VETERINARY SCIENCE

there is no single cause to which the rapid development of veterinary science since 1910 can be attributed. powerful influences have been at work, such as increasing national appreciation of the importance of agri- culture as a whole, and recognition of the facts that animal husbandry forms one of the greatest divisions of agriculture, and that disease is intercommunicable between other animals and man. public health service—the evolution of a public health service has been the means of allocating to animal disease an important position in schemes of preventive medicine. the indebtedness of veterinary science to some of the pioneers in public health is indeed great. the bearing which the animal food products, especially milk and meat, have upon the welfare of man has, during this period, become fully appreciated. in some countries, as north and south america and south africa, animal by-products have become an extremely valuable na- tional asset. in south america it is commonly said that when dealing with an animal body ‘ nothing is lost but the breath.” the purity of meat and milk supplics has assumed a con- siderable importance. inspection, carrying with it a guarantee of purity, has proceeded very rapidly in some countries. for example, in meat inspection alone germany employed 1,180 qualified veterinary surgeons before the world war. in u.s.a. 800 were employed, and in the french department of the seine alone 67 were exclusively thus engaged in 1913. at this time the number engaged in britain in the whole public health service, meat inspection included, was under 50. in 1914 an investigation was made into the annual output of qualified veterinary surgeons in several countries in proportion to the population, with the following result: denmark, 1 in 133,000; germany, i in 210,000; france, 1 in 300,000; sweden t in 275,000 (making provision for 1 in 183,000): united kingdom i in §00,000.! in 1921 dr. gerald leighton, chief inspector (foods) for scotland, instituted a searching enquiry into the question of meat inspection in scotland. as a direct result, scotland has secured by law a complete and uniform system of meat inspec- tion in which it is definitely laid down that the only persons who are entitled to act as inspectors of meat with the power of passing judgment are: the medical officer of health (m.o.h.) of the district; a veterinary surgeon; a person who, not being the m.o.h. or a veterinary surgeon, has had not less than seven years’ practical experience of the subject and has received a special certificate from the board of health. it was thus left to a medical colleague to secure this clear definition of the vet- erinary surgeon in relation to this important work. 1 j. share jones, jtigher agricultural education in wales. vesnic—veterinary science university developmenis.--the rise of animal husbandry, animal industry and zootechny as divisions of veterinary science in countries such as north and south america, switzer- land and rumania, led to the establishment of chairs in the universities of the countries mentioned, so that ‘‘ in view of the constantly increasing importance of the production and con- servation of food and clothing for mankind, especial considera- tion will be given to problems in breeds and breeding, feeds and feeding, care, management, exhibition, marketing and utilisa- tion of all classes of livestock and their products ”’ (university of the state of new york, 1920). the isolation of one particular branch of education is now generally condemned. in those countries which were the pioneers in veterinary education there still exist huge veterinary institu- tions. but where a new veterinary institution has been estab- lished within recent years it has usually been founded in a university centre and as an integral part of the university. at present the movement towards the universitics has become general. it is recognised that to be in the university as part of a national scheme gives education stability. in the united states, where veterinary schools of various kinds were very numerous, every school, with two exceptions, outside the universities or state colleges collapsed during the war. the utilisation of existing endowments in the universities for the advancement of veterinary education has proved of immense benefit, expecially in such subjects as physiology, where com- plete departments with endowments already existed. the universities have recognised veterinary science by grant- ing veterinary degrees, which in some countries entitle the holders to practise, e.g., south africa, australia, brazil and japan. in other countries, as in england, the degrees are simply evi- dences of academic achievement and are not licences to practise. although degrees of b.sc., in which certain veterinary subjects could be taken, were already granted by the universities of london and edinburgh, the university of liverpool was the first british university to grant a full veterinary degree. this university has instituted degrees of bachelor, master and doctor of veterinary science (b.v.sc., m.v.sce. and d.v.sc.). research institutes —under the auspices of the development commissioners and their advisory committees, research insti- tutes have been founded at london and cambridge in england, and in scotland, for the animal diseases research association. scores of thousands of pounds have been disbursed, and in 1925 the commissioners enlarged their held of support by making a grant of £15,0co on a pound for pound basis to the university of liverpool to provide more adequate buildings and equipment for teaching and research in the purely veterinary subjects of the university veterinary school, which is the only intramural school in a british university providing a full course of instruc- tion for a veterinary qualification. the commissioners state that they ‘‘ were impressed by the opportunities available at liverpool for the scientific training of veterinary students ..., that an increase in the supply of highly trained veterinary prac- titioners and research workers should justify itself by a diminu- tion in the national losses from animal diseases, and that liver- pool could specially meet the needs of students from western english counties and from wales.” sir a. d. hall and sir thomas middleton took a leading part in this movement. outbreaks of diseases. ~—foot-and-mouth disease has appeared periodically in britain since 1910 and has been very prevalent on the european continent. the rapid spread of the, disease in britain during 1922-~3-4 created consternation. the most severe outbreak in the history of the united states occurred in 1914-5. the cost to eliminate the disease was $9,000,000, and 172,000 animals were affected. in 1914 britain experienced the highest number of outbreaks of swine fever since 1896. in 1903 england was free from rabies and continued free until sept. 1918. between this date and 1922, 304 cases were reported. western europe was free from rinderpest from 1870 until 1920, when the disease was introduced into belgium by zebus from america. the eradication of glanders in britain was slowly but surely progressing until the year 1917. in 1918, however, 34 veterinary science outbreaks were reported; but since that year the number of outbreaks again diminished, the figures in each successive year being 25, 15, 11, 4,9, 3. on april 1 1923 it was decided to allow the importation of canadian cattle into britain. the decision of the royal commission was that canadian cattle were free from foot-and-mouth disease, pleuro-pneumonia and cattle plague. during the world war “ horrible epizootics were disseminated throughout russia by marching and retreating armies... . anthrax, glanders, rinderpest, contagious pleuro-pneumonia of cattle, foot-and-mouth disease, hog cholera, swine erysipelas, rabies, mange—each of them contributed to the disappearance of the comparatively dense animal population of russia ” (podgaez). the result was that in 1922 russia had slightly over one-third the number of horses it had in 1914, one-third the number of cattle, half the number of sheep and a quarter the number of pigs. in sept. 1924 contagious bovine pleuro- pheumonia appeared in japan, being imported with cattle from china. in 1925 the disease broke out again in osaka and spread rapidly to the five neighbouring prefectures. research.—strenuous efforts have been made to bring about a closer relationship between the workers in human and veter- inary medicine. in great britain the royal society of medicine has instituted a section for comparative medicine. the out- standing result achieved is the universal recognition of the bearing disease in the lower animals has upon disease in man. this is evident in most of the important researches of the period. at the ninth international veterinary congress held at the hague it was resolved: 1. that swine plague and hog cholera are different diseases. 2. that anactive serum against foot-and- mouth disease jis possible. 3. that the presence of negri bodies is the best diagnostic of rabies. amongst researches carried on over a prolonged period the follow- ing are deserving of mention: mcfadyean and stockman (england) on abortion in cattle; buxton, brown, tocher and others (scotland) on grass disease (they claimed to have demonstrated that grass disease in horses in scotland was botulism); jensen (copenhagen) on bradsot; gaiger (scotland) on lamb dysentery; thieler (south africa) on protozoan diseases; watson (canada) on dourine (he utilised the complement-fixation method of diagnosis, through which it is claimed that the disease will be climinated in a few years); lignieres (brazil) on pasteurelloses; vallee (paris) on foot-and- mouth disease; magnusson (sweden) on joint ills; hall (u.s.a.) on the treatment of hookworms by carbon tetrachloride (which has since been applied to more than 12,000 human cases in the fiji islands with success). in 1909 nuttall and hadwen reported the successful use of trypan blue in canine piroplasmosis and later sug- gested its use in piroplasmosis of cattle. bruce and others concluded in i910 that cattle may act as reser- voirs of the virus of sleeping sickness. the final report of the royal commission on tuberculosis (1911) claimed: (1) that there were three types of tubercle bacilli, (2) that animals and man can be reciprocally infected, (3) that a considerable amount of tuberculosis in ohilueen must be ascribed to milk infection, (4) that milk may be infective when thcre is no evidence, even on post-mortem examina- tion, of tuberculosis of the udder. the intimate relationship existing between the disease in man and in animals is thus clearly established. at this time siegel (germany) claimed to have found the causal organism (a coccus) of foot-and-mouth disease; and mcgowan (edinburgh) and ferry (detroit) individually to have found the causal organism of canine distemper. the work of twort and ingram on the diagnosis of johne's disease in 1912 was an outstand- ing merit. leptospiral jaundice was recognised in dogs probably for the first time by courmont and durand in 1917. a special com- mittee was formed to investigate grass disease in 1918. in the following year the south african govt’s, select committee recog- nised the dipping scheme introduced by watkins-pitchford as an effective antidote for east coast fever. in 1922 mellanby issued important results of his work on rickets in puppies carried out for the medical research committee (lon- don). in the same year the field inaugurated a fund to assist re- search in canine distemper, and the animal discases research association of scotland received official recognition. the claim of dahmen and frosch (berlin) to have discovered in 1924 the virus of foot-and-mouth disease has not been recognised. interesting work on leptospiral jaundice was done in england by okell, dalling and pugh in 1925. at the congress on the prevention of tuberculosis in london 1925, professor melgaard, of the royal veterinary college, copenhagen, gave an account of his experiments on animals leading to his discovery of the treatment of tuberculosis with 951 sanocrysin, and professor faber, of copenhagen university, gave the results of the application of melgaard’s method to a number of his human patients. remarkable progress has been made in vetcrinary science in japan, and the journal of the japanese society of veterinary science, edited by drs. j. muto and n. nitta, is an excellent specimen of a first-class scientific journal. the three reports of k. muto, director of the army veterinary school, t6ky6, on the “ toxic action of carbon disulphide ’’; konno’s work on the diseases found in young chicks in the nagoya region and com- monly called ‘ kufun” or “ ohri” in which he isolated the anaerogenic strain of b. pullorum, one of the causal agents of bacillary white diarrhoea of young chicks in europe and america; the ‘‘ resistance of erythrocytes of healthy domestic animals,” by kohanawa and kadono, of the veterinary institute, hok- kaido imperial university, sapporo; ono’s work at the labora- tory of the animal quarantine station, yokohama, on contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia; and the work of kohanawa and ogura on cattle diseases in the sapporo district indicate a breadth of view as well as high scientific capacity. progress in surgery.