TABLE TENNIS—TACNA-ARICA QUESTION ABLE TENNIS

table tennis or ping-pongis agame played by striking a small celluloid ball over a net fixed across a table. the ball must be between 43 in. and 43 in. in circumference and between 2/27 0z. and 2f25o0z.in weight. the net is 69 in. high and fixed across the middle ofatable gft. long and 5 ft. wideinsucha way as to project 61n. on either side. the upper surface of the table lies 2 ft. 6 in. above the floor, and must be of such resilience that a standard ball when dropped upon it from a height of 12 in. shall rebound toa height of from eight to nine inches. theracket may be of any material or shape. the server projects the ball from behind his end of the table in such a way that it bounces first upon his side, then upon his opponent’s side of the table. thereafter it is struck to and fro to pass directly over the net, very much in the manner of lawn tennis, except that volleying is not allowed. ‘the scoring is by points (a single service counting as a point), 21 1n each game; the service changes every five points until the score twenty-all, when the players serve alternately and, as at score deuce in tennis and lawn tennis, the winner is then he who first scores two points more than his opponent. the game began to revive in england about 1921, at first through the machinery of the old ping-pong association. the following year that organisation was abandoned and a new body was formed under the title table tennis association. the most important centres of the game in england, loosely knit in the fab- ric of the t.t.a., are the london and home counties t.t.a., the birmingham and district t.t.a., the northern counties t.t.a., the bristol t.t. league and the sunderland and district ping-pong union. the english t.t.a. is federated to the table tennis associations of germany, austria, hungary, sweden and czechoslovakia, in all of which countries its rules are observed with but slight modification. the table tennis association of wales (founded 1923) has certain rules of its own, among which notably is a prohibition of all but wooden rackets, a rule which is copied locally in bristol and sunderland. the modern attacking game is very fast, probably the fastest in the world except ice-hockey. the attacking stroke is usually made with considerable top-spin, the defensive stroke with under- spin. this predominance of varied kinds of spin in the technique of the game has made the rubber-faced racket the favourite among the younger school of players. various modifications of the game have been introduced from time to time, but the rules remain to this day substantially the same as those provided for by the old ping-pong association rules of 1913. notable reforms which have now been rejected by all table tennis players were the attempt, in 1923, to popularise lawn tennis scoring, and the at- tempt about the same date to introduce a form of play in which volleying was permitted (table lawn tennis). a doubles form of the game in which a white line is drawn down the centre of the table, the server serving the striker-out diagonally opposite to him, and thereafter each partner striking the ball alternately— is sanctioned by most national associations. there is already an etiquette of the game which discourages such practices as wear- ing white clothes, which may tend to unsight the opponent. it should be noted that the margin in singles at table tennis between a man and a woman of equal class is as great as at lawn tennis— about half the game. the following are the results of the english singles championship since 1922:— gentlemen ladies 1922 . a. donaldson mrs. scott 1923 . m. coben miss berry 1924 . percival bromfield miss berry 1925 . p. n. nanda miss berry 1926 . s. suppiah miss vasey results of other matches.—1923—england beat wales in london. 1924—england beat wales at cardiff. 1925—england beat wales in london. 1926—wales beat england at cardiff. 1926—in berlin, hungary beat germany and english t.t.a. team. germany beat english t.t.a. team. 1923—cambridge university club beat 713 oxford university club at cambridge. 1924—cambridge univer- sity club beat oxford university club in london. winners, inter- national tournament in berlin—1925, p. n. nanda (london); 1926 —m. mechlowits (budapest). sce p. bromfield, ‘‘ the flick stroke,’’ essay included in 7he a.b.c. of fable tennis, vy j. j. payne (london, 1924); !vor montagu, table tennis to-day (cambridge, 1924). (i. mo.) tabriz, persia (see 26.341), with a population over 200,000, is a commercial centre, and a seat of the carpet-making industry. trade has been depressed in recent years, though a revival of the export of piece goods through turkey has brought the route from hamadan, which connects with the turkish trade route through trebizond, into use again to some extent. a railway to julfa (on the persian-russian frontier), where connection is made with the caucasian lines, was built by a russian company, opened in ror6 and transferred to persia in 1921. in 1923 the line was in very bad repair, and trains were only run occasion- ally when suflicient freight was forthcoming. tabriz became involved in the world war owing to turko-russian conilicts in the vicinity of lake urmia, and was occupied first by turks and then by russians tn 19165. tachometer: sce speed lndicator. tacna-arica question.—the war between chile and peru, begun in 1879, was terminated by a treaty of peace oct. 20 1883, known as the treaty of ancon. article 3 provided that the peruvian provinces of tacna-arica should be held by chile for 10 years, after which a plebiscite would determine the sovereignty of those provinces. the country winning the provinces would pay to the other 10,000,000 chilean silver pesos or peruvian soles; a special protocol would prescribe the manner in which the plebiscite would be carried out. in 1892 negotiations were entered into between chile and peru for carrying out the plebi- scite, but these and subsequent ones were unsuccessful. in 1922, however, at the invitation of the united states, issued at the suggestion of chile and peru, both governments sent repre- sentatives to washington, and a protocol of arbitration was drawn up on july 20 1922 which set forth that the only outstanding questions be- tween the two countries were those relating to the unfulfilled provisions of article 3 of the treaty of ancon, which should be submitted to the united states for arbitration. a supplementary act provided that in case the arbitrator ordered a plebiscite he was empowered to determine the conditions thereof. the arbitrator’s award, dated march 4 1925, decided that a plebiscite should be held, set forth the conditions thereof and the plan for the payment of the 10,000,000 pesos and decided the definite boundary of the terri- tories involved. plebiscite ordered.—in considering whether or not a plebiscite should be held the arbitrator had to determine: first, whether the parties had acted in good faith in not coming to an agreement regarding the special protocol determining the terms of the plebiscite; and, second, whether chile’s administration of the provinces had been such that a free and fair election could be held. the arbitrator decided the first question in the affirmative; and respecting the second, although far from approving the course of chilean administration or condoning the acts com- mitted against peruvians, found no reason to conclude from the evidence submitted that a fair plebiscite could not be held under proper conditions. in order appropriately to supervise and have general control pacific ocean 1:10,000,000 714 over the plebiscite, the award set up a plebiscitary commission acting by majority vote, consisting of three members, one each appointed by chile and peru and the third, who should be president, appointed by the president of the united states, registration and election boards were also provided. the arbitrator also reserved the right to entertain an appeal from the acts of the plebiscitary commission, which was to assemble at arica not later than six months after the rendition of the award, and proceed at once to formulate rules for its own procedure and regulations governing the plebiscite and to fix the time and places for voting. the arbitrator provided that the 10,000,000 should be paid: 1,000,000 within 10 days after the arbitrator’s proclama- tion of the result of the plebiscite, a second 1,000,000 within the following year and 2,000,000 at the end of each of the sub- sequent four years. the customs revenues of arica were as- signed as security. the arbitrator decided that the peruvian provinces of tacna-arica as on oct.20 1883 constituted exclusively the territory in dispute, and that no part of the peruvian pro- vince of tarata was included therein. tarata was transferred by chile to peru on sept. 1 1925, the definite boundary being left for determination to a boundary commission. objections of peru.—on april 2 peru objected to the finding of the arbitrator for a plebiscite, maintaining that the meaning of the spanish text of the treaty of ancon was “‘ upon,” “‘ at ” or ‘‘immediately after ” the expiration of the ro years. peru also requested guarantees for the voting, including immediate evacuation of the territory by the chilean civil and military authorities and their replacement by americans. the arbitrator replied on april 9, pointing out the agreed finality of the award and that the translation complained of was the one submitted by peru. the problem before him was one of substance, of con- struction rather than of translation, a problem which had been debated by the parties long before the arbitration gave rise to any question of english translation. as to americans taking over control of the provinces, the arbitrator found that this re- quest went beyond the scope of his authority under the terms of the submission and the findings of the award. mecting of commission.—the plebiscitary commission met at arica on aug. 4 1925 and drew up its rules of procedure. on dec. 16 chile appealed to the arbitrator from a resolution of the commission making the date of the plebiscite, she thought conditional upon chile complying with certain regulations of the commission. chile took the position that by these regulations the commission exceeded its power and infringed upon her ad- ministrative control of the provinces and that the commission's control over the plebiscite began only with the registration of voters. chile later withdrew the appeal regarding dates, and the arbitrator, in a decision dated jan. 15 1926, permitted its withdrawal. he pointed out at the same time that the sub- mission agreed that the arbitrator should determine conditions of the plebiscite; that he had established a plebiscitary commis- sion for this purpose whose requirements had the same binding effect as if prescribed by him; and that conditions for holding a fair plebiscite became the primary concern of the commission from the very moment of its organisation. the arbitrator held that while the territory remained in chile’s possession and subject to chilean laws and authority pending the plebiscite, the possession and administrative authority were subject to the provision for holding the plebi- scite, the award having stated that the exercise by chile of legislative, executive and judicial power should not go to the extent of frustrating the provision for a plebiscite. the execution of the requirements of the plebiscitary commission was therc- fore but the exercise by both parties of their jurisdiction respec- tively in accordance with their agreement, and was not in derogation of the administrative authority of chile. on feb. 16 1926 the american govt. proffered its good offices to chile and peru in an endeavour to adjust the differences, on the understanding that pending such an adjustment the authority of the plebiscitary commission should be maintained unimpaired. the american offer was accepted by chile on feb. 19, with the proviso that the arbitral award must be sub- tacoma—tactics mitted for approval to the respective constitutional bodies. peru was unable to accept the offer, and on march 11 the american ambassador at santiago submitted a further memo- randum io the chilean govt. explaining his government’s interpretation of the term ‘‘ good offices.”” chile reiterated her acceptance of the offer, and peru having accepted, the secretary of state, through the american ambassador, on march 25, sug- gested that the plebiscitary proceedings should be temporarily suspended, to be resumed later if the differences could only be adjusted by holding the plebiscite. chile and peru appointed plenipotentiarics who mct with the secretary of state on april 6. the secretary made proposals for the division of the territory between chile and peru, for the neutralisation of the provinces, for the transfer of the provinces to a third party and finally a proposal for a corridor to the sea for bolivia, the territory to the north thereof to go to peru, to the south thereof to chile, equitable compensation being mace for improvements, ct cetera. none of these proposals were accepted by both parties. the last proposal was accepted by peru, but chile desired something more definite, namely, the defining of the boundaries of the corridor, and made a proposal setting forth the limits of the corridor. this last proposal was rejected by peru. in the meantime conditions in the provinces had not been im- proved and the plebiscitary commission, being pressed by the chilean member to fix the date for the elections, voted a resolu- tion on june 14 declaring that chile having failed in its obliga- tion to create and maintain conditions proper and necessary for the holding of a free and fair plebiscite, the commission found that this failure had frustrated the efforts of the commission to hold the plebiscite as contemplated by the award and had rendered its task impracticable of accomplishment. the com- mission therefore decided that a free and fair plebiscite as required by the award was impracticable of accomplishment and that the plebiscitary proceedings be terminated. the commission thereupon closed up its work and left the territory after providing that subsequent meetings might be called by the president. (f. wit.) tacoma, wash., u.s.a. (sce 26.347), had a population of 96,965 in 1920, of whom 21,7053 were foreign born, including 1,067 japanese. the population (1925), was estimated at 104,435. by 1925 the harbour provided berthing space for 60 large vessels; 56 steamship lines made it a port of call; exports and imports had about doubled since 1921, both in tonnage and in value (total handled, 1924, 4,156,590 tons, valued at $162,- 317,610); and the publicly owned and operated facilities on the tide flats, commonly known as portacoma piers, were in process of development. industrial development also was rapid. tactics (sce 26.347).—the article tactics in the rot edition of the eucyclepedia britannica epitomised the two outstanding features of modern warfare on land as “ the de- velopment of firepower” and ‘‘the improvement in com- munications ”’—brought about by the railway. the experience of the world war fulfilled and amplified this judgment. the following article traces the development of tactical science since 1914. the stages in that development are sulliciently well marked to justify the division of the article into five sections, namely: i. the effect of modern weapons; il. tactics in 1914; ifl. the artillery bombardment; iv. the surprise attack; and v. post-war tactics. i. the effect of modern weapons the early fighting man had his sword for offensive use, his shicld for protection, and used his legs for movement. the soldier of 1914 had weapons—the gun and the machine gun— infinitely more deadly than his prototype, but he had discarded his protection and he still depended on his legs for tactical movements, #.e.,on the battlefield. the consequence was to tilt the scales heavily in favour of the defending side, and this ad- verse balance was increased by the improvement in communica- tions—for the railway enabled the defenders to rush vast numbers of static fire weapons to any threatencd point, and so tactics 715 bar the attackers’ path. fighting or tactical power is funda- | swing of the pendulum back towards density of formation, a mentally a compound of power to move, power to hit and power to guard; hence the responsibility for the bloody stalemates of 1914-8 lies with the general staffs of europe, in their failure to realise that the development of one element without regard to the others made inevitable the breakdown of the war machine. faced with the deadly reality of modern fire-power, the troops of the warring nations, for want of any form of mobile protection, were forced to fall back on an immobile form—that of entrench- ments. and because of the swollen armies which were the out- come of the teutonic ‘‘ nation in arms ” theory, these entrench- ments soon stretched from frontier to frontier, rendering offensive action as nugatory as it was costly. stalemate predicted.