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    "source_key": "britannica_1926",
    "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926)",
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    "chunk_id": "1926:welsh literature:8a2ff7387ace",
    "title": "WELSH LITERATURE",
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    "verified_text": "the period ro1o—25 marks the emergence of a new school of poets with new aesthetic ideals, a fresher and wider outlook and, it may almost be said, a new diction and vocabulary. its poetry represents the hard- won triumph against the puritan rigidity which lay heavy on the last decade of the 19th century, and the reaction against the pro- vincialism which the cultural isolation of wales had intensified. the new influences were twofold. first, the more scholarly study of welsh literature, particularly of the age of dafydd ap gwilym and the 15th century, and the scientific investigations of the language and of welsh history, revealing the literary heritage of the middle ages, showed the necessity of purging the language of corrupt grammatical forms, english idioms, and alien style and mannerisms. secondly, with the wider culture came foreign influences, french, german, irish, the classics and english poetry. the translations of heine by j. morris jones revealed to some extent the secret of that supreme lyricist. the lyrical art of eifion wyn is surer and more adequate in technique than that of his predecessors, whilst his awd? y bugail had shown that lyric diction was possible in the alliterative strophes. scholarship and learning reacted on literature, and the first fruits appeared in the work of t. gwynn jones, the leader of the new schooland its most accomplished craftsman. his vy mudawiad arthur, a chaniadau ereill (1910) announced the advent of a poet of the first rank. the title poem, the winning ode of the national eisteddfod of 1902, was the flaming manifesto of the new school. no such music had been heard in wales since the reformation. the rich decoration and missal-like colours of the poem conjured up the glamour and enchantments of the past. both the subject and its treatment are symptomatic. the romantic legend of arthur replaces the former theological or hebraic theme. the diction and vocabulary are in the tradition of the classical age of welsh literature welsh poetry. this is not to say that the poem is pedantic or archaic, but rather that the artist has so absorbed the spirit of his models that he has created his own medium by extending and enriching the resources of his speech. equally characteristic is the superb mastery, unrivalled in this period, of the strict metres, the artistic economy of words, the grave and resounding music and the vivid and accurate descripton of external objects by which the poem conveys the impression of a splendid canvas. a powerful historical imagination, fortified by wide reading but illumined by poetic intuition, has inspired much of gwynn jones’s best work, such as the beautiful pexmon in this collection, and afadog. the promise of the first volume has been more than fulfilled. in afadog, among the greatest achievements of welsh poetry, the stately movement of the elegiac is adopted. with alliteration virtually replacing the older harmony of quantity, producing a noble and sonorous line adequate to the lofty theme and perhaps the best expression of the poet’s genius. tir na n-og (1916) a lyrical drama, displays to the full his command of the alliterative metres, which are here made to yield some ex- quisite music. w. j. gruffydd is a poet of considerable, if unequal, achieve- ment. ilis fearless advocacy of the new school has presented a wide target for the hostile. his early poetry was criticised as imitative, and certainly its inspiration is largely derived from his reading. keats, shelley, swinburne (whose rather sickly dolores stanza is imported), kipling, hardy and the moderns furnish a too obvious contribution. but this springs not so much from poverty of inspiration as from the impact of fine poetry on a sensitive intelligence, and his work is rarely incompetent in craftsmanship even when merely purveying the manner and ideas of other poets. yuys yr hud (1923) shows a marked ad- vance. there are traces of the early weaknesses—reminiscences of other pocts, though fainter and less imitative, and touches of bitterness, though now often rising to a noble anger. at his best, as the poet of the common welsh life of the villager, the quarryman, the farmer and the shopman, gruffydd must rank high, and he, almost alone of his contemporaries, has conveyed the romance and realism of the fast-vanishing sea life of the north wales coasts. the publication of vr taf, a cherddt eraill (1924), by r. williams parry, is a landmark in welsh literature. this slender volume revealed a wealth of poetic endowment and a purity of song unsurpassed since dafydd ap gwilym. the main poem, yr haf, an ode of summer and young love, although strictly alliterative, is, by the poet’s delicate technique and enchanted diction, essentially lyrical. the memorial exglynzon are among the triumphs of poetry. their restraint and terseness recall the early englynion (of the graves); and, though rich in alliterative effects, they have the inevitable music of true lyric. parry has also been the most successful in transplanting the sonnet form, and the sonnets in this volume show again his fastidious care in the choice of words to express his moods with the greatest intel- lectual effect. remarkable, too, is the outlook of the poet: he stands aloof and indifferent to the clash of parties and creeds which occasionally disturbs the harmonies of his contemporaries: he has the artist’s faith in beauty, from which his sensitive, poetic temperament draws its inspiration and sustenance. the poetry thus brilliantly inaugurated continued to flourish. t. parry-williams has marked individuality and accomplish- ment, but the intellectual content of his poetry often overbears the imaginative element. cerdd’r bugail (1918) a posthumous collection of the poetry of hedd wyn, a shepherd poct killed in action, attracts notice by its promise and by the mystical strain of its thought. the verse of cynan at its best has much lyric sweetness and simplicity, but his afab y bwthyn (1921) and y tannau coll (1922) are marred by a false, sentimental treatment of commonplace sex themes. in prose the output has been disappointing. there has been no successor to daniel owen, and no prose writer with the limpid grace of o. m. edwards. hunangofiant tomi (1912) and fir y dyneddon of fe. tegla davies have charm and show a capacity for dialogue, but their range is limited. the main prose develop- wembley—western australia ment has been in the ephemeral journalism of the period or in the literary reviews such as y lienor (founded 1922), or in the pages of the learned journals, where welsh prose is acquiring a flexibility and an adaptability for the requirements of criticism and modern scholarship. bipliography.—t. gwynn jones, ymadawiad arthur, a chanta- dau ereill (carnarvon, 1910); e. tegla davies, tunangofiant tomt (bangor, 1912); j. j. williams (ed.), cerddi’r bugail (1918); w. j. gruffydd, ynys yr hud, a chanenon eraill (cardiff, 1923); r. williams parry, yr haf a cherddi eraill (bala, 1924); journals, etc.: cymeru (1893-1925); y genineir (1910-25); y. beirniad (1911-20); the welsh outlook (1914-25); ¥ llenor cydchgrawn chwaterol (1922-25); anthologies: h. idris bell, poems from the welsh (carnarvon, 1913); a. houlkes, telyn y dydd (cardiff, 1918); hi. i. and c. c. bell, welsh poems of the twentieth century in english verse (wrexham, 1925). (w. g. j.) wembley, england (see 28.517).—the population of this residential suburb of london, which has an area of 4,564 ac. was nearly quadrupled between 1901 and 1921, when it was 16,187. wembley, now served by three railways (metropolitan; london, midland and scottish; london and north eastern), provided the site for the british empire exhibition in 1924 and 1925. it covered a semi-circular tract about 21m. round, with railways north and south and within the grounds. a main thoroughfare, kingsway, leading from the north entrance, was flanked by the palaces of industry and of housing and transport, and by the buildings for australia and canada, and gave at the southern end upon the stadium, which had an area of 10 ac. and accom- modated nearly 100,000 people. here were staged numerous ceremonies, spectacles and athletic contests. besides those mentioned above, cach major division of the empire overseas had its pavilion, the most notable being those of india, south africa, new zealand and malaya. there was a british govt. pavilion, with exhibits by various government departments and a ssci- entific exhibit organised by the royal society. there were also a palace of arts, an amusement park and many other features designed at once to demonstrate the vast resources of the empire and to attract the public. (see also exurpirion: brittsh emmprtre.) werfel, franz (1890- }, german poet, was born in prague sept. 10 1890. during the first 10 years of his career he lived (1911-21) in hamburg, leipzig and vienna. his poetry is contemplative and lyrical, and the idca of the community of souls in all living beings is strongly emphasised in his collections of verse, der weltfreund (1912), wir sind (1913), hinander (1915), der gerichistag (1919) and the selection, gesange aus den dret reichen (1917). among werfel’s successful works for the stage are, a german adaptation of the troades of euripides (1915); and the trilogy, der spiegelmensch (1920), which was performed in 1921 and 1922 at leipzig, stuttgart, vienna and other cities. in his subsequent works werfel dealt with general problems in a historical setting. his drama, juarez und maximilian (1924), represents the differences between democratic-republican and monarchistic thought, while his novel on the opera verdi (1924), contrasts the artistic conceptions of wagner and verdi. see a. luther, franz werfel und seine besten biihnenwerke (1922). werner, anton alexander von (1843-10915), german painter (see 28.523), died in berlin jan. 3 1915. wesleyanism: see methodism. west africa, french (/’ afrique occidentale francaise) (see 11.205). the era of peaceful development which followed the establishment of french rule in the interior had led by 1923 to the setting up of civilian administration over the whole of this vast region. the colony of upper volta was formed in 1919 from the southern part of upper senegal and niger, which, in 1920 was renamed the french sudan. the military territory of the niger was made the niger colony in 1922. mauritania became a colony on jan. 1 1921. the approximate areas and populations of the separate colonies in 1924 are shown in the table. the euro- pean population was estimated in 1925 at 8,000. the whole of the area is under a governor-general, who is responsible for services common to all the colonies. each colony is under a lieutenant-governor. 1005 area in sq. m. 74,112 39,436 121,590 41,302 356,471 142,820 154,200 404,914 1,384,845 colony population 1,266,116 2,026,321 1,301,832 974,597 2,561,515 3,015,388 284,598 1,149,504 12,579,931 senegal . french guinea ivory coast dahomey french sudan upper volta mauritania niger total the contentment of the natives and the increase in population and production were evidence of the success of french methods during the period 1910-25. a military force of 16,oc00 men, of whom 2,o00 were europeans, was maintained in peace time; during the world war large numbers of senegalese and other native troops were sent to france; the only regions not peaceful during the war period were those bordering the sahara. im- provement in means of communication was a leading feature of french policy. by 1924 railways from dakar and konakri linked the seaboard to the niger, which in french territory is navigable for over 1,000 miles. about half of the total trade of the colonies is with france and other french possessions. imports are mainly textiles, hardware, machinery and coal. some 75% of the ex- ports are oil seeds or other oleaginous products. yhe cultivation of cotton is actively encouraged; maize and cocoa are exports of growing importance. the total volume of trade in 1924 exceeded 1,000 million fr.,as compared with about 640,000,000 fr. in 1919 and 177,000,000 fr.in 1907. for other parts of west africa see angola; cameroons; togoland, etc. westermarck, edward alexander (1862 ), fin- nish anthropologist, was born at helsingfors nov. 201862. he was educated at a lyceum in his native town, and at the university of finland where he later became professor of moral philosophy. in 1890 he went to england, and in 1907 was appointed pro- fessor of sociology at the university of london. he made a spe- cial study of primitive marriage and ethical origins, and published the origin of human marriage (1889); the history of ituman marriage (1889, sth ed. rewritten in 3 vol. 1921); the origin and development of the moral ideas (1906); marriage ceremonies in aforocco, 2 vol. (1914). western australia (see 28.530), a state of the australian commonwealth. its area is 975,920 sq. miles. the population in 1925 was 368,027 as compared with 282,114 in 1911. perth, the capital, which on dec. 31 1924 had a population of 176,467, and kalgoorlie, the centre of the gold mining industry, are the chief towns. the principal port is fremantle, the first port of call for mail steamers from europe; albany, in the extreme southwest, is the first port of call for shipping from europe via the cape. the farmers are well organised politically, and the country party plays an important part, in coalition with the liberals or nationalists, in the government of the country. the gold mining industry, which was for many years the chief source of wealth, has dwindled steadily since 1903, when the output was valued at £8,770,719. in 1923, it was £2,232,179, representing two-thirds of the total australian production. steady progress has been made, however, in the development of the primary industries. state-aided immigration, backed up by a vigorous land settlement policy, with liberal financial assistance to settlers through the state agricultural bank, has attracted settlers, not only from overseas, but also from the eastern australian states. production and indusiry—wheat is the principal crop, and in 1925, 1,867,614 ac. were harvested, yielding 23,887,367 bu. in the closer settled arcas of the southwest, dairy and fruit farming are making rapid progress. the annual production of the pastoral industry now exceeds £4,500,000. in the north- west territory are millions of ac. of pastoral country awaiting development, and at wyndham the government has erected large works for the killing, freezing and canning of meat for export. western australia’s hardwoods have a world-wide 1006 reputation, especially jarrah and karri, which are indigenous to the southwest districts. sandalwood is also exported in large quantities to the far east. western australia produces more than one-half of the world’s supply of pearl shell. broome in the northwest is the centre of this industry. the maximum production, reached in ror4, represented a value of {90,000 for pearls and £221,000 for pearl shell. the manufacturing industrics have not been developed to any great extent. a state implement and engineering works was established in ror2 with a view to keeping a check on prices of agricultural machinery. the government also operates six saw mills. in 1925 there were 3,733 m. of government controlled railways, on a 3 ft. 6 in. gauge, open for traffic. the completion of the trans-continental railway between kal- goorlie and port augusta in 1917 linked up the western and south australian systems. (see australia.) western front.—for a good many years after the end of the franco-prussian war of 1870-1 the military policy of france was defensive. targe sums of money and much labour were spent upon the elaboration of an extensive system of fortifications on the eastern frontier; and military discussions turned largely upon how those fortifications could best be utilised in the event of a war with germany. but time passed, and france recovered morally and materially from the effects of her defeat; an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded with russia, and the establishment of an entente with great britain, if it did not assure france definitely of military assistance from that quarter, at least made such assistance possible. french military policy —simultaneously with these develop- ments there had been a marked increase in the gencral efficiency of the french army; french inventive genius had perfected the best field gun in existence and had made france a pioneer in the conquest of the air. under these conditions a new school of mili- tary thought had grown up, to which the idea of awaiting attack was repellent; the offensive was advocated as the true military policy of france, not only as conferring definite military ad- vantages but as being in consonance with the nationa}) character, and as the only means of avoiding a passive acceptance of the horrors of invasion, a course naturally repugnant to a proud nation. the swing of the pendulum was pronounced and in the new zcal for the promotion of the spirit of offence the study of the use of ficld fortifications was neglected, while the addition of heavy artillery to the field army was opposed as being destruc- tive of mobility and of the ¢/an of attack. in this spirit the french plan of campaign was revised, and “ plan 17 ”’ came into existence with an immediate and gencral offensive as its basis. in the preparation of this plan the attitude of belgium and of great britain were uncertain factors. provision was, however, made for the eventuality of belgium permitting german troops to march through her territory, while discussions between the french and british general staffs, authorised by the two govern- ments, resulted in an agreement, that if great britain joined france, her expeditionary force should be assembled in the neizhbourhood of maubeuge. the plan was, however, based upon a fundamental miscalculation as to the strength of the army which germany could bring against france. while it was accepted that the poverty of russia’s communications would make that country’s mobilisation very slow, and that therefore germany would almost certainly assemble the largest possible army on her western frontiers to meet france, the strength of that army was estimated at not more than 40 to 42 active infantry divisions and ten cavalry divisions. the french general staff was aware that germany proposed to create on mobilisation a number of reserve divisions, as they themselves also did; but they did not believe that these reserve formations would be like their own, able to take more than a secondary part in the cam- paign, at least until after a considerable interval. plan 17,—plan 17 envisaged the employment of 10 cavalry, 45 active and 21 reserve divisions organised in five armies, of which the i., ii., iit. and v. were drawn up from right to left along the frontiers of alsace-lorraine and belgium, luxembourg, while the iv. formed a general reserve between verdun and western front chalons-sur-marne. it provided for an immediate offensive into alsace-lorraine by the i. and ii. armies, to be followed by a general offensive on either side of the fortified zone of metz and thionville. when belgium, proudly refusing the german de- mand for permission to march through her territory, prepared to resist and great britain, declaring war upon germany, began to put into execution the plans agreed upon between the two staffs, the confidence at french headquarters in the efficacy of plan 17 wascomplete. the belgian army of six divisions and a cavalry division might, with the aid of the strong fortresses of liege and namur, be relied upon to delay the germans for some time, while the french left was assured of the support of a british force of at least four infantry divisions and one cavalry division. general joffre, the french commander-in-chief, was therefore confident that he had a sufficient superiority of force to justify the agreed policy of attack. german plan of invasion.