SUMMER SCHOOLS

the introduction of new subjects into the curriculum and the development of new teach- ing methods are responsible for the growth of summer schools and vacation courses for teachers. history of movement.—among the earliest must be mentioned the one carried on at naas in sweden and attended by teachers who desired to learn sloyd as an introduction to handwork. a course on somewhat different lines was introduced and conducted at' leipzig by dr. goetze, and in the latter part of the roth cen- tury these courses attracted many teachers from england and america during the summer vacation. the progress of hand- work in english schools soon led to the establishment of summer courses under the direction of the educational handwork associ- ation. i. in great britain in a less specialised field, the university extension movement had established summer meetings held alternatively at oxford and cambridge. these were attended by many teachers, al- though designed primarily to meet the needs of students in university extension classes. the science and art department, now merged in the board of education, provided holiday courses for selected teachers in various branches of science; and certain summer time—sunderland french universities organised summer classes in french language and literature which attracted teachers of modern languages. present organisation.—from these beginnings the movement developed rapidly, and the provision of summer schools and vacation courses became extremely liberal, although it does not yet cover the whole ground or meet the needs of all teachers. the courses offered present great variety alike in their curricu- lum and organisation. some extend over a month, while others last only a fortnight, or even a week. some are specialised in character, as, for example, a course dealing with the teaching of latin; while others cover a wider range and aim at supplving form teachers in secondary and elementary schools with infor- mation concerning new devclopments in school organisation and in general method. the board of education continues to pro- vide courses for selected teachers who receive financial aid in the shape of a grant and attend lectures and demonstrations in such subjects as rural education, modern languages, science, geography and history. music also receives considerable atten- tion, and every summer vacation sees a large number of teachers of music attending the courses provided in their subject. features of summer courses —a well-arranged course is not con- fined to lectures and demonstrations—it provides opportunities for social intercourse and for free discussion, and some of the most successful courses are held in university towns, where the stu- dents live for a time in a college and enjoy the amenities of the playing fields and the river. a very popular course, which is held in london under private auspices, aims at giving to teachers from the provinces and from abroad an intimate knowledge of the chief attractions of london and of hearing addresses from eminent men and women, besides providing courses of lectures on modern lines. courses for t eachers.—it is now generally accepted that teachers should be encouraged in every possible way to refresh their minds and revivify their work by attending summer schools. it is recognised, however, that for many teachers the best refresh- ment is a complete holiday, and some of the courses arranged are therefore held at times outside the holiday period, the teach- ers being granted leave of absence to enable them to attend. this plan calls for the co-operation of the local authority and the board of education, and this is held to be justified on the ground that the work of the teacher gains in efficiency and there- fore brings a return in public service. in england the practice of giving a ‘‘ sabbatical year’ has not been widely adopted, although in some universities certain professors or lecturers have been granted leave of absence for a term or more to enable them to pursue definite lines of research. it is increasingly held, how- ever, that the continued efficiency of school teachers demands that some arrangement should be made by which they may have the opportunity of bringing their studies up to date. the report of the departmental committee on the training of teachers recommended that teachers of experience should be granted leave of absence in order that they might attend university courses on education, and thereby equip themselves for posts of respon- sibility in the educational service. (e.