—this blindness of the general stafis is the more remarkable in that a civilian, m. bloch of warsaw, had predicted such a result as long ago as 1897. in the preface to his book the future of war he had said: ‘‘ at first there will be in- creased slaughter—increased slaughter on such a scale as to render it impossible to get troops to push the battle to a decisive issue. they will try to, thinking that they are fighting under the old conditions, and they will learn such a lesson that they will abandon the attempt forever. then, instead of a war fought out to the bitter end in a serics of decisive battles, we shall have as a substitute a long period of continually increasing strain upon the resources of the combatants. the war will become a kind of stalemate, in which, neither army being able to get at the other, both armies will be maintained in opposition to the other, threatening cach other, but never being able to deliver a final and decisive attack. it will be simply the natural evolution of the armed peace, on an aggravated scale. everybody will be entrenched in the next war. the spade will be as indispensable to the soldier as his rifle. the next war will be a long war, be- cause all wars will of necessity partake of the character of siege operations.” the experience of the war in south africa led some students but few soldiers to lend an ear to the forecast of m. bloch. but despite the still stronger confirmation given by the russo- japanese war, the general stafis scorned this ‘‘ amateur” opinion, and continued to predict and prepare for a short and decisive war of rapicl movements. early lessons of the world war—within a few months of the outbreak of war in 1914 not only had m. bloch’s major pre- dictions—stalemate and siege operations—been fulfilled, but also a host of his detailed forecasts. he had declared that after a battle the victors would not be able to pursue and the re- treating force, falling back on new positions a few miles to the rear, would entrench themselves for fresh resistance; that frontal attacks would be impossible without great supcriority of numbers; that the loss in officers would be disproportionately great; that cavalry would not even be able to fulfil adequately their rdele of reconnaissance; that the bayonet combat would be almost unknown; that the commanders would not be able to overcome the problem caused by the very magnitude and un- wicldiness of the machine which they had created, and that the whole tendency of modern tactics was such as to prevent the nations reverting to armies of a manageable size. ‘ the un- wieldiness of the modern army has never been adequately taken into account.” the fundamental defects which have been discussed were, moreover, aggravated by reactionary tendencies which made worse the diflicultics already inevitable through the dispro- portionate improvement of fire-weapons and communications. a study of the french official reglements from 1875 to 1914 sheds a significant light on this point. the doctrine of 1875, issued while the battlefield experience of the franco-german war was still fresh in the memory, approximated more closely than any of its successors to the lessons learnt by the end of the world war. at the end of a war the test imposed by the bullet and the shell has displayed the weak points in the doctrines based on the unreal conditions of peace-lime manoeuvres; the methods in use have been hammered out of the molten ore of battle experience. with every fresh reglement subsequent to 1875 there was a greater reliance on mere weight of numbers and a disregard of the effects of fire—forgetting that in face of machine-guns density of numbers simply means density of corpses killed by concentrated and relentless fire. asaresult the frenchinfantry went to war in 1914 trained ona doctrine which cost them appalling and futile casualties in the early battles. so also with the germans. and the root cause of this homicidal reaction was lack of imagination. not merely the failure to visualise the presence of hostile bullets, but still more the average inspecting officer’s dislike of training ground manoeuvres where he could not sce the troops, his feeling that an invisible attack was no attack. thick waves of advancing men and massed assaults have both a pageantry and a force which impress a mind incapable of picturing the stream of bullets from concealed attacking groups as it is of visualising those waves turned into swathes of dead. ii. tactics in 1914 let us trace the tactical doctrines on which the chicf powers went to war in ror4. infantry was regarded as the decisive arm, and the artillery as primarily for its support during the attack rather than to pave the way for and make possible the infantry attack. to quote the french reglement of 1913: “‘ artil- lery no longer prepares the infantry attack but supports it.” the object in the infantry attack was to build up as strong a firing line as possible, by the infusion of reserves close to the enemy's position and then, having gained superiority of fire, to deliver a general assault with the bayonet. the unreal idea of a fire fight on a definite line followed by a synchronised assault made by troops in the open was embodied in the manuals and practised on the training grounds. for the cavalry, shock action by large masses was still believed possible, especially in the french army, and it is a curious reflection that the one cavalry—the british—who were effectively trained for dis- mounted action, should have furnished the only, rare, examples of shock action. they at least had recognised that attack mounted could only be by small, dispersed bodies. the firearms of 1914.—<as regards weapons, only the germans had adequately appreciated the importance of the machine gun, although the british partially offset their lack of these new automatic firearms by the exceptionally high standard of ritle- shooting developed in their professional army. in field artillery france had the advantage with her famous 75-millimetre, unique in its rate of fire, and the german “ 77” compared un- favourably even with the british r8-pounder. on the other hand germany alone had really developed the heavy howitzer and the high explosive shell, rather because her general staff planned the rapid reduction of the frontier fortresses than because they foresaw trench-warfare. all armies in fact shut their eyes to the lessons of manchuria and neglected the study of field entrench- ments, expecting and preparing for a war of rapid movement and speedy decision. this decision the germans hoped to achicve by a grand enveloping manoeuvre, with the mass of their jorces on the right wing; moving through belgium and northern france with thionville as the pivot of this vast “ wheel.” partly because the younger moltke had whittled away the original plan of schlieffen, partly because the german high com- mand lost all touch with and control of their wheeling armies, and partly because the rapid advance of such masses proved too great a strain on the supply services, the ponderous machine was thrown out of gear by a relatively light jar on the marne. the german right fell back to the aisne line, and there the franco- british pursuit quickly came to a stop in face of entrenched ma- chinc-guns and barbed-wire entanglements—the supcriority of the defensive over the offensive became manifest. the so-called’ “race to the sea’ ensued, with the rival armics in turn vainly sceking to find and turn the opponent’s exposed flank. by oct. 1914 these flanks reached and rested on the sea, and the repulse of the second great german effort, at ypres, established the trench-barrier firmly from the sea to the swiss frontier. 710 the triumph of defensive action —the tactical significance of the next four years hes in the unceasing attempts, french, brit- ish and german, to discover the key to unlock this barrier. while the high commands sought the key in a progressive devel- opment of gun-power and its employment in varied forms, cer- tain more original minds endeavoured to find a revolutionary rather than an evolutionary solution. in the words of field serv- ice regulations, “ victory can only be won as the result of offcn- sive action ’’—a phrase which embodies the experience of war throughout the ages. yet the outstanding fact at the end of the first clash of the world war was the paralysis of the offensive brought about by the defensive power of modern weapons, ¢s- pecially machine guns, and aggravated by wire entanglements. m. bloch had prophesied this paralysis, the russo-japanese war had foreshadowed it, but the military physicians of europe had refused to listen to warnings from one whom they regarded as a mere “ quack ”’ intruding on professional preserves. but as official historian of the russo-japanese war, col. swin- ton, a well-known military writer, had grasped the tendencies of modern warfare, the dominating rele likely to be played by trenches and the machine gun. by a coincidence he had also taken an active interest in experiments with “ caterpillar ” tractors. in the early months of the war he was sent out to france as official ‘‘ eyewitness ” at g.h.q., and was thus in an exceptional position to diagnose the conditions that had arisen. his previous study gave him the source from which to seck the antidote, and his suggestions to sir maurice hankey, secretary of the committee of imperial defence, became the first link in the causation of the armoured trench-crossing ‘‘ machine-gun and wire destroyer,’ afterwards christened the tank. the recep- tive mind of mr. winston churchill, then first lord of the admi- ralty, fastened on the idea, already considered in a more limited form, and his driving force carried it through a period of inef- fectual experiment and official opposition, until at last it took shape in the original “‘ mother ”’ tank of 1916 (see tanks). meantime, however, on the battlefields of the continent, there were a long scrics of attempts to find a more orthodox solution by the ‘‘ weary process of trial and error.’”’ in this article we neces- sarily exclude those which were made to seek a decision in other theatres of war—expcditions such as that to the dardanelles which were aimed at the strategic flank of the central powers, _ far distant from the barred front in france—as these fall under the head of strategy, not of tactics. nor can the limits of space permit us to dwell on innumerable minor innovations in weapons and organisation, most of which tended to still further technical augmentation of fire-ppower. among these were the devel- opment of the hand and rifle grenade, of many types of trench- mortar, the vast expansion in heavy artillery and the replace- ment of shrapnel by high-explosive shell, the increase of engineer and signal troops—all of which were the product of conditions which approximated to siege operations rather than to mobile operations in the open field. even more noteworthy was the vast and rapid progress in the usc of aircraft (see air warfare), first for reconnaissance 1n all its forms, then for artillery observation, later for bombing and fighting, and to some extent for attacking troops on the ground. iii. artillery bombardment the first tactical attempt of note to find a solution to the trench deadlock was at neuve chapelle, march to 1915. by hoarding his slender stock of ammunition, the british command- er-in-chief, sir john french, was able to open a short but vio- lent bombardment on a sector of the german position. surprise was achieved for the infantry assault which followed immedi- ately, but the opportunity was lost by the failure to bring up ‘ reserves in time and because of the narrowness of the front attacked—the narrower the breach the easicr it is to close. german experiments.—lit 1s a curious retlection that while the british thereafter discarded this promising method in favour of prolonged bombardments which negatived the possibility of sur- prise, the germans should have profited by it. meanwhile, how- ever, they essayed a more radical departure from normal methods; | tactics on april 22 at ypres they discharged waves of chlorine gas from cylinders against a sector of the french front where it linked up with the british. overwhelmed by a weapon against which they had no protection, the french sought escape by flight, and for a time a complete breach lay open in the allied line. but the surprise was double-edged, for the german military authori- ties had not anticipated the success and had no reserves at hand to exploit it. the stout resistance of the canadians on the flank of the breach, and their prompt reinforcement, warded off the danger—and the germans lost a golden opportunity. they were more successful in the development of a borrowed method. foiled the previous autumn in their plan of crushing france while holding russia in check, the germans had resolved to seck a decision on the eastern front. here, with the break- down of the much heralded russian steam-roller, a trench stale- mate had set in also, though not as firmly knit as that in the west. falkenhayn, who had succeeded moltke as chief of the great general staff, transferred reserves from france and thus assem- bled a new xi. army of ro divisions on the dunajec front, be- tween the upper vistula and the carpathians at gorlice. this was placed under mackensen, with von seeckt, the head of the german army, as his chief of staff. four hours’ intensive bombard- ment from some 1,500 guns of all calibres ushered in the infantry assault—or rather procession. stunned and surprised, the rus- sians could offer little resistance and by nightfall their front was broken through. prompt exploitation, both in depth and by the other armics on the flanks, led not only to immense captures of prisoners—170,000 in a fortnight—but to a russian retreat which like a snowball grew and gathered momentum until by the autumn it had rolled back to the line riga-pinsk-dubno. had falkenhayn acceded to ludendorff’s pleas and sanctioned his scheme for striking towards minsk, at the main communications of the enemy, russia might have been put out of the war that year, and even as it was the loss of nearly a million men in prisoners alone inflicted irreparable damage on russia’s fighting power. champagne and artois —on the western front the entente armies made their next attempt to solve the stalemate, in sep- tember. the object was still a rapid break-through, but the method differed, and in fact abandoned the essential element— surprise—for such a purpose. a bombardment of three days’ duration—five in artois—certainly reduced the resisting power of the enemy’s advanced troops, but it also gave them ample warn- ing for the concentration of reserves. if the ‘‘ wheel had come full circle,’ reviving in a more powerful and prolonged form the “artillery duel ” of earlier days, it was a vicious circle. the plan was for the main blow to be delivered in champagne while a sub- sidiary attack was launched in artois, thus menacing the southern and western sides respectively of the german salient lens- noyon-reims. it had two further inherent weaknesses: the first, that the fronts of attack were still too narrow; the second, that they were too widely separated to react on each other. — ‘the double offensive was launched on sept. 25. in champagne the germans’ first positions were quickly penetrated, but tn pro- portion as the advance progressed its own force slackened and that of the defence waxed stronger. in artois, the french attack south of lens was soon checked, but that of the british at loos came closer to a break-through. it failed owing to loss of con- trol among the leading troops, the difficulty of communication between the infantry and their supporting artillery once they had penetrated beyond the enemy’s first position, and, above all, be- cause the reserves were held too far back. behind the fronts of attack cavalry masses waited, as at each subsequent offensive, to pass through the breach and carry out the exploitation—which was to prove yet another mirage in the tactical desert of 1914-8. the delaying power of even a solitary machine gun, the extreme vulnerability of the cavalryman, combined to make such exploi- tation an impossible, though sedulously cherished, ideal. doctrine of the limited objective—the failure of the sept. offensives of 1915 widened the cleavage, already apparent, of military opinion into two schools—those who argued that a break-through was still possible if the right lever were found, and those who contended that in default of a genuine new key the tactics nations must reconcile themselves toa war of attrition. for 1916, however, a common ground was found in the adoption of the «doc- trine of methodical advances with limited objectives. this was the natural sequel of the new maxim “ artillery conquers de- fences, infantry occupies them,” a tacit recognition that artil- lery had supplanted infantry as the decisive arm. the depth of ground which could be effectively bombarded fixed the limit of the occupation, and the infantry thus had to halt until the guns could be moved forward. the germans gave the method its ini- tial trial in the battle of verdun, and it had clistinct success in the later months, largely because they regained some measure of surprise by increasing the rapidity of fire and decreasing the dura- tion of the bombardment compared with the entente forces the previous september. an additional reason was their choice of a sector suitable to the method. for the entente offensive on the somme, beginning july 1 1916, the british command also adopted the “ limited objective ” method, combining it with an artillery preparation even longer than before, and so abandoned any chance of surprise. the bat- tle of the somme may also be said to have been the low-water mark of infantry tactics in recent history, the infantry attacking in dense unarticulated lines, or waves, in close succession—which prevented any possibility of manoeuvre, easily lost direction, and were little better than swathes of human grain to be mowed by the enemy’s bullets. in many units it was even a mistaken pride to maintain the “ dressing ” of these lines. there was one new tactical feature, the “ creeping barrage,” by which the artillery lengthened their range progressively according to a time-table based on the calculated rate at which the infantry could advance. the infantry moved as close as possible to the wall of bursting shells, and were thus virtually subordinated to the artillery, being little better than mere “ barrage-followers.” the tactical low-level of the somme was raised somewhat at verdun in the autumn. here, on oct. 24 and dec. 15, the french, under the di- rection of gen. nivelle and the executive command of gen. man- gin, made two ripostes which achieved a high ratio of prisoners and ground captured at a most economical cost. the reason lay partly in exceptional staff-work, partly in a high concentration of artillery with a minimum of infantry, and partly in a greater elasticity of the limited objective attack with a creeping barrage. iv. the surprise attack the chief tactical significance of 1916 lies, however, in the de- but of the tanks, in the somme battle on sept. 15. contrary to the advice of their sponsors, the tanks were used in driblets as soon as they were available, instead of being kept until a large quantity were ready to attempt a surprise on a large scale. asa result of minor technical faults and tactical mishandling they achieved only a limited, though promising, success. in a memo- randum of feb. 1916, col. swinton had outlined their correct employment and tactics, but nearly two years were to pass be- fore this was put into practice, at cambrai. 1917.