than military successes... that sooner or later a crippling of the forces of this titan must take place... . automatically.” the fault was not in the con- ception, but in the execution. had the british used at the outset even a fair proportion of the forces they ultimately expended in driblets, it is clear from turkish accounts that victory would have crowned their undertaking. on jan. 2 1915 kitchener received an appeal from the grand duke nicholas for a diversion which would relieve the turkish pressure on russia’s army in the caucasus. kitchener felt unable to provide troops and suggested a naval demonstration against the dardanelles, which churchill, appreciating the wider strategic and economic issues, proposed to convert into an attempt to force the passage. his naval advisers, if not enthusi- astic, did not oppose the proposal and in response to a telegram the admiral on the spot, carden, submitted a plan for a method- ical reduction of the forts and clearance of the mine-fields. fisher, while clinging to his own north sea project strongly advocated a combined naval and military expedition. on jan. 13 the war council decided for a naval expedition to “ take the gallipoli peninsula, with constantinople as its objective.” a naval force, mainly of obsolete vessels was got together with french aid, and after preliminary bombardment, entered the straits on march 18. drift mines, however, caused the sinking of several ships, and the attempt was abandoned. it is a moot point whether a prompt renewal of the advances would not have succeeded, for the turkish ammunition was exhausted, and in such conditions the mine obstacle might have been overcome. but the new naval commander, admiral de robeck decided against it, unless military aid was forthcoming. already, a month before, the war council had determined on a joint attack, and began the despatch of a military force under sir ian hamilton. but as the authorities had drifted into the new scheme, so were they tardy in releasing the necessary troops, and even when sent, in inadequate numbers, several more weeks delay had to be incurred—at alexandria—in order to redistrib- ute the force in its transports suitably for tactical action. worst of all, this fumbling policy had thrown away the chance of surprise, which was vital for a landing on an almost impregnable shore. when the preliminary bombardment took place in fcb., only two turkish divisions were at the straits, this was increased to four by the date of the naval attack, to six when hamilton was at last able to attempt his landing. for this he had only four british divisions and one french division—actually inferior in strength to the enemy in a situation where the inherent pre- ponderance of defensive over offensive power was multiplied by the natural difficulties of the terrain. his weakness of numbers and his mission of aiding the passage of the fleet compelled him to choose a landing on the gallipoli peninsula in preference to one on the mainland or on the asiatic shore; and the rocky coastline limited his possible landing places. on april 25 he made his spring, at the southern tip of the peninsula near cape hellas and—with australian and new zealand troops—near gaba tepe, some 15 m. up the aegean world war coast; the french, as a diversion, made a temporary landing at kum kale on the asiatic shore. the troops effected the impos- sible and made good their lodgment on beaches strewn with barbed wire and swept by machine-guns. but the momentary asset of tactical surprise had passed, the difficulties of supply were immense, while the turks held the commanding heights and were able to bring up their reserves. the invaders managed to hold on to their two precarious footholds, but they could not expand them appreciably, and the stagnation of trench-warfare setin. they could not go on, and national prestige forbade them to go back. ultimately, in july, the british govt. decided to send a further five divisions to reinforce the seven by now on the peninsula. by the time they arrived the turkish strength tn the region had also risen to 15 divisions. hamilton decided on a double stroke— a reinforced blow from gaba tepe and a new landing at suvla bay a few miles north—to sever the middle of the peninsula and secure the heights commanding the narrows. he deceived the turkish command and achieved surprise (aug. 6), but the first blow failed and the second lost a splendid chance by the inexperience of the troops and still more the inertia and fumbling of the local commanders. for over 36 hours, before reserves arrived, only one and a half turkish battalions barred the path. energetic new commanders, for whom hamilton had previously asked, were sent out when the opportunity had passed. the british were once more condemned to hang on to tenuous foot- holds, and with the autumn rains setting in their trials were increased. the government had lost faith and were anxious to withdraw, but fear of the moral effect delayed their decision. hamilton was asked for his opinion, however, and when he pro- nounced in favour of continuing—in which course he still had confidence—he was replaced by sir charles monro, who imme- diately declared for evacuation. kitchener was then sent out to investigate, and on his verdict a withdrawal was sanctioned and carried out from suvla and anzac on the night of dec. 18-9 and from hellas on that of jan. 8-9. if the bloodless evacu- ation was an example of masterly organisation and co-operation it was also a proof of the greater ease of such operations in modern warfare. thus the curtain rang down on a sound and farsighted conception marred by a chain of errors in execution almost unrivalled even in british history. while the british were striving to unlock the back door to russia, the germanic powers were hammering their russian allies, whose resistance was collapsing in large measure from a lack of munitions which could only be made good by foreign supplies through that locked entrance, the dardanclles. on the eastern front, the campaign of 1914 had shown that a german force could count on defeating any larger russian force, but that when russians and austrians met on an equality victory rested with the russians. falkenhayn was forced, reluctantly, to despatch german reinforcements as a stillening to the austrians, and thus was dragged into an offensive in the east rather than adopting it as a clearly defined plan. luden- dorff, in contrast, had his eyes firmly fixed on the ultimate object, and from now on advocated unceasingly a whole-hearted effort to break russia. ludendorfl’s was a strategy of decision, falk- enhayn’s a strategy of attrition. in the conflict of wills between these two men lies the clue to the resultant strategy of germany—highly effective, yet not decisive. on the russian side the plan embodied the lessons of experience and was soundly conceived, but the means were lacking and the instrument defective. the grand duke nicholas aimed to secure both his flanks solidly before attempting a fresh blow towards silesia. from jan. until april the russian forces on the southern flank of the polish salient strove to gain pos- session of the carpathians and the gateways into the hungarian plain. but the austrians, with a german infusion, parried their efforts, and the loss was disproportionate to the small gains. the long-besieged fortress of przemysl, however, at last fell into their hands. in northern poland the russians were preparing to strike upwards at east prussia, when they were forestalled by a fresh ludendorff stroke eastwards towards the frontier of world war russia proper. the blow was launched on feb. 7 over snow- buried roads and frozen swamps, and was distinguished by the envelopment of four russian divisions in the augustovo forests. moreover, it extracted the sting from the russian attack further west. these moves were, however, merely a ‘‘ curtain-raiser ”’ to the real drama of 1915. but before turning to this it 1s necessary to glance at events on the western front, the importance of which is partly as a sign post to the future and partly because of their reaction on the eastern front. while a way round the trench barrier was being sought in gallipoli and experiments on a novel key were being carried out in england, the entente commands in france were trying more orthodox solutions. the most significant was the british attack at neuve chapelle on march 10. here a heavy concentration of artillery was secretly assembled, and an intense bombardment of half an hour’s dura- tion delivered on the german trenches, after which the artillery lengthened their range and dropped a curtain of fire to prevent the reinforcement of the enemy’s battered trenches, which were rapidly overrun by the infantry. complete surprise was attained and most of the first positions captured, but control broke down, reserves were late in coming up, and the opportunity of exploiting the initial success van- ished. a further factor was that the narrowness of the attack sector made the breach more easy for the defenders to close, although this defect was unavoidable owing to the general shortage of munitions. the british authorities had been slower than the germans to awaken to the scale of ammunition supply required for this new warfare, and the shortage of shells became so obvious in the spring of rors as to lead to a public outcry which culminated in the establishment of a ministry of muni- tions, under mr. lloyd george, to co-ordinate and develop both manufacture and the supply of raw materials. apart from shells, the crudeness and inferiority of all the british trench-warfare weapons compared with the germans, made such a radical reorganisation overdue, and its urgency was emphasised by the near approach of the time when britain’s new national armies would take the field. if the task was undertaken late, it was carried out with energy and thoroughness, and by 1916 the flow of munitions reached a volume, still expanding, which finally removed any material handicap on the strategy of the british leaders. the tactical sequel of neuve chapelle was less fortunate. it was clear that the small-scale experiment had only missed success by a narrow margin and that there was scope for its development. but the entente commands missed the true lesson, which was the surprise attainable by a short bombard- ment that compensated its brevity by its intensity. and only partially did they appreciate that the sector attacked must be sufficiently wide to prevent the defender’s artillery commanding, or his reserves closing the breach. instead, they drew the super- ficial deduction that mere volume of shell-fire was the key to success. not until 1917 did they revert to the neuve chapelle method. it was left to the germans to profit by the experience against the russians in may. but before that came, the western front was destined to increase the tally of military blunders. in the first, it was the germans’ turn to find and misuse a new key to the trench dead- lock. this was the introduction of gas, and, unlike the british introduction of tanks later, the chance, once forfeited, did not return, owing to the relative ease of providing an antidote. in a local attack in poland on jan. 31, the germans had tried the use of gas-shells, but the experiment had been a failure owing to the nullifying effect of the intense cold. at the next attempt it was discharged from cylinders owing to the failure of the author- ities to provide the inventor, haber, with adequate facilitics for the manufacture of shells. further, the initial disappointment led the german command to place little trust in its value. in consequence, when discharged against the french trenches at ypres on april 22, there were no reserves at hand to pour through the wide breach it created. a strange green vapour, a surging mass of agonised fugitives, a four miles gap without a living 1083 defender—such was the sequence of events. but the heroic resistance of the canadians on the flank of the breach and the prompt arrival of english and indian reinforcements saved the situation in the absence of german reserves. the chlorine gas originally used was undeniably cruel, but no worse than the frequent effect of shell or bayonet, and when it was succceded by improved forms of gas both experience and statistics proved it the least inhumane of modern weapons. but it was novel and therefore labelled an atrocity by a world which condones abuses but detests innovations. thus germany in- curred the moral odium which inevitably accompanies the use of a novel weapon without any compensating advantage (sce chemical warfare). on the entente side, wisdom would have counselled a period of waiting until their munition supply had grown and the new british armies were ready, but the desire to regain lost territory and the duty of relieving the pressure on russia, combined with an ill-founded optimism to spur joffre to premature offensives. the german losses were exaggerated, their skill and power in defence underrated, and a series of diffused and unconnected attacks were made. the chief was by the french between lens and arras, under foch’s direction, and the earher experience of failure to penetrate beyond the first positions was repeated. even more futile were the british attacks at festubert early in may. the effect of these attacks was, however, to convince even the dubious falkenhayn of the strength of his western line and of the remoteness of any real menace from the franco-british forces. his offensive on the eastern front had already opened. tactically unlimited, its strategical object was at first only the limited one relicving the pressure on the austrian front and, concurrently, reducing russia’s offensive power. falkenhayn judged a rupture of the russian centre to be the best means to this end, and chose the dunajec sector between the upper vis- tula and the carpathians as offering the least obstacles to an advance and best protection to the flanks of a penetration. the break-through was entrusted to mackensen, whose force com- prised the newly formed german xi. army—with divisions from the west, and the iv. austro-hungarian army. the ypres gas attack and a large cavalry raid from east prussia were initiated to cloak the concentration on the dunajec, of 10 divisions and 1,500 guns against a front weakly held and lacking rear lines of trenches. on may 2, after an intense bombardment had flattened the russian trenches, the attack was launched and swept through with little opposition. the surprise was complete, the cxploita- tion rapid, and despite a gallant stand on the wisloka river, the whole line along the carpathians was rolled up, until on may 14 the advance reached the san, 80 m. from its starting point. defeat almost turned into disaster when this was forced at jaroslav, but the impctus of the advance had momentarily spent itself and reserves were lacking. a new factor was intro- duced by italy's declaration of war against austria, but falken- hayn persuaded the austrian command, with some dilhculty, not to move troops from the russian front, and to maintain a strict defensive on their italian frontier, which was secured by the mountain barrier. he realised that he had committed him- self too far in galicia to draw back, and that only by bringing more troops from france could he hope to fulfil his object oi transferring troops back there, as this could only be possible when russia’s offensive power was crippled and her menace to austria removed. strengthened by these reinforcements, mack- ensen attacked again in co-operation with the austrians, retook przemysl on june 3 and captured lemberg on june 22, cutting the russian front into two separated portions. but the russians, from their vast man-power resources, had almost made good the loss of 400,000 prisoners, and falkenhayn’s anxiety about the stability of his austrian allies decided him to continue the offensive, although still with limited objects and with one eye on the situation in france. he changed its direc- tion, however, from eastwards to northwards, between the bug and vistula, where lay the main russian forces. in conjunction, 1084 hindenburg was ordered to strike southeast from east prussia, across the narew and towards the bug. ludendorff disliked the plan as being too much of a frontal attack; the russians might be squeezed by the closing in of the two wings but their retreat would not be cut off. he urged once more his scheme for a wide enveloping manoeuvre through kovno on vilna and minsk, but falkenhayn rejected it, fearing that it would mean more troops and a deeper commitment. the result justified ludendorff’s expectation—the grand duke extricated his troops from the warsaw salient before the ger- man shears could close on him. falkenhayn, on the other hand, considered that ludendorff had not put his full weight into the attack. nevertheless, 750,000 prisoners had been taken by the middle of august, poland had been occupied, and falkenhayn decided to break off large scale operations on the eastern front. bul- garia’s entry into the war was now arranged and he wished to support the combined attack of austria and bulgaria against serbia, as well as to transfer troops back to meet the french offensive expected in september. mackensen was sent to the serbian front and ludendorff was given a belated permission to carry out his vilna scheme, with such resources as he had, but as an independent operation. it began on sept. 9, von below’s army of the niemen and fichhorn’s x. army forming two great horns which gored their way into the russian front, the one east towards dvinsk anc the other southeast towards vilna. the russians were driven back in divergent directions and the german cavalry advancing between the horns far overlapped vilna and drew near the minsk railway. but the german strength was slender, the russians free to concentrate against this isolated menace, and in face of the stiffening resistance ludendorff took the wise course of sus- pending operations. the crux of the situation was that the rus- sian armies had been allowed to draw back almost out of the net before the long delayed vilna manoeuvre was attempted; the degree of success attained with such weak forces was confirma- tion of its practicability and of ludendorff’s claim that a power- ful blow delivered while the russians were deeply enmeshed in the polish salient might have annihilated the armed force of russia. she had been badly lamed, but not destroyed, and although never again a direct menace to germany, she was able 1o delay the full concentration of german strength in the west for two years, until 1918. falkenhayn’s cautious strategy was to prove the most hazardous in the long run, and indeed lo pave the way for germany’s bankruptcy. thus, at the end of sept., the russian retreat, after a nerve- wracking series of escapes from the salients which the germans systematically created and then sought to cut off, came to a definite halt on a straightened linc, stretching from riga on the baltic to czernowitz on the rumanian frontier. but the russian armies had gained this respite at a ruinous price, and their western allics had effected little in repayment of russia’s sac- rifice on their behalf in t914. for the franco-british relief offensive of sept. 25 had been no more fruitful than its prede- cessors. the main blow was launched by the french in cham- pagne, in conjunction with a franco-british attack on cither side of lens. one fault was that the sectors were too far apart to have a reaction on each other, but a worse was that the com- mand tried to reconcile two irreconcilable factors—they aimed at a break through but preceded it with a prolonged bombard- ment which gave away any chance of surprise. both attacks gained the front german positions without difliculty, but then delay in bringing reserves forward allowed the german reserves to close the gaps, a task simplified by the narrowness of the attack frontage. the slight gains of ground in no way compen- sated for the heavy price paid for them. the british share in this offensive is, however, notable as marking the appearance in strength of the new armies; at loos they were “ blooded ” and if inexperience detracted from their effectiveness, their courage and driving force were an omen of britain’s power to improvise a national eflort comparable with the long-created military machines of the continent. world war the direction of this effort inspired less confidence, and sir john french gave place to sir douglas haig as commander- in-chief, just as already in sept. the russian command had been transferred from the grand duke nicholas, nominally to the tsar, as a moral symbol, but actually to gen. alexciev, the new chief of staff. the conquest of serbia, oct. 1915.—while stalemate, although with marked changes beneath the surface, once more settled in on both the eastern and western fronts, the latter months of 1915 witnessed fluid operations elsewhere which were to have an uncalculated influence on the war. austria had proved capable of holding the italians on the isonzo, and once the russian danger began to fade under the pressure of the summer offensive, her command was anxious to deal with serbia conclusively. austria’s attempted invasions in aug. and sept. 1914 and again in nov., had been brusquely repulsed by serbian counter-strokes, and it was not pleasant for a great power, especially one with so many slav subjects, to swallow such military rebuffs. her impatience coincided with falkenhayn’s desire to gain direct railway communications with turkey, hard pressed at the dardanelles. throughout the summer the rival coalitions had been bidding for bulgaria’s support, and in this bargaining the entente suffered the moral handicap of military failure and the material handicap caused by serbia’s unwillingness to give up any part of macedonia— of which she had despoiled bulgaria in 1913. as austria had no objection to offering territory that belonged to her enemy, bul- garia accepted her bid. this accession of strength enhanced the chance of a decision against serbia and in aug. ialkenhayn decided to reinforce kevess’s austrian iii. army with gall- witz’s german xi. army from the russian front. in addition two bulgarian armies were available. mackensen was sent to direct the operations. to meet this new threat serbia, apart from her own relatively small forces, had only a treaty guarantee of greek aid and promises from the entente powers. the first disappeared with the fall of veniselos, the pro-ally greek premier, and the second, as usual, was too late. on oct. 6 1915 the austro-german armies attacked south- wards across the danube, with a flanking movement across the drina on the right. the sturdy resistance of the serbs in delay- ing actions, and the natural difficulty of the mountainous country, checked the advance, but before franco-british reinforcements could arrive, the bulgarian armies struck westwards into southern serbia, across the rear of the main serbian armies. this drove a deep wedge between the serbs and their allies, moving up from salonika, and automatically loosened the props of the resistance in the north. with their line bent at both ends until it resembled a vast bow, threatened with a double envel- opment, and with their retreat to the south cut off, the serbian armies decided to retire west through the albanian mountains. those who survived the hardships of this mid-winter retreat were conveyed to the island of corfu, and after being re-equipped and reorganised, joined the entente force at salonika in the spring of 1916. the conquest of serbia, though not as it proved of serbian military power, relieved austria of danger on her southern frontier, and gave germany free communication and control over a huge central belt from the north sea to the tigris. for the entente this campaign dug a military sump-pit, which for three years was to drain their military resources, there to lie idle and ineffective. yet ultimately that sump-pit was to overflow and wash away onc of the props of the central alliance. the salonika expedition—when at the beginning of oct. the entente govts. had awakened to serbia’s danger, british and french divisions had been despatched hurriedly from gallipoli to salonika, which was the only channel of aid to serbia by the railway to uskub. under the command of gen. sarrail, the advanced guard of this relieving force pressed up the vardar and over the serbian frontier, only to find that the bulgarian wedge had cut them off from the serbians, and they were forced to fall back on salonika, pursued by the bulgarians. on military grounds an evacuation of salonika was indicated, but political reasons induced the allies to remain. the darda- world war nelles failure had already diminished their prestige, and by con- vincing the balkan states of german invincibility had decided bulgaria to enter the war and greece to break her treaty with serbia. to evacuate salonika would be a further loss of pres- tige, whereas by holding on they could check german influence over greece, and maintain a base of operations from which to aid rumania if, as expected, she entered the war on their side. to this end the salonika force was augmented with fresh british and french divisions, as well as contingents from italy and rus- sia, and there also the rebuilt serbian army was brought. but apart from the capture of monastir in nov. 1916 and an abortive attack in april 1917, the entente force made no serious offensive until the autumn of 1918. its tnnocuousness was partly due to the natural difficulties of the country—the chain of mountain ridges which guarded the approach to the balkans, partly to the feeling of the allied govts. that it was a bad debt, and partly to the personality of sarrail, whose conduct and reputa- tion for political intrigues failed to command the confidence and co-operation essential if such a mixed force was to “ pull its weight.” on their side the germans were content to leave it in passivity, under guard of the bulgarians, while they steadily withdrew their own forces for use elsewhere. with gentle sar- casm they termed salonika their “ largest internment camp,” and with half a million allied troops locked up there the jibe had some justification—until ror8. the mesopotamia expedition fo the fall of kut—nor was salonika the only “ drain ” opened in 1915. mesopotamia was the site of a fresh diversion of force from the centre of military gravity, and one which could only be excused on purely political grounds. it was not, like salonika and the dardanelles, begun to relieve a hard-pressed ally, nor had it the justification of the dardanelles expedition of being directed at the vital point of one of the enemy states. the occupation of mesopotamia might raise british prestige, and it might annoy turkey, but it could not endanger the power of resistance. although its origin was sound, its development was another example of “ drift,’ due to the inherent faultiness of britain’s machinery for the conduct of war. the oil-fields near the persian gulf were of essential impor- tance for britain’s oi] supply, and thus when war with turkey was imminent, a small indian force, of one division, was des- patched to safeguard them. to fulfil this mission effectively it was necessary to occupy the basra vilayet at the head of the persian gulf, in order to command the possible lines of approach. on nov. 21 1914 basra was captured, but the rising stream of turkish reinforcements compelled the indian govt. to add a second division. the turkish attacks in the spring of 1915 were repulsed, and the british commander, gen. nixon, judged it wise to expand his footing, for greater security. townshend ’s division was pushed up the tigris to amara, gaining a brilliant little victory, and the other division up the euphrates to nas- iriya. southern mesopotamia was a vast alluvial plain, roadless and railless, in which there were two great rivers formed the only channels of communication. thus a hold on amara and nasiriya covered the oil-fields; but nixon and the indian govt., inspired by these successes, decided to push forward to kut-el- ‘amara, a move which was 180 m. further into the interior but had a partial military justification in the fact that at kut the shatt-el-hai, issuing from the tigris, formed a link with the euphrates by which turkish reserves could be transferred from one river line to the other. townshend was sent forward in aug., defeated the turks near kut, and his cavalry carried the pursuit to aziziya, half way to baghdad. enthusiasm spread to the home government, anxious for a moral counterpoise to their other failures, and nixon received permission for townshend to press on to baghdad. but after an indecisive battle at ctesiphon, the growing supe- riority of the turkish strength, compelled him to retreat to kut. here, isolated far from help, he was ordered to remain, as several fresh divisions were being sent to mesopotamia. kut was invested by the turks on dec. 8 1915, and the relieving forces battered in vain against the turkish lines covering the approach 1085 on elther bank of the tigris. the conditions were bad, the com- munications worse, the generalship faulty, and at last on april 29 1916 kut was forced to surrender. however unsound the strategy which despatched townshend, it is just to emphasise that its actual achievements in face of superior numbers, with inadequate equipment and primitive communications, and utterly isolated in the heart of an enemy country, wrote a glorious page of british history. when these handicaps are compared with the four to one superiority in number, and highly organised supply system of the force which ultimately took baghdad, the comparison explains the awe in which townshend and his men were held by the turks. the home front 1915.—yperhaps one of the most significant landmarks of the transition of the struggle from a “ military ” to a “ national ” war was the formation of a national ministry in britain, which occurred in may 1915. for the prototype of parliaments to abandon the deep-rooted party system and pool the direction of the war was proof of the psychological upheaval of traditions. the liberal prime minister, asquith, remaincd, but the real lead began to pass insensibly into other hands, notably those of mr. lloyd george. mr. churchill, whose vision had saved the menace to the channel ports and made possible the future key to the deadlock, was shelved, as already had been haldane, the creator of the expeditionary force. political changes were general in all countries, and were symp- tomatic of a readjustment of popular outlook. the early fervour had disappeared, and been replaced by a dogged determination which if natural to the british was in strange contradiction to what had been reported of the french temperament. economically, the. strain had yet to be felt severely by any country. finance had shown an unexpected power of accom- modation, and neither the blockade or the submarine campaign had seriously affected the food supply. if germany was begin- ning to suffer some shortage, her people had more tangible omens of success to fortify their resolution than had their enemies. iv. from verdun to the entry of america verdun 1916.—in 1914 the centre of gravity of the world war had been on the western front, in 1915 it shifted to the eastern front, and in 1916 once more moved back to france. although the entente had dissipated some of their strength in salonika and mesopotamia, the rising tide of england’s new armies and of her munition supplies promised the power for an effort far larger in scale than before to break the trench dead- lock. measures had also been taken to keep these new divisions up to strength. although the principle of voluntary enlistment had not yet been abandoned, the method was systematised and based on a national register. this scheme, launched in oct. r915 under the aegis of lord derby, aimed to reconcile the demands of the army with the needs of industry, calling up men by groups as they were wanted, and taking single men first. but the response among the latter was not adequate to preserve this graduated principle and in jan. 1916 by the military serv- ice act, the voluntary system—system is hardly the correct term —was replaced by conscription. at the close of 1915 the entente command adopted the prin- ciple of a simultaneous general offensive in 1916 by france, britain, russia and italy. in view of the rawness of the british troops, it was recognised that time must be allowed for training, and that the offensive could not begin before the summer of 1916, although it was hoped to carry out preliminary attacks to wear down the enemy’s strength. but german action was to dislocate this scheme, and only the british share came fully into operation,and not even that into full effect. falkenhayn was about to fulfl his long-cherished plan for a western offensive, but with characteristic limitations. always a believer in the strategy of attrition, he now carried this ruling idea into tactics, and produced the new form of attack by methodical stages, each with a limited objective. in a memorandum to the german emperor at christmas rors he argued that england was the staple of the enemy alliance. ‘‘ the history of the english wars against the netherlands, spain, 1086 france and napoleon is being repeated. germany can expect no mercy from this enemy, so long as he still retains the slightest hope of achieving his object.”’ save by submarine warfare, however, england and her army were out of reach, for her sector of the front did not lend itself to offensive operations. “ in view of our feelings for our arch enemy in the war that is cer- tainly distressing, but it can be endured if we realise that for england the campaign on the continent . .. is at bottom a side-show. her real weapons here are the french, russian and italian armies.” he regarded russia as already paralysed, and italy’s military achievements as unlikely to affect the situation. “only france remains.” ‘ france has almost arrived at the end of her military effort. if her people can be made to under- stand clearly that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for, breaking-point would be reached, and england's best sword knocked out of her hand.” he added that a break-through in mass was unnecessary, and that instead the germans should aim to bleed france to death by choosing a point of attack “ for the retention of which the french command would be compelled to throw in every man they have.”’ such objectives were either belfort or verdun, and verdun was chosen, because it was a menace to the main german communications, because it offered a salient and so cramped the defender, and because of the moral effect if so renowned a place was lost to france. the keynote of the tactical plan was a continuous series of limited advances which by their menace should draw the french reserves into the mincing-machine of the german artillery. and each of these advances was itself to be secured from loss by an intense artillery bombardment, brief for surprise and making up for its short duration by the number of batteries and their rapidity of fire. by this means the objective would be taken and consolidated before the enemy could move up his reserves for counter-attack. although the french intelligence branch at general headquarters gave early warning of the german prep- arations, the operations branch were so full of their own offen- sive schemes that the warning fell on deaf ears. further, the easv fall of the belgian and russian fortresses had led to a com- monly held view that fortresses were obsolete, and joffre, per- suading the french govt. to declass verdun as a fortress, had denuded it of guns and troops. the forts were only used as shelters and the trench lines which took their place were inace- quate and in poor repair. yet eight months’ bombardment was to leave the forts undamaged! at 7:15 a.m. on feb. 21 the ger- man bombardment began, on a front of 15 m., and progressively trenches and wire were flattened out or upheaved in a chaos of tumbled earth, giving to the countryside a weird resemblance to the surface of the moon. at 4:45 p.m. the german infantry advanced, although the first day only on a 25 m. front. from then until feb. 24 the defenders’ line east of the meuse was crumbled away as by the erosion of the tide. ‘operations ” still argued that it was only a feint, but joffre decided to send castelnau to discover the true situation and with full powers to act. castelnau swung back the right flank but ordered the line of the forts to be heid at all costs and en- trusted the defence to petain, for whose use a reserve army was assembled. petain’s first problem was not so much defence as supply—the german heavy guns had closed all avenues into the salient except one light railway and the bar-le-duc road. while gangs of territorial troops worked night and day to keep this in repair and widen it, petain organised the front into sectors and threw in repeated counter-attacks, which helped by the narrow- ness of the front at least slowed down the advance. falkenhayn sought, somewhat late, to widen the front, and on march 6 the germans extended the attack to the west bank of the meuse. but the defence was now stiflening, the numbers balanced, and the immediate thrust to verdun was checked. a slight lull followed, and during it the allies of france made efforts to relieve the pressure on her. the british took over the arras front from the french x. army, the italians made their fifth attack, though in vain, on the isonzo front, and the rus- sians hurled untrained masses on the german front at lake narcocz, near the vilna, once more gallantly sacrificing them- world war selves to help their allies. the slight gains were soon lost through a counter-stroke. these efforts did not prevent falkenhayn pursuing his attrition offensive at verdun. the advances were slight but they were cumulative in effect, and the balance of loss turned definitely against the defenders. on june 7 fort vaux fell, and the german tide crept ever closer to verdun, seeming to the anxious watchers to resemble the forces of nature rather than of men. and in the asiago region, conrad had launched his offensive against italy’s trentino flank. brusilows offensive.—again russia came to the rescue. without warning, because without any special concentration of troops, brusilov, commanding the southwestern russian front, advanced against the austrian lv. army near luck and the vil. army in the bukovina, whose resistance collapsed at the first shock. in three days brusilov took 200,0c0 prisoners. this last vital effort of the russian army in the war had important consequences. it stopped the austrian attack on italy, already impaired by an italian riposte. it compelled falkenhayn to withdraw troops from the western front, and so abandon his plan for a counter-stroke against the british offensive preparing on the somme, as well as the hope of nourishing his verdun attrition process. it led rumania to take her fateful decision to enter the war on the entente side, and caused the supersession of falkenhayn in the supreme command and his replacement by hindenburg and ludendorff. although rumania’s entry was the ostensible reason, the underlying one was the fact that falkenhayn’s “limited ” strategy in 1915 had made possible the russian recovery which stultified the strategy of 1916. falkenhayn was history’s latest example of the folly of half- measures, the ablest and most scientific genecral—" penny-wise, pound foolish ”——who ever ruined his country by a refusal to take calculated risks. brusilov’s offensive continued for three months with fair success, but reserves were not at hand for immediate exploitation, and before they could be moved down from the north the germans were patching up the holes. tlis later efforts were never so dangerous, and his ultimate loss of 1,000,000 casualties completed the virtual ruin of russia’s military power. the somme.—great as was the influence of brusilov’s offensive on german strategy, its effect on the verdun situation was less immediate, and on june 23 the germans almost reached the belleville height, the last outwork of verdun. petain made all ready for an evacuation of the east bank of the meuse, though to his troops he showed no sign of anxiety, and ever repeated the now immortal phrase, “‘ on ics aura!” but on july 1 the long-planned offensive on the somme began, and from that day on the germans at verdun received no new divisions, and their advance died away from pure inanition. nevertheless, although the germans at verdun had fallen short of their object, moral and material, they had so drained the french army that it could play but a slender part in the allied plan for 1916. the british had now to take up the main burden of the struggle, and the consequence was to limit both the scope and effect of the entente strategy. on july 1 after a week’s prolonged bombardment the british attacked with 15 divisions on a front of 15 m. north of the som- me, and the french with five divisions on a front of eight m., mainly south of the river, where the german defence system was less highly developed. the unconcealed preparations and the long bombardment had given away any chance of surprise, and in face of the german resistance, weak in numbers but strong in organisation, the attack failed along most of the bnitish front. owing to the dense and rigid wave formations that were adopted the losses were appallingly heavy. only on the south of the british front, near fricourt and montauban, did the attack gain a real footing in the german defences. the french, with slighter opposition, made a deeper advance. this setback negatived the original idea of a fairly rapid penetration to bapaume and cambrai, and the allied command adopted the attrition method of limited advances aimed to wear down the german strength. the attack was resumed on the southern british flank alone, and on july 14 the capture of the world war germans’ second position offered the chance of exploitation, which was not taken. from now onward a methodical but costly advance continucd, and although little ground was gained the german resistance was seriously strained when the early onset of winter rains suspended operations in november. the effect, however, can be exaggerated, for it did not prevent the germans withdrawing troops for the attack on rumania. but in one respect the somme shed a significant light on the future, for on sept. 15 the first tanks appeared. their early employment before large numbers were ready was a mistake; josing the chance of a great strategic surprise, and owing also to tactical mishandling and minor technical defects they only had a limited success. although the higher military authorities lost faith in them, and some urged their abandonment, more discerning eyes realised that here was a key which, when properly used, would unlock the trench barrier. the somme offensive had a further indirect effect, for its relief to the verdun pressure enabled the french to prepare counter-strokes, on oct. 24 and dec. 15, which regained most of the lost ground with small casualties. these economic successes were due to a more elastic use of the limited objective method, and to a high concentration of artil- lery, with a minimum of infantry, to occupy the defences crushed by the guns. the conquest of rumania —rumania, sympathetic to the entente cause, had been waiting a favourable opportunity to enter the war on their side, and brusilov’s success encouraged her to take the plunge. her command hoped that this, combined with the allied pressure on the somme and at salonika, would fix the german reserves. but rumania’s situation had many inherent defects. the strategical position of her territory was bad, forming an “ j.”’ reversed, with the bottom section sand- wiched between hungary and bulgaria. her army, though exter- nally on a modern pattern, had grave weaknesses beneath the surface. of her allies, only russia could give her direct aid, and they failed her. and, with all these handicaps, she launched an offensive into transylvania, which bared her flank to bulgaria. the rumanian forces advanced west in three columns, leaving only three divisions to watch the danube fronticr facing bul- garia. while the entente fumbled the germans acted. the plan was initiated by falkenhayn and developed by ifindenburg- ludendorff when they took over the supreme command on aug. 28. while one force concentrated in transylvania for a counter- stroke, a bulgarian army with german stilfening—under mackensen—was to strike through rumania’s “ back-door ”’ and invade the dobruja. on sept. 5 mackensen forced the danube crossing at turtucaia, destroyed three rumanian divi- sions and made good his hold on the dobruja. this automati- cally halted the rumanian offensive in transylvania, and drew away its reserves; at the end of sept. they were thrown back by the austro-german counter-oflensive, of which falkenhayn was given executive command. they succeeded in holding the passes of rumania’s mountain border in the west until mid-nov., but falkenhayn just broke through before the snows blocked the passes. mackensen had switched his main forces westwards, and on nov. 23 crossed the danube close to bucharest, on which both armies now converged. it fell on dec. 6, and, despite belated russian aid, the rumanian forces were driven north into the upper section of the rumanian “l” the brilliantly co-ordinated german strategy crippled their new foe, gained possession of the bulk of rumania, with its oil and wheat, and gave the russians another 300 m. of front to hold. sarrail, at salonika, had not succeeded in fixing the bulgarian reserves. the capture of baghdad.—the only territorial success that the entente could show for their year’s campaign was away in nmesopotamia—the capture of baghdad, and this moral token was seized on with an enthusiasm which, militarily, it hardly warranted. the bitter experience of the past had damped the ardour of the british govt., and sir william robertson, the new chief of the imperial general staff, was opposed to any further commitments which drained the strength available for the western front. but maude, the new commander on the 1087 spot, by subtle if unconscious steps succeeded in changing their defensive policy into one of a fresh offensive. after thorough reorganisation of the mesopotamian force and its communica- tions, he began on dec. 12 1916 a progressive right wheel and extension of his front on the west bank of the tigris, until by feb. 22 he faced the main turkish force across the tigris above and below kut. these methodical trench-warfare operations had placed him ready for a spring across the tigris at the turks’ line of retreat, which was thus parallel to his front. but despite his four-to-one superiority of force, the failure of his right to fix the enemy and of his cavalry to cut off their retreat prevented a decisive success. but it led to permission for an advance on baghdad, and he entered the mesopotamian capital on march 11 1917. a series of skilfully conducted operations then drove the turks into divergent lines of retreat and secured the british hold on the province. the advance on palestine —ever since the abortive turkish attempt to invade egypt early in tors, the british had kept large forces there, even when the dardanelles expedition was crying out for troops. when gallipoli was evacuated, the release of the turkish forces threatened a fresh move on egypt. to anticipate this by gaining command of the sinai desert, sir archibald murray advanced in the spring of 1916, defeating the turkish forces, freshly arrived, at romani, magdhaba and rafa. the rate of advance was governed by the time taken in extend- ing a railway and pipe-line (for water) across the desert. this new “ exodus” inspired the british govt. to an invasion of palestine, at as cheap a cost in troops as possible. the towns of gaza, on the coast, and beersheba, 25 m. inland, guarded the approach to palestine. murray attacked gaza on march 26, but the attempt fell short when on the brink of success. a more deliberate attack on april 17-9 was a costlier failure against defences now strengthened. the war at sea 191%5-6.—germany’s first submarine cam- paign—associated by allied opinion with the name of admiral von tirpitz, the exponent of ruthlessness—had been a signal failure, both in its meagre results and the disproportionate ethical damage it did to germany’s cause. a series of notes exchanged between the american and german govts. culmi- nated in april 1916 ina virtual ultimatum from president wilson, and germany abandoned her unrestricted campaign. the dep- rivation of this weapon spurred the german navy to its first, and last, attempt to carry out the initial plan on which it had begun the war. on may 30 1916 the british grand fleet left its bases on one of its periodical sweeps through the north sea, but with reason to expect a possible encounter. on may 31, early in the morning, the german high sea fleet also put to sea, in the hope of destroying some isolated portion of the british fleet. for such an encounter the british admiral, jellicoe, had for- mulated an outline plan in the early months of the war. its basis was the cardinal necessity of maintaining the unimpaired supremacy of the grand fleet, which he viewed as an instru- ment not merely of battle but of grand strategy, the pivot of the allies’ action in all spheres, cconomic, moral and military. hence while desirous of bringing to battke under his own condi- tions he was determined not to be lured into mine and sub- marine infested waters. early in the afternoon of may 31, beatty, with his battle- cruisers and a squadron of battleships, after a sweep to the south “was turning north to rejoin jellicoe, when he sighted the german battle-cruisers, five in number. in the initial engagement two of beatty’s six battle-cruisers were hit in vital parts, and when thus weakened he came upon the main german fleet under von scheer. he turned north to lure them into reach of jellicoe, 50 m. distant, who raced to support him. to describe the intri- cate and much debated manoeuvres which followed is neither possible nor would it be just within the limits of this article, a strategical and not a tactical survey. mist and failing light put an end to an indecisive action, which, however, left the british fleet between the german and its bases. during the night von scheer slipped past their guard, which jellicoe dared not draw 1088 too close in view of his guiding principle and the danger of torpedo attack. but if the battle of jutland could be counted a tactical ad- vantage to the germans, it had no effect on their strategic position. britain’s command of the sea was intact, and the grip of the blockade on germany unrelaxed. once more she fell back on submarine warfare, and the first development was an extension of range. in july one of her new large submarine- cruisers appeared off the american coast and sank several neutral ships. in british and mediterranean waters the pressure began seriously to affect the sea-borne trade and food supplies of the entente. various remedies were tried—the most effective being a system of sailing in convoys—but the only truly ade- quate measure, that of penning the germans in their bases by close-in minefields, was debarred by britain’s failure to obtain a decisive battle success. but if britain was feeling the strain of economic pressure, so also was germany, and her leaders feared that the race between decisive success on land and economic collapse would end against her. the naval authorities declared that a renewal of the “ unlimited ” submarine campaign, which with her increased numbers could now be far more intense, would bring the entente to their knees. accepting this opinion, ludendorff consented to a step which he had hitherto opposed, and on feb. 1 1917 it was inaugurated—with the full realisation that it involved the weight of america being thrown into the scales against them. v. the penultimate year despite incessant provocation for two years, since the “‘ lusi- tania ”’ incident, president wilson had held to his neutral policy, and if his excess of patience angered many of his own people it at least was the means of consolidating american opinion and reconciling it as a whole to intervention in the war. meantime he strove by speech and by the agency of coloncl house, his unofficial ambassador—to find a basis of peace on which the belligerents could agree. this effort was doomed to failure by its misunderstanding of the psychology of the warring peoples and of the fundamental objects for which they were fighting. he was still thinking in terms of traditional warfare, between governmental policies, while the conflict had long since passed into the wider sphere of the struggle of peoples dominated by the primitive instinct of sclf-preservation. the declaration of the unlimited submarine campaign brought convincing proof of the futility of these peace hopes and of the reality of the german intentions, and when followed by the deliberate sinking of american ships and an attempt to instigate mexico to action against the united states, president wilson hesitated no longer, and on april 6 1917 america entered the war against germany. her potential force in man-power and material was illimitable, but, even more unready than britain in rg14, it must be long in exerting more than a moral influence, and germany confi- dently anticipated that the submarine campaign would take decisive effect within a few months. how near her calculation came to fulfilment the record of 1917 and 1918 bears witness. the western front campaign of 1917.—the year 1916 closed in gloom for the entente. the simultaneous offensive on all fronts, planned a year before, had misfired, the french army was at a low ebb, the russian still lower, the somme had failed to produce visible results in any way proportional to its cost, and another fresh ally had been overcun. of jutland was a disappointment, and although germany’s first submarine campaign had been abandoned a stronger one was threatened. to offset these debits, the entente could only show the capture of distant baghdad and a limited italian success on the isonzo in aug., which had gained the important position of gorizia. its value, however, was mainly as a moral tonic to italy herself. the entente plan for 1917 was complicated by changes in the command. french opinion had tired of the meagre results of joffre’s attrition strategy, and the method of the limited ob- jective had fallen into disfavour because of the unlimited losses, at sea the negativeness- world war on the wrong side, which accompanied it without apparent gain. they contrasted the dull course of his strategy with the brilliant results gained by mangin at verdun, in the autumn, under nivelle’s direction, and as a result joffre gave place to nivelle, who promised a real breakthrough. his confidence so inspired mr. lloyd george, the new british prime minister, that haig was subordinated to him for the forthcoming operations—an arrangement which violated the axiom that a general cannot direct one force while exercising executive command of another. for carrying out a plan essentially audacious, nivelle had two further handicaps; he failed to convert several of his sub- ordinates to the idea, and he was given less rein by the govern- ment than his predecessor. again, while joffre had intimated that the british must take the chief part, nivelle changed this policy, and in his desire to conserve the glory for france over- looked how severely the french fighting power had been strained. joffre’s plan had been for a convergent attack on the great german salient lens-noyon-reims, first against its west flank and then against its south—the british to attack north of the somme, including but extending beyond the old battle ground, and the french south of it to the oise. the attacks were to begin early in feb. and to be followed by a french main attack in champagne. nivelle’s change was to ask the british to take over more of the front in order to release french troops for the champagne blow, and as a result the start was postponed a month. before it could begin the germans had dislocated it. luden- dorff’s first step had been to set on foot a complete programme for the reorganisation and expansion of german man-power, munitions and supplies. while this was developing, he intended to stand on the defensive, hoping that the new submarine cam- paign would either decide the issue or pave the way for a de- cisive blow on land when his new reserves of men and material were ready. anticipating the renewal of the entente advance on the somme, he had a new line of defence, of great artificial strength, built across the chord of the arc lens-noyon-reims. then after devastating the whole area inside the arc, he began a methodical retirement, by stages, to the new line called by the germans the “ siegfried ’’ and by the allies the “hindenburg ” line. a consummate manoeuvre, if brutal in application, it showed that ludendorff had the moral courage to give up terri- tory if circumstances advised it. ‘the british, confronted with a desert, were inevitably slow in pursuit, and their preparations for an attack on this front were thrown out of gear, limiting them to the sector around arras, where the front was unchanged. on april 9 allenby’s iil. army opened the spring offensive at this point, but failed to develop its initial success, and con- tinued the attack too long after the resistance had hardened. this costly action was partly to take the pressure off the french. the french blow south of the somme was stultified by the german retirement, and the main attack was a worse fiasco. with a prolonged bombardment giving away any chance of surprise, and without first drawing away the german reserves, the idea of a rapid breakthrough was doomed to fail. nivelle was replaced by petain, whose first concern was to restore the shaken morale of the french troops, and for the rest of the year the british bore the brunt of the campaign. the strain was increased by the failure of russia to make any effective contribution to the pressure on germany owing to the revolution which broke out in march. waig decided to keep the germans occupied by carrying out the original plan for an offensive in belgium, and if the principle was right the method and choice of site were open to criticism. the initial move was an attack on the messines ridge in order to straighten out the ypres salient and attract the enemy’s reserves. carried out by the ii. army under plumer, with harington as chief of staff, it proved a model example of the “limited ” attack, with success economically gaincd by able stafi-work and co-operation between the arms. it was followed on july 31 by the main attack at ypres which, hampered by the heavy rain, was foredoomed by its own destruc- tion of the intricate drainage system of the area. the british com- world war mand had persevered for 24 years with the method of a prolonged preparatory bombardment, believing that quantity of shells was the key to success, and that unlike all the great captains of history they could disregard the element of surprise. the offensive at ypres, which was finally submerged in the swamps of passchendaele in oct., threw into stronger relief than ever before the fact that such a bombardment blocked the advance for which it was intended to pave the way—because it made the ground impassable. the discomfiture was increased by the new german method of defence, which ludendorff introduced, of thinning the front defences and using the men so saved for prompt local counter-attacks. the defence was built up of a frame- work of machine-guns distributed in concrete “ pill-boxes ” and disposed in great depth. on the british side the profitless toll of this struggle in the mud was to some extent mitigated by better staff work, when the direction of the attack was handed over to plumer’s it. army. three months of dreadful struggle came to an end with the british not appreciably nearer their object of driving the germans from their submarine bases in the belgian ports, and if they had worn down the german strength they had worn down their own still more. the renaissance of surprise at cambrat.—the 1917 campaign in the west closed, however, on a note brighter in promise if not in accomplishment. appreciating from the first days the futility of using tanks in these flanders swamps, the tank corps headquarters looked around for an area where they could try out a new and different method. the chief general staff officer, colonel fuller, drew up a project for a large scale raid to scour a canal-enclosed “ pocket ’” near cambrai, where the rolling downland lent itself to tank movement. the basic idea was the release of a swarm of tanks without any preparatory bombardment to give warning of the attack. when their hopes at ypres waned, the british command adopted the scheme, retaining the basic idea, but transforming the operation into a def- inite offensive with far-reaching aims, for which they had not the resources because of the drainof ypres. the operation was to be carried out by byng’s iii. army with six divisions, and the date was fixed for nov. 20. led by nearly 400 tanks, the attack came as a complete surprise, and despite minor checks achieved a penetration far deeper and at less cost than any past british offen- sive. but all the available troops and tanks were thrown into the first blow, and the higher command failed to give byng the few reserves they possessed in time to exploit the success. the cavalry, as always on the western front, proved unable to carry out this rdle. thus the advance died away, and on nov. 30 the german army commander, von der marwitz, launched a convergent counter-stroke against two flanks of the salient created by the british progress. in the north it was parried but in the south broke through and a disaster was only averted by the superb counter-attack, first of the guards division and later of a tank brigade. but if cambrai was a disappointment it revealed that surprise and the tank were the combination by which the trench- barrier could be unlocked. meanwhile petain, after overhauling his instrument, the french army, sought to test its readiness for 1918. in aug. a stroke by guillaumat’s army recovered all the remainder of the ground lost in 1916, and in oct. maistre’s army ilattened the southwest corner of the german front, seizing the chemin des dames ridge. the collapse of russia.—the temporary breakdown of the french fighting power was not the worst of the troubles which together crippled the entente offensive in 1917. the collapse, first partial and then complete, of russia was a loss which even the entry of america into the war could not possibly compensate for many months, and before the balance was restored the western allies were to be perilously near the brink of defeat. russia’s enormous losses, due to her own defective machine but incurred in sacrifice for her allies, had undermined the moral even more than the material endurance of her forces. revolu- tion broke out in march, superficially against the corrupt entourage of the tsar, but with more deep-seated morul causes 1089 beneath. the tsar was forced to abdicate and a moderate provisional govt. climbed into the saddle, but without reins. this was only a makeshift, and in may another succeeded it, more socialist in tendency and outwardly led by kerensky. while clamouring for a general peace and undermining dis- cipline by a system of committee control suitable to a trade union but not to the field of battle, kerensky imagined he could send troops against the enemy by platform appeals. brusilov succeeded alexeiev in the supreme command, and on july 1 the army gained some initial success against the austrians, only to stop as soon as real resistance was met, and to crumble directly the germans counter-attacked. in sept. the germans took the opportunity to practise their new method of attack intended for use in france and captured riga, but next month the bolsheviks under lenin overthrew the wordy kerensky, imposed their self-constituted rule on the russian people and sought an armistice with germany, which was concluded in december. | italy’s caporetto disaster.—the defection of russia did not end the entente tale of woe. each autumn with demoralising regularity germany had seized an opportunity to cat up one of the weaker allies. in rors it had been serbia’s fate, in 1916 rumania’s and now it was [taly’s turn, or so the germans in- tended. ludendorff’s decision, taken in sept., was determined by the appcals of the austrian authorities, who felt that their troops could not endure the strain of another defensive battle on the italian frontier—they had lost ground in aug. in face of the [talians’ eleventh offensive on the isonzo. luden- dorff had a difficult problem to solve. russia had not yet capitulated, the front there was already weakly held for its extent, and the british offensive in flanders made impossible a large withdrawal of troops from france. as he could only scrape together seven german divisions, and the austrians’ quality was lower than ever, he came to the conclusion that the only chance of decisive results was to pick out a particularly weak point which at the same time offered scope for a strategic exploitation of the breakthrough. he found this in the caporetto sector of the italian front. the italian frontier province of venezia (venice) formed a salient pointing to austria and flanked on the north by the aus- trian trentino, on the south by the adriatic. bordering on the adriatic 1s a stretch of relatively low ground on the isonzo front, but the frontier then follows the julian and carnic alps in a wide sweep round to the northwest. the seven german divisions with nine austrian formed the xiv. german army under otto von below, and were to climb the southern end of the mountain barrier, while boroevic’s two austrian armies were to join in the advance along the adriatic shore. the organisation and deployment of the attack in such mountainous country was difficult, but on oct. 24, after a short bombardment, the blow was launched and pushed deep down the western slopes of the mountains, tmperilling the italian forces to both south and north. on oct. 28 von below’s van reached udine, the former italian general headquarters, and on oct. 31 the tagliamento. while the austrian command issued the orders, ludendorft pulled the strings which set them in motion. and not the least significant feature of this offensive was the way it was prepared not by an artillery but by a moral bombardment. propaganda had been exploited for months as a means of sapping the italian discipline and will to resist. cadorna, the italian commander, had failed alike to counteract this demoralisation of the army and to guard against the military attack of which he had ample warning. but its effect seems also to have surprised ludendorff, who with his slender forces had not calculated on such distant ob- jectives as were now possible of attainment. boroevic was slow in following up the italian right, and ludendorff tried to switch part of his force to conrad’s army which flanked the north of the venezia salient, but was foiled by the inadequacy of the rail communications. even so, cadorna, with his centre broken through, only saved his wings by a precipitate retreat to the line of the piave, covering venice, and on nov. 9 the whole italian 1090 army was behind this river except for 250,000 prisoners in the enemy’s hands, and twice as many other casualtics—killed, missing or sick. the same day cadorna was superseded in supreme command by diaz. italy’s allies had begun to rush reinforcements to her aid, a british and french army corps, and on nov. 5 their political and military chiefs arrived at rapallo for a conference, out of which sprang the allied council at versailles, and ultimately a unified command. the invaders had outrun their transport and the resistance of the italians, morally braced by the emergency, succeeded in holding the piave in face of direct assaults and strenuous efforts -by conrad to turn their left lank from the trentino. at the beginning of dec. the british and french, who had been waiting in reserve in case of a fresh breakthrough, moved for- ward to take off vulnerable sectors, but the attack was only renewed in the north and on dec. 19 it came to an end with the snows. if caporetto seriously damaged italy, it also purged her, and after an interval of recuperation she was to vindicate herself at vittorio veneto. the caplure of jerusalem.