WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC

the movement for the suppression of the international traffic in women and children for immoral purposes may be said to some extent to date from the attempt, in the middle of the roth cen- tury, to introduce what may be described as a system of state regulation of vice into england. this system owed its introduc- tion to the remarkably high incidence of venereal disease at that period among soldiers and sailors, and as a result, in 1864, the first of the contagious diseases acts was passed (sce 22.462). steps taken before r920.—at that time in europe there appear to have been, as there still are, two bodies of opinion; in some countries the state recognised prostitution as a necessity which could not be overlooked, but which called for control by registration and sanitary supervision; in other countries a strong body of opinion favoured no such recognition. in 1875 a meeting was called by josephine butler in geneva to consider white slave traffic from its international aspect anc in its relation to state regulation, and as a result the [n- ternational federation for the abolition of state regulation of vice was formed. in 1898 and 1899 william alexander coote, the secretary of the national vigilance association of great britain, visited germany, holland, belgium, france, russia, switzerland, spain, austria and the scandinavian countries, and in the capital of each organised a national committee for the suppression of white slave traffic. an international congress was therefore held in london in june 1913, and at that congress the international bureau for the suppression of white slave traffic was constituted to co-ordinate the work of the national committees. the french government had called an official conference in paris in 1904, and an international agreement was drafted, under which the signatory powers under- took to appoint a central authority in each country charged with the co-ordination of all information relative to the traffic. the signa- tories undertook to ensure vigilance at ports and railway stations, to notify the arrival in each country of suspected persons, to take declarations from alien prostitutes, to protect and maintain the victims of the traffic pending repatriation (for which they also took the responsibility) and to supervise registry offices or agencies engaged in finding employment for women and girls abroad. in 1910 a second governmental conference was called in paris. a convention drawn up alter this conference provided for the punish- ment of procurers for immoral purposes of girls and women, either minors or of full age, in whatever country the various acts con- stituting the offence might be committed. it provided also for the enactment, in those countries where needed, of the necessary legisla- tion. in addition to the official conferences mentioned, the inter- national bureau was instrumental in calling together conferences and congresses in various parts of europe, and it is greatly due to the enterprise of this body and the national committees affiliated to it, that so much has been done to limit the extent of the traffic. the work of the league of nations such was the preliminary work done before the league of nations came into existence on jan. 10 1920. article 23 (3) of the covenant states that members “ will entrust the league with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children.” on the deci- sion of the first assembly of the league, a questionnaire was ‘sent to all governments to ascertain the measures taken or proposed in the various countries to put an end to the traffic. the council of the league was also invited to convene an inter- national conference. thirty-four states were represented at this conference, which was held in geneva from june 30 to july 5 1921. to it were invited, not only states parties to the previous international engagements, but all states willing to take part, and the meetings were open to the public. the con- ference examined the replies to the questionnaire, and a final act was adopted containing a number of recommendations requiring action by governments. this final act was approved by the council and, in sept. 1921 the assembly invited all governments to authorise their delegates to sign forthwith a | convention submitted by the british govt. in which many whitley councils—wien provisions of the final act were given conventional form. this convention was open for signature on sept. 30 rg2t; it has been signed by 33 states, 27 of which (including the british empire, the dominions of australia, canada, new zealand and south africa and india) have up to the present time ratified the con- vention. twenty-five british colonics and dependencies and the territory of ‘iraq (british mandated territory) have adhered. the new convention was not intended to replace the earlier instruments, but to supplement only, and it is for that reason that the first article prescribes that the high contracting par- ties, if not already parties to the agreement of 1904 and the convention of 1910, shall ratify or adhere to them without delay. other new provisions in the convention are that the punish- ments prescribed under the convention of 1910 for those who traffic in women and girls are made applicable to those who engage in the traffic of children of either sex. the punishment is required not only of those guilty of offences committed, but of attempts to commit the offence and, within legal limits, of acts preparatory to the committing of such offence. the min- imum age under which it is an offence to procure a woman for immoral purposes, even with her consent, previously fixed at 20, is raised to 21. in addition, the provisions of the convention of 1921 relating to extradition go further than those of the con- vention of rg1o, the parties agreeing that in cases where no extradition convention exists between two countries, they will take all measures in their power to extradite or provide for the extradition of persons accused or convicted of certain offences specified under the convention of 1910. they also undertook to prescribe such regulations as are required for the protection of women and children seeking employment in another country, if they had not already done so. ; lhe advisory committee—another outcome of the conference of 1921 was the setting up of an advisory committce to the council on all matters relating to the traffic in women and chil- dren. this committee sat for the first time in june 1922. it was composed of delegates of governments, and of assessors appointed by international voluntary organisations. during its four meetings 1t had under special consideration the questions of employment of women abroad by theatrical, variety, concert and cinema agents; the moral welfare of women and children on emigrant ships; the consideration of the system of licensed houses; the employment of women police, and the consideration of the laws and regulations in force in the various countries for the suppression of the traffic. of these questions, one which has been given much importance is that of the system of the licensed house. though it may be maintained that the regulation of vice in any country is purely an internal and national question, it was the opinion of a large number of members on the advisory committee that the licensed house stimulates immorality and encourages an international trade to supply a certain market. the committee gave special attention to the subject, and as a result of its investigations, the council “‘ recognising the connection which may exist between a system of licensed houses and the traffic in women and chil- dren,” invited states which had abandoned the system to explain the motives of their decision in abandoning it, in so far as they concern the traffic; and states which still maintain the system to indicate whether their experience leads them to believe that the system encourages the international traffic or otherwise. the majority of answers received appear to indicate a strong movement for the abolition of the licensed house system, which some of the new states created by the treaty of versailles adopted and subsequently abandoned. the reasons given by these states and others for this abolition are various. it is said, for example, by some that the system has not justified expecta- tion, and has tended to disseminate rather than diminish vene- real disease. it is the opinion given by more than one state that the licensed brothel has proved itself to be a permanent factor in the traffic in women and children, in fact that the traffic owes its very life to the existence of the licensed brothel. the dutch govt., in stating the reasons for the abolition of the system of regulation in that country, state that experience has 1027 shown that the trafic depends on the existence of the licensed brothel anc that its abolitton has almost killed the traffic. on the other hand certain countries, in replying, say that they maintain the system in the interests of public health. this is sometimes qualified by the statement that there is an obvious contradiction existing between the system of tolerance and the higher end of the state, or that the state has decided to give the matter serious attention in view of the growing public opinion in favour of abolition, and in other reports it is said that although the system is maintained, a scheme is in course of preparation for its suppression. the evidence, however, is far from complete. an expert investigation.—in order to ascertain the extent of the world traffic, the routes which it follows and the individuals or organisations connected with it, a small body of experts was nominated to make a world investigation on the spot with the consent of and in conjunction with the governments concerned. during 1924 and 1925, between 30 and 40 countries were visited. bibliography.—reports of the international conference on trafic in women and children (geneva, 1921); the reports of the league of nations advisory committee on traffic in women and children (5 sessions, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926). (r. cr.) whitley councils: see industrial relations. whitlock, brand (1869- ), american diplomat and writer, was born at urbana, ohio, march 4 1869. he was elected mayor of toledo in 1905 and was re-elected for three succeeding terms, but in ro11 declined the nomination for a fifth term. in 1913 he was appointed u.s. minister (later ambassador) to bel- gium. before he had been in belgium a year the world war broke out and the german invasion took place. although the other diplomatic bodies followed the belgian court to havre, whitlock insisted on remaining in brussels. it was largely due to his urgent advice that brussels did not resist and thus escaped devastation. in the carly days of the war he gave protection to many german residents who had been unable to leave the coun- try. by his firm attitude toward the german military officials he saved many innocent belgians from death; but his activities on behalf of edith cavell were unavailing as he was misled at the last moment through false promises by the germans. after the formation of the commission for relief in belgium, its operations were placed wholly under his direction. his ceaseless work on their behalf won the gratitude of all the belgians. he resigned feb. 1 1922. anaccount of the german occupation is given in his memortes of belgium under the german occupation, 2 vol. (1918). whitlock's other writings include the 13th district: a story of a candidate (1902); her infinite variety (1904); the turn of the balance (1907); abraham lincoln (1909, in the beacon biographies); the geld brick (gio); the fall guy (1912); forty years of it (1914); j. ifardin and son (1923), and uprooted (1926). whooping cough: see infectious fevers. whymper, edward (1840-1911), british artist, explorer . and mountaineer (see 28.617), died at chamonix sept. 16 tgtt,. whyte, alexander (1837-1921).