—the opening of 1917 saw a reversion to the “ break- through ” idea. the contrast of the bright autumn successes at verdun with the duller and slower progress, at heavy cost, on the somme, had thrown the “ limited objective ” method into public disfavour. jofire was superseded as generalissimo by nivelle, who, on the aisne in april, tried to apply the verdun method toa large-scale attempt to breach the german defences “‘ at a rush.” its inherent fault was that the decisive blow was aimed before the enemy’s reserves had been “ fixed ” or worn down. the experi- ment failed, and nivelle gave way to petain. for the remainder of the year the british army bore the brunt. the battle of arras showed little originality and the initial profit was squandered by continuing the offensive too long. the capture of the messines ridge was a perfectly executed model of the “‘ iimited ” methed, but was only intended as a prelude to the offensive which began on july 31. tactically, this grim struggle is distinguished by two features. the first was a positive development in defensive tactics by the germans, who based their resistance on a framework of machine guns in concrete pill-boxes, replacing quantity of man-power by 717 quantity of fire-power, and the old linear defence by a dispersed system of strong points disposed in great depth. the men, thus saved, from the wasteful rele of acting as human stop-butts for the attacker’s bombardment, were held in reserve and used for counter-attacks. deserved success crowned the originality of this break-away from the pernicious idea of sacrificing men rather than lose a yard of ground, and the substitution of an elastic method, which by combining the principles of concentration and security was better economy of force. the second feature was the negative lesson that the more pro- longed the bombardment the more it stultified its own object, by rendering impassable the ground which the advance was to tra- verse. the bombardment destroyed the intricate drainage sys- tem of the ypres area and so converted it into a swamp. tanks.—the outcome of this lesson was the new method initiated by the british in nov. (see cambrai, battle of), whereby the vital element of surprise was regained through the release of a swarm of tanks without a preparatory bombardment. if the astonishing initial success was not exploited, owing to lack of reserves, the cambrai method supplied the long-sought key to the trench deadlock. eight months were to pass, however, before the key was to be turned in the lock, and in the interval the tacti- cal interest shifted to the german side. german abandonment of the mass attack —with russia out of the struggle, the german command sought a decision in the west before the swelling volume of american reinforcements could redress the balance, now against the entente. lacking tanks, ludendorff was compelled to attempt a solution by the improved use of existing methods—wider frontages of attack, the prompt infusion of reserves, new infantry tactics, and an artillery preparation which should be short enough to ensure surprise but compensate its brevity by its intensity. the keynote of the new infantry tactics was infiltration and manoeuvre by the little dis- persed groups of automatic riflemen and machine-gunners. in- stead of thick lines breaking themselves against the defender’s posts, these groups penetrated between and pushed rapidly on, while the “ islets ’’ of resistance, cut off from help by the advanc- ing flood, were outflanked and reduced by fresh troops from the reserve. instead of the old massed blow the object was rather the filtering of the attacking force into the enemy’s defensive system, crumbling it away. the concentration of troops acted as a reservoir for supplying the multiple jets, not as a wave to sweep over the defence. the first offensive was launched on a 47 m. front north and south of st. quentin, on march 21, aiter an intense bombard- ment of only five hours, in which full use was made of gas and smoke-shell. the able organisation of the attack and the rapid infantry exploitation resulted in a real break-through. the as- saulting divisions were only brought up the previous night, for secrecy, and a continuous “ leap frogging ” of reserve divisions through exhausted leading divisions mamtained the momentum of the advance. but the new tactical doctrine of reinforcing along the line of least resistance led, as it happened, to an altera- {ion in the strategical direction—towards amiens, with the ob- ject of separating the british and french armies. as it ap- proached amiens, the german flood lost impetus, largely through the difficulty of supply across the old somme battlefields, which was accentuated by the harassing operations of the british air- craft. and, in face of stiffening resistance, the germans made the mistake of prolonging the offensive—an unprofitable drain on their strength. (see german offensive.) on the lysin april, the aisne in may, the method was repeated, each time with brilliant tactical success but without attaining a strategic decision. the interval, both in time and space, was too great for one thrust to have a direct effect on the other. none of the thrusts had penetrated quite far enough to sever a vital artery, and this strategic failure left the germans witha series of huge salients, difficult to feed, wasteful to hold, and in- viling a convergent counter-stroke. ludendorff made his last attempt on both sides of reims, july 15, but surprise was lacking. east of the town he was foiled by gouraud’s large-scale improvement on the method of elastic 718 defence, whereby the thinly held forward positions dislocated the attack, and the germans arrived in face of the strong main po- sition with their initial momentum spent. west of reims their penetration across the marne merely enmeshed them more deeply to their undoing, for on july 18 foch’s countcer-stroke fell on the west flank, first, of the salient created by the april offensive. here the cambrai method was repeated, a surprise blow led by masses of tanks. mobility regained by the allies -——an even better example was to follow, on the amicns front, aug. 8, where rawlinson’s army effected both a strategical and a tactical surprise—by misleading ruses, consummate precautions to ensure secrecy, and the use of 456 tanks. this blow convinced the german command of the hopelessness of victory, and it now fell to foch to convert this loss of hope into the conviction of defeat. the new grand tacti- cal feature of the last phase (see victory, advance to) was what may be termed the fluidity of attack, in contradistinction, as it was a counter to the clastic method of defence. each attack was broken off as soon as its initial impetus waned and cach was so aimed as to pave the way for the next, at some other point; the blows were close enough in time and space to have a reaction on each other. by this means the defender’s power of transferring reserves to menaced points was checked, as his balance of re- serves was drained. the progressive decline in the german resistance enabled this process to continue despite the diminution and ultimate disap- pearance of the allies’ slender stock of tanks. the trench dead- lock had definitely collapsed, and in the mobile conditions thus recreated their infantry, developing the new tactics of infiltration and manocuvre, were able to press back the german rearguards. the gradual slowing down of the advance was due, not to the re- sistance of the enemy, but to the difficulty of supply through the devastated zone, a defect inherent in lines of communication which depend on a fixed and prepared track. but at the moment when this problem became scrious, foch was ready to launch a decisive blow through lorraine, and the germans, stripped of reserves, capitulated. it deserves note, however, that the allies were at no time on the verge of a strategic break-through. infan- try had not the rapidity of movement essential if retreat is to be converted into rout, cavalry had not the protection necessary to preserve their mobility, and tanks were still immature, even had they been available in adequate numbers. the tank plan for r919.—thce tactical history of the world war isnot complete without mention of an original move intended for the 1919 campaign if the war had continued. retlection on the disaster of march 1918 suggested to col. fuller, chief general staff officer of the tank corps, that its extent was due far more to the breakdown of command and communication than to the collapse of the infantry resistance. ile evolved a scheme to launch a flect of light fast tanks, under cover of a general offen- sive, which should pass through the german defences, and, neg- lecting the fighting troops, aim clirect for the command and com- munication centres in rear. these destroyed, it was calculated that the disorganisation and capitulation of the combatant units would folow. this plan, adopted by the allied command for 1919, is of profound significance in taking a mental and moral instead of a physical target. v. post-war tactics with the coming of peace, war weariness and financial exhaus- tion paved the way for the inevitable reaction which has followed every great contlict. if there was some tendency towaris greater density and linear formations, the reaction was far more marked in regard to the new arms which had been born during the con- flict. national conditions also had an influence. the german army was prohibited the use of tanks and aircraft, and so could do no more than study them theoretically. the french, still pre- occupied with a recurrence of the german menace, reconstructed their tactical doctrine strictly within the limits of their recent war experience. truc, such outstanding personalitics and pro- found thinkers as foch and buat berat—post-war chief of the general stafl—recognised the likely predominance of aircralt tactics and tanks, but immediate needs left no money for experiment, and thus while progressive in thought the french have been somewhat static in practice and design. in the united states, on the contrary, design has made greater progress than tactical thought. the british army, influenced by the varied conditions and problems which face it in so scattered an empire, has treated trench-warfare as a phenomenon rather than a normal future con- dition, and has trained for open warfare. for several years, how- ever, the higher command looked back to rgt4 for its model, rather than forward in order to gauge the future. growth of the mechanical army—while secking to quicken action and infantry movement, and discarding much of the para- phernalia of trench-warfare—e.g., cable communication and mor- tars—it failed to recognise that the inherent check on mobility was the vulnerability of infantry and cavalry in face of modern weapons, as demonstrated from 1914 to 1918; also the slowness of infantry, accentuated to-day through the substitution of muscle- power by mechanical-power in other departments and through air attack. the tendency to regard tanks as a transitory device for trench-warfare soon passed, but the idea that they were a mere aid to infantry remained. in the last year or two, however, the arguments put forward by a small band of thinkers have gradually permeated the army, and coupled with technical de- velopment have brought it about that to-day great britain is making more progress than any other country towards a me- chanicalised army. on the horizon lie perhaps complete tank armics, or rather flects—for then would be reproduced on land many of the tactical conditions of naval warfare. but for the present the practical problem is to fit the tanks into the frame- work of tactics and readjust the reles of the older arms accordingly. the new functions of the tank.—the greatly increased speed of the latest tanks makes close co-operation between them and infantry impossible; as complcte a violation of economy of force, indeed, as it would be to yoke a race horse to a cart horse. throughout the world war, infantry was called, illogically, the decisive arm, yet in practice it was dependent, first on artillery, and later on tanks, in order to act at all. now that tanks can no longer be used to bolster up this fiction, infantry must stand or fall on their own merits, and the whole theory of modern tactics must be recast. history gives us the clue to the solution of this problem, for until modern fire-weapons made mounted action impossible, cav- alry was always the arm of decision and exploitation—because of its suitability for rapid out-flanking movements, the devastat- ing momentum developed during its charge, and the demoralisa- tion its furious onset inspired in exhausted or shaken troops. when its vulnerability nullified its battlefield mobility, and the cavalry charge disappeared, war became lopsided and the stale- mates of modern times inevitable. infantry aided by artillery could fix the enemy, disrupt and disorganise his screening forces, but there was no effective means of completing their efforts by a decisive blow such as cavalry had formerly delivered. this dead- lock was broken by the coming of the tank, which through the protection afforded by armour gained scope for its mobility. the deduction is that tanks are the modern substitute for cavalry as an arm of decision and exploitation. they have their limitations— certain types of ground on which they.are handicapped and cer- tain defences against which they are helpless—but so had the cavalry of old. these qualities and limitations must be weighed and their tactical use decided accordingly, as was that of cavalry by the great captains. infaniry inthe mechanical army.—the tactical rele of infantry needs to be readjusted similarly. their qualities are their ability to make use of broken or close country to obtain cover, and to traverse ground which is too rugged or wooded for the other arms. their limitations are their slowness and lack of direct protection, and the latter is accentuated by the fact that to-day, for mobile warfare, they can only count on a fraction of the artillery support they enjoyed in the world war. to cover the whole front with infantry, spread like butter on bread, irrespective of the type of ground, is no longer feasible. an advance over bare and flat country in face of machine guns is merely suicidal, and, instead, taft—tanganyika ‘territory infantry sectors of attack should be chosen with as much calcula- tion as is given to the other arms. the “ universality ” of infan- try action is as out of date as its decisiveness. when the tactical roles of the different arms have been recast and fitted together, we shall have restored the lost balance between offensive power, protection and mobility—and thus have recreated a flexible instru- ment of gencralship and the art of war. for in the years 1914-8 the tactical artist was supplanted by the machine-tender. (b. fl.) taft, lorado (1860- ~—+y,_: american sculptor (see 26.354) was clected to the national academy in 1911. he was director of the american federation of arts from rg9r4 to 1917 and in the latter year was appointed a member of the board of art advisers for the state of illinois. he received a silver medal at the panama-pacific exposition, san francisco, 1915. his later works include: “ black iawk” (1912), figure of an american indian, at oregon, hl.; thatcher memorial fountain (1918), at denver, colo.; and cr the fountain of time” (1920), at chicago. in 1920 he published modern tendencies in sculpture; and in 1924 anew cdition of the history of american sculpture. taft, william howard (1857- ), 27th president of the united states (see 26.354), endeavoured in rore to secure reciprocity in tariffs with canada. the measure was approved by the congress of the united states, but in canada it was de- feated. meanwhile wide public interest has been awakened in the conservation of national resources and the president’s atti- tude was attacked by the conservationists. in roog gifford pinchot, chief forester, charged richard a. ballinger, secretary of the interior, with being opposed to conservation. a con- gressional committee, after investigation, exonerated the secre- tary, but he later resigned. the attack upon ballinger was de- nounced by the president, who continued to be criticised in connection with the sale of public lands, and who dismissed pinchot from office. the president lost ground as a result of a breach of friendship between himself and theodore roosevelt, who supported pinchot. in 1912 the president signed the pana- ma tolls bill, exempting american coastwise shipping from tolls, affirming that it did not violate the hay-i’auncefote treaty and that the united states had the right to fortify the canal. at the same time he expressed a readiness to arbitrate the question with great britain, who had protested. cleavage within the party was crystallised at the republican national convention in 1912. in the pre-convention campaign roosevelt came forward as leader of the progressive wing against taft as leader of the conservative or ‘‘ stand-pat ”? wing, and the mutual recriminations were bitter. at the convention, how- ever, the conservatives controlled the party machine, and the committce on credentials excluded the roosevelt contesting delegates. taft was renominated on the first ballot, receiving 561 votes, 21 more than the required majority. roosevelt de- nounced the action of the convention and later was nominated by the newly formed national progressive party. in the ensuing election woodrow wilson, the democratic nominee, won an overwhelming victory, securing 435 electoral votes to 88 for roosevelt and 8 for taft. [president taft carried only two states, utah and vermont, and those only by small pluralities. the general feeling throughout the country was that president taft had shown a lack of administrative firmness, his good na- ture having caused him to vacillate. on retiring from the presi- dency in 1913 he became kent professor of law at yale, but de- voted much time to lecture engagements. in 1913 he was elected president of the american bar association, and in tror4 first president of the american institute of jurisprudence, onenised to improve law and its administration. after the outbreak of the world war in t914 he supported president wilson’s strong stand for neutrality. in 1915 he ap- proved the army league’s campaign for preparedness. he was an active promoter of the league to enforce peace, but after america’s entrance into the war he argued that victory was necessary for attaining lasting peace. in 1918 he was appointed by the president a member of the national war labour board for arbitrating labour disputes during the war. in 1919 he en- 719 dorsed the peace treaty of versailles, regarding its most im- portant part to be the covenant of the league of nations. he spoke throughout the country on behalf of the league urging res- ervations if these would secure ratification. he supported war- ren g. harding, the republican candidate for president in 1920. on june 30 1921 he was appointed by president harding chief justice of the supreme court to succeed edward douglas white, deceased. an insistent advocate of legal reform, particularly in regard to the reorganisation of the federal courts, he also urged the appointment of additional judges and the provision of ma- chinery for speeding up the procedure. he also drafted a code of canons of conduct for the guidance of the judiciary, which ob- tained the endorsement of the american bar association. taft was the author of popular government: its essence, its per- formance, and its perils (1913); the anti-trust act and the ‘supreme court (1914); the united staies and peace (1914); ethics in service, yale lectures (1915); our chief magistrate and his powers, columbia lectures (1916) and the presidency: tts duties, its powers, its op por- funities and its limitations, lectures at the university of virginia (1916). tagore, sir rabindranath (1861- ), indian poet and author, was the youngest son of maharshi devendranath and grandson of prince dwarkanath tagore. after a private education in india he was sent to england to study law, but soon. returned to india, and while still quite young commenced writing for bengali periodicals. in 1901 he established the famous shantiniketan, or “ abode of peace” at bolpur, 93 m. from calcutta, which developed into an important instructional in- stitution. originally organised as an asram, or retreat, by the maharshi, it was developed by rabindranath into a school con- ducted on unconventional lines, and he aimed at enlarging it into an international university which should comprchend the whole range of eastern culture. rabindranath published some 30 poetical and 28 prose works in bengali, many of which are regarded as classics. the more important of them were trans- lated into english and gained a wide popularity. the author visited europe on several occasions and travelled also in japan and the united states. in 1913 he was awarded the nobel prize for literature, and utilised the amount {£8,000 for the up-keep of the school at bolpur. he accepted a knighthood in rors, but in rg19 resigned it asa protest against the methods adopted for the repression of disturbances in the punjab. in later years, however, he offered no objection to the use of this title. his volumes of poems, with the dates of their english translations include gitanjalt (1913); the crescent moon (1913); the gardener (1913); one hundred poems of kabir (1915); fruit-gathering (1916); stray bird (1917); the lover's gift and crossing (1918). among his novels are the home and the world (1919); and the wreck (1921). he also published several! plays and volumes of short stories, letters and lectures. in 1917 appeared his my reminiscences. (f. h.