—the german plan for a war on two fronts was formulated in 1905 by count schliefien, then chief of the general staff, and provided for the earliest possible offen- sive in the greatest possible strength against france, while austria was assisted with the minimum of force to hold off russia. the decision against france was to be sought by a great enveloping movement across the meuse, through belgium and beyond the zone of the french frontier defences. thus a delibe- rate violation of belgium’s neutrality was planned many years before 1914. this plan was accepted in principle by schlieffen’s successor, the younger von moltke, but as years passed and the development of the offensive spirit in the french army became evident, tt was modified in the direction of strengthening the left lank in alsace-lorraine, whereas schlieffen had maintained to the end of his life that risks should be accepted upon that flank in order that the right should be made as strong as possible. the plan as it developed in aug. 1914 provided for the organi- sation of the force to take the field against france of seven armies composed of to cavalry, 72 active and reserve divisions, six ersatz divisions and 144 landwehr brigades. the ersatz and landwehr troops were intended for the garrisoning of occupied territory and the protection of lines of communications, but the great majority of the reserve divisions were organised in army corps and employed alongside the active divisions. not only was the organisation and equipment of these reserve divisions far superior to that of the reserve divisions of the french army, but germany was ahead of the rest of the military world in the provision and tactical employment of machine guns and of heavy artillery, while her plan of campaign combined judiciously the employment of offensive and defensive methods. the seven german armics were deployed along the frontier from switzerland to holland. on the left the vi. and vii. under the crown prince rupprecht of bavaria were to act at first mainly on the defensive in alsace-lorraine, while the remaining five armies (55 active anc reserve divisions, and seven cavalry divisions) formed the great moving wheel against the french centre and left. of these five armies two, the i. (von kluck) and the ii. (von biillow), comprising 26 divisions and five cavalry divisions, were to cross the meuse, while the iil. (von hausen, eight divisions) and the iv. (duke albrecht of wurttemberg, ten divisions) marched through the belgian ardennes. the way for the i. army was to be opened by a coup-de-muin of a special striking force under gen. von emmick on liege. french and german military policies having now been outlined an account of the actual campaigns can be undertaken. j. operations in 1914 the invasion of alsace was begun in accordance with plan 17 by a preliminary enterprise on aug. 8, followed by the main ad- vance of the i. and ii. french armies under gen. dubail and de castelnau on aug. 14. this advance was stopped on aug. 20 in the battle of morhange-saarburg, in which the french could make no impression on the german defensive positions. the two armies were compclled to retreat to the frontier, where, between aug. 25 and 27 the attacks of the pursuing germans were re- pulsed (see frontiers, battles of the). meanwhile, the ap- 3° ce ore ser age rel campaigns english miles 0 0 20 30 40 50 kilometres 0 10 20 3040 5d c si sss \" ——— ——— = d jinkerk : o mw il. ee thielt ‘ \\y limit of german advance sept.6, /9/4@7/2 2 tm am | 1 h \\ approx. front line oct./4-nov./6, , 2 a | aloat: ~ pgeilenkirchen = pep front line july 15, 19/8 senor f pang poperi ngheo s : | . \\ front line nov. //, 1918. ee a ———— y “4 i re | ok ‘ direction of allred attacks sept ivn8 eee se oa ude re ree 17 cassel o ‘pres audenarde aastright? duiren / | main railways ttiod ne sto mt sateas” 1 i / merd—_ viiecencg * mo . ) ‘ | hazebrouck} eo sld a br . a ' armefftieres© | | neuve ca ’ ~; “om montreuil bethune\\ 3s po) e ‘?) ablain sen © polo “=e _carency© ie od ee coblenz neuville, ei * * e e nci pf eharleroi : ’ we gerolstein sdoutlfne dpabbeville / n frankfurt p ti a \\neufchateau nd \\ s charleville sete. \\ ‘\\luxembourg~ i mezieres.\" ‘ ery) * a oavricourt va ae ieee ah achar qt. 4 + —, luxembourg se a <n a ~ hs 5 ~ = stenayx kaiserslautern _ weienisats f mi —— oo sf sj = 2 r) = od . ca i ‘4 ~-saarbrucken conflans \\ 4 an ste mene houldp iq is ze metz ; 0 /x< ot so ow a > | ‘ ; “sea ye anya cf dieuzeeo : i saarbur ny = = las st dizier tne ° \\ e [\" d eville e , ‘whee = \\romilly y = a j sleet : hartres aktampes” \\ ~~ - s) / _ —— neufchateau nye } \\mireco rt i de en ee eee ee eee ee 2 eee western front pearance of the germans before liege had caused a modification, which had been foreseen as probable in plan 17. the v. army (lanrezac) was moved to its left towards the sambre, while the iv. (langle de cary) took its place about mezieres. a movement of the germans through belgium on either bank of the meuse had been foreseen as probable, but the french staff had not con- sidered it probable that the germans could dispose of more than three or four cavalry divisions and 22 infantry divisions for this purpose, whereas actually they had five cavalry and 34 infantry divisions (i., ii. and iii. armies}. the result of the miscalcula- tion of german strength was disastrous. joffre, believing that if the enemy were strong enough on the left to check his attack in alsace-lorraine and on the right to move in force through belgium beyond the meuse, he must be weak in the centre, proceeded on aug. 21 to launch his iv. army and his iii. (ruffey) in the attack of that centre in the ardennes. this at- tack failed on aug. 23, by which time joffre had become aware of the realities of the situation (see frontiers, battles of the). the germans, after a first failure of a night assault by their infantry, had entered liege on aug. 7, though as the forts still held out, this fact was not known at french headquarters. while those forts were being reduced by german heavy artillery, von kluck was completing the arrangements for the advance of his i. army, which met and defeated the belgians on the gette on aug. 18. on the 2oth the first german troops entered brussels and on the same day they began to bombard the forts of namur (see belgium, invasion of). meanwhile the french v. army had deployed along the sambre on either side of charleroi with its right flank on the meuse above namur. this army had been reinforced by joffre from his right and comprised 13 divisions, (three reserve), one cavalry division and a cavalry corps of three divisions attached. the allied erfrort: aug. 21i-sfpt. 13 on aug. 21 the concentration of the british expeditionary force was almost completed and it began to move forward from behind the fortress of maubeuge towards mons. it comprised four infantry divisions, one cavalry division with an additional infantry and cavalry brigade. the strength of the allied left wing was therefore approximately 173 infantry and 43 cavalry divisions, while the belgian fortress of namur formed what was regarded as a strong pivot on its right flank and the french for- tress of maubeuge, hastily improved by the addition of field defences, a support to its left flank. after the battle of the gette the belgian army had entered into the fortress of antwerp and von kluck had detached two army corps, the iit. and ix. reserve corps, to watch it and cover his flank and communications. this detachment and the provision of a garrison for brussels, left for the three german armies of the right wing, the i., ii. and iii., advancing against the allied icft, a force of 30 infantry and five cavalry divisions, as against the french estimate, inclusive of detachments left in belgium, of three or four cavalry and 22 infantry divisions. acting on the information as to the enemy’s strength supplied by jofire, sir john french’s little army reached mons and its neighbourhood on aug. 22, expecting to advance further into belgium. it is often suggested by french writers that the concen- tration of the british army was tardy, and that to this was largely due the loss of the battle of charleroi. to this 1t may be answered that the germans had not expected that the british could arrive in france so soon, and they were completely sur- prised by their appearance at mons, while it is obvious that a further advance would merely have made the british position more precarious than it proved to be. when sir john french’s troops reached mons, he learned that lanrezac’s v. army had been attacked on the 21st on the sambre and had lost the cross- ings over that river. late on the 22nd he agreed to stand at mons, to cover lanrezac’s left, believing that he would not be attacked by more than two army corps. on aug. 23 lanrezac learned of the fall of namur and that his right flank was dangerously menaced by the appearance of the german iii. army on the meuse above namur about dinant. 1007 iic therefore ordered a retreat during the night of the 23rd—24th, a decision confirmed the next day by joffre, who had at last be-_ come aware of the true strength of the german armies which were attempting to envelop his left. the enemy had proved to be strong enough both to defeat the two great french attacks on either side of metz, and to march through belgium west of the meuse in menacing force. during the 23rd sir john french, whose army had withstood the attacks of three german army corps at mons, became aware that his position, which was far in advance of lanrezac’s left, was untenable, and he too ordered a retreat which began the next morning. thus the whole struc- ture of plan 17 had collapsed! within 10 days of the beginning of the first part of the french main offensive. plan 17 replaced.—joffre at once formed a new plan to meet the danger to his left wing. he decided to swing back his centre and left, pivoting on verdun, and to create on his left “‘ a mass capable of resuming the offensive while the others hold up the encmy for the required time.”” the mass, he explained in an or- der issued on aug. 25 was to consist of his iv. and v. armies, the british army and a new army, the vi. under gen. mau- noury, to be created from troops drawn from his right. this order is the key to the manoeuvres which culminated in the battle of the marne, for it indicates joffre’s purpose, main- tained with rare courage in circumstances of great trial, to answer the german attempt to envelop his left by an envelopment of the german right. the french commander-in-chief hoped to be able to begin this counter-offensive from the line la fere- peronne, and with that object began to assemble the new vi. . army bchind the somme, in the neighbourhood of amiens. but the german pursuit proved to be too vigourous. on aug. 26 von kluck caught up the british ii. corps under gen. smith- dorrien, and left its commander no option but to fight at le cateau, though this was contrary to sir john french’s intentions. sir john french, believing his army to be in grave danger, and being in some doubt as to the power of the french to help him, thereupon ordered a rapid retreat acrass the somme and behind the oise. joffre, meanwhile, in order to help the british, had directed lanrezac to stand and attack von biilow’s uh. army, which he did in the battle of guise on aug. 29. lanrezac requested the co-operation of the british [. corps, under sir douglas haig, which haig was prepared to give, but this was forbidden by sir john french, who held that an immediate fur- ther retreat was necessary. this retreat necessarily involved the french vi. army on the british left and as the french iv. army had continued also to retreat while lanrezac was fighting at guise, the position of the french v. army became highly dan- gerous, as it was threatened on both flanks. vou moltke’s blunder—on aug. 23 the german right had reached positions in advance of that allotted to it in the schlief- fen plan, and in the following days a succession of reports of great victories poured into german headquarters. von moltke appears to have been deceived by these reports into thinking that the allied armies had been decisively defeated, and under that impression he took what proved to be a fatal step. be- fore the whole of the russian armies had been concentrated, two had advanced into east prussia in order to relieve the pressure upon their western allies. the comparatively weak german forces opposed to them had been defeated at gumbinnen on aug. 20 and there was alarm in east prussia and even in berlin. to relieve the situation on the eastern front yon moltke on aug. 25 ordered two army corps, one from the ii. and one from the i[t. army to east prussia, and at the same time it was neces- sary to detach another corps from the ii. army to besiege mau- beuge. thus the german right flank, which was required to make the decisive effort, was weakened by six divisions, a force about equal to sir john french’s army, which had been increased by one division on the eve of the battle of le cateau. further, von moltke, who was in failing health and physically incapable of personally visiting critical points on the long front, was unable to direct the manoeuvres of his right wing from his distant head- quarters, which were established, first at coblenz and subse- quently at luxembourg. 1008 to obviate this difficulty von kluck’s i. army had been placed under the direction of von biilow, who commanded the ii. army. this was faulty organisation, since a man occupied with the executive command of one body cannot successfully also direct another. the arrangement, therefore, broke down and von kluck was released from von biilow’s control. when the latter was attacked by lanrezac at guise he appealed for help to von kluck, who on his own initiative, began on aug. 30 to wheel inwards, from the neighbourhood of amiens, in an en- deavour to strike at lanrezac’s flank. by this manoeuvre von kluck changed direction so as to bring his line of march, which according to the schlieffen plan had been directed to the west of paris, to the east of the french capital and he neglected both the french vi. army and the british, who retreated almost un- molested after the battle of le cateau. on sept. 1 joffre, still preoccupied with the situation of his v. army, which had not been freed from its embarrassments, issued an order for the continuance of the retreat. the left was, if nec- essary, to retire behind the seine and joffre was prepared to abandon paris rather than his plan of a combined counter- offensive by all the armies of his left wing. this proved in the event to be unnecessary, for the vi. army had fallen back within the defences of paris and on sept. 3 general gallieni, the gov- ernor of paris, discovered that von kluck was making a flank march to the east of paris and while preparing maunoury to attack the german right, got into communication with joffre and urged an immediate offensive. by the evening of sept. 4 ‘the v. army had crossed the marne and had sufficiently freed its flanks from danger to enable it to play its part in the manoeu- vre which joffre had envisaged since aug. 25. soon that evening the french commander-in-chief issued the orders which brought about the battle of the marne (see marne, first battle of the). changes tn commands.