—scottish divine (see 28.617), died at hampstead, london, jan. 6 1921. in 1915 he published thirteen appreciations. wien, wilhelm (1864- ), german physicist, was born on jan. 13 1864, at gaffken (east prussia). he studied at the universities of kenigsberg, freiburg and berlin, and in 1890 entered the physico-technical institute as assistant. in 1896 he was appointed professor at the technical high school, aix-la- chapelle; in 1899 he went to giessen, and in 1900 to wiirzburg. wien’s researches covered almost the whole sphere of physics. he wrote on optical problems; on radiation, especially the radi- alion of heat, for which in 1911 he was awarded the nobel prize; on water and air currents; and on the transmission of radiation in rarefied gases (cathode and rentgen rays), which brought him in touch with modern high frequency technology. in 1913 he lectured at columbia university in new york on problems of modern theoretical physics. wien was editor of the annalen der phystk from vol. 21 (1906); his chief works are: lehrbuch der hydrodynamtk (1900); neuere probleme der theoretischen phystk (1913); die relativitdts-theorie vom standpunkte der physik und erkenntnislehre (1921). 1028 wiggin, kate douglas (1857-10923), american novelist (see 28.626), died in london aug. 24 1923. in accordance with her wishes her body was cremated, and the ashes scattered on the waters of the saco river at hollis, me., sept. 12 1923. wilamowitz-mollendorff, ulrich von (183s- _s+#?— german philologist, was born on dec. 22 1848 at markowitz in posen. he studied at bonn and berlin, and afterwards travelled in italy and greece 1872-4. in the latter year he took a post as lecturer in berlin, and afterwards became a professor in greifs- wald and gettingen. in 1897 he was appointed professor of ancient philology in the university of berlin. wilamowitz proved himself not only an excellent editor and witty commen- tator on the greek tragedies of aeschylus, euripides and aris- totle, but also a brilliant translator of greek verse. sharply attacked by fricdrich nietzsche in his youth, wilamowitz became one of the first authoritics of modern times in the field of greek philology. among his numerous works are: aeschyli tragoediae (greek and german 1914); euripides’ herakles, with an introduction to the greck tragedy and german annotations (1889); die textgeschichte der gricchischen lyriker (1900); bucolici gracci (oxford, 1905); die ilias und ilomer (1916); platon, (1919); hellenistische dichtung (1924); gricchische verskunst (1921); pindaros (1922). wilberforce, albert basil orme (1841-1916), eng” lish divine (see 28.630), dicd may 13 1916. wilbrandt, adolf (1837-1911), german novelist and dramatist (see 28.631), died at rostock june 10 1911. see e. scharrer-santen, adolf wilbrandt als dramatiker (1912), and jahrbuch und deutscher nekrolog, xvi., p. 84 (totenliste 1911). wilbur, ray lyman (1875- ), american educationalist, was born at boonesboro, ia., april 13 1875. we graduated at stanford university in 1896, proceeding thence to cooper medical college, san francisco (m.d. 1899), and later continu- ing his studies at london, frankfurt and munich. in 1909 he was appointed professor of medicine at stanford university, becoming dean in 1911. in 191g he was appointed president. he was chief of the division of conservation of the u.s. food commission, and a member of the california state council of defence 1917. wiley, harvey washington (1844- ), american chemist, was born in kent, ind., oct. 18 1844. he was educated at hanover (ind.) college (a.b., 1867; a.m., 1870), indiana medical college (m.d., 1871) and harvard (b.s., 1873). he was professor of greek and latin at butler college, indianapolis (1868-70); state chemist of indiana and professor of chemistry at purdue university (1874-83); and chief chemist of the u.s. dept. of agriculture (1883-1912). from 1899 he was professor of agricultural chemistry at the george washington university. he was specially interested in preventing food adulteration, and antagonised many food packers, who in 1rg1z unsuccessfully exercised political pressure to obtain his dismissal from the dept. of agriculture on the technical charge that an expert in his department had received recompense exceeding the legal rate. president taft wholly exonerated him. dr. wiley resigned in 1912, thereafter devoting himself largely to the cause of pure food by lecturing and writing. his numerous publications include the sugar industry of the united states (1885); principles and practice of agricultural analysts (1894-7; revised edition, 1906-14); foods and thetr aduiterations (1907, third edition, 1917); the lure of the land (1915), and bever- ages and their aduiteration (1919). he also edited a series of [health readers for schools in 1919. willard, daniel (1861— ), american railway official, was born at north hartland, vt., jan. 28 1861. he studied for a year at the mass. agricultural college, amherst, and in 1879 began his railway career as a track labourer in vermont. he rose to fireman, then to engineer, and for years held various posi- tions on the minneapolis, st. paul and sault ste. marie; balti- more and ohio; erie; chicago, burlington and quincy; colorado midland and colorado and southern railroads. in 1910 he was elected president of the baltimore and ohio. in oct. 1916, he became a member of the advisory commission of the council of national defence, and the following march chairman of the com- wiggin—william mission. he was appointed in july 1917, a member of the special committee of the council of national defence to secure mediation in case of strikes on war contracts. in nov. 1917, he was ap- pointed by president wilson chairman of the war industries board. in jan. 1918, he resigned in order to devote his personal attention to the baltimore and ohio rutlroad. after the gov- ernment had taken over the railways as a war measure he was displaced as operating head of his road, but remained president in charge of its corporate affairs, in which position he continued when the u.s. govt. gave up control of the railways. willcocks, sir william (1852- ), british engineer, was born in india and educated at roorkee college, india. from 1872 to 1897 he was engaged successively in the indian and egyptian public works departments. he designed and carried through the aswan dam in 1808, and for this work the c.m.g. was conferred upon him, followed by the k.c.m.g. in 1902. ilis most important undertaking, however, was the irrigation of mesopotamia, begun in 1911 at an estimated cost of £26,195,000. the scheme provided for the irrigation of 3,500,000 acres. his published works include egyptian irrigation (1889); the irriga- tion of mesopotamia (1905) and from the garden of eden to the crossing of the jordan (1918). in march 1921 he was found guilty by the supreme consular court of egypt of seclition and criminal hibel in respect of statements concerning the data in connection with the nile irrigation scheme, and was bound over to be of good behaviour for one year. willett, william (1856-1015), british builder, was born at farnham, surrey, in sept. 1856. wie made a name for himself in london as a designer of beautiful houses; but his chief claim to fame was his conception and promo'tion of the system of “‘ day- light saving.”? though scoffed at in his fifetime, his idea was taken up and put into practice in 1916, and honour has been paid to willctt’s memory, which was denied to him in life. he died at chislehurst, kent, march 4 rors. (see daylight saving.) william (1882- ), late crown prince of germany, eld- est child of william ii. of germany, was born at the marble palace, potsdam, on may 6 1882. he began his military career by serving in the rst foot guards, and accompanied the kaiser to england (jan. rg—feb. 5 1901) on the occasion of the funeral of queen victoria. on june 6 1903 he married the duchess ce- cilia, sister of the grand duke of mecklenburg-schwerin. there were five children, four sons and one daughter, of the marriage. his political and personal interventions in public affairs gave some trouble in the years preceding the war. he was credited with pan-german sympathics, and on one occasion (nov. 9 1911) he appeared in the royal box in the reichstag during the debate on the morocco settlement and demonstratively applauded speakers who were attacking great britain and the imperial chancellor, bethmann-hollweg. he was afterward compelled by the emperor to make amends to the chancellor. on the oc- casion of the conflict in dec. 1913 at zabern in alsace between officers of the garrison and the civilian population, he dispatched telegrams encouraging the officers in their truculent attitude. in 1910-1 he paid a visit to ceylon, india and egypt, and he pub- lished some account of his experiences in his jagdfagebuch. on the outbreak of the world war the crown prince was appointed to the command of the v. army in the west. in sept. 1915 he received the command of an army group, and he was nominally in charge of the german operations against verdun. his flight to holland speedily followed that of the emperor in nov. 1918, and he went to wicringen, an island in the zuider zee. he formally renounced on dec. 1 1918 his rights of succes- sion to the crowns of prussia and the german empire. the ex-crown princess and her children, however, continued to re- side at potsdam. although credited with remaining in touch with the monarchists in germany, the ex-crown prince took little active part in this movement. his father was the national object of the strict legitimist sympathies while william was too closely involved in his father’s fate and unpopularity to be able to head a rival movement of his own. on nov. 10 1923 he sud- denly returned to his estate at oels in silesia. there was strong fecling in france that the german govt. should be com- william ii. pelled to surrender him, but the matter was settled by a german note which stated the act of renunciation of the ex-crown prince and declared that it would not permit the return of the kaiser. the allied powers declared that they would hold germany re- sponsible for any consequences which might arise, but the ex- crown prince himsclf declared that he would take no part in politics. his memoirs, fe suche die wahrheit were published in i william il. (18s59- s+), until 1918 german empcror, was born at berlin on jan. 27 1850, the eldest son of prince frederick of prussia, afterwards crown princeand second german emperor, and of victoria, princess royal of great britain and ireland. at the time of his birth william received an injury to his head and left side that rendered his left arm permanently useless, an event that was to have an important effect upon his character and thereby upon the fuiure of germany and the world. <as a hohenzollern prince, and still more as heir to the throne, he was destined for a military career. yet in this career his useless arm would more patently handicap him than in any other. hence there entered into his personality what would now be termed an “inferiority complex,” to overcome which he as- serted himself 10 the uttermost, so that in the event he became arrogant and self-assertive even when he had no occasion to be so. because he seemed manifestly unfitted for the army, he de- termined all the more to make himself an efficient soldier. with the exception of three years spent at the gymnasium at casscl and two more at the university of bonn his early years were entirely occupied in military training ‘came a second-lieutenant in the first regiment of the guards at the early age of 10 years. hence when he ascended the throne on june 15 1888 he did so thoroughly imbued with militaristic ideas, and in the belief that ‘ the soldicr and the army, not parliamen- tary majoritics, have welded together the german empire. my confidence is placed in the army.” prior to his accession he had made two friendships that were destined to affect profoundly his future career, and that serve to illustrate in their divergency his dual personality. amidst army circles he had learnt to know general count waldersee, a bitter opponent of bismarck and bismarck’s pro-russian policy, from whose enmity with the great chancellor may well have sprung the empcror’s own enmity with him. a prussian prince and sol- dier, he found in waldersce the prototype of the alf-preussische officer for whom there was but one loyally—that of his oath to his king; and one path to national greatness—military victory. there was, however, another and very different side to william’s nature-—a side that sought expression in his dramatic journeyings over europe; in his highly rhetorical speeches; in his very sincere love of music and art. inherited from his coburg grandfather, albert the prince consort, the young kaiser’s strongly developed artistic and theatrical temperament demanded a more sym- pathetic milien in which to expand than the society of waldersee and the officers of the potsdam garrison. and this is found in the kaiser’s friendship, which lasted more than 30 years, with philip, count (later prince) zu eulenburg-hertefeld. in the diaries and letters of this remarkable man is to be found the full- cst, most intimate portrayal of his imperial friend’s personality. on ascending the throne william ii. speedily found that ger- many was not wide enough to contain two such spirits as his and bismarck’s. in theory the aged chancellor conceded the supremacy in the government to the emperor; in practice he had himself been the real ruler. but now there sat on the throne a ruler who was not content to rule merely in name. after a strug- gle that left behind it bitternesses that poisoned german political life for more than a gencration, the chancellor was dismissed and the young emperor grasped with his own hands the helm of the ship of state. despite gloomy forebodings, especially in bis- marckian circles, no disaster overtook the ship; on the contrary, she went forward prosperously for the first decade of the reign. in the ‘nineties, however, the emperor made the discovery that the future of germany lay on the high seas; a discovery that led to the long rivalry in naval armaments between the em- pire and great britain and that was an important factor in bring- 1029 ing about the world war. for once an idea had taken possession of the eemperor he was tenacious to the last degree in endcavour- ing to give practical expression to it. hence he placed himself at the head of the navy party, gave his support to von tirpitz, and telegraphed to prince henry of prussia: “ i will not rest un- til it have brought my navy to the same height at which my army stands.”’ this policy of naval and also of colonial expan- sion inevitably brought germany into conflict with the british impire; but the empcror’s outbursts of ill-humour against this country are chiefly to be ascribed to his dishke to having his desires frustrated rather than to any inherent personal animus against the mnglish. from his earliest years he had been brought up to have his slightest wish regarded as a command, to be in- stantly obeyed; and as years passed by his position as ruler over a greatly prospering nation did nothing to eradicate his egotism. in forcign policy the emperor pursued a less spectacular path in the first decade of his reign than had been anticipated. he was conciliatory towards france; he courted russia, whose rapidly growing intimacy with france gave cause for alarm to the wilhelmstrasse; and he paid a theatrical, yet in its practical results eminently valuable, visit to the sultan of turkey in 1880. the east, indeed, made a strong appeal to his tempcrament, and he did much to intensily the “ drang nach osten * by which germany shortly afterwards became animated. until the dis- patch of the celebrated telegram to president kruger on jan. 3 1896, after the failure of the jameson raid, anglo-german re- lations had been friendly, even cordial, since the emperor’s acces- sion; and at one time the basis of a possible entente was undcr discussion. but after the episode of the telegram a change took place; the two countries gradually drifted apart until, with the growth of the german navy, rivalry began to spring up between them. in the second decade of his reign events occurred presaging the coming of the catastrophe that was to mark its final days. there was the episode of the bjgrke treaty, july 23-4 1905, in which the empcror sought to detach the tsar from his french alliance by pledging him to give, if necessary, his armei, support to germany—an attempt that ended in failure because prince bilow was willing to regard the treaty, which the tsar had actually signed without consulting count lamsdorff, the russian foreign minister, as being zon avenn. two years later came the famous incident of the daily tele- graph interview (oct. 28 1908), in which the empcror inveighed against the anglo-japanese alliance and declared that germany “must be prepared for any eventualitics in the east ’’; a declara- tion that was promptly disavowed by prince biilow, who forced his imperial master to promise publicly that in future he would refrain from such intrusions into the realm of foreign policy. the storm raised in germany by the publication of this interview nearly cost the emperor his throne; for some weeks talk of his abdication was rife, and he became the sport of every caricaturist in germany. eventually the storm blew over, leaving the kaiser unchanged in his autocratic disposition: ‘‘ if another such oppor- tunity comes, then [ will no longer act in a constitutional man- ner.’ if it left the kaiser unchanged, except in his people’s regard for him, the storm destroyed biilow, whose resignation followed in 1909. with his departure the last controlling influence over the kaiser was removed, and that ill-balanced, if gifted, monarch was ieft to fall a victim to the counsels of militaristic advisers. as holstein, who died in 1908, had said when entreat- ing bilow to remain in office: “if you resign, war will be inevitable.’ the year 1908 was indeed a decisive year in the empcror’s life. for 20 years he had ruled over an empire that had steadily waxed materially more prosperous. for 20 years he had been the cen- tral, though by no means the most important figure, in the politi- cal life of europe. now in the space of a year all was changed. lor a second time the work he had sought to accomplish at bjerk6 was destroyed when the tsar and king edward vii. 1 graf robert von oe triitzschier, zwolf jahre am deutschen katserhof, 1923, p. 2. 2 emil ludwig, if thelin der zweite, 1926, p. 381. 1030 met at reval in june. as a politician he had been proved no match for his uncle, for whom he now entertained a verv hearty dislike. as a ruler he had made himself ridiculous in the eyes of his own people because of the flagrant contrast between his professions and his deeds. for the first time in his reign, per- haps for the first time in his life, the emperor expericnced the chilling sensation of unpopularity. the way in which he met it was but a prelude to the days of nov. ro18; he went hunting with the ill-fated archduke francis ferdinand, and wired to biilow from vienna at a time when the reichsrat was debating his conduct: “ the two days here passed very harmoniously and happily .. . the hunt went splendidly. [laid 65 decr low... . i remember you always in my prayers morning and evening. they lift us above all human hatred and envy! there is a silver lining (sic) fo every cloud. god be with you! in old friendship. william i.r.’! between 1908 and 1914 the storm clouds overhanging europe frequently threatened to break. at times it seemed as if the german emperor were bent on provoking the catastrophe; at other times he seemed to be doing his utmost to avert it. achrenthal’s coupin the annexation of bosnia-hercegovina in oct. 1908 aroused the kaiser’s fury no less than that of izvolsky. © vienna will be accused of duplicity,” he wrote on the margin of the dispatch in which he learnt of the annexation, ‘ and with reason. it has duped us shockingly. . . i have been cut to the heart in my feelings as ally . . . simply a felony ... the thanks of the house of habsburg.’” the turkish revolution followed speedily on the annexation crisis. with amazing inconsistency the autocratic emperor wel- comed this latest achievement of democracy. on the margin of a dispatch in which marschall von bicberstein, writing from con- stantinople, commented on the conduct of the sultan’s courticrs who, owing all to him, nevertheless deserted him in the hour of crisis, the kaiser in words prophetic of the circumstances attend- ing his downfall wrote: “ thus do creatures of the court always behave! not only among the turks but also among us chris- tians.’ with the fall of biilow the influence of the military party, and especially of von tirpitz, grew from day to day. the com- petition between england and germany in naval armaments be- came keener and keener. repeatedly urged by biilow to come to an understanding with england on the naval question, the kaiser invariably replied in words he used to king edward: “tt (the naval programme) will be adhered to and exactly car- ried out, without any restrictions.’ in r912 lord haldane visited berlin in the hope that even at that late hour some modus vivendi might be found as between the two countries, but without result, though the kaiser, perhaps to impress his visitor, played the part of a constitutional monarch in the discussions that ensued. by now, however, it was too late to undo the work accomplished in the previous 20 years. already, as sir edward (later viscount) grey observed to count metternich, europe was divided into two camps. the responsibility for the existence of that division must in part fall upon the kaiser’s shoulders. the years 1912-4 were filled with wars in the balkans and rumours of wars elsewhere. perhaps at last some vision of what lay ahead of germany were she to pursue her present path became apparent to the emperor, for he constantly in these years reiterated his desire for peace. constantly he warned bethmann hollweg against the dangers into which germany might be led by a warlike austria, “ which might be the ruin of germany—all because of albania and durazzo.’ when, however, he was at last confronted with the imminent outbreak of that world war to which events had been leading up for a quarter of a century the kaiser lost his nerve. on first learning of the murder of the austrian archduke and his 1 ludwig, op. cit., p. 371. italicised sentence is in english in the original. 2 ludwig, op. cze., p. 394. ’ die grosse politik, 13 and 15. 622. 4 ludwig, op. czt, p. 396. ’ ludwig, op. cit., p. 407. william ii. wife at sarajevo he was filled with fury against serbia, which he declared was not “a state in the european sense, but a robber band.”’