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WALES, UNIVERSITY OF

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Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926) / britannica_1926
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a royal commission was appointed, in 1916, to enquire into the organisation of uni- versity and post-secondary education in wales. in 1920, a supplemental charter, embodying, with certain exceptions, the recommendations of the royal commission, was granted. this added a fourth constituent college, university college, swansea, to the university. the original three colleges are the university college of wales, aberystwyth; the university college of north wales (bangor); and the university college of south wales and monmouthshire (cardiff). the university is now in receipt of the produce of a penny rate from each of the county and county borough councils in wales and monmouthshire, amounting, in the year 1924—-5, to £54,498 7s. 10d. the charter reconstituted and enlarged the university court as the supreme governing and legislative body of the university, and established as an executive body the university council. in both these bodies, the majority of the members are elected by the county and county borough councils of wales and monmouth- shire. the university senate was replaced by a smaller elective body, the academic board. a larger measure of autonomy in academic matters was given to the colleges. by the new charter a board of celtic studies, an extension board, a council of music, a press board, and an appointments board were constituted by the authorities. new chairs and buildings—the university college of wales, aberystwyth, has, since 1910, established a chair of welsh 980 literature, a chair of colonial history, the wilson chair of interna- tional politics, and a chair of music. the university college of north wales established a chair of welsh literature. in the welsh national school of medicine, at cardiff, full-time professors of medicine and surgery and a part-time professor of obstetrics and gynaecology have been appointed. a tuberculous diseases di- ploma open to registered medical practitioners, has been insti- tuted. the chairs founded at swansea are classics, english, welsh, modern languages, philosophy, education, mathematics, physics, chemistry, metallurgy and engineering. a faculty of technology has been established in the university, and the cardiff technical college, provided by the corporation of cardiff, has been recog- nised as a technological institution. the college at bangor has completed its arts and adminis- trative buildings. its science buildings, now (1926) in the course of erection, are being provided by public subscriptions as the north wales war memorial. the college at aberystwyth has erected a college hall with accommodation for 2,500 persons, and the old students of the college have provided buildings for a col- lege union. the permanent physical and chemical laboratories of the university college at cardiff are (1926) in process of erection. of the buildings given to the welsh national school of medicine by sir wiliam j. thomas, the institute of physiology was com- pleted and the department of public health well advanced in 1926. the university college of swansea commenced in 1920, build- ings on the site in singleton park given by the swansea corpora- tion. new buildings for the science departments and for some of the arts departments have been erected. the extramural work of the university has grown steadily during the last four years, and in the session 1924-5, 75 university tutorial and 31 preparatory classes were held, with a total enrolment of 2,389 students. the majority of the county councils and county borough coun- cils in wales and monmouthshire have agreed to contribute the produce of one-eighth of a penny rate in aid of the welsh na- tional school of medicine, in addition to the penny rate contrib- uted for general purposes. this contribution, added to subserip- tions guaranteed for five years and donations, brings in an income of over £7,500 per annum for the school of medicine. bencfactions.—among the most important benefactions re- ceived since 1910 are the following :— (a) an anonymous gift of £100,000 to the university college of wales, aberystwyth, for the endowment of chairs of international politics, colonial history, geography, welsh literature, music and for a directorship of extramural studies, as well as for other objects. (b) a gift of £37,500, from miss ek. c. talbot for the endowment of a mansel-talbot chair of preventive medicine in the welsh national school of medicine. (c) a gift of £50,000 from mr. daniel radcliffe for the benefit of the university. (d) a gift, estimated at a total value of £90,000, from the corpora- tion of swansea in respect of the provision of land, buildings and equipment for the university college of swansea. (e) a gift of £10,000 from the misses davies, llandinam, to the national council of music for the endowment of a university director- ship of music for wales. ! (f) a grant of £14,000 from the rockefeller fund trustees in aid of the medical unit of the welsh national school of medicine. (g) an anonymous gift of £10,000 for the purpose of enabling post- graduate students to prosecute research, (hk) a gift of £25,000 from mr. david davies and the misses davies, llandinam, for the endowment of a david davies pro- fessorship of tuberculosis. | (i) a bequest by mr. lloyd roberts to the university college of north wales, bangor, of the capital value of about £34,000. gj) a gift of £10,000 from sir thomas d. owen for the establish- ment of a department of hydroelectrics at the university college of north wales, bangor. numbers of students.—the numbers of students in the colleges have greatly increased since the world war. the highest num- bers were reached in the year 1920-1, when the full-time students reached 2,926, including the ex-service men who received special grants from the government. the numbers of full-time students in residence since 1920-1 are as follows: 1921-2, 2,850; 1922-3, 2,696; 1923-4, 2,663; 1924-5, 2,643. wallace, alfred russel (1823-1913), british biologist (see 28.275), died at broadstone, dorset, nov. 7 1913. in 1908 wallace, a. ra—-wallenberg, marcus he received the o.m. among his latest publications were the world and life (1910) and social environment and moral prog- hess: (1912). wallace, sir donald mackenzie (1841-10919), british author and journalist, was born nov. 11 1841. ile was educated at the universities of glasgow, edinburgh, berlin and heidel- berg and at the ecole de droit, paris. when 28 years of age he was invited by a friend to visit russia, and became so much interested that he remained there for six years. his russia (1877) had a great success, and was at once recognised as a classic. shortly after its appearance mackenzie wallace became correspondent of ze times in st. petersburg (leningrad); in 1878 he was moved in a similar capacity to berlin, thence to constantinople, and after the battle of tell-el-kebir (1882) to egypt. from 1884-9 he was in india as private secretary to the viceroy, lord dufferin, and to his successor, lord lansdowne. from 1891-9 he was director of the foreign department of the times. in 1899 he undertook the editorship of the new volumes (issued in ro902 as the roth edition) of phe encyclopaedia bri- tannica, but only remained on this work a few months. he had been created k.c.i.e. in 1887, and was made k.c.v.o. in root. in addition to his book on russia he published egypf and the egyptian ouestion (1883) and the web of enpire (1902). sir donald, who was a remarkable linguist, speaking some 20 lan- guages, died at lymington, hants, jan. ro rorg. wallach, otto (1847- ), german chemist,.was born at kenigsberg. he studied in gettingen, was made extraordinary professor in bonn, and in 1889 became ordinary professor in gettingen, retiring in 1915. in 1910 he was awarded the nobcl prize for chemistry. in gettingen he directed the chemical in- stitute of the university, was also a member of the royal society of science in gottingen and corresponding member of the prus- sian academy of science. his researches were mainly concerned with the essential oils and the terpenes. with tiemann and semmler he was one of the scientific founders of the german synthetic perfume industry, which owes much to him. an appre- ciation of his life’s work is contained in the walluch festschrift of the university of gettingen (1909). wallenberg, knut agathon (1853- ), swedish banker, the eldest son of a. o. wallenberg, the founder of the stockholm enskilda bank, served as an officer in the swedish navy from 1874 to 1881. in 1874 he became a member of the board of directors of the stockholm enskilda bank, was its managing director from 1886 to rg11, chairman of the board from roir to 1914 and again from 1917. wallenberg exercised a great influence on industrial and economic development in sweden; in conjunction with the credit lyonnais he introduced swedish state bonds on the french financial market in 1890, and co-operated in the floating of several swedish state loans. he was a member of the board of directors of the banque du maroc from 1917 to 1920 and was succeeded therein by his brother marcus. wallenberg took part in the establishment of the banque des pays du nord in rgizr in paris, and of the british bank of northern commerce in 1912 in london, which in july 1921 became hambro’s bank. he was a member of the first chamber of the swedish parliament from 1906 to 1919, and chairman of the swedish chamber of commerce from 1912 to 1914 and again from 1918. in the hammarskjeld ministry he was foreign minister from 1914 to 1917 (see sweden). in 1918 he and his wife gave about 25 million krone to a fund for religious, social, scientific and educational purposes and for the encour- agement of trade and industry. wallenberg, marcus (1864- }, swedish financier, brother of k. a. wallenberg, began his career as a naval oflicer, and then studied and practised law. he afterwards became a member of the managerial board of the stockholm enskilda bank, being appointed managing director in 1911 and _ vice- chairman in 1920. he founded, or reorganised, a number of industrial undertakings in sweden, and also, in 1905, the norsk ifydro-elektrisk kvaelstof aktieselskab in norway, and was one of the founders of the central bank for norway and of the swedish industrial union. in 1916 and 1917, and in 1917-8, waller—war he took part in the negotiations with the allied powers concern- ing trading matters. he became a member of the neutral powers’ economic section of the supreme economic council at paris in 1919, took part in the amsterdam meeting in roro, and was swedish representative at the brusscls economic confer- ence in 1920. he was the finance delegate at the genoa con- ference in 1922, became a member of the finance committee of the league of nations in 1924, and also chairman of the committee for arranging the tax on german industry under the dawes plan. waller, lewis (1860-1915), british actor (see 28.283), died at nottingham nov. 1 1915. walsh, william john (1841-1921), roman catholic di- vine, was born in dublin jan. 30 1841. educated in dublin and at st. patrick’s college, maynooth, in 1867 he was appointed pro- fessor of dogmatic and moral theology at maynooth. in 1878 he became vice-president of the college and in 1881 succeeded dr. russell as president. dr. walsh took a keen interest in politics and served on several committces and commissions. he was part- ly responsible for the appointment of the commission to enquire into the working of the queen’s colleges, and he became a mem- ber of the senate of the university (sce 14.754). in 1885 he was summoned to rome by the pope and appointed archbishop of dublin. this office he continued to hold till his death in dublin, april 9 1921. dr. walsh’s activities extended far beyond his offi- cial dutics. in 1891 he became a commissioner for education in ireland and, in 1908 a member of the dublin statutory commis- sion which established the catholic national university, dr. walsh being elected chancellor. in politics he was a nationalist, but he strongly opposed compromise with the british govt., and after the rebellion of 1916 he supported the extremists, making no secret of the fact that in the election of dec. 1918 he voted for a sinn fein candidate. dr. walsh’s published works include a plain exposition of the trish land act of 288i (1881); the queen’s colleges and the royal university of ireland (1883-4); the irish university question (1890). walter, bruno (1876- ), german conductor of opera, was born in berlin sept. 15 1876. walter, whose real name was schlesinger, received his training in berlin at the sternsche konservatorium. he studied under ehrlich, buszler and robert radecke, and first appeared as conductor of opera at the munic- ipal theatre in cologne. he then filled the same position in jifamburg, breslau, pressburg (bratislava) and riga. he went afterwards to the royal opera house in berlin, which sphere of activity he exchanged in 1901 for the court opera in vienna, where he conducted until 1912. on jan. rt rt913 he became general musical director at the munich court opera in succession to mottls. on oct. 1 1922 he retired from that position, and later became general musical director of the municipal opera in berlin. walter wrote three symphonies, a string quartette and other musical pteces. wanamaker, john (1838-1922), american merchant (see 28.302), died in philadelphia dec. 12 1922. war (sce 28.305).—the years 1914-8 have dug so decp a trench across the history of civilisation that the epithet “ pre- war ” implics a remoteness not to be measured in time. nothing has suffered more from this ageing process than military litera- ture. the old principles may hold good, but napoleonic, ameri- can, franco-prussian and manchurian illustrations are already obsolete. | the very word “ war ”’ has acquired a new significance. ‘“ war is the armed conilict of states, in which each secks to impose its will upon the other by force ”—so we have always been told. ‘to- day, aided by the revolutions which have rummaged the archives of foreign offices and court-martialled generals, we can go farther. we can perceive for the first time clearly the figures of ambassa- dors and gencral staff chiefs. in isvolski’s letters we hear strange echoes of our own “‘ military conversations.’’ behind the smooth- spoken diplomats the soldiers manoeuvre. the common citizen is, in fact, at last able to get inside the skin of that mysterious entity, the state, which, like father saturn, has an ingrained habit of devouring its own children. “ i am the state,” said the gsi king of france. ‘‘ the state is power,” said treitschke. ‘‘ the state is finance,” said napoleon. ‘“ the state is a mutual benev- olence combine,”’ said kant. ‘ the state is reason in action,” said hegel. actually, in its relation to war, the state has now been proved to be the state of mind of europe, inflamed by its own ministers, periodically craving for adventure. i. mankind and the machine to one who was in hungary, turkey and the balkan states in 1908, and who, between that date and 1914, witnessed manoeu- vres in austria, germany, russia and england, it seems certain that already in those days the young men felt war keeping step with them in their ranks. then, suddenly, some barbarian threw a bomb. the governments, who had for years kept their tax- payers blind to their own crrors by saying, ‘‘ an enemy hath done this,” completely lost their heads and, before they knew where they were, the drums were beating and millions were on the march towards the hour of zero. from 1906 onwards the face of the clock wore its everyday expression, but beneath its smooth surface the alarm was set to “‘ the day,” and empcrors, parlia- ments and reason could only sit outside, watching the rhythmic beat of the pendulum. because good europeans hate war in 1926 it does not follow that they hated war in 1914 or that they will hate it in 1964. be- cause sir bedivere has flung excalibur far out into the mere let no one imagine that the glamour of the sword is forever quenched. against that spiritual symbol the shield of locarno, welded by the spectre of the falling franc, will form a poor protection. to- day pacifists speak to the converted, but their young sons have been born with the old instincts. those who have seen with their own eyes and suffered in their own bodies know the ugly truths of war, but they cannot convey their knowledge to the young generation. the old lack imagination to tell; the young lack imagination to believe. nothing will stop war save a sec- ond advent of christ. the year 1926 finds war in the melting pot where it is much more likely to take on a new shape than to corporate. great britain and the united states should use this respite to overhaul their machinery. let neither of those great, but strangely improvident, nations imagine that because they mean to do the right thing by humanity they will on that account escape the challenge of the sword. does not hegel tell us that tragedy is the conflict, not of right and wrong, but of right and right? was it wrong for russia to want one small ice-free port for all her swarming millions? was it wrong for japan to think of her own swarming millions and to object? was it not right of the southern states to struggle for self-determina- tion? was it not right of the northern states to say no? two good ideas came into collision and bang went the cannon. sup- pose even that the league of nations was as supreme in the regions of morality as was once the pope, could it put a hook in the nose of a leviathan like russia? | | mobilisation and the “ nation in arms”’,—the first glimpses we get of humanity show war, uger-like, springing out of the primeval forest and forcing man to realise loyalty, camaradcrie and self-sacrifice. since then war has clung as close to man as his own shadow, until, incredible as it may one day seem, by 1870 the civilisation of european nations had come to be measured, not by their arts, learning or religion, but by their wealth, by the numbers of their trained fighters and by their equipment. before 1870 the methods of projecting the trained fighters into action and maintaining their numbers were secondary; after 1870 they became primary. one of these methods was ‘“* mobili- sation ’’—the science of rendering an army capable of movement; the other was the “ nation in arms.” all over europe mobilisation schemes were worked up to the highest degree because a ilying start meant that the earlier bat- tles would lie beyond the home fronticr. to begin mobilisation 24 hours sooner than the enemy was so much gained in time and space. as mobilisation itself sheds no blood the logical implica- tion of this has escaped notice. but secing that once started it cannot be stopped, that it substitutes action for negotiation, and that it forces threatened nations to fellow suit, wholesale mobili- q82 sation is, in effect, war. historians in search of a scapegoat on whom to discharge the sins of europe may spare themselves the trouble of sifting impalpable intentions. the culprit is that gov- ernment which first gave the order for a complete mobilisation. the doctrine of the “ nation in arms” was first made com- pletely possible by railways. its idea is that the state has a lien on all men of military age; that the state should earmark those wanted for war, and that the rest should carry on “ business as usual.’ but, since the world war, the brains of the suave atti- las who, in bowler hats and kid gloves, perambulate our modern cities, have hatched out a new thought. the “ nation in arms ” is to become the “ nation at war.” next time the whole tribe are to go, literally, under fire. next time all the life, all the machin- ery, fuel, food, wealth, transport of the state are to be drawn into the net and developed for purposes of destruction. this is the fixed goal of military intention, but it may be that the process will be reversed. instead of the ‘‘ nation in arms ”’ being further ex- panded into the “ nation at war,” it may be that we shall have to revert to small, highly technicalised armies. for, in the view of the present writer, the combination of mobility, fire-power and protection against bullet and poison gas, which the internal com- bustion engine has given to aeroplanes, tanks and mechanical supply and transport units, will render our existing types of fleets and marching troops—-horsc, foot and artillery—as helpless as were the peasants of the jacquerie when they encountcred knights in impenetrable armour moving rapidly on horseback. mechanical warfare-—supposing the other nations of the world refuse to rise to the spiritual heights which would foreshad- ow a second advent, the english-speaking peoples should wel- come at least the advent of the internal combustion engine. for the rifle, bomb and bayonet are as cheap and easy to obtain as the bow and arrow and they are more simple to handle. ‘the war value of the asiatics, the semi-asiatics of russia and of the afri- cans will, for generations to come, lie in mass tactics and the horde.. the war values of northern europe and america lie in the individuality of the fighter. these are biological characteristics. unless civilisation can speedily equip itself with more complica- ted and brainy weapons than rifles, bombs and bayonets the hordes may overwhelm the individuals. it will be another story if we can shift the implements of force from rifles and bayonets to aircraft, submarines and tanks. the british empire and the united states can manufacture war engines on the grand scale; they are alive with young leaders of initiative and action; the men of the north have a genius for handling and tending ma- chines. in these respects asiatics lag behind, and africans are nowhere. the leading asiatic nation, for instance, possesses daring pilots, but cannot, on the large scale, keep delicate ma- chines in trim. therefore, it hehoves every nation that has the will to live to put its military house in order forthwith, and the british, especially, should at least put off their general strikes until they have evolved a super-chief of the gencral staff. ii. lord kitchener never, in the history of the art of war, has the world been treated to so much war and so little art as in the conduct of the world war. one reason was the lack of artists. an artist witha pen uses as few words as possible, an artist with a pencil as few lines, an artist with a sword as few lives. but would even a marlborough, who had so biting an experience of the infirmities of councils, have struggled against a french plan xvii, a brit- ish cabinet, and a british war office from which the brain had been removed? by their very first move the government, aided by lord northcliffe,had set aside the army council and reverted, to the methods of the days of queen anne. be it remembered we are discussing the conduct of modern war in its technical aspect, and the last great example is still very close to us. an encyclopaedia is supposed to supply information; but in this case knowledge is so incomplete and space so limited that the only way to convey to the student a true impression of the conduct of the war of 1914-8 is to use famous names and familiar events, disclosing—though it be for the first time—some of the truth which underlay their outward and piously recorded actions. war an intense individualist.—the british govt., yielding to an impulse, mainly emotional, pulled lord kitchener off his ship to conduct the war. the appointment gave confidence to the whole empire, as well as to lord kitchener’s old comrades in arms who remembered his flashes of instinct, his stonewall forti- tude, his driving power, his industry—all his many just claims to be asuperman. but the nation and many soldiers did not realise how intensely individualistic lord kitchener had remained. his mind entirely rejected the sweeping changes which took place in the british war office and command headquarters in 1904. he knew the british army as a finished article sent out for him to use. railway transport, “ intelligence,” military hygiene, any sort of ‘‘ deal ” or “ wangle ’”’—ilcather for the men’s shoes, silver for their medals, cigarettes for their canteens—interested him. the strategy and tactics used in outwitting individuals fascina- ted him, but strategy and tactics in their continental aspect were to him as a book that has been deliberately left upon the shelf. on his way home from the manchurian campaign in march 1905, the british officer who had been attached to the japanese army was ordered to break journey at calcutta, so that the govt. of india might learn the latest developments of war at first hand. but once lord kitchener had realised that there was no blue china in feng-hwang-cheng he lost interest in the subject: it was lord curzon who wished to hear about the 11 in. howitzers, the barbed wire and the trench mortars. much of the modern technique of his own profession was posi- tively distasteful to lord kitchener. up to the time when he left the army in 1909, these marked idiosyncrasies were shielded from general knowledge by the small bodyguard of loyal and compe- tent officers who had in his campaigns surrounded their hero. some have said that in 1914 he was no longer the man of om- durman and pretoria. that may be so, but not in the sense that far! kitchener was less than “ k.”” on the contrary he had be- come more so. there had been no weakening in his character, but some of his characteristics—his impatience, his lack of confi- dence in others, his secretiveness, his determination to keep cer- tain things (troops, munitions, information) entirely in his own hands—had actually grown upon him. through ro years’ exer- cise of unlimited power these characteristics had made headway and he, kitchener, had quietly determined to conduct and win the world war, not by rule, but by his own rule of thumb. also, let it be said at once, had he been able still to wield his unlimited power, he might still have played the magician. but he had lost his magic ring of devoted and intimate experts who were trained soldiers, who understood him and understood also exactly how far they might venture to go in keeping him in touch with both the press and with his orthodox advisers. the war office in 1914.—just at the moment when kitchener first entered the war office it had become, in theory, the imperial power house. in theory every officer, clerk, typist was standing by asin a man-of-war steaming into action. actually the appara- tus had been dismantled. the chief of the general staff, the ad- jutant-general and the director of military operations had only been put in a month or two previously. the first of these had never, either in peace or war, practised the general staff side of soldicring, or shown any taste for it. he had been appointed be- cause he was a sound administrator of regulations and because, being at the same time inflexible and just, he was rightly believed to be the best officer to restore the spirit of discipline so seriously shaken by the curragh revolt. as it was obvious that, even for the seven weeks’ war then anticipated, he would need coaching, he was to retain the services of an officer whose reputation and experience would greatly have strengthened his hands. this sub- ordinate was sir william robertson, whose commissioned service had been passed on the general staff. but, to the amazement of himself and of the army, on mobilisation he was sent to assume duties he had never before practised as quartermaster-general in france. his gay escape from the war office was at once a catas- trophe and a portent. the general staff work of the high direction was to be handed over to personages who, whatever their value in other branches of the conduct of war, were profoundly ignorant of the principles and technique of policy, strategy and tactics. war kitchener's idea.—lord kitchener might have recalled a born chief of the general staff, sir douglas haig. he did not do so for exactly the reason which induced him to let robertson go. a strong chief of the general staff was to him, not a support, but a rival. a chief of the general staff who would have taken his proper place in the war councils of the nation must have spoiled his plan. he meant to run this great war by himself, just as he used to run the south african war from pretoria. but here, at the last lap of the course, destiny, his old friend, failed him. his very first move miscarried. before sir john french left england he had to receive formal instructions. whether kitchener wrote them or not he signed them. in some respects they are unlike kitchener, being reminiscent rather of the ‘hedging ” instructions issucd by kuropatkin to stackelberg. for instance: ‘‘ the gravest consideration ” (sic) “* will devolve upon you as to participation in forward movements... . where your force may be unduly exposed to attack’; but then he knew that french was apt to be over-confident at the outsct. another sentence, however, surcly betrays its author: ‘1 wish you distinctly to understand that your command is an entircly independent one, and that you will in no case come in any sense under the orders of any allied general.’”’ upon this em- phatic paragraph kitchener meant to base his own personal, if intermittent, conduct of the british operations; these in their turn would lead, during the long war which he almost alone fore- saw, to the command of the whole of the allicd forces. had not these projects been nipped in the bud, at least the conduct of the war would have been more original. the man who conceived and carried out the gigantic idea of planting down all the barbed wire in the world on to the south african sub-conti- nent would have done something out of the common. lord grey of falloden says in the chapter of his book which treats of strate- gy, that “when the opposing armies had dug themselves in from switzerland to the sea, no one was more perplexed than kitch- ener.”’ naturally. it has always been a mystery how kitchener passed into woolwich, but he could deal with the fact when he bumped up against it. as early as sept. 1914 he said, “ i am only an engineer but the kaiser would have been out of the aisne by now had i been there to shove them allalong.” andit was so! french v. kitchener.—when french was continuing his retreat to the southwards of ham with a speed which, from that point onwards, had become unnecessary, the prime minister, in re- sponse to appeals from our allies, begged his new secretary of state for war to go over to france and explain personally to the commander in the field that the independence given him in his instructions was not meant to cover the withdrawal of his forces from the line of battle. kitchener would rather have waited a little longer, but the pressure was great and he consented. he went in uniform and alone. had he taken two army coun- cillors with him, a secretary and a flag, he might have done any- thing and worn uniform or not as he pleased. as it was, he had no one to keep him right on what seemed a mere point of eti- quette, though really it went to the root of his aspirations. his dress implied openly that he was prepared to give executive or- ders. he knew sir john french intimately. he knew that the main fault of that fine commander was an undue optimism, bal- anced at the other end of the spectrum by undue pessimism. he knew that, popular as french might be, he himself stood, imaginatively, on another plane. he knew that the ardour which the mere sight of himself in uniform would create must double the fighting value of the expeditionary force. he knew also that his power over human beings was latent; that it could not be communicated by word or letter; that it depended upon the weight of his personality on the spot and in action. that is where the kitchener books go astray. they give little samples of the sort of things he could not do: the magician escapes them. colonel house is the only one who “ gets there’ and yet even colonel house does not see how, on his own showing, kitchener at their interview outwitted him.” but although kitchener was 1 colonel house, on his interview with lord kitchener, may 12 1915: ‘ 1 was impressed by his fairness and the impartial way he discussed our possible entry into the war. while it was the clever way to talk to me, he did not do it for that reason, for how could he 983 prepared for french, he had not reckoned upon an ambassador. he was encountered not only by his old subordinate in the field— now no longer subordinate—but also by the threat of an appeal to the foreign office, a department for which his respect was childlike. he was technically out of court in his uniform, and so, like a tiger which has missed its spring, he came growling home. his whole method of handing over the tactics of an enterprise to a subordinate and of then, at any crisis, suddenly applying his formidable personality and urging everyone to unheard-of efforts was shattered—once and for all. french had defeated kitchener and more than kitchener. he had been hustled by him for a couple of years in south africa, not to his disadvantage. but here was his chance to throw off the old yoke and so, with sir francis bertie’s help, the battle of the marne was delayed. gencral joffre’s orders for the battle of the marne were written on sept. 4 and it is stated in the book “1914” by lord french that “ on this night (sept. 4) i ordered the brit- ish forces to retreat a few miles further south.’’ no one can say whether to fight the battle of the marne earlier would have been an advantage or the reverse—what can be said is that with kitchener himself in the field, the troops would have been in- spired to make the supreme effort of their lives, both in the attack and in the subsequent pursuit. ill. british conduct of the world war lack of a general staff doctrine-—the british empire, then, went to war without a general staff to advise cabinet, committee of imperial defence or war office. lord kitchener—a soldier who never, to the day of his death, was able to appreciate the idea of a general staff, which he regarded as a subtle device to suppress commanders-in-chief,—lord kitchener shouldered everything. for some 18 months the higher direction carried on without hav- ing any clear notion of the direction in which the main stream of their efforts should flow. working in the dark, distracted by dif- ferences of opinion, the conduct of war became so spasmodic, so erratic that, by the time sir archibald murray and sir william robertson had at last brought home to the cabinet the meaning of the words “ general staff,” it had become rooted in its evil ways. students will best realise the cause of the confusion and lack of consistency in british councils by reading the remarkable letter sir william robertson wrote to lord kitchener in dec. 1915, when the post of the chief of the imperial general staff had been offered to him.? so succinctly, so clearly did it lay down the relations which should exist between the war council of a democracy and the chief of a general staff that, considering by whom and to whom it was written, it is bound to become a classic. yet, upon the immediate conduct of war, it made but a fleeting impression. for the wisdom seemed to melt out of the words un- der the glitter of the rising star of mr. lloyd george, of whom m. clemenceau is reputed to have said that “ he fancied himself the first napoleon.” perhaps, but he was no soldier. so small a dif- ference and yet one which turned all the other resemblances into caricatures! napoleon thought he could dispense with a general staff. so did mr. lloyd george. he was not going to have his hands tied by any general staff doctrine. he told colonel house ‘ he had found soldiers self-opinionated and unsatisfactory,” and he clung to that opinion until he met at last a soldier whose views coincided with his own; for what he wanted was a berthier to valet his genius and dress it up in khaki, a situation accurately gauged by the most acute personality in the army, general sir henry- wilson. as things turned out, the letter of sir william robertson—bravely written and bravely taken—remained a dead letter until foch did, at the end, what kitchener, under hap- pier auspices, might have done at the beginning. students may find it useful to take a few cases in which the british higher direction betrayed its lack of general staff doctrine, and then to go on to reflect that in hundreds of smaller issues, from day to day and hour to hour, similar incoherences were know what would or would not influence me?”’ the last dozen words are funny. did no one warn colonel house that he was about to put himself en rapport with a man who, clumsy as he might scem, was uncanny in his thought-reading powers? = * 2sir w. r. robertson, from private to field marshal, p. 239. 984 taking place: (1) the territorial associations, the only organisa- tion for expansion, discarded. (2) the main force on the west- ern front and its out-flanking detachment at the dardanelles, handled, in regard to dates of battles, transfers of picked troops, howitzers, aeroplanes and high explosives as if there were no sea, no ships, no interchangeability—as if, in fact, the two sets of operations were separate wars in water-tight compartments. (3) four raw divisions launched direct from home billets into the midst of a great battle at the dardanelles when very ordinary common-sense would have sent them to relieve war-seasoned divisions in french trenches who would at once have grasped the situation at suvla bay. (4) the british entry into the eel- trap of salonika, constructed by the french cabinet and general joffre for political purposes and generals. (5) the admiralty torn in two by the struggle between mr. churchill and lord fisher—between the black sea and the baltic. once the student has weighed these questions for himself he will under- stand that the most serious flaw in the british equipment for the struggles of ro14 and 1915 was not the lack of big guns but of a chief of the imperial general staff armed with a doctrine and strong enough to catch hold of brilliant amateurs like mr. winston churchill and others and wheel them into line before they approached the prime minister; strong enough also to support the cabinet against the combined pressure of the french govt. and the g.h.q. of their own expeditionary force. had mr. asquith been 20 years younger he might have straightened out the tangle. as it was he took off his hat ffrst to lord kitchener and next to mr. winston churchill. when they differed he compromised. clever compromise may keep cabinets together; war is uncompromising. the british empire began its conduct of the war with the cabinet of aug. 5 1914. the exact emergency for which the six divisions had been prepared had arisen and 20 civilians, soldiers and sailors were asked what should be done with them! the war, thus begun, was carried on by a series of happy thoughts. this is the cold shade under which modern british soldicrs have fought the world war to a finish. armies, fleets and aircraft form only a part of the nation at war. only one man can unite in his person, policy, finance and military action—that is the prime minister. the wigher direction and strategy.—strategy and tactics are to be dealt with in their technical aspects elsewhere; here they will only be indicated from the standpoint of the higher direction. experience shows that, within his own sphere, the commander should be left as free a hand as possible in bringing his strategy into line with state policy. if there is but one theatre of war the general should be left to solve the problem entirely in his own way, when, other things being equal, he will beat a general tied to the apron-strings of his government. roberts marched on kabul from the shutargurdan pass with only transport enough to move half his force on alternate days, putting time above strength. no higher direction would have shouldered the desper- ate risk of fighting the battle of charasia with half an army against the whole of the afghan regulars whilst the mountain tops were white with the watching tribesmen. wolseley told his own royal commander-in-chief, his own army and the british press that he was about to march from alexandria upon cairo— then took ship for ismailiat these were simple cases and it was well for the empire that lord lytton gave roberts a free hand and that wolseley took a free hand for himself. somewhat less simple was the case of buller, who was left to make up his own mind whether he should march northwards through the orange river colony or whether he should first re- lieve ladysmith. more complicated still was the manchurian problem, when kuropatkin found the whole of his wise strategy bedevilled by the tsar and by admiral alexeyev. nothing was left for him but tactics and administration. thereby russia lost the war. the strategy of the japanese navy and army was, on the other hand, given the. completest independence which has ever, in modern history, been granted by prime minister, emperor or king to naval or military commanders. this was because in prince yamagata the japanese had a defence minister whose rank, age and prestige secured his strategy from being at any war time hampered by state policy. as regards the conduct of the war, he was supreme, excepting in the region of finance. fleet and army moved like one service. great britain never approached these most fortunate conditions. political control.—but whenever there are several distinct theatres of war, then the higher direction is bound to do some directing and the autocrat or prime minister who can draw the delicate line between guidance and interference shows himself a master of his craft. in the years from 1862-4 federals and con- federates had their ‘‘ easterners ’’ and ‘‘ westerners.’”? which of the two war theatres, richmond or the mississippi, held the true goal of victory? till 1864 the federal generals were uncontrolled from washington, and washington all but lost the war. then that apt pupil, abraham lincoln, learned when to guide grant and when to leave him alone, and the north won. in the south, lee, left without political control or guidance, won so long as guidance was not needed. but when guidance was wanted and failed, not all his generalship could give victory to fools in the cabinet. at its outbreak, the world war presented a more simple and straightforward problem than any of the cases quoted. plan x vil. was a cut-and-dried fixture. had joffre, on the first day of the war been replaced by his antithesis, foch, plan xvii. would have stood, though not for solong. the die was cast, in fact, and, if the strategy was unsound, it could only be retrieved by sound tactics and ‘‘ human bullets.” state policy should have effaced itself and left the field entirely free for the naval and military commanders and their strategy. yet, at the cabinet of aug. 5 1914, there was nothing to show that the opinion of sir john french counted for any more, on a question of pure strategy, than that of civilian amateurs or soldiers about to be subordinate to him in the field. eight months later the dardanelles campaign was undertaken, and from that moment onwards the necessity for clear-cut, emphatic direction from whitehall became vital. there was none. state policy was of two minds. the general staff had ceased as a governing body to exist. neither kitchener nor the prime minister ever decided which was momentarily the main strategic current—eastwards or westwards. not one word to the commander in the east of the political trend of affairs in italy or the balkans; not an effort to use the amphibious power of great britain to move troops, big guns and high explosives from one theatre to the other, a feat which the central powers could not have emulated in any way—not at least until bulgaria came into the war (vide the afemoirs of general von falkenhayn). each year that followed brought in a new theatre of war and with each came a greater need for higher direction and, it must be added, for a british yamagata or abraham lincoln. _ what was the attitude of the higher direction on the “ kill germans ” strategy