—before that battle was joined joffre had made wholesale changes amongst his generals. ruffey gave place to sarrail in command of the ii. army, franchet d’es- perey succeeded lanrezac in the v. army, and a large number of: those who at the outset had commanded corps and divisions were removed. away on the right, too, an event had taken place which had great influence on the issue of the battle of the marne. von moltke, still obsessed by the extent of his victories on the frontiers, believed that it would be possible to carry out a double enveloping movement, and with that end in view instruct- ed the crown prince rupprecht to endeavour to break through to nancy. that effort, begun on sept. 4 and lasting for three days of fierce fighting, was broken by castelnau’s it. army on the grand couronne. thus the german plan which hac envis- aged the complete defeat of the french armies within 40 days had broken down. the fact was for a long time kept secret from the german people, but one of its immediate results was the re- - placement of von moltke by gen. von falkenhayn as chief of the general staff. operations in belgium—we must now return to belgium, where the belgian army was left within the defences of antwerp, watched by two german reserve corps. that army began on aug. 24 a sortie to assist the british and french forces fighting at mons and on the sambre. good progress was at first made and the fighting was continued throughout the 25th, but on the 26th, when news was received of the retreat of the allies and of joffre’s intention to resume the offensive later, it was deter- mined to return within the lines of antwerp and to await that event. a second and more important sortie took place between sept. 8, 9 and 13 and its beginning therefore coincided with the decisive day of the battle of the marne. early in september the belgian staff had information that the germans intended to move the ix. res. corps and a division of the iii. res. corps to france and to replace them by marines and landwehr troops. to prevent this the sortic was begun on sept. 9 and again began successfully. its effect was to cause the departure of the ix. reserve corps to be delayed, while that of the division of the iit. res. corps was definitely cancelled. fur- ther, a division of the xv. corps on the way from alsace to the extreme german right was diverted to antwerp. these move- western front ments checked the progress of the belgians, who retired on ant- werp on the 13th, but the general effect of the sorties was to make the germans feel that antwerp was a thorn in their flank, which could not be neglected and from this second sortie may be dated the initiation of the german plans for the reduction of the belgian fortress (see antwerp, siege of). fixing of the first line: seept.-dec. 1914 the german armies of the right, retreating from the marne, stood behind the aisne. the french re-occupied amiens and soissons on sept. 13 and reims on the 14th. the race to the sea.—the battle of the aisne then opened and while it was in progress there began that curious movement of both armies northwards which has been called the “‘ race to the sea.” during the advance to the aisne joffre had impressed upon maunoury the importance of outflanking the german line and with this object the vi. army began an attack on either bank of the oise between carlepont and noyon. this was checked by the timely arrival of the ix. res. corps from belgium, and joffre thereupon prepared for a new outflanking effort under a reconstituted ii. army commanded by castelnau. between sept. 22 and 24 castelnau’s attacks were stopped by the transfer of german troops from their left flank and the french line settled down into the beginnings of trench warfare through lassigny, just east of roye, through chaulnes to a point on the somme a few miles east of bray. joffre’s third attempt to out- flank his enemy consisted in the appointment of foch to the gen- eral direction of the operations on the french left and the crea- tion of a new x. army under gen. maud’huy to operate north of the somme as far as arras. maud'’huy began his effort on oct. 2, but so far from being able to turn the german flank he found himself struggling desperately to save arras. for falken- hayn had in his turn determined on a great effort to envelop the french and had assembled in artois a vi. army composed of troops withdrawn from alsace and lorraine, where their places were taken by landwehr. on the flank of the vi. army eight german cavalry divisions under von der marwitz were to sweep across flanders to the belsian coast, while the siege of antwerp was to be pressed to a conclusion. the result of the collision between the french x. army and the german vi. army was to establish the allied trench line during the first week of oct., east of albert, west of bapaume, along the eastern outskirts of arras, the western slopes of the vimy ridge, of which the greater part remained in possession of the germans, as did the mining towns of lens and loos. meanwhile the german cavalry sweeping round northwards into flanders had occupied ypres and bailleul and sent patrols through hazebrouck, west of which they were checked by french cavalry supported by territorial infantry and by a brigade of british marines, which had been landed at dunkirk on the night of sept. 19-20. a battalion of this brigade occupied lille on sept. 28 but was withdrawn on oct. 1 to move with the remain- der of the brigade to take part in the defence of antwerp (see antwerp, siege of). british retnforcements.—towards the end of sept. the brit- ish govt., anxious to do everything possible to save antwerp, was, besides sending reinforcements directly to the belgian fortress, preparing an expedition for the raising of the siege. this expedition, consisting of the 7th regular div. and ard cav. div.,! under sir henry rawlinson, had landed at zee- brugge on oct. 6. meanwhile sir john french being desirous of regaining touch with the channel coast and of shortening his line of communication, had suggested to joffre at the end of sept. that his army should resume its original position on the allied left. when the menace of the german enveloping movement had become clear, the original british bases at ilavre and boulogne had been abandoned, and had been transferred to st. nazaire on the atlantic. the british communications with the atlantic 1 the 6th regular div. had joined sir john french on the aisne, and the original cavalry division of the expeditionary force had been expanded into two. western front were necessarily impeded by french cross traffic and it would be obviously desirable to reopen the original bases and establish freer and shorter lines of communication. joffre accepted this view, the british trenches were gradually taken over by the french during the first fortnight of october, and the whole british army was transferred to flanders, arriving fortuitously in time to meet another great german attempt at envelopment. this movement was screened by the arrival near bethune of the french xxi. corps from the south, which pushed back the right of the german cavalry, only to be stopped in its turn near and south of la bassee by the german xiy. corps, which had come up from metz. retreat of the belgians——thus when the british ii. corps detrained at abbeville on oct. 8 and 9 the trench line had be- come stabilised as far to the north as the la bassee canal. the first development of falkenhayn’s turning movement had been definitely checked and there seemed a reasonable prospect that the british army arriving in flanders in support of the french cavalry screen would succeed in overlapping the ger- man right. while these movements were taking place, two events had materially altered the situation in flanders. on oct. 10 antwerp capitulated and the greater part of the belgian army retreated along the west to take refuge behind the tloods of the yser valley which had been created by opening the dykes. sir henry rawlinson’s force being too late to assist in the defence of antwerp, assisted in covering the retreat of the belgians and ' moved through bruges and ghent towards ypres, while in order to assist the belgian army further, a brigade of french marines had occupied dixmude. on oct. 13 the british 3rd cav. div. had re-occupied ypres and on the same day the belgian govt. was transferred to havre. on oct. 13, too, lille, which had been attacked by the germans on oct. 8, capitulated. on the day before the fall of lille, smith- dorrien’s ii. corps, swinging round with its nght on bethune, had begun to drive back the german cavalry towards the la bassee-lille road. by oct. 17, with a french cavalry corps under general conneau on its left, it had captured the villages of herlies and aubers on its left, and was approaching la bassee with its right. it was then attacked by the right of the german vi. army, which was constantly being extended as troops came up from lorraine. british advance.—the british iit. corps under gen. pulteney, on its way northwards from the aisne, had on oct. 11 begun detraining at st. omer and hazebrouck and marched towards bailleul; driving german cavalry supported by infantry de- tachments out of meteren it captured armenticres on oct. 16, but was unable to advance beyond the outskirts of that town. on pulteney’s left the british cav. corps under allenby, which had marched from the aisne and reached st. pol on oct. 9, moved thence northwards and pushing back german cavalry from the southern flanders ridges, occupied mont des cats, mont noir and the important hill of kemmel, and obtained a footing on the messines ridge. on oct. 19 the [. british corps under sir douglas haig had concentrated at hazebrouck, whence it marched towards ypres and effected a junction east of that town with rawlinson’s force. on haig’s left a new french viil. army under gen. d’urbal was coming into existence. this at first consisted only of the marine brigade already mentioned, a cavalry corps under gen. de mitry, and two divisions of territorials, but it was rapidly reinforced. the general direction of the operations of the allied left was in the hands of foch, who acted as joffre’s represent- ative. by oct. 20 battle was joined along the whole front from la bassee, along the aubers ridge, just east of armenticres, along the messines ridge, east of ypres to dixmude and thence to the sea near nieuport. towards this front both sides were hurrying reinforcements. the british army was strengthened by the arrival of selected battalions of territorial infantry and of an army corps from india, composed of both british and indian troops, while on the german side four army-corps, created since the beginning of the war, were advancing from brussels towards the yser. in such circumstances, each side still hoping to be | military world of europe and it took it by surprise. 1009 able to outflank the other, the first battle of ypres began (see ypres, battle of). position at end of 1914.—with the close of that battle and the withdrawal by the germans of troops for the eastern front, they adopted perforce a defensive attitude along the whole front. for the allies there followed necessarily some weeks of rest for theexhausted troops and a period during which the franco- british forces which had become much involved during the battle were sorted out. the result of these readjustments was that haig’s corps, withdrawn from ypres, took over the la bassee front with the indian corps on its left; pulteney’s iii. corps still held the armenti¢res section, reinforced by the arrival of an 8th regular div. from england and smith-dorrien’s ii. corps occu- pied the lines opposite the messines ridge with its left fronting wytschaete. thence northwards, d’urbal’s viii. army held the ypres salient, the belgian army the line of the yser and a french detachment watched the coast. these arrangements completed, the allied commanders-in- chief planned to take advantage of the weakening of the german armies in the west by endeavouring to penetrate the enemy’s defences. there resulted a number of minor enterprises carried out by the french, mainly on the lorraine front and by the brit- ish against the messines ridge. these endeavours were entirely unsuccessful and served only to inform the allied leaders that the problem of breaking through lines of trenches protected by barbed wire, defended by resolute men, equipped with quick- firing rifles and machine guns, and supported by modern artillery, was both formidable and new, and required a readjustment of | all pre-conceived ideas of the methods of attack. it was in this atmosphere that the year 1914 closed on the western front. bintiograpuy.—h. r. a. von kluck, der marsch auf paris und die marneschlacht (1914), with engl. transl. (1920); belgian army official, la guerre de 1914 (1915), afilttary operations of belgium in de- fence of the country and to uphold her neutrality, eng. transl. of belgium staff work; b. e. palat, la grande guerre sur le front occidental (1917, etc.); o. schwink, die schlacht an der yser und bet ypern in hlerbst 1914, translated as ypres rorq (1918); viscount french, rorg (1919); c. w. p. von biilow, afetn bericht zur marne- schlacht (1919); sir f. b. maurice, forty days in rorg (1919); m.c. l. von hausen, erinnerungen an den marnefoldzug i9rg (1920): j. s. gallieni, af emotires du general gallieni (1920); c. l. m. lanrezac, le plan de campagne francais (1920); lltstory of the great war based on official documents; j. e. edmonds, military operations, of the british army in the western theatre of war (1920, etc.); h. j. von kuhl, der marnefoldzug torg (1921); m. l. v. h. corda, la guerre mondiale (1922); l. cornet, ilistoire de la guerre (1922). see also world war: bibliograpily. il. trench warfare, 1915-7 while weary british troops were handing over their lines in the salient to their french comrades at the close of the first battle of ypres (see ypres, battle of), and they had time to think of other things than the grim struggle that had just ended, it dawned upon them that the war in the west had entered upon a new phase. the trench barrier had been completed from the north sea to the swiss frontier, and a war of movement and manoeuvre, for which most of them had been trained, had become impossible. this was a development which had not been foreseen by the for the germans this surprise was less unpleasant in the winter of 1914-5 than for the french and the british. the fortifications of the french and russian frontiers had compelled the germans to study closely the art and science of siege warfare and to make preparations for such warfare. they had assimilated the experi- ences of the russo-japanese war and had learnt from them to their profit. the british army was in very different case. its chiefs before the war believed that it would be emploved only in a war of movement, and the study of siege warfare had been confined to a small body of engineers, amongst whom it was largely theoreti- cal. all the money to be found for the army votes had been used in the training and equipment of the expeditionary torce, and there was none left for the provision of the material required for the attack of fortresses. the cost even of hand grenades, with which experiments had been made when the reports of ioio british observers in manchuria came home, was held to be pro- hibitive. for these reasons the winter of ror4-5 was for the british infantry in france and flanders a period of unmitigated suffering. new allied plans—while the soldiers in front were enduring and slowly learning to mitigate the horrors of trench warfare, those behind were planning. there were not lacking active brains in paris and in london who saw that the assaults upon the ever-widening barriers of barbed wire and the evermore serried lines of trenches must prove a slow and bloody business. these brains sought eagerly for a way round the barrier which would lead to a speedier and less costly victory, and so began the controversy between “ easterners”? and ‘ westerners ” which endured while the war lasted. there were signs carly in 1915 of preparation for an austro- german attack upon serbia; and mr. lloyd george, inspired by his friends in france, proposed at once to save a weak ally and to attack the weakest link in the opposing chain by transferring the bulk of the british army to the balkans and reinforcing it with the new armies as they became ready for the ficld. both the french and the british commanders-in-chief hotly opposed this proposal. the lines of communication throuch serbia were long and difficult, and it was very doubtful whether they could be made to maintain an adequate force. the transference of the british army to the balkans must in any event have taken many months, during which it would have been condemned to an inactivity from which the enemy on the inside of the circle, with not only shorter but better communications, would cer- tainly have profited. the balkan enterprise was therefore con- demned, and the immediate outcome of the controversy on the british side was the starting of the dardanelles adventure. joffre’s plan was simpler. he desired to attack on the western front at the earliest possible moment and with all possible force. it was argued at the time, and his repeatedly been argued since, that it would have been better to have awaited the development of the british army, the increase of the allied artillery, the im- provement of their stock of munitions and to have employed the interval in gaining advantages over less formidable foes in other theatres of war. to these arguments jofire’s answer was that the germans were in occupation of a great part of france, that near noyon they were only 50 m. from [aris, on the somme they were barely 20 m. from amiens, the main junction connect- ing the british and french in flanders and artois with the re- mainder of the french troops, while farther north they were little more than 40 m. from calais. the french commander-in-chief maintained that the security of the western front must be a paramount consideration in allied strategy, and that to secure the position in the west it was necessary to drive the germans farther back. early battles in i915 sir john french was in general agreement with joffre’s views. he at first desired a combined naval and military ‘attack upon the coast of belgium, but on receiving representa- tions from lord kitchener that neither the men nor the muni- tions required for this operation could be made ready in time, he abandoned this proposal and set himself whole-heartedly to co- operate in joffre’s plans. these plans comprised a grand attack by the british army north of the la bassce canal and by the french northern group of armies under foch on the front between the la bassee canal and arras. the hope was that this attack would give the allies the vimy ridge and compel the germans to evacuate lille. in order that foch might have the forces necessary for such a battle it was agreed between the commanders-in-chief that the british should relieve the french troops, who had occupied the ypres salient when haig’s men