-r:) ii. in the united states the long summer vacation which interrupts the work of schools in the united states during the months of july and aug. is a survival of the period when the population was very largely agrarian and there was a demand during the harvesting period for the labour of young people. with the readjustment of indus- trial and economic conditions, the summer vacation has come to be recognised as undesirably long. in spite of this fact, the sessions of public schools continue to follow established tradi- tion. various devices have been suggested for the utilisation of the summer months. a number of school systems have organised elementary vacation schools, where a programme of supervised play and handwork is carried on. in a few cases the regular programme of studies has been conducted in what is known as the all-year school. summer schools at the elementary level are, however, relatively rare. they are somewhat more common in secondary schools. here they serve most frequently the purpose 679 of offering opportunity to backward pupils to make up their deficiencies. they furnish, however, to some extent an oppor- tunity for shortening the period of high-school attendance for those who wish to complete their work as fast as possible. it is in the fields of adult education and of higher education that the summer school has achieved its most distinguished success. in its earliest form the summer school provided series of lectures and entertainments intended to supply adults with an opportunity for intellectual recreation during vacation. chau- taunua, n. y., was the home of the largest and most influential school of this type. from chautauqua the practice of adult education spread, and the word chautauqua has become current as the designation for almost any course of lectures. whether given in the summer or winter, whether lasting for six weeks or three days. chautauquas are now common as community enter- prises and as enterprises sponsored by churches and schools. university activity—it is significant that the first proposal for a summer session of a university came from a man who had been intimately associated with the chautauqua movement, william rainey harper. when president harper organised the university of chicago in 1892, he planned its session in four units of twelve weeks each, and arranged that one of the sessions should fall in the summer covering the weeks during which most schools and colleges have their summer vacation. president harper’s idea was scoffed at in many quarters by those who believed that summer study would degrade academic standards. the movement to establish such sessions in universities, how- ever, spread, until they became very common. at first the insti- tutions which held summer sessions limited them to six weeks, and the university of chicago was practically alone in its efforts to conduct four full quarters of work. during the period of the world war a great stimulus was given to the summer school, because it was recognised that economy of plant and of the student’s time could be effected by holding summer sessions. a number of the war boards urged institutions to keep their doors open throughout the year, and as a result several of the larger institutions, especially among the state universities, re- sponded favourably. a poll of 31 leading universities showed the following facts regarding length of summer sessions:—— number of weeks in session . . . 6 number of institutions . eo q 2oo jr -12 io 4 i | ie 3 types of studenis—-the student body of summer sessions is seldom recruited from the regular undergraduates. the typical undergraduate, accustomed through the high-school period to a long interruption of his study in the summer, demands a summer , vacation. graduate students, pushed by the urge to secure a higher degree as early as possible, not uncommonly take advan- tage of summer sessions. the great majority of the summer student population is made up of teachers and school adminis- trators who during the other three quarters of the year are pro- fessionally engaged in school work. it has come to be a very common practice for boards of education either to require sum- mer study of their employees or to reward such study by special salary inducements. a large number of institutions other than universities hold summer sessions. normal schools almost uni- versally do so. the aggregate number of students in the summer schools of higher institutions is large. thirty-one universities reporting for eight years show an increase from 36,971 students in 1918 to 87,208 in 1925. in some of the states it is reported that 80% of the teachers attend regularly summer sessions either in normal schools or colleges or universities. (c. h. j.) summer time: sce daylight saving. sun: see astronomy; solar energy. sun cure: see heliotherapy. sunderland, england (see 26.100), with an area of 3,357 ac. and a population of 159,055 in 1921, is a great shipbuilding centre and has a large coal trade. new libraries have been opened in hendon, monkwearmouth, and in the western district of the city. the parish of st. aidan’s, grangetown, was formed and the church partially finished and consecrated in ror1, and the church of st. gabriel’s, monkwearmouth, was built in 1912. 