& ‘the sanctity of the monarchical principle had been violated, and true to his conception of kingship as a divine institution the emperor called for vengeance upon the murderers and the nation to which they belonged. nor did the imminence of a european war at first appall him. on the margin of a dispatch in which grey was reported as speaking of the danger of a european war he wrote: “ that will certainly come.’ indeed, during that fateful july preceding the outbreak of war the emperor found himself caught between the horns of a dilemma from which it might well have puzzled an abler man than he— and he was an able man—to escape. for years he had played the war-lord before the eyes not only of all europe but before those of the german nation and the military clique. now that war had become imminent, could he dare risk playing the peacemaker? might not his throne, if not his life, be endangered were he to seek to oppose the militarists whose plans he had long encouraged at the very moment when the long-awaited opportunity for putting them into execution had arrived? as he thus hesitated, there came the news of the serbian reply to the austrian ultimatum, and as he read it the emperor was quick to see a possible way of escape from his difficultics. ‘a brilliant result for a delay of 48 hours,” he declared. ‘“* that is more than one could expect. a great moral success for vienna; but with it every occasion for war disappears.’’® unhappily, the kaiser’s advisers proved him a false prophet; and indeed before many days had elapsed he was again possessed by a war-frenzy. at the great crown council at potsdam on july 29 the decision was taken in favour of war. in the war the kaiser’s mercurial temperament was recognised as a danger by the military leaders of germany. he was gradually but effectively side-tracked, and the real control of alfairs passed into the hands of men like ludendorff, hindenburg and talkenhayn. in 1918 as the end approached it became obvious that a revolution was imminent. hindenburg, who treated the emperor with scant respect, informed him that even the troops could not be relied upon in event of a civil war, and urged him to abdicate. at first the emperor protested his duty to germany, but finally gave way, abdicating as german emperor but not as king of prussia. the berlin government had anticipated such a move and had already announced his abdication of both thrones. after some hesitation he agreed to seek safety in holland, and he crossed the frontier on nov. 10, the day after the revolution broke out in berlin. at first he was the guest of count bentinck at amerongen; subsequently he purchased for himself a property at doorn. the empress (au- gusta victoria), who joined him at amerongen, died at doorn on april 11 t92r. she wasa daughter of frederick, duke of au- gustenburg and was married feb. 27 1881. they had issue, six sons and one daughter. on nov. 5 1922 the ex-emperor mar- ried princess hermine of reuss, widow of a german prince. (see also gerwaxy: iistory.) bibliography.—for an understanding of william it.’s character no book exceeds in interest or importance johannes haller's aus dem leben des frirsten philipp zu eulenburg-hertefeld (berlin, 1924); emil ludwig’s wilhelm lf. (1926), besides being a brilliantly written account of the emperor’s life, has done more than any other single volume to destroy the respect for monarchy entertained by the german people: it is, however, highly coloured and exaggerated. among other books may be mentioned bismarck's reflections and reminiscences, 3 vol. (1898 and 1921); prince hohenlohe’s afemozrs (1906); otto ilammann’s um den katser (1919), der neue kurs (1918); graf robert von zedlitz-triitzschler, zwolf jahre am deut- schen katserhof (1924); lady norah bentinck, the ex-kaiser in exile (1921); walther rathenau, der kaiser (1919); baron von eckardstein, lebenserinnerungen und politische denkwtirdigkeiten (1919-20); hl. von moltke, frinnerungen, etc. (1922); a. von tirpitz, eriunerungen (1919-20); a. von waldersee, denkwiirdrg- keiten (1922-3); die grosse politik der europdtschen kabinette (1921-5); die deutschen dokumente sum kriegsausbruch (1919). (i. f. d. ml.) § die deutschen dokumente sum kriegsausbruch (1919), 157. 7 thid. ®§ deutschen dokumente, 271. willstatter—wilson willstatter, richard (1872- —+),_~german chemist, was born in carlsruhe aug. 13 1872. he studied chemistry in munich, and in 1896 became a lecturer in that city. in 1905 he was appointed an extraordinary professor in ztirich. in 1912 he went as orclinary professor to berlin, and there became a member of the kaiser wilhelm institute of chemical research. in 1916 he resumed his activities in munich. willstatter’s chief researches are connected with alkaloids (atropine and cocaine), also with aniline dyes (aniline black) quinones, and with vegetable colour- ing matters, particularly those of the flower and the leaf. these investigations led him to pursue researches concerning the assimilation of carbonic acid by plants, and also in connection with chlorophyll which he carried out in conjunction with a. stoll. latterly he devoted himself to extensive and successful experiments in connection with ferments. in 1g15 he was awarded the nobel prize for chemistry. wilmington, del., u.s.a. (see 28.690), with a population of 110,168 in 1920, of whom 10,746 were negroes and 16,307 for- eign born, contained almost half (49-4%) of the population of the state; for 1925 the census bureau eslimate was 122,049. the out- put of factorics within the city, which do not include the du pont works, six miles away, was valued at $38,069,000 in 19009; $121,040,000 in 1919; $54,539,453 in 1921; $80,016,372 in 1923. after the world war the city undertook the construction (cost $3,100,000) of a marine terminal, with ample modern facilitics, and 25 {t. of water, ultimately to be increased to 35 ft., which was opened in june 1923. it is connected with the business section of the city by a reinforced concrete highway. a joint city hall and county building was completed in 1914; a civic centre (rod- ney square) in the business section, in 1915; a new building for the free library, in 1923. the park area was increased to 702 ac. by 1925, and a zoning ordinance was adopted in 1924. wilno: see vilna. wilson, sir henry hughes (1864-1922), british soldier, was born at edgeworthstown, county longford, ireland, on march 5 1864, and educated at marlborough and sandhurst. he joined the rifle brigade in 1884 and in 1894 he married a daughter of mr, g.c. wray. from the outset he was a serious and an ambi- tious soldier, and while his natural gaiety of disposition made him a welcome companion everywhere, his industry soon attracted the attention of his superiors. he was indeed, almost from the first, one of those men who could not be overlooked. his earliest experience of active service was in burma between 1886 and 1888, and when the boer war broke out in 1899 he had passed through the staff college and become a brigade major at aldershot. before that war ended wilson was brought back to the war office, when in the newly formed staff duties directorate it was his especial task to study and to apply the lessons which were learned in south africa—of which the chief perhaps was the necessity of organising the british army on something approach- ing continental lines ancl establishing a general staff for the study and application of the principles of war. in the work of reform henry wilson played a great, if still subordinate, part and it was no surprise when, in 1906, he was appointed to succeed rawlin- son as commandant of the staff college at camberley. himsclf an inspiring teacher with the irishman’s birthright of eloquence, he gathered around him a group of young officers upon whom he impressed his own views and his own system. more than all he became himself impressed with an almost overpowering sense of the imminence of war between france and germany. the en- tente was already in existence, and if it were to mean anything, at all must carry with it grave military responsibilities. wilson, therefore, established close relations with the french staff col- lege, and particularly a close personal friendship with its com- mandant, ferdinand foch, whose great work les principes de la guerre (the principles of war) became a textbook in this country. under his influence wilson became more and more convinced of the danger which was threatening europe, and spent much of his leave in making himself thoroughly acquainted with every detail of the franco-german frontier. in 1910 he left the staff college to succeed sir w. robertson as director of military operations, while robertson took wil- 1031 son’s place at camberley. it was one of the minor tragedies of the war that these two outstanding personalities were never quite able to act in unison. in whitehall, wilson concentrated the labours of his directorate upon what he believed to be the vital field of operations. incidentally he was one of lord rob- erts’ most ardent supporters in his campaign for national train- ing. thus, while british statesmen were striving for peace, the director of military operations, acting under the chief of the imperial general staff, was step by step perfecting the nation’s preparations for war. while the political leaders of france and britain were unable to enter into an alliance, soldiers were not only at liberty but were compelled, unless they were to neg- lect their manifest duty, to think out in consultation every detail of mobilisation and strategic concentration. at each step he had the cordial support of the other directors, with the result that in aug. 1914 the british war office was in a position to bring off the greatest strategical surprise of the whole war. mobilisation was rapid and the expeditionary force was landed in france without the loss of a man or a horse, complete in every detail. the world war.—in one important respect, however, there was a miscalculation. in common with almost everyone else wilson had counted on a short war to be reckoned in months. it was generally accepted that no nation could stand the mili- tary and economic strain of modern war for long. acting on this assumption the war office was denuded of experienced staff, and when lord kitchencr took office as secretary of state for war he found hardly anyone in whitehall upon whom he could rely. wilson’s own appointment in the field was deputy chief of the general staff under sir archibald murray. of all those who crossed from england with the british expeditionary force he was without doubt the best known in france, so much so that when the numbers of our troops increased the british army corps came to be referred to in french confidential documents as c.d@’ a.w. or corps d’ armee wilson. it was therefore natural that he should be appointed principal liaison officer with the french field headquarters, a post which he held until he took com- mand of the 1v. army corps towards the end of rors. although deeply interested in the life and welfare of the private soldier, he never really made his mark as a commander. to some extent, no doubt, this was due to lack of opportunity, but still more to temperament and to mental development along other lines. thus it was that early in 1917 he left the ficld armies for good and accompanied lord milner’s mission to russia. in nov. 1917 he went to versailles as british military representa- tive on the newly-established supreme war council. three months later, less than a month before the great german attack of march 1918, he once more succeeded sir w. robertson and this time as chief of the imperial general staff in london. he was one of those who supported mr. lloyd george in his efforts to secure unity of command on the western front and strongly pressed the claims of his old friend foch to be appointed com- mander-in-chief of the allied forces in france and flanders. foch was actually appointed at doullens, when the german advanced troops were within measurable distance of amiens. wilson had always belonged to what became known as the eastern school of thought rather than to the western, and when the german advance had been checked he worked hard to re- establish that eastern front which had been shaken by the rus- sian revolution and shattered by “‘ general hofmann’s jack- boot,” at brest litovsk. when the armistice was declared on nov. 11 1918 he had attained the rank of general, and in the final honours for the war he was promoted field marshal, was given a baronetcy and received a grant of £10,000. in his capacity as chief of the general staff he was the prin- cipal military adviser of the government during the prolonged negotiations at versailles, and subsequently at numerous con- ferences. his mastery of language and effective manner of ex- pressing in non-technical terms his views on technical matters no less than his charm of manner made him persona grata to ministers of state, and his intimacy with all the french superior commanders enabled him to make smooth many rough places. 