had been withdrawn from it after the first battle of ypres. sir john french had at the end of ror4 received one more regular british division, the 27th, made up by kitchener from foreign garrisons, while another, the 28th, arrived early in january. the 1st canadian div. disembarked in france in the second week of february. this gave him a total of western front 13 infantry and five cavalry divisions, besides a number of se- lected territorial battalions. these reinforcements allowed him to form his command into two armies, the first under sir douglas haig and the second under sir horace smith-dorrien, and at the same time to extend his front gradually north into the ypres salient. batlle of neuve chapelle—the british army, which like other european armies, had been trained to believe in the supreme virtue of attack, had since the beginning of the war, with the exception of the short pcriod of the advance to the marne and the aisne, been compelled to fight defensively, and sir john french desired to give it a wider experience of attack upon entrenchments. for this purpose he had been carefully saving up artillery ammunition by strictly limiting the amount to be expended in the routine of trench warfare, and he cal- culated that he would have sufficient at his disposal to allow him to engage in a considerable battle early in march. he entrusted the execution of this battle to haig’s i. army, which was directed to attack the german lines near neuve chapelle, an operation which it was hoped would result in a favourable position for the further battle which was to be undertaken later in co-operation with foch. the battle of neuve chapelle opened on march 1o with what was in those days held to be a very heavy bombardment. this bombardment was followed by an infantry assault, which was at first successful, and carried the village of neuve chapelle, but was soon brought to a stand- still by the encmy’s machine-guns. in this battle the british first experienced the difficulty of bringing up reserves at the tight time through roads blocked by the debris of battle and over ground scarred by trenches and torn by shell-fire. on the whole, however, both the french and the british were im- pressed by the result of the bombardment, which was held to promise great things when there should be more guns and more ammunition. preparations for further battles therefore went forward (see neuve-chapelle, battle of). the germans, guessing what was on foot, were not slow to interfere with these preparations. on april 17 a portion of smith-dorrien’s if. army attacked and gained a footing upon hill 60, an important feature on the south face of the ypres salient. the germans, counter-attacking, promptly regained possession of the hill and followed up this success by a far more serious enterprise on april 22. by then foch’s preparations for the attack on the vimy ridge were far advanced, and to ob- tain the troops he needed for the coming battle he had greatly weakened the french forces left in the north portion of the ypres salient. against this portion the germans launched waves of poison gas discharged from cylinders, which com- pletely overwhelmed the french troops, who had no protec- tion against the gas. the flank of the rst canadian div. was completely exposed, and for a short time a definite breach was created in the allied line. fortunately the germans were unprepared for the extent of their success, and had not the troops at hand to take immediate advantage of it, while the gallantry of the first canadian div. and the 28th div. held the enemy at bay until reinforcements could be brought up. the first complete british territorial division to arrive in france, the 46th north midland div., was fortunately in the neigh- bourhood, and these and other reinforcements, some contrib- uted by foch from the reserves he was holding in readiness for his battle, sufficed to save ypres and to patch up a new line. but the second battle of ypres, if it did not give the germans all the success they might have attained had they been ready to follow up the first success, at least gained a great part of their purpose by weakening the forces and exhausting the meagre sup- ply of ammunition which the allies were accumulating for their projected battle. fromeiles and festubert-—~the battle began on may g with an attack by the british i. army under haig on either side of fromelles, and an attack by d’urbal’s french i. army, under the direction of foch, on a much wider front which extended from the scarpe to the north of the souchez. the british at- tack made very little progress and it was soon evident that the western front preliminary bombardment had not sufficed to destroy suffi- ciently the enemy’s defences, or, what was of greater importance, to overcome his machine-guns. sir john french, however, felt himself bound by his agreement with joffre and foch to keep the enemy occupied on his front as long as possible, and the battle of fromelles became merged in the battle of festubert, by bringing the front of attack slightly south into what it was hoped would prove more favourable ground. the experience of festubert was, however, hardly more favour- able than that of fromelles, for again the german machine-gun- ners checked all real progress, while the lack of artillery ammu- nition became more and more felt. the situation was made more difficult in this latter respect by renewed german attacks in the ypres salient upon the ii. army, now under the command of sir herbert plumer. the situation of the british army in tvlanders was somewhat eased by the arrival of five more divi- sions of territorials, followed by the first of the new army divisions, the gth, but it was lack of shell rather than lack of men which forced sir john french to stop his attacks, and the battle of festubert petered out on may 2sth. french successes —meanwhile, on the british right, foch was making encouraging if slow and very costly progress. in the battle of the souchez the villages of ablain st. nazaire, carency, neuville st. vaast and thelus were carried by d’urbal’s men, who fought their way doggedly up the west slopes of the vimy ridge. the french found the german machine-guns to be the chief obstacle to progress and the prime cause of casualties, particularly in the villages, in which the enemy’s machine-gun- ners fought indomitably from cellar to cellar and in a certain elaborate series of works which became known to fame as the labyrinth. when the british ceased their attacks on may 25, foch had made enough headway to encourage him to believe that he could gain the whole ridge, and he determined to con- tinue the battle alone. but for this he wanted more troops, and an extension of the british front, which would set free frenchmen, while both he and joffre were fearful lest the new army divi- sions preparing to leave england should be sent to the darda- nelles. british front extended.—in may joffre, therefore, wrote to kitchener that he proposed to renew the attempts on the arras front to take vimy ridge, while the british army fought on foch’s left and he made his main attack in champagne to the east of reims. to obtain the french troops for this campaign he required the british army to extend its front to the right and left, and also to relieve de castelnau’s vi. army on the somme front. the remainder of the summer was occupied by these changes, which became possible as the new army divisions ar- rived from england. the 2nd and 3rd of these to reach france disembarked at the end of may, and six more before the end of july, so that by then the four divisions and the cavalry divi- -sion of mons had in 11 months increased to 28 divisions and five cavalry divisions. these reinforcements enabled a british ii. army to be formed under sir charles monro, which took over some 17 m. of front from a point to the south of arras as far as the somme, eventually extending its lines to the south of that river. haig’s [. army prolonged its right south of the la bassee canal to the neighbourhood of lens, and thus found itself facing the open plain of loos, simultaneously the ii. army, now under plumer, who had taken smith-dorrien’s place, relieved the re- maining french troops in the ypres salient and brought its left into contact with the right of the belgians. the autumn campaign of iqi5§ while these movements were in progress, vast preparations were taking place on the battle-front. guns, trench mortars, shells and military stores of all kinds had accumulated in hitherto undreamt-of quantities. joffre and his staff had it in their minds at this time that they were engaged in operations in the nature of a huge siege, and the essential was to blow a practicable breach in the enemy’s lines through which the in- fantry could be poured to the assault. a study of the previous battles of trench warfare had con- ioi! vinced them that with sufficient guns and sufficient ammunition this was possible. the output of the french factories had been increased enormously, and though the british ministrv of muni- tions had hardly yet legun to be productive, still the supply of heavy guns and shells for the british army had been greatly in- creased and it was equipped to reply effectively to the german gas. the one fly in the ointment was that there had been a renewal in the british cabinet of the controversy between the “easterners”’ and the “westerners,” and mr. churchill had pressed with all his eloquence and skill for a decisive campaign which should open the road to constantinople. the result was a compromise, and three of the new army divisions had gone to the east. some compensation for this was obtained by the arrival of two more new army divisions in france, and by the formation of a guards’ division, which had been made possible by the crea- tion of new battalions of guards and the replacement of those already in france by other battalions. this gave sir john french an additional army corps, which he kept in his hands as a reserve. . allicd offensive in champagne and artois.—joffre opened his autumn campaign on sept. 25. in addition to his great at- tack in champagne, foch with the french x. army attempted once more to storm the vimy ridge, while haig’s i. army at- tacked between the la bassee canal and lens, in conjunction with a secondary british attack to the north of the canal and demonstrations on the front near armentieres. the general plan of the north battle was that foch, having carried the vimy ridge, should advance east to the south of lens, while haig pushed east through loos to the north of lens and joined hands with foch beyond that town. in this way the alhes would avoid the mass of ruined buildings and miners’ cottages which composed the town and would form admirable refuges for the german machine-gunners. the tactical methods to be employed on both the south and north battlefields were similar in conception, that is to say, there was to be a great rush forward of the assaulting infantry as soon as the attack had been adequately prepared by the artillery, and the reserves were to follow hard after the first- line troops. only in the matter of the preparation of the attack was there any essential difference in the methods to be employed by the british and the french. the former had determined to replace an intense bombardment by a discharge of gas from cylinders similar to that from which they had suffered in the second battle of ypres. of the british share in the general plan, the demonstrations in front of armentieres proved quite ineffective, while the at- tack north of the la bassee canal failed. on the front oppo- site loos, however, the discharge of gas surprised the germans and overcame the resistance of their first-line troops, though it caused some casualties among the british themselves and made it difficult to direct the attack. despite this, the first wave of hritish infantry passed through and beyond loos, when it appeared that they only needed the prompt arrival of the reserves to secure a very considerable success. sir john french had, however, kept these back until he saw how the bat- tle progressed, and when they arrived late in the evening the new army divisions which formed two-thirds of the reserve found great difficulty in making their way through the con- fusion of the battlefield under conditions entirely strange to them, and were unable to confirm the first success won, so that, though loos was held, german counter-attacks recovered a considerable part of the ground gained, and in particular ithe important hill 70, which dominates loos on the north (see loos, battle of). | worse still, foch’s attack on the vimy ridge failed almost completely, and the germans remained in possession of the crest. this alone condemned the north attack to failure, for the british front of battle was not large enough to insure a breach in the enemy’s defences sufficiently wide to be ex- ploited successfully. the remainder of the battle of loos, which lasted until oct. 15, resolved itself into the repulse of a number of fierce german counter-attacks, which ended in ioi2 mutual exhaustion, with the british in possession of the salient extending round loos to the la bassee canal. the great battle in champagne was an even more severe disappointment because more had been expected. the first news from the field aroused high hopes. the first two german lines of defence were carried on a wide front, and many prison- ers and guns were captured, while on the fourth day of the battle the third german line, which was believed to be the enemy’s last system of defence, was for a time breached near sainte marie; but again the solution of the problem of bring- ing up reserves at the right time and in good order was not found, while the enemy’s reserves, which came up fresh through country which had not been fought over, arrived in time to fill the breach. the battle of champagne ran on into nov., developing into a series of struggles for tactical points of importance, but ended with no material change in the posi- tion won by the french at the end of the fourth day of the battle. so the campaign of 1915 closed on the western front, with the allies still asking themselves how it was possible to get through the trench barrier and drive the germans from france and belgium. ‘the great bombardment followed by the assault in mass had failed, and some other method of attack was re- quired. allied organisation revised—ere the year closed a new problem had developed in the near east which had its reper- cussion on the western front. german, austrian and bul- garian forces had overrun serbia, and the allied governments had decided to send a relief expedition to salonika. part of the troops required for this new enterprise came from the dardanelles, but more were needed and these had to be supplied from the western front. five divisions of french troops under the command of gen. sarrail were ordered off and accompanied by the three british divisions of the iii. army which had been holding the line south of the somme, the 27th, 28th and 22nd. it was also decided to spare the two divisions of indian infantry, which had proved such a timely reinforce- ment at the time of the first battle of ypres, the horrors of another winter of trench warfare in flanders, and they were sent off to mesopotamia. this reduction of the british army was made good by the arrival in france before the end of the year of the 2nd and 3rd canadian divs. and the 16th irish div., and of the 21st, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 36th and 38th new army divs., so that the strength of the british army in france and belgium stood at 36 divisions and five cavalry divisions. the allics on the western front had therefore at this time about 3,100,000 men, opposed to 2,000,000 germans. these figures gave rise to anxious dis- cussion as to what superiority of numbers was necessary to en- sure success under conditions of trench warfare, and whether and how the allies could obtain the necessary superiority. while these discussions were going on important changes took place in the allied command. joffre had hitherto been nominally chief of the french general staff. he was now definitely appointed commander-in-chief of the armies of the northeast, with de castelnau as his chief-of-staff. in the british army sir john french was brought home to command the troops in great britain and was succeeded by sir douglas haig, with gen. kiggell as his chief-of-staff, while sir william robertson, who had been chief-of-staff to french, became chief of the im- perial general staff at the war office. operations in 1916 in dec. rors the first serious attempts to obtain unity of action between the allies took place, and a conference of commanders- in-chief and chiefs-of-statf of the british, french, belgian and italian armies, attended also by representatives of the russian and japanese armies, was held at jolfre’s headquarters. at this conference it was agreed to attack the enemy as early in 1916 as possible, sufficient time being allowed for the training of the new army divisions that the british army was receiving, and for the re-equipment of the russian armies. these plans, however, western front never matured, because the enemy anticipated them, and it is therefore unnecessary to refer to them further. during dec. 1915 and jan. 1916 the germans developed con- siderable activity along the front and made local attacks at nieuport on the north sea coast, against more than one point in the ypres salient, at givenchy on the vimy ridge front, on the somme, and in feb. on the alsace front. the majority of these attacks took the form of experiments in various methods of bombardment which the germans wished to test in view of a greater ellort which they were planning. ‘that effort took the form of a great attack upon verdun (see verdun, battle of) which began on feb. 21. both commanders-in-chief were agreed that the principles on which the plans of battle in 1915 had been drawn up required modification. it was seen that the analogy of the great siege did not hold, that something more was required than to blast a great breach in the enemy’s lines and then to launch a great assault. the something more was the defeat of the enemy’s re- serves, which came up fresh and in good order to meet troops when the assault had been thrown into some confusion. it was agreed, therefore, that the first object of battle should be to draw in and exhaust the enemy’s reserves, and that until that object had been achieved no decisive success could be expected. so long as the enemy continued to attack verdun, it would, on this principle, be to the advantage of the french to endure these attacks provided always that the enemy gained no success which would affect seriously the stratcegical position on the whole front, and provided that the exhaustion of the french man-power was not excessive. joffre therefore proposed to fight defensively at verdun as long as possible, but to be ready to strike back as soon as the situation there appeared to him too dangerous, or as soon as the french army was approaching the limits of endurance. he therefore asked haig not only to relieve the french x. army on the arras front, but to prepare to attack north of the somme on a front as wide as the resources of the british army would permit, and undertook to support that attack with a french attack south of the river on a scale which would depend upon the effect of the battle of verdun upon the french army. (see verdun, battle of.) battle of the somme.