—considerable progress has been made in veterinary surgery. with the general adoption of anaesthetics, major operations are now widely practised. the operation on the laryngeal ventricle in the treatment of roaring, originally performed by the brothers gunther, was reintroduced by williams of cornell and subsequently practisedl and popularised by many operators on thousands of cases with, it is claimed, a considerable measure of success. the most comprehensive work on roaring as a result of researches in the argentine appeared in spanish published at buenos aires. imrie has done much to confirm the contention of macqueen during the previous decade, that the abdominal cavity of the horse may be entered surgically almost with impunity, and pugh has made an interesting con- tribution to thoracic surgery in the ox. in ror4 the first eng- lish work published on surgical anatomy of the horse was com- pleted by share jones. velertnary science in war-—in 1oro the strength of the british army veterinary service was 160 officers and 218 others, or a total of 378. in 1917 there were over 1,200 officers and over 20,000 n.c.o.’s and men. sixty-two men were killed in action and 358 died. of the officers, 46 were killed in action or died ot wounds or disease. over 70 veterinary hospitals were establishea with accommodation for more than 100,oco animals. much of the capital cost of hospitals in france was defrayed by the r.s.p.c.a. most of the work in connection with the sale of horse-flesh for food was supervised by veterinary surgeons, and the funds thus realised were utilised to reduce the cost of the veterinary services in france. during i917 over 1,000,000 horses were on the strength at one time on all fronts, and of them 436,000 were in france. the average daily number of sick horses in that year rose to 110,000. the total dead wastage from aug. ig14 to nov. 1918 from all causes was over 500,000, of which 269,000 were in france. the weekly wastage in france was nearly 2° of the total strength. the total admissions to hospital in all theatres was 2,526,549, and of these 78°, returned to duty. the mortality was worst in 1917, when the number lost was 145,475. the mortality in mules was only half of that in horses. during the war, the total number of camels admitted to hospital has been stated to exceed 60,000. one camel hospital averaged 1,103 camels daily, and the percentage discharged for duty was eight. cases of poll evil and quittor were common in horses and mules. it is stated that in one group of french hospitals 627 cases of quittor were dealt with in one day. roarers were also numerous, and it 1s claimed that 80°) were successfully treated. specific ophthalmia appeared in 1916, and the number of cases rose to 1:4°% of the strength. a point of great interest and importance is that glanders was not prevalent. this is due to the thorough manner in which the mallein test was applied. mallcin was ultimately produced at aldershot at 2d. a dose. in 1918 the corps was raised to the status of a royal corps. in 1917 raincy claimed that the total wastage (from death, destruc- tion, missing and casting) of horses and mules of the british forces at home and abroad during the year ending dec. 1916 was 13% of the total. in peace time (1912) it was 14:8%o, while the average annual mortality during the south african war, when there was no army veterinary corps, was 55°. the names of generals sir robert pringle, sir frederick smith, sir layton blenkinsop and 952 sir john moore will be permanently associated with this extraor- dinary development. - bibliography.— finlay dun, veterinary medicines, 12th ed. (edinburgh, 1910); f. hutyra and j. marck, special pathology and therapeutics of the diseases of domestic antmals, 3rd ed. (1912); e. w. hoare, ed., a systen: of veterinary medicine (1913); l. mon- tane and e. bourdelle, anatomie des animaux domestigues (1913); w. ellenberger and h{. baum, lehrbuch der tepographischen anatomie des pferdes (1914); j. share jones, the surgical anatomy of the horse, vol. 4 (1914); r. o. neumann and m. mayer, atlas und lehrbuch wichtiger tierischer parasiten und threr uberirdeger (munich, 1914); l. a. klein, the principles and practice of a{ilk iygiene (pennsylvania, 1917); s. sisson, the anatomy of the domestic an- imais, 2nd ed. (philadelphia, 1917); t. strangeway, veterinary anatomy, toth ed. (edinburgh, 1917); b. f. kaupp, phe anatony of the fowl (philadelphia, 1918); w. l. williams, vetertnary surgical and obsietrical operations, 4th ed. (1919); ix. winslow, veterinary materia medica and therapeutics, 8th ed. (1919); o. c. bradley, the topographical anatomy of the horse (1920); r. g. linton, veterinary itygiene (1921); d. w. paton and j. b. orr, essentials of veterinary physiology, 3rd ed. (1921); sir f. smith, vetertrary physiology, 5th ed. (1921); r. e. buchanan, veterinary bacteriology (1922); b. i. inaupp, poultry diseases (1922); f. x. lesbre, precis d’anatomie comparee (1922); sir j. mcfadyear, the anatonty of the horse, 3rd. ed. (edinburgh, 1922); r. schmaltz, atlas der anatomie des pferdes (1923); g. h. wooldridge, encyclopaedia of veterinary medicine (1923); fe. w. hoare, veterinary materia medica and therapeutics, a ed. (1924); f. t. g. hobday, surgical diseases of the dog and cat (1924); sir l. j. blenkinsop and j. w. rainey, history of the great war, veterinary services (1925); r. edelmann, text book of meat iygiene, 5th ed. (1925); h. kirk, diseases of ihe cat (1926). ch. se 9 victor emmanuel iii. (1869- ), king of italy (see 28.28). when in rors italy declared war on austria, the king at once went to the war zone, remaining there until the armi- stice, appointing his uncle ferdinand, duke of genoa, regent of the kingdom to act in his stead. at the front he lived in a most unassuming manner at the ‘‘ villa italia,” near udine, and after caporetto near padua, constantly visiting the trenches and the most exposed positions, as well as the military hospitals, and leading to a very large extent the life of the soldiers. his example was of great value as an encouragement, and he fully lived up to the tradition of his house that it has never known fear. he took the keenest interest in everything concerning the welfare of the men; but although nominally commander-in-chief he never interfered with the conduct of operations nor in the matter of appointments, and he allowed himself no more leave than was accorded to other combatants. after caporetto he multiplied his activities a thousandfold, and his proclamation of nov. 19 1917 sounded like a trumpet call to the whole people. ‘‘ as neither my house nor my people, one in spirit, have ever wavered in the face of danger, so even now we look adversity in the face without flinching. . . . citi- zens and soldiers, be a single army! all cowardice is treachery, all discord is treachery, all recrimination is treachery.” after the armistice king victor emmanuel returned to rome on nov. 14 1918, and had a triumphal reception. he visited paris and the french front with the crown prince, and subsequently london. at the time of the fascist march on rome (oct. 28-30 1922), the prime minister, sig. facta, intended to proclaim martial law throughout italy, and had actually prepared the decree and communicated it to the prefects and the press; but the king, with that intuition that has never failed him on critical occasions, realised that its application would mean civil war, and refused to sign it and insisted on ils immediate withdrawal. after the occupation of the capital the fascist squadre before returning home marched past the quirinal and paid homage to the king. the advent of the fascist govt. undoubtedly strengthened the prestige of the crown, which the troubles of 1919-22 had seri- ously shaken. on may 26 1924 the king, accompanied by the queen, the crown prince and princess mafalda, arrived in lon- don to return the state visit to rome of king george and queen mary. on june 7 he visited madrid for a similar reason. in june 1925 the 25th vear of his reign was celebrated throughout italy with the greatest solemnity. after the birth of his son and heir, umberto, prince of pied- mont (sept. 15 1904), the king’s family was increased by two victor emmanuel iii—victory, advance to more daughters, giovanna, born nov. 13 1907, and maria, born dec. 26 1914. his eldest daughter, princess yolanda, was mar- ried on april g 1923 to captain count giorgio calvi of bergolo. and his second on sept. 23 1925 to prince philip of hessen. a keen scholar, and especially interested in numismatics, in 1910 and 1913 he published six volumes of his monumental work on the coins of italy, the corpus niummortum ifalicorum, after the war he made over to the nation a large number of royal resi- dences in various parts of italy, a heritage of the days when iialy was divided into a number of separate states, each with one or more royal or ducal palaces and villas. among the most famous of these are the pitti palace in florence, the villas of castello, la petraia and poggio a cajano in the neighbourhood of that city, the royal palaces of milan, venice, genoa, naples, the villa of capodimonte near naples and the “ neapolitan versailles ” at caserta. some of these buildings were turned into hospitals and homes for war victims, and others into museums. che net) victoria (see 28.37), a state of the australian common- wealth. area 87,884 sq. miles. its population increased from 1,339,102 in 1911 to 1,670,852 in 1925. victoria is the most conservative of the states of the commonwealth, and up to the end of 1925 had had only one labour govt., which was appointed in june 1924 and defeated six months later. the farming interests (country party) are well represented, and in the coalition govt. (nationalists and country party) which came into power in nov. 1924, a representative of the country party, mr. j. allan, was elected premier. state-aided immi- gration was re-established in 1908 and a vigorous policy of close settlement adopted. irrigation and production—the water act 1905 practically nationalised every river and watercourse within the state, and between 1905 and 1925 over {13,000,000 was expended in works of irrigation and water supply. the area artificially supplied with water for domestic and stock use in 1923 was 13,440,000 ac. and the land under irrigation culture, chiefly along the valleys of the goulburn and murray rivers, was over 300,000 acres. after 1918, good progress was made in intensive fruit-growing at mildura on the murray. the total area under crops in 1924 was 4,682,144 ac., of which 2,705,323 ac. was under wheat. in the same year 86,888,000 lb. of butter was produced. minerals and manufactures—depcsits of brown coal and lignite of immense extent occur in various districts. in 1918 a commission was appointed by the government to work the brown coal deposits at morwell, to be utilised for the generation of electricity to serve melbourne and other towns. the first generator was brought into operation in 1924 and is serving melbourne. the manufacture of briquettes on a commercial scale is being undertaken. the state also operates the black coal deposits at wonthaggi; the output of this field in 1923 was 418,394 tons, the total production for the state being 476,823 tons. the total value of the manufacturing output in 1924 was £113,921,000, of which factories connected with food and drink accounted for £33,760,c00, and clothing and textile factories for {23,617,000. great progress has been made in the manufacture of woollen goods, and in 1924 there were 27 woollen and tweed factories, the output being valued at £3,561,980. melbourne, the capital, had a population of 885,700 on dec. 31 1924. it is the second port in the commonwealth. of the other important towns, ballarat and bendigo owe their rise to the gold rush, and are now prosperous agricultural centres. geelong is the next port to melbourne and is also the centre of the woollen industry. (sce australia.) | victory, advance to.—by the end of july ror8 the german offensive on the marne and in champagne, which had been intended by their high command to be decisive, had been brilliantly repulsed by an allied counter-blow which had forced the enemy to evacuate the greater part of the ground gained and had almost cleared the allied lateral railway communications from paris eastwards. in the meantime, the british front about amiens had not been idle. during may and june, the australian corps in gen. rawlinson’s iv. army had by constant raids and victory, advance to minor operations obtained an almost complete moral mastery over the enemy, and had done much to encourage the harassed troops on other parts of the front. the following article de- scribes the allied advance, which began early in july 1918 and ended with the armistice. it has been divided into six sections, namely: i. battle of amiens; ii. battle of bapaume-peronne; ili. the breaking of the hindenburg line; iv. battle of meuse- argonne; v. the offensive in flanders; vi. the french armies. i. the battle of amiens towards the end of june, rawlinson decided that an operation on rather a larger scale than the australians had so far carrie out had every chance of meeting with success. on july 4, six australian battalions, working in close co-operation with some 60 tanks, together with four companies of the american 33rd div., which was attached to the iv. army for training, attacked on a front of nearly 3} m., and with consummate ease and only small losses captured the ridge running from villers-bretonneux down to the somme at hamel. this operation gave greater depth and valuable positions for observation to the british line, while at the same time it denied to the enemy important ob- servation over much of the somme valley. it also showed that the german infantry was no longer the determined foe that it had been in 1916 and 1917, and that the enemy’s defences were not formidable. the real significance of the operation was its evidence that on the iv. army front a well organised attack, supported by tanks well trained beforehand to co-operate with infantry, would have every prospect of breaking through the enemy's defences, given the element of surprise. on july 17 rawlinson, to whose initiative the opening of the decisive allied offensive was chiefly due, submitted proposals to haig for an attack by the iv. army on a front of approximately 16 m. from mereuil to morlancourt. the plan was at once approved by haig, who, in response to a request from gen. foch that