and tactics? in the absence of a gencral staff can anyone say? even now it can only be surmised that the attri- tion system was supported by the cabinet. napoleon once said that the destruction of the main force of the enemy was the true war objective. but napoleon’s maxims are like postage stamps; stick them on any opinion—it will get there! all through the war this axiom was trotted out to support a strategy which involved 1actics culminating in the suicidal frontal attack. ‘ the main force of the enemy ”’ was the avowed objective during the cham- pagne offensive of 1915 where the flower of the british empire was sacrificed for half their number of germans. the french cabinet and british g.h.q. in france were at one in the vio- lence of their opposition to any turning movement beyond the sacred boundaries of “la patrie.” they were within bombing range of the germans and, to them, the argument that “ side- shows ” were an avoidance of the ‘‘ main force of the enemy ”’ made personal appeal. but jomini, who knew napoleon so well, repudiates the notorious axiom. in the 8th edition of the ency- clopedia britannica it is written:— in war it has been laid down as a fundamental axiom by successive military writers, including jomini and the commandant of our own staff coliege, colonel macdougall, that to obtain success in the shortest time the greatest force should be brought to bear, in the right direction, on the weakest or most impressible point of the enemy. war in so far as the line of battle on the western front had become static it gave no scope for strategy which, by its dynamic quality, is the natural antidote to dugouts and altrition. strategy, in fact, had been elbowed off the mainland of europe and only hung on at her skirts. the british higher direction, by leaving the con- duct of the war to the french cabinet and the british g.h.q. in france, are responsible for festubert and loos—expenditures at the wrong time and place; expenditures wasting human energies and high explosives a small proportion of which, applied to a weakly covered flank by an amphibious power, must have been decisive. iv. the future of war time and space have ever been the dominating factors of strategy: fleets and armies become daily more mobile: accelera- tion is in the air. but what is the good of all this to a pedestrian higher direction? the velocity of the motions of the mind of a cabinet can be gauged by the new conductor of strategy they have just created. a cabinet committee has hatched out a “ su- per-chief of the general staff in commission ” to advise the prime minister. the three chiefs of staff to the three services are to meet under the chairman of the committee of imperial defence and are to consider themselves a super-chief! but the general staffs of the three services and of the dominions are human beings. ‘‘ i can deal with a man, not with a committee,” said sir douglas haig to lord milner and so say the commonwealth and dominion services. aircraft are challenging ships and railways. palaces, houses of parliament, arsenals, power houses, banks may be put out of action within a very few hours of a declaration of war. the chiefs of the general staff of each service will be con- centrated upon their own land, sea or air forces, with every fibre of their being, but the super-chief of the general staff in commis- sion will have vanished—he will have resolved himself into his three elements—and with him will have gone the prime minis- ter’s right hand! if the higher direction be well advised in leaving their com- mander as free a hand as possible in his strategy the same princi- ples apply, even more strongly, to his tactics. for here we enter the domain of the commander, the artist, the only individual now left in war who stands outside of the preconceived and who, by his personal inspiration, may crumple up the best laid plans. he it is who has it in his power to spread confidence by merely look- ing confident or, by one brief inspection, to infect a gallant army with despair. he it is whose learning must have become instinc- tive, who must possess both moral and physical courage, who must enjoy fighting, and yet always seek for his victory in ma- noeuvre rather than in slaughter. the nation possessing a great commander has half the battle in hand every time. for war be- comes a science only during peace. numbers, armament, train- ing, national characteristics can all be weighed and calculated in peace-time, but when “‘ the day ” arrives the human will enters upon the scene and may stultify statistics. in 1908 the adjutant general to the forces spent his leave inspecting the mobilising troops of the hungarians and the balkan nations. he reported to the war office that the bulgarian infantry were second to none in europe. the judgment proved itself sound in the campaign ‘against turkey. in the campaigns against the other balkan states and the allies the bulgarians went to pieces. they de- served to be defeated; they felt this, and they were defeated. owing to moral factors the bulgarian army lost 50% of its value. military strength and policy—the higher direction cannot al- ways pre-arrange moral factors, but it can see that its army does not lag behind in the material factors. in his book rorg lord french remarks, ‘‘ i cannot help wondering why none of us real- ised what the most modern rifle, the machine gun, motor trac- tion, the aeroplane and wireless telegraphy would bring about. it seems so simple when judged by actual results.”? this—the astonishment of an ex-chief of the impcrial general staff—is not quite fair to those who had at least urged that the war office windfall (spent on extra cavalry horses) should be devoted to heavy artillery. history only repeats itself because lack of imag- ination repeats itself. if any personage of transcendental quality 985 could possibly spare time to concentrate for a fortnight upon the military problems of greater britain he would find that the de- fence forces of the empire have been very busily spending the past four years in working up for another ‘‘ i cannot help wonder- ing why none of us realised.”” one of the first things a prime min- ister (for instance) would discover was that he had not carried out his part of the bargain laid down in the field service regulations which say that the government will at all times, at their discre- tion, keep the chief of the imperial gencral staff informed as to the drift of their policy and that he, on his part, will prepare ac- cordingly. unfortunately post-war govts. have given no indication of the drift of their policy except that they are “ drifting ”’ towards the obligations of locarno. under asquith, haldane and grey there was what is called a tacit understanding between the sailors, soldiers and politicians. faced by so clear-cut an issue territorial and regular vied with one another in the race for eff- ciency and became what they were. since the war there has been less cohesion and less enthusiasm, because men can never do their best when they feel instinctively that their chiefs do not know what they are driving at. the bulk of them are quite well enough educated to feel sure that the next european war will be decided in the clouds and yet they see their chiefs in the navy and army each struggling for the lion’s share of the military budget. the phantom super-chief of the imperial general staff in commission cannot judge between them, for he is a trinity holding, on that point, three diametrically opposed views. war may be a long way off but since this article began to be written it has drawn a little closer. were it only for the sake of tactics there is crying need that the british get their military house in order, especially in its top storey. the rank and file and lower deck ratings are the most splendid stuff imaginable. the officers have war expe- rience. the masses of trained fighters are still fit to take the field. but there is no head. only the prime minister can be head in war, and he is not equipped for the task nor kept in practice dur- ing peace. he has neither a defence minister nor a living super- chief of the general staff to take his ideas on policy and give him back a technical view of their bearings upon his defence force estimates. a mechanicalised army.—tactics being an art which is largely concerned with material and visible factors reflects the emptiness of the british military top storey most clearly. as soon as possi- ble after the war it was the duty of the higher direction to evolve anew model army. that was the moment to cut down the man strength of the divisions and replace the lost fighting strength by machines. instead of that the problem was shirked. writing on the efficiency of the army in sept. 192s, field marshal sir wil- liam robertson, by no means a revolutionary or fanciful person- age, says of the tank that it “has not yet been accorded the prominent place in our war preparations which it merits.” the field service regulations tell us, he goes on to observe, that during the comparatively briet period which has elapsed since tanks were first used, their characteristics have changed ma- terially; that further rapid changes and improvements will prob- ably take place; and that until these experimental stages have been passed through a temporary organisation must necessarily be adopted. but the war ended in 1918 and still there are only a handful of tanks tacked to the old 1914 divisions of regulars and without any tanks at all for the territorials! roberts drove this “ wait and see’’ heresy out of the indian army when, in 1882, he found that the armstrong guns purchased ten years previously for the defence of the roadstead of madras were still lying unmounted on the beach. fle was told “ further rapid changes and improve- ments will probably take place, etc., etc.,” and so they did, for although the guns could not be fired, the responsible officer was discharged. seven solid years have been squandered, masses of money have been misspent, while great britain has been waiting, hoping to see some other nation create a new model army, of which every man, in virtue of his equipment, will be worth half a dozen of those british soldiers who took part in the autumn manoeuvres 986 of 1925. then, presumably, the intention is to set to work and copy it. does anyone really still imagine, after all that has been learnt about war, that this would be tolerated? from the time of the armistice onwards one or two military enthusiasts have done what they could to press these views upon the british people. at last, the ideas of a mechanicalised army began to make head- way until, at the royal banquct of 1924, there was a reply. ‘the rifle and bayonet,” reaffirmed the responsible official, ‘‘ are the infantryman’s chief weapon. the battle can be won in the last resort only by means of these weapons.”’ two months later, at bisley, returning to the charge, he told the marksmen there as- sembled that ‘‘ mechanicalisation would help to get them to grips with the enemy, but once at grips the issue lay with the man and the rifle and bayonet would decide battles as they always had done.”’ there stood the riflemen of england, worthy descendants of the archers of agincourt. there stood the war leader, assuring them they were still lords of the battlefield. and yet—how if a single enemy tank had appeared upon those bisley ranges? since then there have been manoeuvres in india and in eng- land, at which, for the first time, a fringe of machines have been tacked on to the skirts of the main 1924 organisation. there were the armies, longing to be at one another and yet—no bat- tles! the lessons drawn from these manoeuvres will fall under the heading of tactics. from the more general standpoint of war, suffice it to say that, few as were the machines, they so set the pace as to leave the old-fashioned troops out of it. clearly, cav- alry and infantry must not be too proud to takeahint from their civilian brothers who find that the motor ’bus gets them there and that the horse ’bus does not. to write an article on war is easy; to read it at a time when universal lip-service is being paid to peace needs courage. those who have come so farin company with the writer may be trusted, therefore, not to flinch from the reflection that the chemical war- fare committee, as shown in the army list, is not in any way re- laxing its activities since the white dove, hatched out at locarno, began to fly over the earth. this being so, one may be fairly sure that in no other country is there any slacking-off in these prepara- tions by men to poison their fellow-men when the next “ day” comes along. the most convinced pacifist need not then scruple to carry his thoughts onward to the contemplation of a new model army, even although the idea has hitherto been persistently re- jected by responsible authorities. for there is a tide in the af- fairs of men, and although admiralties let go every anchor they possess and war offices megaphone to their generals, ‘‘ back to 1914,” that tide will prove in the end too strong for their tackle. an army must be built up round something. the fabrics of greek art and roman law rose from the foundation of the heavily armed hoplite and the steel-clad legionary. in 378 a.d. heavy cavalry swept these pillars of society out of military signifi- cance until 1314 a.p. after that came the day of infantry again first in conjunction with archers, afterwards as fighters of dual functions, the bullet and the bayonet their weapons. these sur- vivals of blenheim, waterloo and mons were, at least until a few months ago, the supreme arbiters of war in the eyes of british military authority. but let the student look up, for victory is winged. sea and land forces have become the servants of the air force. the navy will be represented more and more by fleets of seaplane carriers. the functions of armies will be to push on as fast as petrol can drive their machines to scize advanced bases and depots, whence ever more extended air raids can be deliv- ered. the atom round which the british defence forces must be grouped is no longer a human being—it is an internal combus- tion engine. (see strategy; tactics.) (i. h.) ward, sir adolphus william (1837-1924), british man of letters (see 28.319), died at cambridge june 19 1924. he was knighted in 1913. his germany 1815-1890, 2 vol. (1916-7) was a notable addition to his published works. ward, james (1843-1925), british psychologist and meta- physician (see 28.320), published, after 1910, the realm of ends, or pluralism and theism (1911, 3rd. ed. 1920); heredity and memory (1913); psychological principles (1918, 2nd ed. 1920); a study of kant (1922). he died march 4 1925. ward, sir a. w.