—between jan. and july the british strength in bayonets and sabres grew from 450,000 to 660,000, and there was a more than corresponding increase in artillery and aircraft. this enabled haig to fall in completely with joffre’s wishes, and as soon as the relicf of the french x. army was com- pleted he set about preparing for the great attack on the front north of the somme. the growth of the armies made necessary the creation of a iv. army under the command of sir henry rawlinson. the iii. army was now commanded by sir e.allenby, and sir charles monro, who had gone out to supervise the evacu- ation of the dardenclles, returned to command the i. army. british troops now held a continuous line from the yser canal to the somme, and were actively preparing to take upon themselves more of the brunt of the war on the western front, a burden of which nearly seven-eighths had hitherto fallen on their french comrades. in the latter part of may the german crown. prince redoubled his attacks on the verdun front, and on the z1st the germans stormed the mort homme hill on the ieft bank of the meuse, for which they had been struggling for weeks. petain at once called joffre’s attention to the gravity of the situation, and pressed for an early beginning of the counter-offensive on the somme, but joffre was anxious to give haig as much time as possible for the training of his troops, and made petain endure yet longer. fire from the mort homme hill had long impeded german progress on the right bank of the meuse, but with the hill in their possession the enemy in the beginning of june began to press hard on that bank and on the 7th captured fort vaux. thereupon petain renewed his representation to joffre, who in consultation with haig decided that the battle of the somme should begin on july t. the preliminary bombardment was begun a week earlier, on june 24, the day on which the ger- western front mans, after capturing fort thiaumont, stormed the village of fleury and attained the farthest point in their progress towards verdun. the battle was fought out in three phases, the first being the struggle up the slopes from the valleys of the ancre and of the somme to the south crest of the somme plateau, the second the struggle for possession of the plateau, the third phase consist- ing of the advance down the north slopes. the first phase was consummated by a brilliant night attack by the iv. army on july 14, and on july 17 the british and french troops north of the river were abreast of the french south of the somme, the french having for some time been established opposite to peronne. the whole front of attack could again move forward together. the econd phase constituted along series of fierce struggles, the germans bringing up more and more troops and disputing every yard of ground, so it was not until sept. 9 that the british, with the french on their right, were able to look down upon the north slopes of the plateau and the plains beyond. progress of the baitle—by this time two of the objects for which the battle had been fought were gained. the germans, forced to transfer troops to the somme, had to relax their pres- sure on verdun. the french retook fort thiaumont on june 30, while throughout july they slowly regained part of the ground which had been won from them, and on aug. 17 drove the enemy out of fleury. verdun was no longer in danger, and petain and nivelle were able to plan at jeisure counter-attacks on a more extensive scale. the second object of the battle of the somme, the exhaustion of the enemy’s reserves, was being obtained as surely. when the battle began, the front attacked by the british was held by six german divisions, that attacked by the french by two. in the two months 36 german divisions had been engaged on the british front, 18 on the french. in the six months of verdun the germans had employed 43 divisions in battle, so that their defence on the somme was far more exhausting than their attacks at verdun. at the end of aug. the failure of falkenhayn’s plans was publicly admitted by his supersession by hindenburg, with ludendorff as his chief assistant. the latter, after visiting the fields of verdun and the somme, found the german position on the western front to be one of great gravity, and the chief problem confronting him to be how to stop “ the progressive falling off ” of the german fighting power. the situation of the allies had im- proved marvellously since june, when men were wondering how long it would be before the germans entered verdun. not only had verdun been saved and the germans been forced to fight desperately on the defensive, but the italians had driven back the attacking austrians in the alps and had then passed them- selves to attack on the isonzo. on the russian front brusilov had won great victories on the bukovina and rumania had en- tered the war, too late certainly to profit by brusilov’s success, but none the less adding apparently another ally to those who confronted the central powers. the whole machinery of the allies was, for the first time, simultaneously at work, and joffre’s strategy appeared to be triumphant. it was in these encouraging circumstances that the third phase of the battle of the somme began on sept. 15. the attack of that day was made famous not only by the successes won, which were considerable, but by the fact that tanks then made their first appearance in battle. despite the employment of tanks, and despite the splendid valour of the infantry of the new armies, the resistance of the enemy was not broken in the third phase of the battle of the somme. the days were growing shorter and the weather became uncertain, while the enemy, drawing troops from ail parts of the front to prevent his line from breaking, fought with fine courage. by. nov. 17, when rain and mud put an end to the battle, the germans had engaged no fess than 127 divisions. the enemy’s reserves had indeed been worn down; in the valley of the ancre he was hemmed by gough’s v. army into an awkward salient, but the weather had broken and it was too late to reap the har- vest on the battle-front. the first fruits of the somme were garnered elsewhere. 1013 the nivelle method.—on oct. 24 nivelle began an attack on the right bank of the meuse, and on the following day recap- tured fort douaumont. this conspicuous success was followed by the recapture of fort vaux on nov. 2. the battle ended in a complete victory for the french, six french divisions overcoming seven german divisions at surprisingly small cost. nivelle and mangin, who commanded the army corps engaged, became the heroes of france. the victory was largely due to the skillful handling of massed artillery, and the nivelle method became famous. its fame was extended when, on dec. 14, a second at- tack won an even more brilliant success, which made verdun quite secure and brought in 11,387 prisoners and 115 guns, again at small cost. when the statesmen of paris and london compared'the results of these two battles at verdun, which had resulted not only in important gains of ground but in the capture in a few days’ fighting of more than 17,000 prisoners, with the slow bludgeon work of the somme in which the british army in four and a half months had captured 38,000 germans at a tremendous price, they began to think that they had at last discovered the man for whom they were looking so anxiously. ; operations in 1917 on nov. 11 10916 joffre assembled his second conference of commanders-in-chief te consider plans for the following year. it was agreed that the germans were in great difficulties on the western front, and that the situation of the allies was more favourable than it had ever been. strength of the allies —the fighting strength of the british army had grown to about 1,200,000 men, and it was known that considerable further reinforcements would reach france during the first few months of the year. the fighting strength of the french army had been increased by the incorporation of native troops to about 2,600,000, so that, including the belgians, the allies disposed of about 3,900,000 men against about 2,500,000 germans. jofire declared that the french army could maintain its strength for one more great battle, but that thereafter it must progressively decline, as france had no longer a sufficient num- ber of men of military age to replace losses. he therefore warned sir douglas haig that during the coming year the burden must fall more and more upon the british army, a position which the british commander-in-chief readily accepted. germany had re- cently created a number of new divisions, some of which had been employed against rumania, but it appeared probable that the transfer of these divisions to the western front would be delayed if russia was able to be active on the eastern front, and of this the great improvement in the supply of munitions for the russian army held out promise at this time. it was also agreed that, in view of the probable decline in strength of the french army later in the year and the promised reinforce- ment of the british army, the relative superiority of the allies on the western front would be greaterinthe spring of 1917 than at any time which could be foreseen with certainty. foundations of the 1917 offenstve-—for all these reasons it was decided to take the earliest possible opportunity of pressing the advantage won by the battle of the somme, and of continuing the process of exhausting the enemy’s reserves as preparation for an effort which should be decisive. all the armies of the entente were to be ready to attack in the first fortnight of feb., the british army between the vimy ridge and bapaume, the french armies between the somme and the oise; and the french attack was to be followed soon after by another in champagne to the west of reims. it was further understood between joffre and haig that these attacks would, if necessary, be followed by further attacks by the british army in flanders. during the winter the british army was to do its utmost to press the enemy on the somme battlefield, and to prevent him from recovering from his embarrassment there. the underlying ideas of this plan were primarily that the policy of exhausting the german reserves should be resumed at the earli- est possible moment, and secondly that the utmost effort should ioi4 be made to complete the work begun on the somme. the com- manders-in-chief believed the situation to be such that victory could be won in 1917, but they were under no illusion as to the possibility of ending the war by one great blow to be delivered in the spring. joffre followed up the results of this conference by issuing general instructions embodying the decisions reached, and in these instructions he directed that the first british and french attacks, that is to say, those to be delivered between vimy and bapaume and between the somme and the oise, were to be ready by feb. r. nivelle 1n comm.nd.—no sooner were joffre’s plans completed than a series of intrigues against the french commander-in- chief came to a head. a number of ollicers of the french gen- eral staff tegarded with dismay a proposal to give more and more of the task of consummating victory to the british army and less and less to the french. they found many supporters among the politicians in paris, and these were reinforced by others, who feared that the “ war of exhaustion ” and the proccss of wearing down the enemy’s reserves would end in exhausting france be- fore it exhausted germany. the cry therefore went up that it was time to have a change in the higher command. foch, whose bloody assaults upon the vimy ridge had not been forgotten, was held to be too much of a “ hammer and tongs ” fighter, and he was placed on half-pay, while the state of the defences of ver- dun before the german attack began was brought up against joffre. so he was given a marshal’s baton, and an honorific posi- tion in paris and nivelle reigned in his stead. the new commander-in-chief at once made a drastic change in joffre’s policy and plans. he proposed to increase the weight of the french attack; and in order that he mizht obtain the french troops necessary he asked that the british should relieve the french vi. and xx. armies and extend their front south across the somme as far as the amiens-roye road. in return he suggested that haig should modify his plans for keeping up the pressure on the germans on the somme battlefield during the winter, and that the date of the combined attacks should be postponed until march tr5. this meant a delay of six weeks in launching the attacks planned by joffre, and the enemy would be given time to recover from the effects of the somme. but it became clear, as nivelle’s plans developed, that there was to be an even more complete change of plan than this. he proposed to apply on a great scale the methods he had employed with such success at verdun, and to return to the policy which had been discarded after the failure in champagne in 1915. he intended, by skilful employment of a great mass of artillery, to overcome the enemy’s resistance in his front lines, and then to pour in to the assault a great reserve which should break through the trench barrier completely and so change the whole strategical position on the western front. allies’ mistaken policy.—fearly in dec. 1916, there had been a change of government in great britain, and mr. lloyd george had become prime minister. h[e had made up his mind that the somme had been a costly failure, and was eagerly looking for some method of winning the war which should be speedier and less costly in life than that of a “ war of exhaustion.” he there- fore welcomed a general who promised a short, sharp and decisive battle, which would be over, one way or the other, within a com- paratively short time. so at a conference held at calais at the end of feb. 1917, it was agreed between the british and french governments that the british army should be placed under the general direction of nivelle for the forthcoming operations. this decision violated a fundamental principle of military organisation. a general of a division is not, while still in com- mand of his division, placed also in command of an army corps which includes other divisions, for the good and sufficient reason that if his attention is absorbed by the details of one unit or of one part of the front, he cannot simultaneously give proper attention to the other units or to other parts of the front. the right course would have been to have given nivelle the general charge of the whole western front and to have appointed an- other commander-in-chief for the french army. the results of this mistake soon became apparent. on the last day of the calais western front conference news arrived from the british v. army that there were signs of a german withdrawal in the valley of the ancre. some time before, the british airmen had «discovered that a great new system of defensive works had been constructed by the enemy covering douai, cambrai and st. quentin, the system which became known to the allies as the hindenburg line; and not long after the report from the ancre came in there were indications that the germans were preparing to retire from the whole of the somme battlefield into this life. but nivelle, not being in close touch with happenings on the british front, did not believe in a german retreat, and issued to haig orders which were not compatible with the changed situation, and in certain matters went far beyond the agreement reached in calais. this led to friction, which was adjusted at a further conference in london. by then it had become apparent that the germans were in re- treat on the whole front between arras and the aisne near vailly. german retreat to the hindenburg line-—the germans, re- lieved from pressure on their front during the winter, had pre- pared for their retreat systematically and brutally. the whole country which had been in their occupation west of the hinden- burg line was devastated, villages were burnt, roads and railways destroyed, fruit trees cut down and everything of any value was removed and mines which exploded at a touch were prepared with diabolical ingenuity. in these circumstances a rapid pur- suit became impossible and the germans were able to delay the advance of the allies by rearguards, while they removed their heavy artillery and established their main bodies in the hinden- burg lines. , this manoeuvre, planned and successfully carried through by ludendorff, who with hindenburg as his chief had suceeded falkenhayn in sept. 1916 when the failure of the latter’s attack on verdun had become obvious, effected a great change in the situation to the benefit of the germans. not only did it mate- rially shorten their front and thereby enable them to increase their reserves, but their troops exchanged the battered defences of the somme battlefield with its awkward salients for the strong- est lines which had yet been built upon the western front. jurther, the enemy had withdrawn from a considerable part of the front which nivelle had intended to attack, and this made necessary a further postponement of his battles, but he still ad- hered to the main features of his plan. in the altered circum- stances grave doubts arose in the minds of some of the senior yrench generals as to the feasibility of this plan, and when these came to the ears of the french war minister, m. painleve, he assembled a council of war on april 6, on the very eve of the offensive, at which criticisms of the plan were presented by certain of the commanders who were to take a leading part in its execution. nevertheless, the french govt. decided not to inter- fere with gen. nivelle. the spring offensive.