-b*) tajikstan (see tajik 26.365), an autonomous socialist soviet republic within the territories of uzbegistan. it lies to the north of the oxus, opposite badakshan in afghanistan, (see turkestan.) . tanganyika territory (see german east africa, 11.771).— during the world war german east africa was con- quered by british and belgian troops. the mandate toadminister the country was given in may 191g by the allied and associated powers to great britain, but by an agreement of sept. 1919 between great britain and belgium the mandate for ruanda and urundi, the northwestern parts of the former german colony, was transferred to belgium, while portugal was given the small area at the mouth of the ruvuma river known as the kionga triangle. thearea of tanganyika territory is about 373,000 square miles. the population (1921) was approximately 4,107,000 na- tives, 2,400-2,500 europeans, some 10,000 indians and 4,000 arabs. ruanda-urundi, with an area of about 20,000 sq. m. only had about 3,500,000 inhabitants. the three districts of tangan- yika territory adjoining ruanda-urundi, namely bukoba, mwanza and tabora, had over 1,500,000 inhabitants; the rest of the territory is sparsely populated. the capitalis dares salaam (population 1921, about 25,000, including 555 europeans). 720 : : evi ne ‘, —dlongqwe qd ss : » — \ * 6 *.. wutla = a kilimatane let\ d0 d tanganyika territory iy eriga la 4 s h~ es a seis arusha ey. rage geese € : see ees ed we | cae &. parl fi ey oe a eee a ~ abagamoyo—"agy 2 e = 5 *e, iqed 14 cds moi or ag 7 ; rn. is “ bi: qtm - py = ; ~ i... “a es, aba ga. mouent ~ 7 pi. sor ogoro ck lem : ; — 5 ng8sa 7 sf — = ds pp a_—sawira pas bent a | “morogoro ; qn ap : ot an ~ siig pa ef , dar es angie ® we ‘aa: cg nett smlaam 1 is kisak, imisangire_-- sya —— safaupina ,, e mijewa lringa base on dahambawe me seen : — / ov? 4 a a 2 : # eine pp deve “jale ~ \ kipemtm 7 ny gf eap ruf j ope 7ot mafia — be | aor trast ——@ — go 2. sr bi , : +4} ¢ ae rego bpuina se pl — an ethics a 4 r uhagyona ae a oes alae - = ec preah a rs , wn ee kilw a sr ung e 5 om, oy run ig “= we? flindi p a. =! >| bagayg > mwe ol! eae pi manda : - = 7 nyanga ae: rc aprs on gie a } ie sles ss territory epee ake ta tases? eta per xigontera ongea 2 asasi english miles ae nyasa [ aieaes ) 00 150 ee ( a a (4) 50 ! op ~ ny ” aoon wen . ruvee isasawara kilametres ——- 20 : qo 50 wo 150 : district boundarses ++... —— railways sey pos ee ss poriticart. history the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the world war in 1914 had been a period of much administrative and commercial activity in german east africa, the principal achiev- ment being the completion in feb. 1914 of the railway from dar es salaam to kigoma-ujiji on lake tanganyika. there was a flourishing european settlement in the usambara highlands and, as far as civil administration was concerned, the colony had be- come sclf-supporting. the budget for 1914~-5, the last framed by the germans, balanced revenue and expenditure at {1,023,000, with {£165,000 as an imperial grant for military purposes. (the story of the military operations is told elsewhere, sce east africa.) the british and belgians established their own administra- tions in the districts they conquered. it was not until march 22 1921 that all the districts which belgium had occupied but which fell within the british mandated area were transferred to tan- ganyika territory, the name officially given to the british area in jan. 1920. a civil administration had been set up while the war was in progress, mr. (afterwards sir) horace byatt being the first administrator—a title changed in aug. 1920 to that of gov- ernor. the country had suffered severely from the ravages of war and the work of reconstruction was difficult and prolonged. all the german settlers were repatriated and their estates sold. up to the end of 1924 these estates had realised £1,221,c00. until this process was nearing completion few new land grants were made and agriculture for a time was practically at a standstill. moreover both the planters and the commercial community complained, with some show of reason, that the government was indifferent to their needs. complaint was also made by the euro- peans of the competition of the indians. as to that the adminis- tration was tied by the terms of the mandate (which were approved by the council of the league on july 201922). theman- date enjoined equality of treatment to nationals of all members of the league in matters of “ residence, trade and commerce.” the administration was hampered by lack of funds and the neces- sity of rebuilding a large part of the central railway (the dar es salaam-tanganyika line); and it had as its first duty the care of the natives, many of whom were restive and demoralised by the war. it had its hands full; nevertheless it might have paid greater attention to the needs of planters—and the amani insti- tute for scientific research, which was one of the best works of the germans, was allowed to go nearly to ruin. in nov. 1924 sir horace byatt was transferred to trinidad and sir donald cameron succeeded him as governor of tanganyika. meanwhile attention had been called to the suitability of the highlands in the southwestern parts of the territory for white tangier settlement and a number of europeans subsequently bought farms there. this region, however, lacked means of communica- tion; to open it up, and at the same time to provide an outlet for the trade of northern nyasaland and northeastern rhodesia, it was decided in 1926 to build a railway crossing the highlands and extending to lake nyasa. the project to link up uganda an tanganyika bya railway had been abandoned. ‘theonly route for such a line was through a part of ruanda, and that part had therefore been retained in british mandated territory by the 1919 agreement with belgium. this arrangement had, however,led toa division of the native state of ruanda and had caused incon- venience. by anew anglo-belgian agreement of 1923 the strip of ruanda which had been in tanganyika was assigned to belgium. the connection of lake victoria with the tanganyika system by a railway from tabora to mwanza was, however, decided upon in 1926. the importance of tanganyika as a vital link in the chain of territories in east africa under british administration was clearly recognised by the parliamentary commission which visited east africa in 1924. it was emphasised at an unofficial conference of delegates, representing the settlers of four territories interested, held in 1925 at tukuvu (formerly neu langenburg) and at a conference of east african governors held at nairobi in 1926. both conferences were concerned principally with questions of economic development. political federation was not favoured. bv this time (1926) the era of transition after the war had ended and it was announced that tanganyika would be given a legisla- tive council. ex-enemies were allowed to enter the territory. economic conditions tanganyika depends mainly on agricultural and jungle pro- duce. the considerable sylvan wealth is undeveloped and rubber has ceased to be exported. gold is worked on a small scale and diamonds have been discovered near mwanza. mica, too, is worked—but the mineral resources of the territory were but partially known up to 1926. commerical depression and currency difficulties, the enforced change as in kenya colony (q.2.) from rupees at 15 to the £ to florins and then shillings, added to the cost of restoring the devas- tated regions, reacted unfavourably both on trade and revenue. the volume of trade increased however from {3,098,000 in 1922 to £5,451,000 in 1924. in the last-named year commercial imports were valued at £1,901,000 and exports at £2,695,000, while the transit trade, mainly with the belgian congo, was worth £693,000. cotton-piece goods, foodstuffs and iron and steel manufactures were the chief imports. the principal exports were sisal (worth £644 ,oo0in 1924), ground-nuts (£359,000), coffee (£352,000), cotton (£373,000), copra, hides, skins and grains. ivory worth £120,000, gold valued at £30,000 and mica at £27,000 were exported in 1924. nearly all the gold was alluvial, from the lupa river washings. by 1925 trade had recovered to the level reached in 1913. some 75% of the cotton was raised by natives. revenue increased from £660,000 in 1919-20 to £1,315,000 in 1923-24. expenditure in the same period rose from £790,000 to f£1,901,000. the bulk of the excess of expenditure was on rail- ways. the deficit on the working of the railways had been re- duced to £92,000 1n 1923-4, as compared with {158 ,o00in 1919-20, while in 1925 the railways paid their way. the chief sources of revenue are the house, hut and poll tax and customs. about half the revenue in 1923-4 was paid by the natives. bibliography.—report on tanganyika territory xxx to the end of 1920, a british official publication (1921); subsequent reporis to the league of nations (geneva, annually), and the report of the east africa commission, issued by the colonial office (london, 1925). the south and east a frican year book and guide (london), and the east african red book (nairobi) give useful infor- mation. for the anglo-belgian boundary see the british bluc book correspondence regarding the modification of the boundary xxx in fast africa (1923). (fe ray) tangier (see 26.397), a town and district of morocco (q.v.) which enjoys a neutralised and internationalised regime under the sovereignty of the sultan of morocco. its area is 200 sq. m. 721 and the population (1920) about 50,000 for the town and 70,000 for the town and district. history, 1911-23.—the franco-german crisis of r911 which had threatened to disintegrate morocco, if not to lead to an european war, left tangier practically unaffected, and the franco-german treaty which ensued included amongst its clauses the article which had appeared in every earlier treaty since 1904, that tangier was to receive in due course of time a special regime. while in 1912 france and spain began the occupation of their respective zones, not without recourse to arms, for the natives did not always acquiesce, tangier remained a part and parcel of the old morocco under the direct rule of the sultan and his maghzen, modified by a system of rights of inter- vention on the part of the european representative. the declaration of a french protectorate over morocco did not alter the situation at tangicr, which was understood to fall outside the effect of that declaration. if by this isolation tangier escaped being drawn into the fighting which spasmodically occurred as the french and spaniards advanced to occupy new districts of their zones, it suffered from the fact that, abandoned to a continuance of corrupt and unprogressive government, no amelioration in its situation was possible. the jealousies of the powers and of their local representatives, the obstruction with which certain governments never ceased to meet every propo- sition of progress, prevented tangier from benefiting from its superb position and becoming a place of commercial and mari- time importance. so loud grew the complaints of its population that the governments of great britain, france and spain decided in rg1r3 to draw up a convention and introduce the special regime which the treaties accorded. after long months of negotiation the representatives of the three powers concerned were on the point of signing the con- vention in 1914, when the war broke out, and the spanish govt. refused to sign. no doubt spain preferred to await the results of the war before she definitely signed away her hope of one day possessing tangier herself. so the status remained unapplied and the convention disappeared in the pigeon-holes of the foreign offices. tangtier’s sufferings were thus pro- longed and its fate left unsettled. ‘the construction of the port which had been decided upon in 1910, when an international company was formed for that purpose, was again postponed and obstruction to progress and prosperity was once more the order of the day. while the towns of the atlantic coast, under the very able administration of marechal lyautey, were becoming both large and prosperous, tangier remained stationary. tangier, like the rest of morocco, was little affected by the war. [ood was plentiful, restrictions few. during that whole period there was but one incident of importance, the expulsion of the german and austrian charges d’affaires and the personnel of their legations. the internationalisation of tangier rendered it doubtful what steps the alhed governments would take on this question, but the sultan of morocco, under whose direct jurisdiction tangier lay, was himself an ally and the govern- ments interested did not hesitate to act. at the conclusion of the war europe was too occupied to give thought to tangier and the policy of obstruction continued to the lasting detriment of the place. peace was seldom disturbed, though the fighting in the neighbouring spanish zone impeded trade and closed the roads. the staiute of 1923.—it was not until 1923 that the question of tangier’s future was once more taken into active consideration. the situation had now changed. france’s position had become stronger since the sultan had recognised her protectorate. the british govt. was, however, still determined that an inter- national form of government must be adopted, and spain, having failed to benefit by the war, supported this demand. it was a question difficult of solution and a preliminary conference in london in july 1923 failed to bring about any settlement. it served, however, as a useful exchange of views and in the following oct. british and spanish delegates proceeded to paris where the negotiations were continued. on dec. 18 1923 the convention was signed by the representatives of france and great britain and on feb. 7 1924 by spain. 722 the new status of tangier is based upon a charter of permanent neutral internationalisation, under the sovereignty of the sultan of morocco, who maintains his control over moslem and jewish moroc- can subjects. the sultan is represented by a high moorish official, the mendoub. the administration of this town and its zone rests in the hands of an administrator and two assistant-administrators, who carry out the decisions of the legislative assembly, subject to their ratification by the committee of control. the convention laid down that during the first six years the chief administrator should be a french subject and his assistants a british and a spanish sub- ject. after that period they should be chosen by the assembly. a french and a spanish engineer should superintend the public works. the committee of control, consisting of the consuls of all the powers —except ex-enemy powers—who signed the algeciras act has power, by majority decision, to veto the acts of the legislative assembly. the legislative assembly consists of 26 members, chosen from the subjects of the powers represented in tangier and from the moorish and jewish population. the number of members represent- ing each nationality is regulated by the local importance in popula- tion, trade and influence of the nationality in question. clauses have been introduced into the convention and in the legal codes for pro- gressive modifications at specified periods of time should modifica- tion be deemed necessary or advisable. special legal codes have been drawn up based on those in use in the french and spanish zones, justice is to be administered in mixed tribunals by judges of different nationalities. a gendarmerie of 250 men, natives of morocco, is placed under the command of a belgian captain with french and spanish assistants. it is quite evident that such a scheme is far more difficult to put into practice than to put upon paper, and even two years after its signing in paris the status had not become a going concern. its initiation was rendered far more difficult than would otherwise have been the case by the refusal of italy and the united states of america to accept the con- ditions it introduces, and by the delays of portugal to adhere. a certain confusion resulted, for the dissenting powers refused to allow the operation of its edicts upon their subjects. consequently while the subjects of all the assenting powers passed under this new regime, those of italy, america and portugal retained their old status, under which they were not legally bound to pay the new forms of taxation and other charges imposed upon the less fortunate sub- jects of the adhering powers. (sce also morocco.) biblivgraphy.