the british should take the offensive on the lys front with a view to recovering the important position on kemmel hill, recommended that the venue for the british offensive should be changed to the amiens front. to this proposal foch assented with the modification that the french i. army (debeney) should attack on the southern portion of the front between moreuil and the river luce (about 33 m.) shoulder to shoulder with the british lv. army, both armies operating under the direct orders of the british commander-in-chief. on july 28 foch issued his orders. ‘‘ the object of the operation,” he said, ‘is to disengage amiens and the amiens- paris railway, as well as to beat and push back the enemy between the somme and the avre. the offensive, covered on the north by the somme, is to push forward as far as possible in the direction of roye.”” the amiens-roye road was fixed as the dividing line between french and british, and aug. 10 was to be the day of attack. this date was subsequently advanced to aug. 8. preparations for the british attack—on july 26 orders were received that the preparations, which rawlinson had already begun in anticipation of sanction being given to his proposed operation, were to be pressed forward with all speed. ‘the essence of the whole plan was secrecy. unless the existing con- ditions both as regards the state of the hostile defences and the absence of reserves could be maintained, success could not be guaranteed, and in consequence it was not until july 31 that divisional commanders even were told the true story of the operations, a false but adequate reason having been given for the preparations. allied forces —on aug. 1 the strength of the [v. army was seven divisions, one cavalry division, three tank battalions (about rro tanks), rx squadrons r.a.f. and 1,000 guns and howitzers. by zero hour on aug. 8, this force had been in- creased to 13 divisions, three cavalry divisions, 12 tank battalions (about 456 tanks), 17 squadrons r.a.f., and over 2,000 guns and howitzers, of which 672 were “ heavies.”” in addition, one division, retained in the hands of the commandert-in-chief, was brought into the area, while two others arrived on the day of the battle. the cavalry, about 96 whippet tanks and part of the 753 artillery were moved by road, the remainder being brought up in some 2090 special trains, 230 for personnel and guns and 60 for ammunition and material. as the canadian corps, at the time in reserve near arras, had not been involved in the desperate fighting earlier in the year, it was realised that wherever it was identified in the line by the enemy an early offensive would certainly be expected. the first problem, therefore, was to camouflage its move and to keep its presence secret up to the last possible moment. with this object a few canadian units were moved into the line near kemmel, whilst the remainder moved down to the amiens front, though it was not allowed to take over its part of the front line until just before zero hour on aug. 8. the task also of intro- ducing and registering a very large number of guns without detection was no easy matter. all movements of artillery units and the formation of ammunition dumps had to be done at night. <a strictly limited number of guns only were allowed to fire daily, nothing above the normal number of rounds being permitted. general plan of attack.—the british front of attack was divided between the canadian corps (currie, four divisions) from the amiens-roye road to the amiens-chaulnes rly., 7,500 yd.; the australian corps (monash, five divisions) thence to the somme, 7,500 yd.; and the iii. corps (butler, four divisions) thence to the river ancre, 5,000 yd.; while to each corps a proportion of tanks was allotted. the task of the iii. corps was to form a defensive flank north of the somme, whilst the french i. army would carry out a similar task on the right of the canadians. ‘three successive objectives were assigned at distances respectively of 2-23, 3-5 and 6-8 m. from the original starting line. owing to the ample provision of tanks and the weakness of the enemy’s defences a preliminary bombardment was unnecessary, the artillery, infantry and tank action commencing simul- tancously at zero hour, up to which moment there was no divergence from the ordinary daily routine of trench warfare. with the french, however, the situation was different, as tanks were not available to assist them; and debeney decided to bombard the enemy’s defences for 40 min. prior to the infantry advance. the zero hour, 4.20 a.m., of the iv. army advance synchronised with the opening of the french bombardment. the hostile forces believed to be available to oppose the british were six divisions in first line with eight in reserve of the german ii. army (marwitz), while in front of the attacking corps of the french i. army were the two left divisions of the german ii. army and one division of the german xviii. army (hutier). by the morning of aug. 8 all preparations for the battle were complete, and the allied forces, all unsuspected by the enemy, were about to enter upon the first stage of their continuous and victorious march to the rhine. the british attack, aug. 8—at 4.20 a.m. (approximately one hour before sunrise) rawlinson’s iv. army, under cover of a powerful barrage, debouched to the assault. thick ground mist veiled the advance from the eyes of the germans, who were completely surprised and overwhelmed with little resistance along nearly the whole front. the canadian corps attacked with three divisions in line, the 3rd, rst and 2nd in order from the right. the canadian 3rd div., making light of the difficult task of debouching from a narrow bridgehead on the south bank of the river luce, captured hlangard and demuin, and by noon had carried its front forward to the second objective, between mezicres and cayeux. the 3rd cav. div. then went through, followed by the canadian 4th dtv., but, after taking beaucourt, was held up by machine-gun fire. the infantry on coming up succeeded in pushing forward, though they were unable that day to capture le quesnel, the final objective. . the canadian rst div. in the centre reached the first objective by 6.20 a.m.; but the canadian 2nd div. on its left only attained it an hour and a half later, having met with strong opposition at marcelcave. at 8.20 a.m. the advance was resumed, the german machine-gunners putting up considerable resistance against the canadian 2nd division. the 1st cav. div. now sent forward 954 victory, advance to battles of amiens and bapaume — peronne. 1918. english miles. oq { 2 3 4 5 6 kilometres. 4 ge we *\bailleulmont faroe a se ge ss a os cee se iotrt2345678:9 10 ool roads | : railways ee i fan ervillers q : oomory blainzeviltel) = ' , ra ' 7 oa (\bengnatre bihuceurt\ co) - . favreut yp, sees / \ ,llouvencourt : qq 2 ¢ y p y \ reaucourt() " 4 | ° v ?, ‘ . ‘ “a = () a wy, | , j ‘ lan : cource ect p ff | ft *notnieprat swe? ; a li sf ey ‘ “zug } sat : me ae cc ent almsi (son fr) i ig we y a borssetle ’ ese = ambles st x yeast ee: _ 7 an suzanne ad or £ie ry-sur- cataiges iif o. ie ‘st jenn anyi we. ey, wf gronne = biaches) es suge be] wie. ers bretdnneux raye hanes “a we _fayonviller ee marceleaver ) a luce #. ‘angard ‘ 8 ee demuin ucayeux i day, ciaateas we moreurl ko e's victory, advance to two brigades, one of which passed through the canadian 2nd div. and drove far into hostile territory, attaining the final objective in conjunction with the infantry, which followed up, clearing the ground in rear of the cavalry. by the end of the day’s fighting the canadian corps had, with the exception already noted on the extreme right, carried out its appointed task, and captured over 5,000 prisoners and 161 guns. progress in the centre.—the australian corps in the centre of the british attack had their 2nd and ard divs. in the front line with the sth and 4th in support, the rst div. being in reserve. the leading line, assisted effectively by the tanks, reached the first objective with little opposition. the 5th and 4th divs. then continued the advance, pushing on beyond bayonvillers and morcourt, and occupied the second objective by about 10.30 a.m., when a brigade of the 1st cav. div. passed through towards harbonnitres and armoured cars raced forward down the brie road, penetrating far into the enemy’s back areas. behind them, the australians, throwing back their left to face the enemy on the north bank of the somme, pushed forward their centre and right to the final objective just west of vauvillers and proyart, where they found the cavalry held up. during the day the australians took nearly 8,000 prisoners and 173 guns. north of the somme the ij. corps had not met with the same measure of success. the plan had been disarranged by a local german attack near morlancourt on aug. 6, which forced back a part of the allied line some 800 yards. in addition the terrain was not so suitable for tank manoeuvres as south of the river. the attack opened with the 58th, 18th and rath divs. from right to left. after the first objective had been gained, the further advance broke down against the resistance of the enemy holding the chipilly spur, while further north the enemy counter-attacked and drove back the advanced attacking troops. nevertheless, the iii. corps captured during the day nearly 2,400 prisoners and 4o guns. the results of this most successful day’s battle were the com- plete defeat and rout of 11 german divisions, a gain of ground to an average depth of six to seven miles on a front of eight miles, the capture of over 16,000 prisoners, 373 guns, several thousand machine-guns and quantities of ammunition and stores. most important of all, the battle destroyed the last hope of german victory. ‘‘it was,” says ludendorff, “the black day of the german army in the war... to continue would be a gamble. the war would have to be ended.” the french attack, aug. 8—at 4:20 a.m., simultaneous with the british assault, the french bombardment of the enemy’s position on the commanding ground in the angle between the rivers avre and luce opened, and at 5:05 a.m. the french in- fantry debouched to the attack. for this operation debeney allotted three divisions of the xnxi. corps, of which one division was given the task of capturing moreuil. despite a stubborn defence, the enemy was gradually driven back and moreuil wood taken. this feature was of great importance, as its capture secured the flank of the british advance. at 9 a.m. the ix. corps crossed the avre, south of moreuil, and extended the front of attack, which by the end of the day’s fighting reached the general line plessier-f'resnoy (excl.). although the french attack did not quite reach its final objective for the day, its main task of securing the british flank was carried out, while some 3,000 prisoners and many guns were captured. the re- sult also enabled general fayolles, commanding the french reserve group of armies, to carry out his plan of extending the battle front further to the south on aug. o. continuation of british advance, aug. o-11.—it was decided by rawlinson that the iv. army should on aug. 9 continue its advance to the line roye-chaulnes-bray-dernancourt. the main attack was entrusted to the canadian corps which was to push southeast to the line roye-hallu, whilst the australian corps was to secure its left between the latter place and meri- court, and the iii. corps to advance to etinehem and form a defensive flank north of the somme. early in the morning the canadians captured the village of le quesnel, thus completing the capture of all the objectives 200 allotted to the main british attack for the 8th. during the day, assisted by cavalry, they advanced the line an average of five miles and halted for the night on a general line east of rouvroy and meharicourt. ‘to the north the australians reached lihons hill and captured framerville after stubborn fighting. the hi. corps, north of the somme, cleared the chipilly spur and oc- cupied morlancourt. during the day six german divisions reinforced the front from neighbouring armies. on aug. 10 and 11 the advance continued against ever stiffening resistance and hostile counter-attacks, eventually reaching the general line le quesnoy-lihons-raincourt, whilst north of the river the itinehem spur was completely cleared. pause in the advunce—it was now clear that to push the offensive further would lead to disproportionate loss with little corresponding gain. the enemy had reformed his front, shat- tered on the 8th, by fresh troops from other portions of the line, and had settled down on the edge of the area devastated in the somme battles of 1916, where a maze of old trenches, wire and shell holes rendered defence easy and rapid advance imprac- ticable. rawlinson had engaged all his 13 divisions, units were tired and in need of a breathing space. he therefore decided to allow his troops a few days’ rest while preparing for a renewal of the attack on aug. 15. units in the line were relieved and tired infantry and cavalry withdrawn into reserve. french operations, aug. 9-tz.—on aug. 9, debeney made an encircling attack, southeast and northeast with his x. and axxyv. corps, his objective being montdidier. the operation was completely successful, and though the garrison of the town managed to slip out the town was occupied and the rearguard captured on the morning of aug. 10. in the meantime the nxxi. corps to the north reached the line pierrepont-arvillers. by the night of the 11th it gained the western outskirts of roye. on aug. ro fayolles brought in the french hi. army (hum- bert) on the right. attacking on the front courcelles-gournay in the direction of lassigny, it made an advance of an average depth of three to four miles. next day the front was extended suill further southwards, but, owing to the enemy's resistance becoming stronger, progress was thenceforward slow. british operations, :lug. 1r2-21.