—ward, wilfrid philip ward, sir joseph george (1856- }, new zealand politician, was born at emerald hill, melbourne, april 26 1856, his father being a merchant. he was educated privately in mel- bourne and at a state school at the bluff, new zealand, and at the age of 13 entered the post and telegraph department. at 21 he became an export merchant, and in 1887, after nearly 10 years’ experience of municipal politics, he entered parliament as liberal member for awarua. appointed treasurer in the sed- don cabinet of 1893, he was the prime minister’s chief lieuten- ant until mr. seddon died in 1906, and then succeeded to the premiership and the leadership of the liberal party. he had not the dominating personality or immense popularity of mr. seddon, but he showed practical administrative ability of a high order and pioneered several important reforms, such as loans to settlers, the all-red cable service, and penny postage for new zealand. sir joseph was a staunch imperialist, and unlike many of his contemporaries in the other dominions, believed in subsidising the imperial navy rather than creating separate fleets. to this end he offered the home government a dreadnought—or if the need arose, two—in 1909. his ministry was defeated in feb. 1912, but sir joseph ward—he had been knighted in r901 and was made a baronet after the imperial conference of 1911—re- turned to office as minister of finance in the national (war) cabinet of 1915-9. in 1917-8 he was a member of the imperial war cabinet and in 1919 represented new zealand at the peace conference. in 1919, after representing awarua continuously since 1887, he lost his seat, and in 1923 he was defeated in a by-election for tauranga. he then definitely retired from poli- tics and devoted himself to business. (g:. c.d) ward, lester frank (1841-1913), american geologist and sociologist (see 28.320), died in washington, d.c., april 18 1913. his numerous minor publications, together with biographical notes, were issued under the title, glimpses of the cosmos, 6 vol. (1913-8), the last five volumes posthumously. see mrs. e. p. cape, lester f. ward, a personal sketch (1922). ward, mary augusta (1851-1920), british novelist known as mrs. humphry ward (see 28.320), died in london march 24 1920. since i910 she had published the case of richard mevyneil (1911), a study of modernism and, in a sense, a sequel to robert elsmere; the mating of lydia (1913); the coryston family (1913); delia blanchflower (1915); eltham itouse (1915); a great success (1916); lady connie (1916); afissing (1917); the war and elizabeth (1918), and a posthumously published novel, harvest (1920). she had also in 1918 published her memoirs, a writer’s recollections, and publications connected with her war propaganda work were england’s effort (1916); towards the goal (1917); and fields of victory (1919). the passmore edwards settlement, in tavistock place, london, was renamed after her the mary ward settlement, this being a tribute to the great interest she had shown in its work. her husband, thomas humphry ward, long associated with the times, died in may 1926. bibliography.—stephen l. gwynn, mrs. humphry ward (1917); j. stuart walters, afrs. humphry ward; her work and influence (1922); janet p. trevelyan, the life of mrs. humphry ward, (1923). ward, wilfrid philip (1856-1916), british man of letters, was born at ware, hertforshire, jan. 2 1856, the second son of william george ward (see 28.321). educated at st. edmund’s college, ware, ushaw college, durham and the gregorian university of rome, he became lecturer in philosophy at ushaw college in 1890, and examiner in mental and moral science to the royal university of ireland, 1891-2. in 1906 he became editor of the dublin review. he was the author of numerous books: the wish to believe (1884); the clothes of religion(1886) hw. g. ward and the oxford movement (1889); w. g. ward and the catholic revival (1893); life and times of cardinal wiseman (1897); aubrey de vere, a memoir (1904); life of john henry cardinal newman (1912) and several volumes of essays. he died in london april 8 1916. a biographical notice of him, written by his wife, josephine mary (b. 1864), was published as a preface to his last lectures (1918). war graves war graves.—one of the most interesting pieces of organi- sation resulting from the world war is represented in the im- perial war graves commission, which was constituted on behalf of the governments and peoples of all parts of the british empire, and charged with the care in perpetuity of the graves of their sailors and soldiers. origin of the war graves commission.—with a view to ensuring the permanence of the graves of british soldiers buried in france discussions took place early in the war between the british military authorities responsible for the marking and registration of the graves and the french government. on dec. 29 1915, the latter passed a law which provided that all allied graveyards on the soil of france should be acquired by the government of the republic at its own expense, and that the rights of ownership should be enjoyed in perpetuity by the allied nations concerned.! this practical tribute to the valour of the british armies was pro- found in its effect on the relations between the two allies during the war. under this law it was possible for an association reguli¢rement constituee by an allied govt. to be entrusted with the care of its gravesin france. the result was the establishment in great britain (jan. 1916) of a national committee for the care of soldiers’ graves, the presidency of which was accepted by the prince of wales. as the fighting extended it became evident that the care of the graves after the war and the erection of permanent memorials would be a task too extensive for a body with the limitations of the national committee to undertake. among these limitations was the lack of direct representation of the dominions and other parts of the empire, whose soldiers were falling and being buried side by side with those of the united kingdom. in a memoran- dum addressed to the prime minister, dated march 15 1017, the prince of wales, as president of the national committee, suggested that the formation of “ a joint committee of the govern- ments of the empire, or a statutory body of commissioners some- what on the lines of the development commission,” should be proposed to the forthcoming imperial conference. the question was accordingly laid before the conference on april 13 1917, when a resolution was passed praying his majesty to grant a royal charter for the constitution of an imperial war graves commission, which should be empowered to care for and main- tain the graves of those fallen in the war, to acquire land for the purpose of cemeteries and to erect permanent memorials in the cemeteries and elsewhere. the charter was passed under the great seal on may 21 1917, and the commission, of which the prince of wales became president, was established. constitution of the commission.—the members of the com- mission are the secretary of state for war (ex-officio chairman), the secretary of state for the colonies, the secretary of state for india, the first commissioner of works and the representatives of canada, australia, new zealand, south africa and newfound- land. the charter further provides for eight non-official members appointed from time to time by the sovereign. the commission’s deliberations during their first year resulted in the double proposal laid before the next imperial conference on june 17 1918, that £10 per grave should be taken as the proba- ble cost of the construction of cemeteries, and that the cost of carrying out the decisions of the commission should be borne by the respective governments in proportion to the numbers of the graves of their dead. it is hardly necessary to emphasise the significance of the adoption of this proposal; a precedent may thus have been established with far-reaching effects; at any rate a most interesting experiment in co-operative administration among the nations of the british commonwealth had been ini- tiated. it is based on the principle that each shall be financially responsible in proportion to the amount of service rendered on behalf of the whole. in this connection it is important to note that estimates are presented yearly in identical form to each of the participating governments, the respective parliaments being asked to vote a proportion of the total in accordance with the ' later on, the governments of belgium, italy, greece, egypt and palestine followed the lead of france by passing equally generous measures. 987 decision of the imperial conference of 1918 referred to above. the commission administers the grants in aid thus received through a finance committee, which meets regularly at short intervals and which is attended by’ a representative of the treasury of the united kingdom to advise and assist. the principle of complete co-operation runs through all the work of the commission, the participating governments being repre- sented in the administrative personnel, both in london and abroad, on the same proportional basis as has been adopted for the sharing of expenditure. policy.—one of the first acts of the commission was to lay down as a guiding principle that the graves of all ranks should be treated on a basis of absolute equality. with this principle as a foundation, the commission invited sir frederick kenyon, director of the british museum, to report on the best method, in his opinion, of discharging their responsibilities. sir frederick’s recommendations, which were adopted by the commission, were briefly as follows: 1. the erection of uniform headstones over all war graves. 2. the erection of two central monuments in each cemetery where possible. 3. the collection of isolated graves into selected cemeicrics. among the architects entrusted by the commission with the preparation of architectural designs were sir edwin lutyens, sir reginald blomfield, mr. herbert baker, sir robert lorimer and sir john burnet. the headstones are 2 ft. 8 in. in height, 1 {t. 3 in. in breadth, and 3 in. in thickness. each stone as a rule bears at the top the badge of the regiment or unit. then follow the military details with the name of the deceased and the date of his death, below which is carved the symbol of his faith, while at the foot of the stone is engraved a personal inscription chosen by the next-of-kin. of the two central monuments the great altar-like stone of remembrance, designed by sir edwin lutyens bears the inscription chosen by mr. rudyard kipling, “ their name liveth for evermore.” the other memorial is the great cross of sacrifice designed by sir reginald blomfield, to the shaft of which is fixed a crusader’s sword of bronze. in addition to the marking and care of the graves the com- mission were entrusted with the commemoration of the missing dead or those sailors and soldiers who have no known graves. this is no small task, for the number of these is over 400,000. several memorials to the missing dead had been completed by the end of 1925. among these are the three naval memorials to those lost at sea which stand on prominent sites at the three ports which throughout britain’s naval history have been inti- mately connected with the sea service. other memorials to the missing are those at cape helles, at lake doiran in macedonia, at port tewfik and at the menin gate, ypres. the last, which was still under construction in 1925, bears the names of some 60,000 officers and men “. . . who fell in ypres salient, but to whom the fortune of war denied the known and honoured burial given to their comrades in death.”” cemetery and memorial registers are published by the commission. these registers when finished will present a complete record of the empire’s dead. the unprecedented nature of the task with which the commis- sion was charged is obvious; its complexity and magnitude will be realised when it is remembered that the 725,000 known graves for which they were responsible were scattered all over the world in many different countries with different laws and customs, some of them the enemy countries with whom special provisions were made in the treaties of peace to ensure the graves being respected; and there are no less than 15,000 burial places in different parts of europe and the east where british sailors and soldiers rest, the great majority being in civil cemeteries contain- ing small groups of graves, but some 1,500 of them being ceme- teries of considerable size, the largest containing 12,000 graves. as has been seen, the permanent construction work carried out in these cemeteries is of a simple but durable kind, but the com- mission’s gardeners set to work immediately after the armistice, without waiting for the erection of the permanent headstones, planting shrubs, grass and flowers. permanent m. aintenance.—as a guarantee that the graves and memorials shall be forever cared for, the various governments 988 of the empire represented on the commission have undertaken to provide permanently the income required for maintenance at the accepted standard of upkeep laid down by the commission. after discussion it was agreed that an endowment fund amount- ing to £5,000,000 should be established for this purpose by the united kingdom and dominion govts. and this fact twas announced to the house of commons on july 30 1925, by sir laming worthington-evans, at that time chairman of the commission. sir herbert lawrence, mr. e. r. peacock and sir fabian ware were appointed the first trustees of the endowment fund, on the occasion of their appointment, the prince of wales wrote ina letter to the chairman “ we shall thus be able to honour the pledge given to all the relatives of the dead who can now be assured that the last resting-places of those whom they lost in the war will be properly cared for.” | french and american graves —while, as a rule, the allies adopted methods of commemorating the fallen similar to those described above, the great differences in the numbers of their casualties and in the conditions obtaining in the different countries rendered certain divergences unavoidable. france, on whose soil lay over three million allied and enemy dead,was faced with the problem of honouring her fallen soldiers without clogging the wheels of industry and agriculture, which were beginning to revive under peace conditions, even in the devastated areas where the graves lay thickest. the british helped to solve the difficulty by concentrating all isolated graves into cemeteries which would forever mark the british battle-line. the french adopted the further expedient of giving the next-of-kin the op- portunity of having their dead re-buried at the state’s expense in the churchyard or burial-ground of their native place, while those who were left would rest in great national cemeteries con- structed by the state as a lasting monument to the heroism of the soldiers who died for france. many of the fallen soldiers of the american expeditionary force were borne back across the atlantic to rest in their native land. the american authorities would no doubt have hesitated to undertake a task of such difficulty had not a pledge been given before a single american battalion left the united states that no american soldier who died fighting for his country and the liberties of nations should be left to lie on foreign soil except at the express wish of his next-of-kin. of the 100,000 american dead, those left to rest in france were grouped together in three or four great cemeteries. the plan of construction of those cemeteries is based on the principle of uniform treatment of the graves, a conception which appears to have been first put into practice by those who laid out arlington national cemetery, the burial place of those who fell in the american civil and other wars of the united states. (f. w.) warren, whitney (1864- ), american architect, was born in new york city jan. 29 1864. after studying at the ecole des beaux arts, paris, under daumct and girault (1885-94), he began the practice of architecture in new york, later becom- ing associated with charles d. wetmore in the firm of warren and wetmore. they specialised in railway architecture, hotels, business buildings and residences, and were architects for the new york central, michigan central, canadian northern and erie railways. their numerous structures in new york city in- clude the chelsea docks, the grand central station and the hotels belmont (1905), vanderbilt (1910), biltmore (1912) and commodore (1916). warren was an intimate friend of d’annunzio, accompanying him to fiume, and was later appointed diplomatic representative in the united states of the “‘ free state of fiume.”’ in 1920 he was chosen by the international committee to recon- struct the library of the university of louvain, destroyed by the germans in 1914. he was the author of temoignage d'un ciloyen americain, les justes revendications de i’italie: la question de trente, de trieste et del adriatique (1918). many of his addresses were published and widely distributed. warsaw (see 28.334), the capital of poland, had a population of 931,176 in the city alone, and 936,046 in the administrative district of 121 sq. km., in 1921; 72°3% were poles and 34-6% jews. the municipality had a substantial surplus in 1924, and warren—washington work was begun on extending the water and drainage systems; it was also proposed to build slaughter houses and lay fresh paving. the suburban electric railway is being extended to zyrardew. since the foundation of an orthodox church, inde- pendent of the russian patriarch, in 1922, warsaw has been the scat of its archbishop. there is also an exarchate of the russian church, and a roman catholic archbishop. the russian cathe- dral, the outward sign of russian domination, has been demol- ished, and the university, evacuated during the war, was reor- ganised in 1918 as a polish body. the bridges over the vistula were destroyed by the russians in their retreat. the poniatew bridge, joining warsaw to the suburb of praga, was reopened in 1925. another bridge was rebuilt at once by the germans. a french institute was built in 1925, and the erection of a radium institute and hospital was begun as a national monument to madame curie, a native of warsaw, who laid the foundation stone. a soviet chamber of commerce was opened in 1926. stubborn battles between the russian and german forces took place in the neighbourhood of warsaw in 1914. in rors the russians withdrew to the right bank of the vistula, and the germans entered the city. the first polish parliament was held in warsaw in 1919 (see vistula-san, battles of the). washington, booker taliaferro (1859-19015), amer- ican negro teacher and reformer (see 28.344), died at tuskegee, ala., nov. 14 1915, as the result of a breakdown due to overwork. he was the author of afy larger education: being chapters from my experience (1911) and the man farthest down; a record of observation and study in europe (10912). see b, f. riley, life and times of booker t. washington (1916). washington, d.c. (see 28.349), capital of the united states, enjoyed its share of prosperity following the close of the world war and grew in importance and population until its inhabitants numbered in 1925 approximately 500,000, one- third of whom were born within the district. many thousands of federal employees were brought there for war purposes in 1917, on whose subsequent departure the government force re- sumed normal conditions. the city is becoming more beautiful each year with its added parks and attractive buildings, and an average of 9,000 visitors register at its hotels every day. to regulate automobile traffic, which constituted one of the city’s chief problems, a traffic bureau was provided in 1925. buildings.—an idea may be gained of the value of improve- ments steadily going on in the district by a reference to the as- sessment, at full value, for the buildings erected during the years 1923, 1924 and 1925, the total for the three years being $86,- 366, 211, that for 1925 alone being $42,729,000. the most beau- tiful and important building recently erected is the head-quarters of the chamber of commerce of the united states, located oppo- site the white house on ground where once stood the residence of daniel webster. it is for the use of american business men, including more than 1,350 chambers of commerce and trade as- sociations and 15,000 business firms and individuals scattered over the united states and the world. the building consists of a series of meeting-rooms seating from 125 to 400 persons each, and an auditorium with a seating capacity of 1,000. another building recently erected is the washington auditorium at 1900 e street, n.w., with a seating capacity of 6,000. at ninth street and new york avenue is a new building erected by the american federation of labor as its head-quarters. the gallin- ger hospital, in the extreme southeast part of the city, was opened in 1923 to the district poor, for whom it was constructed. the corner stone of the victory memorial building in the mall at seventh and b streets, n.w., was laid by president harding nov. 14.1921. the building is to be erected by private subscrip- tions and when finished is to cost $10,000,000. other important buildings begun or completed include the john k. mullen memorial library in the grounds of the catholic university of america, the corner stone of which was laid by cardinal hayes on april 22 1925, the jewish community centre, at sixteenth and q streets, n.w. (corner stone laid on may 3 1925), the wardman park hotel, the hotel washington and a large number of other hotels and apartment houses. a proposed washington structure is the new home of the national press club to cost $9,000,000 and to occupy the site of the ebbit hotel at f and fourteenth streets, n.w. the francis scott key bridge has been opened to traffic, and work on the episcopal cathedral of ss. peter and paul is making good progress. to give better access to arlington national cemetery and contiguous parts of virginia, a new bridge is to span the potomac beyond the lincoln memorial. this will be one of the most handsome bridges in the world and will cost together with its approaches $14,750,000; it will be com- pleted about 1930. a much needed local improvement now near- ly completed is the new water service. including the $3,000,000 aqueduct from great falls, 14 m. northwest of washington, the necessary reservoirs and other incidental work, the total cost of this undertaking will be $9,160,000. this service will augment the district water supply by 100,000,000 gal. of water a day, and together with the old service, which has been in use for 65 years, will give the city a total water supply of 180,000,000 gal. a day, enough for a population of 1,000,000 inhabitants. in the dis- trict of columbia there are 7o major buildings that are govern- ment-owned, the total value of federal property being estimated at $275,348,737. streeis and parks.—in 1925, congress provided for a national capital park commission, to have at its disposal an annual ap- propriation for the purchase of parks and recreation grounds, and the 6,000 and more acres now set aside for these pur- poses will hereafter receive regular and substantial additions; already 54% of the city is in parks, streets and alleys. there are 527 m. of streets in the district, paved and unpaved. asphalt predominates, though many of the roadways are of cement and macadam, comparatively few being unpaved. congested traffic conditions are being relieved by widening the roadways in the downtown area; thirteenth street from f to i has been treated in this way, and a number of others are to follow. monuments and alemorials —a number of these have been added to the city’s parks and reservations, the more prominent being the dupont memorial in dupont circle; the statue of dante, by ettore ximenes, sculptor and whitney warren, archi- tect, unveiled in meridian hill park, dec. 1 1921; joan of arc (a copy of the original statue which stands in front of the cathe- dral in rheims, france) unveiled in the same park, jan. 6 1922, by mrs. harding, wife of the president, and mme. jusserand, wife of the french ambassador; a memorial to joseph j. darling- ton in judiciary square, executed by c. p. gennewcin; statue of edmund burke (gift of sulgrave institute) at massachusetts avenue and eleventh street, n.w., unveiled oct. 12 1922; eques- trian statue of gen. u.s. grant, by henry merwin shrady, sculp- tor, in the botanic garden, facing the capitol building, unveilect april 27 1922; statue of alexander hamilton, first secretary of the u.s. treasury, unveiled may 17 1923; shaft south of state, war, and navy building, erected to the memory of more than 5,000 men of the first division, u.s.a., who dicd in the world war; statue of bishop francis asbury of the methodist episcopal church, unveiled at sixteenth and mount pleasant streets, oct. 15 1924; and a duplicate of the famous statue by dumont of gen. san martin, in buenos aires, being erected in judiciary square. a memorial to john ericsson, to form the first portion of the arlington memorial bridge, will be completed in 1926. education.—the district is making rapid progress in educa- tion. early in 1925, congress authorised a five-year building programme. the act will make it possible to abandon in a few years the many unsuitable buildings now in use and will reduce elementary classes to a standard of not more than 40 pupils to a class. this bill, effective july 1 1925, provides for additions of something like 220 rooms to school buildings already erected; a number of junior high schools, a new manual training school, a new business high school, six buildings for graded schools to con- tain 92 rooms, together with gymnasiums, assembly halls, rest rooms, dining rooms and kitchens. a considerable number of sites are also provided for. the appropriation act for the fiscal year 1925-6 provides for new buildings and grounds to cost $4,176,500, $5,168,000 for teachers’ salaries and $2,812,437 for textbooks, repairs, etc.—a total for educational purposes of 989 $12,156,937. in the years 1921-3, approximately $7,000,000 was spent for building sites and buildings. the enrolment of pupils at the close of school in june 1925 was 67,000. munufactures—tvhe output of manufactured products is rapidly growing; the total aggregate output was $73,108,000 in 1923. printing and publishing newspapers and periodicals are the most important industries. their total output amounted to $18,227,000, an increase of 20:1% over 1921. the number of persons employed was 1,308, a figure slightly exceeded by the number of employed in the bread and other bakery industries. the average number of wage-earncrs employed in privately owned factories with output valued at $5,000 or more was 9,823, and the total wage payments $14,796,000. finance.—one of the principal indications of the district’s healthy financial condition is its personal income tax returns. of less than half a million people living there in 1923, 75,796 made returns showing a net income of $284,622,234, or 1°8% of the nation’s total; the income taxes paid amounted to $8,083,- o50. asmaller total of tax was paid by cach of 34 states. while only 6-94% of the nation’s population filed income tax returns during this period, 15-92% of the district’s residents submitted returns. “cy: p) washington (see 28.353), a state of the united states of america. the population in 1920 was 1,356,621, an increase of 214,631 or 18-8% over the population of 1910, as against an increase of 120-4% in the preceding decade. the density of population in 1920 was 20-3 per sq. m.;in 1910, 17-1. the urban population (in 35 places of 2,500 or more) was 55-2°o of the whole, as against 53% in 1910. the population of cities having more than go,ooo inhabitants was:— increase gz ree per cent 1910 237,194 seattle. spokanc . ‘tacomii:.. 315,312 104,437 96,965 the most significant change in the characteristics of the popula- tion was the increased number of japanese, and especially japanese women. in 1920 there were 17,114 japanese, or 1-3 % of the total, the percentage of males being 65-3. one reason for the proportional increase of females was the privilege, prior to the legislative session of 1921, of acquiring title to land in the names of native-born children of japanese parents. the total population in 1925 was estimated by the united states bureau of census to be 1,510,280. agriculiure.—during the decade rg1o~20 the number of farms increased from 56,192 to 66,288; the acreage of improved land from 6,373,311 ac. to 7,129,343 ac.; and the value of all farm property from $637,543,411 to $1,057,429,848. theaverage value of land per ac. in 1910 was $44.18; in 1920, $60.22. by 1925 the number of farms hac increased to 73,266. the follow- ing table shows changes in acreage, production and value of chief crops:— acreage : value year (in thou- i toe (in thou- sands tao neees sands) wheat 1909 2,118 40,920 bu. $35,102 199 2,494 41,838 bu. 91,207 192 2,072 36,848 bu. 47,981 oats . 1909 270 13,228 bu. 5,871 iqig 192 8,073 bu. 8,073 1925 254 11,176 bu. 5,812 barley 1909 172 5,835 bu. 31332 1919 85 2,250 bu. 25375 1925 gi 3,094 bu. 2,104 maize 1909 26 563 bu. 404 i9i9 35 902 bu. 1,623 192 58 2,030 bu. 1,928 potatoes 1909 58 7,667 bu. 2,994 i9ig 55 5,867 bu. 12,320 192! 