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    "source_key": "britannica_1926",
    "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926)",
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    "chunk_id": "1926:venezuela:20a9eda1d4da",
    "title": "VENEZUELA",
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    "verified_text": "a republic on the north coast of south america. its area is 398,504 sq. m. and the estimated population on jan. 1 1925 was 2,563,334. the population of caracas, the capital, in 1920 was 92,212; maracaibo, 46,706; valencia, 29,466. venezuela acquired membership in the league of nations in 1920. | venezuela’s constitution of 1922 declared that the republic was composed of 20 states, 2 territories, a federal district and certain islands in the sea of the antilles. it provided that the federal district was to be organised by a special law and should be composed of the city of caracas with the neighbouring par- ishes as well as the department of vargas. it is further stipulated that the territorics of amazonas and delta-amacuro, which were to be organised by a special law, might become states when they fulfilled certain conditions, as when they had at least as many inhabitants as the quota required by the constitution for the election of one deputy to congress. i. political history constitution.—on may 18 19014 a congress of deputies from the venezuelan states adopted a new constitution for their union. that constitution declared that the venezuelan states reciprocally recognised their autonomy and equality, and that they retained all sovereignty not delegated to the central govt. by the constitution. the states agreed to promulgate constitu- tions that would harmonise with the fundamental law, and agreed to see that the national constitution, laws and orders were obeyed. early in june assemblies at the capitals of the respec- tive states ratified the new form of government, which came into force on june 13 1914. this constitution conferred male suffrage on all citizens 21 years of age or over. foreigners who took part in political controversies (confiendas) could be arrested, confined or expelled by order of the president. executive power was vested in a president and a cabinet of ministers appointed by him. the president was to be elected for a seven- year term by vote of congress. among the extensive powers vested in the chief executive were the following: to administer the federal district and the two federal territories; to issue decrees and regulations for the better execution of the laws; to negotiate loans as provided by congress; to grant certificates of naturalisation; to appoint national officials whose appointment was not otherwise provided for; to convoke an extraordinary session of congress; to declare war when authorised by con- gress; to negotiate treaties with foreign nations; and to pro- claim martial law throughout the republic. legislative authority was granted to a congress composed of a senate and a chamber of deputies. the senate was to be compose! of two senators from each state chosene by its legis- lative assembly for three years. the chamber of deputies was to be composed of members chosen from every state and from the federa] district by popular vote for three years at the ratio of one deputy to every 35,000 inhabitants. congress was to mect annually on april 19g at the capital for a session of 70 days. judicial authority was vested in a supreme court designated the corte federal y de casacie6x and in other tribunals established by law. the federal supreme court was to be composed of seven judges who were to be elected by congress for a term of seven years. clauses defining the powers of this court provided that it should take cognizance of accusations against the president and other high officials. it was given jurisdiction over cases involving claims against the nation, cases relating to foreign diplomatic agents in venezuela, cases arising from contracts made by the president and cases involving conflicts between laws or decrees, state or federal. these provisions were retained in the constitution of 1922. events from 1908-—-when in nov. 1908 president castro left venezucla to visit europe, the first vice-president, juan vicente gemez was given the presidential power. in decrees of nov. 23 1908 gemez appointed a general secretary and con- firmed the existing cabinet appointments. on may 3 1909 he issued a decree announcing that he was exercising the powers of president of venezuela, and after suppressing opposition to his venezuela rule, he was acclaimed president dec. 19 1909. under the constitution of 1909, on aug. 27 1910 congress elected gemez constitutional president for four years. in june and july ror1 venezuela celebrated the centenary of her declaration of inde- pendence. during the rule of gemez diplomatic relations with foreign nations that had been ruptured were resumed, and venezuela undertook to pay those obligations to foreign nations upon which payments had lapsed. upon an attempt of ex- president castro to regain power, president gemez issued a proclamation on aug. 3 1913 announcing that he was leaving the capital to undertake a campaign for the restoration of public order. on aug. 4 he delegated his authority to jose gil fortoul, president of the council of government. on jan. 1 1014 he re-entered caracas at the head of his army and reas- sumed the powers of president. according to the constitution the term of office of president gemez ended on april 19 1914. upon that day a congress of deputies from the venezuelan states adopted a provisional con- stitutional statute for the union, which declared that all laws not inconsistent therewith should remain in force. it further provided that this congress should elect a commander-in-chief of the national army at the same time that it elected a pro- visional presilent of the republic. congress was also to frame a new pact of union for venezuela, which should be submitted to the assemblies of the states for approval. the period of pro- visional rule should last until the new constitution had been ratified by the states and until the constitutional functionaries had taken their posts. on the same day congress elected victorino m4rquez bustillos, who had been minister of war and the navy, provisional president, and by a decree of the same day bustillos appointed his ministers of state. congress elected general g6mez commander-in-chief of the national army. on may 3 1915 the congress chosen under the constitution of 1914 unanimously elected gen. gemez president of the republic for the term ending april 19 1922, but the presicdent- elect did not assume the presidency. the provisional president continued to exercise authority while general gomez remained commander-in-chief of the army with the title president-elect of the republic. in may 1922 gen. juan vicente gemez was unanimously re-elected president of venezuela. on june 19 a new constitution was promulgated which made some slight but important changes in the constitution of 1914. articles 137 and 138 of that fundamental law, which stipulated that the pro- visional president and the vice-presidents of the republic should hold their offices until the new magistrates were inaugurated and that the commander of the national army should exercise his functions until the inauguration of the constitutional presi- dent, were omitted from the constitution of 1922. this consti- tution further provided that in case the president should be permanently disabled, he should be succeeded by the ranking vice-president. on june 24 following, general gemez relieved marquez bustillos of the nominal authority which the latter had exercised since 1914, and assumed the powers of president for the term terminating in 1929. on july 1 1923 the president’s brother, gen. juan c. gemez, first vice-president of the republic, was murdered in miraflores palace. in oct. 1923 the venezuelan minister of foreign affairs declared that mexico had severed diplomatic relations with his country alleging that venezuela had expelled a mexican theatrical company. in april 1924 the congress -.of venezuela assembled at caracas. boundary disputes —the boundary dispute between colom- bia and venezucla, which had been submitted to the arbitration of the swiss federal council, was decided in march 1922 in favour of the colombian contention; namely, that she was entitled to take possession of such portions of the territory in dispute as had been adjudged to her in accordance with the decision of the king of spain in-189t. this award also decided that both colombia and venezuela might proceed to occupy sections of territory bounded by natural frontiers which had been adjudged to them by the action of mixed commissions. the boundary line through the contested territory, so far as it had not been definitely settled, was subsequently determined 937 by swiss experts who employed aeroplanes and cameras to map out the unexplored areas involved. defence.