—owing to the difficulty of reorganising the front of attack and of bringing up the guns, the attack arranged for aug. 15 did not materialise and up to the 21st only local actions took place on the 1v. army front. brit- ish attacks alternated with hostile counter-attacks, the line after hard fighting reaching damery-lihons-proyart-dernancourt. on aug. 17, haig decided to transfer temporarily the centre of gravity of the british offensive to the iit. and i. army areas. the canadian corps was taken out of the line and the french i. army took over the british front as far north as lihons. during the period aug. 8-21 the iv. army had forced back the germans to a depth of 12 m., had defeated or engaged with its own 13 divisions no less than 27 of the enemy’s, had taken over 23,000 prisoners and 4oo guns and had killed and wounded more than an equivalent number, at a cost to itself of some 27,000 casual- ties. french operations, aug, 12-21.— during this period the french i, army, which remained under haig’s command until the 16th, continued its advance in touch with the british right, while the french iii. army, whose advance was assisted by the french nx. army’s attack east of the oise, after a hard and determined defence succeeded in occupying lassigny on aug. 21. in the 12 days’ fighting humbert’s army of seven divisions had driven eight hostile divisions from their strong vantage ground and had taken 5,000 prisoners and io00 guns. general results of the battle—the course and results of the fortnight’s fighting may be summed up as follows: the three allied armies (british lv., french i. and iii.), with 32 divi- sions, had attacked and defeated the german ii. and xviii. armies of 42 divisions. the allies had advanced to a depth of 6-13 m. on a front of 47 m. taking 40,000 prisoners and 600 guns. most important of all, the allied lateral communications be- tween paris and the north had been cleared, and a wide breach had been made in the german front, susceptible, as events were 956 to show, of being rapidly widened to either flank by further al- lied attacks. a shattering blow had been dealt to the morale of the german army and their high command, from the effects of which neither was destined to recover. the battle of amiens was the first page in the story of the allied victory of 1918. bispliography.—f. m. cutlack, the australians: final campaign, ror8 (1918); a. a. montgomery, the fourth army, aug.—nov. rgr8 (1920); h.e.r. steele, the canadians in france, 1915-8 (1920). (see also worrld war: bibliography.) . ii. the battle of bapaume-peronne on aug. 10 at the moment when rawlinson’s iv. army was carrying all before it, foch issued a directive to haig in which it was enjoined that “ enterprises by the british iii. army in the general direction of bapaume and peronne should be prepared as soon as possible.” at the time the front of byng’s il]. army was held as follows: v. corps (shute, with three divisions) from the left of the [v. army just north of albert to beaucourt, iv. corps (harper, with five divisions) thence-as far as opposite ablainzeville, vi. corps (haldane, with four divisions) thence to the army boundary south of arras. preparations were at once put in hand, the operations being timed to begin on aug. 21, by which date the rapid advance of the iv. army had been checked on the western edge of the old somme battlefields of ro16. altack by iti, army—on aug. 2t a preliminary operation was carried out by the iv. and vi. corps together with the left division of the v. corps, in order to get within striking dis- tance of the enemy’s main defensive position along the arras- albert railway. this attack, which was entirely successful and resulted in the capture of some 2,000 prisoners, enabled byng to spend the 22nd in bringing up his guns preparatory to the main attack on the 23rd,.on which date a general advance on the whole army front, together with that portion of the iv. army which was north of the somme, was timed to take place. on the 23rd, byng attacked on a front of 16 m. from just north of albert to the cojeul. though stubborn resistance was en- countered, considerable progress was made, the objective being reached all along the line. the iv. corps, in the centre, pushed forward to bihucourt and loupart wood, while the vi. corps captured ervillers and established itself east of the arras- bapaume road in the vicinity of boyelles. on the right the v. corps, in conjunction with the iii. corps (iv. army), pushed out its right and established itself on the hills overlooking the town of albert just west of la boisselle. during the day 5,000 prisoners and a number of guns were taken. the advance was continued on the 24th and 25th, by the eve- ning of which the 1v. corps had pushed forward as far as the line favreuil-mory, thus threatening the enemy’s line of retreat from bapaume. to the south the v. corps, after capturing the thiepval stronghold on the 24th, attained a general line west of contalmaison and courcelette. on the left the vi. corps occu- pied st. leger and henin-sur-cojeul but was held up in front of croisilles. iv. army operations. —the operations of the iii. army were closely supported by the iv. army troops north of the somme. on the 22nd, the iii. corps and left australian div. attacked on a front of 7,000 yd., reaching all its objectives toa depth of from 2,000 to 3,000 yards. in the afternoon a strong counter- attack developed against the iii. corps right division and much of the ground won earlier in the day was lost. during the next three days the advance continued in conjunction with the iii. army, and on the evening of the 25th the front had reached a general line along the high ground west of suzanne-mametz. south of the somme the australian corps on the 23rd advanced up to the edge of the old somme battlefield, capturing 3,000 prisoners and 23 guns. british advance continued.—as a result of the critical situa- tion caused by these operations, the german higher command ordered von boehm, commanding the group of armies between the ancre and the aisne to fall back to the general line queant- east of bapaume-peronne-ham. this movement was carried out on the 26th and 27th. victory, advance to on the 26th the v. corps made a rapid advance, whilst the iv. corps continued to swing round to the northeast of ba- paume, occupying beugnatre. on the evening of the 25th, the xvii. corps (ferguson) relieved the vi. and undertook the difficult task of dispossessing the enemy of his strong position in the vicinity of croisilles. during the next week a stubborn de- fence was shown all along the front, which by the evening of sept. 2 had reachecl the enemy’s position on the line morval- haplincourt-norcuil. during the 13 days’ fighting the r4 divisions of the iii. army had engaged 23 hostile divisions, had taken from them 11,000 prisoners and many guns and had driven them back a depth of 8-13 m. on a front of 20 m., besides inflict- ing heavy losses in killed and wounded. on the iv. army front north of the somme, the iii. corps together with the 3rd. aus. div. continued the advance in touch with the iii. army. south of the somme the advance had been rapid, and on the evening of the 29th the river had been reached between cizaucourt and biaches, whence the line continued northwards to combles. in view of the small prospect of success afforded by an attempt to force the strongly held river line south of peronne, rawlinson decided that the next operation must be a strong advance by the centre and left towards nurlu in order to turn the river line. before that could be done, however, the key to it, the dominating height of mont st. quentin, which commanded all the country to the north and west including all the river passages by which it could be approached, had to be captured. capture of mont st. quentin.—a\though the operation which resulted in its capture by the australians extended over only a few miles of front, they were of such importance to the general advance and so brilliantly executed that a description will be given in rather greater detail. on the 30th, a bridge head on the north bank of the river near clery was seized and by 4 a.m. on the 3rst, the sth bde. (2nd aus. div.) had crossed over and by 7 a.m. had captured mt. st. quentin village, the right being held up in front of anvil wood. shortly afterwards, a strong counter- attack developed and drove the british line back to the road on the southwest side of the village. as a result of the day’s fighting the 5th bde. of some 1,200 rifles hadi penetrated to a depth of 2,000 yd. and though reduced to only 600 rifles had held out on a wide front of 4,000 yd. against repeated and desperate counter- blows. next morning the 6th bde. which had crossed the river the evening before, passed through the 5th bde. and after a short bombardment stormed the village and wood and established itself on the height. meanwhile the rath bde. (5th aus. div.) also passed through south of the 6th bde. and brushing aside all opposition entered and occupied peronne, only a small portion of the suburbs on the northeast remaining in the enemy’s hands. next day, the australians occupied allaines and the iii. corps st. pierre vaast and vaux woods. the line of the somme had been turned, due, as a detailed account would show, to the bril- liant initiative of every commander from the army commander to the section leader and to the magnificent fighting qualities of the australian soldier. between aug. 22 and sept. 2 the iv. army of 9g divisions had engaged 23 of the enemy’s divisions and taken 23,000 prisoners and many guns. results of the battle—byng and rawlinson’s armies totalling together 23 divisions had defeated 46 german divisions. on a front of 28 m. they had advanced toa depth of 6 to 13 m., cap- turing 34,250 prisoners and 270 guns. the whole area of the somme battlefields, which had cost the british five months of bitter fighting in 1916, had been reconquerecd| in less than a fort- night; more than half the ground gained by the german spring advance had been recovered, the only good natural line of defence west of the hindenburg system had been broken, and the shift- ing of the moral and material balance, in favour of the british and against the germans, had become patent to the world. bibliography.—f. m. cutlack, the australians: final campaign, rois (1918); g. p. cuttriss, “over the top” with the 3rd australian divtsion (1918); a. a. montgomery, the fourth army, aug.-nov. 1918 (1920). see also world war: bibliograpity. (r. m. lu.) victory, advance to hil. the breaking of the hindenburg line on aug. 26 began the third stage of the series of offensive operations which formed the british share of the allied advance to victory. this stage culminated on oct. 5 in the capture of the last and strongest system of german defence, known as the hindenburg line. the first stage had been the attack by rawlinson’s iv. army, assisted by the french i. army under debeney, castwards and southeastwards from amiens with the object of frecing the paris-amiens railway. in the second phase the british iii. army under byng had extended the front of the attack northwards by a successful thrust towards bapaume. the british i. army under horne was now to broaden the front of attack by driving eastwards from arras with the object of turning the german positions on the somme battlefields. wancourt l ersy cagnicou ¢ a obi sy © sains- vis-ef fide ¢ oe ae uchy-lestredh riencourt- eo z-cagni j bullecourt = pronvil a ca # fgipau we » grillers- “nn au-flos beaylencourt? j = se albert | mee 2p sailly-saillisel $ epe viorsef -faucon o57 hindenburg line described.—the hindenburg line consisted of a heavily wired system of trenches which ran northwards from st. quentin to the village of bantouzelle approximately parallel to the schelde canal. this portion was known to the yermans as the siegfried line. from bantouzelle the main line of trenches ran northwest to havrincourt, whence it turned north and followed the line of the canal du nord to moeuvres. from mocuvres it ran northwest past queant and bullecourt to the original german front line east of arras. within this northern bend in the system, and covering the approaches to cambrai lay several switch lines and defensive positions, the most formidable of which were the drocourt-queant line which ran in a northerly direction from the hindenburg line at queant and the canal du nord which passed by moeuvres to the sensee. the breaking of the hindenburg line 1918. english miles o } 2 3 4 5&5 6 7 8 kilometres cre ee ee ay ee | ®i1234 367 8 9 wh roads railways canafs nee line on august 29% == 6 oe . september 6 mpecm . october /04 eeaeacse0e ffi indenburg ine od ee . zadisy-i \ s ainoy ‘ crorquipn a we a “lez- -marquion ere rlon cee 4 a e faulx- ro j wraticoure x ' ay : eel , a hermigs es@ ki cout , a :.. bars-4 pp lrasca i p9he = 2 ee x i zo bantouzell gouzeaucourt? # a sana : . ouzelle be, \ mers-cuisiai y vendhuitle e. bony? ronssoy bellicov ‘ olnon st a enti . 958 on the night of aug. 25-6 the british line extended from a point northwest of chaulnes where the right of the british iv. army joined the left of the french i. army, east of bray, west of bapaume to croisilles, and thence northwest to the old british line, southeast of arras. the iv. army had the aus- tralian and iii. corps in line; the iii. army, which extended northwards from a point east of albert, had the v., 1v., vi. and xvii. corps. the i. army front was held by the canadian corps and the viii. and i. corps, of which only the canadian corps, astride the scarpe, was involved in the operations to be described. the german troops who were to bear the brunt of the impending blow were the left wing of below’s xvii. army, the ii. army under marwitz and the right wing of hutier’s xviit. army. | the offensive launched.