—once more a distant theatre of war provided the sole triumph of the entente cause during the year—this time in palestine. the second reverse at gaza in april 1917 led to a change in command, murray being succeeded by allenby, who was strong enough and fortunate enough to obtain the adequate force for which murray had asked in vain. the british govt. was anxious for a spectacular success to offset the moral depression of the nivelle failure and the decline of russia, and the british general staff desired to dislocate the turkish attempt to recapture baghdad by drawing away their reserves. allenby took over in july and devoted the first three months to intensive preparations for an autumn offensive, when the scason would be suitable. the command was reorganised, the communi- cations developed, and his own headquarters moved forward from cairo to the front. by complete secrecy and ruses he deccived the turks as to the main point of attack. the defences of gaza were bombarded from oct. 20 onwards, and an attack followed on nov. t to pin the enemy and draw in his reserves. meanwhile, as a necessary preliminary to the real blow, the inland bastion of beersheba was scized by a convergent ma- noeuvre on oct. 31, a prelude to the decisive attack on nov. 6, which broke through the enemy’s weakened centre and into the plain of philistia. falkenhayn, now in command at aleppo, had also been planning an offensive, but the better communications of the british had decided the race, and although i’alkenhayn tried to stem the tide by a counter-stroke against beersheba, the breaking of his centre compelled a general retreat. the pursuit was hampered owing to lack of water, but even so by nov. 14 the turkish forces were driven apart in two divergent groups, the port of jaffa was taken, and allenby whcecled his main force to the right for an advance inland on jerusalem. he gained the narrow hill passes before the turks could block them, and after a necessary pause to improve his communications brought up reserves for a fresh advance, which secured jerusalem on dec. 9. by the time the winter rains set in the british had expanded and consolidated their hold on the region. as a moral success the feat was valuable, and one immediate result was a revolt in arabia against the turks. yet, viewed strategically, it seemed a long way round to the goal. if turkey be pictured as a bent old man, the british, after missing their blow at his head—constantinople—and omitting to strike at his heart—alexandretta—had now re- signed themselves to swallowing him from the feet upwards, like a python dragging its endless length across the clesert. the conquest of east africa.—the year 1917 witnessed another overseas success, the clearing of german east africa, although not the close of the campaign. more than a year elapsed after the rebuff at tanga before a serious attempt was made to subdue their last german stronghold on the african continent. to spare troops from the main theatres was diflicult, and the solu- tion was only made possible by the loyal co-operation of the south african government. in feb. 1916 gen. smuts was world war appointed to command the expedition and formed the plan of a drive from north to south through the difficult interior, in order to avoid the fever-rampant plain on the coast. in conjunction with this central wedge a belgian force under tombeur was to advance eastwards from lake tanganyika, and a small british force under northey was to strike in from nyasaland in the southwest. the germans under lettow-vorbeck were weak in numbers but handled with masterly skill, and with all the ad- vantages of an equatorial climate, a vast and trackless region— mountainous in parts and covered with dense bush and forest— to assist them in impeding the invader. from dar-es salaam on the coast to ujijion lake tanganyika ran the one real line of rail communication, across the centre of the colony. after driving the germans back across the frontier and seizing the kilimanjaro gap, smuts moved direct on this railway at moro- goro, over 300 m. distant, while he dispatched a force under van deventer in a wide sweep to the west to cut the railway further inland and then converge on morogoro. lettow-vorbeck delayed this manocuvre by a concentration against van deventer, but smuts’ direct advance compelled him to hurry his force back, and thus enabled van deventer to get astride the railway. however, lettow-vorbeck evaded the attempt to cut him off and fell back in sept. on the uluguru mountains to the south. the belgians and northey had cleared the west and the net had been drawn steadily closer, confining lettow- vorbeck to the southeast quarter of the colony. early in 1917 smuts returned to england and van deventer conducted the final operations which ended with lettow-vorbeck, avoiding envelopment to the end, slipping across the fronticr into port- uguese africa. here he maintained a guerilla campaign through- out 1918 until the general armistice. with an original force of only 5,000, 5° being europeans, he had caused the employment of 130,000 enemy troops and the expenditure of £72,000,000. the mastering of the submarine—the military side of 1917 is thrown into shadow by the naval, or more strictly the eco- nomic, side. the vital issue turned on the balance between ger- many’s submarine pressure and britain’s resistance. april was perhaps the most critical month. the allics lost nearly a million tons of shipping, 60°% british, and although the german navy’s promise of victory by the end of the month was proved a miscalculation, it was clear that ultimately the continuance of such a ratio of loss must starve the civilian population and auto- matically prevent the maintenance of the armies. britain, indeed, had only food enough to sustain her people for another six weeks. the british govt. sought to counter the men- ace by the indirect means of rationing, increasing home pro- duction and the expansion of shipbuilding; by the direct means of the system of convoys with naval escorts, and a counter- offensive against the submarine. aided by new devices to detect the presence of submarines and the use of thousands of patrol craft this highly organised campaign exacted an ever-rising toll, and by the end of 1917 the menace, if not broken, was at least subdued. in this task america’s aid became a potent factor long before her military assistance. it embraced her provision of light craft to reinforce the british anti-submarine fleet, her rapidly developed construction of new mercantile ships and still more her financial aid. by july 1917 britain had spent over £5,000,000,000, her daily expenditure had risen to £7,000,000, and the burden of financing her allies as well as her own efforts was straining even her resources, when amcrica’s aid came to ease the pressure. these were the defensive benefits; the offensive were at least as great. no longer was the grip of the naval blockade hampered by neutral quibbles, but instead america’s co-operation con- verted it into a strangle-hold under which the enemy must soon grow limp, since military power is based on economic endurance. as a party to the war, the united states, indeed, wielded the economic weapon witha determination, regardless of the remaining neutrals, far exceeding britain's boldest claims in the past years of controversy over neutral rights. the submarine menace, crippled in 1917, was ended to all intents during the early months of 1918, largely through two positive achievements. ‘the first world war was the laying of a mine-barrage by the american navy across the 250-mile wide passage between norway and scotland; the second, the daring attacks of sir roger keyes’ force on zee- brugge and ostend, which closed the belgian coast as a base for the german submarines. yet the removal of the menace should not lead to an underestimate of its powers for the future. the 1917 campaign was launched with only 148 submarines and from the most unfavourable strategic position. great britain lay like a huge breakwater across the sea approaches to northern europe and the submarines had to get outside through narrow and closely watched outlets before they could operate against the arteries of supply. and despite these handicaps they almost stopped the beat of england’s heart. the air offensive—another new form of action reached its crest at the same time as the submarine campaign. as the submarine was primarily an economic weapon, so was the aeroplane primarily a psychological weapon. the explosive bullet had virtually ended the zeppelin raids in 1916, but from early in 1917 acroplane raids on london grew in intensity until by may 1918 the air defences were so thoroughly organised that the raiders thereafter abandoned london, as a target, for paris. if the stoicism of the civil population took much of the sting from a weapon then in its infancy, the indirect effect was serious, interrupting business and checking output in industrial centres, as well as drawing off, for defence, many aircraft from the front. in reply the british formed an independent air force, which carried out extensive raids into germany during the closing months of the war, with marked effect on the declining morale of the “home front.”’ to relate the action of aircraft in the military sphere is not possible, for it formed a thread running through and vitally influencing the whole course of operations, rather than a separate strategic feature. the beginning of t9r8 witnessed the development and _thor- ough organisation of another psychological weapon, when lord northclitfe was appointed director of propaganda in enemy countries, and for the first time the full scope of such a weapon was understood and exploited. vi. the allied victory on the threshold of t918—the middle years of the world war had been, in a military sense, a tussle between a lean hercules and a bulky cerberus. the germanic alliance was weaker in numbers but directed by a single head, the entente stronger in numbers but with too many heads. owing to their own exces- sive losses, diffusion of effort and the collapse of russia, the entente at the end of 1917 were faced with the grim fact that the numerical balance had been reversed, and months must elapse before the prospective stream of amcrica’s new divisions came to tilt the scales once more in their favour. the emergency paved the way for the creation of a unified command but it still needed disaster to bring it into being. at the conference at rapallo in nov. the formation of a supreme war council was decided upon, to be composed of the principal ministers of the allies, with military representatives, and to sit permanently at versailles. if the fundamental defect was that it merely substituted a formal for an informal commit- tee, a further flaw was that the military representatives had no executive status. in the economic sphere, where deliberation rather than instant action was necessary, it led to a real improve- ment in the combination of shipping, food and munition re- sources. militarily, it was futile, for it set up a dual advisorship —the versailles representatives on the one hand and the chiefs of the national general staffs on the other. as the menace of the german attack grew closer and with it the need for common action, this advisory body was converted into a military execu- tive committee to handle an inter-allied general reserve, a fresh compromise which set up a dual control—the commanders-in- chief and the versailles committce. if concentration of control was lacking, so also was concen- tration of force. the political chiefs were slow to realise how grave was the danger. since carly in nov. the stream of german troop-trains from east to west had been steadily swell- ioqi ing. when the 1917 campaign opened there had been a propor- tion of nearly three allies to two germans, but now the germans had a slight balance and the likelihood of bringing still more. yet with this knowledge the allied statesmen could not agree to draw reinforcements from the other fronts. mr. lloyd george went further and urged an offensive in palestine, a scheme which was sanctioned on the understanding that no reinforcements went there from france, but which also meant that none came from there to france. robertson, the chief of the imperial general staff, disagreed both with this palestine plan and the creation of the versailles executive committee, and resigned, being succeeded by sir henry wilson. the position was still further weakened by the insistence of m. clemenceau, the new french premier, that the british should extend their front south to the oise. this meant that gough’s v. army was dangerously stretched out and took over ill-prepared defences on the very front that ludendorff was about to strike. haig, rightly, and petain, wrongly, each expected the main german attack to fall on their respective fronts, and in view of this uncertainty the supreme war council decided to form a common reserve, which the new military executive committee under foch should use wherever necessary. foch called on haig to contribute seven of the thirty divisions, and when the british commander replied that he could spare no troops the scheme broke down a week before the german blow fell. on the german side the submarine panacea for victory had been replaced by a military panacea, and hopes were perhaps exaggerated by the unexpected collapse of russia. but although ludendorff promised victory in the field, he did not disguise that a western offensive would be a far harder task than the conquests in the east. he realised also that it would be a race between the effect of germany’s blow and the arrival of american reinforce- ments, although he hoped to win the race. to secure the rear of his offensive, a definite peace was won from the bolshevik govt. of russia by a military demonstration, and also forced on rumania. and to secure if possible the economic base of his offensive the ukraine was occupied, for its wheat supplies, with little resistance except from czechoslovak troops, who had formerly been taken prisoners from the austrian army. the german offensive—ludendorfl’s next problem was to decide his first point of attack. the sector between arras and st. quentin was chosen, on the western face of the great salient formed by the german front in france. the choice was governed by tactical reasons—this sector was the enemy’s weakest point and the ground offered fewer difficulties than elsewhere—although ludendorff had in mind the possibility of separating the allied armies and driving the british back against the channel coast, too closely penned in to evade the blows. the tactical bias was, however, to have vital results, leading the germans to change direction and dissipate their strength owing to their principle of taking the line of least resistance. if the franco-british com- mand had erred hitherto by aiming at the strategically correct target without enough attention to the tactical difficulties, the german command was now to concentrate on tactical success at the expense of the strategical goal. ludendorff’s strategy in the east had been so masterly and so far-sighted that the change is difficult to explain. from the experience of the vain allied attacks he had drawn the deduction that ‘‘ tactics had to be considered before purely strategical objects which it is futile to pursue unless tacticalsuccessis possible.’? presumably he hoped by jirm control to guide these tactical movements to a strategic destination. if so, he failed. perhaps he himself was fecling the strain of directing so many vast operations; in any case the cam- paign leaves the impression that ludendorff had neither his former clearness as to the goal, nor quite the same grip on the changing situations. but in the organisation of his attacks his powers were at their highest level. the troops were trained in the new infiltration tactics already tested at riga, and the most thorough arrangements were made for concealing and for ex- ploiting the attacks (see tactics). the assaulting divisions were to be brought up over night, the masses of artillery brought close to the front line in concealment, and their ranges obtained 1092 by methods which did away with preliminary “ registration.” the bombardment was to be brief but intense and its surprise effect to be increased by lavish use of gas and smoke shell. fur- ther, while ludendorff had settled to strike first on the somme sector, to which blow the code-name ‘‘ michael ” was given, he also made preparations for successive attacks at other points, which besides being in readiness for the future helped to mystify the enemy. two were on the british front and one on the french —‘‘* st. george i.” against the lys sector, ‘‘ st. george it.” against the ypres sector and “ bliicher ” in champagne. the “‘ michael ” attack was to be made by the german xvil., ii. and nvi. armies on the 47-mile front arras—st. quentin —la fere, but its main force was intended to be exerted north of the somme, and after breaking through, the xvil. and it. armies were to whecl northwest and press the british army against the coast, while the river and the xviii. army guarded their flank. the attack was launched on march 21, and while it broke through completely south of the somme, where the defence was thinnest, it was held up near arras, a check which reacted on all the attack north of the river. asaresult, on march 23 ludendorff abandoned his original idea, and directed his main effort towards amiens. by march 27 the advance had pene- trated nearly 40 m. and reached montdidier, cutting one rail- way to paris; by march 30 the german flood was almost lapping the outworks of amiens. but their route had led them across the desert of the old somme battlefields, a brake on communi- cations and supply, and to an area where the french could most easily support their hard-pressed allies. this support was certainly slow to arrive, for petain still expected the main blow on his own front, but disaster drove the allies to an overdue step, and largely through lord milner’s in- tervention foch was appointed on march 26 to “ co-ordinate ” the operations of the allied armies. once before, in the crisis at ypres in ror4, he had filled such a rele, on a smaller scule, and his will-power and energy had helped to buttress the resistance. and if since then he had fallen into disfavour owing to the heavy cost of his attacks in artois during rors and the barren fruit of the somme in 1916, he was later to show that he had turned the experience to profit, and to justify in practice his unique reputa- tion asatheorist. on april 14 he was definitely made commanider- in-chief of the allied armies. foch was stimulating the flow of reserves to cement the already hardening resistance, when he was interrupted by a fresh menace. on march 28 ludendorff had launched the xvii. army to a fresh effort, this time to secure the heights near arras, in oriler to pave the way for his “ st. george i.’’ attack on the lys. the blow was repulsed by byng’s iii. army and inevitably affected ludendorff’s designs. nevertheless, on april 9 he launched his “ st. george i.” attack, and its astonishing early success against a weakened front led him to convert it into a major effort. the british were desperately close to the sea, but their resistance stopped the german tide just short of the important railway junction of hazebrouck, and an attempt to widen the front to- wards ypres was nullified by haig’s swinging his line back just before and by the gradual arrival of french reinforcements. thus ludendorff had fallen short of strategic results; on the other hand he could claim huge tactical successes—the british casualties were over 250,000. the british lion had been badly mauled, and although fresh drafts were hurried out from eng- land and divisions brought back from italy, salonika and pales- tine, months must elapse before it could recover its offensive power. ten british divisions had to be broken up, reducing the allied strength to 158 divisions against 208 german with 80 still in reserve. a restoration of the balance, however, was now in sight. a dozen american divisions had arrived in france and, responding to the call, great efforts were being made to swell the stream. further, pershing, the american commander, had placed his troops at foch’s disposal for use wherever required. for germany the sands were running out, and, realising this, ludendorff launched his ‘‘ bliicher”’ attack between soissons and reims, on may 27. falling by surprise with 40 divisions against seven, on a 30-mile front, it swept over the aisne and world war reached the marne on may 30, where its impetus died away. blocked frontally by the river, an attempt was made to push west, but it failed in face of allied resistance—notable for the appearance of american divisions at chateau-thierry, where they gallantly counter-attacked. ludendorfl had now created two huge bulges, and another smaller one, in the allied front. his next attempt was to pinch out the compiegne “ tongue ” which lay between the amicns and marne bulges. but this time there was no surprise, and the blow on the west of the “ tongue,” june 9, was too late to coin- cide with the pressure on the east. a month’s pause followed. ludendorff was anxious to strike his long-cherished decisive blow against the british in belgium, but he considered that their reserves here were still too strong, and so again decided to take the line of least tactical resistance, hoping that a heavy blow in the south would draw off the british reserves. he had failed to punch out the compicgne “ tongue ” on the west of his marne salient; he was now about to attempt the same method on the cast, by attacking on either side of reims. but he needed an interval for rest and preparation, and the delay was fatal, giving the british and french time to recuperate, and the americans to gather strength. the tactical success of his own blows had been his undoing; yielding to their influence, he had pressed each too far and too long, so using up his own reserves and causing an undue interval between each blow. he had driven in three great wedges, but none had penetrated far enough to sever a vital artery, and this strategic failure left the germans with an in- dented front which invited flanking counter-strokes. the turning of the tide—on july 15 ludendorff launched his new attack, but its coming was no secret. east of reims it was foiled by an clastic defence, and west of reims the german penetration across the marne merely enmeshed them more deeply to their downfall—for on july 18 foch launched a long-prepared counter-stroke on the other tlank of the marne salient. flere foch turned the key which ludendorff lacked, using masses of light tanks to lead a surprise attack on the cambrai principle. the germans managed to hold the gates of the salient open long enough to draw thcir forces back into safety and straighten their line. but their reserves were depleted, ludendorfi was forced to postpone the offensive in belgium and the initiative definitely and finally passed to the allies. foch’s first concern was to keep it, by giving the enemy no rest while his own reserves were accu- mulating. to this end he arranged with haig, petain and pershing for a series of local offensives, aimed to free the lateral railway communications and to improve the position of the front ready for further operations. but already before the marne counter- stroke, rawlinson, commanding the british iv. army in front of amiens, had submitted to haig a plan for a large surprise attack there, and foch agreed to this in place of his own idea for an attack on the lys front. he also placed under haig the french i. army (debeney) to extend the attack to the south. rawlinson’s army was doubled, and by skilful precautions the enemy were kept in the dark until, on aug. 8, the attack was delivered —led by 450 tanks. great as a material success, it was still greater as a moral. ludendorff says: “ aug. 8 was the black day of the german army in the history of the war. . . . it put the decline of our fighting power beyond all doubt. . . . the war must be ended.” he informed the emperor and the political chicfs that peace negotiations ought to be opened before the situation became worse, as it must. on aug. 10 foch issued a fresh directive for the preparation of an “ advance ” by the british iii. army “ in the gencral direction of bapaume and peronne.” and as the momentum of the lv. army was waning, the iii. army moved. from then on foch beat a tattoo on the german front, a series of rapid blows at different points, each broken off as soon as its initial impetus waned, each so aimed as to pave the way for the next, and all close enough in time and space to react on each other. thus ludendorff’s power of switching reserves to threat- ened spots was stopped, as his balance of reserves was drained. on aug. 10 the french iii. army had struck to the south; then on aug. 17 the french x. army still further south; next on world war aug. 21 the british iii. army, followed by the british i. army on aug. 26. ludendorff’s order to the troops holding the lys salient to retire was hastened in execution by the attacks of the reformed british v. army, and by the first week in sept. the germans were back on their original starting line—the strong defences of the hindenburg line. and on sept. 21 pershing completed the series of preliminary operations by erasing the st. mihiel salient—the first feat of the americans as an inde- pendent army. the clear evidence of the germans’ decline and haig’s assur- ance that he would break the hindenburg line where the ger- man reserves were thickest, decided foch to seek victory that autumn instead of postponing the attempt until rorg. all the allied armies in the west were to combine in a simultaneous offensive. the collapse of bulgavia--but before it could develop an event occurred in the balkans which, in the words of luden- dorff, ‘ sealed the fate of the quadruple alliance.” he had still hoped to hold fast in his strong lines in the west, and with his strategic flanks in macedonia and italy covered, while the ger- man govt. was negotiating for a favourable peace. at the same time there was alarm as to the moral effect of the west- ern front defeats on the german people, their will-power al- ready undermined by shortage of food, and perhaps also by prop- aganda. but on sept. 15 the allied armies in salonika attacked the bulgarian front, which crumpled in a few days. guillaumat, who had succeeded sarrail in dec. 1917, had prepared the plan for an offensive, and when recalled to france in the crisis of july as governor of paris he won over the allied governments to consent to the attempt. his successor in salonika, franchet d’esperey, concentrated a franco-serb striking force, under michich, on the sokol-dobropolye sector, west of the vardar, where the bulgarians trusted to the strength of the mountain ridges and were weak in numbers. on sept. 15 michich attacked and, while the british attack at doiran pinned a large part of the bulgarian reserves, he broke right through towards uskul. with their army split into two parts the bulgarians, already tired of the war, sought an armistice, which was signed on sept. 29. franchet d’esperey’s achievement not only knocked away the first prop of the central alliance but opened the way to an ad- vance on austria’s rear. the collapse of turkey —the offensive pianned for the spring in palestine had been interrupted by the crisis in france and the consequent withdrawal of most of allenby’s british troops. the depletion was made up by reinforcements from india and meso- potamia, and by sept. allenby was again ready to take the otfensive. hesecretly concentrated, on the mediterranean flank, the mass of his infantry, and behind them the cavalry. in this way he changed a two to one superiority on the general front into four to one at the decisive point. at dawn on sept. 19 the western mass attacked, rolling the turks back northeast towards the hilly interior—like a door on its hinges. ‘through the open doorway the cavalry passed, riding straight up the coastal corri- dor for 30 m., before swinging cast tocut the turkish communica- tions and close all exits of retreat. completely trapped, the main turkish armies were rounded up, while the british cavalry exploited the victory of megiddo by a swift and sustained pur- suit which gained first damascus and finally aleppo. defence- less and threatened with a direct advance of milne from mace- donia on constantinople, turkey capitulated on oct. 30. the first peace note-—the capitulation of bulgaria and, if toa less degree, the destruction of the turkish armies, convinced ludendorff that it was necessary to take a decisive step towards securing peace. while he was scraping together a paltry half dozen divisions to form a new front in serbia, and arranging a meeting with the political chiefs, foch’s grand assaults fell on the western defences, sept. 26-28, and the line began to crack. on sept. 29 ludendorff told the foreign minister that an armi- stice must be asked for at once, and on oct. 4 the german govt. dispatched the first peace note to president wilson. while they were debating the conditions for an armistice and 1093 questioning ludendorff as to the situation of the army for fur- ther resistance if the terms were unacceptable, foch continued his military pressure. the final advance —the plan agreed upon between foch and the allied commanders was for a series of convergent and prac- tically simultaneous attacks:— t and 2. by the americans west of the meuse, and by the french west of the argonne, both in the direction of mezieres—begin- ning on sept. 26; 3. by the british on the st. quentin-cambrai front in the general direction of maubeuge—beginning on sept. 27; 4. by the belgian and allied forces in the direction of ghent— beginning on sept. 28. the general aspect was that of a pincer-like manoeuvre against the vast salient jutting out between ypres and verdun. the attack towards mezieres would shepherd that part of the ger- man armies towards the difficult country of the ardennes and away from their natural line of retreat through lorraine; it was also dangerously close to the hinge of the antwerp-meuse line which the germans were preparing in rear. the attack towards maubeuge would threaten the other main line of communication and retreat through the liege gap, but it had further to go. in these attacks, the americans had the hardest natural obstacle, the argonne forest; the british had the strongest defences and the heaviest weight of enemy troops. pershing’s attack, adding surprise to its four to one superiority in numbers, opened well, but lost impetus owing to the difficulties of supply and exploitation in such country. a new force, it was suffering the growing pains which the british had passed through in 1915-6. haig, by pushing forward his left wing first, facilitated the attack of his right on the strongest section of the hindenburg line—the canal du nord, and by oct. 5 the british were through the german defence system, with open country beyond. but on this front the attackers were in actually inferior numbers to the defenders, their tanks were used up, and they could not press forward fast enough to endanger the german retreat. nevertheless the combined pressure of the allied armies, and their steady advance, were loosening the will-power of the ger- man govt. and people. the conviction of ultimate defeat, slower to appeal to them than to the army chiefs, was the more forcible when it was realised. and the indirect moral effect of military and economic pressure was accentuated by the direct effect of peace propaganda, skilfully directed and intensively waged by northcliffe. the ‘‘ home front ” began to crumble later but it crumbled quicker than the battle front. the collapse of austria-—the last austrian attempt at an offensive on the italian front, in conjunction with the german assaults in france, had been repulsed on the piave in june. diaz waited until conditions were ripe for an otfensive in return, until austria’s internal decay was spreading and she was without hope from germany. on oct. 24 cavan’s army moved to seize the crossings of the piave and on oct. 27 the main attack opened, driving towards vittorio veneto to divide the austrians in the adriatic plain from those in the mountains. by oct. 30 the austrian army was split in two and the retreat became a rout, and the same day austria asked for an armistice, which was signed on nov. 4. the curtain balls on the western pront.—already on oct. 23 president wilson had replied to the german requests by a note which virtually required an unconditional surrender. luden- dorff, who had wished to anticipate such terms by seeking peace before the situation had degenerated, now wished to carry on the struggle in hopes that a successful defence of the german frontier might damp the determination of the allies. but the situation had passed beyond his control, the nation’s will-power was broken, and his advice was in discredit. on oct. 26 he resigned, and a few days later germany became a republic in outward response to president wilson’s demand and in inward response to the up- rising of the german people against the leaders who had led them into disaster. the german fleet had already mutinied when their commanders sought to send them out ona forlorn hone against the british. 