680 backhouse park of 13} ac. was presented in 1923, and a war memorial has been erected in mowbray park. ‘the south break- water at the harbour entrance has been extended, making the pier 2,844 ft. long; the area of the harbour, which has been enlarged by dredging, is about 150 ac. a jarge dry dock, 515 ft. long, was opened in ro2s5. sun yat-sen (1867-1925), chinese republican leader. dr. sun (known in china by the more familiar title of sun wen) may truly be described as the father of the chinese republic. his father, a poor farmer living at hsiang shan near the island of macao, was a convert to christianity (under the london mis- sionary society) and his son early espoused the christian faith and continued to describe himself as a christian till his death, before which he gave instructions that he should be buried with christian rites. another influence of his early years came from his uncle who had fought in the tuiping rebellion and who was the village schoolmaster at his birthplace (hsiang shan). at 18 years of age he was employed at the mission hospital in canton and had already acquired some knowledge of the eng- lish language from an english lady. in 1891 he entered upon a medical course at the newly formed medical school in hongkong of which he was the first graduate in 1894. it was here that his life-long friendship with sir james cantlie began. through a chinese fellow student, dr. sun came into association with a secret society which was planning to overthrow the existing re- gime in china and which offered to assist him in the carrying out of the plans which were already developing in his mind. the first of a number of definite revolutionary efforts with which dr. sun was associated was brought to light in 1895. the other members of the group concerned with this attempt were exe- cuted, dr. sun alone escaping with his life. thus began that long period of dr. sun’s life during which he was working out- side his native country with the object of bringing about a revolu- tion. in all, ro abortive attempts were made. dr. sun worked indefatigably during these years, taking three trips to europe, four to the united states, five to japan and also visiting the east indies and straits settlements and honolulu on several occa- sions. in the latter place, shortly after the chino-japanese war in 1895, he established hsing chung hui, the forerunner of later revolutionary organisations. of these the most important was the tung men hui formed in japan with the help of general hwang hsing. in 1898 he determined upon those principles which he later announced and expounded at great length. the three fundamental principles were nationalism, democracy and socialism, and the five spheres in which they were to be worked out were: the executive government, the legislative field, the ‘judicial field, the civil examinations and the department of censorship or impartial scrutiny of public matters and officials. it was not, however, until r905 that dr. sun publicly declared his adherence to these ideas and worked them out in fuller detail. immediately following the boxer outbreak in 1g00 dr. sun at- tempted to use the reaction as a means of establishing a demo- cratic government and ending the manchu regime, but this attempt as others proved abortive. in 1905 the chinese revolu- tionary league was formed in europe and japan and through this dr. sun enlisted the support of a great number of chinese not resident in china. dr. sun raised during this period large sums of money among adherents to the revolutionary cause and was thus able to spread his ideas through secret agencies in china itself. his activities brought him into prominence and a large price, finally amounting to £100,000, was placed upon his head. on one occasion in 1896 he was kidnapped while in london and held at the chinese legation for several days. his release came about through a note to sir james cantlie, which was smug- gled out of the legation and which led to lord salisbury taking the matter up as one of privilege. | in rgtt the revolution broke out in china which was to sweep away the effete manchu leaders and to set up, in name at any rate, the new republican form of government. dr. sun’s per- sonal influence had much to do with the inner organisation of this revolt, and in particular with the form in which an alterna- tive to the manchu regime was presented to the nation. while sun yat-sen there was a widespread feeling that the dynasty had outlived its usefulness, there was little understanding of what was involved in establishing a republic and only the efficient organisation of the kuo ming tang (dr. sun’s creation, known as the republican party) was able to turn the anti-manchu tide into a pro- republican movement. dr. sun was in england when the revo- lution began and was called back to china as soon as it became general. on jan. 5 1912 he took the oath of office as provisional president of the new republic, this position having been offered to him by the national convention which was then meeting in nanking. on feb. 12 an imperial edict announced the abdication of the emperor and the substitution of republican for monarchical government. yuan shih-k’ai was entrusted with the task of carrying through the changes involved, and dr. sun, realising the impossibility of uniting the country under his own presi- dency and in hopes of unity being attained under yuan, resigned his presidency in favour of the latter. he accepted the post of director-general of transport and trade and in this position made some study of the constructive side of the task involved in making a new china. he travelled widely throughout the coun- try, being no longer a suspected traitor but the honoured father of the republic. he was, however, always more of the propa- gandist and inspirer than the practical administrator. he became increasingly