—at 3:00 a.m. on aug. 26 the cana- dian corps under sir a. currie attacked the german positions astride the scarpe on a front of 53 miles. the attack was car- ried out by the 2nd and 3rd canadian divs. and the 51st high- land div. supported by 45 tanks and some 600 guns. the xvii. corps of the iii. army co-operated on the right. the attack was a complete success. the bavarian ij. corps and bavarian i. res. corps were driven back through wancourt, guemappe, monchy and roeux, and by evening, in spite of strong counter- attacks, the canadian corps had established itself well to the east of those villages. on aug. 27 the attack was continued by the same divisions, and cherisy, vis-en-artois and gavrelle fell into their hands. on the following day the canadian 3rd div. made further progress, and that night both divisions were relieved, the canadian 2nd div. by the canadian ist while the british 4th div. relieved the canadian ard. during the next few days considerable progress was made. this advance brought the british to within assaulting distance of the formidable trench system known to the allies as the drocourt-queant line, and to the germans as the wotan line. the capture of this system, would, it was anticipated, turn the whole of the german organ- isect positions for some distance southwards. preparations were put tn hand to launch the attack on sept. 2. the xxii. corps took over the front north of the scarpe held by the sist div. and relieved that division by the 11th. the drocourt-queant line altacked.—by the evening of sept. 1 all preparations for the attack of the drocourt-queant line were complete. the main attack was to be carried out by the canadian corps, whose principal task was to break through the defences between hendecourt and sailly. the nnii. corps, also of the i. army astride the scarpe, was to secure the canadian left, while the xvii. corps of the iii. army, advanc- ing on the right of the canadians, was to capture the maze of trenches at the junction of the drocourt-queant and hinden- burg lines, and turn the last named defensive position from the north. the xvii. and canadian corps were then to push on up to and if possible beyond the canal du nord. the attack of the canadian corps was launched at 5:00 a.m. by the canadian 1st and 4th and the british 4th divs., sup- ported by some 500 guns and 4o tanks, on a front of 4} miles. all resistance on the first objective was speedily overcome, ancl by 9:15 a.m. the whole system of trenches on the front of the canadian corps was in the hands of the assaulting troops. on the xvii. corps front, the attack was launched at the same hour and met with equal success. the 52nd div. stormed the network of trenches at the junction of the two systems, and after heavy fighting succeeded in overcoming all resistance. the 57th div., attacking north of the 52nd, pressed forward south of the canadians, and by nightfall had swung round to the right and were threatening the villages of queant and pronville from the north. the 63rd div., which passed through to exploit the suc- cess, had heavy fighting during the afternoon, but by dark had reached the railway east of queant. during the afternoon the canadian corps met with increased opposition, particularly from machine-guns on the british 4th div. front, but by the evening an advance of some 3 m. had been made and british troops had captured cagnicourt, villers and dury, and were approaching the outskirts of buissy. fight victory, advance to thousand prisoners and many guns were captured, bringing the total captures on the i. army front alone since aug. 26 to 16,000 prisoners and 200 guns. in eight days the 10 british and cana- dian divisions employed by the i. army had defeated 13 german divisions and driven them back to m., out of all their organised positions in front of cambrai. troops of the iti. and iv. armies prolonged the attack southward on sept. 2, and substantial progress was made, though the fighting was severe. the results of this mest successful operation became obvious at once, as on the night of sept. 2-3 the germans fell back to the line of the canal du nord from peronne to hermies. the follow- ing day they commenced to withdraw from the somme, south of peronne, and by the night of sept. 8 they were back on a line vermand (6 m. west of st. quentin)-epehy-havrincourt and thence along the east bank of the canal du nord to the sensec. preparatory operations continued the canal du nord, behind which the german forces facing the i. army and left of the iii. army had now established themselves, was far too strong a natural position to warrant attack without very careful preparation. the next three weeks were therefore devoted by the british forces on this front to the organisation of an opera- tion which eventually took place on sept. 27. south of havrin- court the german main line of resistance was the hindenburg line, but strong forces were still occupying advanced positions in the trenches which formed the old british and german lines prior to the german offensive in march 1918. these had to be captured before the hindenburg line itself could be assaulted, and to this end operations were undertaken by the british iti. and iv. armies. on sept. 12 the iii. army attacked with the iv. corps and the vi. corps on a 5 m. front in the neighbourhood of havrin- court wood. a considerable advance was made and the villages of trescault and havrincourt were captured. meantime the iv. army had continued to press the german withdrawal, and between sept. 11 and 17 the line had been pushed forward at several points. on sept. 18 a much more extensive operation was undertaken, in which the ly. army in conjunction with the if. army attacked the german forces on a 17 m. front from holnon to gouzeaucourt. the french i. army co-operated on the right. the final objective of the main attack was the old british outpost line running past pont ruet, west of bellicourt, bony and vendhuile. it was not intended that this final objec- tive must necessarily be reached on the first day—and in fact it was not reached until after several days of very severe fighting. at 7:00 a.m. on sept. 18 the iv. and iii. armies attacked in heavy rain. vhe attack was supported by 23 tanks and 978 guns, and in some scctors dummy tanks were used with con- siderable success. the ix. corps advanced on the right with the 6th and ist divisions. the first objectives were taken at 9:00 a.m., but the 6th div. was checked at ifolnon and west of fresnoy. the 1st div. was more successful, but was unable to reach pont ruet, and both divisions suffered severe casualties. the australian corps had very heavy fighting, particularly in and about le verguier, and was held up in front of its final objec- tive till dusk. during the night a successful attack was made which completed the operation on the australian front. north of the australians the iii. corps attacked with the e4th, 18th, rath and 58th divs., and met with very stubborn resistance. ronssoy was captured by the 18th div. and epehy by the 12th and 58th divs., but little progress was made beyond these places. the v. corps of the iii. army continued the front of attack to the north and all divisions made consider- able progress, though it was not found possible to take gouzeau- court on this day. minor operations were undertaken during the succeeding week, which resulted in the capture of gricourt and pont ruet by the ix. corps, and by sept. 26 the british line had been advanced to a position from which the attack on the main hindenburg system could be launched. in this last series of operations 15 divisions of the british iit. and iv. armies had driven back 29 divisions of the german ii. and xvii. armics into the hindenburg defences, and inflicted on them a loss of 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns. victory, advange to the storming of the hindenburg line -—all was now ready for the great effort to break through the hindenburg line. the strategic plan decided on by marshal foch and the allied com- manders-in-chief involved the launching of four convergent and practically simultancous offensive operations. the ameri- cans were to attack west of the mcuse in the direction of me- zieres. the french offensive, also against mezieres, was to be launched west of the argonne. the british were to break through the hindenburg line between st. quentin and the river sensee and advance on maubeuge, while an allied force (british, french and belgian) under the king of the belgians, was to attack in flanders in the direction of ghent. the results to be obtained from these offensive operations depended in no small degree on the success of the british attack in the centre, where a threat to the german vital systems of lateral communication would re-act on their defences elsewhere. it was here, too, that the german system of defence was most highly organised, and here success or failure might be expected to produce the greatest moral effect, both from the military and political points of view. in accordance with the above gencral strategic plan the french and americans attacked on sept. 26; the british offen- sive commenced on the 27th, and the allied attack in flanders was launched on the 28th. haig’s plan was to strike first with his left wing in the direction of cambrai, while the right wing, which was faced by the more formidable defences, was to attack later after a very heavy preliminary bombardment. it was hoped that any success obtained by the left wing would draw off the german reserves, and deceive their higher command as to the point where the main blow was to fall. a very heavy bombardment was opened on the night of scpt. 26-27 on the front of the british i., iii. and iv. armies, and at 5:20 a.m. on the 27th four corps attacked on a front of 13 m. from gouzeaucourt to the neighbourhood of sauchy lestree. on the northern ilank the canal du nord was too formidable an obstacle to be carried in face of opposition, and consequently the plan was conceived of crossing on a comparatively narrow front, and then of turning the line of the canal further north by a diver- gent attack from the point of crossing. this difficult manoeuvre was most successfully carried out. on the right the 5th and 42nd divs. of the 1v. corps established and held a strong flank between beaucamp and ribecourt. on their left the vi. corps advanced with the 3rd and guards divs., and captured ribe- court and flesquieres, while the 62nd and and divs., passing through, continued the advance in the direction of marcoing. further north the 52nd and 63rd divs. of the xvii. corps forced the passage of the canal and, after heavy fighting, estab- lished themselves in graincourt, and the 57th div., in close co- operation with the canadians, reached anneux. on the i. army front the canadian corps attacked with the canadian 4th and ist divs., and in the half light of dawn stormed the canal on the line mocuvres-sains-marquion. with irresistible impetus the canadian 4th div. pushed on to bourlon village and wood where the canadian 3rd div., taking up the attack, advanced towards fontaine notre dame and sailly. on the left the canadian 1st div. was equally successful, and having captured sains and marquion, advanced rapidly towards hayne- court and sauchy lestree, while the british 11th div. passed through and captured epinoy and oisy-le-verger. meanwhile the 56th div. of the xxii. corps crossed the canal, west of sauchy lestree, cleared that village and advanced on palleul. by the evening of sept. 27 over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns had been taken. as soon as the crossings of the canal were secured the british and canadian engineers began to construct the necessary bridges, and in spite of heavy artillery fire com- pleted their task with remarkable speed, and contributed in no small degree to the success of the operation. on sept. 28 the advance was continued and gouzeaucourt, marcoing, noyelles, fontaine notre dame, sailly and palleul were taken, and a footing was obtained on the east bank of the schelde canal at marcoing. at 5:50 a.m. on the morning of sept. 29, after a preliminary bombardment lasting over two days, in which some 1,600 guns were employed, the british iv. 959 army advanced to the, attack, covered by an intense artillery barrage. the front of attack extended from holnon to vend- huile, a distance of about 12 miles. on the right the ix. corps met with complete success. the 1st div., advancing south of the bend in the canal at bellenglise, established a flank facing southeast from gricourt to the le tronquoy tunnel. the 46th div., which was faced by a most formidable task, advanced with the greatest gallantry, and with the assistance of rafts, mats and even life-belts, stormed the canal at and north of bellenglise and - rushed the german trench system west of the canal. the german defences here faced south, and the british troops swung to the right and took them in flank and rear, capturing many prisoners and guns. by 3:00 p.m. the 46th div. had broken through the hindenburg line toa depth of 3 miles, routed four german divi- sions, and taken over 4,000 prisoners and 70 guns at the small cost of 800 casualties. the 32nd div., passing through, completed the capture of the hindenburg reserve line, and by nightfall had taken 800 more prisoners and 20 guns. work of the american corps.