1094 on nov. 6 the german delegates ieft berlin to treat for an armistice. their acceptance of the severe terms was hastened less by existing military events than by the imminence of a fresh blow. the allied advance was still continuing, in some parts seeming to gather pace in the last days, but the main german forces had escaped from the perilous salient, and their complete destruction of roads and railways made it impossible for supplies to keep pace with the advancing troops. a pause must come while these communications were being repaired, and thus the germans would have breathing space to rally their resistance. the advance reached the linc pont 4 mousson-sedan-mezieres- mons-ghent by nov. 1r—the line of the opening battles in 1914— but strategically it had come to a standstill. to meet this situation foch had concentrated a large franco- american force, of 28 divisions and 600 tanks, to strike below metz directly east into lorraine. the general allied advance had fixed the enemy’s reserves, and now this decistve manoeuvre was to fall on his bared flank, turning the whole of his new line of defence along the meuse to antwerp. in addition trenchard’s independent air force was about to bomb berlin, on a scale hitherto unattempted in air warfare. with revolution at home and this menace on their front, the german delegates had no option but to accept the drastic terms of the armistice, which was signed in foch’s railway-carriage in the forest of compiegne on nov. 11, andat 11 o’clock that morn- ing the world war came to an end. controversy has long raged as to what was the deciding act of the contlict, what were the causes of victory, and, even less profitably, which country won the war. if it be accepted that the mind of the enemy’s ruling power is the ultimate target, aimed at indirectly through the bodies of their troops and their civil foundations, then, so far as any military act was decisive, the memoirs of ludendorff reveal that it was the attack of aug. 8 reinforced by the overthrow of bulgaria. but if these would have ensured peace it is most improbable that germany would have accepted the conditions ultimately secured. the truth is that no one act, still less one cause, was, or could be, decisive. the western front, the balkan front, the tank, the blockade and propaganda have all been claimed as the cause of victory. all claims are justified, none is wholly right. in the new warfare between nations victory is a cumulative effect, to which all weapons—military, economic, and psychological— contribute. victory comes, and can only come, through the utilis- ation and combination of all the resources existing in a modern nation, and the dividend of success depends on the way in which these manifold activities are co-ordinated. it is even more futile to ask which country won the war. france did not win the war, but unless she had held the fort while the forces of britain were preparing and those of america still a dream the release of civili- sation from this nightmare of militarism would have been impos- sible. britain did not win the war, but without her command of the sea, her financial support and her army to take over the main burden of the struggle from 1916 onwards, defeat would have been inevitable. the united states did not win the war, but without their economic aid to ease the strain, without the arrival of their troops to relieve considerable parts of the allied forces— freeing them for offensive use, and, above all, without the moral tonic which their coming gave, victory would have been im- possible. and let us not forget how many times russia had sac- rificed herself to save her allies; preparing the way for their ultimate victory as surely as for her downfall. finally, how- ever we may judge her motives, let us pay tribute to the incom- parable endurance and skill with which germany more than held her own for four years against superior numbers, an epic of military achievement. the principles of war as disclosed and evolved in this period are described in the articles: war; strategy; tactics; cavalry; artillery; infantry. the campaigns and battles have received separate and detailed treatment in articles such as the following: air warfare; ant- werp, siege of 1914; asiago, battle of 1916; belgium, invasion of 1914; brest-litovsk, battles of, 1915; cambrai, battle of, 1917; cameroons, operations i914-6; caporetto, battle of; world war, naval carpatiiians, battles of tite; caucasus, campaigns in the} dardanelles campaign; dunajecsan, battles of the; east africa, military operations 1914-8; eastern european front campaigns 1914-8; frontiers, battles of the: i. early opcrations in upper alsace, 2. first battles in lorraine, 3. battle of the ardennes, 4. battles of charleroi, mons, le cateau and guise. traltan campaigns, 1915-8; jutland, battle of; lem- berg, batrles of; lopz-cracow, battles of 19143; luck (lutsk) battles of, 1916; marne, battle of the; masurrian laakes, battles of the; aniesopotamia, operations in; narew, battles of the, i915; narocz, baatrle of lake; wort-p war, naval: przemsyl, sieges of i914-5; salonika campaigns; serbian campaigns, 1914-5; somme, battle of the; verdun, battles of3 victory, advance to; vistula-san, battles of the; vittorio venito; wesrern front, 1914-8; ypres, battles of: first battle of, (1914) 2nd battle of—gas attack; third battle of, (1917); yser, batrrle of the; zeebrugge, attack on, phe mechanism of war, the organisation of naval, military and air forces, and the scientific aspects of military machinery are dealt with in such articles as those on apsreacty, boarp or; arr forces; artillery (inc. trench ordnance); baliistics; bomps; bridging, military; camouflage, military; camouflage, naval: cheme- ical warfare; expblostves, mintrary; flame-throwers; in- telligence, naval and muivcitary; minelaying and mine- sweeping; moror transport, military; ordnance; paravane; range-finders and position finders; rirles and licut ma- chine guns; supply and transport, military; tanks. (b. h. l. h.) world war, naval.—it was on july 28 1914 that austria issued her declaration of war on serbia and the first fleet received orders to proceed to scapa ilow in the orkneys. it left portland at 7 a.m. on july 29. the bulk of the navy at this time was to be found in the home flect, which was divided into three forces, representing three successive stages of efficiency. the first fleet, which became the grand fleet, mustered all the latest ships, fully manned and in permanent commission. the second fleet consisted of older but still efficient battleships and cruisers, manned in peace time with nucleus crews amount- ing to two-fifths of their complements. last of all came the third fleet, 2 motley collection of obsolescent ships in the basins of the naval ports. the war organisation of these fleets is summarised in tables ij. and ii., which show the strength of the forces ranged against one another in the north sea. in terms both of ships and gun power the british flect was superior; 13 of its 19 dreadnoughts were armed with 13-5-in. guns, and the rest with 12-in., while the germans had 12-in. guns in only nine of their ships and 11-in. in the remainder. i. the opening of hostilities 3 on july 29 “ warning telegrams ” went out to all squadrons abroad. on aug. 1 the tension had increased and germany issued the ominous order for ariegsgefahr (precautionary period). late that night the news came in that germany had declared war on russia, and at r:25 a.m. on aug. 2, mr. churchill issued the order to mobilise. by 4 a.m. on aug. 3 the whole navy stood mobilised and ready for action. the german fleet had returned hurriedly from a visit to norway. on aug. 1 the end and 3rd squadrons came round from kiel to the north sea and at 8 p.m. that evening the order to mobilise went out in germany. on the morning of aug. 4 the grand fleet received orders to put to sea from scapa. ‘the term of adml. sir george callaghan’s command was nearly expired. it was thought that a younger commander was required to face the heavy strain of war, and the grand fleet (for it so was to be designated) put to sea at 8:30 a.m. under its new commander, adml. sir john jellicoe. that night at 11 p.m. the eventful order went out from clee- thorpes to all ships and squadrons, ‘commence hostilities at once against germany.” the british war plans were primarily based on the concentra- tion of the main fleet in the north to guard the northern exit of the north sea and bar germany’s path to the ocean. the pro- tection of the coast was entrusted to patrol flotillas under the admiral of patrols (the 8th flotilla in forth, gth in tyne, 7th in humber, 6th at dover). behind these plans stood the coast- line of great britain stretching like a colossal breakwater across germany’s path to the sea. the northern passage between the world war, naval table i. disposition of british fleet, aug. 1014 sweepers fleet ——_ er ee | | ee |, ———.}. . first fleet adml. sir john jellicoe, ist, 2nd, ard, 4th b.s... ist b.c.s. (vice- adml. sir david beatty) 2nd c.s., std cs 1st lars) aah es 4/ 8] g6 roth c.s. (from third fleet) we | we pvesaih sa 8 flotillas 2nd and 4th , coll aay. || ok neh ae 2 harwich force commodore (t) reginald tyr- whitt flotillas rst and 3rd : a se ee eee ee 2 second fleet (channel) vice-adml. sir c. burney, sth b.s., 6th b.s. : eo the ote, ae il aleg es 2 (5th c.s. to trade routes). third fleet vice-adml. sir a. bethel] 2 ? 7th and 8th b.s. . (6th, 7th, 9th, rith, 12th c.s. to trade routes) ; ell pel te (10th c.s. to first fleet). (8th c.s. stituted) not con- patrol flotillas (coastal areas) rear-adml. g. bal- lard, admiral pa- trols, flotillas 6th, 4th, 8th, gth shee my note, wnl te tesa sa ee ae s-m flotillas, com- modore (s) roger keyes, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, oth s-m flotillas 6th and 8th a home ports . ea pees, “| ok. te ath ode ake 8s cruiser squadrons (7 rade) 5th (cruiser force d) (gouth atlan- tic) rear-adml. ay py stoddart. 4a ees. 4 6th (escorts va- rious) . ; 7th (cruiser force cg (narrows) rear-adml. a. ii. christian oy a ere ere 5 goth (cruiser force 1) (finisterre) rear-adml, j. m. de robeck . dew sa, dct cove 6 11th (cruiser force fe) (west of ire- land) rear-adml. k..5. pp; hornby ¢|) icc.) cce dy) 5 re | ee j ef | ed dl 12th (cruiser force g) (soundings) rear-adml. ross- lyn wemyss squadrons abroad mediterranean (vice -adml. sir berke- ley milne) 2nd b.c.s., ast cs., 5th flotilla . north america and west indies (rear- adml. sir chris. cradock) 4th c.s. (cruiser force 11) china (vice-adml. | sir thos. jerram) | east indies (rear- | admi. ril. peirse) cape (rear-adml. h{. g. king-hall) australia (rear- adml. sir = g. patey) . ; s.e, coast america table it. dispasition of german fleet po bend ‘el wi wt real ale a ee era e aa eee eo ee al ree a vv) itigh sea fleet adml. von ingenohl, tst, 2nd, 3rd squadrons”... | 13 sill 22 ist scouting group .{.. | .. 3 me ors cruisers . : ; | ee ee ee oo was 7 ilotillas 1 to 7 . ect! cates call) bae mi tceeae sae ae +! p i saates ab ae bee submarines old 18 new 10 keserve . plllee. eh ea i 5 | 20 oa mediterranean (rear- adml, souchon) . mn coat ml oie ao ee i east asiatic (vice-adml. von spee). solllh, stes het ska) ll care 2 s west indies 2 shetlands and norway, 190 m. wide, could be kept constantly patrolled. the straits of dover, only 21 m. wide, lay exposed to attack, but any attacking force was threatened with a heavy counter-attack from the north on its return, and germany never actually took the risk with her big ships. so long as the enemy refrained from an attack in force the dispatch of british troops across the channel was no more hazardous than sending them to ireland. the average time of transport across the channel was no more than 13 hours, which meant that no trans- port could ever be more than seven hours from port, leaving an ample margin of time to reach harbour if a german force was reported in the narrows. the straits of dover remained the weak point of the war plans, and there can be little doubt that a determined attack on the channel at the beginning of the war would have severely shaken the whole structure of british strategy, germany did not attempt it, and troops poured across the channel in a continuous stream. to the westward there was only the “ goeben,” and on aug. 10 came the news that she had entered the dardanelles. lhe submarine menace.—germany’s strategy was defensive. it was based on the idea that the british fleet would enter the bight, where it was hoped to wear it down by ruthless mine- laying and submarine warfare. then when an equality of strength (the greatly desired and much-talked-of k rafteausgleich) 1096 had been attained, a decisive battle would be dared. first a policy of waiting and attrition, then the decisive action. this was the essence of germany strategy in the north sea. in pursuance of these aims, at 2:30 p.m. on aug. 4 the “ kgni- gin luise,’’? a hamburg-america liner, was dispatched to lay mines off the thames. she did not return. commodore tyr- whitt was already at sea with the ‘‘ amethyst,” ‘‘ amphion ” and the harwich destroyer flotillas. the ‘‘ kenigin luise ” was sighted on the 5th about ro a.m., chased by the “‘ lance ” and ‘* landrail,” and sunk some so m. east (true) from lowestoft. but she had laid her mines off aldeburgh, and the ‘‘ amphion,”’ ‘on her way home, ran on one of them and went down in a few minutes with a loss of 150 men. this threat to the north sea routes emphasised the necessity of minesweeping and started the enormous expansion of that important service, which be- came one of the principal spheres of naval activity (see mine- laying and minesweeping). for the germans the problem was to find the british flect and, on aug. 6, 10 german submarines went off into the north sea to search for it. they found it at sea the same day. a tor- pedo, fired at the ‘* monarch,” missed; ur5 was rammed by the light cruiser ‘‘ birmingham ” and sunk (58°26’ n., 1°58’ e.), and ur3 never returned. this encounter, however, roused a sense of insecurity on the british side, and that night (10 p.m. on 6th) the commander-in-chief received orders to take his whole force to the northwest of the orkneys. the menace of the submarine was already beginning to work. protection of the expeditionary force-~—on aug. 5 the cabinet decided to send the expeditionary force to trance, mr. churchill guaranteed its safety at sea, and aug. 9 was fixed as the first day of passage. the transports were already assem- bling at southampton. the war plans had provided that for this operation the grand fleet was to come down as far as the forth (lat. 56° n.). but it was now west of the orkneys, and as it remained north of cromarty (58° n.) till aug. 15, the bur- den of protection fell for a time on the channel fleet. by aug. q the latter’s 18 ships had assembled off portland. in the narrows, between holland and harwich, tyrwhitt had 12 to 18 destroyers watching on a 30 m. front. the armoured cruisers ‘* bacchante,” “‘ cressy,”’ ‘‘ hogue ” and “ aboukir ”’ were in the downs, and in the straits were destroyers of the dover patrol and commodore keyes’ 10 submarines. to the west- ward, cruising from land’s end to ushant, was rear-adml. rouyer’s french force of 14 old cruisers with rear-adml. rosslyn wemyss’ cruiser squadron of four “ talbots.’”? covered by these forces a steady stream of transports passed across the channel, rising to the number of 44 on aug. 14 and remaining well over 30 a day. when the flow of troops was at its height, the grand fleet returned to the north sea and on the 16th swept down to the latitude of the forth (56° n.) and joined hands for a few hours with the southern forces. nothing was seen of the enemy. on aug. 23 the troops were across. out of 240 trans- ports employed not one had been lost. to secure the position to the southward, a squadron (cruiser force k) of two battle cruisers, the “ new zealand ” and “ in- vincible,” was stationed for a time in the humber. hardly had the passage been accomplished than there came news of the terrible retreat in france, and so dangerous did things appear that on aug. 24 boulogne was closed and the army base shifted, with an immensity of labour, to st. nazaire. mr. churchill was intent on saving ostend and for nearly two days (aug. 26-8) the channel fleet was hurrying marines across and lying off ostend to support their landing. the effort availed little and they were no sooner landed than they were re-embarked. meanwhile the attention of the german fleet had becn riveted to the bight. there on aug. 28 beatty’s battle cruisers had swooped down, driving in the german patrols and sinking the light cruisers ‘‘ mainz,” ‘ ariadne” and “ celn ” (see hel1- goland bicnt). this action, fought in germany’s very gate, had weighty consequences, for it confirmed the kaiser in his decision to follow a strictly defensive policy and hardened him against von tirpitz’s ardent pleadings for a strenuous offensive. world war, naval german naval strategy settled down to a minor warfare of sub- marines and minelayers, varied by occasional raids against the knglish coast. the activity of the submarine soon began to be felt. on sept. 5 u2r at the mouth of the forth sank the small cruiser ‘‘ pathfinder,” the first vessel to succumb to the submarine. scapa’s defenceless state was a source of acute anxiety to adml. jellicoe at this time. on sept. 1 a submarine was reported in the harbour, and the alarm culminated in the battle fleet weighing and putting to sea at night. it withdrew to loch ewe on the northwest coast of scotland, 115 m. to the westward, and was there till sept. 7, when it was recalled to the north sea to cover the passage of the 7th div. to france. ten days later (sept. 17) an important conference assembled in the “ iron duke’s ” cabin at loch ewe. the first lord was there with the chief of the war staff (rear-adml. doveton sturdee) and there was weighty discussion on the defences of scapa, the possibility of entering the baltic and the control of neutral traffic on the east coast. when the first lord got back to lon- don the german thrust was threatening the channel ports, and on sept. 19 orders went out for the marine brigade to be landed at dunkirk. it was the task of the southern force to screen its passage and it came as a severe shock to find cruiser force c swept suddenly off the board. weddingen’s exploit—on sept. 22; patrolling at 10 knots, without a destroyer screen, off the coast of holland (lat. 52°18’ n., long. 3°41’ e.), the armoured cruisers ‘ aboukir,” ““ hogue”’ and ‘‘ cressy’? were torpedoed in quick succession between 6:25 and 7:30 a.m. by ug (otto weddingen); they sank with a loss of 60 officers and 1,400 men. mr. churchill on sept. 18 had suggested that they should not continue on this beat, a view in which the first sea lord concurred, but no orders had been issued to withdraw them. the exploit created a profound impression. weddingen became the hero of germany. the belgian coast had to be covered, and it was decided to lay a defensive minefield in the north sea. on oct. 2 1914 a large area was notified and the first line was laid between the downs and holland. the same day there came the startling news of the belgian intention to retire from antwerp. the first lord was caught up in the whirl of events and found himself in antwerp involved “ in a hideously critical local situa- tion.”? the idea of holding antwerp superseded everything else. the marine brigade at dunkirk was ordered up; the royal naval div., raw and unequipped, was hurried across, and on oct. 7 the 7th div. was landed at zeebrugge; the next day the british force fell back from antwerp, which surrendered on oct. to. these movements brought a heavy strain on the dover patrol, which was created a separate command under rear-adml. the hon. horace hood on oct. 13. in the north the commander-in-chief had been ordered, on oct. 2, to take special measures for the safety of the canadian convoy, then on its way across, and for eight days the whole fleet was at sea, covering the waters between scotland and norway. the battle cruiser ‘‘ princess royal ”’ went out into the atlantic to screen it, and the convoy of 31 ships arrived saicly at plymouth on oct. 14. the roth cruiser squadron was still patrolling at 10 a.m. on oct. r5 off peterhead, when ug appeared and sent a torpedo into the old cruiser ‘“‘ hawke,”’ which sank in a few minutes with a loss of 500 lives. the losses, however, were not all on one side. the british submarine eg (lieut.-comm. max horton) lying off heligoland had sunk the small cruiser “ [ela ” on sept. 12. operations off nicuport-—a great german attack was gather- ing at nieuport, and when general joffre asked on oct. 16 for the support of naval guns, adml. hood and his light craft hurried across, followed by monitors, and for nearly a week maintained a heavy fire on the german flank. in reply to an urgent call from german army headquarters for action against the monitors, four german destroyers left the ems on oct. 17 to lay mines off the north foreland. they were met by the * undaunted ” (capt. cecil fox) and four harwich destroyers (“ lennox,” “ lance,” ‘‘ legion ” and “ loyal ”’) in the nar- world war, naval rows and after a sharp fight and chase the last german boat was sunk off the texel at 4:30 p.m. in scapa flow there had been another submarine alarm. in the afternoon of oct. 16 a supposed submarine was reported off the main entrance, and again the flect raised steam and put to sea by night. this time the commander-in-chief decided to take the fleet around to lough swilly (ireland). its arrival there, on oct. 22, meant a serious dislocation of the war plans, which were beginning to give way both in the north and south, through the pressure of the submarine. the remedies were simple. in the north an efficient boom, in the south an ample supply of effective mines, but these requirements were not forthcoming at the time. the sinking of the german destroyers had, how- ever, given an assurance of safety to hood’s flotilla on the belgian coast, but on oct. 26 the german army swept down lke an avalanche threatening to scize the sluices and engulf the whole belgian line. the old battleship “ venerable ”’ was dis- patched to hood and, while the culverts were being bricked up in breathless haste, the crash of her r2-in. guns enabled the belgians to hold on for a few days till the waters rising round the sluices forced the germans to retire. again the german army called for help to the navy, but uro, hurrying down, was rammed by the “ badger ’”’ (comm. chas. fremantle); u28 was hunted, by another destroyer and got into a trawler’s net; and only u27 reached the straits of dover, where it sank the old cruiser ‘“‘ hermes ”’ (transformed into an air carrier) on oct. 31. in the north the move to lough swilly had been unfortunate. two days before the battle flect left scapa, the “ berlin,” a large norddeutscher-lloyd, had left the jade and on oct. 23 laid mines some 26 m. northwest of lough swilly. on the 26th the dreadnought battleship ‘‘ audacious ” (capt. cecil dampier) struck one of them. the white star liner “ olympic,” outward bound, came up and tried to tow her in, but she was still some rs m. from lough swilly when she sank and blew up at 9 p.m. her loss was kept a profound secret in great britain, and a whole fortnight elapsed before it was known with certainty in germany. with the grand fleet 300 m. from the north sea, the original war plans were giving way, and the commander-in- chief went up to confer with the admiralty. it was a new board that he met. prince louis of battenberg (marquis of milford haven), who had given the order for the first fleet to stand fast on july 26, had resigned and lord fisher had taken his place. it was decided that the 3rd battle squadron of “ king edwards ” should come down to reinforce the channel flect, and, to secure the approach to dover, mines were to be laid in the north sea, which was declared a military area on nov. 2. it was announced that all ships passing northabout did so only at their peril, and all ships were advised to go and come by the english channel. first german raid.—the notification was barely issued when on nov. 3 a german raid was made on the east coast by the battle cruisers ‘‘ seydlitz,”’ “ moltke,” ‘ von der tann ” and ‘* blucher,” with three light cruisers escorting the “ stralsund,” with the object of laying a minefield on the british coast some 15 m. from yarmouth. the morning was misty; the germans, after laying their mines, engaged the patrols, dropped a number of rounds harmlessly on the beach near yarmouth, and made off. adml. beatty with the battle cruisers put to sea from cromarty, but by 4 p.a. the germans were well on their way to the bight and he was ordered to return. hipper got safely back at 11 p.m. but the next day the armoured cruiser “ yorck ” struck a german mine in the jade and sank. this was the first sortie of the high sea fleet. the commotion had hardly died down when on nov. 4 a telegram arrived from the british consul- general at valparaiso with the news of coronel (see coronrr) and the whole system of trade defence began to tremble under the menace of von spee. this is a milestone in the naval war and to understand it we must leave home waters for a time. il. cruiser warfare outside home waters the principal task of the british navy was the protection of trade, for which purpose cruiser squadrons 1097 were stationed at the focal points of maritime traffic. the number of german cruisers abroad was comparatively small. the largest squadron, whose influence was felt in every sea, was in the pacific commanded by vice-adml. graf von spee, consisting of the armoured cruisers “‘ scharnhorst ” and “ gneli- scnau ” (each 8 8-2-in., 8 5-9-in.) and the light cruisers ‘f em- den,” “ niirnberg ”’ and “ leipzig.” in the east indies was the “ konigsberg ” (10 4-1-in., 23°5 knots) and in the atlantic the “ dresden ” and “ karlsruhe,” armed with 12 4:1-in. and witha speed of 24 and 27°6 knots respectively.! at the outbreak of war, the admiralty was faced with insistent demands for convoy which would not be denied. in the east ihe whole of the east indies squadron was engaged in the con- voy of troops from india, and the convoy of the expeditions to new guinea and samoa occupied the whole australian squadron for a time. the cape, the cameroons and british east africa all made similar demands, and the system of patrolling focal areas was constantly threatening to break down in the attempt to mect these urgent calls. cradock’s pursuit of the “ dresden.”—when war broke out, the “ karlsruhe ” had just relieved the ‘‘ dresden ” and both were still in the west indies. in new york were several fast german liners, but the ‘‘ kronprinz wilhelm ” was the only one that actually put to sea. on aug. 6 she was being armed and equipped by the “ karlsruhe” at a rendezvous some 120 m. northeast of watling island (off cuba), when the “ suffolk,” cradock’s flagship at the time, came upon them at 11 a.m., but after a long chase and night action with the “ bristol ” the ** karlsruhe ” got away. then there came news of her and of the ‘“ dresden ”’ to the southward, and on aug. 22 cradock, who had transferred his flag to the “ good hope,” went off in pursuit and began his fateful journey to the south. the “‘ karlsruhe ” remained in the west indies and south atlantic. the liner ‘** kaiser wilhelm der grosse,” the only merchant cruiser which had succecded in slipping out of the north sea (on aug. 5), was trying to get in touch with her but on aug. 26 was caught coal- ing at rio ouro, a desolate anchorage on the sahara coast, by the british cruiser “ highflyer ” (capt. henry t. buller) and after a short action was sunk. the ‘ karlsruhe ” (commander kohler) continued her depredations on trade for some months, and up to nov. 4 had captured or sunk 17 ships (76,609 tons registered) when she suddenly blew up in the west indies (lat. 11°7’ n. long. 55°25’ w.) on sept. 3 rear-adml. sir christopher cradock was appointed to command on the southeast coast of america. he was given the two armoured cruisers “good hope ” and ‘ monmouth,” the light cruisers “ glasgow ” and “ bristol’? and the armed merchantmen “ otranto,” ‘* carmania ” and “ macedonia.” there ensued a hunt for the ‘ dresden ” down the coast of south america. the “ carmania ” (capt. noel grant, 8 4-7-in.) went off to trinidada, a tiny islet (lat. 20°30’ s., long. 29°22’ w.) 6co m. out in the south atlantic, and there on sept. 14 came upon a german armed merchantman, the ‘ cap trafalgar” (2 4:1-in.), coaling. an action ensued, the ‘‘ cap trafalgar ” was sunk and the “ carmania ” limped back to gibraltar for repairs. meanwhile the “ dresden ” (capt. liidecke), with two collters, the “ paden ” and ‘f santa isabel,” had sped south to a little harbour, orange bay, hidden away in hoste island in the vicinity of cape horn, where she lay from sept. 5 to 16. in the atlantic she had sunk only two ships. von spee had been located at ponape in the caroline islands on aug. g, and on sept. 15 cradock, then at santa caterina (brazil), received an important message sent on sept. 14 from the admiralty. he was told that there was strong probability of von spee’s arriving in magellan straits and that the armoured cruiser “ defence ” (4 9-2-in., ro 7-5-in.) and the old battleship “ canopus ” (4 12-in., 12 6-in.) were being sent out to reinforce him. he was to keep the ‘f canopus ” and “ monmouth ” with him, until the ‘ defence ” joined, then concentrate a squadron t'three battleships to grand fleet as minebumpers on 7/8/17. 6th [3.s. ceased to exist 8/8/17, and 7th was merged with 8th, leav- ing channel fleet composed of 5th and 8th b.s. 1098 strong enough to meet von spee, “search magellan straits, break up german trade and destroy the german cruisers.’ but the very next day, sept. 16, the admiralty heard that von spee had appeared off samoa on the 14th; and cradock was informed that the situation had changed; “ cruisers need not be concentrated and german trade on the west coast was to be attacked at once.’”’ this second telegram was the beginning of a chapter of misfortunes. the situation on the southeast coast had not changed; 1t had merely been postponed; concentration and reinforcement were as necessary as ever, but the order to the “ defence ” to proceed to the southeast coast was can- celled without cradock’s being informed of it. he was at monte- video when he received this telegram on sept. 17 and pro- ceeded south with his squadron on the 22nd. [or another reason, sept. 15 stands out as a red-letter day in cruiser warfare, for on it came the news that the ‘‘ emden ” had burst into the bay of bengal. she had parted from von spee and the “ scharn- horst ?? on aug. 14. von spee’s force-—von spee was at ponape in the carolines when war broke out. thence he went to pagan in the marianas islands, where the ‘“ emden” brought him a dozen supply ships from tsingtao. the squadron proceeded eastward to eniwetok (aug. 19) in the marshall islands; then on to majuro in the same group, arriving on aug. 26, where von spce, having heard on aug. 25 of japan’s declaration of war, finally aban- doned all idea of return. his next port of call was christmas island, in the very middle of the pacific, where he arrived on sept. 7. on his way he heard of the fall of samoa and, after coaling from his colliers at christmas island, proceeded there on sept. 9, hoping to surprise any british ships in the vicinity. but when he arrived at 3 a.m. on sept. 14, the harbour was empty. the report of his visit was passed by wireless to suva in fiji and thence by cable to new zealand and london, where it arrived early on sept. 16. in china it left adml. jerram’s forces free to hunt the “ emden ” down, and in australia re- moved all anxiety as to the expedition to new guinea and the homeward-bound convoy of australian troops. china squadron.—in china the effective force of the com- mander-in-chief, vice-adml. sir thomas jerram, consisted of the old battleship ‘‘ triumph,” the armoured cruisers ‘‘ minotaur ”’ (capt. edward kiddle, 4 9-2-in., 10 7-5-in.) and “‘ hampshire ” (capt. h. w. grant, 4 7-5-in., 6 6-in.) and the light cruiser “yarmouth ” (capt. h. l. cochrane, 8 6-in.). japan’s entry into the war on aug. 23 secured the china seas and jerram, leaving only the “‘ triumph ” (capt. fitzmaurice) and destroyer “usk ” to assist in the investment of tsingtao, took his ships south to secure the road to the east indies. on aug. 23 came instructions {rom home to proceed in search of the “ scharn- horst ” and ‘* gneisenau ”’ and keep in touch with rear-adml. patey in australia, but as nothing was known of the german ships, jerram, on his arrival at singapore on aug. 30, sent his cruisers to search the dutch east indies, where 22 german merchant ships had taken refuge. this search lasted till sept. 13, but already demands for con- voy had begun to dislocate his plans. on sept. 8 the admiralty ordered him to send his two best ships, the ‘‘ minotaur ” and ** hampshire,” to meet the australian convoy, which was due to leave fremantle for europe on oct. 3. the vice-adml. decided to send the “‘ minotaur,” in the meantime, with two japanese ships, the battle cruiser ‘ ibuki”’ (4 12-in., 8 8-in.) and cruiser, ‘* chikama ” (8 6-in.), to rabaul in new britain to cover aus- tralia, when suddenly the situation in china was changed on sept. 15 by the news of von spee’s appearance off samoa, and more impcratively by the simultaneous appearance of the “‘ em- den ” in the bay of bengal. till the “‘ emden ” was finally run down by the “ sydney ” at cocos island on nov. 9 jerram’s ships were almost wholly engaged in hunting for her in the east indies. in australia the same influences had been at work. on the outbreak of war rear-adml. sir george patey had decided to take up a position at port moresby in the gulf of papua, british new guinea (lat. 9° 28’ s., long. 147° 9’ e.), covering australian world war, naval waters and within reach of the two principal german harbours, rabaul (or simpsonhafen) in new britain and friedrich- wilhelmshafen (madang) in new guinea. demands for convoy began even earlier than at singapore to dislocate his plans. new zealand’s expedition to capture samoa was ready to go on aug. 18 and the admiralty approved of its starting, directing patey on aug. 13 to give it naval support. but no sooner had he ar- ranged to meet it with the battle cruiser “‘ australia ’”’ and the “melbourne ” 450 m. south of fiji on aug. 24 than the aus- tralian navy board asked that their expedition to new guinea should be taken first. finally it was decided that the cruiser “sydney ” should take the new guinea force as far as the barrier reef, on the east coast of australia, and then wait for the * australia’? and “ melbourne” to return from samoa. this was done. the “ australia ” arrived at samoa on aug. 29, the force was landed, the british flag hoisted, and she left the next day to join the new guinea force. but now the demands of the european convoy came flooding in. patey was then engaged in the new guinea operations. rabaul was occupied on sept. 13, and on sept. 15 the news of von spee’s visit to samoa cleared up the situation. friedrich- wilhelmshafen was occupied on sept. 24 and angaur wireless station was destroyed by the “sydney ” on sept. 26. when news arrived of von spee’s appearance off tahiti on sept. 22, patey received orders to take his squadron to suva (fiji) to bar the road to his return, and sailed from rabaul on oct. 3. it had been intended that the australian convoy should leave fremantle on oct. 5, escorted by the “ minotaur,” “ sydney ” and ‘ ibuki,’” but new zealand refused to let her transports proceed to australia without a strong escort and the ‘ mino- taur” and * ibuki” had to trail the whole way to wellington to bring them on. this meant a delay of three weeks and it was not till nov. 1 that the great convoy of 37 transports left king george’s sound, albany, escorted by the ‘‘ melbourne,” ‘ mino- taur’”’ and “ ibuki.”