1032 parliamentary careery.—unfortunately, when the war was over, the troubles in ireland came to a head and wilson was a -great irishman. his position as chief of the [mperial general staff, under a government with whose policy in ireland he could not agree, became extremely difficult. cordial relations became strained and old fricndships were broken. when, in feb. 1922, his tenure at the war office came to an end he entered parlia- ment as member for north down and at the same time he placed his military experience at the disposal of the government of northern ireland. seldom has a new member gone to west- minster better equipped. debate, and especially criticism, came easily to him, for he was a ready and effective speaker with sulh- cient restraint to prevent him from discussion of subjects of which he did not possess special knowledge. his maiden specch was delivered on march 15 on the army estimates and was fol- lowed at fairly frequent intervals by others on the irish question. here he quickly established himself as the most outspoken critic of those colleagues with whom in his military capacity he had worked so long, and in so doing he drew upon himself the hatred of his fellow countrymen in the 26 counties. on may 31 1922 he concluded a speech with the words: wonder when the moment will come when the government will have the honesty and truthfulness to say; ‘‘ we have miscalculated every single element in the [rish problem. we are exceedingly sorry for ail the terrible things that have happened owing to our actions. we beg seave to return to private life and never to appear again.”’ he never spoke again in the house of commons, for just three weeks later he was shot on his own doorstep in eaton place, london, as he returned from liverpool street station after un- veiling a memorial to the men of the creat eastern railway who had fallen in the war. it was a dastardly crime, as horrible in conception as in the occasion and manner of its execution. he was buried with full military honours in st. paul’s cathedral. sir henry wilson’s character is difficult to sum up. essen- tially a critic, he nevertheless did great constructive work for the british army and was, as much as any man, in great britain, the builder, though not the architect, of the entente with france. nevertheless he cannot be ranked with the greatest soldiers for he never held high command; in parliament he at once achieved distinction, but did not live long enough to prove himself a statesman. perhaps his greatest achievement was that at the most critical period in history, by his brilliant ability and compelling personality he bridged the gulf between the govern- ment in london and the armies in the field, for he more than any other soldier had the confidence of the prime minister. (n. m.*) wilson, james (1835-1920), american administrator (sce 28.693), died at tracer, ia., aug. 26 1920. wilson, thomas woodrow (1856-1924), 28th president of the united states, was born in staunton, va., dec. 28 1856. the scotch strain predominated in his ancestry, for his pa- ternal grandfather came from county down, in ulster, and his maternal grandfather, thomas woodrow, a graduate of glas- gow, from scotland. the stern presbyterianism of his father, a minister of small means but marked capacity as a theologian, early influenced him and left an indelible mark upon his charac- ter. his early years were spent in georgia and south carolina, where he was deeply affected by the sufferings of the south dur- ing the reconstruction period. in 1875 he entered princeton, graduating four years later. his record for scholarship in college was not remarkable, but he was prominent in debating and literary circles, and became student director of athletic sport. his most notable achievement was an article written in his senior year, and published in the ixfernational review, which analysed unfavourably the procedure of congress and formed the basis of his more mature political principles. after study- ing law in the university of virginia and following a bricf attempt to practise in atlanta, he decided to pursuc his studies in gov- ernment and history at johns hopkins university, whcre he received the degree of ph.d. in 1886. wilson’s thesis, entitled congressional government (1885), was a development of the attack upon congressional methods, and wilson, james—wilson, woodrow because of its clear and felicitous expression has been reprinted many times. in that year’ he began his teaching carcer at bryn mawr college, where he was associate professor of history and political econony until 1888; after two years as professor of the same at wesleyan, he entered the princeton faculty in 1890 as professor of jurisprudence and political economy. with slight changes in title he served in this capacity until 1902, when he became president of princeton. as professor he rapidly achieved distinction. his lectures were remarkable for clarity of presen- tation and brilliancy of phrasing, and the same qualities char- acterised both his addresses and his published writings. his gift was for generalisation rather than plodding scholarship, and after the publication of his thesis his happicst literary efforts were in essay form. they display keen critical capacity, but are not remarkable cither for crudition or for striking creative power. as president of princcton, mr. wilson devoted himself to serious reforms of the educational and social habits of the undergraduates. in the hope of elevating the standards of scholar- ship and of increasing the efficiency of instruction, he inaugurated in 1905 the “ preceptorial system,’ designed through small classes to bring teachers and students into the most intimate relationship. in his endeavours to democratise the social life of the university he mct detcrmined opposition. further diffi- culties developed from a disagreement with the dean of the grad- uate college. mr. wilson’s policies aroused warm controversy among alumni, faculty and undergraduates. while at princeton, both as professor and as president, mr. wilson displayed great intercst in political questions of the day, and through his addresses and articles speedily won a national reputation. insept.1910 he was tendered the democratic nom- ination for governor of new jersey. the offer, coming at the moment when the prospects for success of his policy at princeton seemed most discouraging, secured his ready acceptance. re- signing his academic position he entered upon an active electoral campaign which won him the support of progressive elements throughout the state, despite the fact that his candidacy had been inaugurated largely under the auspices of the conservative col. george harvey (afterwards u.s. ambassador to great britain) and the democratic state boss, senator james smith. in nov. he was elect ed by a plurality of 49,000 votes. heat once made it plain that he intended, regardless of the protests of ma- chine leaders, to fulfil his liberal pledges and would assume the leadership of the party for this purpose. as governor he suc- cessfully carried through a series of reform measures. of these the most significant were: a direct primaries law, which, sup- plemented by an effective corrupt practices act, did much to purify the political atmosphere of new jersey; an employers’ liability act; the creation of a public utilities commission; reform in municipal administration, making possible the adop- tion of the commission form of government. elections to the state senate and assembly in rg1r gave the republicans a ma- jority in both houses and the legislative output was curtailed. nevertheless his final activitics as governor were characterised by the impetus which he gave to the passage of a series of bills, known as the seven sisters, directed to the protection of the public from exploitation by trusts. when in june 1912 the democratic national convention met at baltimore to choose a candidate for president, mr. wilson's reputation as an effective reformer had brought his name prom- inently before the delegates. the convention was apparently controlled by conservative elements and there scemed little chance of the nomination of an anti-machine progressive. but as the struggle to secure the necessary two-thirds vote proceeded. with the conservative forces divided between champ clark, harmon and underwood, mr. w. j. bryan, leader of the pro- gressive elements, threw his dominating influence in favour of mr. wilson. it proved decisive, and on the 46th ballot he was nominated, july 2 1912. in the campaign that followed he voiced popular discontent with the conservatism of the republican 1tn 1885 he married ellen louise axson, of savannah, ga., who died in 1914, leaving three daughters. on dec. 18 1915 he married edith bolling galt, of washington, d.c. wilson, woodrow administration, which he believed to have been too closely allied with the interests of “ privileged big business.”’ his campaign speeches, characterised by a striking phraseology, won much applause, but were remarkable for their high moral tone rather than for originality of thought or policy. like roosevelt he demanded a national renaissance of ideals. in matters of im- mediate concern, such as the tariff, trust regulation, currency, the interests of labour, he insisted that the “ rule of justice and right ’’ must be set up. as regarded the future, in matters of conservation and trade, he asserted that great opportunities had been lost through the interlacing of privilege and private advan- tage with the framework of cxisting laws: “we must effect a great readjustment and get the forces of the whole people once more into play.’