— tangier convention (cmd, 2096, 2203); aa, cases, tdunger, dignidad nacional (madrid, 1922); p. champion, tanger, fes et meknes (paris, 1924). (w. b. el.) tang shao-yi (1858- ), chinese statesman, a native of kwantung, became notable as the first foreign-trained chinese to rise to high office, and one of the leaders of the chinese na- tionalist movement which adopted the cry of ‘‘ china for the chinese.”? he was educated in the united states at columbia university and received his first important post in 1898, when he became consul-general in seoul in succession to yuan shih-kai. gaining the favour of that rising statesman, he was appointed director of the northern railway and customs taotal, and under- took important missions to tibet (1904) and india, the result of which was the tibet convention of 1906. his ability and friend- ship with yuan shih-kai brought him anumber of lucrative posts, but his radical sympathies and progressive policy earned him the dislike of the reactionaries, and he was impeached on the grounds of “ self-sufficiency and the employment of unsuitable persons.” recovering from this set-back, he was appointed special envoy to europe and the united states (1908). he played an important part in the negotiations that followed the revolution of 1911, and in 1912, became premier under yuan shih-kai. but in june of that year he fell, and though he held office several times during the succeeding decade, he never played the great rele for which his ability once seemed to single him out. in 1919 he was one of the four directors of the canton govt. and was minister of finance at canton 1919-22. though a strong nationalist, tang never showed hostility to foreigners, but, on the contrary, pro- tected them at much risk during the boxer rebellion (1900): tanks.—the name tank was given during the world war to the bullet-proof, armed vehicle, driven by mechanical power and capable of crossing rough country and obstacles by the use of caterpillar tracks. the name was first used in dec. 1915 as a blind to conceal the true nature of the experimental fighting machine then being secretly constructed in england; aiter the first appearance of the machine in the field the name was univer- sally adopted. to the british is due the credit of first conceiving and introducing this weapon which was destined to exert a de- cisive influence on the course of the war. tang shao-yi—tanks i. the invention of the weapon the tank idea in history —from the earlicst times men have attempted to find methods whereby they might move under some form of protection while they delivered blows at the enemy. vehicles of many different types have been con- structed throughout the ages with a view to solving these first principles of war and those vehicles were the forerunners of the tank. the earliest fighting vehicles of which there is a record, date back to 1200 b.c. when the chinese made use of*protected vehicles propelled by man or horse-power and to the use of war chariots by the assyrians. in the 15th century the tudor “ war carts ” appeared and fighting vehicles were constructed which were the exact counterpart of the modern tank except}in motive power; and numerous examples of fighting vehicles appear throughout history, all aiming at the provision of mobile pro- tection for the fighting man. the introduction of rifled breech-loading firearms led to the disuse of all forms of fighting vehicle. the weight of armour which was necessary to provide protection was such that no armoured vehicle could be propelled across country by man- power or horse-power. the necessity for a fighting vehicle still existed and was in fact accentuated, especially with the introduc- tion of the machine-gun; there was, however, at the time no apparent solution to the mechanical construction of such a ve- hicle. as time progressed two inventions were developed and it was the combination of these that led to the construction of the tank. the two inventions were the caterpillar track and the high-speed internal-combustion engine. ‘the former enabled heavy vehicles to cross soft ground by the use of a track or end- less belt so that the weight was distributed over a large‘area of ground; the latter provided a light compact power unit by means of which the vehicle could be propelled. the combination pro- duced tractors such as the holt, invented and in common use in america before the war. between 1907 and 1914 several inven- tors suggested that tractors of this nature should be constructed and provided with armour for use as a fighting vehicle in war. no official action was, however, taken in this direction. the prevailing military opinion among all nations prior to 1914 was that any future war would be mainly a war of movement, and although it was realised that a frontal attack against a defensive position would be costly, it was considered that such an attack would be greatly assisted or even avoided entirely by envelop- ment or flank action. the opening phases of the world war appeared to confirm these views, but in sept. the germans fell back and took up a defensive position on the aisne and it was then that the great strength of modern field defences became apparent. the main source of strength of these defences lay in the machine-gun pro- tected by an extensive use of barbed wire entanglements, and they proved to be impregnable to attack by troops, equipped as they were in 1914, without the most prodigal loss of life. the efforts of the british troops early in oct. to outflank the germans in the north, led to an extension of these defences right up to the sea. the allies were then faced with a continuous defensive position without flanks that could be turned and they possessed no means of penetrating such defences. one solution of the difficulty appeared to be a large increase in the available artillery resources, particularly in the larger pieces and the provision of high-explosive shells. this solution was acted on at once and although no result could of course be expected for many months, it was hoped that sufficient artillery and ammuni- tion would eventually be available to blast a way through the enemy defences and so re-establish the power of mobility. col. swinton’s proposal.—early in oct. 1914 an officer of the royal engineers, lt.-col. (later maj.-gen.) e. d. swinton, royal engineers, formed the opinion that a frontal assault against prepared positions, especially with limited artillery sup- port, had become impossible, and that some form of power- driven protected machine which could traverse trenches and barbed wire was necessary to enable the attack to overcome the power of the defence. on oct. 20 1914 col. swinton saw col. (later sir maurice) hankey, secretary of the committee of tanks imperial defence, and put forward his scheme which was briefly to develop the holt tractor and produce a mobile armoured machine which should lead the assault and act as a machine-gun destroyer. as a result of the interview described col. swinton took up the question with g.h.q. in france and col. hankey put the idea before lord kitchener; but in neither case did it lead to any result. col. hankey however also submitted the scheme to the prime minister as head of the committee of imperial defence, and this reached mr. churchill who was already experimenting with armoured cars for the naval detachment of the belgian coast. on jan. 5 1915 mr. churchill wrote to the prime minister emphasising the importance of col. swinton’s suggestion. this letter was sent to lord kitchener, and at the same time col. swinton called at the war office to discuss his proposals. as a result the matter received some attention and a few trials were carried out, after which the whole question was dropped. in the meantime mr. churchill formed a committee at the admi- ralty under the chairmanship of mr. (later sir) tennyson d’eyn- court, to investigate the problem. they carried out trials with large wheeled machines, coupled steamrollers, pedrail and caterpillar tractors, single and articulated, the underlying idea being the production of a machine for the conveyance of troops and not a machine-gun destroyer. in the meantime col. swinton took his proposals to the com- mander-in-chief in france with the result that the specification radiator fe se ge, a cme secondary gears 723 of labour and material owing to the great national effort to produce munitions of every kind. the first british tanks.—the mark i. tank was built in two types, ‘“‘male”’ and “female ’’; both types had “ sponsons ” mounted on the sides to carry the main armament. on the male tank this consisted of two 6-pdr. guns and on the female tank of four vickers machine-guns. the idea was that the tanks would work in pairs, the male tank being more capable of dealing with defences behind brick walls or steel loophole plates and the female tank having greater man-killing fire power. the total number under construction was 150, half being males and half females. the mark i. tank was 26 ft. long, weighed 28 tons and carried a crew of eight men. the maximum speed on the level was 4 m.p.h. and the tank could cross a trench to ft. wide. reference has already been made to the track which was carried all round the tank; this track was driven from the engine through a two-speed gear box (controlled by the driver) and then through a differential which carried a second gear box at each outer end of the half shafts. these secondary gears were operated by hand levers and necessitated a gearsman on each side of the tank in addition to the driver. from these the drive was carried by chain to the driving sprockets in rear. as the original idea of the inventors had been that the tank should be used as a sur- prise on a large front the armour was for most part only proof against ordinary rifle ammunition. it was realised that it might be necessary, as was indeed the case, to increase the thickness exhaust pipes — wey = ae bale steering wheel —»~ jo ee scale in feet ai an ca 3s 4 5 6 at nv —a fic. 1.—sectional wig of mark i. tank (tail omitted). of the type of machine required was sent to the war office. by that time a joint naval and military committee had been formed and they were now able to work to a specification which detailed the military requirements. the result was the production— first of ‘‘ little willie ” which just failed to reach the standard required, and later of “ big willie’ or “‘ mother” as it was christened, which passed all tests at hatfield on feb. 2 1915. the chief point in the design, and on which it differed from other caterpillar machines, was its rhomboidal shape and all round track which were the invention of lt. (later lt.-col.) w. g. wilson, working in conjunction with mr. (later sir) w. tritton. this machine, afterwards known as the mark i. tank, was th2 prototype of all british machines used during the world war. in the meantime normal trench warfare had been proceeding in france. the artillery had been considerably strengthened, but even then it was found at the battle of loos that large num- bers of enemy machine-guns would survive the heaviest bom- bardment and cause prohibitive casualties to the attacking infantry. g.h.q. france therefore ordered 40! of these experi- mental tanks, and this number was increased by the war office to 100 machines. a tank supply committee was formed under the ministry of munitions with major (later sir) albert stern as chairman. orders were placed on feb. 12 and production started at once with utmost secrecy, and under great difficulties. 1 the first order placed by the french army headquarters, with-- out awaiting the construction of an experimental machine, was for 400 machines, and this was increased to 800 machines. of the armour, in later models, to withstand armour-piercing bullets, when the enemy had had time to produce large quanti- ties of these bullets. the male tank carried 324 rounds of 6-pdr. shell and 6,272 rounds of s.a.a. the female tank carried 31,232 rounds of s.a.a. both types carried sufficient petrol for about 15 m. on a cross-country course. a feature of this tank was the tail which consisted of a pair of steel wheels hinged on to the back of the machine and pressed down on to the ground with powerful springs. the wheels could be steered from the driver’s seat and in this way the tank could negotiate easy bends; the wheels improved the balance of the machine and also slightly increased the trench crossing capacity. in order to take a sharp bend or swing round on its own axis, the wheels were raised by a small hydraulic ram and secondary gears placed in neutral on one side of the tank. the power of the engine was then transmitted to one side only and the tank would take a sharp bend, or if a brake was applied on the same side as the gears were in neutral, then the tank would swing on its own axis. in march 1916 a unit was formed to man these first tanks. for the purpose of secrecy the unit formed part of the machine gun corps and was known as the heavy section, machine gun corps. this name was later changed to heavy branch, machine gun corps. the unit was commanded by col. swinton and contained sufficient personnel to man the 150 tanks under con- struction. the unit was organised in six companies of 25 tanks each. as soon as the tanks began to arrive from the contractors 724 the unit encamped at a secret area near elvedon in suffolk and started driving and gunnery practice. il. the tank in action first engagement on the somme.—tin the meantime the somme offensive in france had come to a standstill. the right wing of ‘the attack between the somme and the ancre which had met with some success at the start was definitely held up. the very heavy bombardments of the greatly increased artillery force had enabled the attackers to make some headway, but in the end the artillery fire had shelled away the barbed wire and replaced it by a worse obstacle, namely shell torn ground over which the infantry could only advance with difficulty, especially in wet weather. moreover, this ground was quite impassable to trans- port and any question of pressing forward at some point where an attack had met with success was rendered impossible, as no ammunition or supplies could be sent up until new roads had been constructed. it was at this stage that it was decided to use the first two companies of tanks in an attempt to resuscitate the advance between the somme and the ancre. these two companies were accordingly sent to france at the end of august. on sept. 15 1916 the first tank attack took place. the iv. army was to attack and advance on the line morval, les boeufs, guendecourt and flers and the v. army on the left of the iv. army was to advance on martinpuich and courcelette. a total of 49 tanks were to be used, the majority with the iv. army. they were to advance in small detachments of two or three machines against the enemy strong points. the general idea was that they should advance so as to reach the objectives just before the infantry. in some cases lanes were left in the artillery barrage up which the tanks were to advance ahead of the in- fantry. the tanks advanced at dawn in a slight mist and came as a complete surprise to the enemy; the results were, however, disappointing. the tanks had been constructed to traverse wide trenches, banks and barbed wire obstacles, but not the shell torn ground which was the result of prolonged bombard- _ ment on a small area. of the 49 tanks which were employed, 32 reached the front line. of these nine went ahead of the in- fantry and rendered valuable assistance; nine kept up or followed just behind and helped in reducing strong points where the enemy were still holding out. the remaining 14 broke down or sank and became ditched in the soft shell torn ground shortly after the battle had commenced. one tank in front of flers gave remarkable assistance to the infantry and caused the sur- render of 300 germans. on sept. 25 and 26, 13 tanks were employed on the same front and a few were employed later, on nov. 13. in each case a large proportion of the tanks were unable to negotiate the shell torn ground, but those that did rendered valuable assistance to the infantry, causing heavy casualties and the surrender of a large number of germans. the employment of the tanks in sept. 1916 was ety to the views of those who had originated the arm and were respon- sible for its production. they considered that the tanks should be kept as a secret and used in large numbers as a surprise on a new portion of the front so as to give a chance of achieving decisive success. by using the tanks in small numbers a repe- tition was created of the error made by the germans when they released gas on a small scale on april 22 r915. it was done in order to resuscitate the somme offensive and raise the morale of the troops, but it is doubtful if the value so gained was equal to the loss of surprise in the use of a new weapon which it entailed. it did however prove that the tank was a very definite reply to the machine-gun and barbed wire and that infantry accompanied by tanks could attack defended positions with every prospect of success. improved types.—as a result of these trials it was decided that the arm should be expanded to a force of 1,000 tanks. the tanks were not to be used again until the spring and the winter was to be spent in re-arming and training. the original six companies were expanded to nine battalions and the force in france was to become three brigades, of three battalions each, under the command of lt.