—it is difficult to conceive of a more un- fortunate prelude to a great battle. however, these doubts and hesitations of the leaders were not known to the rank and file of the army or to the french people; and when, on april 9, the spring campaign began by an attack by allenby’s iif. army on the enemy’s lines east of arras, and by the canadian corps with one brigade of the 5th div. on the vimy ridge, and met with an immediate success, hopes soared high. the french pub- lic was deeply impressed by the rapid capture of the vimy ridge, which had for so long resisted foch’s attacks, and great things were expected when the french army advanced. the second of nivelle’s blows was delivered by the group of armies of the centre, now under franchet d’esperey, against the german front in the neighbourhood of st. quentin; but fran- chet d’esperey was here in contact with a part of the main hin- denburg line, and he had neither the time nor the means to prepare effectively for an attack upon their formidable defences. the operations of the centre group of armies, which had been intended to be an important part of nivelle’s programme dwin- dled therefore into little more than a demonstration, which took place on april 14 and had no material results. nivelle’s main battle, which took place on the front between reims and anizy, began on april 16. it had been planned that the assaulting western front troops should, on the first day of battle, break through the first three german lines. the attack was made by mangin’s vi. army and mazel’s v. army, with duchesne’s x. army and a mass of cavalry in reserve ready to exploit their success. an- thoine’s iv. army struck in to the east of reims on the 17th. the left of mazel’s attack failed almost entirely; and elsewhere, though the first german line was captured, little progress was made beyond it. the dream of a rapid rupture of the enemy’s front had to be abandoned, and a fresh plan of battle had to be formed. one of the first results of the failure of nivelle to realise his hopes was that he had to request haig to press his attacks to the east of arras with all possible vigour, so as to keep the largest possible number of germans occupied in that quarter. this entailed a prolongation of the battle of arras into a period when gains became small and were only purchased at great price. none the less haig decided that the situation made it necessary to support the french with all his power, and he fought on till may 17, by which time the bnitish front was established some four miles to the east of arras and in the plain to the east of the vimy ridge. | while haig was thus battling in the north, nivelle on the aisne front had brought his x. army into his front line, and by slow and bitter fighting had won his way up the chemin des dames ridge, of which he captured the eastern portion. early in may it was quite evident that there was no prospect of such a break through as had been planned, and on the rsth the french govt. replaced nivelle by gen. petain, while gen. foch, recalled from semi-retirement, became chief-of-staff in paris. petain’s first task was to wind up the operations on the aisne front, and the battle ended definitely on may 20. the immediate consequence of this repulse was the outbreak of a series of mutinies in the french armies, which so affected the morale of the french troops that petain found it necessary to appeal to haig to keep the enemy engaged while he restored the confidence of his men. battle of messines.—if the attention of the germans was to be occupied by the british armies it was necessary that they should be forced to fight. upon any part of the british front south of the point where it bends south from the belgian frontier north- west of lille it was possible for the germans to repeat their manoeuvre of march and avoid a battle by retiring into another system of defences, for in doing this they would be merely aban- doning a portion of french territory which was of no great value to them, while they might by this method economise sufficient troops to enable them to fall upon the french. on the belgian front they could not fall back without risking their hold upon the ports of ostend and zeebrugge, which were to them impor- tant bases for their submarine campaign, and without endanger- ing the security of the chief aerodromes from which their air attacks upon england were made. for these reasons haig decided to press the enemy with all his available means upon the belgian front, and on june 7 he began this campaign with the battle of messines. this battle was most skilfully and thoroughly prepared by sir herbert plumer, and was fought and won by his ii]. army. the battle began with the explosion of a number of huge mines, the sccret of which had been preserved by constant and devoted watch- fulness on the part of the miners, who had tunnclled beneath the enemy’s lincs many months previously and awaited patiently the opportunity for their use. the effect of these explosions, combined with a very skilfully planned bombardment of massed guns of all calibres, was such that, except on the right of the at- tack in the neighbourhood of messines, the infantry, for once, had little to do. the whole of the messines-wytschacte ridge was captured at comparatively very light cost, and the ypres salient, a name of ill omen for the british army since oct. 1or4, disappeared. the strength of the british army in combatant troops was now at its greatest. haig had 64 divisions and ten cavalry divisions under his orders, and a mass of heavy artillery, tanks and acro- planes. it was well that this was so, for the army was to be called ioi5 upon to endure greatly while petain and his men got their second wind. nor was it only the situation on the western front which called for resolute action, for the condition of the russian army was far more critical than that of the french army. kornilov had, on july 1, begun an offensive, and if he was supported and encouraged by success in the west it was still possible that the russians might continue to be a powerful factor in the war. third battle of ypres —with these heavy responsibilities on his shoulders, haig began on july 31 the third battle of ypres, with a great attack by the v. army, which had been moved north for the purpose. as in the case of the battle of the somme, the first fruits of the third battle of ypres were reaped elsewhcre than on the battle front. the germans, forced to send more and more troops into the flery furnace which blazed on the ypres ridges, were compelled to leave the french alone, and petain had time to restore the confidence of his army. part of his method was the delivery of very carefully prepared attacks on a com- paratively small front, supported by a great mass of artillery which should leave the infantry little more to do than to occupy the ground won. the first of these attacks was delivered by guillaumat’s iit. army on the verdun front, and was completely successful, ending with the french in possession of all the ground which the germans had won in six months fighting in 1916. this was followed by a more important attack delivered on oct. 23 by maistre’s vi. army, which gave the french the whole of the chemin des dames ridge, and resulted in the capture of [1,000 prisoners and 200 guns. then and not till then petain expressed himself as satished that his immediate purpose was achieved. the british troops, struggling in the mud of flanders could not be told the reasons which had called for a supreme effort from them and the terrible struggle through the mud, unrelieved by any conspicuous success, was a heavy strain upon them. as events turned out it would probably have been wiser to have brought the third battle of ypres to a close immediately after the french had won the chemin des dames, but at that time the british were within a short distance of the crest of the pass- chendaele ridge, while information received at g.h.q. showed that the strain upon the german army had been far grcater, and that there had been a very appreciable lowering of the morale of the german troops. haig had yet another blow in preparation. the continued bad weather and the slowness of the progress had caused the aban- donment of the project of landing on the belgian coast, and all hope of driving the germans from the belgian ports had gone, but there still appeared to be an opportunity of profiting from the exhaustion of the german reserves before the winter gave them a period for recovery, as it had after the battle of the somme. a final reason for continuing the struggle was that on oct. 24 an austro-german attack had been launched in italy and at caporetto had broken through the italian lines. it was therefore of importance to keep up the pressure upon the ger- mans on the western front. so the third battle of ypres was continued, until the ridge and village of passchendaele were captured on nov. 3. british tanks at cambrai—a fortnight later byng’s iii. army attacked the german front opposite cambrai. this battle opened a new era in trench warfare. one of the outstanding difh- culties which the trench barrier had created was that it had hitherto eliminated one of the chief resources of generalship, surprise. the time and labour required to prepare for a great bombardment, and the accumulation of the huge stores of mate- rial of war on the selected front of battle, made it impossible to conceal intentions from the enemy. but at cambrai these difh- culties were overcome by using a great number of tanks, brought up secretly to take the place of the bombardment in breaking the enemy’s defences (see cambrai, battle of). the attack was made upon one of the strongest parts of the hindenburg system, but the tanks successfully broke through, and the surprise was complete. at messines the guns had left nothing for the tanks to do, and in the third battle of ypres they 1o16 had been defeated by the mud of flanders, but at cambrai they came into their own. one thing alone was lacking as far as their part in the battle went. the co-operation between the tanks and the artillery in the later stages of the attack was not com- plete, so that numbers of tanks fell easy victims to the german guns, a lesson of which advantage was taken in 1918. of greater importance was the fact that six french and five british divisions had been transferred to italy to help the italian army to stem the disaster of caporetto, so that haig had not the troops to complete and extend the first successes won at cambrai. it isa typical illustration of the advantage which their central position conferred upon the germans that several of the british divisions which would have been invaluable at cam- brai had not reached the italian front at the time when the austro-germans were checked on the piave and the battle of caporetto came to anend. so the german counter-attacks won back a good part of the ground which byng had gained in the first advance, and the battle of cambrai ended on dec. 7 in one more disappointment for the allies. lessons of 1917.—the campaign of 1917 on the western front had been fatally hampered by the change of plan which had been made by nivelle when he succeeded joffre. that change had permitted ludendorff to prepare for and carry through the retreat into the hindenburg line, and had postponed the date of the allied offensive from feb. 1, the date fixed by joffre, until april g—a delay of nine precious wecks. as joffre had an- ticipated, it had been necessary for the british army to bear the brunt of the fighting, but it would have done so under very dif- ferent conditions if the germans had been hustled back into the hindenburg line, as they were in sept. 1918, and if messines had been fought at the beginning of april, and the third battle of ypres had begun on may 30 instead of july 31. the battle of cambrai might then have synchronised with the last offensive of the russian army, and the combined effect might well have saved that army from dissolution, for adequate french and british reserves would have been available in france to support byng’s attack, and the war might have ended vic- toriously in the autumn of 1917. as it was, the battles of 1917 showed clearly that the solution of the problems of trench war- fare at which haig and joffre had arrived was correct. it was first necessary to exhaust the german reserves and then to strike a surprise blow or series of surprise blows. cambrai had shown how surprise might be achieved. but all this experience, which had been purchased at great cost, had been acquired too late to be put to profit in 1917, owing to the fatal delay in opening the campaign of that year. bibliography.— viscount french, the despatches of lord french rgi4~§ (1917); h. dugard, la victoire de verdun (1918); j. ei. boraston, sir douglas haig's despatches (1919); j. f. c. fuller, tanks in the great war (1920); a. y. e. dubail, quatre annees de commandement sur le front de france 1914-8 (1920); max schwarte, der grosse krieg 1914-8 (1921, etc.); sir w. r. robertson, from private to field marshal (1921); g. a. b. dewar and j. h. boraston, sir douglas haig's command (1922); m. l. v. h. corda, la guerre mondiale (1922). see also world war; bibliography. iii. the western front in 1918 in the latter half of 1917 there had been numerous discussions between the allied statesmen and generals with the object of finding some effective means of co-ordinating their efforts, more especially in the military sphere. the supreme war council up to the time of the crisis created by the defeat of the italian armies at caporetto these discussions had produced no result, but one effect of that crisis was the assembly of an allied con- ference at rapallo, where on nov. 9 it was decided to create a supreme war council of the chief allied ministers, with head- quarters at versailles. permanent military representatives of the chief allied powers were appointed to assist this council in the preparation of plans of campaign, gen. weygand being the french representative, gen. sir henry wilson the british, gen. bliss the american and gen. cadorna the italian. western front before the creation of the supreme war council numerous conferences of the allied ministers had been held to deal with problems as they arose, but there had been no international body charged with the preparation of questions for considera- tion by such conferences or with supervising the execution of the policy agreed upon. the establishment at versailles of an inter- national secretariat therefore supplied a need which had long been felt and was a great step forward in securing co-operation in the many spheres in which the allies had been to a consider- able extent competitors. it did not, however, solve the vexed question of the unity of military command, for the military rep- resentatives were not members of the supreme council, and were advisers only without any executive authority. situation in early 1918.