restless under the leadership of yuan shih-k’ai, and in 1917, after the latter’s coup d’etat and death, he put himself at the head of a movement for an independent republic of south china. the strength of his support had always been drawn from kwang-tung province and here he might have remained within his own group had he been able to work with others and content to develop one part of china, leaving the rest to go its own way. however, he soon found it impossible to co-operate with the military leaders in canton and he resigned from his position as president of the republic of south china. the military regime was maintained largely by kwang si troops until 1921 when ch’en ch’iung-ming drove them out and called in dr. sun again. the following year he determined on an advance in force against the north, while ch’en ch’iung-ming desired to con- solidate the work begun in the province of kwang-tung. this led to an open breach and dr. sun was once more driven from his native province, finding refuge in shanghai. in feb. 1923 he called to his aid troops from kwangsi and yunnan and thus defeated his one time colleague and subsequent rival, general ch’en. from that time until his death he was acknowledged as the chief executive of the province, but his effective sway did not extend far beyond canton and even there was maintained only by the use of the troops from elsewhere. he used and per- mitted very violent methods, more particularly in the attack upon the merchants volunteer corps and the looting and burning of a considerable part of the city of canton in march 1924. in these ways he lost much of the support which had been given to him and to the kuo ming tang by chinese overseas. at the same time his pronounced socialist views ensured him the support of the mass of the workers and on a number of occasions he used his influence to secure higher wages for labourers, particularly when strikes were declared in canton. so far as local support was concerned dr. sun’s star seemed to be declining in the autumn of 1924, but he was still idolised by the student class and in his own party where his was a name to conjure with. it was then that feng yii-hsiang brought about his coup whereby wu pei-fu (a determined enemy of dr. sun’s) was routed and chang tso-ling co-operated with feng to put the old anfu leader tuan ch’i-jui in the position of chief executive in peking. dr. sun had been cultivating friendly relations with the parties now predominant, and he was called to peking to con- fer with them in regard to the calling of a people’s conference and other matters connected with the establishment of the new re- gime. for some time past his health had been failing with the growth of what proved to be cancer of the liver and he finally succumbed to thiscomplaint on march 12 1925,shortly after reach- ing peking. time was sufficient however again to reveal the super-power difficulty which dr. sun always had in co-operating with others, particularly those who did not fully share his ideals. a serious difference over the method of calling the conference had devel- oped and sun yat-sen’s death seemed the only thing to prevent open hostility. dr. sun left behind him two wills which have been very widely distributed and commented upon in china, one concerning his personal effects, a very simple document; the other a re-aflirma- tion of the principles by which his life had been guided and an expression of his desire to sce these carried out after his death in the reconstruction of china. dr. sun was a man of outstanding personality, and one whose position came to be recognised throughout the whole of china. it would be no exaggeration to say that before his death he was recognised as the leading figure in the country, even those who criticised him most severcly recognising the contribution which he had made to the new order and the power which his personality had exercised upon his fellow countrymen. this he owed to his sincerity, single-minded- ness and courage. he was kind-hearted and an eager student, humble-minded and patriotic. his ambition was for china rather than for himself. by his personal charm he won to his side many who did not fully share his theories. nevertheless he showed weakness in certain directions. he frequently made mistakes in his estimate of men, more particu- larly in the military leaders with whom from time to time he allied himself. he failed clearly to see the danger of seeking his own high ends through methods which were really at variance with them. he was not able to see all round a question and there- fore lacked powers of constructive statesmanship. his was a restless spirit and he was not content to settle down to more commonplace tasks. the most considerable effort made by l ke o ario reading o8i dr. sun in the field of constructive policy is to be found in his volume the international development of china (1922). his public works include a number of speeches, articles and pamphlets, more particularly the following: he doctrine of sun wen; the international development of china; the principles of democratic government (statement of 25 outstanding points). see sir james cantlie and c. s. jones, sun yat sen and the slwakening of china (1912); p. linebarger, sun yat sen and the chinese republic (1925). gh. tt} super-power.