? the ‘‘ sydney,” too, was with them on the road that was to lead her to the “‘ emden ” and to victory and fame. cradock’s force.—meanwhile, in the atlantic cradock had gone from montevideo to the southward and by sept. 28 his ships stood before the magellan straits, and started searching the creeks and crannies of tierra del fuego. on oct. 3 the “* glasgow ” and ‘‘ monmouth ” went off to the west coast to attack german trade in accordance with the admiralty telegram of sept. 16, but the ‘‘ good hope ”’ remained in the falklands area, waiting for the “‘ canopus.”’ von spee had been reported a second time off tahiti in the society islands on sept. 22, and en oct. 5 was again located by an intercepted wireless to the ** dresden,’ which stated that he was on his way to easter island. no shadow of doubt could remain that he was on his way across the pacific, and the admiralty on oct. 5 sent word to cradock to be prepared to meet him, adding that the “‘ cano- pus ” should accompany the “ glasgow,” ‘‘ monmouth ” and ‘“‘otranto ” in their search. the idea can be regarded as sound on only the assumption that cradock was expected only to find and locate von spee, for, tied to a battleship which could not be trusted to go more than 15 knots, his armoured cruisers could not be expected to attack or pursue a fast and powerful enemy. cradock received the message on oct. 7, and on the 8th sent a message to say that he was concentrating at the falklands, and suggesting the formation of a strong second squadron on the east coast to intercept the german squadron if it should evade him. the telegram reached the admiralty on the rrth, and the armoured cruisers “ defence” and ‘‘ kent” (14 6-in.) were immediately ordered to reinforce rear-adml. stoddart on the east coast. the first lord (mr. winston churchill) also recom- mended the postponement of cradock’s cruise to the west coast, but the reply actually sent to him merely took the form of ‘‘ con- curring ” in the “ concentration ”’ of his vessels ‘‘ for combined operations.” the ‘“ concentration”? at the falklands never materialised. the ‘‘ good hope ” left for the west coast (via cape horn) on oct. 22, leaving the ‘* canopus ” to follow with her colliers (via magellan). cradock’s conception of the situation world war, naval will never be known. he probably felt it incumbent on him to support the ‘‘ glasgow” and ‘“ monmouth.” there was a vagueness at both ends of the wire. cradock spoke of concen- trating at the falklands, when half his squadron had already gone to the east coast. the admiralty, knowing that the “ glas- gow ” and “ monmouth ” had gone to the west coast, concurred in a concentration for “‘ combined operations,’ whatever that might mean. but the admiralty’s readiness to reinforce stod- dart, at cradock’s suggestion, indicates that it would have been equally ready to reinforce cradock if he had asked for it. but neither in his telegrams nor in his last dispatch of oct. 12 did he suggest, much less definitely state, that his squadron was too weak to face the foe. there was one vessel which might have saved the situation, namely the battle cruiser ‘“‘ australia,’’ if cradock had been told to wait for her, but in response to urgent representations from new zealand, she had been retained off fiji, and remained there straining on her leash. coronel and the falkland islands —von spee was then at masa-fuera (oct. 18-26), a small island 450 m. from the coast of chile, and the two squadrons were approaching one another, for cradock had joined the “ glasgow,” ‘‘ monmouth” and * otranto ” at vallenar in chonos archipelago (lat. 45° 24’ s., long. 74° 18’ w.) on oct. 27. the squadrons met off coronel on nov. 1, the “* good hope”? and “ monmouth” sank in the pacific, the ‘‘ glasgow ” and “ otranto ” got away. the ‘‘ cano- pus” was 300 m. off at the time toiling northward with her colliers at 12 knots (see coronel). the news arrived in england on the morning of nov. 4 and fell on the country like a thunderclap. lord fisher was then first sea lord and every effort was made to redeem the situa- tion. the battle cruisers “ invincible ”’ and “ inflexible ’’ were taken from the grand fleet and sailed from devonport on nov. 1r with vice-adml. sir doveton sturdee, late chief of the war staff, in command. rear-adml. stoddart was waiting for him at abrolhos rocks off the coast of brazil, with the ‘‘ carnar- von,” ‘‘ cornwall,” ‘ defence” and “ kent,” while von spee, unaware of the thunderbolt launched at him, had visited val- paraiso and was on his way southward. sturdee coaled at abrol- hos rocks and rushed on with his ships (“ inflexible,” “ invin- cible,’ ‘‘ carnarvon,” ‘“ cornwall,’ ‘ kent,’ ‘“ glasgow,” “ bristol ”’ and “ orama ”’) to the south, arriving at port wil- liam, falkland islands in the forenoon of dec. 7. the “ aus- tralia’ meanwhile was speeding across the pacific, while a strong japanese squadron had taken her place off iiji. von spee passed the florn in a gale at midnight on dec. 1. the next day he met a scottish barque, the “ drummuir ” with 2,800 tons of coal, and put back to picton island near beagle channel to transfer her coal. the “ drummuir” was sunk on dec. 6 and with her sank von spec’s hope of getting home. he had decided at picton island to make a raid on the t’alklands. on dec. 8, at dawn, the islands were in sight and the “ gneisenau ” and ‘‘ nurnberg ” were sent in towards port william. in the battle which followed (see falkland islands battle) the ‘ scharn- horst,” “ gneisenau,” “‘ leipzig” and ‘‘ niirnberg ”’ were sunk and von spee and his two sons perished. the battle stands as one of the great beacons of the naval war, marking the collapse of german sea power in the outer seas. the emden.—the “ emden’s ” career in the east indies had already come to an end with a tale of 15 ships. she had ranged the bay of bengal from sept. 7-25, bombarded madras on sept. 22, cruised in the approach to colombo till oct. 21, coaling in the maldive islands and at diego garcia, and raided penang on oct. 28. the armoured cruisers ‘‘ hampshire ” and “ chi- kuma,”’ the armed merchant cruiser “ empress of asia” and light cruiser ‘‘ yarmouth ” were all chasing her in vain pursuit, though the “‘ hampshire ” just missed her on oct. 21 and the ‘* yarmouth,” on oct. 9 sank two of her supply ships at pulo tapak on the west coast of sumatra. at dawn on nov. g she appeared otf the cable station at cocos, kecling island, where the operator promptly sent out an s.o.s. to all ships, and flashed the news by cable to singapore just as the boats of the german landing party grounded on the beach before his door. ‘the big 1099 convoy of 37 transports bound for europe from australia and new zealand had left albany on nov. 1 and, escorted by the ** melbourne ”’ (capt. m.l’e. silver), the “ sydney ” and jap- anese battle cruiser “ ibuki,” was at the moment approaching cocos. it was only 55 m. off when the ‘‘ melbourne ” received the s.o.s. and the “ sydney ” was sent off to cocos island at full speed. the ‘‘ emden ” (comm. karl von miiller, 10 4-1-in. had not even time to get her landing party on board. the “ syd- ney ” (capt. j. c. glossop, 8 6-in.) came down on her suddenly and at 11:30 a.m., after a sharp fight, drove her ashore, a blazing wreck. there remained then only the ‘‘ dresden,” hiding in the ice creeks of tierra del fuego, and the “ kenigsberg,”’ shut up in the swamps of the rufiji river (german east africa) both power- less for harm. by the end of 1914 the ocean passages were secure. samoa and new guinea had fallen; a japanese guard stood in the gates of tsingtao. in the cameroons, duala, buea and vic- toria had been occupied with the help of a naval squadron under capt. cyril m. fuller, and his ship the ‘‘ cumberland ” joined the stream of british cruisers homeward bound. hipper’s raid.—at home the old battleship “ bulwark ” had been blown up by an internal explosion at sheerness on nov. 26. the germans had continued their policy of raids and minelaying. on dec. 15 rear-adml. hipper left the jade with a force of four battle cruisers, three light cruisers, 18 destroyers and the ‘ kol- berg’? with mines on board. behind him in support came the german battle fleet of 14 dreadnoughts and eight deutschlands. the admiralty, warned by german signals of hipper’s sortie, but not knowing that their battle fleet was out, dispatched a force including the 2nd battle squadron (vice-adml. sir george warrender) and the rst battle cruiser squadron under vice- adml. beatty, mustering in all six dreadnoughts, four battle cruisers, four armoured cruisers, four light cruisers and seven destroyers, to a position near the dogger bank (lat. 54° 10’ n., long. 3° o’ e.) to intercept ilipper. at 5:20 a.m. on dec. 16 the destroyer “‘ shark ” (comm. loftus jones), 10 m. on beatty’s port beam, struck the destroyers ahead of the german battle fleet. the destroyer action which ensued caused adm). von ingenohl, who was then only some 30 m. from warrender’s force, to turn back and make for home. | hipper meanwhile had reached the coast at 6:40 a.m. after bombarding hartlepool at 4,000 yd. (killing 103 civilians and wounding 344) and also scarborough (17 killed, 99 wounded), he had laid his mines five miles off scarborough and at 9:40 a.m. was making for home. warrender and beatty were then some 140 m. to the east, making straight for him. but by noon a heavy sea was running with mist and rain. hipper’s light craft, so m. ahead of him, emerged suddenly at full speed from the mist, and after a running fight for 20 min. with the “‘ southamp- ton” and ‘ birmingham” (lat. 54° 36’ n., long. 1° 55’ e.), disappeared. hipper, hearing from them of the british force in front of him, made a long detour to the north and got safely home. this was apparently the first occasion on which the ger- man movements were successfully anticipated by their own signals, it. the dardanelles the year 1915 began badly. at 2:20 a.m. on jan. 1 the old battleship ‘‘ formidable” (capt. arthur loxley) cruising with the channel fleet, was sunk by u24 off start point. but later in the month, on jan. 24, hipper and his battle cruisers suffered a heavy blow at the battle of the dogger bank (see dogger bank) where the germans lost the “* bliicher.’’? adml. von inge- nohi was superseded and adml. von pohl, chief of the staff, took his place in command of the high sea fleet, charged to observe a still more cautious policy. the successes of von weddingen had led the german naval staff to favour submarine warfare, which opened with the declaration of a war-zone round the british isles on feb. 4 (see submarine warfare). these views were no doubt strengthened by the final collapse of their cruiser warfare abroad. the “ dresden,” lurking since the battle of the falklands in the fiords of the magellan straits, had crept ttooo back into the pacific to meet a german collier off juan fernandez (chile). the ‘“ kent,’ searching for her with the ‘‘ glasgow ” in magellan straits, heard of it and hastened north. on march 7 she was at the rendezvous, but the “ dresden’s ”’ speed enabled her to get away. the ‘‘ glasgow,” however, had made out the words “ juan fernandez ” in a signal and there in cumberland bay on march 14 at 8:50 a.m. the ‘‘ glasgow,” “ kent ” and ‘“‘orama ”’ found her and brought her career to an end (her casualties numbered 7 killed and 15 wounded). dardanelles plan broached.—in europe the centre of interest was shifting to the dardanelles. the german fleet rarely left the bight. a deadlock seemed to have arisen and the idea of an attack on the dardanelles was mooted, challenging even the grand fleet in its insistency and swallowing the channel flect at a guip. the scheme offered advantages ‘of the first magni- tude, strategic, diplomatic and economic, but its beginning was marred by the idea of a ‘* purely naval enterprise,” arising in its turn out of lord kitchener’s refusal to supply troops for a com- bined operation, and by the failure to appreciate that a naval bombardment must imperil the success of any subsequent com- bined operation, where surprise was the essence of success. it began with a request from petrograd on jan. 2 for a diversion to relieve the russians in the caucasus. the idea of the dar- danelles was broached. vice-adml. sackville carden, senior officer in the mediterranean, gave his opinion on jan. 5 and 11 that the dardanelles might be forced by ‘‘ extended operations,” a phrase which soared easily over a multitude of difficulties. the first lord (mr. winston churchill) waxed enthusiastic over it. lord fisher consented to the new battleship ‘f queen elizabeth ” doing her gunnery trials there, and mr. churchill saw her creep- ing relentlessly forward with the forts disappearing one by one in clouds of dust before her 15-in. shell. aerial reconnaissance and the great range of naval guns were supposed to have revo- lutionised bombardment and it was thought that the proposition was worth a trial. on jan. 13 the war council agreed that the admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in feb. to bom- bard and take the gallipoli peninsula with constantinople as its objective. lord fisher and sir james murray, chief of the gencral staff, were ominously silent. the result was an endeavour to perform a task of first-class magnitude with second-class material and insuflicient prepara- tion. acrial reconnaissance in conjunction with naval guns was not then born. to force the straits a nucleus of the best artil- lerists, the best minesweeping vessels in the fleet and at icast two score of first-class airmen would have been required. these were not forthcoming, and apart from this need the whole con- ception was strategically weak, for the fleet, even if it broke through, would have been left in the air in the sea of marmora, relying on the precarious chance of a revolution in turkey. but by feb. rors the idea of a “ purely naval enterprise ” was being abandoned. a military force was to be available “ to reap the fruits.” the opinion found favour that if the navy failed, the army should help—a conception utterly contrary to the gencrally accepted strategy of combined operations. lori fisher’s attitude of lukewarm acquiescence had changed by then to one of downright disapproval, but his arguments were blunted by his passionate adherence to the idea of a great landing in the baltic, a plan even more difficult and dangerous. the war council approved of the project on jan. 28, bringing lord fisher to the verge of resignation. bombardment of the forts —the main naval force assembling for this purpose consisted of two modern and 12 older battle- ships, drawn from the channel fleet and every quarter of the globe, and four old french battleships, viz.: ‘queen elizabeth” (capt. geo. iiope, 8 15-in.), ‘‘ inflexible ” (capt. r. f. philli- more, 8 r2-in.), ‘‘ agamemnon” (capt. h. fyler, 4 12-in., 10 g:2-in.), “* lord nelson ” (capt. j. w. mcclintock, 4 12-in., 10 o:2-in.), “‘ vengeance ” (capt. bertram smith, 4 12-in., 12 6-in.), ‘“ albion ” (capt. alg. heneage, 4 12-in., 12 6-in.), “ irre- sistible ’? (capt. douglas dent, 4 12-in., 12 6-in.), ‘‘ triumph ” (capt. maurice fitzmaurice, 4 ro-in., 14 7:5-in.), “ cornwallis ”’ (capt. alex davidson, 4 12-in., 12 6-in.}, ‘‘ ocean” (capt. a. world war, naval hayes sadler, 4 12-in., 12 6-in.), “‘ swiftsure’’ (capt. cecil lefroy, 4 12-in., 12 6-in.), “‘ canopus ” (capt. heathcote grant, 4 12-in., 12 6-in.), ‘‘ prince george’ (capt. a. v. campbell, 4 12-in., 12 6-in.), “ majestic” (capt. h. f. talbot, 4 12-in., 12 6-in.), “* suffren ’’ (rear-adml. guepratte, 4 12-in., 10 6-4-in.), ‘* bouvet ”? (capt. de la touche, 2 12-in., 2 10-8-in.), ‘* charle- magne’”’ (capt. lagresille, 4 1£2-in., ro 5-5-in.), “‘ gaulois ” (capt. biard, 4 12-in., 10 5-5-in.). it was under the command of vice-adml. sir sackville carden with commodore roger keyes as his chief of staff. rear-adml. john de robeck was in the “ vengeance,” and at port mudros in lemnos, rear-adml. rosslyn wemyss was busy making a base for the armada out of nothing. at 8 a.m. (times are east european) on feb. 19 the attack on the four outer forts was commenced by eight ships—the ‘“ in- flexible,” ‘‘ agamemnon,” “ cornwallis,” ‘‘ vengeance,” “‘ tri- umph,” “‘ bouvet,” “‘ suffren ” and ‘‘ gaulois.”? the ships first kilid el bahr ~ forts armamerts (approx) helles 2,940. - sedde! bahr (5! wee 2m. orkaniye ra ee : ‘2in qum qal‘e (9 aan, we dardanus 5,5-9:n. mes‘udiye 3, 5: 9in. mejidiye 2, 1in. 4,9 4in. hamidtye (112,14 in, namaziye 114in, 4 10-2i. 9 41m, 3.8: 21n.3,§ gin. hamidiye (i) 2,14 in, j #,8 2in a b cc d e i j l b cc 4934in 4.5:9:n co qum qal ‘e minchelds thusooaa defences engaged at long ranges; the forts were apparently silenced and the ships closed to medium ranges (7,c0oo yd.) at 2 p.m.; when failing light put a stop to the operation, orkaniye alone was maintaining a fitful fire. on feb. 25 the operations were resumed. the “ queen elizabeth,” assisted by the “ agamemnon,” put both the guns at helles out of action; the qum qal'’e forts on the asiatic side were dealt with by the “irresistible,” ‘ gau- lois,” “‘ suffren ” and ‘ charlemagne ” and by 5:15 p.m. all the outer forts were effectually silenced. the fleet anchored that. night full of hope and confidence, while the minesweepers entered and swept a channel four miles up. but the outer forts were merely the outworks of the position. the real dangers loomed at the narrows, where a channel only a mile wide was defended by nine lines of mines and commanded by heavy batteries, mounting 6 r4-in. guns, 6 11-in. and at least two score 10-2-in. and 9-4-inch. attempt to sweep the narrows —the next fortnight (march 3-17) was occupied with an attempt to sweep the channel by night and reduce the forts by day. on march 5 the “ queen elizabeth ” opened indirect fire on the kilid ¢l bahr forts, shelling them over the hills from the west side of gallipoli and apparently putting hamidiye il. out of action. indirect fire was continucd the next day on hamidiye i. and ii. at 21,000 yd., while the “vengeance,” “albion,” “ majestic,” “ prince george’? and ‘suffren,” inside the straits, engaged forts dardanus and mes‘udiye half-way up. the air reconnaissance available was of little use, and hidden howitzers forced ships to keep on the move and prevented their observing the fire. on march 7 the french battleships engaged fort dardanus, and the “ lord nelson”? went up and engaged mejidiye and hamidiye it. in the kilid cl bahr group at a range of 12,000 yards, apparently silencing them. meanwhile the progress of the mine- world war, naval sweepers was poor. it was here that the principal difficulties arose. the minesweeping force was too feeble for its colossal task, and its trawlers, which could make no more than four knots against the ' current, were an easy target for the turkish guns. on march 10 they went up at night, supported by the light cruiser “‘ ame- thyst ’ (comm. g. j. todd) and the “‘ canopus.” two trawlers were hit by 6-in. shell, one was sunk by a mine and the whole force had to be reorganised and manned with naval ratings. at home the first lord was growing insistent, and on march 11 sent a telegram to the vice-adml., urging a decision, and sug- gesting that the point had been reached when it was necessary to “ overwhelm ” the forts at the narrows at decisive range. everything now hinged on clearing the minefields. on the night of march 13-4, seven trawlers and five picket boats manned by voluntcers made a determined effort to sweep the channel, supported by the ‘ amethyst ” and “ cornwallis.”” they were driven back at 3:50 a.m. under a tornado of fire. the ‘‘ ame- thyst ’’ received nine hits and had 22 killed and 38 wounded. the result effectually demonstrated the insuperable difficulty of sweeping under fire by night, and it was decided to attempt it by day under cover of a heavy bombardment. the final attack.—vice-adml. carden’s health broke down and the final attack took place on march 18 tors under vice- adml. john de robeck. it was a clear sunny day when the “ agamemnon ” at 10:30 a.m. led the fleet into the straits. at 10:45 the “ queen elizabeth,” “ inflexible,” “ agammem- non ”’ and “‘ lord nelson ” engaged the batteries at the narrows at 16,000 yd., while the “‘ triumph” and “ prince george ” kept down the fire of the forts and howitzers on the adjacent shores. after a bombardment of about an hour and a half the four french battleships advanced as far as kephez and engaged the narrows forts at about 9,000 yards. the fire of the forts was slackening, when at 1:45 the ‘‘ vengeance,” “ irresistible,” “ albion,” ‘“ ocean,” “ swiftsure”? and “ majestic” were ordered to relieve the french line. as the “ bouvet ” retired, she was struck by a mine or shell at 1:50 p.m. and sank in two minutes with the loss of all but a score of her crew. the mine- sweepers had got their sweeps out and by 3:10 p.m. were proceed- ing up stream. up to this point the day had gone fairly well though the “‘ inflexible ” had been badly hit by howitzers posted near eren kd. her forebridge was set on fire, the control station on the foremast put out of action and comm. verner, her gunnery officer, mortally wounded. no other ship, however, had received serious damage. by this time the position in the turkish forts was growing critical. the supply of modern ammunition was scanty, several guns were out of action and nearly all were choked with sand and dirt from the terrific earth spouts ast up by the english shell. hamidieh i. alone, manned by german gunners, was firing steadily. then came the climax within one short hour. shortly after 4 p.st. the “ inflexible ” struck a mine and only with difficulty reached tenedos, where she had to be beached. at 4:15 the “ irresistible ” struck another; the general recall was flying, when the “ ocean,” going to help her, met the same fate at 6:05 p.m. and both had to be abandoned. all this happened in eren k61 bay on the asiatic side, only four or five miles from the entrance, where mines had been laid by the turks on march 8. the ‘ suffren ” and “‘ gaulois ”’ were also so severely injured by gunfire that they had to be docked. out of 18 battleships, three had been sunk and three disabled. on the turkish side eight guns had been put out of action, and four officers and 40 men killed, but the minefields remained practically intact. the fleet had attempted too much. to force a channel defended by a minefield and heavy batteries was a task of the first magni- tude, beyond the compass of de robeck’s force. on march 23, after a conference with gen. sir ian hamilton, de robeck de- cided that he must keep the fleet intact to assist in the landing operation. mr. winston churchill urged the admiral to renew the attempt to break through, but lord fisher would not agree. this was the end of the “ purely naval enterprise.” sir lan hamilton had arrived without plans; the transports had not been loaded for an immediate landing; a month elapsed before ito! the army could make their attack, and in that month the pen- insula was converted into a fortress. the gallipoli landing.—it was now the task of the navy to prepare to support the landing. this did not take place till april 25. the naval force acting in support numbered 18 battle- ships, 12 cruisers, 29 destroyers and eight submarines, while a great armada of transports and auxiliary craft assembled gradu- ally behind them at port mudros in lemnos (greece). the whole shore of gallipoli had been reconnoitred and six beaches chosen for the landing on the 12-mile strip of coast, stretching northward from the northern entrance of the straits. these were designated by the letters s (just inside the straits), v (just west of sedd cl bahr), w (by cape teke), x (1 m. north of w), ¥y (1 m. north of x) and z (10 m. north of y), near gaba tepe, to be christened in a baptism of fire with the new and splendid name of anzac. the force to be landed numbered 75,000 with 140 guns. the ships were divided into “ covering ” ships (to support the landing with their fire) and “ attendant ”’ ships (to carry the troops and assist in their landing). the landings at the nose of the peninsula that is at s,v, w, x and y beaches, were under rear-adml. rosslyn wemyss with seven battleships, viz.: the ‘‘ lord nel- son,” “* swiftsure,” “ implacable,” “‘ cornwallis,” ‘‘ vengeance,” ‘“* albion ” and ‘‘ prince george ”’ and four cruisers, the ‘ eur- yalus ”’ (capt. r. burmester, 2 9-2-in., 12 6-in.), “ talbot ” (capt. f. wray, rr 6-in.), “ minerva’? (capt. p. warleigh, 11 6-in.), and ** dublin ” (capt. john kelly, 8 6-in.). the land- ing at anzac was under rear-adml. cecil thursby with five battleships, the ‘‘ queen” (flag, capt. h. a. adam), “ prince of wales ” (capt. r. bax), ‘‘ london ” (capt. j. armstrong), “triumph ” and “ majestic,” and one armoured cruiser, the ‘“‘ bacchante ” (capt. hon. algernon boyle, 2 9-2-in., 12 6-in.). these last six ships left port mudros in the afternoon of the 24th. the night was calm without a breath in the air or ripple on the sea. ‘the moon set at 3 a.m. and it was dark when they approached the coast. of the advanced force for anzac, 1,500 men were in the ‘‘ queen,” “‘ prince of wales ” and “ london,” each of which was provided with four tows of six boats; the remaining 2,500 were in seven destroyers, each towing six life- boats. the rest of the force was following in 4o transports. the ships stopped two miles from theshore, and the steam picket boats started off with their tows in dead silence. at anzac by good fortune the boats struck the beach a mile and a half north of the intended spot, which had been strongly entrenched. the australians leapt into the water, rushed the turks up the hills and out of them. by §:30 a.m. the whole of the advanced force was ashore at anzac. at y beach the advanced force was landed in four trawlers, each towing six boats supported by the cruisers ‘‘ sapphire ” (comm. p. w. ifill), ‘* amethyst ” and the ‘ goliath ” (capt. t. l. shelford), and was ashore at 7:15 a.m. at x beach the advanced force was in the “ implacable ” (capt. h. c. lockyer). the captain dropped anchor close in, veered till the ship was almost aground, then let fly with all her guns just over the beach, raising such a dust and smoke and din that the troops landed there with hardly any casualties. w beach was bristling with wire and flanked with high cliffs. the advanced force was in the “ euryalus ” with boat tows to take it ashore; the “‘ swift- sure ” was the covering ship. the beach was strongly defended and the lancashire fusiliers had a terrible time. v beach, just under the castle, became a place of despair. the old collier “river clyde” full of troops was run ashore with a bridge of lighters to carry the men ashore. the lighters broke adriit, though comm. edward unwin and three gallant companions (all four awarded the v.c.) made desperate attempts to get them. into place, and the landing broke down entirely. at s beach the troops were landed in trawlers, which were run aground under a heavy fire from the “ cornwallis ’ and “ lord nelson,” and the 2nd south wales borderers got ashore with very few casual- ties. such was the landing at helles, which, as a feat of arms, ranks high in the annals of the british army (see dardanelles campaign). t1102 resignation of lord fisher and mr. churchill—but another danger was looming on the horizon. otto hersing, one of the most skilful german commanders, was on his way out in uat. on may 13, too, the “ goliath,” anchored in morto bay just inside the entrance, was attacked at 1:15 a.m. by a destroyer, the “‘ muavenct-i-millet,”” with a german commander, and hit by three torpedoes, sinking in a few minutes with a loss of over 500 men. lord fisher insisted on the recall of the ‘ queen elizabeth ”’ but in the attitude of the war council and the first lord on may 14 he saw his great alternative scheme in the baltic doomed. on may rs he walked out of the admiralty, precipi- tating a political crisis which swept the first lord from white- hall; mr. balfour took his place and adml. sir henry jackson became first sea lord. on may 25 otto hersing arrived at the dardanelles. at 12:25 p.m. he torpedoed the “ triumph,” which capsized in ro minutes, with the loss of three officers and 70 men. on the 27th at 6:45 a.m. the “‘ majestic ” suffered the same fate, with the loss of only 40 men. the battleships had to be replaced by monitors and by old cruisers of the ‘‘ theseus’ class which had been fitted with bulges, but the fleet still maintained the army’s supplies by sea and remained its “ father and mother ” right up to the amazing night of jan. 8 1916, when swiftly and silently it gathered into its arms the men of those tremendous legions and bore them home. but the passage of the dardanelles, impenetrable to big ships, had been made by submarines. nine british and three french submarines passed the straits, of which three french and four british never returned. it was on this hazardous service that lt.-comm. norman holbrook in bir, lt.-comm. e. c. boyle in er4 and lt.-comm. m. e. nasmith in eri won the v.c. here too e1s (lt.-comm. t. s. brodie), ae2 (lt.-comm. h. h. stoker), e7 (lt.-comm. a. d. cochrane) and e20 (lt.- comm. c. h. warren) were lost and e12 (lt.-comm. kenneth bruce) on oct. 25 got entangled in a net, but with her conning- tower flooded and under a hot fire won through in safety. from july 1915 to the end of the year there were usually two british submarines working in the sca of marmora, seriously interfering with the turkish transports and supplies. the end of the year saw the great crusade setting in a cloud of glory and stormy disappointment. it had in it the elements of a striking success, but there was no real staff at the admiralty or war office; france and the grand fleet were insistently call- ing, and lord fisher was wedded to his plan of attack in the baltic, a still more dangerous enterprise, where german granite would have to be bitten instead of gallipoli sand. in that sea, as at the dardanelles, british assistance was limited to sub- marines, which did excellent work after their kind, but could do no more. the sound was not passable to big ships, and ger- many, at the beginning of the war, had agreed with denmark to close the great belt with mines. the battic—the defence of the baltic had been left to the older german ships but the russians proved themselves no mean antagonists. an attempt on june 28 191g to land troops at windau (courland) to support the german army closing round warsaw was frustrated by a swarm of russian destroyers attacking the transports and driving them off, bringing the operation to an abrupt close. on july 2 russian cruisers drove the german minelayer “ albatross ”’ ashore at ostergarn (swe- den) and the german armoured cruiser ‘6 prinz adalbert ” (4 8-2-iin., 10 6-in.) making for the spot was torpedoed and seriously damaged by the british submarine fo (comm. max horton). in aug. 1915 a serious attempt was made to force the gulf of riga in order to support the german army’s advance; a large part of the high sea flect including eight dreadnoughts and four battle cruisers came round from the north sea, but on aug. 19, er (comm. n. f. laurence) torpedoed and seriously injured the battle cruiser ‘‘ moltke.” next day the operations were abandoned, all the high sea fleet ships were sent back, and there ensued in the baltic a long period of only minor activity. ifome waters, rors.