—the first great task before the su- preme council was the consideration of the plans of campaign for 1918. the situation was serious. the collapse of the rus- sian army was complete and on dec. 22 peace negotiations be- tween russia and germany had begun at brest-litovsk. for some time past german divisions from the eastern front had been arriving in france and belgium and it was certain that many more would follow. at the beginning of 1917 there had been on the western front 170 british, french and belgian divisions and by march of that year this number had been increased to 178 owing to the arrival of six british and two portuguese divisions. these had been opposed to 129 german divisions. during 1917 six french and five british divisions had gone to italy, and four french divisions had been broken up owing to lack of men to maintain them. as against this decrease in the allied strength the french had dismounted part of their cavalry and created one infantry divi- sion with the men so obtained, while 43 american divisions had arrived. therefore the allied strength had fallen from 178 divi- sions to 1684, a decrease of 9} divisions. at the end of jan. 1918 the german divisions had increased in numbers to 177, a rein- forcement of 48 divisions as compared with 1917, thus making a balance in favour of the germans of 543 divisions. this change in the situation was the more formidable because it was calcu- lated that the germans could bring another 30 divisions to the west, while the portuguese divisions were of uncertain quality and it would be some months before the american divisions would be sufficiently trained to take a full share with their allies. the entry of the united states into the war had more than compensated for the defection of russia and had given the allies an invaluable naval reinforcement together with equally valuable financial aid, but it was calculated that american military strength, which took longer to develop, would not restore the balance in favour of the allies before the late summer, and that the intervening period would be one of danger on the western front. france had no longer the men to replace her losses and petain, the french commander-in-chief, had been compelled to reduce the number of battalions in his divisions from 12 to nine. there were no more divisions to come from england and haig, owing to lack of drafts, was compelled to follow petain’s example and reduce the infantry in his divisions to a similar extent. this reduction was offset by a corresponding reduction in the infantry of the german divisions, but in view of the number of the latter, which might be expected on the western front, it was more than probable that the germans for the first time since 1914 would be in a numerical superiority. it was in these circumstances that the supreme war council met at the end of january. it was then clearly necessary to pre- pare for the possibility of a great german attack. while most of the german divisions coming from the east were being assem- bled opposite the british front and there were definite signs of military preparation in the neighbourhood of cambrai, it was far from certain that the main effort of the germans would be made in that part. it might be decided further to the south against the french or even against the italians. in such circumstances any one of the allied commanders-in-chief might if a neighbour were attacked be in legitimate doubt whether such attack were not a feint preparatory to a more formidable effort against him- western front self. some superior authority was therefore required to supervise the whole field of operations and to allocate reserves as and when required. the military executive committee —the military represent- atives could not fulfil the functions of such an authority, as they were without executive power, and therefore after prolonged dis- cussion the supreme war council decided to turn the military representatives into a military executive committee with gen. foch, then chief of the french general staff in paris, as its chair- man. the function of this committee was to create an allied general reserve, to determine the location of that reserve and to issue orders for its employment. opinion was not yet ripe for the creation of a generalissimo and the decision actually reached was @ compromise between a number of proposals. compromises are rarely effective in war, and this was no exception. the exercise of military command by a committee is always objectionable, for a committee is constitutionally prone to discussions and is therefore very rarely able to act with that promptness which the exigencies of a military situation usually require. further the committee was the less likely to be prompt in its decisions, because it was located at versailles and could only obtain information from the front through the medium of the commanders-in-chief. the arrangement, far from unifying command, made it more complicated, in that it left the british and french commanders-in-chief in control of the greater part of their armies, while taking from them that part which was to constitute the general reserve and placing it under an independent body. further unsatisfactory compromises-—nor was this the only decision of the supreme war council which resulted in an unsat- isfactory compromise. reinforcements, apart from american troops, could only be obtained for the western front by with- drawing troops, mainly british, from italy, salonika and pales- tine. but the italian statesmen would not consent to any weak- ening of the allied contingents on their front, the french states- men were as strongly opposed to any reduction of the forces at salonika, while the british ministers were eager to extend the success which gen. allenby had won in capturing jerusalem, by an offensive campaign against the turks. the allied chiefs of the staff had agreed at a preliminary conference to recommend to the supreme council that a defensive attitude should be adopted in other theatres of war and that all troops not ab- solutely required for defence in those theatres should be trans- ferred to the western front. this recommendation was referred to the military representa- tives, who reported that the offensive campaign in [alestine should take place provided the western front was made safe. they did not, however, add their opinion as to the number of troops required to make the western front safe. the discussion turned on the latter point. the british prime minister believed that the experience of the war had shown that the lines of trenches on the western front were impregnable and that the right policy was to act defensively in france and belgium, await the arrival of the americans with a view to a decisive campaign in 1919 and in the meanwhile to take the offensive in palestine. finally m. clemenceau, the french prime minister, agreed to the offensive campaign in palestine on the understanding that no reinforcements should be taken from the western front. thus the conference closed without making any provision for strengthening the western front. the sequel was even less satis- factory. m. clemenceau had brought great pressure to bear on the british govt. to have the british front in france extended to compensate for the reduction of the french army. despite sir douglas haig’s protests, made in view of the fact that the ger- mans were massing opposite his front, he was compelled to ex- tend his right as far south as the oise, the new front being taken up by the british v. army under gen. gough. meantime the military executive committee had reported that it required a general reserve of 30 divisions from the british, french and italian armies and to this number the british contri- bution was to be seven. to the request for this number of divi- sions ilaig replied that in view of the extension of his front and 1017 of the steady increase in the number of german divisions, which by the first week in march amounted to 190, he could spare no troops. at a meeting of the supreme war council held in lon- don on march 14, the formation of the general reserve was post- poned and a week later the great german attack began. one result of these controversies was that the british chief of the staff, sir w. robertson, who had been unable to agree with his government as to the creation of the military executive com- mittee and the offensive campaign in palestine, was removed from his position and his place was taken by sir henry wilson, sir henry rawlinson becoming military representative at versailles. the german offensive of 1918 the change in the military situation in favour of germany, brought about by the collapse of russia and the victory of capo- retto, had towards the end of 1917 encouraged ludendorff to believe that there was a prospect of winning the war by a deci- sive victory in the west. he tells usin afy war memories that he regarded the situation at that time as favourable in every theatre of war save in asia, and he held the reverses which the turks had suffered as of secondary importance. in his report to the kaiser on feb. 13 1918, he said: the battle in the west which the year 1918 wil! bring presents the biggest military problem ever set before an army. france and eng- land have grappled with it in vain for two years, ... it must not be imagined that we are going to have another such offensive as in galicia or italy. it will be a stupendous struggle, beginning in one ~ place and continuing in another and will take up a long time (see german offensive). ludendorff’s problem.—the first question then to be settled was where the battle should be begun. the advantages of start- ing with an attack on the french were considered and dismissed because it was believed that such an attack would be answered by a british attack in flanders, while it was held that exhaustion of french man-power would prevent france from undertaking an offensive on a large scale. next the strategical situation of the british army was considered to be less favourable than that of the french, for its lines ran parallel to and at no great distance from the coast of the channel and any considerable break through the british front would at once make the position of haig’s troops precarious. on the other hand the french army with more room to manoeuvre might recover from an initial reverse. it was also the general opinion at german headquarters that the british army, now almost entirely composed of troops raised since the beginning of the war, had shown itself to be less capable of battle manoeuvre than the ['rench, and that once it was driven from its main defensive lines it would prove an easy victim. finally great britain was regarded as the main prop of the allies. a somewhat exaggerated view of the privations which unrestricted u-boat warfare were causing in england prevailed and lord lansdowne’s suggestions for a peace by arrangement were known. it was conf.dently believed that, if to the threat of starvation could be added a severe defeat of the british army in france, mr. lloyd george’s determination to continue the war would be broken and the views of the peace party in great britain be made to prevail. on all these grounds it was decided to make the first effort against the british. setection of the point of attack—the next question was to choose the part of the british front to be attacked. trince rup- precht of bavaria, who commanded the group of armies on the northern part of the british front, strongly urged an attack on the armenti¢res-la bassee front on the grounds that the british would certainly prepare for a renewal of the attack to secure the submarine bases on the belgian coast, that therefore the british reserves would be massed in flanders and that such an attack would lead most speedily to the desired object, a war of move- ment against the british reserves. there was also the advantage that in flanders the british lines were nearer to the coast than elsewhere and that a break through there would cause greater embarrassment than on any other part of the front. the objection to this plan was that ioi8 the ground in the valley of the lys, always water-logged during the winter, would not be in a fit state for active operations until about the middle of april. now, as in 1914, time was a vital factor in the german plans. then the object had been to defeat the french before the russians could develop a dangerous offensive. now the object was to defeat the french and british before the american army could become a decisive factor in the situation. german opinions on united states —the views held at german headquarters during the winter of 1917~8 on the military eilort of the united states were:— the united states are forming an army of about 50 divisions of which three only have as yet landed in france. one of them is at the front to be trained. the two others are in need of more training behind the front. by the spring of 1918 the american forces in france may reach a strength of about 15 divisions. the mass of the divisions will only be suitable for use on quict fronts. only the three divisions now in france may be expected to take part in a spring offensive. the corps of officers is not yet trained for war on a large scale. on these grounds, the independent use of large american units in dificult positions will be out of the question at present. the drafting of reserves and the arming and equipment of the american troops are good. training is still inadequate. but the first regiment put in at the front fought well during a german attack and it is therefore to be expected that the american soldier after more train- ing and experience will prove himself a worthy opponent. these calculations were substantially accurate. the total number of americans in france at the end of march was approxi- mately 370,000, with a combatant strength of about 150,000 organised in five divisions. the first american divisions took over an active section of the front on april 25 and at cantigny on may 28 made the first american attack. ludendorff decided that, in order to anticipate america, the first attack must be made before the middle of april and selected the st. quentin front. the strategical purpose behind this enterprise was the separation of the british and french armies. the main axis of the attack was to be directed at first just north of the somme where it bends westwards to the sea near peronne. the somme reached, that river was to be used to hold off the french rein- forcements coming up from the south; and the general direction of the attack was to be changed northwestwards so as to round up the british army against the coast. the objection to the st. quentin front was that an attack there led across the devastated area of the somme battlefields, but ludendortf held that this disadvantage was more than counterbalanced by the strategic results which the plan offered and by the importance of beginning early. as he had told the kaiser, this attack was to be but the first of a series, ancl instruc- tions were issued to army commanders to prepare for such a series along a great part of the front. these attacks were given code names, that on the st. quentin front being called the “‘ michael ” attack. the date selected for it was about march 20. it was to be followed by a subsidiary attack south of the oise called “‘ archangel.’”? prince rupprecht was to prepare for the offensive which he had advocated on the armenticres-la bassee front, to which the name ‘ st. george i.” was given and for a second on the ypres front called “st. george ii.” the crown prince was to prepare an attack in champagne to which the name “ bliicher ’’ was subsequently given. preparations for the offensive —in order to preserve secrecy, each army was given the impression that its attack would be the first and the most important and therefore the preparations for all the attacks were seriously made. the reserves for the michael attack were so placed that they could be brought up rapidly by night marches to the st. quentin front, but could be moved almost as readily for the st. george i. and bliicher attacks. it is interesting to observe the effects of these preparations on the minds on the other side of the line. sir douglas haig in france and sir w. robertson in london both deduced from the german dispositions that the first attack would be made on the st. quentin front and might be expected at any time after march 1. but there ceuld be no certainty that this would be the main german effort and haig was aware of the prepara- tions for the st. george attacks. in view of the sensitiveness western front of his left to any threat of a german advance against the channel ports, and to the fact that a comparatively short advance would enable the germans to shell calais and boulogne with long range guns, he decided to keep the bulk of his reserves north of the somme and for the same reason to refuse the demand of the military executive committee for divisions for the general reserve. petain, while agreeing that the indications showed that the first attack would be made on the british, was by no means sure that the enemy’s main attack would not be delivered on the champagne front; and his eyes were constantly upon the preparations in that area. right up to the doullens conference on march 26, he was chary of sending reinforcements to help the british until he was more certain that a great attack, which might open the road to paris, would not be made against his own front. the military representatives at versailles were of. opinion that the difficulties of the shell-torn and devastated area of the somme would prevent an attack on the st. quentin front, and they expected an attack on the la bassee-arras front to take place probably in may. therefore although ludendorff was unable to conceal the preparations on the st. quentin front and [laig’s intelligence staff accurately predicted the place and date of the german attack, yet he had made his dispositions with such skill as to keep his enemies in doubt of his intentions even after the michael attack had begun. german offensive of march-april 1918.