? his radicalism was of a mild sort, and he insisted that “ we need no revolution, we need no excited change; we need only a new point of view and a new method and spirit of counsel.” the popular temper was responsive to such a tone, but success in large measure could hardly have come to him except for the division of republican forces through the cam- paign of theodore roosevelt as progressive candidate. in the nov. election mr. wilson received 435 electoral votes as against 88 for roosevelt and 8 for taft; but his popular vote was 1,000,- ooo less than that of his two chief opponents, and in only 14 states (all in the south) did he receive a clear majority. despite the fact that he was the choice of a minority of the whole people, mr. wilson’s political position when he assumed office on march 4 1913 was one of remarkable strength. he was supported by a democratic majority in both houses of congress, the republicans were at loggerheads and he might expect sup- port from the progressives for much of his reforming legislative programme. his cabinet was not distinguished, but it contained certain elements of political and administrative strength, which proved advantageous for the moment, although later it was to become the mark for bitter criticism. the president soon made it plain that he was determined, as in his governorship of new jersey, to exercise his personal influence and his position as head of the party to initiate and carry through the legislation he had advocated in his campaign. his ascendancy in congress was soon established. after convoking both houses in special session on april 7 1913 he delivered his first message in person, reviving the custom that had lapsed since the administration (1797) of the elder adams. he intervened constantly during this and later sessions, to further the legislation in which he was especially interested. the first important piece of legislation that resulted from the special session was the underwood tariff act, which was passed in sept. and signed by the president oct. 3 1913. it pro- vided for a notable downward revision, and naturally met strong opposition from varied industrial interests. such opposition was overcome largely through the personal efforts of mr. wilson, who appealed constantly to public sentiment, notably in an at- tack upon the activities of hostile lobbyists. the tariff act, in addition to lower duties and important administrative changes, introduced an income tax—long advocated by democrats— which was destined in later developments to counterbalance the loss of revenue resulting from the lowering of the tariff; it weighed heavily upon the industrial interests of the north and increased the growing unpopularity of the resident in that region. the tariff act was followed by a broad measure of currency reform, the federal reserve act, signed dec. 23 1913; it is generally regarded as the administration’s second great legislative triumph. mr. wilson’s purpose was to supplant the dictatorship of private banking institutions by a reorganisation that should provide funds available to meet extraordinary demands and a currency that would expand and contract automatically. early in 1914 the president called upon congress to continue its labours of reform by the regulation of the trusts. after long debate and warm opposition, his appeal was answered by the passing of the federal trade commission act and the clayton anti-trust act. the latter, besides perfecting anti-trust legislation in several ways, met the demands of labour bv declaring that labour was not a commodity, by prohibiting injunctions in labour disputes 1033 unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury, and by proclaim- ing that strikes and boycotts were not violations of federal law. it further exempted labour associations from the anti-trust laws. mr. wilson’s policy of domestic social reform had thus been developed with surprising legislative success during the first year of his administration. his foreign policy was not so clear- cut and aroused little enthusiasm. it was characterised. by an evident desire to concede the rights of other nations to the limit and to avoid any stressing of the power of the united states for the material advantage of its citizens. definite steps were taken to prepare the filipinos for self-government. pressure was brought to bear upon the california state govt. to mitigate the severity of its anti-japanese legislation. the ‘‘ dollar diplomacy ” of the preceding administration was repudiated and american bankers effectively discouraged from participating in the inter- national chinese loans. as a result of the president’s personal demand, congress repealed the jaw exempting amcrican coast- wise shipping from panama canal tolls. mr. wilson, however, failed to secure the senate’s ratification of a treaty with colom- bia, which contained a virtual apology on the part of the united states and an offer to pay $25,000,000 as reparation for the al- leged grievances of colombia in connection with the establish- ment of panama as an independent country. in the caribbean, mr. wilson’s policy differed in principle rather than practice from that of his predecessors; in nicaragua and haiti the cus- toms were taken over by u.s. officials. by a treaty signed sept. 16 1915, a virtual protectorate of haiti was assumed; in santo domingo the precautionary visits of american cruisers were followed in the summer of 1916 by the landing of marines, and in nov. of that year by the proclamation of a military government under american auspices. mr. wilson’s mexican policy aroused heated criticism. fol- lowing the accession of gen. itucria to power and the president's failure to arrange a settlement providing for his elimination as dictator, mr. wilson resigned himsclf to what he called a policy of “ watchful waiting.” conditions in mexico were anarchical, and intervention was strongly urged by both ameri- can and european commercial interests. to formal interven- tion the president was definitely opposed, but in april 1914 he was compelled to authorise the occupation of vera cruz in retaliation for affronts to american bluejackets. the proffered mediation of argentina, brazil and chile he gladly accepted, but the resulting protocol of niagara falls (june 24 1914) did not provide a basis for peace. although huerta fled from mex- ico in july, the country continued to be torn by rival factions. amcrican troops were withdrawn from vera cruz in nov. i914, but it was not until oct. 1915 that the government of carranza was recognised by mr. wilson, in company with eight south and central american governments. further complications ensucd. the raid into american territory of gen. villa, march 9 1916, led mr. wilson to authorise a punitive expedition, which soon aroused the protests of carranza. in may and june the president mobilised the national guard and sent a force of about 100,000 to patrol the mexican border. the crisis was tiled over by a joint mexican-american commission sitting at new london, conn., which brought no definite settlement, but at least postponed hasty action on cither side. in jan. 1917 the last american troops were withdrawn from mexican soil. the president’s policy had not led to stable conditions in mexico, and the sole advantage secured seemed to be the emphasis laid by the u.s. govt. on the principle that it would not take advan- tage of the misfortunes of a weak neighbour for its own selfish profit. . foreign affairs after july 1914 were naturally dominated by the world war. president wilson insisted upon a policy of strict neutrality. vhis he emphasised not merely by formal proclamation on aug. 4, but by an address to the american people on aug. 18, in which he adjured them, in view of the mixture of nationalities in the united states, to be impartial in thought as well as action. his offer of mediation, made on aug. 5, remained without response, and further attempts at mediation in carly autumn proved fruitless. his determination 1034 to remain absolutely aloof from european quarrels was under- lined in several addresses, in which he insisted that the united states was in no way concerned, and was further emphasised by his opposition to any change in its military policy. america’s vital interest in the struggle, however, soon became plain and resulted in diplomatic controversies with the belligerents. great britain’s attempt to control indirect importation of goods into germany, by an enlargement of contraband schedules and an extension of the doctrine of “ continuous voyage ’”’ to condi- tional contraband, was vigourously opposed by president wilson, who authorised mr. bryan, his secretary of state, to protest in strong terms. a lengthy interchange of notes followed, which led to no settlement. the diplomatic controversy with germany proved more serious. the proclamation of a “ war zone” about the british isles, in which german submarines threatened to destroy enemy merchant vessels with consequent danger to the lives and prop- erty of neutrals, was met by a note of feb. ro 1915, which warned germany that she would be held to “ strict account- ability’? for the lawless acts of submarine commanders. mr. wilson further attempted to find a compromise, based upon a relaxation of the british food blockade and an abandonment of the german submarine campaign. the effort failed and was followed by a scries of submarine attacks, which culminated in the sinking of the “ lusitania,’ may 7 1915, with the loss of over 100 american lives. the president, while he disappointed opinion in the eastern states by a speech in which he reafhrmed his pacific determination, stating that a man might be “ too proud to fight,” at once set out to win from germany a dis- avowal and a promise that merchant ships should not be tor- pedoed without warning and the saving of the lives of passengers. a lengthy exchange of notes ensucd; the pacific mr. bryan, secretary of state, regarding the president’s language as too strong, resigned; on the other hand mr. wilson’s patience with the evasions of the german govt. and the continued sinking by submarines led to bitter attacks upon the president’s policy of conciliation, which was stigmatised as anaemic or even cowardly. mr. wilson succeeded, however, in securing from germany 2 promise not to sink liners without warning (sept. 1 1913), and continued his efforts to induce germany to abandon the submarine campaign completely. he was hampered by an attempted revolt of congressional leaders, who blurred the issue with germany by introducing resolutions designed to prevent americans from travelling upon belligerent ships. the presi- dent, through his personal influence, secured the defeat of these resolutions in feb. 1916, insisting that he would not consent “to any abridgment of the rights of american citizens in any respect.” shortly afterwards the issue with germany was brought to a head by the sinking of the “ sussex,” march 24 1916. mr. wilson waited three weeks before sending a formal note of protest to germany (april 19 1916), but couched it in the form of an ultimatum, stating that unless germany should immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare, the united states would be com- pelled to sever diplomatic relations. the german answer, while attempting to make acceptance conditional upon great britain’s relaxation of the blockade, was in effect a promise not to sink merchant ships without warning and without saving human lives. the submarine issue now seemed less critical. the diplomatic victory thus apparently secured by mr. wilson was utilised in his behalf during the electoral campaign of 1916, in which he was inevitably the democratic candidate. it en- abled his supporters to declare that he had vindicated the rights of the united states successfully, and at the same time had ‘kept us out of war.” the slogan made a strong appeal, espe- cially in the districts of the middle west. the republicans, on the other hand, who had nominated charles e. hughes, criticised the whole foreign policy of the president. they in- sisted that he had failed to take prompt action for the protection of american lives and honour, alike in his dealings with germany and in his handling of the mexican crisis. they characterised his domestic policy as demagogic, instancing the clayton act wilson, woodrow and the adamson act; the latter had been urged on congress by mr. wilson to avert a railroad strike in sept. 1916, and many citizens regarded it as an untimely surrender to labour threats. they also criticised his attitude on “ preparedness,” to which the president had been opposed until the close of 1915, and ridiculed the cautious expansion of military forces provided for in the national defence act of 1916. in the east and in most industrial centres of the middle west mr. wilson was unpopular, but the election showed his strength in the farming districts west of the mississippi and on the pacific coast; in spite of