—in the north sea during 1915 u2g (weddingen) had been rammed by the ‘‘ dreadnought ” about 79m. from scapa. german strategy took the shape of minelaying world war, naval sorties, in which light cruisers to lay the mines were escorted by battle cruisers and the battle fleet. such were the sorties of march 29, april 17, april 22 and may 17, ‘‘ one day out and one day back ’’—this was the strategical formula. the grand fleet, fully informed of german movements, came out and the high sea fleet returned to harbour. british minelayers were not idle and von pohl nearly ran his evasive tleet full tilt into minefields laid by the “ princess margaret ” and ‘ orvieto ” on the ger- man coast on may 8 and 10. british cruiser squadrons continued their sweeps down the north sea, and on june 20 rors the 3rd cruiser squadron crossed the path of four german submarines lying in wait off the forth. the “‘ roxburgh ” was hit by u38 and had to go into dock. some three wecks later came the last echo of cruiser warfare. the “ koenigsberg ”’ had been lurking in the rufiji river since sept. 1914, watched by the ‘ chatham ” (capt. s. r. drury- lowe). there, on july 11, she was bombarded by the monitors ‘* severn,” “ mersey ” and “ iiumber,” under capt. fe. j. full- erton. fire was opened by the “‘ mersey ” at 9,500 yards, hitting was established with the help of an aeroplane after the eighth salvo, and the last german cruiser afloat abroad was left a blazing wreck in an african jungle. a supply ship, the s.s. ‘‘ rubens,” which had left germany on feb. 18 1915 with coal and munitions, had slipped safely through the blockade and reached the african coast, but rear-adml. george king-iall, in the “ hyacinth,” recelving exact intelligence of her, drove her into tanga harbour (german east africa) on april 14, where she was scuttled. the auxiliary cruiser “ meteor,” fitted as a minelayer, had also slipped through the blockade on may 31 and laid mines off archangel on the russian reute. on the night of aug. 7-8 the same ship (lt.-comm. von knorr) laid a large minefield of 380 mines off the moray firth, sinking the patrol vessel “ ramsey.” betraying her position by wireless, she was intercepted within 30 m. of horn reef on aug. 9 by commodores tyrwhitt and goodenough and was scuttled about t p.m. by her commander, who escaped in a swedish vessel. , in germany, the controversy on submarine warfare again had become acute. after the sinking of the s.s. “f arabic ” on aug. 19 1915, by u24, orders were issued that no passenger steamers were to be sunk without warning. tirpitz again asked to resign. adml. bachmann, the chief of the naval staff, entered a protest against the decision and was relieved of his post. ‘the com- mander-in-chief recalled his submarines and submarine activity in the channel and to the westward ceased for a time. the pressure of the blockade was by this time beginning to be severely felt in germany (see blockade). in the north this work was performed by the roth cruiser squadron, but the new year of 1916 saw another german ship, the ‘s moewe,” one of the most notable german raiders, slip through its weather-beaten lines and get safely to sea after laying a large minefeld on the west side of the orkneys, where the battleship, “ king edward vil.” was lost on jan. 5 1916. iv. the north sea on jan. 18 1916, adml. von pohl, the german commander- in-chief, who had been seriously injured in an accident, was relieved by adml. scheer, a strong believer in a more offensive strategy. one of his first measures was the dispatch of 33 de- stroyvers to the dogger bank on feb. ro 1916, where they attacked the roth sloop flotilla of the humber patrol and sank the “‘ ara-~ bis ” sloop while minesweeping. the safe passage of the “ moewe ” induced another raider, the “ greif’ (4 §-g-in.) to try and get tosea. she was sighted on feb. 29 some go m. north- east of the shetlands and the “ alcantara” (capt. thomas wardle) of the roth cruiser squadron got within 6,000 yards of her at g:15 a.m. and ordered her to stop. an action ensued in which the “ greif’? was sunk, but the “ alcantara,’ hit by a torpedo, went down as well. two days later, in the night of march 2, the “ moewe?’ slipped through the patrol line and reached home on the 4th. her cruise in mid-atlantic in the region of flying fish had been very successful. she had captured 15 ships of 57,835 tons, of which the most important was the world war, naval “ appano ” (fan. 15), an elder dempster liner of 7,781 tons, with the governor of sierra leone and a cargo worth {2,000,000 on board. sent, however, to newport news as a german prize, the “ appano ” was released by the u.s. supreme court in march 1917, on the plea that she had been sent in with the in- tention of being laid up indefinitely. in march von tirpitz and the german naval staff had pressed for the commencement of unrestricted submarine warfare, but the chancellor’s view again prevailed and von tirpitz’s resig- nation, offered for the third time, was finally accepted. on march 24 1916 tyrwhitt in the “ cleopatra,” with five light cruisers and 18 destroyers, escorted the “‘ vindex ” with five acroplanes to attack the zeppelin sheds at tondern. beatty’s battle cruisers were supporting the advance. the aeroplanes did little and only two returned, but a situation developed not unlike that of aug 28 1914 at heligoland bight (¢.v.), for the destroyer “ laverock ” rammed the “ medusa,” which had to be abandoned on the 25th. the german destroyers pushed out that evening, and during the night the “ cleopatra ” (tyr- whitt’s flagship, capt. f. p. loder-symonds) rammed and sank gro4, but was herself rammed by the ‘‘ undaunted,” whose speed was reduced to six knots. scheer, with his flect on march 26, was coming westward in pursuit, and beatty, coming down from the north to cover the light cruisers, was 80 m. from the german battle cruisers when scheer turned back at 7 a.m. the aircraft dropped one bomb in denmark. bombardment of lowestoft—the end of april 1916 was full of events. sir roger casement was landed by uro at tralee on the zoth to take part in the irish rising, and the “ libau,” a small ship disguised as the norwegian s.s. “ aud,” with a cargo of 25,000 rifles, 10 machine guns and ammunition for the irish, was captured on the irish coast by the sloop “ bluebell,”’ only to be scuttled off queenstown. on april 24 a large barrage of mines and nets was laid by adml. sir reginald bacon and the dover patrol off the belgian coast, and the same night scheer struck a blow at the east coast. the whole high sea fleet with 17 dreadnoughts and five battle cruisers left harbour by 2 p.m., april 24. at the very start it received a nasty blow when the battle cruiser “ seyd- litz ” at 2:45 p.m. struck one of the mines laid by the “ princess margaret ” in nov. rots. the admiralty had the usual intel- ligence that the high sea fleet was out, and by midnight jellicoe with the battle fleet had left scapa and beatty with the battle cruisers had ieft the forth. all night long bombs were falling from the german zeppelins on the east coast, and at 4:11 a.m. boedicker, with his four battle cruisers (hipper was ill), bom- barded lowestoft, destroying some 200 houses, and opened fire on yarmouth at 4:24 a.m. tyrwhitt had left iarwich at mid- night with the light cruisers ‘“‘ conquest,” “‘ cleopatra,” “ penel- ope ’’ and nine destroyers. he pushed up the coast, and engaged the light cruisers “‘ rostock ” and “ elbing ” off lowestoft at 4:30 a.m. the german battle cruisers came down on him and engaging him at 4:49 a.m. sent five 12-in. shells into the “ con- quest,”’ killing and wounding 4o officers and men, then made off hurriedly at 4:56 a.m. tyrwhitt followed till 9:25 a.m. (april 25), when he was ordered to return, and on the way back the “ penelope ” was torpedoed by ub2g and her rudder blown off. beatty was now striking down towards terschelling, but was still 50 m. off when boedicker reached the bight and got behind the german minefields, and the admiralty sent out his recall at 12:30 p.m. six submarines (e55, e29, e26, e22, d4, d6) had been sent out from harwich with the destroyer “ melam- pus,” by capt. a. w. waistell, capt. (s), and just missed by four miles the german battle cruisers flying homewards. in these operations the german submarine ub13 was lost, and the british submarine e22 (lt. reg. thos. dimsdale) torpedoed and sunk by ub18 at 11:40 a.m. to strengthen the position in the south, it was decided to station the 3rd battle squadron (seven ‘‘ king edwards ”’) in the thames, and it sailed for sheerness on april 29. on may 5 1916 jellicoe launched another air attack against the zeppelin sheds at tondern. two minefields were laid at the same time 1103 in the bight, one off fforn reefs by the minelaying destroyer ** abdiel ”’ (comm. berwick curtis), the other off borkum by the “‘ princess margaret ”’ (comm. lockhart leith), the grand fleet put to sca in support. the rst light cruiser squadron escorting the ‘‘ vindex ” and “ engadine ’’ with nine sea-planes was off sylt at 3 a.m., may 4. the sea-planes would not rise, and only one got away, but the “ galatea’ and “ phaeton ” damaged zeppelin l7. she came down near e31, which com- pleted her destruction. the battle of jutland —on april 24 scheer, as he returned from lowestoft, had received an order that submarines were not to sink merchant ships without warning and examination. \ie immediately recalled all the high sea fleet submarines from the war against commerce, and set to work to devise a scheme for enticing the british fleet out. twenty-two submarines were to be stationed off the british ports, the high sea fleet was then to appear off the coast of england or norway, in the hope that the grand fleet would rush out in pursuit and meet the german submarines. such was the plan of the jutland opera- tions. it did not develop “ according to plan.”” the submarines, 14 in number, were off the british coast by may 23, but weather delayed the sailing of the high sea fleet till may 30. the ger- man battle cruisers left the jade at 2 a.m. followed by the battle fleet. it met the british battle fleet on may 31. there followed the battle of jutland (see jutlaand, battle of). the british lost three battle cruisers, three armoured cruisers and eight destroyers, 6,094 killed, including two rear admirals, 674 wounded and 177 prisoners. the germans lost one older battleship, one battle cruiser, four light cruisers and five destroyers, 2,551 killed and 507 wounded. scheer, threatened with envelopment, made good his escape and the high sea fleet remained intact, to guard the bight, to ensure the safe entry and exit of sub- marines and to compel the british to keep a mass of craft locked up in the grand fleet when they were wanted for convoys and the tremendous struggle against the submarine. the german submarines achieved a single belated success. u75 had laid mines on the west side of the orkneys on may 29 and on june 5 the “ hampshire” on her way to archangel struck one of them and went down, bringing lord kitchener’s mission and great career to a sudden end. a gale had been blowing from the northeast that afternoon, but lord kitchener at scapa insisted on sailing. to give the “ hampshire ” a lee she was sent up the west side of the orkneys and sailed at 5:30 p.m., but the wind backed to n.n.w., and the destroyers escort- ing her, unable to face the gale, haa to put back. about 7:50 p.m. she struck a mine, 13} m. from shore between the brough of birsay and marwick head and sank in 15 minutes with the loss of all but 12 men. scheer’s renewed attempt—tn aug. scheer renewed his efforts. this time the submarines, instead of being off the ports, were disposed in lines in the north sea on the expected track of the british fleet. the high sea fleet put to sea in the evening of aug. 18 with the intention of bombarding sunderland at sunset the next day. the new battleship ‘‘ bayern ” and the “grosser kurfiirst ”? and ‘ markgraf” were attached to the battle cruisers of the 1st scouting group in place of the “ derf- finger” and “ seydlitz,” which were still under repair. the battle fleet with eight zeppelins followed only 20 m. behind. i'23 was waiting for them on the way across and put two tor- pedoes into the dreadnought “‘ westfalen,” forcing her to return. directionals and intercepts supplied ample intelligence of the german movements and jellicoe had put to sea with the grand fleet at 5 p.m. on aug. 18. he was on his way down the east coast with the battle cruisers 30 m. ahead when the and light cruiser squadron ran into the first line of german submarines in the latitude of farne islands at 5:55 a.m. on aug. 19, and the “nottingham,” going 20 knots, was struck by two torpedoes from us52. jellicoe turned and made to the northward for a time. the ‘‘ nottingham,” badly damaged, was hit by a third torpedo at 7 a.m. and sank. meanwhile the harwich force made towards the enemy, while scheer held steadily on, receiving a stream of reports from his t1104 zeppelins, submarines and the german intercept station at neu- miinster which enabled him to locate the british forces. jellicoe at noon was some too m. east of the farne islands, steering down the coast, with beatty’s battle cruisers ahead of him while the german ficet about roo m. east of whitby was steer- ing to the west on a converging course. at 12:30 beatty’s battle cruisers with battle flags hoisted were abreast of new- castle, only 42 m. from the german fiect, when scheer turned to the southward and made a push against the harwich forces. he turned for home at 2:35 p.m., and jellicoe, thinking it un- wise to follow on account of the submarines, directed beatty to turn back at 4 p.m., but at 3:20 p.m., on receiving another re- port of a submarine, ordered him to turn at once. at 4:52 p.aal., while returning, the “ falmouth” of the 3rd light cruiser squadron, going 23 knots, was hit by two torpedocs from u66, on aug. 20 at noon u63 sent two more torpedoes into her and she sank off flamborough head. the harwich fotillas kept in touch with scheer till 7:30 p.at., but without the support of the grand fleet could not press home an attack. scheer regarded this as a very successful operation, and intended to repeat it, but in oct. his submarines were ordered to resume their war on merchant ships and were no longer available for flect operations. the resumption of the submarine campaign called for a clear passage down the channel, where a barrage of mines and nets had been laid by adml. bacon in april 1916, extending from the south goodwins towards dunkirk. this was patrolled by a force of 23 drifters and the german ard and oth flotillas were sent round to zcebrugge for the special purpose of raiding it. intel- ligence of their arrival had been received and the vice-admiral at dover distributed his destroyers to meet an attack—four in the downs, eight at dunkirk and six at dover. the night of oct. 26 was dark and the german destroyers attacked in two clivisions of five and six boats. the destroyer ‘‘ flirt ”’ on patrol was sunk with all hands at 11 p.m. the destroyers at dover, dunkirk and in the downs put to sea. ‘the “ nubian ” sighted the germans, challenged them and was torpedoed in reply (12:40 a.m.); the enemy disappeared in the night and got back to zee- brugge, after sinking seven drifters and two destroyers. ‘this was the first of a series of attacks on dover intended to assist the passage of submarines. in the north the “ moewe ”’ (comm. graf nikolaus zu dehna-schlodien) had got safely to sea again in the winter nights (nov. 23-5) and was followed by another raider the ‘ wolf’ (capt. karl nerger) on nov. 30. submarines were again engaged in their war on trade (sce submarine campaign) and on noy. 5, when u30 and u20 ran ashore on the danish coast in a fog, scheer sent out a half flo- tilla of destroyers supported by the “ moltke” and the ard squadron of battleships to get them off. jr (comm. n. f. laurence) was there as well and torpedoed the battleships “ grosser kurfiirst ’ and “ kronprinz,” driving them both back to harbour. the kaiser remonstrated with scheer for risking battleships in this work, but scheer maintained that the leet’s principal task at this stage of the war was to secure the safety of the submarines passing in and out. v. the submarine war, 1917-8 the peril of the submarine was now growing more and more acute, and on noy. 29 1916 adml. sir john jellicoe left the fleet to take the post of first sea lord of the admirality and adml. sir david beatty succeeded him as commander-in-chief of the grand fleet. unrestricted submarine warfare (that is sinking at sight without warning) was being urged by both the army and navy in germany. the chancellor’s opposition was over- come, and on jan. g 1917 an imperial order went out to com- mence it on feb. 1. the war at sea now became a war against the submarine and to assist the submarine. the dover raids.—in the south the harwich flotillas were kept constantly busy. early in the morning of jan. 23, the ger- man 6th flotilla of eight destroyers, trying to return from zeebrugge to the bight, was met by a harwich force of three light cruisers and some 14 destroyers. it was a cold dark night and a general melee ensued. v6g, the flotilla leader’s boat, was world war, naval driven into ijmuiden and s30 had to put back. the british destroyer ‘ simoon ” was torpedoed and sunk. feb. 1 saw the beginning of the momentous submarine campaign followed by the rupture between germany and the united states. the principal concern of the german commanders was to maintain a safe passage for the submarines, and with this in view a series of raids was made on the straits of dover. on march 17 1917 the night was dark; the barrage patrol consisted of four destroyers patrolling on separate beats. six more were jying in deal, and the “ broke ” and five others were in dover. the “ paragon ” on patrol sighted three or four destroyers 2t ro:j30 p.m., chal- lenged and was torpedoed in reply. the “ llewellyn,” thinking she had struck a mine, went to help her and was torpedoed at rr:t3 but got back to dover. the germans then disap- peared into the night. while these events were happening, the ““ moewe” had slipped through the blockade and got back to kiel on march 20 1917, after capturing 27 ships in the atlantic. another raider on the way out was not so fortunate. on march 17, at 4 p.m., the armoured cruiser “ achilles”? (capt. f. m. leake) and the merchant cruiser “ dundee”? (comm. s. m. day) intercepted the “ leopard ” disguised as a norwegian, northeast of the faroes and sent her to the bottom. the night of aprif 20 saw another raid at dover. the patrols had been reinforced. two flotilla leaders, the “ broke” (comm. e. r. evans) and ‘ swift”? (comm. ambrose peck), were pa- trolling off the goodwins, and a whole division of destroyers was on patrol in the straits, with reserves at dover and deal. the german 2nd flotilla attacked in two sections, one of which went off to the french, and the other hugged the english coast. the latter was on its way back and at 12:45 a.m. was off the goodwins on an tasterly course when it was sighted on the port bow by the ‘ swift’ and “ broke,” patrolling on an opposite course. there was no challenging. the “ swift” turned at once to port, fired a torpedo which probably hit g85, and dashed through the enemy’s line. the “ broke” did the same and crashed into g42, the third boat in the line. a hand-to-hand fight ensued as the germans attempted to board and were driven back, and the ‘f broke ” then completed the destruction of g85. this was the famous little action of the “ swift ” and “ broke ” and except for two ineffective sorties on april 26 and may 2 put a stop to destroyer raids on dover for nearly a year. united states at war with germany.—on april 6 the united states entered the war, and vice-adml. w. s. sims was des- patched to europe to devise means of co-operating with the allies. this was a black month for merchant shipping. the war at sca was developing into a protracted struggle with the submarine, while the battle fleets acted as shields, behind which the submarine and its antagonists fought out a bitter fight for supremacy. the baleful effect of scheer’s escape at jutland was now severely felt. the high sea flect stood guarding the roads for its submarines, and its menace compelled the grand fleet to retain for fleet use numbers of destroyers urgently required for the fight with the submarine. in this sphere the united states was able to afford invaluable assistance and united states destroyers, the first six of which, under comm. j. k. taussig, arrived at queenstown on may 4 1917, helped to save the situation. in the mediterranean, the war was becoming more and more a war of ilotillas. there the straits of otranto took the place of the straits of dover and a force of some go vessels, chiefly drifters, patrolled it to prevent the passage of submarines from their base at cattaro. these little ships were attacked by a force of austrian cruisers and destroyers on may 15 1917 and 14 drifters, which stoutly refused to surrender, were sunk. on the approach of the light ervisers “‘ dartmouth ” (capt. a. p. addison) and “ bristol” the austrians retired to cattaro; the ‘* dartmouth ” was torpedoed but got safely back. at dover since 1915, adml. bacon had been attacking the submarine by bombardments of their bases at zeebrugge and ostend, and these were continued in 1917 with the monitors “lord clive,” “ general wolfe,” “‘ prince rupert” and “ prince eugene ” (2 12-in.) and the “ marshal soult,” “ erebus ”’ and world war, naval “ terror’ (2 15-in.). zeebrugge was bombarded on may 12, and ostend on june 5, and a number of heavy shells fell close to the basins, though the lock gates were not actually hit. on july 9 the dreadnought “‘ vanguard ” (capt. i. m. dick) was lost at scapa by an internal explosion in the same terribly sudden way as the six other allied ships which suffered this fate in the war—* bulwark,’ nov. 26 1914; ‘“‘ benebetto brin,” sept. 27 1915; “ natal,” dec. 30 1915; ‘‘ leonardo da vinci ” (fire), aug. 2 1916; “ tsukuba,” jan. 14 1917 and “ kawachi,”’ july 12 1918. the plans division recently constituted at the admiralty was busy at this time with a project for mining heligoland bight, though its execution was delayed till oct. 1917, by lack of mines. on sept. 1 the 4th light cruiser squadron and 15th flotilla made a raid on the channel by horn reefs, driving four german straite, $ ptirbe tel a oes gulf of riba german operations oct. 1917 taga bay & arensberg minesweepers ashore. these minesweepers working sometimes 150 m. from heligoland sweeping the ways for the submarines were a natural target for attack, but as they were always sup- ported by heavy ships, light cruiser attacks on them were not easy. german capture of osel.—in the baltic the germans had been engaged in a big operation to assist their army. in nov. 1916, they had tried to force the gulf of finland, but after the loss of seven destroyers on mines had abandoned it. in sept. 1917, the capture of riga by the army (nov. 3) led to an attempt by the german navy to open up the gulf of riga. to capture the defences it was decided to land a force of 23,000 men at taga bay in the north of the island of osel which lics across the gulf of riga with the straits of irben on the south side between it and the mainland. vice-adml. schmidt with the battle cruiser ‘“‘ moltke,” 10 of the latest dreadnoughts, eight light cruisers and 47 destroyers came round from the north sea to perform the task. the fleet and transports sailed from libau on oct. 11 and the force was landed in taga bay by 5:30 a.m. on oct. 12, though the “‘ bayern” and “ grosser 1105 kurfiirst ” both struck mines on entering the bay. the straits of irben were swept, the russian battleship ‘‘ slava ” sunk and by oct. 17 the germans were in complete occupation of the island. three of their battleships however had been attacked by british submarines, and on oct. 29, when the dreadnought “ markgraf ” struck a mine, orders came for the naval forces to be witndrawn. the operation is specially interesting as being somewhat similar to that of the dardanelles, involving an attack on a minefield defended by heavy guns. symptoms of the spirit which was to end in germany’s col- lapse were already beginning to appear. sporadic outbreaks of mutiny had occurred in the 3rd squadron as early as may, 1917, and the “‘ kaiserin,” ‘ kaiser ” and ‘‘ konig albert ” had to be sent to brunsbuttel for recreation and leave. the crew of the “westfalen ” too was disaffected, and the spirit and courage of the german fleet were evidently beginnin g to flag. the convoy system, which was one of the most effective replies to the submarine, was a natural target of attack, and on oct. 17 1917, the scandinavian convoy received a heavy blow. this convoy, sailing regularly from lerwick to the norwegian coast, was on its way to lerwick, consisting of 12 ships (two british, one dane, one belgian, five norwegian, three swedish) with an escort of two destroyers, the “ strongbow ” (lt.-comm. ed- ward brooke) and ‘‘ mary rose” (lt.-comm. chas. l. fox). it was about half way across (60° 26’ n., 1° 16’ e.) steaming eight knots about 6 4.m. on oct. 17 when the ‘ brummer ” and ‘““ bremse”’ two fast new german cruisers, armed with four 5:g-in., were seen on the port side coming up at 25 knots. they opened fire and sank both the destroyers, with all hands (132 men), before they had even time to send out a wireless to the light cruiser squadron supporting them, and went off at 8:20 a.m. after sinking nine of the merchant ships without examina- tion or warning of any kind. the armed trawler ‘ elise ” got away but as she had no wireless, it was not till 7 p.m. that the admiralty received the report. this attack led to a general revision of the arrangements for convoys and to the provision of stronger forces to cover them. the question of using the grand fleet, or portions of it, to cover convoys was a difficult one. the use of directionals had induced what may be called a policy of immediacy, in which the battle fleet with all its light craft had to be ready for immediate excursion, and could not always be available for the routine work of convoys. nov. 1917 was marked by grand flcet light cruiser raids in the cattegat and bight. the cattegat had become more and more a sphere of german activity against british commerce. minefields and guardships had long guarded the southern en- trance to the sound, ships proceeding to sweden were constantly exposed to attack and decoy ships cruised in the cattegat to attack british submarines. one of these was the “ kronprinz wilhelm,” which was cruising off kullen light on nov. 2 at 7 am., when several british cruisers swept down on and sank her, with a very damping effect on german activity in this area. engagement in the bight.—in the bight the increase in british minelaying, which started in earnest about oct. 1917, involved an enormous expansion in the german minesweeping service. as the minefields grew, the swept channels or “ ways ” grew longer and longer, and the minesweepers, working out at sea, had to be supported by light cruisers and battleships. an engage- ment on nov. 17 1917 affords an interesting illustration of the part played by the german battleships in this respect. the german minesweepers that morning were making their test trip escorted by destroyers, covered by the light cruisers of the 2nd and 4th scouting groups and supported by the battleships “ kaiser” and “ kaiserin,” when at 7 a.m. they were attacked by a british force consisting of the ‘‘ courageous ”’ (rear-adml. t. d. napier) and * glorious ” (capt. chas. b. miller, 4 15-in. 30 knots), the ‘ renown ” (capt. michael hodges) and “ re- pulse ” (rear-adml. r. f. phillimore, 6 15-in., 30 knots), the ist and 6th light cruiser squadrons and a number of destroyers. the horizon was misty and an action developed at 12,000 yards with the german light cruisers running to the southeast raising a smoke screen to cover their minesweepers. at 8:50 a.m. the 1106 british destroyers attacked the 2nd scouting group without success. the light-cruiser ‘‘ kgnigsberg’’ had been hit by a heavy shell, when at 9:30 the “‘ kaiser ” and “‘ kaiserin ” came on the scene. the “‘ kaiserin ” scored a hit, but on their arrival the british force withdrew, before the “ moltke” and ‘ hin- denburg,” which were hurrying to the spot, arrived. the germans lost one outpost vessel, 21 killed and 21 wounded. on the british side the “‘ calypso” was hit and her captain (capt. h. l. edwards) killed. the engagement furnishes an- other illustration of the difficulty of opposing heavy guns on the edge of a minefield. the attack on the german minesweepers was answered by another german thrust at the scandinavian convoys made by the 4th half flotilla on dec. 12 1917. at 11:30 a.m. about 35 m. from the coast of norway an attack was made on a british convoy of six steamers escorted by the destroyers “ pellew ”’ (lt.-comm. jas. cavendish) and ‘“ partridge” (lt.-comm. reg. ransome), which advanced boldy and engaged the five german destroyers at 5,000 yards. the ‘“‘ partridge ”’ was badly hit, but before sinking fired a torpedo, which hit vroo but did not explode. the four armed trawlers were sunk. the “ pellew ”’ managed to escape in a squall of rain. the armoured cruisers ‘minotaur ” and “ shannon ” heard the “ partridge’s ” call for assistance and steamed at full speed for the spot (59° 30’ n., 4° e.), but by the time they arrived, all was over, and the ger- man destroyers got safely back to kiel with four officers and 71 men as prisoners. the raid ied to the provision of stronger covering forces and to considerable changes in the scandinavian convoy system which had almost broken down under these successive blows. the dutch convoy in the south suffered a little later an equally nasty blow of a different kind. its escort was provided by the harwich destroyers, and on dec. 23 at 8 a.m. a few miles n. of the maas light, they stumbled into a german minefield, where the “ torrent,” ‘‘ surprise”? and ‘ valkyrie ” were all mined in quick succession and sank before they could reach the shore. the year was drawing to a close but before it closed adml. sir john jellicoe had left the admiralty, and his place as tirst sea lord was taken by adml. sir rosslyn wemyss. the war at sea was expressing itself more and more in terms of the sub- marine. it was imperative to close the straits of dover to sub- marines and rear-adml. sir roger keyes was sent to do it, and did it very effectually. in the next four months nine submarines were destroyed in the dover area and the high sea fleet sub- -marines ceased to use the straits of dover. all this time the black sea had been the scene of sporadic warfare between russian and turco-german forces. russia at the beginning of the war had possessed two pre-dreadnoughts, the “ivestafi’’ and “ivan zlatoust ” (1906, 4 12-in., 4 8-in., 12 6-in.), to pit against the “ goeben,” and by the end of rg15 three dreadnoughts had been completed in these waters—the ‘“ ekaterina ii.,” “‘ imperatritza maria ” and “ alexander iti.” (all 12 12-in.)—which gave her the control of the black sea and ensured her communications with the caucasus. the collapse of russia and the mutiny of the black sea fleet may have led the “ goeben ” (sultan selim) to look to the westward for, on jan. 20 1918, she made a sortie from the dardanelles. the british force in that area under rear-adml. hayes sadler con- sisted of the “ lord nelson ” (flag) and ‘“‘ agammemnon,” six old light cruisers, 12 monitors, seven sloops and 27 old destroyers. the “‘ lord nelson ” was at salonika and the “ agammemnon ” at mudros. the destroyers ‘‘ tigress’? (lt. j. b. newill) and ‘lizard’? (lt. n. a. ohlenschlager) were patrolling off the straits and the monitors “ raglan” (comm. visct. broome) and m28 (lt.-comm. donald macgregor) were anchored at imbros, some 15 m. from the straits. the ‘‘ goeben” and “ breslau ” sallied out about 5 a.m. and made for imbros shad- owed by the “ tigress ” and “ lizard.” the “ raglan ” sighted them at 5:35 and gave the alarm by wireless. she was engaged by the ‘‘ breslau,” set on fire and sunk. m28 was set on fire and ‘blew up with her captain at 6:27. the ‘“ goeben ” and “ bres- world war, naval lau’ went off to the southward, but off the southeast point of imbros the latter struck a mine at 7:07 a.m. and sank, leaving 40 survivors to be picked up by the “ tigress.”” the “‘ goeben ” struck two mines about the same time and heading for the straits beached herself off nagara in the narrows. in the course of the ensuing week more than 15 tons of bombs were dropped round her by aeroplanes with several hits, but the small 112 lb. bombs inflicted no vital damage. an heroic attempt to torpedo her was made by er4 (lt.-comm. m. geoffrey white), which was sunk and her captain killed. the last of the dever raids.—in the north sea the dover barrage had been greatly strengthened. it consisted of 18 lines of deep mines, patrolled by a strong force of drifters and trawlers, with searchlights and enormous flares burning all night to dis- cover submarines and force them to dive. the high sea fleet submarines no longer dared to pass there, and the german and flotilla, numbering rt of their best and fastest boats, was sent straight from the bight to attack it on feb. 15 1918. ‘there were 58 drifters in the straits that night, with a monitor m26 and four destroyers, while two destroyers were off the goodwins, and the * attentive ” and three more were in the downs. the germans arrived in the straits about 11:30 p.w. and one half flotilla made for folkesto.e, the other for gris nez. the former set fire to a searchlight vessel, sank two drifters and disappeared without anyone firing the alarm—a green rocket. tlashes were seen and guns were heard, but they were thought to be ships on patrol firing on submarines. the other half flotilla set fire to a searchlight vessel and sank three drifters, but it was not till about 1 a.m. when the enemy were retiring that the alarm signal went up. the germans got away after sinking seven drifters and one trawler. they were not so fortunate a month later. on march 21 the destroyer “ botha” (comm. roger rede, 2 4-7-in., 2 4-in.) and ‘“‘ morris ’ (lt.