—strategically it may be said that the issue of that battle was decided on march 28, when byng’s iil. army defeated the attacks of the right of the german xvii. army south of arras. the effect of this com- bined with the unexpectedly easy success of the attack of the german xviii. army against the british mght was to cause ludendorff to make a fundamental change in his plan. instead of directing his main attack north of the somme, with the object of using that river as a barrier against the french and of making an eventual turn northwest against the british right flank, he directed his main effort south of the somme, generally southwestwards. thus it was committed to an area which could be most readily and speedily reinforced by the french; and when foch was appointed at doullens ‘‘ to co-ordinate the operations of the allicd armies on the western front,” and had decided to direct all his energics to maintaining the junction between the french and british armies, the michacl attack was brought to a standstill. that attack was followed on april 6 by the archangel attack just south of the oise. originally designed as a subsiciary effort to help the michael attack forward, it was now used to improve the somewhat awkward situation of the xviii. army, which had been stopped in a pronounced salient with its head towards amiens. having secured some ground up to and slightly beyond the ailette; the archangel attack was stopped on april 8. the next day prince rupprecht began an attack in flanders against the front held by the portuguese in the neighbourhood of neuve-chapclle. towards the end of march ludendorff had reduced the plans for the st. george i. and ii. attacks to the limits of a secondary enterprise, and the battle in flanders was begun with no ambt- tious aims. it at once achieved such success that [prince rupprecht was authorised to return to his original programme and the germans had hopes of securing the whole of the landers ridges. the st. george ll. attack was directed on the important railway junction of hazebrouck and was stopped at no great distance from that town, but the st. george iil. attack delivered against the ypres salient by the german iv. army was to a great extent evaded by the timely evacuation of the salient by the british ii. army; and thanks to the arrival of french reinforcements that attack only resulted in the capture by the germans of the important hill of kemmel, the main ridges remaining in the hands of the allies. ludendorff has often been criticised for allowing himself to be diverted by the first success of the battle in flanders from his original objective, the separation of the british and french armies, and it has been maintained that had he limited prince western front rupprecht’s efforts, as he had intended to do, and renewed the attacks south of the somme, he would have captured amiens and thereby made trafiic between the french and british armies difficult if not impossible. certainly during april the allied position in front of amiens was highly critical, but all the expe- rience of the war had shown that once a great attack had been brought to a standstill the difficulties of restarting it were almost insuperable; and in this case the area behind the front of the german xviii. army had been devastated in repeated battles and the communications behind that army were excep- tionally difficult, while seeing that french reinforcements arrived from the south to stop the st. george attacks it is reasonably certain that they would have stopped a renewal of the michael attack upon amiens, had that been attempted. results of first german alttacks—though ludendorff had failed in his main purpose he had gained a greater measure of success than had been won on the western front since the beginning of trench warfare, and had for the time exhausted the offensive power of the british army. its battle casualties amounted to 14,053 oflicers and 286,517 other ranks. the germans captured 63,000 prisoners and 769 guns, many more guns were damaged and a vast quantity of war material fell into the enemy’s hands. the losses in material, thanks to the activities of the ministry of munitions, were quickly replaced; but the replacement of the casualties, swollen by an inevitable increase in the number of sick, was a more serious matter. the british age of military service was raised, and 140,000 drafts were sent out, but further help could only come from the secondary theatres of war. therefore two divisions were brought to i'rance from italy, the proposed offensive in palestine was abandoned and two divisions were transferred from allenby’s command, while a number of british battalions were released from palestine, their places being taken by battalions of the indian army. some more battalions were transferred from salonika. by these means the ten divisions, mainly from his v. army, which haig had been compelled to break up, were gradually reconstituted, and the strength of his command was restored. but during this period of reconstruction the initiative neces- sarily remained with the germans; and ludendorff, having « envisaged a long series of battles, was not disposed to give up the attempt to win victory because his first efforts had not given him all that he had hoped. by the end of may the number of german divisions in the west had reached 207, the greatest number attained, and with 81 divisions in reserve ludendorti proposed that the bliicher attack should be his next great efiort and should be begun on the chemin-des-dames front which he knew to be weakly held. the blicher attack, begun on may 27, swept over the chemin-des-dames, across the aisne and was only stopped on the marne near chateau-thierry by the timely arrival of american divisions. (see german offensive.) combined german atiacks~—the result of this battle, which brought the germans to within 4o m. of paris, was to leave them in a very narrow salient, with its head on the marne and, as after the michael attack, so now, ludendoril attempted to improve this position, first by an attack intended to reach compiegne, delivered to the west of the salient by the german xviii. army on june g, and secondly by another attack on the following day on the western face of the salient near villers- cotteret. foch had divined ludendorfi’s intention and both these attacks were checked and yielded little result. thereafter there followed a pause which proved fatal to the germans and exposed the underlying fallacy in ludendorfi’s plans. he had from the first seen that time was a vital factor, that he must defeat the french and british before the americans could intervene, and under that impression he had attempted too much at first. a series of limited blows designed to exhaust the enemies’ reserves and to culminate in a great final effort when those reserves had been exhausted it is just possible that his applica- tion of this policy might have been as successful as [och’s: if his first attacks had taken the form of toi9 proved to be later. but he had in fact in the michael, st. george and bliicher attacks attempted to break through, and had been induced by preliminary success to carry on each of these battles into the stage where they yielded little but loss. consequently his efforts instead of being continuous and pro- gressive were broken by the necessity for rest and preparation. an undue effort left him momentarily weakened. for some time past rupprecht had been instructed to prepare for a renewal of the battle in flanders, which it was hoped would hem the british army against the coast, but this attack was to be preceded by a great attack on either side of reims designed to widen the marne salient and drive in towards paris. rupprecht’s preparations, which had begun in may, were known both to haig and to the british govt. and when the bliicher attack developed at the end of may, and foch called upon haig to send eight divisions to help the french, the british govt. sent gen. smuts (then a member of the war cabinet) to haig, to inquire whether this would not endan- ger the british army. to this haig replied that foch, having been appointed generalissimo (he had been given that title at an allied conference at amiens on april 14), must be sup- ported, and that he would take the entire responsibility of sending off the divisions, which went accordingly. 1t may be mentioned that, as the result of foch’s appointment the ver- sailles military executive council had disappeared and sir henry rawlinson had resumed command of the british iv. army. alitied position improves —the accumulation of allied reserves between amiens and the marne had decided ludendorff to attempt the attack east of reims, where he believed the line to be held weakly. but his attacks could not be ready until july r5 and the five weeks’ delay since the end of the bliicher attacks had brought a great improvement in the allied situation. all the british divisions which had been broken up as the result of the michael and st. george attacks had by then been recon- stituted and, as the consequence of a special appeal to the president of the united states made in the crisis of march, and the provision of extra shipping, american troops had been arriving since the end of april at the rate of 300,000 a month. thus the number of american divisions ready to take part in battle was steadily increasing. further ludendorff’s plans became known to foch and when the german attack was made it was defeated (see german offensive). that defeat was promptly followed by a counter-attack in the marne salient which foch had prepared for some time (see marne, second battle of the). the success of that counter-attack was so complete as to compel ludendorff to draw upon his reserves elsewhere and to postpone rupprecht’s projected offensive. therewith the initiative passed finally from ludendorff to foch. tuer allied offensive, 1918 towards the end of july foch had agreed with the allied commanders-in-chief that in order to keep the initiative and to free lateral communications a series of local offensives should be undertaken, the first by the british on the amiens front to free the paris-amiens railway; the second by the french on either side of compiegne to free the paris-avricourt railway in its northern section; the third by the americans to free the paris-avricourt railway in its eastern section. battle of amiens.—for the first haig had some time previously instructed rawlinson to prepare, and now, to extend the scope of the proposed battle, foch placed gen. debeney’s i. army on rawlinson’s right, at haig’s disposal. the battle began on aug. 8 (see victory, advance to), and resulted in a triumph for the new type of british tank. foch, delighted with the british success, urged haig forward across the somme to the capture of peronnc, but the british commander-in-chief had no desire to repeat ludendorif’s mistake and allow the unexpected success of a preliminary attack to tempt him into continuing a battle into the stage when the first drive had lost its momentum and further fighting would cause heavy losses in return for small gains. to20 the battle had achieved its original purpose, the freeing of the paris-amiens railway, and haig insisted that instead of knocking his head against the stiffening resistance of the germans his attack should be transferred further to the north. so on aug. 21 byng with the british iii. army began the battle of bapaume, the town being captured on aug. 29. the success of byng’s operations induced haig to extend his front of attack still further to the north and on aug. 26 horne’s i. army, co-operating with the left of byng’s iii. army, began the battle of the scarpe, which drove the germans back from in front of arras into the main defences of the hindenburg system. further allied successes —meanwhile the second of the limited offensives had begun and on aug. 10 humbert with the french iii. army attacked and secured the german positions on the massif of lassigny, while a few days later mangin on aug. 17 advanced with the french x. army northeast of compiegne and in a series of attacks penetrated to the valley of the ailette and secured the heights north of soissons. thus, as the result of haig’s intervention, the scope of the first two operations had been greatly extended, the german lines had given way on a front of 70 m. and the allies by sept. 2 held the chord of the. great salient which had run from near arras, by albert, just southeast of amiens to soissons. that chord now ran in a general north and south line from the scarpe 1o m. east of arras, by peronne and noyon to soissons. german retreat commences.—ludendorff had not at first been much perturbed by the initial success of foch’s counter-attack of july 18 and he had gone to flanders to hasten the prepara- tions for rupprecht’s offensive. when there he learned the full extent of the disaster which had befallen german armies and cancelling that offensive he began to withdraw troops from flanders to ease the situation on the marne front. while he was so engaged the battle of amiens came like a thunderbolt from a clear sky and the resulting situation was felt to be so grave that a crown council was held at spa on aug. 13-14, at which ludendorff declared that it was no longer possible for germany to gain her war aims and a peace by arrangement should be sought at the first favourable opportunity, while germany still held large stretches of allied territory. this complete change of front produced a political crisis and resulted in the negotiations which made prince max of baden german chancellor. the evacuation of the great lys salient created by rupprecht in april was decided on and this evacua- tion was now hastened by a number of local attacks by the british. on aug. 30 they re-occupied bailleul and by the end of the first week of sept. the germans had recrossed the lys and were back in the lines from which they had started in the spring. on sept. 12 gen. pershing completed the series of preliminary operations by attacking the st. mihiel salient with nine american divisions. with the elimination of that salient the introductory phase in the advance to victory came to a close. within eight weeks a complete change had taken place in the military situation. no longer were the allies anxiously anticipating german attacks from positions menacing paris and the channel ports; the germans, who had lost all their territorial gains of the spring, were now anxiously anticipating the next allied blow and had abandoned all hope of winning the war. their reserves were depleted, while those of the allies were steadily increasing. ludendorff had been compelled to break up 16 of his divisions to provide drafts for the remainder. in may the americans had three divisions fit for battle, now pershing could place at foch’s disposal 25 divisions, each double the strength of a german division. at the end of april haig’s strength had fallen to 48 divisions fit for battle, by mid sept. this number had grown to 61. thus while in may the germans had 207 divisions opposed to 153 allied divisions, after the battle of st. mihiel they had rox divisions opposed to 21o allied divisions, counting one american as the equivalent of two german divisions. allied offensive plan outlined —success had fired the allied troops with enthusiasm, while the americans were fresh and western front inspired with the zeal of crusaders. defeat had on the other hand greatly depressed the german ranks and the tanks which the germans had neglected had become a weapon of terror. in these circumstances foch and the allied commanders-in-chief agreed that the time had come to seek victory in 1918 by means of a series of combined attacks to be delivered as soon as possible after the american operations at st. mihicl were concluded. these were to be made 1. by the amcricans west of the meuse in the direction of secfan. 2. by the french west of the argonne in the direction of mezi¢res. 3. by the british on st. quentin-cambrai front in the direction of maubeuge. 4. by belgians, british and french in flanders in the direction of ghent. (see victory, advance to.) first overtures for peace.—on sept. 28 the hindenburg system was cracking under haig’s blows and on that day hindenburg and ludendorff agreed that the situation of their armies was desperate. the next morning they informed the german foreign minister than an immediate request for an armistice was essential and on oct. 4 the first peace offer was sent to president wilson. thus it was the battle of amiens which decided ludendorff to tell the kaiser on aug. 15 that a german victory was impossible and the battles of the end of sept. together with the news of the collapse of bulgaria before gen. guillaumat’s attacks and of the turks in front of allenby, which caused him to appeal for terms. the suggestion, therefore, that the collapse of germany was due to what is generally known in that country as the “‘stab in the back,” that is to say, internal revolution and not to military defeat, cannot be substantiated, though it is true that the despatch of plenipotentiaries, who crossed the allied lines on nov. 8, was hastened by the revolution, as was their readiness to accept on nov. 11 the terms imposed. position on nov, 11.—~—the general situation on nov. 11 was that the allied front ran northwest from pont-a-mousson on the moselle through stenay-sedan-meezieres-chimay mons- ath and ghent to the dutch frontier. thus the allied right was considerably nearer to the german lines of retreat over the rhine than were the german forces in belgium. it has often been held that the allies should, therefore, instead of imposing terms on nov. 11, have continued the struggle and ended the war dramatically by compelling a large mass of german troops to surrender. the decision to impose terms was made by foch in consulta- tion with the allied commanders-in-chief because on nov. 11 the allied advance to the meuse had come temporarily to a standstill. the germans had in their retreat destroyed very completely both roads and railways and until these could be repaired supplies could not be brought up to the front beyond the line reached on nov. 11. therefore on the meuse front a short halt was necessary and this would have given the ger- mans time to rally behind the meuse and have entailed further battles. foch had provided for this contingency and had actually begun to set in motion a new allied offensive by french and american troops directed into lorraine on either side of metz, in order to turn the line of the meuse. this portion of the front was weakly held by the germans and against it the allies could have brought their freshest troops and their largest reserves, for it was in this quarter that the bulk of the american army was employed. at the time of the armistice the number of american divisions in france had increased to 42 and of these 32 were ready for battle. ‘there is therefore no doubt but that an immediate advance into lorraine would have been successful and have placed the german armies on the meuse in a position of great embarrassment by the time that the allied advance against the meuse could have been resumed. foch and the allied com- manders, however, felt that if they could force germany to accept such terms as would leave her militarily helpless they had no right to call for a further sacrifice of life or to expose the territories of france and belgium to further devastation. lt was in this spirit that the armistice was signed in foch’s railway carriage in the forest of compiegne on nov. 11. wester wem yss—west indies bibl1ography.—j. h. boraston, sir douglas hatg's despatches (1919); sir f. b. maurice, the last four months (1919); j. j. pershing, final report of gen. j, j, pershing (1920); r. recouly, la bataille de foch (1920); c. m. e. mangin, comment finit la guerre (1920); louis madelin, za bataille de france (1920); g. a. b. dewar and j. h. boraston, sir douglas hatg'’s command (1922): m. ll. v. h. corda, la guerre mondiale (1922). see also wor-p war; bibliography. (f.. b: m.) wester wemyss, rosslyn erskine wemyss, ist baron (1864- j, british sailor, was born in london april 12 1864, a posthumous son of james hay erskine wemyss of wemyss castle, fife. he entered the navy in 1877, was promoted lieu- tenant 1887, commander 1898 and captain 1901. rear-admiral of and battle squadron 1912-3 and of the r2th cruiser squadron 1914, he was made vice-admiral 1916 and admiral of the flect 1919. he commanded a squadron during the landing of the british troops in gallipoli (1915), was commander-in-chief in the east indies and egypt (1916-7), deputy first sea lord, and afterwards first sea lord of the admiralty (1917-9) and a member of the war cabinet (1918). he was created k.c.b. (1916), g.c.b. (1918) and raised to the peerage in 1919. in 1924 he published the navy in the dardanelles campaign.",
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