—on the left of the ix. corps the american ii. corps had been superimposed on the australian corps. the task of the american troops was to break through the hindenburg line at and north of bellicourt, where the st. quentin canal passes through a tunnel. the australian 5th and 3rd divs. were then to take up the attack and advance on more distant objectives. the americans advanced with the greatest gallantry, but owing to inexperience and impetuosity they omitted to secure the captured ground as they advanced. the german troops, swarming up out of their dug-outs and shel- ters in the tunnel were consequently in position to oppose the supporting australian divisions as they came up and it was only after very heavy fighting that the australian sth div. on the right finally succeeded in reaching the hindenburg reserve line about nauroy. the australian 3rd div. following up the americans could make but little headway and was finally checked in front of bony. on the left the iit. corps carried out their task of securing the left flank of the [v. army. on the same day the iii. army achieved an important success by securing the canal crossings at masni¢res and northward as far as cambrai, while the i. army front was advanced northwest of that town. on sept. 30 the break in the hlindenburg system was widened by the capture by the lx. corps of thorigny and le tronquoy, and on the same day the germans abandoned villers guislain and gonnelicu. on oct. 1, in co-operation with the french i. army who occupied st. quentin, the 1x. corps took levergies and the australians captured joncourt, estrees and bony. the hi. and i. armies also achieved important successes. during the first week in oct. the xiii. corps relieved the iii. corps north of the australians and a series of successful minor operations were carried out on the fronts of all three armies, and by oct. 5 the whole of the rearward lines of the hindenburg system were in british hands. results of the offensive—during this nine days’ battle 30 british and two american divisions had broken through the last and most powerfully organised system of german defences, had overwhelmed 39 german divisions and captured 36,000 pris- oners and 380 guns. the effect of the british victory was decisive on the subsequent course of the campaign, and though there was still to be hard and bitter fighting before the termina- tion of hostilities on nov. 11, only natural obstacles such as woods, rivers and villages now lay between the british armies and their objective at maubeuge. bibliography.—f. a. mackenzie, through the hindenburg line fore); g. hl. f. nichols (quex), pushed and the return push (1919); r. e,. priestly, breaking the hindenburg line (1919). (see also worrld war: bibliography.) cv sy'bi) iv. the battle of the meuse-argonne in its main outlines the plan of the meuse-argonne attack was agreed upon ina conference between marshal foch, general petain, and general pershing at bombon, on sept. 2 1918. the decisions of this conference were embodied in a general directive 960 victory, issued by foch and elaborated by petain into precise orders for the two armies concerned—of pershing and gourauid. allied plans—the general objective named for the combined attack on the front was mezi¢res. the american i. army was to attack on the front from the meuse to the argonne and the french iv. army to attack from the argonne to suippe. the direction for the attack of the two armies was buzancy-me- aieres, but the first objectives named were the hindenburg line on the front briculles-sur-meuse-romagne-sous-montfaucon- grandpre. army corps of three divisions each in the front line and three divisions in reserve. ‘this force was strengthened by the addi- tion of 180 french aeroplanes, 239 french tanks, and 1,712 19 ” english | miles 5 20 40 ne a 3 ‘4 kilometres ft 36 ei (s a \ \ ri esd mer ber hel s\ 2 8 wire % ks a) mata roads wee? ip ne bur asim cameuse kn : vouiers' rae are oir ng ‘a: romagne'' us-montlauc one an, ch, be an le: 4 , a ali " : : nlogs -sur-marne,“® af <, french guns and mortars. of the american troops in the front line only one division was regular, and six of the remaining eight divisions lacked any previous battle experience. german forces engaged.—the german positions between the meuse and the argonne were naturally strong and had been strengthened by every possible artifice. vauquois, a fortified hill east of and overlooking the aire valley, was regarded as an impregnable fortress, and montfaugon, dominating the whole plateau, afforded not only a strong defensive position, but observation and command posts which greatly aided in con- trolling the defence of the entire sector. german troops in the line on the front of attack consisted of only five divisions, four of them of inferior quality and the fifth, a guard division, much worn from intensive fighting further north and sent to this sup- posedly quiet sector for rest. among the german divisions immediately in reserve only one was rated first-class. thus the german infantry actually in line was out-numbered about four to one, since the american divisions had twice the infantry strength of the german divisions, and a decisive artillery and air superiority. prior to the attack general pershing caused various feints and ruses suggestive of coming :american attacks to be employed in the luneville sector east of the moselle as well as in and south of the vosges mountains. this had served to distract the atten- tion of the german general staff and led it to expect an attack to the east or south rather than west of the meuse. the real attack, consequently, had the advantage of being almost a com- plete surprise. first attack: sept. 26.—following an artillery preparation of three hours, the attack was begun at dawn on sept. 26. on the first day the attack progressed well. the i. corps on the left stormed vauquois, reached its objectives in the aire valley, and even made sensible progress in the argonne forest. on the right the iii. corps crossed the difficult forges brook, and also gained its objectives, but in the centre the v. corps was held up in the american attacking troops consisted of three: advance to passing through the woods in its front, and was unable to take montfaugon although the iii. corps had passed beyond it on the right. on the second day montfaucon was gained and the attack went forward, but not so far as had been planned. on the third day, sept. 28, still less advance was made in the centre and not what was hoped for on the left. by this time the german reserves from outside the sector began to pour in and by the fourth day, having nine divisions in the line, the germans made strong counter-attacks, which were partially successful in regaining lost ground. the german artillery was also greatly increased and from the favourable flanking artillery position on the heights east of the meuse and in the argonne forest hampered the advance of the american troops, in what had now become an advanced salient in the american line between the meuse and the aire rivers. the weather for the first three days had been favourable, but on the 28th drizzling rain set in, which added to the difficulties both of the tactical handling of troops and of their supplics. the recon- struction of roads across no-man’s land has been found especially difficult on the front of the centre corps, on account of the depth of the shell-battered zone created by years of intensive fighting. offensive renewed, oct. 4.—west of the argonne the attack of the french iy. army had not been successful in making any appreciable advance and american reserves were called for to reinforce the french iv. army, as well as to replace tired divi- sions in the i. army for a general renewal of the offensive on oct. 4. this renewal of the attack was successful on both flanks of the argonne. on the west the french iv. army cap- tured blanc mont, while east of the argonne the right of the i. corps gained an advance of 10 km. on the right bank of the aire, an advance exploited three days later by bringing a flank attack on the upper argonne from the east, which resulted in the capture by oct. 10 of the entire forest, and enabled the french and american armies to connect their flanks through the pass of grandpre. the failure of the i. army to gain its objectives on the western half of the meuse-aire plateau in its attacks of oct. 4 made it clear that a broader base was required to push the attack beyond the main hindenburg line, and that the possession by the germans of the heights east of the meuse afforded them too favourable artillery positions and observation posts to make possible an extended advance west of the meuse. accordingly on oct. 5 petain placed at the tactical disposal of the i. army the french xvii. corps, at the time passively holding the line east of the meuse, and directed that, reinforced by some ameri- can divisions, it should be called upon to gain the line dun-sur- meuse-damvillers. this attack was made on oct. 7, coincident with a renewal of the attack on the west. by oct. 10 the i. army was, in general, up to the rearmost carefully prepared german positions in this region, known as the kriemhilde stel- lung. on oct. 11 petain called for a renewal of the attack on both banks of the meuse with the same objectives as before on the east bank, but with the breaking of the kriemhilde line and the capture of buzancy as the objectives on the west bank. this attack was carried out on oct. 14 and resulted in small material gains, including the cete dame marie, cunel and romagne- sous-montfaucon. preparations for final attack.--the troops by this time were well worn and for the remainder of the month the i. army had of necessity to limit itself to local operations and to preparations for a systematic renewal of the offensive. on oct. 12 the i. army front, which had hitherto extended to the east to the moselle, was divided into two army sectors, and on the 16th general pershing transferred the immediate command of the i. army to lieutenant-general liggett, and exercised supervision, as group commander, of both armies. on the german side there was no lack of appreciation at either army or general headquarters of the threat which the american attack constituted. von der marwitz declared to his army, on oct. 1, “ it is on the firm resistance of the verdun front that depends the fate of the great part of the western front, per- haps even of our nation.’”’ hindenburg wrote in his memoirs: victory, advance to “ tt was plain that the situation could not last. our armies were too weak and too tired. moreover the pressure the american masses were putting upon our most sensitive point in the region of the meuse was too strong.” during the month of oct. the german army, pressed at all points, had used up nearly all its available reserves of fresh divi- sions, and no longer had means of replacement of depleted or exhausted units on the front line. the result was that the care- fully prepared general attack on nov. 1 broke through the ene- my’s line at all points and henceforth it was a case of rapid pur- suit, with occasional rear-guard actions until the armistice on nov. 11. the chief preoccupation on the allied side during this pursuit was holding the troops in leash in their sectors and deter- mining who should have the honour of first entering important towns such as sedan. the main line of the carignan-sedan rail- way, the real objective of the meusc-argonne attack, was brought under artillery fire on nov. 3, and reached by the i. and v. corps on nov. 7, while the iii. corps had by the same date forced the crossing of the meuse and advanced ro km. to the north and east. the i. army during the meuse-argonne operation had em- ployed 22 american and four french divisions. of the american divisions 12 were engaged on other fronts during part of the beerst oviadsloo handzaeme ; ss te cortemarclesy wg, 1. zarren jf d fe che @ lake wage: gart’\ / =a, wa epr a pade grest of,2 ya a 5.fouthulst. astadenberg sf 2 ty ewa aroulers > os o bixschoate owestroosebek > = l | °moorslede oninebeke ond olvadizeele aj sg 1 ~~ bkk" "becelaere 4 ss = nq : . i ie &: heluvelt ieee y ay © ges oo te caine ¢ eo sos zandvoorde oa sly ig 4 st : : . = se —— ous j 4 lins ot = flas dy, obi my i pe ~ ii a y ese passchendaele iseghem cf 0 winkel s'flo/ 961 time. on the german side in addition to the five divisions originally in the sector 38 divisions had in the course of the battle been put into the line. the maximum strength of the american troops engaged at one time was 896,000, their losses were 117,000 killed and wounded, their captures 26,000 prisoners and 846 guns. bibliography.—de chambrun and de marenches, the american army in the furopean conflict (1919); f. palmer, our greatest battle (1919); final report of gen. john j. pershing (1920); a. w. page, our rro days fighting (1920), report of the first ambrican army (1923). ade ,) v. the offensive in flanders by the end of aug. 1918 the initiative in operations had been definitely lost by the germans. strengthened by american co-operation, marshal foch planned a triple attack in which franco-american forces were to attack on both sides of the argonne: the main british forces to break through the hinden- burg line; the belgian army with some british and french troops to operate in flanders. the three echelons were to move off on aug. 26, 27 and 28, respectively, at intervals of 24 hours. allied and german forces ——the flanders army group, created sept. 11, and placed under the command of king albert, included the belgian army of 12 infantry divisions and one cavalry division; the british il. army of ro infantry smerkhoe. ‘ge, = q- hy. se blall 3 bs ‘a at tin \ on gs z, wee aeagy ss ne a a | sdr o rregeetrrses wr a ne english miles li? t vetss gipe es . > 10 maliea i . kilometres nat ; 7. 