—in 1912 venezuela purchased a small vessel from the united states, which was made the flagship of the navy. in 1925 the venezuelan navy was composed of three gunboats and a training ship with a personnel of a few hundred men. the standing army was composed of some 9,000 infantry, artillery and cavalry. in addition there was a reserve estimated to consist of about 100,000 men. by a law published in june 1919 military service was made compulsory for all adult male citizens with certain exceptions. service in the army or navy for two years in peace-time and during war at the president’s pleasure was made compulsory with relegation to the reserve until the age of 45. a decree of april 17 1920 pro- vided for a military aviation schoo] at maracay. fducation.— according to the law of 1921 primary education is free and compulsory between 7 and 14 years. secondary education comprises two courses; one of general study occupying four years, and one of professional study occupying two years. normal training is furnished by two institutions at caracas. among the special schools are schools of commerce and modern languages at the capital and other important cities, besides two schools of industrial arts and trades. higher education is afforded by the central university of venezuela at caracas where instruction is given in medical science, political science, ecclesiastical science, mathematics and physical science. ‘there was a similar institution, the university of the andes, at merida. physical education is compulsory in all schools up to the age of 21. according to the report of the minister of public instruction for 1925, the attendance at educational institu- tions of venezucla for 1924 was as follows: primary schools, 352,337; secondary schools, 9,203; normal schools, 3,664; special schools, 14,762; higher institutions, 4,304; making a total of 384,270. expen- diture on education for 1924-5 was 4,648,345 bolivares. fl. financial and economic history finance.—since 1909 the financial condition of venezuela has steadily improved. the new law concerning public credit which came into force on june 15 1923, introduced reforms in the adminis- tration of venezucla's finances. among other provisions it stipulated that certificates of the internal national consolidated debt which were recetved by the treasury should be burned. the following de- tails of the public debt of venezucla in bolivares as outstanding on dec. 31 1923, are taken from the report of the minister of finance for 1924:— external debt: national three per cent cliplomatic debt three per cent diplomatic debt of 1905 total internal debt: national internal three per cent consolidated 9, 169,490°26 58,948,145 68,117,635.26 debt : 42,647,277 -93 three per cent inscribed debt 2,098,652°50 total 44,745,930°43 the total indebtedness of the venezuelan govt. on dec. 31 1923 thus amounted to 112,863,565-69. the budget for 1924-5 estimated expenditure at 63,354,500 bolivarecs. over one-fourth of this amount was allotted to the ministry of finance and public credit, one-fifth was assigned to the ministry of war and the navy, while more than one-sixth was given to the ministry of the interior. in the budget the receipts of that year were estimated at 66,167,000 bolivares, an increase of 3,322,000 over those for 1923-4. in his message to con- gress on april 25 1925 president gomez stated that the total na- tional debt had been reduced to 99,445,723 bolivares by jan. i 1925, and that on dec. 31 1924 there was in the treasury a surplus of 64,692,080.46 bolivares. the bolivar was relatively stable during the world war. the exchange value of the u.s. dollar measured in bolivares at different dates was as follows: july ig14, 5-30; april 1917, 5:14; april 1918, 4°32; jan. 1919, 4-25; dec. ig19, 5°16; feb. 1920, 5-18; sept. 1923, 5°43; jan. 1924, 5:25; and oct. 1924, 5-18. on dec. 31 1923 there were in circulation in venezuela 35,129,695 bolivares of bank-notes, while the gold reserve aggregated 55,149,749. of the paper currency 25,293,340 bolivares was supplied by the banco de venezuela. a shortage of silver in the circulating media has been met under the provisions of a law of 1918 by the minting of new silver coins. industry and commerce.—agriculture and cotton raising were the chief sources of national wealth, and for 1924 the venezuclan oil- fields showed a successful yield; in 1924 petroleum production was 1,330,912 metric tons. exports of coffee had risen from 52,088,000 kilos in 1922 to 38,436,000 during the first six months of ig24. according to official reports, the total foreign trade of venezuela in 1923 amounted to 309,396,512 bolivares (1 bolivar = $.19295). the imports aggregated 152,692,315 while the exports came to 156,704,- 197 bolivares. the countries furnishing the largest amounts of the imports were in order: united states, great britain, germany, france, the netherlands, spain and italy, while the countries taking the largest amounts of exports were the netherlands, united states, 938 spain, france, great britain and germany. in_1923 the chief exports were valued as follows in bolivares: coffee, 68,945,726; petroleum, 27,321,920; cacao, 23,817,102; sugar, 5,359,123; balata, 4,084,588; hides, 3,515,550; cattle, 1,901,455; gold, 1,300,000; as- phalt, 1,332,940; heron plumes, 1,017,735; and pearls, 740,880. communications.—in 1924 thirteen railways of importance were operating in venezuela. the total length was 645 m., and the con- struction of new, short lines was contemplated. the construction, improvement and repair of venezuclan roads continued to receive much attention from the government. decrees have been issued providing especially for the construction of a great western highway to connect caracas with the colombian border near cristebal, and for the construction of a great eastern highway to connect caracas with venezuelan guiana. wireless communication with trinidad is maintained through the caracas station, which has been im- proved. communication with puerto rico has been maintained through the maiquetia station. the puerto cabello and maracaibo ptations have ceased operations. bes_tiogrrapny.—p. l. bell, venezuela (washington, 1922); l. v. dalton, vevezuela (london, 1922); w. s. robertson, [zzstory of the latin-american nations (new york, 1922); and fspanic- american relations with the united states (new york, 1923); mensaje que el general juan vicente gomez, presidente constitucional de los estados unidos de venezuela, presenta al congreso nactonal en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1925 (caracas, 1925); anuario estadistico de venezuela (annual, caracas); department of overseas trade re- ports, annual series (h.m. stationery office, london); report of council of corporation of foreign bondholders (annual, london). (w. s. ro.) venice, italy (sce 27.995), had a population of 171,615 in 1g2t. an exact reproduction of the famous campanile, which collapsed in r902, was finished in 1912; and the loggetta det cavalieri, which was crushed in its fall, has also been repaired. the city suffered from aerial bombardments in the world war; 620 bombs were dropped, but the damage to its famous buildings and monuments, though considerable, was less than had been feared. the church of santa maria formosa was practically destroyed, but has been restored. the bronze horses of st. mark’s were removed to rome for safety. after the war various pictures were returned to the academia by austria. in 1920 the procuratie nuove, which was first the home of the procurators of st. mark’s and then a napoleonic palace, was given to venice by the italian royal family, and now houses the civic museum of art and history. in 1925 the foundation stone of a votive temple was laid on the lido by the venetian patriarch in fulfilment of a vow made in ror7 that if the city was saved from falling into the hands of the enemy a church would be built in honour of the virgin. a brick from st. peter’s and a piece of rock from the grotto at lourdes have been incorporated in the foundations. improvements to the port—in 1917 plans were made for a new port for venice on the mainland, south of the railway line to padua; in 1922 the canal of approach was opened by king victor emmanuel, and named in his honour, and in 1924 the con- struction of the main works was begun. the port, when finished, will cover twice the area of venice itself, and will consist of parallel moles 3,000 ft. long with docks of 600 to 800 ft. between. two moles will be built at first, with isolated jetties on the canal for oil ships. with the existing docks in venice this will give the port a capacity of 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 tons a year. it 1s hoped that the industrial area, which ts being built behind the docks, will create a considerable volume of trade. behind the industrial area again a garden suburb to house 30,000 is being brought into existence by the municipality. special customs facilitics have been granted for the encouragement of trade in the new port, which, it is thought, will in no way spoil the beauty of venice. veniselos, eleutherios (1864- —+), greek statesman, was born in crete aug. 23 1864 of a family which had emigrated from greece in 1770. having been educated in the schools of syra and athens and having taken a degrce in the university of athens at the age of 23, the future statesman practised law in crete. but following his father’s example and like most mem- bers of his profession in the near east, he soon became a poli- tician, and in the insurrection of 1889 was compelled to flee from the island. after his return and the re-establishment of tran- quillity, veniselos was elected a member of the cretan assembly, venice—veniselos and in 1897 came into prominence as one of the leaders of the cretan uprising; it was he who received the british, 'rench and italian admirals when they came to negotiate a settlement between the insurgents and the turks early in feb. of that year. in dec. 1898 prince george of greece landed in crete as the high commissioner of the great powers, and a few months later veniselos became head of the island executive. but he soon found himself at variance with the prince’s autocracy, and in 1904 a complete rupture occurred. subsequently the veni- selists were defeated at the polls, but the cretan leader organised a revolt, which greatly increased the unpopularity of the high commissioner among a people whom he was misruling. in sept. 1906 the prince left the island, his place being taken by m. alex. zaimis, who was appointed not by the powers, but by the king of greece. from that time until 1909 veniselos was sometimes chief of the cretan govt. and sometimes leader of the opposition. but whilst the cretans often came into sharp conflict with the protecting powers, veniselos’s wisdom and moderation were responsible for the generally friendly relations which existed, and his far-sightcdness, particularly after the departure of m. zaimis in oct. 1908, and during the crisis of 1909, facilitated the union of crete with greece, which ulti- mately took place as a result of the first balkan war. in 1909 the military league headed a bloodless revolution against political corruption and court favouritism in greece and invited veniselos to come to athens. he persuaded king george and the league that the best way out of a dangerous situation would be the revision of the constitution by a national assembly. elections were held in aug. 1910, and veniselos, who had re- mained technically a greek citizen during his cretan political life, took his seat at athens for the first time. the chamber having been opened in sept., a month later veniselos became prime minister. indeed, such was his power at this time that, although faced by parliamentary difficulties, he was in a posi- tion to have brought about the expulsion of the royal family and the establishment of any regime which he thought desirable. but the cretan statesman was bent upon reforms by pacific means, and realising that a fundamental change would be con- trary to the interests of the country, he loyally decided to work with the king and his successors. the constitution was suc- cessfully revised in 1911, reforms in the public services were introduced, and the reorganisation of the army and of the navy were respectively placed in the hands of french and british missions. in the spring of 1912 venisclos was returned to power as the leader of an overwhelming majority in an ordinary cham- ber which then replaced the revisionary assembly. by that time, too, the prime minister was busily occupied with the formation of the balkan league, and on may 29 1912 the greco-bulgarian treaty was signed. other greek statesmen had worked for a like object, and the circumstances may have been more favourable than heretofore, but it is certain that the balkan league would never have come into being except for veniselos’s foresight in accepting the necessity for taking greece into an alliance which had already been made between bulgaria and serbia. whilst the balkan wars and veniselos’s diplomacy led to an unexpected hellenic expansion, the assassination of king george at salonika on march 18 1913 removed a man who had always been in favour of moderation, and placed upon the throne his son constantine, who had not forgiven, and who never really forgave, veniselos for his attitude towards prince george in crete. when the world war broke out, therefore, the position of greece was greatly complicated by the facts that she was bound to serbia by a treaty signed in the summer of 1913; that from the first veniselos was an ardent supporter of the allied cause; and that the king was in sympathy with the central powers. before the entry of turkey into the war, veniselos openly favoured hellenic assistance for the entente in case of that entry, and early in tors the prime minister advocated concessions to bulgaria, greek support for serbia, and greck co-operation at the dardanelles in exchange for the promise of important future compensations in western asia minor. but, veniselos though he appears originally to have approved of the idea, the king vetoed veniselos’ decision to accept this offer, and he was forced to resign, though he possessed a strong majority in the chamber. in the election which followed in june the veniselist party secured the return of r90 deputies out of a total of 316, of which the chamber was then composed. in spite of this, and with the excuse of the king’s illness, veniselos was not recalled to power until after the mecting of the chamber in aug. and by that time the situation had become seriously modified. the entry of italy into the war, helpful as it was, complicated the position of greece, the attack upon the dardanelles had proved a failure, and developments in the balkans were reacting seriously against the allied cause. serbia managed more or less to hold her own during the first year of the war, but now a fresh austrian invasion was imminent, and bulgaria, whose support the allies had failed to gain, was pre- paring to throw in her lot with the central powers. in equity, if not in actual law, the entry of bulgaria brought into operation the greco-serbian treaty of 1913 and necessitated the support of serbia by greece. bulgaria mobilised on sept. 19 1915, and a few days later veniselos had an audience with the king, at which his majesty reluctantly consented to a greek mobilisa- tion and to a greek request that the allies should furnish an army of 150,000 men to take the place of the contingent which ought to have been supplied by serbia under the treaty. immediately after the original allied landing at salonika on oct. 1 veniselos secured a vote of confidence during an historic and stormy meeting of the chamber, when he declared that if in aiding serbia greece was brought into contact with germany she would act as her honour demanded. in spite of a formal protest against the allied passage through hellenic territory, this speech led to the second dismissal of veniselos and to the open and final rupture between that statesman and the king, who, it would seem, always intended to withdraw his consent to an iicllenic entry into the war. zaimis, the new prime minister, maintained his position for a month as a result of the patriotism of veniselos, his friend from cretan times, but, with the accession of skouloudis to power, on nov. 6 the chamber was dissolved and a new election ordered for dec. 19. as a protest against what was the king’s infringement of the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitution, veniselos called upon his party to abstain from the polls, and therefore, whilst m. gounaris secured an overwhelming majority for his policy of neutrality, the fact that m. veniselos was able to prevent a large proportion of the voters from taking any part in the election proved the then existing strength of his party. veniselos spent that winter and spring (1915~6) in endeavour- ing to compel the king to change his point of view. but the surrender of eastern macedonia to the bulgarians in the summer of 1916 and the delay in the success of the allied campaign at salonika had strengthened the position of constantine, and on sept. 25 1916 veniselos, together with his principal supporters, sailed for crete, whence he sent out proclamations calling upon all true patriots to flock to the standard of the entente. pro- ceeding thence to salonika, early in oct., he founded a provi- sional govt., which was recognised about two months later by great britain and france, though not by italy. a call for vol- unteers was responded to by the inhabitants of those parts of greece not in constantinist hands, and thousands of volunteers were soon gathered at salonika, but the royalist govt. countered this and other developments by causing a solemn anathema to be pronounced against veniselos by the archbishop of athens. after the dethronement and enforced departure of king con- stantine, veniselos returned to athens on june 26 1917, and took over the government of the whole country. the june 15 chamber was convoked, a general mobilisation was ordered, and greece formally entered the theatre of hostilities