—this phrase has come into wide use in connection with the extensive development of the electric power industry. it has been defined as “ the systematic grouping and interconnection of existing power systems to the end that greater economy will be effected.’ according to another authority, “‘ super-power is the term used to designate the furnishing of large blocks of power generated in efficient power stations and transmitted in bulk at very high voltage, such as 220,000, and supplied through transformers to the present power systems for distribution at some lower voltage.”” an interesting analogy compares a super-power system to a power bank in which de- posits or withdrawals are made at widely different points. any surplus production of an existing power system can be absorbed and simultancously a deficit on the part of another system can be made up by the resources of the super-power network. basis of the system.—in its strictly technical sense, as pointed out by w. s. murray, the basis for a super-power system lies in the economy effected by the interconnection of electric power systems whose peak loads are reached at different times; in other words diversity cconomy. in a power system, a, the capacity of plant in the power station must at least be equal to the peak or maximum load although the average load may be if ofitchba 9 husetts ©®booston ercesyer [ pees massa sfringfield ¢ fartford j connec ur ' new haven \ c) cut a o) — ~ - dridgeporte 3 wr, es ae pe \ philadelphia - a ru we virginia _.awashingto ¥ 75 ~=:100 fic. 1.——map of the region included in the u.s. super-power survey, 1920. (transactions a.i.e.e. 1920.) 682 only from 20% to 30% of this. a neighbouring power company, b, may have similar characteristics except that the time when the maximum load occurs may be quite different from that of a. in such a case it is obvious that, given suitable connections, power house a could carry the peak load on both systems. this would leave power house b with a non-peak or base load which might be carried most economically by a hydroclectric plant or a steam plant located at the coal mine but within the range of practical transmission. the extension of this idea to the opera- tion of a number of independent systems is the basis of super- power. the most important of the advantages are:— (a) a higher capacity factor on the combined systems resulting in fewer generating units and reduced investment per kilowatt. (6) a higher joad factor resulting in substantial fucl economy. (c) greater reliability and continuity of service, especially in the supply of large railway or industrial loads. u.s. government survey —in the years 1919-20 a govern- ment super-power survey was made in the united states cover- cedar rapids on the st.lawrence river providence aed new york newark philadelphia wilmington washington : x - automatic breaker fic. 2.—main transmission lines and location of base load power plants for the u.s. super-power survey, 1920. ing the region lying between boston and washington with a view to ascertaining what fuel economies and other advantages might be derived from interconnection and co-ordination of the power sources and industries in this territory. the subsequent report, in the preparation of which a large body of representa- tive engineers co-operated, affords an admirable model for any study of this kind. it was shown that the total capacity of all the individual generating plants in the region was then about 13,000,000 kw. but the average load factor wasonly 15%. inother words, for every 100 kw. of generator capacity only an average of 15 kw. was produced. by reinforcing the power utilities with a super-power system it was shown that the load factor could be raised to so or 60%, and that coal could be saved to the extent of 30,000,000 tons per year. many contingent economies were indicated, such as the reduced load on the railways for coal trans- portation and the diminished maintenance and upkeep of ma- chinery. while the report made clear that it is no function of the super- power system to replace the existing power companies, it was also shown that something more than the mere linking up of the present networks would be called for in order to meet the expanding demand for electric power. the following were there- fore proposed to amplify the existing equipment of the individual power companics. (a2) a transmission bus line extending the entire length of the super-power region from boston to washington consisting of four circuits at 220,000 volts. _ (5) a group of base load power stations located in the bituminous coal-fields of west virginia. (c) a similar group located in the anthracite coal-fields of penn- sylvania. 