-comm. p. r. percival 3 4-in.) were lying with the french destroyers “ bouclier,” “ capitaine mchl” and ‘“magon” in dunkirk when a burst of firing was heard at 3:30 in the morning, the destroyers slipped and passing through the zuydcoote pass, a narrow channel between dunkirk and ostend roads, sighted the german destroyers and came on two of their boats. the exploit of the ‘ broke” was repeated. the “ botha ” rammed a german at full speed and cut it in half. another was disabled by gunfire from the two boats. the “‘ botha ”’ was tor- pedoed in the darkness by a friend, but the ‘‘ morris ” chased the enemy into ostend and on her return sank the disabled boat and took the ‘ botha ” home in tow. this was the last of the long series of dover raids. the war had become a war of straits and passages, but it was not till 1918 that mines were laid in the cattegat. in the early part of the war this had been a ‘‘ no man’s sea,” but by 1917 german ships were regularly cruising there. the british sweep of nov. 2 1917 had diminished their activity, but submarines had begun to use this route regularly whenever the bight ways were blocked. in feb. 1918 a deep minefield was laid off the skaw to catch them and another on april 15 1918 off laese. this was laid by the ‘‘ princess margaret ”’ and ‘ angora,” supported by ships of the 6th light cruiser squadron and 13th flotilla and escorted by the destrovers “ valentine ” and “ vi- miera,’’? which sank 10 german trawlers off anholt. the discov- ery of the mines apparently raised serious apprehension in ger- man naval circles but the operation was not repeated the blocking of zeebrugge—at dover rear-adml. roger keyes was maturing a plan to supplement the closure of dover straits with the blocking of zeebrugge and ostend. this would seal up not only the flanders submarines but the destroyers as well, which were a constant menace to the barrage and its pa- trols. the enterprise was a daring one, but it was carefully prepared and skilfully carried out on the night of april 22-3. the “ vindictive ’ (capt. alfred b. carpenter) proceeded along- side zeebrugge mole to draw the fire from the three blocking ships, two of which achieved their object and the whole attack remains a great and inspiring example of careful planning and heroic execution. at ostend the attempt miscarried and a second world war, naval attempt, made by the “vindictive ”’ on may 9, also failed (see zeebrugge). as the “ vindictive ’’ was returning from zeebrugge the ger- man fleet was putting to sea on its last excursion for a big attack against the british scandinavian convoys. the ileet left at 6 a.m. on april 23 with hipper’s battle cruisers ahead and 17 battleships and four flotillas behind. by the morning of the 24th hipper’s battle cruisers had reached the norwegian coast, when the battle cruiser “ moltke’? broke down and had to put back. by 7 a... when she was off stavanger she could only go four knots and began to call for assistance; the battle fleet sighted her at 9:40 a.m. and she was taken in tow. hipper meanwhile had run up as high as lat. 60° n., but saw nothing of the convoy. the fleet turned back with the “ moltke” in tow which was torpedoed by e42 (lt. c. h. allen) off sylt at 6:50 p.m. but got safely home. it was a bad day for the excursion. the home- ward bound convoy of 34 ships was approaching the forth at 8 a.m. on the 24th, and the outward bound convoy had not left the river. the sortie was futile, but it led to an important con- ference held in the forth on april 29 on the subject of convoys, where it was decided to shift the scandinavian route to the northward of 61° north. up to the moment too when the ‘ moltke ” began to call for help, there had been none of the usual indications of the german fleet being at sea. submarine j4 had sighted it at 7 p.m. on april 23, but her report had not reached beatty, and the disadvantage of relying too exclusively on directionals and wireless was clearly demonstrated. this was the last excursion made by the german flect, and ranks in importance with that of jutland and aug. ro 1916. in the north a great effort was being made in conjunction with the united states to close the northern exit to submarines (see minelaying) and the grand flect was largely occupied in escorting and covering the minelayers, just as the high sea fleet was busy in covering its minesweepers. one of the last important operations in the north sea was another air attack on the zeppelin sheds at tondern near sylt on july 19 1918. this was made by the aircraft carrier ‘‘ furious,” an immense cruiser, similar to the ‘“‘ courageous,” which had been converted into an air carricr. she was supported by five battleships of the ist battle squadron (“‘ repulse ” class) and escorted by the 6th light cruiser squadron and a number of destroyers. the attack, representative of the stage reached by air carriers at the end of the war was made by seven aeroplanes, each carrying two 65-ib. bombs. six machines started and reached their des- tination, setting fire to a double zeppelin shed which was burnt out. two got safely back, one fell into the sea and three landed in denmark and were interned. on aug. 11 1918, a combined raid of aircraft and coastal motor boats—light boats going 35 knots and carrying two torpedoes—was carried out in the bight. a zeppelin l53 was brought down by the aircraft, but german aircraft swept down on the motor boats; three of which were sunk and three lost. the mediterranean.—in the mediterranean, the straits of otranto, 40 m. wide, corresponded to the exits of the north sea, and on aug. 16 1914, were closed by the arrival of the french fleet, based on malta 300 m. away. the austrians then had three dreadnoughts (“‘ viribus unitis,” ‘“ tegethoff,’” “‘ prinz fugen ’’) to oppose to the french four (‘‘ courbet,’’ “ jean bart,” “‘ paris ” and “ france ’’). the torpedoing of the “ jean bart”? by the austrian u12 on dee. 21 1914 and the sinking of the armoured cruiser ‘‘ leon gambetta ” on april 26 1915, by the austrian us compelled the french admiral to withdraw his battleships from the narrow waters of the adriatic. italy’s declaration of war against austria on may 24 1915, gave the allies eight italian and french dreadnoughts to the austrian three. the supreme command in the mediterranean was nominally vested in the french commander-in-chief adml. boue de lapeyrere, but italy became responsible for the block- ade of the adriatic and her fleet there was reinforced by four old british battleships (‘‘ queen,” ‘‘ london,” ‘“‘ implacable,” “prince of wales ’’) and four light cruisers (“ dublin,” “ dart- mouth,” ‘‘ sapphire,” ‘‘ amethyst ”’), 12 french destroyers and 1107 seven french submarines. her battleships were based on tar- anto, and her cruisers and destroyers on brindisi, and operations in the adriatic consisted chiefly of cruiser raids. ‘the “‘ dublin ” was torpedoed and damaged on june g 1915, and on july 18 tors, the italian cruiser ‘‘ giuseppe garibaldi’ was torpedoed and sank. on the coast of syria in r9rq the cruisers “ minerva ” and “doris ” (capt. frank larken) had shelled alexandretta on dec. 17 1914, but on feb. 2 1915, adml. dartige du fournet was appointed to command on that coast and with the “ st. louis,” ‘ doris”? and two french armoured cruisers shelled gaza and el‘arish in april 1915. egypt was a separate com- mand and there vice-adml. r. h. peirse, in feb. 1915, put up a stout defence of the suez canal assisted by two battleships the “‘ swiftsure ” and ‘* ocean.” the year 1915 saw the dardanelles campaign, the advent of german submarines and the beginnings of the salonika expedi- tion. when serbia collapsed in nov. 1915, the serbian army {cll back on albania. this led, on dec. 29 1915, to a raid on their base at durazzo by the austrian cruiser ‘‘ helgoland ” (9 3:9-in., 27 knots) and five destroyers, supported by an ar- moured cruiser ‘‘ kaiser karl vi.” one austrian destroyer was mined and the “ helgoland ”’ was chased and engaged by the “ dartmouth ” (capt. a. p. addison), the “‘ weymouth ” and an italian cruiser the ‘‘ nino bixio ” and was severely damaged but got away. the end of the year saw the reinforcement of the east mediterranean squadron by the battleships “ hibernia ” (rear-adml. sydney fremantle), “‘ zealandia,” ‘ albemarle ” and “ russell.” the salonika campaign led to the occupation of corfu on jan. 11 1916, as a base for the serbian army and in the numerous complications with greece which followed, the pressure exercised by the navies played a large part. it was not till aug. 28 1916, that italy declared war on ger- many, and in r917 the allies in the mediterranean could muster 12 dreadnoughts against the austrian four. but it was no longer solely a question of dreadnoughts, and the advent of the sub- marine, operating all over the mediterranean, emphasised the disadvantages of separate commands. the necessity of a single authority for controlling the routes and for the protection of merchant shipping had to be recognised and vice-adml. sir somerset gough-calthorpe was appointed british commander- in-chief at malta to perform this work. a system of convoys was introduced, and 14 japanese destroyers which arrived in this year gave invaluable assistance in this work. the great problem in the mediterranean was to co-ordinate the work of the allies and on nov. 29 1917, it was decided to create an allied naval council, of which sir eric geddes was chairman, which helped matters very considerably. the centre of mediterranean strategy was the straits of otranto. the austrian dreadnoughts never ventured out, but it was very difficult to keep the submarines in, on account of the depth of water, about soo fathoms, which precluded the use of mines. the net and drifter barrage placed there in sept. 1915 was not very effective, and the efforts to make it so in 1917 and 1918 led to raids on it, like those at dover. on may 15 1917 the austrian cruiser ‘“‘ helgoland ” and two others attacked it and sank 14 drifters. the “‘ dartmouth ” and ‘“ bristol ” chased them back to cattaro, but the former was torpedoed and nearly sank. another raid by austrian destroyers took place on april 22 1918. on june ro ro18, the austrians, spurred on by ger- many, sent their dreadnoughts down to cattaro to attack the barrage, but two of them were met by comm. luigi rizzo with two tiny torpedo craft near premuda islands and the dread- nought ‘‘ szent istvan ” was torpedoed and sunk and the attack collapsed. the barrage at this time employed 35 destroyers, eight submarines, and 36 united states ‘‘ chasers,’’ with three or four score drifters. on the night of oct. 31 1918, a little itahan motor boat entered pola and sank another dreadnought, the “ viribus unitis.”? on the syrian coast, a naval force of french and british ships co-operated in the bombardment of gaza and maintained gen. allenby’s communications by sea from egypt to haifa, beirut and tripoli. 1108 to meet the danger of the russian dreadnought “ volnya ” falling into german hands, the aegean squadron had been strengthened by four french battleships and the dreadnoughts “ superb ” and “ temeraire ” from england. it was the “‘ su- perb,” which flying the flag of vice-adm]. gough-calthorpe led the allied squadrons up the dardanelles on nov. 12 1918. mesopotamia.—in three great river expeditions the navy played an important part; one up the dvina in the icy waters of the white sea; another up the tigris in the deserts of mesopo- tamia; and a third up the duala in the swampy creeks of the cameroons. in the first mesopotamian campaign which ended with the investment of kut on dec. 2 1915, the naval force con- sisted of the sloops “‘ espiegle ” (comm. wilfred nunn, 6 4-in., 2 3-pdr.) and “‘ odin ”’ (4 4-in., 4 6-pdr.), the indian marine paddleship ‘‘ laurence” (4 4-in., 4 6-pdr.) and three small armed vessels. the principal base was at basra 70 m. up the shatt al ‘arab and accessible to ocean steamers drawing 19 feet. above basra the river was uncharted, but vessels of 11 ft. draught could get to al qurna, 40 m. farther up, a port of great importance, as the point of junction of the tigris and euphrates. baghdad ctesiphon 2d ied \bustan shaitan 29-/f-45 al ‘aziziya camet & fire ae — sanniyat $4245 ae magee reet me, 2 hanna tn. eo sulnared f16 ie ie w occupied 28-9-1§ _ surrender 29-4-16 retaken 24-2:17 » . 2.’ _ miles xp river land baghdadtokut 215 103 gvyamara | mut to‘amara «153: 120 comet arrives ‘amara taal qurna 89 al qurna to basra py 66 sw. sloops sto basra to fao a . baghdadtofao 57! ezras tomb o) 4 monch wom. 77s draught to basra 19° nasir l, al j raught to basra i uph@e, ep quroa : ta af erg 14 ; tis (hee *8. r a) ae above ezras tomh 34 te ¢: = low water july to nov. noe chany x; as flood dec. ta june — ? mesopotamia a 46 ‘os - abadan river campaign 1914-1917 fao’ railways ——= ss the flotilla hastened the retirement of the turks from basra and pushed on to al qurna, where it took part in the attack and capture of the town on dec. 9 1914. from al qurna the sloops pushed up the tigris, under commodore wilfred nunn, as senior naval officer. the turks were entrenched at bahran about six m. above al qurna. gen. townshend arrived in april and on may 31 1915 there followed the amphibious battle of al qurna, where gen. townshend was on board the “ espicgle,” supported by the sloops “ clio” and “ odin.” as the turks retired, the flotilla followed hot on their heels, shelling the turk- ish gunboat ‘‘ marmaris,” and when the sloops were held up by their draft above ezra’s tomb, gen. townshend and commo- dore nunn shifted to the ‘‘ comet,” a small yacht (one 6-pdr., 3 3-pdr.), and pushed boldly on to ‘amara where their arrival on june 2 1915 greatly disconcerted the turks. the original object of the campaign had been to secure the head of the persian gulf, but there followed the advance to kut 143 m. farther up, supported by the ‘ comet,” the ‘“ shaitan ” and “ sumana ” with 4 4:7-in. guns in horseboat. there followed the victory of sept. 27-8 1915, eight miles from kut, where lt.-comm. e. c. cookson of the ‘‘ comet,”’ senior naval oflicer at the time, was “killed (and awarded a v.c.) gallantly trying to cut the wire hawser of a boom under fire. the army was now in kut 240 m. up the tigris, and went on through the baking marshes towards baghdad and the battle of ctesiphon on nov. 22 1915. the flotilla, consisting of the “ fire- fly ” (1 4-in., 1 6-pdr.}, ‘‘ comet ” and two armed launches, was held up by heavy artillery, and could do little in the actual world war, naval battle, but did yeoman service in the retreat shepherding the army river craft. kut was invested, and, in the first attempt to relieve it, a heroic attempt was made on april 24 1916, by lt.- comm. chas. cowley and lt. h. o. firman in the “ julnar ” to get 270 tons of stores into the town, but the ship was held up by a wire, and they were both killed, being awarded the v.c. gen. sir stanley maude’s campaign brought with it a whole fleet of river craft, scores of barges and dozens of lynch’s river paddle steamers. commodore nunn’s naval flotilla had been strongly reinforced and by this time consisted of three ‘‘ insect ” class (2 6-in., 2 12-pdr.), five “ fly ” class (1 4-in., 1 12-pdr., 1 3-pdr.) drawing 33 to 4 feet. it advanced with the army reaching kut on feb. 24 1917, coming under a heavy fire at the nahr killak bend, where the “ mantis ” and ‘‘ moth ” suffered severely and the captains of both (comm. bernard buxton and lt.-comm, chas. cartwright) were wounded. but the flotilla forced its way through and with its 6-in. guns converted the turkish retreat into a rout. on march 11 1917 the british flag was hoisted at baghdad. the white sea, 1977-9.—the expedition to archangel and up the dvina began only in 1918 and survived the war. the ola bay white sea ano dvina 9a campaign 1917 - 1919 ¥ murmansk 1 (sketch) svyatai as .y ke orfov morjovets sl. kola to archangel 450m. archangel to vologda 400m. rail (approx.) § allied line a march 1919 a railway to : petrograd{completed i917) kurgominskaya seitso flotilla aug.i5i9 \t to hot/as 200m. from bereznitski railway to vologda closure of the baltic and black sea to the allies had enormously enhanced the importance of the arctic route. there were two ports there, murmansk in kola bay and archangel, the former ice frec, the latter accessible to ships of 24 ft. from july to octo- ber. from lerwick in the shetlands to kola bay was 1,152 m. and from murmansk a railway was being built to petrograd, though it was not completed till 1917. archangel therefore remained the only port of entry on the russian railway system, and direct telegraphic communication was established by a cable 1,427 m. long laid from peterhead to murmansk in jan. 191s. in 1917, 600,000 tons of war stores had entered archangel in addition to 600,000 tons of coal, which were left derelict when russia collapsed in that year. the armoured cruiser ‘‘ cochrane” and the french cruiser ‘‘ admiral aube ” were then sent to reinforce the old battleship “‘ glory ” at murmansk, and in may 1918, when the germans were in finland, a force of 600 british and 2,000 other troops was dispatched to archangel, and 1,500 british and 5,000 others to murmansk. it was decided lo occupy world war, naval archangel and push on down to vologda to join hands with general koltchak’s force, and the town was occupied with little resistance on aug. 2 1918. general poole then advanced up the railway, in conjunction with a flotilla moving up the dvina. this consisted of two monitors m23 and m2s, four russian river gunboats, and two russian motor launches under capt. ed. altham. bereznitski, 200 m. from archangel, was reached on sept. 3 1918, but by oct. 19 the flotilla had to retire as the river froze. in march 10109, it was decided to withdraw all forces from north russia. the flotilla then consisted of six monitors (m23, 25, 26, 27, 31, 33), four gunboats (2 6-in., 2 3-in., 6 max- ims), four minesweepers and six motor boats. then the decision was reversed and it was decided that gen. ironsides should push on up the river to kotlas, 200 m. above berenski. but the river in june was commencing to fall and hopes of going further fell with it. the flotilla dropped gradually down to archangel blowing up m25 and m27 which had gone aground. by sept. 27 1919 the evacuation was complete. the cameroons.—the primary object of the expedition to the cameroons was to blockade the river and destroy the german wireless station at duala. the work of the navy began on aug. 23 1914, when capt. cyril fuller in the cruiser “‘ cumberland ”’ (14 6-in.) proceeded there and organised the small vessels of the nigerian marine for river work. the gunboat “ dwarf ” (comm. f. e. strong, 2 4-in., 4 12-pdr.) and the “ ivy,” a small nigerian steamer armed with 3-pdr. guns, did good service in clearing the creeks, and on sept. 16 the ‘‘ nachtigall,” a small armed german steamer, attacked the “‘ dwarf ” and was sunk. by sept. 22 the mouth of the river had been swept, and on sept. 23 the cruiser “ challenger ” (capt. c. p. beatty-pownall, 11 6-in.) arrived with six transports, and drawing 19} ft., succeeded in passing into the river. the british force then consisted of 54 officers, 1,859 natives, six guns and 1,000 carriers and a french contin- gent of another 2,000 men was expected from dakar. on sept. 27, when an attack on duala was pending, the germans blew up the wireless and surrendered the town. fight vessels of the woermann line and one of the hamburg-american were captured in the river. to the flotilla fell the task of clearing the enemy from the tortuous creeks of the river and transporting the troops and on oct. 14 jabassi, so m. further up the river, was captured. the “ cumberland ” was recalled after the battle of coronel, but capt. fuller remained to complete his work, and though the final surrender of the colony did not take place till feb. 28 1916 it was virtually in our power by the end of 1914. east africa and tanga.—things did not go so happily in east africa. early in aug. 1914, the german governor at dar-cs- salaam had agreed to regard the ships there as british prizes, but when the boats of the “‘ goliath ” and “ fox ” entered the harbour on nov. 28 1or4 to disable their engines a heavy fire was opened on them. comm. pecl ritchie was severely wounded in bringing the boats out of harbour and won a victoria cross. far inland on lake tanganyika two motor launches the “ mimt” and “ toutou ” arrived in dec. 1915, and after an action with the german craft secured british communication there. they were under comm. spicer simson, who had brought them all the way from the cape by land a long journey of 2,0c0 miles. early in 1916, another german ship managed to evade the blockade in the north sea and in march slipped into sudi in the south of the colony with an invaluable cargo of stores and munitions for von lettow-vorbeck, the german military com- mander, which enabled him to continue the campaign. the coastline remained in german hands till june 1916, when tanga was occupied by the cruisers “‘ talbot ” and “ severn ”; bago- moyo was occupied by the ‘* vengeance ” and the cruiser “ chal- lenger ’ on aug. 15 1916, and by the end of sept., rear-adml. edward charlton with his flag in the “ vengeance ”’ could report the whole coast in british hands. but in the interior fighting dragged on till the armistice. another raider got home in 1918. the “ wolf” (capt. karl nerger) an armed steamer (7 5:9-in., 4 torpedo tubes and mines) carrying a small plane for reconnaissance had sailed on nov. 30 1916, passed down the atlantic, laid mines off cape town, and i109 colombo, cruised in the indian ocean, passed on to new zea- land, returned by fiji to singapore, and finally arrived home in feb. 1918, after a cruise of 451 days. she captured 13 ships and her mines laid off capetown, new zealand and singapore, were responsible for 15 more. the first news of her came from a bottle thrown overboard in the celebes by a prisoner. in sept. 1918 there came news of the last german raider, the ‘‘seeadler”’ (capt. von luckner) which left bremen in dec. 1916, and slipped through the blockade disguised as a norwegian timber ship. armed with two 4-in. guns and manned by 60 men, she had cruised off south america and sunk six british ships, and then rounding cape horn had disappeared into the pacific. in the society islands off mopihaa, a small atoll, she dragged on to a reef and broke her back. out of six attempts by german raiders to pass the blockade, four were successful. their cruises were unstained by any of the incidents which marred the german submarine campaign and may rank, with the cruise of the “‘ em- den” and “ karlsruhe,” among the brightest exploits of the german navy in the war. vi. the end the war was now drawing to a close. in july 1918 adm]. scheer was summoned to imperial headquarters and on aug. ir was appointed chief-of-the staff, von hipper succeeding him as commander-in-chief. under the hammers of foch and haig the german front was breaking up. on sept. 18, scheer was told to be ready to leave the flanders coast. on sept. 209, the bulgarian front collapsed, and on oct. 5 germany was forced to her knees. immense explosions heralded the evacuation of the belgian coast. on oct. 17 the german troops left ostend and two days later were in full retreat from zeebrugge. fleven destroyers and nine torpedo boats succeeded in reaching the bight. the four submarines left there were blown up. scheer wished to continue the warfare on commerce to the bitter end but on oct. 21, the submarines at sea received orders to cease the campaign and return home. he then set to work to plan a great sortie of the high sea fleet. ‘the submarines were ordered to assemble on oct. 22 off the scottish coast. a last great raid was to be made on the channel while the submarines attacked the grand fleet on its way down. they were to be assisted by a large minefield laid off the forth, which unknown to scheer had been swept up as soon as it was laid. the plan was not to be fulfilled. scheer saw the weapon he trusted break in his hands. on oct. 29 the signal was made to prepare for sca; a great clamour arose and a mutiny broke out which compelled von hipper to abandon his project. the flotillas and submarines remained true and the commodore of submarines with 16 boats took refuge in sylt on nov. 8 but the end was near. revolu- tion was flaming everywhere. the troops were disloyal, the navy passed out of the admiral’s hands. the war was over. surrender of the german flect—under the terms of the armi- stice, ro german battleships, six battle cruisers, eight light cruisers, 50 destroyers and all submarines were to be surrendered. on friday nov. 15, rear-adml. hugo von meurer arrived in the “ konigsberg ” in the forth to make the final arrangements with adml. beatty. on wednesday nov. 20 a long line of sub- marines began their dolorous journey to harwich where they were met by rear-adml. sir reginald tyrwhitt with his flotillas 35 m. from the essex coast. they passed into harwich in dead silence. not a sound arose from the vast crowds watching them on shore and sea, a total of 129 passed into tyrwhitt’s hands (57u, 49ub, 23uc). on nov. 21 the battleships of germany’s proud navy were surrendered to adml. beatty. it was a misty day and the grand fleet, cleared for action, steamed slowly down the forth for the last time in two long lines six miles apart. the light cruiser “ cardiff ” led the ships of germany (nine battleships, five battle cruisers, seven light cruisers) up the lines. beatty stood on the bridge of the “ queen elizabeth,” and as the “ seyd- litz,’’ heading the german ships, came abreast of her, the whole british line turned, enclosing the german ships in a serried avenue of steel. llto the naval conditions of the peace terms signed in june 1910, comprised 17 articles and laid down that the german navy was not to exceed six battleships of a pre-dreadnought type, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 torpedo boats, and was not to include submarines. within two months of signature the eight dreadnoughts still in german hands (‘‘ oldenburg,”’ “ thuringen,”’ “ ostfriesland,” “‘ helgoland,”’ ‘‘ posen,” “ west- falen,” ‘‘ rheinland,” “‘ nassau ’’), eight light cruisers, 42 of the latest destroyers and 50 of the latest torpedo boats were to be surrendered, disarmed but with all guns on board. at the expiration of one month all german submarines building were to be handed over; such as could move or be towed were to be taken to allied ports, the remainder were to be broken up. units were only to be replaced in the case of battleships at the end of 20 years, in the case of destroyers at the end of 15. the personnel, including reserves of the fleet and coast defences, was not to exceed 15,000 officers and men. the disposal of the german ships gave rise to lively argument. great britain wanted to destroy them all, france to add her share to her fleet. the question was complicated by the germans scuttling most of their ships at scapa on june 21. there were interned there 11 battleships (‘‘ baden,” ‘‘ bayern,” “ friedrich der grosse,” ‘‘ grosser kurfiirst,’’ ‘‘ kaiser,’’ ‘‘ kaiscrin,” ‘ kronprinz wilhelm,” ‘“‘ markgraf,”’ “ prinzregent luitpold,”’ “ konig,” “‘ kenig albert ’’), five battle cruisers (‘‘ seydlitz,”’ “ moltke,” “* von der tann,” ‘ hindenburg,” ‘ derfflinger ’’), eight light cruisers (“ emden,” ‘ frankfurt,” ‘‘ niirnberg,” ““celn,” ‘f dresden,” ‘ karlsruhe,” ‘‘ brummer,” “ bremse ”’) when on a signal made at ro a.m. by rear-adml. von reuter from the ‘“‘ emden,” the ships were scuttled and began to sink. only four were salved—the “ baden,” “ emden,” “ frankfurt ” and “ niirnberg.’”’ germany gained little by this act. she had to hand over, in default of the battleships, 300,000 tons of float- ing docks; her remaining light cruisers (‘‘ graudenz,”’ berg,” “ pillau,” ‘‘ regensburg,” “ strassburg ’’) in place of the cruisers; and 42,000 tons of floating cranes, tugs and dredgers instead of the destroyers. the terms of peace were no mere formality. the destruction of the submarines and vessels building was entrusted to a naval section of the inter-allied commission under vice-adml. sir montague browning (subsequently under vice-adml. sir ed- ward charlton) and was strictly executed. the fortifications of heligoland were razed and its guns broken up. the destruc- tion of germany’s sea power was complete. it had been achieved by economic pressure and the imminence of military defeat based on command of the sea. the year 1920, which was to have seen the consummation of germany’s navy law of r900 embodied in a great fleet of 61 capital ships, 40 cruisers and 144 destroyers, saw the whole fabric of her naval aspirations shattered, her proud fleet lying at the bottom of a desolate harbour, her emperor, who had inspired its creation, a fugitive in a foreign land. superiority of the allies —the fleets of the allied and associ- ated powers covered every sea and their immense superiority is shown in the following figures :— dread- | battle | light noughts | cruisers | cruisers 1 allied powers . germany and austria . the grand fleet had grown to double its size in ro14. it mustered with rear-adml. rodman’s 6th battle squadron (“ new york,” “‘ texas,” “‘ wyoming,” “ florida,” “ arkansas ’’) 38 battleships, making with rear-adml. t. s. rodgers’ squadron at berehaven (“‘ nevada,” ‘ oklohama ” and “ utah ’’), which came over specially to anticipate any sudden sortie of the german fleet at the end, a total of 41 battleships in british waters. the battle cruisers numbered nine. its single light cruiser squadron had become seven; its two destroyer flotillas had increased to eight (3rd, 11th, rath, 13th, rq4th, 15th, zoth, 21st), mustering 167 destroyers, and its five submarine flotillas (1oth, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th) numbered 48 submarines. “* konigs- ' world war, naval and this represented only a portion of its activities. round the coast an enormous organisation had grown up under the name of the auxiliary patrol for keeping the sea approaches clear of mines and secure against submarines. it comprised craft of all sorts and sizes, chiefly trawlers and drifters with a considerable sprinkling of yachts and motor launches. this motley collection of vessels running into thousands, manned by fishermen, yachtsmen, officers of the merchant navy and men of the royal naval volunteer reserve, became a great disciplined force which bore no small share of the burden and heat of the day and played an important part in the struggle with the submarine (see submarine campaign). it formed in reality a great auxiliary navy on duty round the coast and at the dardanelles, at otranto, and at dover worked strenuously and fought valiantly to the last. the whole coastline of these islands was divided into 21 sections and in each section a number of these auxiliary vessels was constantly at work, each in its particular way. thus immingham (humber), yarmouth, and lowestoft were pre-eminently minesweeping bases, which ensured the safety of the swept channel, called the war channel, up the east coast. queenstown (adml. sir lewis bayly) became one of the principal bases for escorts for the atlantic convoys. there was stationed in 1918 a united states force of 34 destroyers and seven sub- marines and more than 40 other smaller craft. buncrana with 30 destroyers and 33 smaller craft performed the same work on the north of ireland route. at larne again the work was chiefly directed to securing the north channel and the liverpool ap- proach against the submarine, performed by four destroyers, 38 trawlers, 55 drifters and 15 other craft. at granton (adml. james startin) in the firth of forth, over 100 trawlers were en- gaged in patrolling, and the convoy of scandinavian ships to the tyne and humber absorbed six destroyers and 30 trawlers. as the war went on and on, the merchant navy and the navy royal became more and more a single force, ensuring the safe passage of the soldiers and the nation’s daily bread. british losses.—the british losses had not been small. they amounted to 254 war vessels of which the greatest number fell to enemy submarines. british warship losses a, action; b, submarine; c, mine; d, destruction to avoid capture; e, block-ship; f, internal explosion; g, collision; h, wreck; j, accident; kk, unknown, ton- = ~ ~l¢ to-| nage roe ae oad ie, am om ow) pes cae ee a al) tal] (dead- weight) dreachioughts) ste). el ook he ey wigs ace ae | 200,735 pre-dread- mougris:. 4.50- ll s82 on auc eae, |) ed se eel ace loo battle rrtsense st 2.0 | vs: || oe 4 ase] sarl welll ee, cp ee! 863,000 cruisers 5/ 5] 1 i i 13 |158,300 light cruisers. 1 oy bi 2405 | op ws. aud |acd oe 92) 26am aircraft carriers . i} 1 a 31 27,488 minelayers es ae ‘on (eee 2| 11,000 gunboats .|..] if] 1 di 2 6] 4,235 monitors .| 3] i| i 5} 8,125 coast defence ships pe es | eel gta gael a sarl eel ea dee el is fo6 sloops 4) tee “sp eciaa ars lad ite ahead) ses): s230ge flotilla leaders . 0) elected call) “al! 32 3| 5§,204 dgstroyers:« |eo) 7420) cal 4] s| 8 1| 64] 52,045 torpedo boats ...|/..}| 2] 1 - al) ca ee a al, 252380 submarines 31 4f 4] 9] 1 4+] 41 4/21] 54] 43,649 patrol boats i a gh ieee, semel uwe (2 1,226 armed mer- anh “ruisers . aie © ne | 2 2|17/179,16 armed board- ee ing steamers, i| 9| i{/..|..[-.| i} r]..]..1] 13] 23, coastal mo- s| ae tor boats . ghd nee pib s| fase ll 08 ate eh se 85 of auxiliary craft 815 were sunk, including 246 trawlers, 244 colliers, 130 drifters, 44 oilers, 24 motor launches and 18 mine- world war, naval sweepers. of this total 289 (35-4%) were sunk by submarines, 225 (27:-7%) by mines and 77 (9:4%) by wreck and stranding. the losses of the other allies were not so heavy in comparison. contparative naval losses (to nov. if 1918.) — i} © 3/4 le] 2 naval losses 3 s| 3 & eae ag =) c4 aa) u hy {a s) great britain and | dominions . 