mr. roosevelt’s return to the republican fold the president drew largely from the progressives, and on election day received a slight electoral majority over mr. hughes (277 to 254) and a popular plurality of 9,129,606 to 8,538,221. this re-election enabled mr. wilson to proceed with plans for peace proposals to the european belligerents. these he had been preparing since the early summer of 1916, and, regardless of the german peace balloon of dec. 12 1916, he sent on dec. 18 identical notes to the belligerents, asking them to state the terms upon which they would consider peace. informed of the undercurrents of german military circles, he evidently feared that if the war continued the united states would necessarily become involved; he also hoped that a clear definition of war aims would strengthen pacific elements in both belligerent camps. the german reply was evasive; that of the allies refused to consider peace until germany should offer “ complete resti- tution, full reparation and effectual guarantecs.” the replies gave the president opportunity to expound what he had come to believe was the only sure basis of an enduring peace. this he did in a speech of jan. 22 1917, in which he insisted that the peace must be organised by the major force of mankind, thus emphasising the need of a league of nations; that no nation should extend its policy over another nation; that no one power should dominate the land or the sea. there must be a limitation of armaments. as a guarantee of future peace and justice, the ending of the existing war must not be the violation of the rights of one side or the other: it must be “a peace without victory.”’, further efforts to secure a peaceful arrangement were frustrated by the determination of the german militarist clique to renew the submarine warfare, regardless of the effect on the united states. on jan. 31, the german ambassador, von bernstorff, delivered a note to this effect, and four days later the president handed him his papers. he still, however, avoided formal war with germany, and on feb. 26 asked for a resolution of armed neutrality, which would permit the arming of amcrican mer- chant ships for entrance into the barred sea zone. the resolu- tion was blocked by a filibuster. finally, in view of continued sinking of american ships, the president came to congress on april 2 t917 and asked for a declaration that a state of warfare existed with germany. the resolution was passed by the senate on april 4, by the [louse on april 6. president wilson had always abhorred the exercise of force in international relations, and the war which he at last regarded as necessary was, in his mind, a war to ensure peace. neverthe- less he was determined that it should be waged efficiently and that the mistakes of previous wars should not be repeated. those mistakes, he believed, had resulted chiefly from the inter- mixture of politics in military affairs, and from the decentralisa- tion of the american military machine. he opposed a coalition war cabinet, as leading to divided responsibility. military policy was handed over to the military experts. he approved the immediate development of the general staff as the centralising military organ, and it was upon the recommendation of that body that he urged, against the wish of congressional leaders, the selective service act. on the advice of the general staff he appointed gen. john j. pershing commander of the expedi- tionary force to france, and, also following that advice, he refused to authorise a volunteer force under mr. roosevelt. similarly the plans for the development of a large army in france were inaugurated and translated into fact by the military experts. as regards conduct of operations the president gave to gen. pershing complete authority, and permitted no interference by wilson, woodrow politicians. in the building of the new army the president took no direct part, but he used his authority consistently to favour centralisation under the general staff. he followed a similar policy in the mobilisation of the industrial resources of the nation. he encouraged the centralising efforts of the council of national defence and its committees, and sought always to secure for them executive rather than the merely advisory powers which they at first possessed. he urged the lever act, which in aug. 1917 created a food and a fuel administration, and advocated the taking over of the railroads by the govern- ment in december. his policy of economic centralisation was ultimately assisted by the many protests against his war policies which were made in the winter, and which centred round the demand for a non-partisan war cabinet or ministry of munitions; for his supporters were able to insist that the more eflective handling of war problems demanded not new machinery but greater efficiency of the existing mechanism. the president asked for powers to cut through red tape and rearrange bureaux without reference to congress. his demands were embodied in the overman act, which was passed in may 1918, and which enabled him to grant executive powers to the various boards that had been created. the war industries board, released from its dependence upon the council of national defence, at once became the centralising organ of the economic activities of the country. in his war appointments mr. wilson disregarded party lines, a notable fact since in political appointments he always showed himself strictly a party man. republicans, such as hoover, stettinius, goethals, schwab, vanderlip, were chosen because of their administrative qualities and regardless of political affiliations. during the war president wilson consistently developed his ideals of a new international system which should perpetuate peace and assure justice and security to every nation regardless of its material strength. he hoped thus not merely to construct a basis for just peace when the war should end, but to hasten the end of the war by appealing to the peoples of the enemy states against their governments. ‘the most notable of his speeches was that of jan. 8 1918, in which he stated r4 points necessary to a just and jasting peace. this, with his later ad- dresses, was ultimately accepted as the basis of the final settle- ment. their effect in germany and austria-iiungary was not apparent until the military defeat of those empires, but his words acted continually as a corroding factor, weakening the enemy’s determination to fight. when in the autumn of 1918 they faced military defeat, they turned to mr. wilson, offering to accept his fourteen points as the basis of peace. the president’s insistence upon justice as essential to a settle- ment brought him great prestige in allied countries, but the chiefs of the allicd govts. hesitated to accept the fourteen points in the fear that the advantages of the victory might be thrown away. they yiclded, however, to the persuasive diplo- macy of col. house, who represented the president at paris, and it was on the understanding that the fourteen points (reserva- tion made of “ freedom of the seas ” and inclusion of germany’s promise to make full reparation) should be the basis of the peace that the armistice was granted to germany.! the presi- dent realised, however, that it would be difficult to translate his principles into the actual treaty. aside from the opposition he might expect from selfish nationalistic interests among the allies, he lacked unified support at home, where his political opponents called for a “strong peace” that would annihilate germany; there was little enthusiasm for a league of nations, which the president regarded as essential to a just and lasting settlement. furthermore he had weakened his political position at home by a series of tactical mistakes. of these, the most important was an appeal issued immediately before the con- gressional election of nov. 1918, in which mr. wilson asked the voters to cast their ballots for democratic candidates, on the ground that a republican congress would divide the leadership at the moment of international crisis. such an appeal would 1the fourteen points are set forth in full tn an article on that subject. 1035 have been comprehensible if it had been made by a prime min- ister in a parliamentary country, but wilson had proclaimed himself the leader of the nation and could not logically also play the rdle of party leader. the republicans seemed to have some ground for complaining that although they had submerged partisan quarrels during the war, president wilson was now attempting to capitalise the war and foreign affairs in order to win a partisan advantage. many voters were antagonised by the appeal, and the elections went in favour of the republicans. the president thus lost command of the senate in the next con- gress and its foreign relations committee was to be controlled by his political and personal opponents. believing that his presence at the peace conference was neces- sary, if it was not to be dominated by old-style diplomatic prac- tices, mr. wilson decided himself to go to paris, and on dec. 4 1918 sailed with the other members of the amcrican commission on the ‘‘ george washington.”’ he arrived at brest on dec. 13, and was received at paris, in england and at rome with tremen- dous enthusiasm. for the moment he was the popular hero, both in allied and enemy countries. but his prestige rested on a precarious footing, and must inevitably diminish when he came to oppose the national aspirations of any people. he was anxious, therefore, to strike off a quick general peace, leaving details for later settlement; but this proved impossible, and formal con- versations at paris began only in jan. 1919. the president succeeded in winning an carly victory when he persuaded the conference to accept the principle of the league of nations as the basis of the peace, and when, on feb. 14, he won unanimous approval of the preliminary draft of the covenant. on return- ing to the united states, however, he found republican opposi- tion to the league strongly manifested in the senate, although he had the support of mr. taft’s influence in that party and in the country. public opinion seemed to be uninstructed and apathetic as to the president’s policies. going back to paris in march, he was able to secure the insertion in the covenant of certain amendments required by american sentiment, and the approval by the conference of the final draft of the covenant. but he was confronted by the demands of the french, italians and japanese for territorial and economic concessions from the enemy, which he regarded as excessive. long discussions fol- lowed, culminating in mr. wilson’s acceptance of a portion of the allied demands, notably the granting of shantung to the japanese, of much of the frontier line promised by the treaty of london to italy, and the exaction from germany of what amounted to a blank cheque in the matter of reparations. such concessions aroused the opposition of liberals in england and america, who insisted that the president had surrendered his principles. mr. wilson, on the other hand, acknowledging that certain aspects of the settlement were not ideal, believed that he had won his main contention in securing the league of na- tions, which provided the mechanism for eradicating the vices contained in the treaties. in this belief he was supported by another liberal protagonist, gen. smuts. on june 29 1919, the day following the signing of the versailles treaty, the president sailed for america. his international prestige had suffered from his opposition to national claims, especially that of the italians to fiume and of the french to the left bank of the rhine. nevertheless, as the bitterness of the moment passed, the magnitude of his accomplishments