7 (d) a hydroelectric power plant on the st. lawrence river. super-power these three groups of generating stations are to be connected by transmission lines direct to the 220,000 volt bus line at the most logical points. base load stations are mentioned particularly because it is assumed that the peak loads would be carried by the most economical of the existing stations in the local indus- trial centres. it is clear, however, that, with the development of the super-power idea and the improvement in load- and capacity-factor, local peak loads would become of less and less importance. while the centres of population form the logical foci for factories, it is not necessary nor desirable for large power stations to be built in the heart of modern industrial cities and one effect of super-power will probably be the decentralisation of the power industry, the principal power sources being at the mine and the waterfall with auxiliary stations a short distance outside the individual centres. reference steam power stations @ aydroelectrre 195) ecerving statrons epc conn ry lic. 3.—super-power system of the new england power co. (map divided into 25 mile squares.) other systems.—while the development of electric power in the boston-washington zone has not entirely followed the lines of the above report, the tendency is in that direction. mean- time other super-power systems have grown up—mainly in the united states, of which the new england power system and its affiliations form an interesting example (fig. 3). this com- pany operating in massachusetts, vermont, new hampshire, connecticut and rhode island covers a territory of more than 20,000 sq. m. with connections to systems in other states. it has been evolved by the consolidation both financially and physically of a number of smaller independent power companies and opcrates (1926) eight water-power and six steam-power stations. it has a total installed capacity of nearly 200,000 kw. and in addition purchases 100,000 kw. irom neighbouring sys- tems. it should be noted that this does not comprise the entire energy consumption of the territory because several large steam plants of modern design are independently operated in boston, providence and other large citics. these are, however, susceptible of being connected with the new england system. transmission lines amount to a total of 765 m. of 110,000 and 66,000 volts. a glance at the map will show widely distributed load centres concentrating toward the southeast extremity of the region and supplied by steam stations in the proximate locality. about roo m, to the west is the deerfield river, on which a number of power houses have been built, chief among which is that at davis bridge (45,000 kw.), from which an important trunk line has been constructed 76 m. southeast to the substation at milbury. supilo—supply and transport this linc, which will ultimately be operated at 220,000 volts, forms the backbone of the system and serves as a bus to dis- tribute the load between the hydroelectric stations in the west, the steam stations in the east and the various load centres. while special attention has been drawn to the new england system, this has been used simply as an illustration. the amer- ican gas and electric co. in western pennsylvania and the southern power co. in north carolina and a number of others might have been described as exemplifying the super-power idea in practice. developments in japan.—outside the united states, japan and germany have shown the most important developments. in central japan there is virtually no coal and, while water- power sites are plentiful and are freely developed, the variation in flow of the streams is a serious handicap and jeads to a high cost of development because of the difficulty of storage as well as a low capacity factor. this has been fully recognised by the engineers of some of the most important power systems. in a study of the subject minoru fukuda has shown that the present energy demand of central japan is of the order of 1,400,000 kw. divided almost equally between the eastern and western zones. the potential water power available is 3,530,000 kw. but the dry season reduces this by 20%. to utilise the water power economically therefore an auxiliary 700,000 kw. must be pro- vided by steam plants to operate during the low-water period. while there appears to be a reasonable surplus of potential power over consumed power, the load- and diversity-factors must be taken into account and only by the adoption of super- power principles can these power resources be made to meet the demand which will come upon the combined systems. condiltons in germany.—in germany the problem has been somewhat different and less onerous because the majority of the new power plants are designed to burn briquetted lignite; the plants have been built in close proximity to the mines and, because of the relative absence of water power, the problems of distributing base and peak loads between steam and water stations have not arisen. nevertheless the super-power idea is well illustrated by recent developments of the elektrowerke a. g. and the rhenische westfalische elektrizitieitswerk. bibliography.