2 11 3 13 i2 64 54 france . i 5 12 14 italy . , ee 3 bbe i 2 8 8 japan i ~ i ne 2 i - united states . = - i 2 i russia 2 2 2 20 20 germany . a i i 6 17 66 | 199 austria 2 i 3 6 i4 turkey i i a though these figures give a merely statistical picture of the colossal ramifications of the war, they leave ample roum for comment. the submarine inflicted and suffcred most of the damage done in the war. it was the most active and the most dangerous service, and it was the german submarine that in 1917 became our worst menace. in the north sea, great britain and the united states maintained a force of 46 capital ships (battle- ships and battle cruisers) against the german 23, in numbers a twofold, in gun power a threefold superiority. in the mediter- ranean, france and italy could muster 12 dreadnoughts against austria’s scanty three. these batileships were the shields behind which the other forces worked. the effect of sea powcer.—the work wrought by sea power, envisaged as a whole, he who runs may read. german trade was swept from the sea, the oceans were kept open for the troops and trade of the allies and the shores of great britain and france and all the dominions were never once threatened with invasion. in the far east the fleet of our ally japan drove von spee from germany’s only base and then, closing up behind him, barred the sea to his return. it may be said that the seas were not barred to the german submarine, but the answer is that the submarine merely attempted to do laboriously and slowly what a couple of battle cruisers appearing unopposed in the channel could have done at once. and though the submarine was power- ful against merchant shipping it accomplished much less against the fleet. not a single dreadnought was sunk by it during the war and it was only in narrow waters like the adriatic that it became a pressing danger to the fleet. it was countered by anti- submarine measures and convoys, working under the aegis of the battle fleet, which except in the case of sudden raids, like those on dover, preserved them immune from attack. the fact that there was no great decisive battle has made some doubt the utility of the battleship. it is true that the opportunity which escaped the british fleet at jutland was never wholly redeemed. if a battle is merely an incident in a blockade then its end may be achieved when the enemy retires to harbour. but if a battle represents the economy of the decisive blow, if the enemy’s fleet can remain intact to play an important part in the cam- paign, then nothing can take the place of decisive battle. the fact that the battle fleet was never able to get to grips with the enemy does not diminish the importance of the battleship nor the importance of battle. it meant that vast resources of per- sonnel and material had to be kept locked up in the grand fleet which a decisive victory would have released for the war against the submarine. no surface ship was sunk by aircraft, but the end of the war left large possibilities still on the horizon, such as the use of air- craft on a large scale with a fleet. the power of the mine remains one of the lessons of the war and the combination of a minefield, supported by heavy guns either afloat (as in the bight) or ashore (as at the dardanelles) remains a very difficult proposition, for the mines offer an insuperable obstacle to heavy ships approaching, and the guns are able to prevent minesweepers approaching the | i ie ee mines. the paravane offered only an uncertain solution to the problem which can only be solved in its entirety by destroying the heavy guns or by capturing the forts, as the germans did at osel (saaremaa) in 1917, but even there three dread- noughts were severely damaged by mines. the mine must not be regarded as a merely defensive weapon. it is an immobile weapon but it can be very offensive, and in the bight, and the dardanelles, proved more than a match for the stronger flcet. certain other outstanding lessons remain as the fruit of our experience in the war. invasion or landing on a large scale be- comes more hazardous than ever, if it is opposed by submarines and large and powerful aircraft, while aircraft carriers laden with opposing aircraft are necessarily vessels of the largest size and offer an enormous target 10 attack. the interception of wireless signals and the location of ships by means of wireless directionals played a large part in the intelligence systems on both sides. the decisive factor —but the tendency to interpret war wholly in terms of the mechanical apparatus of war is one to be avoided. the dominating factor in the war was not guns but maritime geography and was to be found in the sound, in the bight, at dover and at otranto. when the war broke out, grave doubts arose in the minds of some as to the advisability of sending a british army to france in the face of an undefeated german fleet. it was not merely the inactivity of the german fleet, but maritime geography and the dangers of approach to the straits of dover at night that enabled this to be done in safety. england was 300 m. ahead of germany. the war was dominated by the fact that germany’s path to the ocean was barred by the solid bulk of the british isles. it was peculiar in another way. both navies were working in close proximity to their principal bases of repair and supply, and both navies were therefore able to exert the full strength of all their combined weapons of air, sea and submarine to an extent only possible within a reasonable distance (say 1,000 m.) of the great bases of a fleet. the navy that fights within easy reach of its great bases and principal industrial centres, fights ata great advantage. the lessons of the world war must not therefore be applied indiscriminately to the conditions of a war 5,000 m. away. it is barely possible for a single mind to envisage in all their aspects the colossal ramifications of the war or to gauge precisely the relative part played in the final victory by economic, naval or military pressure. but this may be said. if the british navy in that tremendous quartet of years had to face an even greater task than anyone dreamt of when king george called it the sure shield ” of the nation, it could feel that this confidence had not been misplaced on that memorable day when beatty received the surrender of the great german fleet. bibliography.—british authorities: a, t. stewart and c. j. e. peshall, the immortal gamble (1917); dardanelles commission, first report (1917), and final report (1919); sir r. h. s. bacon, the dover patrol (1919); lord fisher, afemories (1919) and records (1919); viscount jellicoc, the grand fleet 1914-6 (1919) and the crisis of the naval war (1920); sir c. callwell, experiences of a dug-out (1920); a itistory of the great war based on official docu- ments; sir j. s. corbett, naval operations (1920, etc.); c. e. fayle, seaborne trade (1920), and a. s. hurd, the merchant navy (1921); gen. sir i. s. m. hamilton, gallipoli diary (1920); british admi- ralty, battle of jutland, official despatches (1920) and narrative of the battle of jutland (1924); a. b. filson young, with the battle cruisers (1921); w.l.s. churchill, 7he lyorld crisis (1923); baron wester wemyss, the navy in the dardanelles campaign (1924). american and foreign authorities: capt. e. liidecke, kreuzer- fahrien und kriegserlebnisse, s. m.s. dresden (1915); adm. c. dick, das kreuszergeschwader (1917); k. nerger, s. al. s. wolf (1918); e. vedel, quatre annees de guerre sous-marine (1919); w.s. sims, the victory at sea (1920); dartige du fournet, souvenirs de guerre (1920); r. scheer, deutschlands hochseeflotte im welt arieg, (1920); e. von mantey, der krieg zur see (1920, etc.); lt.-comm. o. groos, der krieg in der nordsee (1920); lt.-comm. r, firle, der krieg in der ostsee (1921); capt. e. raeder, kreuzerkrieg (1922); g. von fase, kiel and jutland (1921); l. von reuter, scapa flow: das grab der denischen flotte (1921); c. manfroni, storia della marina ftaltana durante la guerra mondiale (1923); capt. t. g. fothering- ham, naval [istory of the world war (1924); etat-major-general turc, campagne de dardanelles (1924); a. laurens, le dblocus et la guerre sous-marine (1924); capt. a. a. thomazi, la guerre navale dans l’adriatique (1925); commodore g. von schoultz, with the british batile fleet (1925). (aa cod) ii12 world war, bibliography of world war: bibliography—the following list of books, sclected with much care from several thousands on the subject, is designed to provide the general readcr with the best informa- tion available in book form concerning the world war as regards both its main aspects and the events which were of most impor- tance therein. an effort has also been made to give the names of at least one or two books relating to events in each of the minor theatres or sub-theatres of the war, and where contro- versial matter still exists refecences to books on both sides are given. books in foreign tongues have been confined to those in french, german and italian. where books in several volumes have been published at intervals, the date given is usually that of the last volume to appear. origins and responsibility (see alse under political) rt. hon. h. h. asquith, the genesis of the war; etc. (1923); m. edith durham, the serajevo crime. (1925); - hermann von eckhardstein, ten years at the court of st. james 1895-1905. (1921); germany, forcign office, deutschland schuldig? (1919); by a german (r. grelling), j’accusef translation by a. gray. (1915); j. w. headlam, the [history of twelve days. (1915); j. w. headlam, the outbreak of war. foreign office docu- ments. (1926); k. kautsky, outbreak of the world war (1924). translation. full collection of german official documents—die deutschen doku- mente zum kriegsausbruch. 6 vol. (1919); prince k. lichnowsky, afy afission to london ror2-14. (1918); count max montgelas, the case for the central powers. (1925); dr. w. miihlon, dr. miihlon’s diary, 1974. (1918); c. oman, the outbreak of the war of 1914-18. based on official documents. (1919); r. poincare, the origins of the war. (1921); das russische orange-buch von ror4. (1925); r. w. seton-watson, serajevo. (1926). general histories (chronological) annual register, great britain, the annual register. (1914-9); brassey's naval annual, portsmouth. (1914-9); whitaker's almanac (1914-9), short chronologies; | chronology of the war, t9f4-19. edited by lord edward gleichen. 3 vol. (each of 2 years) and atlas. (1918-20); committee of imperial defence (historical section), principal events 1914-1918. (1922); s. r., chronologie de la guerre. to small vol. (1919); ‘‘times, the,” the times diary and index of the war, 1914-18. (1921); histortes (see also under military operations) gen. schwarte’s volumes (¢.v.). austro-hungarian cantpaigns, nothing official published. good material in gen. schwarte’s volumes. (1920, etc.); gen. oberst a. arz, zur geschichte des grossen krieges 1914-18. (eastern front). (1924); j. buchan. a tlistory of the great war. 4 vol. (1921); bulletin belge des sciences militaires, belgian official account of the war coming out in this periodical; gen. cherfils, la guerre d ja delivrance. 3 vol. (1920-2); lt.-col. m. l. v. h. corda, la guerre mondiale 1914-18. (1922); l. cornet, r9r4-1915 tistotre de la guerre. political and general. (1915-22); brig.-gen, j. e. edmonds, official itistory of the great war, with maps and plans. (1925, etc.); diario deila guerra d'itafia, official; 65 parts. (1923); the military and financial effort of italy during the war. official figures. (1919)3 les armees francaises dans la grande guerre. french official history of war. 2 vo). of chronological) dictionary of formations during whole war. 1 vol. (thin) story. numerous vol. of docu- ments only. difficult to obtain; sir charles p. lucas, the empire at war. dominions and colonics in particular. 3 vol. (1921, efc.); nations of to-day series. ed. j. buchan. 12 separate vol. great briiain (2), bulgaria and rumania, france, belgiunt, haly, treland, india, yugoslavia, baltic and caucasian states, british america, japan. description of war, etc., in cach. (1923, etc.); gen. b. e. palat, za grande guerre sur le front occideittat. ir vol. (1917, etc.); a. f. pollard, a short history of the great war. (1920); reichsarchiv, der weltkrieg 1914-18. german official history of the war. 2 vol. out, of probably 12. a popular abbreviated edition of each vol. is also published. (1922, etc.) gen. lt. m. schwarte (ed.), der grosse krieg 1914-18. very good and full. 11 vol. to date. (1921-4); “times, the,” documentary history of the war. 11 vol. (1917, etc.)3 capt. a. tosti, la guerra tialo-austriaca 1915-18. good official resume. (1925); g. m. trevelyan, the war and the european revolution in rela- tion to history. (1920). miscellaneous a ae le tragique destin de nicolas it. et de sa famille. 1921); g. p. gooch, history of modern europe 1878-1019. (1923); anonymous, the pomp of power. (1922); n. sokolov, the amfurder of the imperial family. (1921); war office, statistics of the military effort of the british empire 1914-19020. (1922); h. wickham steed, through 30 years (1892-1922). (1924). histories of armies and contingents australia oficial history of -lustralia in the war, 12 vol. (1925); lt.-gen. sir j. monash, the australian victories tn france im 7q18. (1920); canada report. canada, afinistry of overseas military forces, report rors. (1919); mae a at w. currie, canadian corps operations during 7918. (1920); may. c. g. roberts and m. aitken (lord beaverbrook). canada in flanders. 3 vol. (1918); ; ape h. steele, the canadians in france 1915-1918. (1920); ndia gen. sir j. willcocks, with the indians in france. (1920); new zealand h. t. b. drew, the war effort of new zealand, 4 vol. (1924); col. h. stewart, the new zealand division 1916-1919. (1921); south africa ie oe itistory of the south african forces in france. 1920); south africa, department of defence, the union of s. africa and the great war. official history. (1924); united states maj.-gen. r. l. bullard, personalities and reminiscences of the war. (1925); lt.-col. de chambrun and capt. de marenches, l'armee americaine dans le conflit eurapeen. (1921); final report of gen. j. j. pershing. (1919). covers history of ).s.a. forces: capt. shipley thomas, [zistory of the american expeditionary force. (1920); united states, g.s., historical branch, monographs (3) on mobilisation, economic agencies, etc, (1921). arms of the service maj.-gen sir l. j. blenkinsop and lt.-col. j. w. rainey, official tfistory of the veterinary services. (1925); lt.-col. f. s. brereton, the great war and the r.a.m.c. (1919) (sce also macpherson, under medical and casualties); bt.-col. j. f. c. fuller, tanks in the great war, 1914-18. (1920); royal engineers’ institute, the work of the r.e. in the european war ro14-19. (1921, etc.). military operations the western front. terms of armistices concluded with germany, austro-hungary and turkey. cmd. 53. (1919); belgian army, la campagne del’ armee belge, july 3t 19t4-jan.t 1915. (1915); the war of rorg. official. (1915); commandant wily breton, pages d’fistotre. (1915, etc.). on belgian operations. various volumes. official basis; maj. a. corbett-smith, the retreat from mons. (1916); maj. a. corbett-smith, the marne—and after. (1917); p, eh. courriere, camment fui sauve paris. (1918); h. dugard, la victoire de verdun, feb, 21 1916-nov, £1 1917. (1918); general dupont, le haut commandement allemand en rgr4. (1922). from german standpoint; gen. e. v. falkenhayn, general iteadquarters, 1914-10, and its critical decisions. (1919) field-marshal visct. french. zorg. (1919); ficld-marshal visct. french, the despatches of lord french, ror4-15. {1917}; renee general staff, germany, der grosse krieg in einzeldarstellungen (1920). sclected episodes. 8 parts published; ypres, rgr4. trans. (1919); germany, reichskanzlci, history of events immediately preceding the armistice. officiat german. (1920); les origines de l’armistice. translated by koeltz (german official). (1919); world war, bibliography of sir d. haig’s despatches, 1915-19. ed. by lt.-col. j. h. bor- aston. (1919); he rity ernest hamilton, the first seven divisions (in 1914). ig16); g. hanotaux, wistorre illustree de la guerre de 1914. 13 vols. (1914, etc.); gen. oberst a. v. kluck, der marsch auf paris und die marne- schlacht, 1914. also in english (1920); j. maercker, vom kaiserheer sur reichswehr. (1921). german revolution; maj.-gen. sir f. maurice, forty days tn ror4. (1919); mayj.-gen. sir f. maurice, the last four months (1919); g. s. gordon, mons and the retreat—with preface by lord french. (1918); oberstlt. a. niemann, kaiser und revolution. (1922); reichsarchiv, germany, schlachten des weltkrieges. (1921, etc.); gen. sir it. l. smith-dorrien, afemories of forty-eight years service (incl. 1914). (1925); austro-italian . gen. l. cadorna, la guerra alla fronte italiana, ete. (1915-nor. 1917). 2 vol. (1921); gen.-lt. a. von cramon, quatre ans au g.q.g. austro-hongrois. (1922), as german representatives; ee alae supremo, report on battle of vittorio veneto. 1919); gen. maj. h. kerchnawe, der zusammenbruch der oester- reichischungarischen wehrmacht in 1928. (1921); russian gen. b. gourko, russia in ror4-17. (1918); gen. m. hoffmann, the war of lest opportunities. (1924). eastern front. translation; maj.-gen. sir a. knox, with the russian army, 1914-17. (1921); capt. r.s.g. watkin-williams, under the black ensign, (1922). operations on the murman coast; s. r. (serge raffalovitch), pages @histoire. l'if{istotre de la revolution russe, t905-i1917. (1917); balkan a ae through the serbian campaign (and retreat). 1916); g. gordon-smith, from serbia to jugoslavia, 1974-18. (1920); lt.-col. hon. h. d. napier, experiences of a military attache in the balkans. (1924); h. c. owen, salonica and after. (1919); c. price, serbia’s part in the war. vol. i. (1918); g. w. price, the stery of the salonica army. (1917); ber aad einzelschriften, der ehndkampf tn sfacedonien. 1921); sare eat mon commandement en orient (salonica), rgr6~18. 1920); lt. m. sturdza, avec l’armee roumaine, 1916-18, (1918); l. villari, the macedonian campaign. (1922); dardanelles and galli poli brig.-gen. c. p. aspinall, gallipoli. official history; (1926); the final report of the dardaneties commission. (1919); gen. sir i. hamilton, a gallipoli diary. 2 vol. (1920). gen. o. liman v..sanders, fiinf jahre ttirkei. (1922), incl. dardanelles; j. masefield, galltpolt. (1923); p. f. schuler, australia in arms (anzac). (1916); dr. h. stuermer, zwo war years in constantinople. (1917). translation; ce historical section of staff, campagne des dardanelles. 1924); egypt and palestine a, aaronsohn, with the turks in palestine. (1917). transla- tion; lt.-col. g. e. badcock, jfistory of the transport, services, egyptian expeditionary force. (1925); maj.-gen. sir m. bowman-mainfold, <x ontline of the egyptian and palestine campaigns, 1914-18, (1922); e. dane, british campaigns in the nearer east, 1914-18. (1919); egyptian expeditionary force, record of the advance of the egyptian expeditionary force, july 1917-oct. 19z8. (1919). from official sources; lt.-col. p. g. elgood, egypt and the army (egypt during the war). (1924); w. t. massey, the desert campatgns (1918); lt.-col. hon. r. n. o. preston, zhe desert mounted corps (palestine and syria), 1977-18. (1921); a s. g. watkin-williams, in the hands of the senoussi. 1916); mesopotamia and persia maj.-gen. l. c. dunsterville, the adventures of dunsterforce (persia and baku). (1921); report of the commission on mesopotamia. (1917); brig.-gen. f, j. moberly, afesopotamia campaign, 1914-18 (1923, etc.). 3 volumes. official; maj.-gen. sir c. v. f townshend, fy campaign in meso- potamia. (1920); : ii13 africa brig.-gen. j. h. crowe, general smuts' campaign in east africa. (1918); e. dane, british campaigns in africa, ete. (1919); brig.-gen. c. p. fendall, the hast african force, 19%4-109. (1921); gen. o. von lettow-vorbeck, heia safari! (1921). german campaign in east africa; gen. o. von lettow-vorbeck, my reminiscences of east africa. (1920). translation; os o'neill, the war in africa, efc. (1918). includes kiao ‘haus | w.s. rayner and w. w. o'shaughnessy, ow botha and sniuts conquered german south west africa. (1916); p. j. sampson, the capture of de wet: the south african rebellion. (1915); dr. hl. schnee, deutsch ost-afrika 1m weltkrieg. (1921); correspondence re operations in togeland. (1915); lt.-commidt. w. whittal. with botha and smuts in africa (south west african campaign). (1917); england capt. j. morris, the german air-raids on great britatn 1914-18. 1925); lt.-col. a. rawlinson, the defence of london, 1915-18. (1923); miscellaneous correspondence re taking of samoa. (1915); ae ne der kampf um tsingtau. "neill. (1920) see also memmoorrs of commanders, statesmen, etc. sir g. arthur, life of lord kitchener, 3rd vol. (1920); a. hi. atteridge, afarshal ferdinand foch. (1918); lord bertie, diary, 1914-1918, 2 vol. (1924); princess e. blitcher, an english wife in berlin. (1920); sir g. buchanan, afy mission to russia, etc. 2 vol. (1923); rt. hon. w. s. churchill, the world crisis. 2 vol.: 19r1-4 and r9r§. (1923); feld marshal frhr. conrad von hitzendorf, aus metner dienst- seit (1906-1918). (1924); j. w. gerard (u.s.a. ambassador), afy four years in germany. (1917); frederick william, ex-crown prince of germany; memoirs. (1922); viscount grey of fallodon, twenty-five years, 1892-1916. 2 vol. 1925); b. j. hendrick, life and letters of ww. @. page (u.s.a. ambas- sador in london). 3 vol. (1922-8); feld marshal p. v. hindenburg, aus meinent leben. (1919). translation, out of my life (1920); ne ene papers of col. ilouse, arranged by c. seymour. 1926); gen. h. de lacroix, le marechal foch. (1921); gen. e. ludendorfl, kriegfitihrung und politik. gen. e. ludendorfl, afy war memories. (1919); h. morgenthau (u.s.a. ambassador), secrets of the bosphorous, (1921); 1918); m. paleologue, 42% ambassador’s mentotrs. (1923-5). transla- tion; col. ac. repington, the first werld war. 2 vol. (1920); ee een sir w. robertson, from private to field farshal. 1921); gen. v. (1919); adml. a. v. tirpitz, fy afemories. 2 vol. (1919). stein (war minister), eviebnisse und betrachtungen. navaal and mercantile marine admiralty, the battle of jutland, official, with maps, ctc. (1920); narrative of the baitle of jutland. (1924); return showing loss of ships of r.n. return showing loss and damage of merchant- and fishing-vessels. (1919); board of trade, aferchant shipping. return of casualties and loss of life. july 1 19%4—dec. 31 1978; sir j. s. corbett, zzistory of the great war. (naval operations). official, 3 vol. (1920-1); c. e. fayle, seaborne trade. official, 3 vol. (1920, etc.); germany, marine archiv., der arieg zur see, 1914-18. 4 vol. to 1915. (1924); may. p. gibbon, the triumph of the royal navy. official record of surrender of german fleet. (1919); adm. visct. jellicoe, the grand fleet, 1914-16. (1919); the crisis of the naval war. (1920); m. parmelee, blockade and sea power, 1914-19. (1925); a. h. pollen, the navy in batile. (1918); ees scheer, germany's high sea fleet in the world war. 1920); j. r. smith, zufluence of the great war upon shipping. (1919); c.s. terry, ostend and zeebrugge. despatches, etc. (1919); adm. lord wester wemyss, ze navy in the dardanelles cam- paign. (1924). lr14 world war, bibliography of aviation a. pulling, food supply amfanual and orders; war material sup- maj. w. a. rishop, winged warfare. (1918); capt. a. bott, contact,” an airman’s outings. (1917); e. middleton, the great w ar in the air, 2 vol. (1920); sir w. a. raleigh, the war in the air. official. (1922, etc. : medical and casualties >: gene and k, o. v. petersen, losses of life caused by war. 1923 maj.-gen. sir w. g. macpherson, history of the great war. ie services and diseases in the great war. 4 vol. official. 1924 red cross, reports by the red cross and order of st. john on work during the war, (1921); war office, memo. on treatment of i ae 11.m1.s.0. (1916); injuries and diseases of war. (1918); return of officers (2 parts) and afen (80 parts) died in the great war, i9t4-1919. (1919-20). political brest-litovsk, treaty of peace between central powers and ukrain- jan government. cd. 9105. (1918); maximilian harden, arieg und frieden. 2 vol. (1918); g. de manteyer (ed. ), austria's peace offer, iqio-17. (1921); maj.-gen. sir f. maurice, intrigues of the war. (1922); - mermeix, fragments d’ itistoire, 7914-19. 6 vol. (1919, etc.); c.f. nowak, the collapse of central eurepe. translation. (1924); official german documents relating to the world war, reports of german rst and 2nd sub-committees. commencement of the war. (1923); dr, a, f. pribram, the secret treaties of austro-itungary, 1879- 1914 (1920); “ms puyvelde, le mouvement flamand et la guerre. (1918); l. rogers, america's case agatnst germany. (1917); j. b. scott (ed.), diplomatic cries between the u.s.a. and germany, iqt4-17. (1918); j. b. scott (ed.), a survey of ‘international relations between u.s.a. and germany. (1918); j. 3: aor cay. ay oi tat statements of war aims and peace pro- eis oy 1921): g. v. seldes, the united states and the war. (1917); r. ae ‘baker, woodrow wilson and world eee 1922); hh. poe he aa alli istory of the peace conference of paris. 6 vo 1923); stationery office, treaties of peace: between allies and germany ne 1919); austria (st.germain, 191g), iiungary (trianon, 920), bulgaria (neuilly, 1920) and turkey (sevres, 1920—not fflficd). president wilson's great speeches and other iistory-making docu- ments. (1919); 3 vol. economic and financial n. angell, the fruits of victory. (1921); j. e. barker, economic statesmanship (1918). from the w ar} a. l. bowley, prices and wages in the united kingdom, 1914-1920. (1921); carnegie endowment, economic and social history of the war. british series. 23 vol. (1922, etc.); rear adm. m. consett, the 7 riumph of unarmed forces, 1914-18. german supplies. (1923); g. a. b. dewar, the great munition feat, ror4-18. (1921); disconto- gesellschaft, berlin, die deutsche volks: wirtschaft im kriege. (19485, etc. 3 a. dix, wirtschaftskrieg und kriegswirtschaft, (1921); foreign office, grad on the isconomic situation in germany during the wa (1914-8); e, goldschmid, die wirlschaftlichen kriegsorganisationen o6ester- reichs. (1919); f, h. hatch, the iron and steel industry of the un ited kingdom under war conditions. (1919); b. j. hibbard, effects of the vane war upon agriculture in the u.s.a. and great britain. (1920); major d. c. huston and major o. rutter, gen. sir j, cowans, the o.m.g. of the great war, (1924); j. m. keynes, the economic consequences of the peace. a revision of the treaty. (1921); ministry of reconstruction, reconstruction problems, during war and after. no. 16. (1919); national expenditure, reports (1-70) from the select committee on national expenditure. (1918); j. s. nicholson, war finance. (1918); w. a. paton, the economic position of the untted kingdom, z 1 cois a l'effort economique et financier de l’angleterre. 1918); ee evel la guerre economique, 1914-17. problems arising (1920); prices (1917); plies, etc., etc. numerous publications. (1916 onwards); sir jee salter (sce also carnegie endowment), allied shipping control: an ltxperiment in international administration. (1921); | dae de starling, report on food and agricultural conditions in germany. (1919); tariff conimission, the war and british economic policy. (1915); hi. withers, [var and lombard street. (1916). international law, violations, etc. correspondence between h.m. and u.s. governments re alleged tnterference with american shipping. (1916); “bar along,” der baralong-fall. (191g); 7 ib: aralong,’’ correspondence re the +\lleged einetdent cd. 8144, cd. 8176. (1916); | belgium, commission denquete sur les violations des regles du droit des gens, etc. 3 vol. (1915-6- ~21), belgium, die belgischen greuelthaten gegen die deutschen. (1914); die velke rrechtswidrige frihrung des belgischen volkskriegs. german whitebook (may i0 1915); belgian afinistries of justice and foreign affairs: reply to german whitebook, afay ro rors. english translation. (1918); correspondence with the u.s, ambassador respecting the execution of miss cavell at brussels. cd. 8013. (1915); visct. bryce, report and evidence of committee on alleged german outrages. 1914-16, cd. 7894. (1915); c.l. droste, the ae case. pro-german. (1915); france (official), recenil de documents relatifs ala guerre. 3 vol. enemy violation of international law. (1915, etc.); j. w. garner, international law and the world war, (1920); a. got, the case of miss cavell, (1920); a. hurd, ordeal by sea. german atrocities at sea. (1918); kommission schicking, german commission on complaints of maltreatment of prisoners in germany. (1920); report of formal investigation of loss of s. s cd. 8022 (1915); proceedings in camera. cd. 381 (1919); prof. j. h. morgan, the german war book. (1915); german atrocities: an official investigation. (1916); c. mullins, the leipsie trials. german mentality. (1921); das schwarsbuch der schandtaten unserer feinde. (1915); exchange of correspondence between u.s.a. and gana govern- menis re action of submarines. (1917); 4a. j. toynbee, the german terror in belgium. (1917); a. j. toynbee, the german terror in france. (1917). “ lusitania,” semi-official. semi-official. nmiscellaneous maj.-gen. sir g. aston, war lessons, new and old. (1919); official names of battles, etc., tor{j-19. (1921); re. bevan, german social democrac y during the war. (1918); reporis by u.s. officials on treatment of british prisoners of war. (1915); gov ren committee on treatment of british prisoners of war. (1915). 2nd ed. (1916); report on treatment of british prisoners of war in turkey. cd. 9208. (1918); report on treatment by the germans of british prisoners and natives in german fast africa. cd. 8689. (1917); sir c. cook, defence of the realm manual. (1918); sir bat, cook, the press in war-time. (1920); n. everitt, british secret service during the great wa (1920); = re lee felstead, german spies at bay, 1914-1918. ron official sources. (1920); i. fraser and j. gibbons, ed., soldiers’ and sailors’ words and phrases, (1925); (sermany, reichsgesundheitsamt, through hostile blockade. (1918); al: ifammond, british labour conditions and legislation during the war. (1920); capt. v. w. holohan, divisional and other signs. (1920); in. m. h. llovd, experiments in stute control ai the war office and the food ministry, (1924); a. marchand, les chemiis de fer de l'est, 1914-18. (1924); damage to german stamina oberst w. nicolai, the german secret service. translation. (1924); wack: chenaicasl presse und volksstimmung im weltkrieg. (1921); e. b. osborn (ed.), the muse in arms. anthology. (1917); e. a. pratt, british railways and the great war. 2 vol. (1921); a. pulling, ‘defence of the realm, regulations and orders. (1915 onwards); sir c. stuart, secrets of crewe itouse. (1920); sir basil thomson, queer people. (1922); mrs. humphry ward, england's effort. (1916); sir a. k. yapp, the romance of the red triangle. y.m.c.a. (1918). worthington-evans—wright, wilbur mars, etc. | i. bowman, the new world: problems in political geography. usa. (1922); hl. j. fleure, the treaty settlement of europe. geographic and ethnographic. (1921); eae sis catalogue of maps of the theatres of war, etc. (1918); nelson's amfap-book of the world-wide war. (1917): g. philip and son, the world's batilefronts ata glance. (1918); the western front at a glance. useful. (1917); “the times,” war atlas. (1917); war atlas, atlas of ‘‘ chronology of the war.” small. (1920). bibliography bibliotheque et musee de la guerre, catalogue du fonds allemand de la bibliotheque. 4 vol. (1921-3): camille bloch (carnegie foundation), bibliographie generale methodique de l'histoire economique et sociale dela france pendant la guerre. (1926): british museum, subject index of books on the war, (1922); m. e. bulkley, brdliographical survey of contemporary sources for the economie and social history of the war. (1922): dr. j. l. kunz (austrian), bibliographie der kriegsliteratur. 1920); hone ? btane, collection, za grande guerre. bibliographie, documents divers. 11 vol. (1916): sir g. w. prothero, a select analytical list of books concerning the great war, (1923); stationery office, list of publications issued by stationery office. the european war. (1914-6); united states, library of congress. a check list of the literature, etc., on the european war. (1919); list of references on europe, etc. (1914); select list of references on economic reconstruction. (1919); war office library, catalogue: subject index, (1915-25). very full work of reference. | (is, ge") worthington-evans, sir laming (b. 1868), british poli- tician, was born aug. 23 1868 and became a solicitor in 1800. in 1910, after one unsuccessful attempt, he was elected conserv- ative m.p. for colchester, and in ror8 for the colchester divi- sion of essex. in 1916 he entcred the coalition govt. as parlia- mentary secretary to the ministry of munitions, having pre- viously been controller of the foreign trade department of the foreign office. he left the ministry of munitions in 1918 to become minister of blockade, and afterwards filled the following offices under mr. lloyd george and mr. baldwin: minister of pensions, 1918-20; minister without portfolio, 1920-1; secretary for war, 1921-2; postmaster-general, 1923-4; and again secre- tary for war, 1924. he has written books on company law. wrangel, peter nicholaievich, baron (1878- of russian soldier, was born at st. petersburg (leningrad) aug. 15 1878. after experience in the ranks of the horse guards and as a mining enginecr in siberia, he served as an officer in a cossack regiment, transferring after the russo-japanese war to the horse guards asa captain. during the world war he com- manded successively a squadron, a regiment and a division of cossacks. he was one of the first officers to join kaledin against the bolsheviks. after kaledin’s suicide wrangel allicd himsclf to alexeyev and deniken, distinguishing himself particularly by his defence of tsaritsyn. on april 4 1920, after deniken’s re- treat, wrangel was appointed commander-in-chicf of the volun- teer army. from may to oct. 1920 his forces met with consider- able success, but after the signing of a peace treaty between poland and the bolsheviks the tide turned. on nov. 15, sebas- topol was lost and the evacuation of the army carricd out.