upon the allied side. but the removal of the king, the successes of the central powers, particularly in the balkans, and an increased greek desire for neutrality, backed up by german’ propaganda, were responsible for a great diminution of the prime minister’s popu- larity. thus, whereas the entry of greece into the war mate- 939 rially favoured the allied position at salonika, and whereas hellenic contingents co-operated in that area, the officers and functionaries whom it was necessary to retire on account of their political views formed a dangerous element in an opposi- tion which became ever more and more active. between the armistice of nov. 1918 and his fall two years later, veniselos and his colleagues, who represented greece at the peace conference, were almost continuously absent in paris and in london and, during this period, it appeared that the widespread influence of the premier would secure for his coun- try a success to which even her most ardent admirers had never even aspired. about the end of april 1o19 the greeks were permitted, or encouraged, to land at smyrna; a year later the conference of san remo promised large areas to greece, and the treaty of sevres (aug. to 1920) coupled with the earlier treaty of neuilly (nov. 27 tor1g) seemed destined to promote that country from a position of secondary balkan importance to one of international significance. during this period, too, the hellenic representative won such admiration and played so brilliant a part that he became a leading figure in the counsels of the allies. nevertheless, at a moment when his triumph appeared to be complete, and when he might have been expected to be a greater hero at home than abroad, an attempt was made upon his life at a paris station (aug. 1920), and three months later (nov. 14) he received a crushing defeat at the hands of the greek electorate for whom he had worked so hard. opinions have been, and are, widely divided as to the reasons for veniselos’s political downfall. it has been attributed to the unpopularity of the war in asia minor and to the consequent continued mobilisation, and it has been ascribed to a determina- tion on the part of the people to regain what they called their liberty. each of these factors played its part, but the decision was influenced primarily not by the foreign but by the broader aspects of the home situation. thus the facts that veniselos had been maintained at salonika, that he was brought back to athens in 1917, and that he was kept in power there largely by foreign support, were resented by the people. moreover the re-assembly and particularly the prolongation of the chamber of 1915, the maintenance of martial law, the bad administration carried on by the subordinates of the premier while he was abroad, and the formation of and injustices practised by the “ corps de la sirete ” were responsible for widespread ill-fecling. furthermore, the continued absence of the premier and the unreliable information then supplied to him caused him to lose touch with the electoral atmosphere, and gave him a confidence which was entircly unjustified. and, lastly, there was the popu- larity of constantine, gained in the balkan wars and greatly increased by his enforced departure from athens in 1917. this was always a matter of fundamental significance, but after the unexpected death of the young king alexander, as a result of a monkey’s bite, immediately before the election, the dynastic question, open mention of which had previously been prohibited, was brought into the forefront of the political struggle and, in what then became the direct issue between constantine and veniselos, the king won an overwhelming victory. from the arrival of the king in athens on dec. 20 1920, until his final abdication and second departure on sept. 30 1922, veniselus took no official part in greek affairs, though he con- tinued to use his international influence in order to endeavour to mitigate the results of the asiatic disaster, the seeds of which he had sown by his own policy. after the revolution (sept. 1922), however, veniselos for a time undertook the representation of greece in western europe, and in that capacity he voiced the interests of his country during the long-drawn-out conference of lausanne which culminated in the peace signed with turkey on july 24 1923. in the following dec., when the publication of that document and various other events had aggravated the existing internal dissension and when the election (dec. 16) had again given his party a majority, veniselos was persuaded to return to athens, where he arrived on jan. 4 1924. king george was already then on leave of absence, veniselos was prime minister from jan. 11 till feb. 4, when he resigned on the advice 940 of his physician, and a great struggle centred around the future constitutional system. veniseclos favoured a republic, should a plebiscite support its establishment, and about a fortnight after his departure from athens on march 10, this alternative was declared to have been adopted by the chamber, which secured a mandate for its policy at a plebiscite held on april 13. veniselos, who spent the greater part of his leisure from 1921-6 in france, was left a widower with two sons (kyriakos b. 1893 and sophocles b. 1895) in 1895. on sept. 15 1921 he married miss helena schilizzi, heiress of a greek chiot family estab- lished in england. bibliography.—-c, kerofilas, eleftherios venizelos, his life and work (eng. tr. 1915); s. b. chester, life of venizelos (1921); fy a; gibbons, venizelos (1921); w. miller, a flistory of the greek people, 1821-1921 (1922); the vindication of greek national policy, speeches delivered in the greek chamber aug. 23-26 1917 (eng. tr. london, 1918); ‘‘ the internal situation in greece and the amnesty of political offenders” (speech in greek chamber april 23-may 6 1917); greek bureau of foreign information, london (eng. tr. 1920). (h,. c.. wo.) ventilating: see heating and ventilating. verdun, battles of. from the east is confronted by a series of ridges between the moselle and paris. the second of these ridges is formed by the historic escarpment 400 metres in height, above the meuse and called the heights of the meuse. here is placed the fortress of verdun, one of the main barriers on the road to paris. the reduction of this position was one of the main aims of the germans, especially after their failure to break through in the early months of the war. the following account of their efforts is presented in four sections, entitled respectively: i. verdun before 1916; ii. the first battle, feb. 1916; iii. the second phase, march-sept. 1916; and iv. verdun set free. i. verdun before 1916 in order that the strategic importance of verdun may be duly appreciated, its position in the general french defensive scheme must be briefly described. history of the fortress.—after the war of 1870 gen. sere de rivicre, who was entrusted with the task of organising the frontier defences, constructed a protective curtain stretching from verdun on the north to toul on the south. fortresses guarded the routes between these two places. the forts at genicourt and troyon covered the bridges of dieuc and lacroix. the battery at paroches dominated the pass at shada. the fort at the camp of the romans dominated the road to st. mihiel. further south the forts at liouville, gironville and jouy jinked up with toul. on this rampart of the heights of the meuse verdun formed the northern muzzle, opposite the fortified camp at metz some 4om. away. the railway from paris to metz passes within the precincts of the fortress by the tavannes tunnel. the fortress was planned so as to form the principal line of resistance towards the north —on a cross ridge on which were the forts of froide terre, douaumont, and hardaumont. on the east, on a line following the crest of the cliffs, were the forts of vaux, la laufee and moulainville. the line then turned south on a cross ridge, the ridge of rozellier, east of the meuse along the dugny and landrecourt ridges on the west. the line then closed on the west and north on the ridges of the left bank by the forts regret, sartelles, choisel and bois-bourrus. a second line of defence on the right bank, behind the first, was flanked by the fortifications at belleville, saint michel, souville and belrupt. the core of the position consisted of an old forti- fied enclosure of vauban’s time and a citadel dating back to henry ii. galleries hewn out of the rocky foundation of the citadel, with workshops, bakeries, stores of food, water pumps and barracks formed a subterranean city safe against bom- bardment. verdun in 1914.