54 7,840 bu. 12,920 hay 1909 743 1,400 tons 17,200 1919 1,064 2,014 tons paar 7 a2 2,103 tons 31,471 990 crops of increasing importance are bulbs, flowers, vegetable seeds, flax, filberts and english walnuts. prohibition increased enormously the demand for berry juices. three-fifths of the loganberrics produced in the united states come from washing- ton (1,157,778 qt. in 1919, valued at $208,402). the evergreen wild blackberry (supposed to have been introduced from hawaii) is spreading through the river valleys, and the fruit is shipped in carload lots to the canneries. the production of the chief orchard crops in 1915, 1920 and 1925 in thousands of bushels was as follows:— i9i5 1920 1925 apples 7,300 21,502 28,700 pears . 564 1,140 2,300 peaches : 155 the following table shows the growth in number and value of domestic animals during the decade 1910-20:— number value horses 1910 280,572 $ 9,680,849 1920 296,381 25,069,336 mules . igio 12,185 1,776,297 1920 23,091 2,930,813 milch cows 1910 186,233 7,988,133 1920 289,635 23,648,537 sheep . i9io 475,555 1,931,170 ; 1920 623,779 7,750,407 swine . iqio 206,135 1,674,927 1920 264,747 5,049,249 in ro17-8 condenseries used 205,657,654 lb. of whole milk to produce 1,844,097 cases of condensed milk, valued at $8,870,825. cream and butter were sent to the cities from 110 creameries. in 1919 in 19 factories the production of cheese was 2,004,365 lb., valued at $348,660. during the decade roro-20 the irrigated farms increased from 7,664 to 13,271, irrigated acreage from 334,378 ac. to 529,899 acres. the reclamation service of the federal govt. has impounded the waters in keechelus lake (kittitas county) and other lakes to serve large projects in the yakima valley. the largest enterprise is the columbia basin project, to utilise the waters of pend d’oreille lake and river for the irrigation of 1,750,000 acres. mining.—for all producing mines and quarries, the number of enterprises in 1919 was 83, and in 1909, 93; the average num- ber of wage-earners in 1919 was 5,050, and in 1909, 6,904; the aggregate horsepower used in 1919 was 38,198, and in 1900, 20,742; wages in 1919 were $7,466,000, and in 1909, $5,891,000; value of products in 1919 was $13,329,000, and in 1909, $10,- 538,000. production of gold in 1924 was 13,000 fine 0z.; in 1920, 7,000 fine 0z.; in 1910, 39,000 fine ounces. production of silver in 1924 was 194,000 fine 0z.; in 1920, 178,000 fine o0z.; in rgro, 205,000 fine ounces. production of copper (in lb. fine) was 979,- 000 in 1924; 2,126,000 in 1920; 65,000 in rg10. production of coal (in net tons) was 2,400,000 in 1924 (estimated); 3,757,000 in 1920; 3,912,000 in 1910. in the decade 1910-20 five new cement plants were established in the state, and large quantities of portland cement were exported. of increasing importance are clay products, such as paving brick, sewer pipe and terra cotta. manufactures —the following table shows changes in manu- factures between 1909 and 1923:— 1923 1919 1909 establishments . 3,029 4,918 2674 wage-earners (aver- age) 111,663 132,928 69,120 wages $156,435,000 | $194,968,000 | $49,766,000 primary horsepower . 593,330 687,436 297,897 $443,178,000 | $117,888,000 $372,044,000 $809,623,000 | $220,746,000 $678,543,000 cost of materials value of products the chief items were lumber and timber products, flour-mill and grist-mill products, slaughtering and meat-packing, butter, washington conference cheese and condensed milk, malt liquors, salmon fishing, canning and preserving. the state contains 16% of the total water-power resources in the united states. ports—during and immediately after the world war the commerce passing through the district of puget sound was sec- ond only to that of new york. a law approved on march 14 1911, authorised the organisation of ports. seattle, tacoma, aberdeen and other cities have taken advantage of this law to improve their harbours and to build great wharves and other conveniences to handle the increasing commerce. highways.—the state has embarked upon the task of pro- viding an extensive system of improved roadways. these in- clude the washington link of the pacific highway, intended to extend from alaska to the straits of magellan, another highway around puget sound to the pacific; and highways across the cascade range and eastern washington. foresis and parks.—the federal govt. maintains the mount rainier national park (324 sq. m.) and the mount olympus national monument (290,370 acres). national forests include 12,000,000 ac. within the state. history.—ernest lister, democrat, became governor in 1913 and was re-elected in 1916. he died june 14 1919, and was suc- ceeded by lt.-gov. louis f. hart, republican. governor hart was re-elected in 1920. he recommended what is known as the governor’s administrative code of 1921, one of the most sig- nificant changes in the state government since its organisation. in 1921 the legislature passed a law restricting alien ownership of land, aimed especially at the japanese. the word “ alien ” is so defined that it does not include an alien who has in good faith declared his intention to become a citizen of the united states, but does include all other aliens and all corporations and other organised groups of persons, a majority of whose capital stock is owned or controlled by aliens or a majority of whose members are aliens. gov. hart was succeeded by roland h. hartley. commerce developed rapidly during the years 1910-26. in seattle there were, in 1921, 24 resident consuls representing foreign countries. the greater number of vessels coming to ports of puget sound were under the japanese flag and branches of japanese banks were established. progressiveness was shown in such legislation as the working men’s compensation law (1911), initiative and referendum (1913), recall of public officers (1913) and aid for destitute mothers (1915). to meet the high cost of government the legislature in rg2r enacted laws levying a poll- tax on every person between the ages of 21 and 50, and a tax of one cent on each gallon of gasolene used by motor vehicles; the tuition charges in state institutions of learning and the fees for licences for automobiles and for fish dealers and others were also increased. (e. s. m.) washington conference.—preliminary invitations to a conference at washington on the limitation of national arma- ment “‘ in connection with which pacific and far eastern ques- tions could also be discussed ” were issued by president harding in july r921, to great britain, france, italy and japan. on aug. 11, formal invitations were sent to these powers, to china and later to belgium, the netherlands and portugal, president harding having been authorised by congress on july 11 1921, to arrange for the conference. as american delegates mr. harding designated secretary of state hughes, elihu root, senators lodge and underwood; the british empire was represented by mr. balfour (as he then was) lord lee of fareham, sir auckland geddes and sir robert l. borden, as principal delegates; france by m. briand, m. viviani, m. sarraut and m. jusserand; italy by signor schanzer and signor ricci; japan by prince tokugawa, admiral kato and ambassador shidehara; china by mr. wellington koo and mr. sze. opening of the conference-—the conference assembled on | nov. 12 1921, was addressed by mr. harding, and elected mr. hughes as its chairman. the latter at once placed the american proposals on naval disarmament before the gathering; they were so precise and far-reaching as to cause general surprise. mr. hughes proposed that there should be a naval “ holiday ”: “ for washington conference a period of not less than ro years there shall be no further construction of capital ships.”? he then presented a definite plan for the scrapping of certain of the older capital ships and of capital ships under construction, and the restriction of capital ship replacements by an agreed maximum of tonnage, as follows: for the united states and great britain 500,000 tons each, for japan 300,000 tons—a “ 5-5-3’ ratio. discussion of the tonnage allowance for france and italy was reserved for later considera- tion. the directness with which mr. hughes stated his case evoked hearty response from the delegates and the public, and he was at once supported by the british delegation. ‘“‘ we can no longer content ourselves,” mr. hughes said, “‘ with investiga- tions, with statistics, with reports, with the circumlocution of inquiry. . . . the world wantsa practical programme which shall at once be put into execution.” at the second plenary conference, held on nov. 15, the representatives of france, japan and italy also accepted the principles of the hughes proposals, leaving the technical details for consideration by the experts. in the plenary session of nov. 21 the subject of military arma- ment was introduced by mr. hughes, who said that the united states had followed its traditional policy of-reducing its own regular military establishment to the smallest possible basis. he recognised, however, the special difficulties existing in europe. m. briand explained the attitude of france as based on her need for security in europe; expressing the readiness of his country to take any steps necessary to ensure peace, he emphasised the necessity of a genuine atmosphere of peace, a “moral disarmament,” before physical disarmament could be attempted. this atmosphere, he maintained, was lacking— chiefly because of what france regarded as the incomplete pacification of germany. france, he claimed, had already re- duced her army by a third, and was planning to reduce it by a half. complete demobilisation, however, was impossible for her under the conditions existingin germany and russia. m. briand concluded with an appeal for the moral support of france by other nations, and this evoked a sympathetic response. signor schanzer, however, made plain the desire of italy that “ the general limitation of land armaments may become a reality within the shortest space of time.” the result of the attitude of france was to establish the impracticability of discussing any definite plan for the limitation of armies. a sub-committee was ap- pointed, however, to consider the question of aircraft, poison gases and the rules for the conduct of war. the agenda of the conference were dealt with by two com- mittees of the whole, one composed of the delegates of the five principal powers to deal with limitation of armament, the other composed of delegates of all nine powers to deal with matters affecting the pacific and the far east. meetings of these committees and their sub-committees were not open to the public; their results were reported formally at the open plenary sessions, of which six were held. the decisions reached were in regard to navies, including submarines; poison gases; the pacific ocean and its islands; and chinese affairs. the question of capital ships.—the committee on armament discussed fully the maximum tonnage and ratio of capital ships to which each power should restrict itself; and on dec. 20 a provisional agreement was reached. japan maintained (dec. 20) that 60% of the quota proposed for the united states and great britain was insufficient for her defensive needs, and asked that it be increased to 70%; her delegates were especially unwilling to sacrifice the ‘‘ mutsu,” a new capital ship (in large measure paid for by popular subscription), which, under the hughes plan, would have to be scrapped. this obstacle was overcome by permitting japan to retain the ‘‘ mutsu,” on condi- tion that an older ship, the ‘‘ setsu,” should be scrapped. this change gave japan two post-jutland ships and an increased capital-ship tonnage, to offset which it was agreed that the united states should complete two ships still in process of con- struction, and that great britain should construct two new vessels not to exceed 35,000 tons each. in replacement tonnage the ratio was to stand thus: united states and great britain 525,000 tons each and japan 315,000 tons—a ratio of 5-5-3. 991 this agreement was stated to be contingent upon a suitable arrangement for france and italy, who had been offered a replacement tonnage of 175,000 each. but m. sarraut, repre- senting france, held out for an aggregate of 350,000 tons, to be constructed on a replacement basis from 1925 onwards. the controversy was finally laid before m. briand, who had returned to france; he agreed to accept for france the maximum of 175,000 for capital ships, but made his consent conditional on the obtaining of a larger proportion of auxiliary craft and sub- marines, which were regarded by france as purely defensive weapons, ‘“‘ the idea which dominates the washington con- ference,” he telegraphed, “ is to restrict naval armaments which are offensive and costly. but i do not believe that it is the programme to deny to a nation like france, which has a large extent of coast and a great number of distant colonies, the means of defending its communications and its security.” the question of submarines—the french reply settled the problem of capital ships, but a warm controversy was provoked over submarines. mr. balfour proposed their complete abolition. mr. hughes proposed a reduction of submarine tonnage for the united states and great britain to 60,000 apiece, and approxi- mately the stutus quo for france, japan and italy (31,500 for the first two, 21,000 tons for the last}. but the french delegates refused to accept less than 90,000 tons for submarines and 330,000 for cruisers and auxiliary craft. mr. balfour then made it plain that, failing action against the submarine itself, great britain could accept no limitation for anti-submarine craft. as a result, the treaty, as finally agreed upon by the five major powers, did not include limitation of total tonnage of submarine or auxiliary craft. limits, however, were placed upon the total tonnage of aircraft carriers and upon individual tonnage of cap- ital ships and cruisers, as well as upon the calibre of guns carried. the failure of the british attempt to abolish the submarine was mitigated by the passage of a series of resolutions presented by mr. root and later embodied in a treaty. as accepted, they stated the rules of international law as to “ visit and search ” on the high seas, and declared that belligerent submarines are not exempt from these rules. they invited the adherence of all civi- lised powers to this statement. in the third place, they recognised that the use of submarines as commerce destroyers was practi- cally impossible without violation of these rules, and that pro- hibition of such use should be accepted as a law of nations; they declared the assent of the contracting powers to such prohibition, and invited that of all other nations. no definition of a mer- chant ship was adopted. in the fourth place, they declared that commanders of all ships transgressing international rules should be subject to punishment for piracy. aircraft limitation was rejected by the conference, after a technical report of the sub- committee had declared limitation to be impracticable, but an inquiry commission was appointed. ‘the abolition of the use of poison gas in international warfare, on the other hand, was advocated by the naval committee jan. 7 1922, on the motion of mr. hughes, and prohibition of poison gas was embodied in a treaty. problems of the pacific—in respect of the problems of the pacific a new treaty was drafted and presented at the plenary session, dec. 10 1921, between the united states, great britain, france and japan. it pledged each to respect the rights of the others in relation to their insular possessions and insular domin- ions m the pacific, to accept mediation in case of controversy over these possessions and to open frank discussions if their rights were threatened by any other power. the treaty was to remain in force for 10 years, and upon its ratification the anglo- japanese alliance was automatically to be terminated. a reservation accompanied the treaty embodying provisions to the effect that it should not be deemed an assent on the part of the united states to “ mandates ”’ granted in the pacific under the peace treaty of versailles, and should not preclude agreements rclative to mandated islands. (see singapore.) the reservation also excepted from arbitrable controversies questions lying within domestic jurisdiction of the contracting powers. to the treaty was later appended a second agreement, 992 defining the phrase “insular possessions and insular domin- ions ”’ in such a way as to exclude japan proper from its scope. the representatives of the united states and japan also signed a treaty regarding yap, according to which the united states was to have [ree access there on a footing of entire equality with japan in all that related to cable and radio service, and received certain privileges and exemptions in relation to clec- trical communications. subject to various conditions the united states consented to the administration by japan of the mandated islands in the pacific north of the equator. altitude towards china.