—the literature of super-power is distributed through the transactions of the principal national engineering societies during the years 1919-26, particularly the transactions of the american institute of electrical engineers (new york) and trans. world power conference 1924 (london, 1925); professional paper no. 123, issued by the u. s. geological survey, describes most fully the super-power survey of the boston-washington region already referred to, as well as treating of the general principles of the subject. in addition should be mentioned w.s. murray, superpower (1925); g. klingenberg, bau crosser elektrizitdtswerke (1913 ane ee ps supilo, frano (1870-1917), yugoslav statesman, was born of poor croat parents at cavtat (ragusa vecchia) in southern | dalmatia. at the age of 20 he obtained a subordinate post on the staff of a small provincial croat newspaper. in 1900 he was made the editor of novi list, a new paper, founded by a group of croat patriots at fiume, and he rapidly made this a rallying ground for the younger generation of yugoslavs in their struggle against the intolerable regime of count khuen heder- vary. in 190s, together with trumbie, cingrija and smodlaka, he played a leading part in drawing up the resolution of fiume, which became the basis of political co-operation between serbs and croats in the critical period before the world war. when the magyar coalition parties came into power in hungary in april 1906 and placed the serbo-croat coalition in office at zagreb, supilo became a deputy at budapest. within a year magyarising tendencies produced an acute conflict between budapest and zagreb, and for a time supilo was the soul of croat resistance. he thus became a marked man and was specially aimed at in the notorious forgeries by which the austro-hungarian foreign office attempted to prove serbia’s revolutionary intrigues in croatia and thereby to justify the annexation of bosnia in 1908. at the friedjung trial, however, in dec. 1909 supilo was triumphantly vindicated. - 683 on the eve of the world war he devoted his energies to plead- ing the cause of yugoslav unity before the statesmen of the entente. he was the first to discover the secret negotiations with italy which culminated in the treaty of london (april 26 tors) and earnestly warned sazonov of the disastrous compli- cations to which it would give rise; but he was unable to prevent the promise of wide slav territories on the eastern adriatic to italy in the event of victory. supilo came into conflict with the pan-serb and reactionary tendencies of pasi¢e, and even with- drew from the yugoslav committce, which in the early stages of the war he regarded as unduly subservient to belgrade. but before his premature death (in london, sept. 23 1917) he heartily endorsed the declaration of corfu, issued in july 1917, which laid down the broad lines upon which the future yugoslav state was to be constructed. supply and transport (sce 26.113).—the administration of supply and transport became of the first importance as the world war developed into a struggle between two groups of na- tions, each using the full resources of civilisation to exhaust the other. in the last stage, supply was the determining factor; munitions, food, equipment, railways, roads, ships, had become the most important things, and victory inclined to the force which could best maintain supplies, as well as men, at some particular point; which could best develop, conserve and trans- port its material. at the same time, in foodstuffs, forage, cloth- ing, timber and metals, and in transport material, the world shortage was acute. thus the work of administration was not only very heavy because of the number of combatants and the development in scale of equipment, but also because of the economic scarcity owing to world exhaustion. the development of supply and transport services will be best understood by a very brief review of the positions respectively of the chief armies at the beginning and end of the world war. position tn 191.4.—when the armies first took the field in 1914, germany was at a clear advantage. she had prepared for the war with meticulous care. the equipment of the german soldier was in every detail complete, and comprised several novel ideas for greater comfort and efficiency. the german transport organisation was fine, and showed that there had been a clear thinking out in advance of the new problems of ammunition supply raised by the free use of heavy artillery in the field. german staff documents published since the war by general ludendorff indicate that these matters had been closely studied from 1910 onwards, and that the german staff were very con- fident of the superiority of thcir organisation of transport and supply. the french administrative services in 1914 appeared much weaker if examination were confined to plans and materiel. the troops were not as well provided for, the transport organisa- tion not as well planned. but if the human factor were taken into consideration, much of the handicap was made up. the french showed a genius for improvisation on the actual battle ficld and a faculty for “‘ getting there” with inferior means. their food scales for man and beast (to give an example) spelt scarcity in british eyes: but they sufficed. in the battle the french soldier was not inferior in energy and endurance and the french transport was generally up to time. british services in 1914.