—at the beginning of the war the fortress was an independent command. after the battle of the frontiers the iii. army in retreat based its right upon it and, pivoting round it, finally faced west on the crown prince’s flank. the latter then sought to turn it by a southerly move along the ventilating—verdun, battles of valley of the ornain, but on the morning of sept. 13 1914 was obliged to retreat by the defeat of the german armies before paris. the french lines were then established 10 km. north of verdun and the point was quiet for nearly 18 months. at the southeast of verdun where the heights of the meuse slope east to the plain of woevre, a stiff but indecisive fight took place in the spring of 1915 for the observatory of les eparges. i'rench and germans remained face to face along the crest. further south, in the area of st. mihiel, by a surprise attack on sept. 20 1914 the bavarians penetrated to the camp of the romans and gained a foothold on the left bank of the meuse in the barracks of chauvoncourt. the french iii. army on one side and the i. army on the other, checked the bavarian success by operating on their flanks. the bavarians stabilised their position in the woods of chevaliers and mouilly and to the south in the woods of ailly. the german lines remained huddled up opposite st. mihiel. west of verdun the crown prince attempted to reach the argonne in the direction of varennes and forced the french lines back to the edge of boureuilles and vauquois. the verdun-boureuilles line had the grave defect of exposing the main supply line for verdun to enemy fire from aubreville. status of the fortress changed.—the autonomy of the great fortresses was cancelled on aug. § 1015 in order to make their garrisons and equipment available for the armies in the field. dunkirk, verdun and belfort, the three great fortresses on the area of battle, became fortified regions linked up with the armies. the fortified region of verdun (r.f.v.) was placed under gen. herr, who ranked as an army commander. his headquarters were at dugny. the r.f.v. was at first part of the group of armies of the east, but on feb. 1 1916 was attached to the group of armies of the centre—then commanded by gen. langle de cary whose headquarters were at avize. on feb. 10 1916 gen. herr had available seven divisions with one in reserve, and two territorial brigades. on the left hand, the 29th and 67th div. formed the bozelais group. on the right bank the xxx. corps, with two divisions (72nd and 51st) was on the heights. the 14th div. with the territorial brigades was to the east in the plain of woevre. the ii. corps was in support from fro- mezey to paroches. the 37th and 48th divs. formed the reserve. these dispositions were laid down by the instructions of aug. 9 1915. they were entirely defensive in nature and sought to secure the front between the army of humbert on the left and the army of roques on the right. germany selects verdun for attack—about christmas 1915 gen. von falkenhayn submitted to the german emperor a report setting forth the views of the german staff as to the campaign of 1916. the report urged that france had reached the limits of exhaustion. russia was powerless, serbia destroyed, italy deceived, though all were sustained by the will of britain who was fighting against germany as she had fought against napoleon. unfortunately it was not easy to reach britain effectively either in her distant possessions by operations which could never be decisive, or on her own soil, or on the continent. in flanders, no attack could be made before the middle of spring. the ground was too difficult. between arras and the ’s front—an offensive would take 30 divi- sions. germany could gather only 26 divisions, to be used all together, and this would expose dangerous points on the front. it was impossible to attack britain directly. she would be defeated if the allied armies on the continent were broken. where, then, was this to be done. defeat of italy would have little effect on england. opcrations against russia could not begin till april and then only towards the ukraine where com- munications were lacking and a flank would be exposed to rumania. the only possible line of attack was against trance. it was not necessary to attack or break through in force, which would be costly and stood condemned in the light of the recent failure in champagne. behind, but close to, the french front were positions of such importance that they would have to be held to the last man. operations on a limited scale would not involve very large forces and germany had reserves enough to mect all emergencies. this reasoning led to the battle of verdun. verdun, battles of sy buf rm» j ay pre zo _ ae a a ty aa, ~ <a ps oil sees bi mort homie 2958 = rer at sat ry, ~ sener atc) eet a” froide terre dowaumant hardaumont vaux lalaufee moulainville regret sartelles thersef beis-bourrus belleville st michel souville belrupt haudainville dugny genicourt troyon liouville &rronville med f fhaumont is telm fiequarity tteee ze nes ssxafredr-seeonnnewn= the german command sought to force the french to accept battle under conditions of forced defence—conditions which the art of war shows are fatal to the defender. the two objectives which realised falkenhayn’s conditions were belfort and verdun. the capture of belfort involved the evacuation by the french of upper alsace. verdun, however, was important for three reasons. from verdun the french could launch an attack, similar to that contemplated by the germans, upon the germafi communications. ‘ verdun,” said falkenhayn’s report, “‘is the strongest starting point for any attempt by the enemy to threaten the whole german front in france and belgium with relatively small forces.” the french lines were but 12 m. from the german communications. throughout the war german headquvarters dreaded an allied attack starting from verdun, and with justice since it was from verdun that marshal foch hurled the great american attack on sept. 25 1918 (see victory, advance to). french preparations.—an attack on verdun had been fore- seen by the french side. col. driant, deputy for nancy, who commanded a group of chasseurs in the fortified region of ver- dun, at the bois de caures, wrote to the minister for war that the decisive blow would be struck on the line verdun-nancy. the defensive organisation of verdun was very incomplete. it could hardly be otherwise. gen. herr, by the instructions of aug. 9 had to link up the iii. army in argonne with the i. army in the woevre. that involved the revision of the defen- sive system of the fortress from a circular scheme to one of a a ag, ’ 4, consenvoye wood § . rh s oe re zb rat je ” ay ws an cutee pa? sao a n. fobecuge ol one sue suet m7 &) i pe li 2 ish sp am ag by louvemont ezomvoux oy / i: i yi dieu aures we zz , merbe wood. ye o41 verdun, battle of english miles 0 l to aon, etres main rail wa hs. main roads hd rests ts fe ville yrood age ofouaymont, fromez “px 3 ls gex. \"7 — io 539 3 ert vy : ‘ae ie confians gee ot kl te a 2. ut '8 9 phevaliers wood 4 | te pad a @ pro och €5 one ei e thaivoncoughy) ») cc ae sur-meuse =< woinbey a ha, series of parallel and successive lines. but the supreme com- mand, disturbed by the thrust of the germans in the argonne, also ordered gen. herr to prepare a defensive position on the left bank in case verdun had to be abandoned. gen. herr could not manage this double programme with his resources and of four positions suggested on the right bank, only the first existed at the end of jan. 1916. on dec. 3 col. driant was in paris and communicated his views to his colleagues on the commission of the army. gen. pedoya, president of the commission, passed the warning to gen. gallieni, the minister for war, who wrote on dec. 16 to marshal joffre inquiring whether all along the front a defensive system of at least two lines had been planned and carried out with such constructional features as were necessary in support. on the 18th joffre replied somewhat confusedly and stated that the improvement of the double line system already existing along the whole front had been ordered on oct. 22, that the organisation of the fortified arcas in the rear of the armies had also been ordered, and that this combination of defensive measures was in process of completion and at a number of points had been completed. he ended thus: “ i consider there is no justification for the fears you express in the name of the government in your despatch of the 16th of december.”’ he complained that the criticisms had not reached him in the proper official manner and offered to resign. xallieni replied on the 22nd that the government hoped that the works still to be completed would be carried out with all 942 speed and care and that the government had full confidence in the commander-in-chief. in order to conceal its plans about verdun the german high command arranged to carry out preliminary measures at several points on the front. the french staff was for long in doubt whether the attack would come in artois or in champagne. but from jan. 1916 french airmen reported enemy preparations on the verdun front. on jan. 16 gen. herr collected all this information in a formal report and asked for a division to reinforce him. this was sent to him. on the roth gen. castelnau, as inspector general, visited the front. in his letter of the 26th to gen. herr, summing up the results of his visit he stated that the first line was in accord with requirements. he ordered the construction of strong points for the reserves and of closed redoubts with counterscarp. the second line was to be strengthened and the defensive works carried to the counterscarp. ii. the first battle on feb. 8 1916 it was discovered that the germans had brought a mass of manoeuvre to the neighbourhood of verdun. a deserter disclosed the presence of the iii. corps and the viii. res. corps. on the rith an intelligence officer reported a concentration of troops on the right bank of the meuse, which included the xv. corps and heavy artillery. the french com- mand at once took precautions. on feb. 13 three divisions of the vii. corps (14th, 37th and 48th) were moved to souilly a march south of verdun, followed on the 16th by two divisions of the xx. corps. on the 20th the commander-in-chief, who had inspected this front on the roth, ordered the i. army to place the 16th div. at gen. herr’s disposition, thus completing the xx. corps. between feb. 10 and 20, 85 heavy guns were added to the equipment of the verdun frontier region, the scene of the future battle. it thus had 388 field guns and 244 heavy guns. french supply problems.—transport questions arose. ordi- narily two standard gauge railways serve verdun. the southern line had been cut by the enemy. the western line would be, and was, cut as soon as operations started. a departmental railway, the meusien line, and a road from bar-le-duc still remained. to maintain supplies for an engagement in which 15 or 20 divisions are engaged, the daily requirements are 2,000 tons of munitions, too tons of supplies and material for each division, say 2,000 tons, and from 15,000 to 20,000 men. the meusien railway at best carried 800 tons daily. on the roth capt. doumenc, com- manding the m.t. service, undertook to carry 2,000 tons and 12,000 men daily in lorries provided that the m.t. service had sole control over the roads. motor traffic was organised on the 20th on railway lines. from the 29th, 3,000, later 3,500, lorries passed in an endless stream along this little road only seven yards wide. 6,000 vehicles passed a given point in 24 hours, an average frequency of one vehicle every 14 seconds. at times the traffic rose to one vehicle every five seconds. in the lan- guage of the war this road was known as the “ sacred way ” (la voie sacree). german dispositions.—verdun was confronted by the ger- man v. army—part of the command of the crown prince, who directed the offensive. the germans had 26 divisions available on the western front. a third of these were kept as a general reserve; 17 to 18 divisions were therefore available for the verdun attack. the german command allotted nine divisions to the first attack, which started from the right bank. fast of the meuse was the vii. res. corps (one division in line, one in support); then the xviii. corps and the iii. corps in echelon of divisions. further east the xv. corps was held in the plain of the woevre, ready on the breach of the french front to hurl itself on the french flank. the 113th div., completing the assault troops, was in support. this mass of manoeuvre had been embodied in the crown prince’s army command and to make way for it, room was made between the ¥. res. corps and the vi. res. corps. the duty of the latter, on the left bank of the meuse, was to attack the french when broken on the right bank and to bar their retreat. thus it was engaged only on march 6. verdun, battles of on feb. 21 1916 at 7:15 a.m. the germans commenced bom- bardment on a front of 25 m. from the bois d’avocourt to etain. it was of unheard of intensity. heavy shell were used in vast quantities, not a shell was smaller than 150 or 210 millimetres. the woods were full of guns which fired ceaselessly with measured regularity. observers from the air ceased to mark batteries on the map. the woods to them were masses of clouds pierced by flashes of lightning. soon the french squadrons were chased from the sky. the enemy had mastery of the air as of the artillery duel. the attack opens.—about 4:45 p.m. the first infantry attack was launched. commandant vouvard remarks that “it is probable that there were strong reconnoitring parties to test the efficacy of the artillery preparations and to seize trenches which had been destroyed. beyond doubt that first day the germans sought to put their infantry im an advantageous position and to get into line for the battle of the next day, by making it pass even the unequal intervals separating the lines.’”” as a fact, the germans, to effect a surprise, had not dug parallels from which to issue and moved from their lines at distances from the french lines which varied from 600 to 1,100 metres. gillet describes their new tactics thus: “ each troop had a specific task, with an objective of limited breadth and depth. before taking hold of it, a wave of scouts was sent forward to test the destruction by the artillery fire. if the destruction were not thorough the scouts retired and further artillery preparation was organised. the attack took place in waves about 80 metres apart. first came a line of pioneers and men with bombs. then came the main body in single fle. then followed a reserve section carry- ing up ammunition, tools, sandbags, and filling up gaps in the first wave. a second line followed in the same order, passing through the first line, supporting it if checked and renewing the assault on their own initiative. the attack should now proceed by encircling movements, utilising cover and passing alorg ravines. thus the centres of resistance would fall one by one. shell fire would support the advance continually. on no account should troops attempt to overcome resistance which has not been broken by artillery fire. units when held up must wait for fresh artillery action.” early german successes —the french line rested on the vil- lage of brabant, then on the bois de consenvoye, bois d’hau- mont, bois de caures, bois de ville and on herbebois. a little in the rear the bois de la wavrille (southeast of the bois de ville) and the village of beaumont had been strengthened with redoubts. on the extreme right the line rested on the village of ornes. before the german attack, what remained of the french trenches was filled with defenders. at herbebois the germans captured the first lines but were stopped in front of the support- ing trenches. the bois de caures was lost but its northern part was retaken during the night. the loss of the bois d’haumont was a serious matter. a french counter-attack on the 22nd at 6 a.m. failed. the line had been pierced. the germans made good use, on the 22nd, of the advantage gained at the bois d’haumont. the village of haumont was destroyed by shell fire and at 5:00 p.m. was attacked by three columns. the main redoubt, built of concrete, collapsed and buried 80 men. the remaining defenders were hunted from the cellars by bombs and liquid fire but rallied at samogneux. bois de ville was lost. bois de caures was then enveloped on the right and left and col. driant decided to withdraw his chasseurs to beaumont. he was the last to leave the wood and was then killed. on the 23rd the village of samogneux was overwhelmed by shells and set on fire but the garrison held on till night fell. on the extreme left the village of brabant outflanked by the german advance became untenable and was evacuated. on the right wavrille and ilerbebois were lost and the front passed along the northern edges of bois des fosses and la chaume. in three days the germans had captured the first of the french positions. each side was reinforced on the 24th. a fresh regiment from the v. res. corps was sent to each of the german corps. the corpson the right which, having gained the greatest success, thereby became as it were a pivotal wing, also verdun, battles of alonsenvoye s bs wood = % 3 oy oat me - =, fof ge? sr. ‘os (eres wood. xi uy a bs, ais g sae. =———s-s = ei] ”? —— a weree ex , o 2 3 4 ki lometres } railways roads lanals english miles ieee sartelles fort 9 recelved a battalion of chasseurs. on the french side the two divisions in line from the 21st were relieved from the left by a division of the vii. corps, on the right by two brigades from the xx. corps. these troops, thrown at night into doubtful positions in the open country, were immediately destroyed. the 24th was the most critical day of the whole battle. on their right, where the germans sought to move out from samogneux, they were nailed down by the french artillery on the jeft bank. but they started a fresh attack immediately eastwards and cap- tured all the line beaumont, bois des fosses, bois des caurieres. further they penetrated towards douaumont along the ravine of the vauche. the second french position was lost in one day. in the eve- ning the situation was so grave that gen. langle de cary, com- manding the centre group of armies, ordered the ii. corps, then closely engaged in the woevre, to fall back on the heights of the meuse. this movement was carried out during the night. that same evening (24th) gen. joffre handed over the opera- tions before verdun to a fresh army, the ii., commanded by gen, petain, who after the battle of champagne had been resting at noailles. the x. army, on relief by the british army, was placed in the general reserve. new french dispositions.