5 (0 ae main railways a ; main roads main canals 962 divisions; and, later, the french vii. corps and ii. cav. corps, with a considerable reinforcement of artillery. the commander- in-chief of the allied armies decided that the first operation should have as its object the occupation of the clercken hills heights, the forest of houthulst and the passchendaele- wytschaete-comines ridge. irom these points a second offen- sive delivered in the direction of roulers-courtrai might be expected to bring about the evacuation of the belgian coast and the industrial region round lille. the german iv. army (gen. von arnim), lying between the sea and armenticres, had 16 divisions: the marine group (2nd marine div., 38th landwehr div. in line, rst marine div. in reserve); the guards res. group (13th res. rth and 12th bav. divs. in line, 23rd div. in reserve); the x. res. group (236th and 8th divs. in jine, 187th in reserve); and the guards group (11th res. and 56th div.). the last two of these groups were facing the british, the first two the belgians. four divi- sions were resting: the 16th at bruges, the 3rd at thourout, the 16th bavarian at iseghem, the 52nd res. at courtrai. the marine divisions were fresh and at normal strength but the other divisions had only 60 to 70 men to a company. the dis- position of the defence comprised three positions, the zone of the shell-holes and “ pillboxes ” of the 1917 battle; the planderi ii stellung, marked on the crest by zarren—westroosebeke— passchendaele; and the flandern i siellung between handzaeme and the west of roulers. allied attack: sept. 28.—at 2:30 a.m. on sept. 28, 1,800 guns opened fire; and after a bombardment lasting three hours, nine belgian divisions—of whom two were in the second line—pro- ceeded to the attack on a front of 7 m., extending from lake blanckaart to st. jean, near ypres. twenty minutes later, four british divisions (the 9th, 29th, 35th and r4th) attacked between this point and st. eloi without any artillery preparation. in two hours the zone of the shell-holes had been crossed under a heavy downpour of rain, and by evening the allied troops had advanced some 5 m. over a sea of mud. the belgians had car- ried all before them, taking the houthulst forest and passchen- daele, and the british had taken becelacr, kruiseik and zaund- voorde. on aug. 29, in spite of counter-attacks by the resting german divisions which had been thrown into the battle, the belgians had carried dixmude, clercken, stadenberg and westroosebeke, the latter points being severely contested. fight- ing side by side in the best spirit of camaraderie, the belgian 8th div. and the british gth took possession of moorslede and dadizeele. success became complete through some minor en- gagements on aug. 30. the total advance was one of eizht miles. the whole of the flanders crest was taken and 9,000 prisoners and 300 guns were captured. second advance oct. 14.—after a respite of a fortnight in which to organise the roads and transports over the zone of the craters, the landers army group commenced a second battle, on oct. 14, to force the flandern i stellung. on the german side, six new divisions were holding the line (the 3rd, 16th, 32a, 36th res. ersatz guard, and the 1st bavarian res.). three other divisions (the 3rd landwehr, 6th dismounted cav., and 207th) were held in reserve. on the allied stile, four french divisions, with two belgian divisions to the north and three belgian divisions to the south, went forward to the attack at 5:00 a.m. on a front of 11m., without artillery preparation. the french took possession of hooglede and roulers, the belgians of cortemarck and winkel st. eloi. on the following day the belgian 3rd div., having cut the ersatz guard div. to pieces, gained another 3 m. to the cast, reaching bavichove, northeast of courtrai, while the british i7., v. and nix. corps, who were flanking the movement, facing south, threw the germans back to the lys after hard fighting, advanced 6 km. and ap- proached courtrai. german retreat to ghent.—on the morning of oct. 16 the enemy began to retreat on the front from the sea to the lys, being completely exhausted. the allies followed in hot pursuit. on the 17th, the belgians entered ostend, the british entered courtrai and lille and the french drew near to thielt. as had victory, advance to been foreseen, von arnim, once his centre was broken, abandoned both the coast and lille, and retired behind the canal that con- nects maldeghem and deynze and is prolonged by the lys and, further south by the schelde between avelghem and tournai. the allies got in touch with this new position on the 20th. ten days later, after a new french division and two american divi- sions had arrived to reinforce the flanders group, king albert attacked the position, directing the principal effort between the lys and the schelde. complete success crowned this enterprise. overthrown at anseghem and kerkhove by the british ii. and aix. corps, and at cruyshautem by the american 37th div., the enemy was forced to retire behind the schelde and make his way up stream to ghent and beyond the terneuzen canal to the north of that city. in conformity with foch’s orders an attack against this line was prepared for nov. 11; the armistice, however, rendered this fourth battle unnecessary. since sept. 8 the flanders group of armies had advanced 65 km. and had captured 20,000 prisoners and 500 guns. the belgian army had fought with distinction. their casualties amounted to 1,000 officers and 29,000 men. bibliography.—f. b. maurice, the last four months (1919); c. e. m. mangin, comment iinit la guerre (1920). see also world war: bibliography. (r. van qo.) vi. the french armies in the course of the general offensive extending from sept. 28 to nov. 11 1018, all the allied forces were included in a com- bination of convergent actions, controlled by the high com- mand and designed to turn the enemy out of his positions or outflank him. disposition of forces —speaking generally, the centre group of french armies (gen, maistre) operated from south to north in liaison with the american forces through its right (iv. army), while the reserve group (gen. iayolle) operated from west to east, being in touch with the british forces through its left (i. army). but in the centre of the french disposition gen, petain specially combined the action of the two groups to fight the battle of the serre. the v. and x. armies attacked the “ tiunding ” position from the front while the right of the i, army outflanked it from the north. at the extremities of the battle line of the allied armies french forces were again to be found: on the one hand, in belgium; on the other, in lorraine, where the eastern group, under gen. castelnau, was preparing the offensive arranged for nov. 14. between july 1 and sept. 15 the french had lost 7,000 officers and 272,c00 men. their <livisions showed an average deficit of about 2,000 men and all available reinforcements had been embodied. but marshal foch was opposed to any reduction in the number of divisions. he recommended them to make good their weakness by interna! reorganisation of units. there were not enough horses for all the gun teams. lastly, the re-estab- lishment of communications had involved an allocation of 100,000 men for railway service. nevertheless these troops were about to go into battle again with a very high morale, prepared for hard fighting and heavy losses, in spite of their reduced strength, great physical fatigue and the prospect of carrying on without rest until the winter. french prout extended —on the left wing of the french line the i. army (debeney), which was to support the british right throughout, remaining in close touch, attacked and captured the strong point of cerisv, south of st. quentin, on sept. 27-20. on oct. 3 it extended its front of attack and, on oct. 6, occupied lesdin and progressed towards fontaine uterte while lending effective support to the brilliant offensive of the british. on the right and in the centre petain decided to lengthen the front of attack by an operation carried out by the v. army, in order to exploit the early successes to be obtained by the 1v. in the offensive it was to launch in conjunction with the american army. by this means he hoped to reduce the value of the forts of reims and the champagne heights. ‘to exploit the possible success of this v. army he further ordered the x. to “ prepare an action by its right wing in the direction of chavignon and la vienna malmaison.” on sept. 30 the v. army made a surprise attack between the vesle and the aisne, following upon the iv. army’s success of the previous day on the py. it pushed back the enemy on the east bank of the aisne-marne canal from berry-au-bac to the neuvilette, taking 2,500 prisoners and 30 guns. ‘this victory, added to that of the french iv. army, forced the enemy to withdraw to the northeast of reims, behind the suippe and the line of the arnes. on oct. 8 the combined attacks began afresh. while the french iv. army established itself on the right bank of the arnes, the v. on its left forced the passage of the suippe and the x. crossing the ailette, gained the heights of cerney en laonnois and jumigny. allies’ combined offensive —these advances, in conjunction with the progress of the american i. army, constrained the enemy to execute a wide retreating movement on to the strong position of fere —crecy-sur-serre—sissonne—chateau-porcien and the aisne below grand pre (“ hunding ” and “ brunhilde ” positions). by oct. 15 the french armies were in contact with this position. from oct. 15 onward operations on the french front consisted of carrying into execution the commander-in- chief's plan of oct. 11, of which the dominant idea was that of combining in one and the same manocuvre the push by the reserve group’s left wing (french i. army) and the franco- american offensive, which were to sweep away the defences of the serre and the aisne. between these two manoeuvring wings liaison was to be maintained by the interior armies (french x. and v.). the operations began on the wings, from oct. 15, and the enemy succeeded in holding his ground with the aid of forces taken from his centre. thereafter set in the battle of the serre, in the course of which the french x. and i. armies wore out the enemy to such a degrce as to place him at the mercy of a new offensive by the wings, which was to be successively renewed against each of the water lines held by the enemy. hunding position captured —the french i. army, charged with the difficult task of simultaneously supporting the attack of the british armies and manoeuvring by the right to turn the enemy resistance on the line serre-soissons, carried the hunding position between the oise at mont d’origny and the serre below assis. at the same time the x. army, attacking on its right, took verneuil-sur-serre, notre-dame cde liesse and crossed the drainage canal between vesles and pierrepont. under this double menace the enemy, on oct. 27, evacuated a large stretch of ground between guise and crecy-sur-serre. the french v. army, attacking west of chaumont porcien, had on oct. 25 wrested from the enemy the last portion of the hunding posi- tion between st. quentin and the aisne. the manoeuvre of the left wing, by which foch intended to break down the line of the aisne, was thus well under way at the end of october. opera- tions on the right wing had opened disappointingly for the american j]. army, but a successful attack was launched on nov. 21; and in the first days of nov. the enemy, shaken by the assaults of the british and threatened on both wings, began his general retreat from the dutch frontier to the foot of the meuse banks. by his capitulation on nov. 11 he was to escape from the decisive attack that was being prepared in lorraine for the 14th. | french offensive in lorraine.—as soon as the first successes of gen. fayolle’s and gen. maistre’s groups of armies between amiens and reims had been achieved, the commander-in-chief had instructed the eastern group (de castelnau) to begin to pre- pare for operations of the same nature. from oct. 7 to tg an initial scheme for a large scale offensive had been studied. on the 2rst, foch decided to attack east of the moselle as soon as possible, “so as to profit by the favourable opportunity afforded by the enemy’s weakness in that region and his general lack of reserves.” instructions were sent to de castelnau to attack be- tween seille and sanon by mangin’s x. army, which was pre- viously to be withdrawn from the reserve group of armies. the attack was to be covered towards metz by the american ii. army, and towards the region des etangs by the french viii. army (gerard). the offensive was to be exploited in the general direction of morhange-sarreguemines; and surprise was to be 963 obtained by the employment of a large number of tanks. these instructions were confirmed by an operation order of nov. 6, which provided for the participation of the viii. army in the exploitation movement on sarreguemines. allied plan for nov. 14.—on the same day, gen. mangin established himself with his general staff at tantonville, while the concentration of the troops went forward in secrecy. but there was not another moment to lose. the general retreat of the enemy became more evident and foch pointed out on nov. 5 “the evident advantage of opening the lorraine offensive as soon as possible, remembering that the importance of the means matters less than the moment of the attack.’? without wasting further consideration on the transport crisis or the exact num- ber of american divisions that would be available, therefore, the attack was to be made on a definite date with whatcver forces had been assembled by that date. the offensive was to be launched on the morning of nov. 14 with 28 divisions (six american), three cavalry divisions, powerful artillery and 600 tanks. to this mass attack the enemy would be able to oppose only six divisions (three landwehr). the unequal distribution of his forces on either side of the ardennes mass, which was difficult to penetrate, the loss of the hirson-mezicres railway by means of which he had formerly been able to make play with his reserves, and above all the binding effects of the allies’ gencral offensive, put him at the mercy of an attack in lorraine. noth- ing but capitulation could save him from complete disaster. pursued by the allies, fleeing in confusion, without supplies, with rebellion in its rear and revolution in germany, the german army, now incapable of serious resistance, signed that capitula- tion on nov. 11. blbliography.