—chinese problems were presented (nov. 16 1921), by mr. sze in the form of 10 points, which the conference was asked to adopt (see chinaa). they called for recognition of the territorial integrity and political and adminis- trative independence of china, the “‘ open door ” neutrality and the complete removal of all political, jurisdictional and adminis- trative restrictions upon the chinese republic. the general attitude of the conference towards china was crystallised (nov. 21) when four resolutions presented by mr. root were adopted. they declared the intention of the powers to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of china, their desire to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry ns okkaido (ogasawara jina ~volcane fs bri tish= (4) va *icocos/$ ro meal, set indian “ alce an < 4 #frenc “a nv new = caledonia.” norfolk te” 2 ie j hee == lord howe /. p| inew zealand + ° ‘ c tasman sea j aworth 4 p a washington conference of all nations and their agreement not to seck special rights or privileges. details of specific arrangements to be enforced led to long discussions. a resolution was adopted (dec. 24) provid- ing for the voluntary withdrawal of foreign post-offices from china jan. 1 1923, on condition that china should maintain efficient service and continue the supervision of the foreign co- director-general. the problem of extra-territorial rights could not be settled definitely, but it was referred to an international com- mittee for intensive study and report within a year. the demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops from china was referred to a sub-committee, and finally it was agreed that, while the principle of withdrawal was accepted, the issues raised should be made the subject of inquiry, in order to determine the conditions upon which withdrawal must depend. on the other hand, the powers passed a resolution urging china to reduce the large military forces maintained by the military governors. the relinquishment of foreign leaseholds in china was not actually secured (though great britain announced her readiness in this respect if other countries would join her); but china’s fight for “ open diplomacy ” was virtually won when a resolution was passed (dec. 8) pledging the nine powers not to enter into any agreement that might impair the force of the four root resolutions. as regards the custems tariffs, the demand of united’ states ape om* tmom, - * junited oo, 6 , | c-midway ts 7s tropie of gancer — 7 a v hawaii f. ty vohnston!. ois en + om " 3 _kermddec fs s$'\0o s., c 1 l atasmanias new zealand n | | schathamls : southi! % 2 aes 1 ® | h (6) : “ sass ae bounty 1s 6) “antipodes > 's projection i i pds i on mercators project ae ‘campbell ts ae boundaries of mandates — ‘macy uarie {s a yp possessions sarsmeme (ayioo”_(b)__ta0" __(€) 140" tong. (d) east of 60°creem€) 180° ___(f) tong. 160'westf(g)oreerwia” map showing the mandates affecting the islands of the pacific as laid down by the washington conference. tinted areas not to be fortified further. fiji (with rotuma island) forms a british colony by itself. other british possessions (excluding australia and new zealand) are under the administration of the high commissioner for the western pacific. wassermann, august von—wassermann, jakob china for complete autonomy was not granted, nor the request made, in view of the nation’s financial necessities, that her quota be raised from 5% to 123%. it was decided, however, that china’s customs revenue should be increased by $46,000,000 silver annually, through an advance to 5% effective, a surtax of 24%, and a surtax not exceeding 5°% on luxuries. the treaty provided for the convening of a tariff revision commission at shanghai, the opening of which was delayed until oct. 1925, owing to the internal troubles of china. other resolutions in- cluded agreements that foreign radio stations should transmit only government messages, that there should be no unfair discrimination in railway rates, an expression of hope that the railway system might be unified under chinese govt. control, and an agreement for the establishment of a board of reference for far eastern questions. shantung—tyvhe question of the japanese occupation of shantung entailed long negotiations which at 1imes seemed to reach a dead-lock, especially those relating to the tsingtao- tsinan-fu railway. largely through the mediation of mr. hughes and mr. balfour, a separate agreement was finally reached be- tween japan and china and signed feb. 4. it provided for the return to china of the former german leasehold and 50-km. zone in shantung, and the withdrawal of japanese troops and gen- darmes; china was to purchase the tsinan-fu railway for $30,000,000, but, before complete redemption, there were to be appointed a japanese traffic manager subject to the direction of the chinese managing director, a japanese accountant and a chinese accountant of equal rank. japan renounced all rights to foreign assistance stipulated in the chinese-german treaty of 1898, and relinquished the maritime customs at tsingtao and former german public properties. as to siberian problems, baron shidehara made a full statement to the effect that it was the fixed and settled policy ” of japan to respect the territorial integrity of russia, and to observe the principle of non-inter- vention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations. the treaties.—-the decisions taken by the conference were embodied in seven treaties and various supplementary resolu- tions: (1) five-power treaty limiting naval armaments, desig- nating the capital ships to be retained by each contracting power and determining the ratio of capital ship replacement—5 25,000 tons for the united states and great britain, 315,000 tons for japan, 175,000 tons for france and italy each—or 5-5~—3-1.66. this treaty also limited the tonnage of individual capital ships to 35,000 and the calibre of guns to 16 inches; individual cruisers were limited to 10,000 tons and their guns to cight-inch calibre. aircraft carriers were limited in general to an individual tonnage of 27,000 with a total tonnage of 135,000 for the united states and great britain, 81,000 for japan, 60,c00 for france and italy each. with certain exceptions the seutws quo was to be main- tained with regard to fortifications and naval bases in the pacific. (2) five-power treaty relating to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare, embodying the resolutions described above. accompanying these treatics were two resolu- tions for a commission of jurists to consider amendment of the laws of war and limitation of their jurisdiction. (3) four-power treaty, between the united states, great britain, france and japan, relating to the insular possessions and the insular domin- ions in the pacific ocean, with an accompanying declaration. (4) four-power treaty, between the same powers relating to the foregoing, and defining ‘‘ insular ” so as to exclude japan proper from its scope. (5) nine-power treaty, relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning china, as described above. this was supplemented by 10 resolutions embodying the decisions taken as to a board of reference, extra-territoriality, foreign postal agencies, forcign armed forces, unification of rail- ways, chinese military forces, existing commitments of china or, with respect to china, the chinese eastern railway. the treaty embodied the root resolutions as its article i., and strongly emphasised the principles of the “ open door.” (6) nine-power treaty, relating to chinese customs tariffs. (7) 993 chinese-japanese treaty, regarding shantung. two other trea- ties connected with the work of the conference were: united stutes-japanese treaty, regarding yap; and the six-power treaty, allocating german cables in the pacific. the conference on limitation of armament was formally terminated feb. 6 1922. on march 1 the u.s. senate ratified, by a vote of 67 to 22, the treaty with japan regarding yap. by june 9 1923, all the signatory powers except france had ratified the five-power treaty in relation to the use of sub- marines and noxious gases in warfare, the nine-power treaty relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning china, and the nine-power treaty relating to chinese customs tariff. france ratified the last two on july 20 1925, but had not, up to feb. 10926, ratified the treaty in rela- tion to the use of submarines and noxious gases. by july 28 1923, all the signatory powers had ratified the five-power treaty limiting naval armaments; also the four-power treaty relating to insular possessions and insular dominions in the pacific ocean, the declaration accompanying this treaty, and the treaty supplementary thereto. norway adhered on sept. 23 1925, to the treaty relating to chinese customs tariff; and on nov. 13 1925, to the treaty relating to principles and policies concerning china. denmark and sweden signified their adherence to the treaty relating to chinese customs tariff on aug. 27 1925 and sept. 11 19285, respectively. binliographny.—g. z. wood, china, the united states and the anglo-japanese alliance (new york 1921); h. w. taft, japan and the far east conference, 1921-2 (new york-london); l. archim- baud, la conference de washington (paris 1923); a. l. p. dennis, the anglo-japanese alliance (univ. of california press 1923); canadian government: conference on the limitation of armament iteld at washington. report of the canadian delegate including treaties and resolutions, (sessional paper no. 47, 1922); french government: documents diplomatiques; conference de washington, juillet 1921 —fevrier 1922 (1923); united states government: ad- dress submitting treaties and resolutions approved and adopted by conference together wtih report of american delegation of praceed- ings of conference, submitted to the president oth feb. 1922 (senate doc. 125, 1922); proceedings of conference on limitation of arma- ment feld at washington, nov. 1921~-feb. 1922; president's address to senate, letter of secretary of state submitting treaties to the presi- dent, etc. (senate doc. 126, 1922); report of the american delegation (1922); american association for international conciliation: washington conference on the limitation of armaments, dec. 1921, 2 parts (new york, inter. conciliation, no. 169 and no. 172). (c. sry.) wassermann, august von (1866-1925), german pro- fessor of medicine, was born feb. 21 1866 at bamberg, in bavaria. he studied in erlangen, munich, strasbourg and vienna, and in 1888 began to practise as a physician in strasbourg. he was then engaged as an assistant to the robert koch institute for infectious diseases, berlin, where, from 10906, he directed the department of experimental therapy and serum research. in 1913 he became director of the kaiser wilhelm institute in berlin-dahlem. wassermann achieved international fame and reputation by his discovery of sero-diagnosis in syphilis—the so-called wassermann reaction—which enables both past infec- tion and the activity of the process of the disease to be ascer- tained. in addition he investigated the problem of a cure for cancer and collaborated with p. ehrlichs in introducing the diphtheria serum into practice. in later years wassermann sought to obtain a sero-diagnosis of active tuberculosis; as to the practical utility of the latter as a reliable diagnosis, however, there is still a considerable divergence of views. he died in berlin march 15 1925. ilis works include: “ allgemeine einleitung zur lehre von den infektionskrankheiten ” in ebstein and schwalbe’s hmandbtich der praktischen medegia: influensa, immuniteit und serumtherapie and ffamotysine, zytotoxine und prdsipitine (1910). wassermann, jakob (1873- ), german writer, was born at fiirth, bavaria, march 10 1873, the son of a small mer- chant. after an unhappy youth spent in wandering and poverty he settled in austria, and it is about austria and austrians that he writes. his literary life, as he himself has said, began “ when realism and naturalism were rampant” but he remained a 994 solitary figure owing allegiance to no school. his first novel die juden von zirndorf was published in 1897, but it was die ge- schichte der jungen renate fuchs (1900) which first brought him fame. many of his works have been translated into other lan- guages but christian wahnschaffe (1919), published in america as the world’s illusion (1920), first made him known to the eng- lish-speaking world. other translations into english followed: gold (1920) faber, or the lost years (1925). some of his novels were collected under the title of der wendekrets (1920-2); his other works include das gansemdnnchen, casper hauser (1908), and an autobiography, afein weg als deutscher und jude (1921).