at paris became more generally recognised. when the veil of secrecy surrounding the negotiations was gradually lifted, it was seen that the belief that he had been outmanoeuvred by lloyd george and clemenceau was hardly justified by the facts. lacking the negotiating ability of lloyd george and the political experience of clemen- ceau, he refused to enter the diplomatic lists with them, but by his manifest candour and sincerity carly disarmed his oppo- nents in argument. ile said exactly what was in his mind, and was careful that his statements should be fortified by the documents and statistics furnished by his expert advisers. the strain of the conference had told upon mr. wilson’s phys- ical and nervous strength. ile was thus not well equipped to wage the struggle with his republican opponents in the senate 1036 which developed upon his presentation of the treaty. had the president been willing to compromise and accept reservations to the covenant of the league, it ts possible that the two-thirds necessary to ratification might have been secured. this course he refused to follow, and it soon became clear that the foreign relations committee would not recommend ratification without serious reservations or amendments. in the hope of winning popular support, the president set forth upon a tour of the country, and along the pacific coast aroused enthusiasm in marked contrast to the coldness of the east. the effort, however, overtaxed his strength, and on sept. 26 at wichita, kan., the president was compelled to give over his tour and return to washington, where he suffered a complete nervous collapse. the exact nature of his illness was not made public and few realised how serious it would prove to be. many, however, felt that in view of his inevitable abstention from active work it would have been wiser for him to retire at least temporarily. as it was, his system had provided for no understudy and the administration was icft without a leader. entirely apart from the confusion thus caused in the conduct of public business, mr. wilson’s illness led directly to the defeat of the treaty. there was no one else capable cither of leading the fight for ratification without reservations, or with sufficient authority to arrange a compromise. on nov. 13 the senate adopted reservations which mr. wilson declared would “ nul- lify ” (etc., etc.) the treaty; for this reason he urged the demo- crats to refuse to vote for the ratifying resolution, which was accordingly defeated on nov. 19 r919. during the succeeding wecks efforts were made to arrange a compromise. the repub- lican leaders agreed to soften the language of certain reserva- tions, and the president intimated that he would accept a mild reservation on article x. of the covenant, which had aroused the chief opposition. neither side would yield enough, and when on march 19 1920, the final vote was taken on the ratifying resolu- tion, which contained a strong reservation on article x., mr. wilson again urged democratic senators not to accept. the reso- lution thus failed of the necessary two-thirds by a margin of six votes, 57-37. the president appealed to the autumn presidential election in 1920 as the decisive plebiscite. although he had lost his former control of the party, and the democratic presidential nominee at san francisco was not his choice, the wilsonian policies, including approval of the league of nations, were inevitably the issue of the elections. in the clectionecring campaign, however, the president himself could take no active part, for his physical collapse proved so serious as to confine him to the white house. for the overwhelming victory won by the republicans, see unirep states (/7istory). after his defeat mr. wilson kept close silence on public matters, and his annual message of dec. 1920, while it sounded the note of national duty, made no reference to that which lay nearest his heart—the league of nations. this silence, indeed, he preserved until the close of his administration, march 4 1921. in dec. 1920 he had been awarded the nobel peace prize. after his retirement from office mr. wilson lived quictly in washington, refraining from all political comment. he ap- peared to greet his admirers on armistice day, 1923, with a short speech from the porch of his house. for months he had been growing weaker, and on feb. 3 1924 he died in his sleep. the failure of president wilson to win the approval of the united states for his peace policies presents one of the most interesting problems of american history. he had led the country through the difficult period of a war unsurpassed in magnitude and culminating in complete victory; in the face of serious obstacles he had forced european statesmen to accept the major item in his programme; he returned home only to be repudiated by his own people. personal and partisan factors unquestionably contributed to his defeat. in private inter- course mr. wilson displayed a personal magnetism, a breadth of culture and a genial cordiality that are amply attested by his intimates. but in public life he proved unable to capitalise such advantages, possibly because of natural shyness, possibly because physical delicacy restricted his social activities. roose- wilson, woodrow velt’s capacity for ‘‘ mixing ” with all political and human types he totally lacked. in the formation of his policies he isolated himself and was unable to establish close relations with con- gressional leaders. this gave rise to the impression that the president disliked advice, was an egocentric autocrat and imme- diately dispensed with anyone who disagreed with him. such criticism, by no means a nove]ty in the case of strong-willed presidents, was utilised by his political opponents and intensified his unpopularity in the industrial centres, especially of the east, an unpopularity which, except for a bricf period during the opening months of the war, was an outstanding factor in the political situation. broadly speaking, the criticism does not seem to be fully justified. in matters of what he regarded as principle he was adamant, and he distrusted the judgment of those whose basic point of view was different from his own; but the evidence of those who worked with him, including that of republican advisers at paris, is almost unanimous to the effect that he was anxious to secure advice, was tolerant of opinions, and glad to delegate responsibility. the contrary belief was doubtless fostered by mr. wilson’s inability to build up an eflicient secretarial organisation, and his incapacity, rather than unwillingness, to apportion effectively the details of adminis- trative labour. his handling of war problems shows clearly his desire to delegate responsibility; once an appointment was made he refused to interfere and consistently protected his appointee from the importunities of politicians. political responsibility in general, he believed, should rest with the president. from conviction, rather than from egotism, he sought to emancipate the presidential office from the control of congressional committees, a control which he earnestly deplored in his earliest writings. the president, he felt, should be the real leader of the nation, and not a mere executive super- intendent. the cabinet he looked on as an executive and not as a political council, and it was always strictly subordinated to his policies. so long as the democrats held the majority in congress he was able to translate such ideas into fact, and effec- tively disposed of all attempted congressional revolts. this attitude naturally did not allay the political resentments which were inevitably aroused and which were intensified by mr. wilson’s tendency to regard political opposition as tantamount to personal hostility; when the democratic majority disappeared he faced uncompromising hostility. he was intensely impatient of partisan obstruction of his idealistic plans, and there is much of the calvinist in his refusal to temporise or deviate from the path which he believed himself appointed to tread. while in matters of detail he showed at times some capacity for compro- mise, in matters of principle he displayed the unswerving deter- mination characteristic of the prophet, a trait that is not always conducive to success in the exigencies of modern party warfare. indeed it is as a prophet rather than as a statesman that mr. wilson should be regarded. no one has preached more effec- tively the necessity of introducing a moral standard into inter- national politics. the following are the most important writings of president wilson: congressional gavernment, @ study tx american politics (1885); the state—elements of historical and practical politics (1889); division and reunion, 1820-89 (1893); an old master and other political essays (1893); mere literature and other issays (1893); george washington (1897); «1 izistory of the american people (1902); constitutional governnrent in the united states (1908); the new freedom (1913); on being human (1916); international ideals (1919). personal and political biographies of president wilson have been written by h. j. ford, woedrew wilson: the man and [fs work (1916); by h. w. harris, president wilson: his problems and ilis policy (1918); by w. kk. dadd, wroedraw wilson and his work (1920); and by his private secretary, joseph p. tumulty, woodrow wilson as i know tim (1922). all four are eulogistic, especially the two last named. critically appreciative biographics are: david lawrence, the true story of woodrow wilson (1924), and william allen white, ivoodrow witson, the man, his times, and his task (1924). a jess friendly interpretation, valuable for wilson’s prince- ton career, is robert fe. annin, weodrow wilson; a character study (1924). the chief authority for wilson’s work at the peace con- ference is ray s. baker, woodrow wilson and world settlement (1923). a documented exposition of wilson’s character and policies is found in the intimute papers of colonel house, arranged as a winchester—wine narrative by charles seymour (1926). general surveys of wilson’s foreign policy are to be found in e. e. robinson and v. j. west’s the foretgn policy of president wilson, 1913-7 (1918), and in charles seymour's woodrow wilson and the world war (1920). in beacon lights of history, 1924, p. w. wilson gives a close analysis of wilson's character and career. the authorised edition of president wilson’s state papers and addresses is the public papers of woodrow wilson, edited by ray s. baker and william e. dodd (929). eory, winchester, england (see 28.704), had a population of 23,79 in 1921 and an area of 1,930 acres. the city has been in- cluded in the parliamentary division of the same name since 1918. a scheme for the division of the large diocese received the royal assent in 1924. alarming cracks and subsidences having been discovered in the walls and vaulting of the transepts and east end of the cathedral, the work of underpinning the foundations almost throughout, of grouting and bonding the walls and of reconstructing much of the vaulting, was begun in 1906 and finished in 1912, at an expenditure of about £110,000. a recum- bent bronze figure of sir redvers buller was placed in the north transept in tg911. the hampshire, isle of wight and city of winchester war memorial cross was unveiled outside the main west door in 1921; a memorial statue to men of the king’s royal rifle corps in the churchyard in 1922; and the winchester college war memorial, a beautiful cloister in connection with the boer war memorial gate, in 1924. a site of 100 ac. in the st. cross district has been developed as a garden city. new county council offices on castle hill were opened in 1911. a chamber of commerce was founded in 1919. windmill: see airscrew.