—the initial task of the army under instructions of eb. 25 at g:o0 a.m. was to gather together the troops of the verdun area on the left bank and to prevent the germans from crossing the meuse. but on the 24th at mid- night gen. castelnau set out for verdun armed with full powers from the commander-in-chief. he halted at avize, head- quarters of gen. de langle de cary, whence at 5:45 a.m. on the 25th he telephoned to gen. herr to order him to hold at all costs the line on the right bank facing north between the meuse and douaumont and, facing east, on the heights of the meuse. at 7:00 a.m. gen. castelnau reached dugny, the headquarters of gen. herr. gen. petain went on the morning of the 25th to chantilly and thence to dugny, which he reached in the eve- ning. he took charge of the battle on the 25th at midnight. during the 25th, on the french left, the germans advanced phan eu he thier % tylouvemont a ane poivre eicudonont ty ye £-douaumont fort § thiaument farms nee dalgiery se wood fleur mr of de te erre lord freide te pe ysee ville fort inna sac: ; r oa 4 pre an ze q. vannes ti wee ? 1,500 metres south of samogneux up to the mill of cotelettes. further east they captured bezonvaux. a party of branden- burgers crept up to the fort of douaumont, found it empty and took possession of it. gen. de bonneval, commanding the 37th div. on the french ieft on the talon and the poivre hills was afraid of being surrounded and ordered retreat on the belleville hills. this order was only partially carried out. the zouaves held their position on the west of the poivre. on the other hand while the 37th div. retreated, the 39th div. of the xx. corps, going up into the line, passed it and covered the line bras- i{audiomont. | on the 26th gen. petain, at his headquarters at souilly, re- organised the battle plan. he drew a sharp line—bras-douau- mont—which he entrusted to the xx. corps. he divided the area into four sections: (1) under duchesne in the woevre, (2) under balfourier from the woevre to douaumont, (3) under guillaumat astride the meuse, and (4) under bazelaire on the left bank. the artillery as it arrived was divided between these four commands. on feb. 21 it consisted of 388 field guns and 244 heavy guns. ina few wecks there were 1,100 ficld guns, 225 guns of calibres from 80 to 105 mm. and sgo heavy guns. many fresh battery positions were created and linked up by telephone. the french regained the mastery of the air. the soth div. was set to build two defensive positions chosen on the 27th and redoubled on march 2 by two intermediate lines. bridges were built across meuse. three thousand territorials repaired and widened the sacred way. french resistance stiffens—reinforcements arrived. the i. corps was at souilly on the 25th and the xiii. corps at_ revigny. the xxi. corps followed it two days later. the aiv. corps detrained on the 2oth and the iii. corps on the 2gth. between the 26th and the 20th the germans hurled violent attacks against douaumont, using 560,000 men. on the east they reached the position of hardaumont and attacked bois de la caillette. they stopped, exhausted, on the 2oth. it was the first lull for eight days. gen. castelnau deemed the situation firmly held (calee) and returned to chantilly. 944 iii. the second phase the germans failed to gain an immediate decision at verdun. they soon realised that the british army was about to attack them on the somme. at the beginning of april they had to rein- force their front on the ancre by a division. for four months they kept the battle of verdun going with furious tenacity in order to disorganise the attack prepared by the allies in picardy. for the french staff the problem was to hold on at verdun without ceasing to prepare for the somme, to exhaust the enemy as much as possible in advance and to wear him out for the attack on the somme. front of attack extended.—the principal episodes of that | struggle were the capture on march 4 of douaumont after a violent attack on the 2nd. the french entrenched themselves 200 metres south. on march 6, as gen. petain had expected and feared from the beginning, the germans extended the action to the left bank. the attack was made by two corps, the vi. res. and the x. res., the latter taken from the general reserve. on the 6th they captured the hill de l’oie and on the toth bois de cumieres. they were thus enabled to attack one of the pillars of the main line of defence, the mort homme. on the 14th they captured the lower crest of that double hill. the higher crest, peak 295, could be held by neither side and was no man’s land. the second pillar of the french line, further to the west, and known as hill 304, was attackedon march 20 by the 11th bavar- ian div.which took the bois d’avocourt but could not issue thence. while extending his attack on his right, the crown prince also developed it on his left. on march 8 the iii. corps with the 113th div. and two regiments of the xv. corps attacked on the line douaumont-hardaumont. the works at hardaumont were taken. next day the attack was developed further. on the west the vii. res. corps attacked the cete du poivre while the 21st div. advanced on the ravines and crests between the cete du poivre and douaumont. on the east the v. res. corps attacked the village and fort of vaux but met with a bloody reverse, renewed on the 16th and 18th. the germans brought up fresh troops and the battle began again on march 28 on the left bank. it ended on april 8 by the french losing all that remained of their former front line. the new front passed thereafter by the redoubt at avocourt, the first slopes of hill 304, the southern reverse of the mort homme and the north of cumieres. on the right bank on march 31 the germans captured the village of vaux, which had held out till then, and on april 2 took the lake behind the village. then on april 9 the crown prince attacked on both banks on a scale not known since the first attacks in february. on the left bank alone, 11 regiments were involved. the results were insignifi- cant. on the morrow gen. petain wrote in his orders of the day “ the oth april was a glorious day for our armies . . .courage. nous les aurons.” french counter-attacks——on april 20 the french counter- attacked on the left bank in order to clear the mort homme. the goth div. continued the struggle till may 3. the eastern front became practically what it was before the german attack of april 9. but on may 3 the germans renewed the offensive by an attack on hill 304. on the 8th they captured bois camard, west of the hill. on the 13th and 16th they attempted without success to advance from this position. they then organised a new attack on the 18th with a fresh corps, the xviii. res. corps and two divisions of the xviii. and added on the 22nd the 22nd. res. division. this violent battle ended on the 24th with the capture of cumieres. as the germans had no reserves available the tired units could not be relieved and on the 26th they lost a portion of the trenches they had won. on the right bank in front of douaumont, where on the 22nd the french made a vigorous counter-attack on the i. bavarian corps des- tined for the left bank. they held douaumont but their attacks on the left bank were checked. there had been changes in the command. on april 2 the right bank section had been placed under the orders of gen. nivelle, the leit bank under gen. berthelot. at the end of a pp i t , verdun, battles of april gen. petain was called to command the armies of the centre and handed the ii. army to gen. nivelle. the germans, too, from march had divided the field of battle into two sections, gen. von mudra commanding on the right bank, gen. von gall- witz on the left bank. in april gen. von mudra was replaced by gen. von lochow. in july gen. von francois relieved von gallwitz. the allies’ preparations on the somme took definite shape. before all things the germans had to prevent the french from taking part in these operations. for this a new success in the meuse was necessary. germans capture thiaumont and fleury.