-col. (afterwards major-gen.) h. i tanks elles, r.e. each battalion was organised in three companies and one mobile workshop, and each company was composed of four sections of four tanks each. although france had asked for 1,000 tanks, the design of the tanks had not been settled. there was much discussion as to whether a completely new design should not be introduced; sug- gestions were made that a type with much wider tracks, or pos- sibly equipped with more than one pair of tracks, should be tried. in the meantime 100 machines were ordered which were to be similar to the mark i. machine, but with certain minor improve- ments. these were known as the mark ii. and mark iii. ma- chines. other than the obvious fact that tanks had difficulty in crossing the pulverised ground on the somme which was covered with craters and shell holes, the only military lesson that had been learnt as regards tank construction was the fact that it was not worth while fitting the tail to the tank; owing to its vulnerability and complications, it was constantly out of action and was of little value. the mark it. and iii. machines were therefore both very similar to the mark i., the main differ- ences being the provision of stronger rollers, and stronger armour to withstand the armour-piercing bullets which the germans would be fairly certain to use in the next battle. in the meantime the authorities in england who were respon- sible for the production of tanks were becoming perturbed about the delay over a decision as to the design of tanks for the order of 1,000 machines. for the original idea of fighting a surprise battle on a new front the existing design was suitable, but to produce the ideal machine for traversing the shell torn ground of an old battlefield, a new and special design was necessary and this would mean a complete new series of experimental trials, involving much delay. it was not till the end of march, involv- ing the loss of five valuable months, that a decision was reached and it was then decided that the 1,000 machines should be of a type known as the mark iv. this type was again very similar to the mark i., using the same engine and transmission and the same shape of hull. it included the minor improvements already incorporated in marks ii. and iii. and in addition had sponsons which could swing into the body for travelling on a railway, and so saved the labour of detaching and remounting these heavy-sponsons for every railway journey. another feature of this tank was that it carried an unditching beam which could be fastened when required on to the tracks to extricate the tank from, a ditch. the mark iv. tank was the main machine used thre ighout 1917 and the early part of 1918. the next action in which the tanks took part was the battle of arras on april 9 in which the i., iii. and v. armies attacked with a view to penetrating the german defences and allowing an army corps and two cavalry divisions to break through. only 60 tanks were available for this attack and they were ag ain used in the minor rele of assisting the infantry to “ mop up ” machine-gun nests and small posts that had been passed over by the artillery barrage and the assault of our leading troops. the tanks were of the mark i., if. and iii. pattern and some of them suffered heavily from armour-piercing bullets. in many _cases the tanks rendered valuable assistance, overcoming enemy machine-guns and barbed wire with ease. although there had been a heavy preliminary bombardment the ground was not torn up to the condition in which it had been on the somme and the result was that comparatively few tanks became ditched and most of these were soon extricated. the cavalry were prevented from breaking through owing to the usual obstacles—barbed wire and machine-guns—the tanks being far too few in numbers and too dispersed to be able to keep up the pressure and assist in further operations. the lessons were the same as before, namely that tanks should not be dispersed, but used in large numbers and further that succeeding waves were necessary to keep up the pressure and achieve decisive results. messines.—the next attack was against the messines-wyt- schaete ridge on june 7 in which 76 mark iv. and 12 supply tanks were used. the latter were made from old converted. mark i. or ii. tanks and were used to keep the fighting tanks supplied with petrol and ammunition—a need which had been. cb an ks plate i. . 4 ‘ tm | > fo i &, oe ¥" 7 “5 = & : at > el . ie bs - : a ae fay ite fic. 1. british mark i. tank, with gun dismounted. fic. 2. allied tank (known by british as mark viii., and by americans as the liberty tank). fic, 3. british medium c tank. plate ii. tanks = > = %4+caier< fic. 4. vickers light tank (mark ii.). fic. 5. french renault tank. tanks much felt in former battles. the attack was in the nature of an assault in the old form of siege warfare. the result was a com- plete success in which the tanks only played a small part, though in a few individual cases they rendered valuable help. the ground was completely pulverised by the preliminary bombard- ment but very few tanks became ditched, mainly owing to the fact that there had been no rain for many weeks and that there had been time to make a close reconnaissance of the ground and pick out the best lines of advance for the tanks. after this attack the arm was renamed as the tank corps. failure at vpres—on july 31 the third battle of ypres was launched. as the preliminary bombardment had been so suc- cessful at messines it was decided again to use a long prelim- inary bombardment lasting 10 days. the danger of thus ren- dering the ground impassable to tanks, especially if it rained, was explained by those responsible for the action of tanks, but it was considered that the value of the bombardment more than balanced the possible loss of the use of tanks; this did not prove to be the case as the germans adopted a defence distributed in depth which did much to discount the value of the bombard- ment. unfortunately it rained on the first day of the battle and. although the tanks rendered much assistance in individual cases during the early stages of the attack, the ground soon became quite impassable to tanks, and later it became impassable to in- fantry as well. success at cambrai-—although the failure of the tanks at the third battle of ypres was through no fault of the officers and men and those who commanded them, it led to much discussion as to whether tanks should be retained at all. the germans formed the opinion that the tank was practically useless, and many british officers held the same view. fortunately this view was not unanimous and on nov. 20 permission was obtained to launch an attack at cambrai, in which the tanks were to be used in the way in which their originators had intended that they should be used. this was the turning point in the history of the tank corps. the action as fought was in almost every detail the execution of the plan put forward officially for the employment of the tanks by col. swinton in feb. 1916, seven months before the first tank action. the attack was to be a complete surprise and no preliminary bombardment was to be used. three brigades of tanks (nine battalions) were to take part with a total of 378 mark iv. tanks and 98 administrative machines (see cambrai). the attack was launched at 6:20 a.m. in a slight fog, maj.- gen. elles leading the attack in a vanguard tank with the centre division. the operation was a complete success; the enemy were taken absolutely by surprise and most of the infantry bolted or surrendered. within 12 hrs. the infantry had advanced 12,000 yd. on a front of 13,000 with only 4,000 casualties. a similar penetration at ypres had taken three months, with enormous loss of life and morale. the preliminary bombardment which had cost some {22,000,000 at ypres was dispensed with and a further advantage was gained in that the roads had not been torn up with shell fire and were available for use almost at once. and this had been achieved by the tank corps using great mechanical power, but numbering only 4,000 of all ranks. as regards tank design three main lessons were learnt from the battle of cambrai. first of all the tanks required to be handier, and controlled by one man, without the assistance of any gearsmen, and to meet this requirement the mark v. tank was produced. this design had been suggested but not accepted almost a year previously. outwardly the tank had the same appearance as marks i. to iv., but the engine and transmission were much improved. the engine developed more power and the steering was effected by using epicyclic gears on the trans- mission to each track; this was the best tank produced during the war. then the difficulty of crossing the wide trenches of the hindenburg line had been considerable, and a certain num- ber of special long tanks were ordered for this purpose. these were made from mark v. tanks by adding a section in the centre to obtain the required length, and were known as mark v.* tanks. later an improved type was made with a more powerful engine 729 known as the mark v.** the.third jesson was the necessity at times for a much more mobile tank for use beyond the main trench systems. these tanks would not need to cross wide trenches and hence they could be shorter and lighter and more mobile. one type, known as the whippet, had already been con- structed experimentally. these lighter tanks became known as “medium ” tanks, and the whippet was named the medium mark a. german offensive of march 1918.—the tank corps was now expanded to five brigades of 13 battalions with 320 mark iv. machines and 50 medium a. machines. during the winter of 1917-8 all units were training and being equipped with new tanks. no further offensive operations were in view and there ensued a period of preparation for the expected german attack in the spring of 1918. to assist in repelling such an attack the tank corps was distributed in detachments on a front of some 60 miles. the attack was launched on march 21 and the germans advanced rapidly. the tanks took part in many improvised attacks in attempting to stem the german advance. some of these met with fair success and caused heavy casualties but the tanks were too few and too dispersed to make their real weight felt. it was during this retreat that the mediuin a. tanks were first engaged in action and they met with considerable success, their additional mobility being of great assistance in this type of warfare. the attack fought itself to a standstill within a month, immobility being caused more by the difficulties of trans- port than by the resistance offered by the allies. the supply of ammunition and food to the advanced german troops, espe- cially where the lines of supply crossed the old battlefields, be- came exceedingly difficult, and it was at this stage that the necessity for some form of cross-country transport to enable an army to pursue across the devastated country jeft behind by the opposing force, began to be realised. the tank corps had alreacly foreseen its own requirements by the provision of supply tanks and sledges drawn by tanks, and later by moving signal- ling equipment in special signal tanks. a small number of gun carrier tanks had also been constructed at an earlier date for the transport of the heavier guns and ammunition, though these had not been found very satisfactory mechanically. at a later date large numbers of tractors were ordered for every type of transport work, with the idea that at any rate a portion of the army could be made mobile and independent of made roads for its line of supply, but none of these were received before the date of the armistice. in the meantime a reaction had set in as regards the estimated value of fighting tanks. the critics asserted that the battle of cambrai could never be repeated and pointed to the lack of decisive results achieved by the tanks during the german ad- vance. the proposed expansion of the tank corps was post- poned and the existence of the corps seriously threatened. for- tunately the mark v. tanks were now arriving at the rate of about 60 machines per week, and on july 4 one brigade of tanks equipped with these machines carried out a surprise attack on the germans at hamel in conjunction with the australians. the attack was a complete success. the extra handiness and mobility of this machine enabled it to be used very effectively against machine-guns, many of which were crushed and rolled into the ground. the triumph of the tank.—the great french victory of soissons on july 18 1918 marked the turning point of the war; the victory was largely due to the use of french tanks employed in much the same way as the british had used their tanks at cambrai. this was followed by the opening of the british strategic offensive on aug. 8 with the battle of amiens. in this attack the tank tactics were those of cambrai modified by recent experience and adapted to the improved machines available. the attack was carried out by three army corps, a cavalry corps and 11 tank battalions; nine battahons were equipped with mark v. tanks and the remainder with medium a. tanks. for the first time since tanks had been used for an offensive it was possible to keep some in reserve and 42 tanks were kept in hand. 726 the attack was a complete success, the greatest penetration of the tanks being 73 miles. the tanks continued in action till aug. 11. from that date until the armistice tanks took part in every main attack and in no case, where tanks were properly employed in conjunction with the other arms, did the attack fail. during this period the tanks co-operated in the battles of bapaume, epehy, cambrai, st. quentin, the selle and mauberge. tanks came to be looked upon as essential to the success of any attack, and in his final dispatch the commander-in-chief stated that the successful attacks which won great victories at amiens and afterwards would have been impossible without tanks. the germans also confessed that it was the tanks that had caused the downfall of their armies in the field. an expansion of the tank corps to 34 battalions had been sanctioned if the war con- tinued into 1919, and the ministry of munitions in england had hoped to produce a total of 6,000 machines in 1919. ill. french and american tanks independent invention by the french.—the french were faced with the same difficulty as the british in the early stages of the war, and their attacks were held up by machine-guns and barbed wire although they were often well supported by artillery using high-explosive shells. it was col. (later gen.) j. b. e. estienne of the artillery who first perceived the necessity for some mechan- ical machine which could cross the trenches and barbed wire in the face of machine-gun fire, and when this officer saw the holt caterpillar tractors at work behind the british front for hauling guns, it occurred to him that the solution might be found in an armoured caterpillar machine. on dec. 1 1915 col. estienne put forward his idea officially to the french commander-in- chief and asked for an interview. thus the ideas which had been thought out by the british originators in 1914 were reinvented separately and independently by the french in i915. as the result of col. estienne’s interview, 400 tanks were asked for and the design was to be prepared jointly between col. estienne and m. brille of the schneider works. later a further order for another 400 machines was placed with the st. chamond works. in june ro16 french headquarters received information from british g.h.q. as to what was being done in england. col. estienne visited england and saw the mark i. tanks in training. he expressed the view that the two countries should collaborate as regards the production of tanks and that as the british had progressed with the design of a large heavy machine, the french might specialise with a hght machine for more mobile warfare. colonel estienne was specially insistent in the view that neither country should forestall the other in the use of tanks, but that they should co-operate and launch a great offensive in which both british and french tanks might obtain full value from surprise. french light and medium tanks.—the first light tank was produced by the renault firm in nov. but the production of these small machines did not receive official support. the french classified their tanks or “ chars d’assaut,”’ as they were called, in three categories, and this classification was generally accepted. the light tanks were under 1o tons in weight and were to be transported over long distances in lorries. the medium tanks (st. chamond and schneider) weighed between 1o and 30 tons and could be transported by rail on ordinary trucks. the heavy tanks, of which the british mark i. formed the only example at the time, were machines weighing over 30 tons and required special railway trucks for transport. a training centre was now formed at marly-le-roi and later an additional centre was started at champlieu. on sept. 30, the artillerie d’assaut, which was the counterpart to the british tank corps, was formed under the command of colonel es- tienne. the french medium tanks now began to arrive. the schneider tank was six metres in length and driven by a 60 h.p. engine. it was armed with a short 75 mm. gun and two machine- guns. the st. chamond tank was somewhat larger and heavier, being 8 metres in length and driven by an 80 h.p. engine through tanks a petrol-electric transmission. the armament was one 75 mm. gun and four machine-guns. both machines differed radically from the british tank in that the track was not carried round the machine but consisted of the ordinary short type used on trac- tors. this resulted in the machines having very limited climbing power out of shell holes or craters. the artillerie d’assaut was organised in ‘ groupes ’’; each “groupe” had four batteries of four tanks each. the light renault tank was used as a “ com- mand ” tank and one was allotted to each “ groupe.” the delivery of both types of tank was very slow and instead of 800 tanks being ready for the spring offensive in 1917 only 250 had been received. the result was that only ro “ groupes ” were able to take part in gen. nivelle’s offensive. the french high command had grave doubts whether to make use of so small a number of tanks, but eventually decided to do so. the offensive was unsuccessful and although the tanks did good work in isolated cases, the result was disappointing. the employ- ment of tanks in this manner was a repetition of the mistakes made by the british. the attack was not launched as a surprise and the tanks were dispersed and used in small detachments. the tanks showed certain faults but mainly mechanical troubles that were already known. the main fault was lack of climbing power owing to the body projecting beyond the front end of the tracks. success of the renault type—between this date and the end of the year 1917, the french tanks were again used on several occasions with similar results. on oct. 23, five “‘ groupes ”’ took part in the battle of la malmaison and met with much success though the battle was not launched as a surprise and was pre- ceded by an artillery bombardment, during this period much discussion took place and designs were prepared for improved medium tanks and for heavy tanks. finally in dec. 10917 it was dlecided to concentrate on the renault light type; this was the machine that col. estienne had asked for in 1916. some of these tanks were already on order but production had been very slow. in jan. 1918 it was decided to increase the orders to a total of 4,c00 light tanks, of which 1,000 were to be ready by the end of march. the renault tank was a small machine weighing 63 tons. the length was four metres and in addition there was a short skid tail in rear to assist in trench crossing. it was driven by a 35 h.p. engine. ‘there were two types, one being armed with a 37 mm. gun and the other with one machine-gun. the crew consisted only of two men, one driver and one gunner. the french had hoped to use their tanks in mass in a great offensive in the spring or summer of 1918, but the german advance on march 21 upset all these plans. instead the tanks were used piecemeal and in