—f, b. maurice, the last four months, 19018 (1919); l. madelin, bataille de france, 21 mars-11 nov. 1918 (1920); u. m. mangin, comment finit la guerre (1920). (see also world war: bibliography.) (e. r.) vienna, austria (see 28.50), with a population of 1,863,783 in 1923, is now the capital of the austrian republic, 28:5 °, of whose population live in the city. under the constitution of the austrian republic the city of vienna became an autonomous federal province (land); its municipal council receiving the status of a provincial diet. although no longer the chief city of an em- pire, vienna is still the commercial and intellectual centre of southeast europe. during and immediately after the world war the distress in vienna was greater than in any other great european city; but following the application of the league of nations reconstruction scheme to austria, the position improved. foreign relicf was no longer distributed, and the position, although the improvement was largely duc to borrowed money,. was not unpromising. less trade has been lost to the capitals of new states than was at one time expected: vienna in particular has been for centuries a commercial centre, and the banks, personnel, offices, etc., are not easily transferred elsewhere. the export of luxury goods is. important, and the transit trade with southeast europe is. increasing; the intermediary trade in forcign goods that do not even enter in transit is growing as vienna remakes its former business connections. the international fair, which has been restarted, has been successful; it is claimed that it is second only to leipzig on the european continent, and is more inter-: national in character. film making is now one of the chief industries. housing conditions, very bad before the war, were. still a great source of difficulty in 1925, but a number of garden suburbs had been erected with the help of the co-operative land settlement movement, by which houses are built co-opcratively; and the municipality had also spent large sums on cottages and tenements. the municipality is wealthy, since so large a pro-- portion of the people of austria live in vienna, and has spent largely on city improvements, social welfare, public health, education, etc. several fine public parks have been made from gardens formerly in imperial possession. parts of the hofburg, the huge imperial palace, have been turned into offices and shops, and the larger halls are let out on hire. the schenbriinn palace is now a popular resort. the city belt railway is in process: 964 of electrification, and a new bridge over an arm of the danube was opened in 1925. the bodies of beethoven and schubert have been transferred from the old wihring cemetery (re- opened as schubert park) to tombs of honour in the central cemetery. vigeland, adolf gustav (1860- ), norwegian sculp- tor, was born at mandel in south norway on april 11 1869. in early youth he received instruction in wood engraving and in 1889 at christiania (oslo), produced his first work as a sculptor, a relief depicting incidents from the j/iad. he afterwards travelled widely and studied technique under skeibrok in chris- tiania and bissen in copenhagen. vigeland’s subsequent work deals almost entirely with the primitive emotion of men and women. as his genius developed he forsook his earlier semi- impressionistic form of arf and adopted a more classic style. his chief work ‘ the fountain,’ which was commenced in rgrs, is still unfinished (1926). it was intended, when com- plete, to consist of 26 large groups of stone and a multitude of minor figures in bronze; the whole depicting the history of man- kind, through its vicissitudes from barbarism to civilisation. vigeland also achieved a wide reputation as a portrait sculptor and was commissioned to execute busts of many prominent men. see m. g. vidalene, l’art norvegien contemporain (paris, 1921). vilde, eduard (1865- ), estonian author, was born march 6 1865. he attended the german revel district school and from his youth he devoted himself to publicist activities as a journalist and author. in 10905 he travelled extensively in europe, and after the russian revolution of that year, he emi- grated to copenhagen. in roro he visited america, on which he wrote some satires (afuiged, 1914). in 1917 he returned home and, three years later, was appointed first ambassador of the estonian republic to berlin. vilde composed some to long prose works, including a series of voluminous and valuable novels, also two plays, pisuhdnd (dragon) and tabmata ime (the unattained miracle). his fiction is of a high order, and deals chiefly with estonian social problems. his best novels are: afantra seda, dealing with economic unrest among the estonian peasantry in the middle of the roth century; proh- wet maliswet (prophet maltswet); aiilmale maale (the cold country of siberia) and afdekula pitmamecs (the milkman of miaekula). villard, oswald garrison (1872- ), american eclitor and publisher, was born at wiesbaden, germany, of american parentage, march 13 1872. after graduation from harvard university (a.b., 1893) he was appointed assistant in u.s. his- tory there, but resigned in 1896 to take up newspaper work. he was a reporter on the philadelphia press, 1896-7, in which year he joined the editorial staff of the new york evening post, be- coming ultimately president of the company. he also became interested in the new york nation. in july 1918 he sold the post, retaining his connection with the nation, of which he was editor. he also owned the nautical gazette, new york city. he wrote john brown~—-a biography fifty years after (1910); germany embattled (1915); and newspapers and newspaper men (1923). villari, pasquale (1827-10917), italian historian and statesman (see 28.76), was invested in 1910 with the the order of the annunziata. he died in florence dec. 5 1917. vilna or wilno (see 28.88), a city, lying within a former province of the russian empire of the same name, on the main railway between berlin and st. petersburg (leningrad). in nationality the population (214,600 in 1914), is very mixed, and almost all recent statistics are so tendencious as to be valueless. greater reliance can be placed upon the percentages given in the russian imperial census of 1897. from the political and cultural point of view, the affinities of vilna were equally complicated. in the middle ages vilna had been the capital of the fittle state of lithuania. after the union of lithuania with poland, which brought all parts of the former lithuanian kingdom under polish influence, the city be- came a centre of polish culture. it was at the same time one of the chief cultural centres of the east european jews. the suc- vigeland—vilna 53 0 a ; gs a c census of 1897 8 oa gx v a =r, $ ac mn © “~ |s & | 4 mo for the province of vilna including the clbys <x daas 5:00 | 56-05 | 8-18 17°59] 12°72 | 0-46 for the city of vilna | 20-50 | 30:90 ' 2-00 { 40:30] 2-10 cessive partitions of poland brought vilna under russian rule, together with the whole of lithuania and a great part of poland. the question of the political disposal of vilna therefore did not arise until poland and lithuania re-emerged, this time as sepa- rate and mutually unfriendly states, after the world war of 1914-8. no definite frontier between the two states was laid down by the treaty of versailles. on dec. 8 1919 the supreme council of the allies in paris laid down a provisional eastern frontier for poland, the so-called “ curzon line,” which assigned to poland most territories where the polish element was in a majority, but excluded mixed and doubtful districts, the prin- cipal among these being vilna city and province. meanwhile, during and after the war, vilna was occupied successively by the germans, lithuanians, bolsheviks, poles (who held it at the moment when the curzon line was laid down), the bolsheviks, who retook it during their invasion of poland in 1920, and finally by the lithuanians, to whom the soviet govt. ceded vilna under a peace treaty signed at moscow on july 12 1g20. the subsequent retreat of the russians brought polish and lithuanian troops into collision on the edge of the vilna area; poland appealed to the league of nations; and the league persuaded the lithuanians to withdraw to the east of the curzon line, while obtaining a pledge from poland to respect the neu- trality of the vilna territory east of the line, which was now occupied by the lithuanians. on these terms a polish-lithu- anian armistice convention was signed on oct. 7 1920 at suwalki but on oct. 9 the lithuanians were driven out of the city of vilna and the greater part of the province by an independent polish commander, gencral zeligovski. his action was nom- inally disowned by the polish govt., but vilna has remained since then continuously in polish hands. the league of nations made a number of fruitless attempts to secure a just and satisfactory settlement not based on force and incidentally to reassert its own authority, which had been flouted by general zeligovski’s action. the first abortive scheme was the taking of a plebiscite under the protection of a mixed international force, but in march rozr this was abandoned in favour of direct negotiations between poland and lithuania under the presidency of m. hymans, representing the league. m. hlymans proposed the incorporation of vilna in lithuania as an autonomous canton with special guarantees, on condition that lithuania contracted with poland a permanent military and economic alliance. these proposals pleased neither party, and in jan. 1922 the council of the league virtually abandoned the case in despair and withdrew its commissioners from the spot. meanwhile, in the peace treaty of riga, soviet russia had accepted a new russo-polish frontier running to the east of vilna up to the river dvina; and this line was endorsed by the conference of ambassadors in a decision published on march 15 1923. in the same decision the ambassadors laid down a frontier between poland and lithuania which assigned to poland vilna and the whole district which had been forcibly seized by general zeligovski. lithuania refused to recognise this decision but failed to obtain any satisfaction either from the principal allied powers or from the council of the league of nations. on dec. 14 1925 the polish diet passed a bill unifying the wilno prov- ince with the rest of poland. (sce also liravanta; poland; league of nations.) bibliography.— league of nations, official journal, special sup- plement no. 4; lithuanian government, phe lithuanian polish dispute, aithuanian information bureau, 3 vol. (1922); l’europe nouvelle (april 7 1923); a. j. toynbee, survey of international affairs 1920-3, pp. 250~56. cv]. 2.) vincent—virginia vincent, george edgar (1864- ), american educa- tionalist, was born at rockford, ill., march 21 1864. after graduating from yale in 1885, he engaged in literary work and in 1886 was made literary editor of the chautauqua press. he was president of the chautauqua institution from 1907 to 1915 and thereafter honorary president. in 1892 he was appointed fellow at the university of chicago, receiving his ph.d. in 1896. he taught at chicago as instructor, assistant professor, associate professor, and from 1904 to 1911 as professor of sociology. he was dean of the junior colleges from 1900 to 1907 and then for four years was dean of the faculties of arts, literature and sciences. from rgt1 to 1917 he was president of the university of minnesota. in 1917 he was chosen president of the rocke- feller foundation in new york city; he had been a member of the general education board since 1914. vincent was author with albion w. small of an introduction to the study of society (1895) and the social mind and education (1897). vinogradoff, sir paul gavrilovich (1854-1025), anglo-russian scholar, was born at kostromo, near moscow, and educated at the university of moscow. as a young man he travelled widely, and obtained a working knowledge of at least seven modern languages, before being appointed a professor in his own university. he then interested himself in the zemstvo movement, and was specially keen on improving the provision for the education of the russian people. his activities, however, were displeasing to the authorities, consequently he resigned his professorship and in 1902 settled in england, where he had already made friends with many english scholars. in 1903 he was appointed corpus professor of jurisprudence at oxford, and there he remained until his death on dec. 19 1925. in 1917 he was knighted, and his honours included a fellowship of the british academy. in 1917, on the outbreak of the revolution, he again took part in russian politics, but as the reformers became more extreme in their tendencies his sympathies vanished, and were finally changed into hostility tempered with grief. vinogradoff’s first book was on the origin of feudalism in italy (1887). this was written in russian, but his later works were appropriately written in english, and he became recog- nised as probably the first authority on the early laws and cus- toms of that country. his standard work is villemnage in eng- land (1892), in which he put forward the theory that the anglo- norman manor descended not from a condition of serfdom, but from a free village community. his article “ folkland,” published in the english historical review in 1893, put forward an entirely new theory on this subject. his other works are english society in the eleventh century (1908); the growth of the manor (1905); roman law in mediaeval europe (1909). he also wrote self-government in russia (1915) and outlines of historical jurisprudence (1920-2). he wrote for the encyelo- pedia britannica and the cambridge modern history. at oxford, vinogradoff conducted a seminar which offered a suit- able outlet for his immense store of knowledge. (see russia.) vinton, frederic porter (1846-1911), american por- trait painter (sce 28.101), died in boston, mass., may 19 tgtt.