—the main french line of defence on the right bank was the cete de froide terre— fleury—fort de souville. on the right this position was cov- ered by the fort of vaux, on the left by the crest of thiaumont. it was first necessary to capture vaux and thiaumont. on june 1 these two positions were attacked. vaux was taken on the oth. thiaumont farm, taken by the germans on the st, was recaptured by the french on the 2nd, who lost it again on the oth. german attacks on the thiaumont outworks behind the farm failed completely. they succeeded in establishing themselves on the west and opposite side in the ravine of la- dame. at the same time battle was resumed on the left bank. between may 29 and 31 the germans took cumieres but tried vainly to move out of bois camard against hill 304. on the rsth the french resumed the offensive and recaptured a kilo- metre of trenches on mort homme. time pressed more and more. on june 4 gen. brusilov started a wide offensive in volhynia. in his announcement of the russian victories of june 13 to the troops, gen. joffre said: “soldiers of verdun, to your heroic resistance we owe these victories. from your resistance will spring the victories we are soon to win.” in these conditions the germans attacked the line froide terre-souville on june 21 in the grand style, with 19 regiments. on the west the bavarian corps took the forti- fied post of thiaumont but was checked in front of the fort at froide terre. in the centre the alpine corps captured fleury. on the west the ro3rd div. took the first line of trenches in front of souville but failed before the second line. so serious was the situation for the french that on june 23 gen. petain commanding the armies of the centre warned gen. joffre and suggested moving to the left bank if the enemy reached the counterscarps. joffre’s answer on the 27th was a peremptory order to hold on to the right bank. the turn of the ti1de—meanwhile the preliminaries of the great franco-british offensive on the somme started on june 24 and the actual battle began on july r. on july 11 the ger- mans made yet another attack on verdun—from vaux to sou- ville with 12 regiments. it crumpled up on the slopes of souville the principal objective. on aug. 1 another attack with eight divisions also failed. on aug. 3 the french retook thiaumont and fleury on aug. 4. the germans regained thiaumont on the 8th. throughout the whole month there was local fighting. the last german attack on sept. 3 also failed. the battle of verdun, properly called, had come to an end. from feb. 21 to june 15 the army at verdun had seen 66 divisions on its front. up to july 1 the germans had used up 435 divisions. it is true that they maintained them on the ground by depots situated a march behind the front and left them fighting till worn out. the french artillery fired 10,300,000 rounds with the field artillery, 1,200,000 rounds of medium calibre and 600,000 rounds of jarge calibre. iv. verdun set free on sept. 13 m. poincare handed to verdun the cross of the legion of honour and allied decorations. the ceremony took place in the casemates of the citadel. from that moment began a new phase, that of the liberation of verdun. to a large extent the glory of this feat belongs to gen. mangin. he it was who led the attack on douaumont on may 22. called from the battlefield of verdun on june 22 he was placed in command of group d, which then stretched from the meuse to fleury and was progressively enlarged right up to the cliffs of the meuse. verdy du vernois—vermont on sept. 17 in a report to nivelle he set forth reasons for aban- doning operations in detail and for seeking to free verdun by a plan on broad lines. relief offensive opened.—the first scheme, approved by nivelle on sept. 21, dealt only with an advance up to 300 metres north of the farm of thiaumont. the scheme of the 24th went further and included the fort of douaumont as far as possible. a third scheme, that of oct. 9, covered the capture of the fort of douaumont and perhaps that of the fort of vaux. a form) dable artillery preparation with 650 guns started on oct. 21. the assault was delivered on oct. 24 at r1:40 a.m. by three divisions, the 38th on the left, 133rd in the centre, and 74th on the right. the first waves marched under a rolling fire which progressed according to a set time-table, so that the infantry were as it seemed fastened to a wall of steel. by night douau- mont was taken with 6,000 prisoners. the division on the right had not reached the fort of vaux which -vas evacuated by the germans on nov. 2, the day before the date fixed for attack by the 63rd division. the fortress liberated—in order to exploit this success to the full gen. mangin was obliged to restore his ammunition reserves by continued economy. he intended to attack again on dec. 5 over a front of 10 m. in order to retake at one blow the whole of the former second french line which had been lost on feb. 24. artillery-preparation started on nov. 29 with 750 guns. bad weather intervened. the germans had been warned and the value of a surprise was lost. in order to upset the plans of the french the germans made a violent attack on dec. 6 and cap- tured hill 304. fine weather returned on the oth and nivelle recommenced the artillery preparation. it was a keen struggle — the germans replying vigorously. in the air, too, battle was set. on the 15th at 10a. m. the attack was made. the german barrage started two minutes too late. the attack had started, four divisions—126th, 38th, 37th and 133rd—being in line. by night they had retaken the whole of poivre hill. the line was in front of hill 378, stopped 20 metres south of the farm at cham- brettes, then turned south across bois d’hardaumont and la vauche up to the outwork at bezonvaux. the french cap- tured and destroyed 115 guns and took 9,000 prisoners. this, known as the battle of louvemont, was completed on the 18th by the recapture of chambrettes with a total of 11,387 prisoners. it was the end of the battle of verdun. on the evening of dec. 15 nivelle took over the command of the armies of the north. mangin went to the vi. army. the ii. army was entrusted to gen. guillaumat and reduced from 25 to 15 divisions. the spring passed in organising the area conquered and in making preparations for the final battle. the final battle—in the summer of 1917 petain formulated plans for a series of limited offensives for the purposes of raising | the spirit of the army and decided on an operation on the northern front of verdun on both banks having as objectives, mort homme on the left and samogneux and beaumont on the right. from these positions the line would link up with bezon- vaux through bois le chaume and bois des cauricres. the germans, however, anticipated the french by making an attack on the left bank on june 28 which was followed by fighting right up to aug. 3. the attack planned by petain was delivered on aug. 20 after six days’ heavy artillery preparation. the xiii. and xvi. army corps attacked on the left bank, the xv. and xxit. on the right bank, 16 divisions in all being engaged. mort homme was captured on the 2oth, hill 304 on the 24th. on the right bank hill 344 was taken on the 20th, samogneux on the 21st. more than 10,000 prisoners were taken. beaumont alone remained in german hands. this was the final battle of verdun. bisliography.—h. dugard, batatlle de verdun (1916); m. genevoix, sous verdun, aoetit-octobre i9gr4 (1916); g. jollivet, liepopee de verdun, 1976 (1917); l. gillet, batatlle de verdun, 1916 (1921); see also wortld war: bibliography. (h;.bi*) verdy du vernois, julius von (1832-1910), german general and military writer (see 27.1019), died at stockholm sept. 30 rgro. ee _clatres. 945 verga, giovanni (1840-1922), italian novelist (see 27.1021), . died in rome jan. 27 1922. cos’e il re (short stories) was pub- lished in 1922, and two of his works were translated into english by d. h. lawrence: mastro-don gesualdo (new york, 1923), and ltitle novels of sicily (oxford, 1925). brnliograpehnyy.—laura gropallo, aztort tialiani d’oggi—gtovanni verga, etc. (1903); l. russo, grovartt verga (1920); c. a. levi, autort drammatict ttaliani, g. verga, etc. (1922); n. scalia, giovanni verga (1922). verhaeren, emile (1855-1916), belgian poet (see 27.1023), greatly increased his reputation during the last years of his life, mainly owing to the publication of his chief work poute la flandre, which he wrote from 1904-12 and which in- cludes six series of poems dealing with the memories of his boy- hood, les tendresses premieres; the belgian coast, la guirlande des dunes; various episodes of flemish history, les heros; life in the small towns, les villes d pignons; and the flemish country- side, les plaines and les bles mauvants. the comparison between this great work and the first volume of verse published by the poet in 1883, on a similar subject les flamandes, shows the full development of his technique and of his genius. in 1o11, verhaeren published les heures du soir, a series of intimate poems dedicated to his wife, completing two previous serics published in 1905, les heures de vapres-midi, and in 1806, les heures his tragedy, helene de spartc, was produced in paris in 1912. during the world war, the poet wrote les ailes rouges de la guerre (1916), which contains an ode to rupert brooke, and two short volumes of prose, la belgique sanglanie (1915) and parmt les cendres (1916). he died on nov. 27 1916, a victim of a railway accident in rouen station. selections of verhaeren’s poems have been translated into english by jethro bithell and by alma strettell. an english version of his lore poems has been published by f. s. flint, and the plays have been translated by arthur symons, osman edwards, f. s. flint and jethro bithell.",
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