local counter-attacks to stem the german advance. in may and june tanks were used on occa- sions and the renault tank made its first appearance in battle on the east of the forest of retz. during this time the artillerie d’assaut was reorganising and rearming. on july 18, the battle of soissons took place and the french tanks came into their own. it was in many ways a repetition of the battle of cambrai but as the warfare had been of a semi-mobile nature for some months, the wide trenches of static warfare were non-existent. this suited the renault tanks. the attack was launched as a surprise using a total of 120 medium tanks and 7oo renault tanks. the attack was a complete success and definitely estab- lished the value of the tank in the french army. from that date until the armistice, the french tanks—mainly renault tanks—took part in practically every attack and contributed largely to the success of the final french offensive. american tanks—the americans were quick to grasp the great possibilities of tank action on the western front and this form of mechanical warfare appealed to their national char- acteristics. officers were sent to study the employment of tanks and questions relating to their construction and design. as a result the americans decided to adopt the british heavy type of tank and the french light type known as the renault tank. in dec. 1917 an allied commission was formed and it was decided to construct a tank known as the allied tank; this was a heavy tank similar to the latest british type and was to be the mark tanks viii. tank for the british army. it was designed to use the liberty aero engine and was known in america as the liberty tank. a factory was erected at neuvy pailleux which was even- tually to be capable of constructing and assembling these tanks at the rate of 1,200 a month and the first 600 were to be used for equipping the first american tank units. a large construc- tional programme was also started in america to produce both this type and the french renault tank. the first tanks of this type were not constructed until just after the end of the war, but several american tank units cquipped with british and french tanks took part in the latter phases of the war and met with marked success. if the war had continued the american tanks would have come in with an overwhelming effect in 1910. anti-tank defence —the germans never made any attempt to construct tanks in large numbers, partly due to the restricted manufacturing power possessed by germany compared with the allies, and partly due to the comparative failure of the british tanks at ypres in 1917. a rather clumsy type of heavy tank known as the a.y.v. was constructed in small numbers. these and a number of captured machines were formed into units and used in small numbers in a few isolated cases during 1918, but owing to the way in which they were employed and handled they met with little success. on the other hand the germans made continual attempts to introduce some form of anti-tank defence, but as the british tanks met with comparatively small success in the early stages, these measures were only developed half-heartedly. the first step was the introduction of armour-piercing bullets which was countered by the use of thicker armour on the mark lv. tank. next the germans turned their attention to the employment of field guns specially allocated for anti-tank defence and often dug in or concealed in the forward areas. the employment of field guns in this way seriously depleted the power of the ger- man artillery for ather purposes, but they were meeting with considerable success until the introduction of the mark v. tank, which, with its increasing mobility was able to reduce very jargely the value of this field gun defence. in addition the germans often employed obstacles such as pits and barricades or mines. the former required a large amount of material and labour in construction, and could usually only be made in isolated places or in defiles, and did not seriously trouble the allied tanks. the latter were a source of danger to friend and foe, and required much time and material before a continuous line of minefield could be constructed. although tanks were blown up in isolated cases by german mines the danger was never serious. the allies made preparations to meet enemy tank attacks with field gun fire and in some cases by the use of male tanks kept in hand for this purpose. the latter is the most certain method of secure defence against tanks but was never adopted by the germans. in 1918 the germans evolved a heavy anti-tank rifle which was capable of penetrating the armour plates of the tanks, but the rifle had a heavy recoil and was difficult to handle and did not prove successful as an anti-tank measure. after the success of the allies at the battles of soissons and amiens in july and aug. 1918 the germans were awakened to the great danger in which they stood from tank attacks. they then constructed 2 heavy machine-gun firing a 13 mm. bullet and capable of penetrating 30 mm. of armour. the gun was known as the tuf, and great efforts were made to construct it rapidly and secretly, but none were ready till after the armistice. the allies knew of the construction of these guns and realised the value which they would possess for frontal defence. they hoped however that the increased mobility of at any rate a proportion of the tanks in 1919 would enable them to penetrate and attack the enemy in the rear or along his communication and thus discount to a large degree the increased defensive power of the germans against a frontal attack by tanks. iv. progress since the world war since the war progress has followed similar lines. some nations have adopted a special anti-tank gun and others a heavy 727 machine-gun but the most secure method is still the employment of some form of gun on a vehicle which can travel cross-country, and this in effect becomes a tank, though it may be a tank spe- cially designed as a tank destroyer. experimental patterns.—with the exception of the germans, who are prohibited by the peace ‘treaty from doing so, all great nations now employ tanks as part of their military force. the french have retained the renault tank as the main armament of their tank corps and although they have carried out much experimental work with heavier tanks, no models have been con- sidered sufficiently advanced to standardise and construct in any large numbers. the americans have also constructed many expcrimental patterns but have retained the mark viii. or allied tank as the heavy tank with which their tank units are equipped and the renault as the light tank. the british, as the originators of the tank, have made great efforts to maintain their lead. some months before the con- clusion of the world war, when preparations were being con- sidered for a great offensive in 1919, the specification was drawn up for a tank which was to be a great advance on the existing patterns. it was to have a speed of 20 m.p.h. and be capable of floating and propelling itself across water. enough petrol was to be carried to travel 200 m. cross country and the tank was to be long enough to cross a trench 12 ft. wide. this tank was to be used for attacking the enemy communications and head- quarters while the more conventional tanks were attacking the main armies in front. the first experimental model was actually completed just after the armistice. the tank used a system of spring suspension on a cable and hydraulic power for control. although the machine attained a speed of 28 m.p.h. and swam successfully across a narrow river on several occasions, it proved to be unreliable owing to the many new devices which it con- tained and which required further development. the next step that was tried was to produce a machine with an improved form of stecring. up till then tanks had been steered by locking one track and skidding round to the desired direction. this method of steering absorbs a large amount of power and brings large and unnecessary strains on the track and transmission. the device now tried was to produce a track with lateral flexibility so that it could be laid in a curve and enable a tank to take ordinary curves in the same way as any other vehicle. the problem how- ever was found to present many mechanical difficulties and, although much work has been done, no satisfactory solution has yet been found as far as tank construction is concerned. the vickers light tank.—in the meantime the british tank corps which was reduced to four battalions after the war, was armed with the mark v. tank and the medium c. the medium b. replaced the medium a. at the end of the war, but very few of this model were made and the units were equipped with an improved type in the medium c. this machine had a maximum speed of 12 m.p.h. and a radius of action of 7o m. and would have been a very useful tank in france. but by 1920-1 these machines were becoming worn out, and, although much knowl- edge had been gained, the experimental machines aiming at far higher achievements, and which have already been referred to, were not yet in a satisfactory state for production. a tank was therefore designed which was constructed on conventional lines and aimed at obtaining a high degree of mobility, if necessary at the expense of trench spanning capacity. the machine was known as the vickers light tank. it is 18 it. in length and weighs 1o tons and is armed with one 3 pdr. gun and two machine-guns. it can attain a speed of 20 m.p.h. and travel 150 m. on the petrol that it carries. owing to its short length the tank has poor obstacle-crossing capacity, but in other respects it has proved very satisfactory. . the future of the tank.—since the war there has been much discussion on the subject of mechanical warfare, initiated mainly by books and essays written by col. j. f. c. fuller! who acted as general staff officer to the tank corps in france. the great 1 these include tanks in the great war, the reformation of war and the gold medal prize essay for 1919 in the jour. of the r.u.s.i., may 1920. . 725 saving in man power that can be effected by using mechanical power instead of men and horses for transport purposes is now fully realised. reference has already been made to the necessity of using tractors to render an army capable of cross country movement independently of roads and much has already been done in mechanicalising the transport of artillery in the british service. a detailed consideration of this subject is, however, beyond the scope of an article on tanks. more recently attempts have been made to produce a force composed of infantry, tanks and artillery, the whole force being capable of moving 100 m. in 24 hours by means of mechanical power. such a force would have a value in war far beyond its numerical strength in men. preliminary trials of this nature have already been carried out on manoeuvres in england but the whole subject is at present in its infancy. more recently experiments have been carried out in england with very small tanks with a crew of either one or two men only. the one man tank! is constructed from the type of engine and transmission in normal commercial use and the tank is therefore both cheap and easy to obtain in large numbers for war. ‘the control is so arranged that one man can fire the machine-gun at the same time that he is driving the tank. tactically the object of employing such small tanks is twofold. in the first place they are required for scouting and reconnaissance duties. a com- mander who uses ordinary tanks for such purposes risks losing his tanks on minor enterprises before the main battle takes place; on the other hand infantry are slow in performing these duties and cavalry are often too vulnerable. the small cheap tank possesses none of these disadvantages. the second object is to obtain increased safety against anti-tank fire by the use of dispersion. as many as 20 of these small machines can be pro- vided for the cost of one large tank, and by the use of large numbers it should be possible to advance in the face of anti-tank fire where a small number of large machines would fall an easy prey. these small tanks are capable of traversing any ordinary country at an average speed of 10 m.p.h. and can cross a trench about 4 ft. 6 in. wide. if warfare continues to be a serious pos- sibility between great nations in the future, the development of great tank armies is certain. heavily armoured tanks carrying large calibre guns will be the main arm in the battle, and these will be assisted by larger numbers of small tanks for reconnais- sance and protective purposes. in addition there will be the administrative tanks or tractors for communications, engineer work and supply purposes. sce d. g. browne, the tank in action (1920); e. g. beck, tank construction, etc. (1921). {g. le q. m.) tannenberg, battle of.—no portion of the earth’s sur- face has been more fought over than east prussia. it was in 1410, on the field of tannenberg, that the teutonic knights were utterly routed by their enemies the poles and lithuanians, and german victory of 500 years later was in some degree the reversal of this defeat. i. the general situation in august 1914 the tannenverg of 1914 was the greatest victory achieved by any of the combatants at the commencement of the world war, and its strategic and moral effect upon the succeeding years of the struggle were far-reaching. france and russia had been joined by military convention since 1892 and their chiefs of staff had made careful arrangements for concerted action. in case of war with central powers it had been agreed that germany was the main enemy and that the principal military ef- fort must be made against her. she was to be attacked in east and west as nearly simultaneously as possible, so that she might not be in a position to reap the advantage of her central situation. her preparedness and offensive military spirit made it tolerably certain that she would attack france first, leaving her ally aus- tria to hold russia in check, until troops from the west could be made ready to crush russia in her turn also. 1 the inventor of this new machine which, if its promise matures, may be epoch making, is major martel.—(ed. £.b.) i d | tannenberg, battle of owing to the vastness of her territory and to the comparatively undeveloped state of her railways, russia’s rate of concentra- tion was considerably slower than that of france, so much so that there was a danger of the latter being crushed before the attack on germany in the east could commence to exert its effect. unfortunately, under the pressure of french insistence, the good will and optimism of russia’s military leaders exceeded practical possibilities and the outbreak of war found her mili- tary plans in some disorder. austria was regarded by the mass of the russian people as the main enemy, for it was she who had attempted to dragoon the southern slavs, and the russian general staff found themselves unable to alter their main ad- vance to one against germany. all their initial operations in east prussia were in fact hasty improvisations. geographically, east prussia points forward into the heart of slavdom and constituted a difficult problem of defence for ger- many. true to her policy of concentration of force at the deci- sive point, she had decided to advance against france with her main forces whilst maintaining only a minimum of strength in the east. not wishing to abandon national territory without a blow, she had decided to concentrate this minimum strength in east prussia, despite the dangers involved in such action. ger- many’s strength in the east was to consist of 11 divisions, six first-line and five second-line, with but a single cavalry division. taking the east prussian front as it appeared to the russians, we can divide it militarily as follows:— (a) kenigshberg area.—a more or less fortified area extending over the kenigsberg peninsula, of a depth of 19 m. from north to south. in the centre lay the obsolete fortress, strong against anything but heavy artillery. the area could be reinforced by sea through the canal from pillau. it formed a strong flanking position from which to attack any force attempting to pass it to the south. vr“ onl > pp : arigabury seach, oy & . as . english miles : io 20080 | kilometres u0 10 20 30 40 so main railways (b) insterburg gap.—a gap of 43 m. of open country, down which ran the main insterburg-allenstein railway. the river angerapp running north and south blocks this gap. it formed an excellent line of defence with the right flank resting against the impassable lake mauer. */ (c) masurian lakes.—a line of continuous lakes from anger- burg to the russian frontier at johannisburg, a distance of 50 miles. the narrow gaps between the lakes could be held with few troops, and the whole line presented an almost impregnable front behind which the germans could operate to either flank. (d) johannisburg—dziatdowo (soldau) front—a distance of 5 m. running east and west. on the russian side the country had been left a desert as a defence against germany tannenberg, battle of il. the russian plan of invasion *the russian plan for the invasion of east prussia was to ad- vance with two armies north and south of the line of lakes, with the object of enveloping the german forces supposedly concen- trating behind this line. the northern army under rennenkampf was to advance first, towards the insterburg gap, with the ob- ject of drawing the germans as far to the east as possible. the southern army under samsonov was to advance to the line ras- tenburg-allenstein, with the object of striking the rear of the germans opposing rennenkampf. rennenkampf’s army crossed the frontier on aug. 17 with a strength of 63 divisions and 5} cavalry divisions. on the zoth an action was fought with the german viii. army at gumbin- nen. von prittwitz, the german commander in the east, had concentrated his main strength to meet rennenkampf, six divi- sions and a cavalry division, whilst leaving some two divisions to face samsonov’s army, which was concentrating on the river narew but was not considered to be ready to advance. rennenkampf had moved off without a great portion of his transport and found himself forced to halt on the 20th. pritt- witz advanced to attack him. there were serious miscalcula- tions in the german movements, with the result that the action was indecisive, both sides suffering heavy losses. that evening the news arrived that samsonov had not only started to advance, but that two of his corps were already close to the frontier and that he had at least five corps with him. the german command- er abandoned all hope of defeating rennenkampf on the 2tst and ordered a withdrawal to the vistula. he and his chief of staff were at once superseded. hindenburg takes command.—the new commander, hinden- burg, had not yet been employed in the war. his chief of staff, ludendorff, reached supreme headquarters at coblenz on the 22nd and the situation in the kast was explained to him. he immediately ordered the troops retreating in front of rennen- kampf to halt at once and to prevent him from pursuing, and issued instructions for a concentration against samsonov. gen- eral hindenburg joined ludendorfl’s train at hanover and took over the command in this arca at marienburg on the afternoon of the 23rd. luckily for the new command, hoffmann, the chief of the operations section under prittwitz, had already carried out many steps facilitating the concentration desired by ludendorff, and the situation, though alarming, had not grown worse since the supersession of prittwitz. samsonov’s right was indeed well over the frontier near ortelsburg and his left between neidenburg and dziatdowo (soldau) but the russian advance appeared to be slowing up. the german xx. corps had taken up a position north of neidenburg and was awaiting attack. the leading units of the i. corps were detraining south of deutsch eylau and were moving up on the right of the xx. corps. the ard res. division had detrained at allenstein and was moving up on the left of the xx. corps. a landwehr division and units from the vistula garrison troops were also coming up. thus, a strength of about six or seven divisions had been collected to oppose 10 divisions and three cavalry divisions of samsonov’s army. no decisive results could be expected from such strength, and decisive operations were the germans’ only hope. the most im- portant feature of the situation, however, was that rennen- kampf had made no forward move since gumbinnen and had lost all touch with the enemy in front of him. ludendorff there- fore conceived the idea of withdrawing all the troops from ren- nenkampi’s front, with the exception of the cavalry division, and of directing them against the right flank of samsonov’s army. another four divisions thus obtained would give him an actual superiority over samsonov and the direction of their attack might indeed be decisive. il. an account of the battle samsonov, who in peace time was the governor-general of turkistan, had arrived from sick-leave in the caucasus on aug. 12. he had seen neither his subordinate generals nor his staff before, and his immediate superior jilinsky, the commander 729 of the northwestern front, was urging him forward to cross the frontier on the 19th. the original concentration areas of his army behind the bobr and the narew had been considered to be too far to the east and a general move of all corps to the west was in progress. by the 2oth, the right wing (vi. and xiii. corps) had reached the frontier, with the 4th cav. div. well bchind on the right. the left wing (xv. and i. corps) was just short of the frontier, with the 6th and rs5th cav. divs. covering it. of the xxiii. corps, one division was two days’ march behind the left wing and the other had not yet detrained at warsaw. the troops had been marching for a week across the desert area north of ostroteka, over execrable roads in very hot weather. much of the transport had been left behind, the men were tired and unfed and numbers had been much reduced by sickness. no contact had been gained with the enemy and the army was already more than 24 hours late in crossing the frontier. reports from ren- nenkampf of his victory at gumbinnen and, during his advance westwards on the 24th and 25th, of the signs of a hurried retreat on the part of the germans, brought further urgings from jilin- sky to samsonov to hurry. samsonov obeyed to the best of his ability, and by the morning of the 26th his position was as fol- lows :— his centre of two corps (xiii. and xv.) was advancing north- west and was close on the line allenstein-hohenstein. on his right was one corps (vi.) and the 4th cav. div. at rothfliess, at two days’ march from the centre. on his left was a corps (i.) and the 6th and 15th cav. divs. near koschlau, at one day’s march from his centre. the xxiii. corps troops which were up were moving into the gap between the centre and the left. his forces were thus much dispersed. reconnaissance had been bad and he had little information as to the enemy’s dispositions. he seems to have thought that the germans flying in front of rennenkampf had already crossed his front in their march to the vistula and that he was too late to cut them off. he had deviated from his instructions to advance with his left on allenstein and now had practically the whole of his force to the west of that town. he had no knowledge of the whereabouts of rennenkampf’s army and did not realise that he was increasing the space between the two russian armies and thereby facilitating the german operations. his supply system had broken down utterly and his men were half-famished and worn out with the fatigue of excessive marching. the signal serv- ice had also broken down and orders had been sent out to corps by wireless. the russian signals were easily read by the ger- mans, who thus had absolutely accurate information as to their opponent’s dispositions and intentions. germans attack samsonov.—the new german command had galvanised the dispirited viii. army from the first and hope of success ran high. the attacks on samsonov’s two flanks were to be launched simultaneously on the 26th. on the right, the german i. corps, strengthened by the vistula garrisons, attacked only half-heartedly. von francois, the commander of the i. corps, was short of some of his heavy artillery and he con- tented himself with driving in some of the russian outposts. on ihe 27th, however, he launched his attack in earnest. at dawn a hurricane bombardment was opened on the russian i. corps’ positions on either side of uzdowo. the famished russians did not wait for the infantry attack but broke and ran. by ro p.m. that night there was nothing left of the russian left wing except a small rear-guard just north of dziaidowo; and that too had disappeared before the next morning. the rear of the russian centre was now completely exposed and francois directed his march on neidenburg. opposition there was none, and by the night of the 28th his leading troops had reached muschaken, eight miles east of neidenburg. by the night of the zoth the whole length of the road from neidenburg to willenberg was held by a line of entrenched pickets. the russian retreat to the south was completely blocked. during the 30th francois was attacked at neidenburg by fresh russian troops coming up from mtawa and actually lost the town for a time. he held stoutly on to the line of his pickets, however, and on the 31st neidenburg was reoccupied. 73° on the left, the german xvii. and i. res. corps, having turned their backs on rennenkampf and marched due south, had ar- rived within striking distance of the russian right at rothflicss on the night of the 25th. their attack on the morning of the 26th came as a complete surprise. the russian vi. corps with- drew in confusion, losing 6,000 men and 16 guns. by the night of the 27th the russian right was 32 m. to the south of roth- fliess and in a state of hopeless demoralisation. the rear of the russian centre was now exposed on its other flank. the german xvil. corps continued its march to the south, whilst the i. res. corps moved in closer towards allenstein. the story of the fighting in the russian centre is not so inglorious as that on the two flanks. in accordance with samsonov’s plan the centre (xiii. and xv. corps) continued their advance on the 26th towards the line allenstein-hohenstein. the xiii. corps encountered no opposition, but the xv. had to fight its way steadily forward. for the 27th, the advance was to be continued. second german blow.—ludendorff, with his accurate infor- mation of the events on either flank, now decided that the german centre had retired enough. the reinforced nx. corps was therefore ordered to attack on the 27th. the battle which ensued between the russian xv. corps and the german ax. corps was particularly fierce, the russians holding their own and even advancing a little on their leit. the russian xiii. corps rendered no help to its neighbour. on the 28th the germans renewed their attacks and this time the hardly-tried russian xv. corps commenced to break. the xiii. corps, moving down to assist, found itself assailed in rear by troops arriving from allenstein and for the second time brought no help. when night fell the two russian corps were on a line from gricslienen to waplitz and in close touch with the germans. hoping to escape from pursuit, they commenced to withdraw during the night. the withdrawal soon became a rout, and a mass of troops and transport, both unfed and unwatered, be- came inextricably mixed in the depths of the forest of griinfliess. determined attempts were made during the 29th to break through to the south of muschaken and to the north at kalten- born, but the german ring held fast. only some 2,000 men el- fected their escape. the greater portion of these two corps sur- rendered to the german parties, clearing the forest during the 3oth and 31st. the end of samsonov—samsonov himself had moved up to neidenburg on the 27th in order better to control the battle. he was greeted with the news of the disaster to both his flanks and met streams of stragglers coming into the town. he decided to go to the headquarters of the xv. corps and take personal charge, and left neidenburg on the morning of the 28th with a small staff, all mounted on horses. at once he became mixed in the mass of transport in the forest and could exercise no effective command. he then decided to ride to the south, but during the night of the 28-29th he became exhausted after having walked for some distance. he drew aside in the darkness and his staff heard a single shot. a careful search brought no result and the staff continued their way, certain that their unfortunate com- mander had taken his own life in his despair at the turn which events had taken. results of the battle —the practical result of the fighting from aug. 26-30 was the total annihilation of two russian corps and the reduction of three other corps to half their strength in num- bers. the whole russian ii. army was so demoralised and was so deficient in essential material, such as artillery and transport, that it was no longer of any fighting value. the germans claimed 125,000 prisoners and 500 guns. it is certain that their booty was very great, for 60 train loads of captured material left puchallowen after the battle and the captured horses were driven in herds to improvised camps at neidenburg. although greatly inferior in the whole eastern theatre, the germans had yet managed to concentrate a superiority on the field of battle. the russians had 132 battalions, 96 squadrons and 620 guns, including 12 heavy, whilst the germans had 155 battalions, 48 squadrons and 818 guns, including 128 heavy. taoism bibliography.—w, von stephani, avit hindenburg ber tannen- berg (1919); h. von francois, afarneschlacht und lannenberg (1920); p. von hindenburg, out of my life (1920); e. ludendorff, afy war afemories (1922): j. daniloff, russland im weltkrieg, 1974-5 (1925). (see also world war: bibliography.) (w. e. l.) taoism (sce 26.402).—the term taoism has two meanings: (1) the philosophical system attributed to lao tze (b.604 b.c.) and chuang tza (b.330 b.c.); (2) the popular religion of the chinese. taoism as a philosophical system—the term tao originally meant the revolution or the way of the heavens about the earth. this movement of the heavens was regarded as the cause of the phenomena on earth. the tao was located about the celestial pole which was considered to be the seat of power because all revolves about it. in the course of time this concrete expression became abstract, and the tao was viewed as the universal cosmic encrgy behind the visible order of nature. this cosmic energy (sce confucianism) regarded as being is impersonal, omnipresent and eternal; viewed as becoming it works spontaneously, orderly, unselfishly and continuously for the highest good of all beings. the tao produced the yiz and the yang, the negative and the positive principles of nature. these by their interaction brought forth heaven and earth. heaven andearth gave birth to all beings. the human order is the product of the eternal energy. philosophic aspect.—~taoism has usually been regarded as a mystic religion, but it was also an economic and political philos- ophy. it advocated frugality, simplicity and the joys of the peasant life in contact with the soil. it opposed the educational programme of the confucianists, and advocated the theory that the people should be kept in innocence (not in ignorance), the taoist philosophy is responsible for that remarkable trait of the chinese, namely, their contentment in situations which offer a minimum of comfort, and their prizing of culture above possession. political aspect.—in politics taoism opposed a highly central- ised government and favoured the maximum autonomy for the people. lao tze and his successors promoted the small village state which enjoyed full autonomy and lived in harmony with its neighbours. all forms of bondage and legal restraints were opposed. non-resistance was exalted and militarism was con- demned. the ethics of confucianism met with the strongest opposition on the part of the taoists. such virtues as love, justice, rever- ence, wisdom and sincerity were regarded as the first steps de- parting from the harmony of the simple life in the tao, and producing the distracting contraries which marred the purity of life. the taoists were mystics, but they were practical mystics, who hoped to realise the best social order through a harmonious relationship with the tao. their ideal was “ this worldly.” their mysticism had three stages: (1) the purgation, casting out selfishness and self-seeking; (2) union with the tao, by which the individual lost his individuality with the distraction of the contraries; (3) power, which enabled the individual merged with the tao to escape the limitations of time and space. taoism as a religion.—-taoism as a religion is inherent in taoism as a philosophy. the early mystics practised breathing and abstaining from food, and sought longevity and a future life in the taoist paradise. the religious aspect did not become prominent, however, until the han dynasty (206 b.c.-221 a.d.), when the taoists occupied themselves in compounding the elixir of life and in making journeys to the isles of the immortals. they also developed several sects which practised exorcism and fortune-telling and exercised considerable political power. the rise of taoism as a church is attributed to chang tao- ling (b.34 a.d), who developed a high degree of magic power which he transmitted to his heirs, together with the political prestige which reputation for such power brought. these took part in a successful rebellion in the latter part of the 2nd century, and established a state in szechwan based on taoist principles. the descendants of chang tao-ling were recognised by the gov- ernment and in 1016 were givena fief at lung hu shan in kiangsi. tardieu—tariffefs their function consisted of a general oversight of the taoist priests and monks and the rule over the world of the gods. the system developed a hierarchy among the gods which corres- ponded to that of the govt. of china. at the head was yi huang shangti, the pearly emperor, who presided over an elab- orate pantheon. buddhist influence —through contact with buddhism in the first six centuries of our era the taoists appropriated the buddhist world view, adopted the monastic system and imitated the bud- dhist pantheon. lao tze was deified and was associated with pan ku and yii huang shaneti in the taoist trinity patterned after the three jewels of buddhism. present day taoism is a con- glomeration of animism, polytheism and magic. brintrogrrapny.—h. a. giles, chuang tsu (london, 1889); james legge, the texts of taoism, pts. ].and i. (sbe xxnuix. and xl.) (oxford, 1891); paul carus, lao-tse's, tae teh-king (chicago,1898); spurgeon medhurst, tao teh ching (chicago, 1903); r. k. douglas, confucianism and taotsm (1906); e. il. parker, studies in chinese religion (1910); d. t. suzuki, a brief hwistery of early chinese philosophy (1914); h. dore, researches intu chinese superstitions, vol. 1,7; hu shih, development of ihe logical method 1n ancient china (1922); a. forke, the world conception of the chinese (1925), and “ taoism” in encyclopacdia of religion and ethics, a oe as fes: tardieu, andre pierre gabriel amedee (1876- __—i+), french politician and writer, was born in paris sept. 22 1876. educated at the ecole normale supericure, he became chef de cabinet of waldeck-rousseau in 1899 and retained the post until 1902; between that year and 1or4 he taught at the ecole des sciences politiques and the ecole supericure de la guerre, and also acted as foreign news editor on le temps. from 1914-24, as deputy of the chamber, he fulfilled the functions of french special commissioner in the united states (1917-8), of french plenipotentiary at the peace conference (1918-9), and minister of the liberated regions (1919-20). as captain of chasseurs between 1914 and 10916, he was wounded and three times mentioned in despatches. at the peace conference (1919) he was largely concerned with the proposals for the political and territorial clauses. he presided over the committce of five entrusted with the work of drafting the allied reply to the german observa- tions on the draft terms of the peace treaty. tardicu also presided over the alsace-lorraine committee, the committce of the saar and that of the execution of the treaty. tardieu’s political attitude was characterised by his inflexible attachment to the policy of clemenceau, with whom he was asso- ciated in the closest collaboration for war and for peace. three times in succession, between ror9g and 1924, he refused to enter the government, in order to maintain his independent defence of this policy. as director of the echo national, the daily paper founded by clemenceau and himself, he waged a frerce war, in foreign affairs, against the successive revisions of the treaty of versailles; and in internal affairs, against the acts which paved the way for the victory oi the cartel des gauches. tardieu was the author of the following historical works: ques- tions diplomatiques (1905); france and the alliances (1908); la conference d'algesiras (1909); le prince de bulow (1909); fiirst v. bulow (1910); la france et les alliances (1910); le mystere d’agadir (1912); notes sur les etats-unis (1917); l’ amerique en armes (1919); la paix (1921); le slesvig et la paix (1925). tardiveau, rene: sce boylesve, rene.