—the british administrative services in 1914 were lavish both of supplics and transport. but the british force was small, and though its scale of transport was generous compared with the french, the total was only 250 motor-cars, 950 motor-lorries, and 40,000 horses. with railway transport it had at first no concern, as the french took charge of that. progress during the war—as the war developed, the germans suffered from a steady deterioration as compared with the french and the british. the war had become a contest of materiel, in which germany could not keep up. the french, on the other hand, were able to develop their supply and transport on more generous lines with the help of british and american resources. the british devcloped a complete machine of administration, helped by the fact that the nation took the view that all reasona- ble expenditure was justified in securing for the troops the best 684 possible chance of victory and the best possible comfort in the trenches. but the germans, considering the depletion of their resources, kept up a wondertul efficiency in supply and transport. they realised, perhaps more clearly than the other armies, the importance of these services; in their high command, the quartermaster-general was allowed a remarkable power. trench warfare conditions.—during the long period of ‘‘ trench warfare ” which ‘followed the battle of the marne, the adminis- trative systems of the three armies were adapted to new con- ditions, the chief of which were: an enormous increase of ammuni- tion expenditure; the introduction of poison gas as a weapon, calling for new supplies of offensive and defensive material; and a great simplification of transport which in a stabilised warfare could follow almost a civilian routine disturbed only by the chances of shell fire and aerial bombs. administration thus, whilst it had to cope with the progressive increase in the scale and variety of supplies per division, was given as a rule ample time to increase its transport facilities. it could add to its broad-gauge railway tracks, supplement them by light railways and tramways as well as by motor roads and develop the canal systems as useful adjuncts. as the war opened out, with the development of great attacks on both sides, prob- lems of supply and transport became more difficult. in facing such a german effort as the verdun attacks of 1916, the french had a very difficult problem of transport, which was met by a motor-lorry mobilisation, the success of which was one of the great feats of the war. reorganisation of british system.—yvrom 1914 up to the date of the first battle of the somme (july 1916) the british ad- ministrative services had had no very severe test, but had developed their system almost completely. in munitions, the british army was now better supplied than any other force in the field. it had control of its own railway services and supple- menting the french broad-gauge railway system on its front— which it had taken over and increased—had a system of light railways, and a greatly increased scale of motor transport. but the somme battle showed that supply had been increased beyond the scale that transport could cope with. there followed in nov. 1916 a reorganisation of the system. one feature of this reorganisation was good: the division of authority which put the administrative services really under two heads, one for the battle area and one for lines of communication, was done away with. the military railways, which had been hitherto somewhat starved, were reorganised according to the plans of a civilian expert and were generously supplicd with staff and material. but here, what proved in the result to be a mistake in organisation was made: railways were separated from the control of the quartermaster-general (who kept control of other forms of transport) and put under a director-general of trans- portation. thus there were two separate transport authorities. errors of dual control.—after the battle of the somme the line was practically stable for a long time. whilst this almost stationary trench warfare continued, the weakness of the division of authority and the mistake of allowing any but the military idea to rule in an essential part of an army organisation were not apparent. when the germans attacked in the spring of 1918 the mistake showed very clearly, and the railways were brought again under the control of the quartermaster-general, after an interval during which the traffic to be carried and its priority was regulated by a committee composed of staff officers and officers of the transportation directorate. but the transport situation in the interval was very critical. the german advance had brought the british front lateral line—st. just—amiens— st. pol—hazebrouck, under shell fire at many points. the ger- mans, whose strategy under general ludendorff was dominated largely by transport considerations, sought to paralyse com- pletely the whole railway system by continuous air attack on the british rear lateral—eu—abbeville—itaples, especially at the points where it crossed the rivers canche and somme. whole-hearted work in building ‘ avoiding ” lines and bridges and the efforts of the motor transport just kept the position in hand until a british advance in front of amiens relieved the supply and transport front lateral. fortunately the building up of a g.h.q. reserve of motor lorries had just been brought to completion. motor transport system—in the winter of 1917-8 the battle of passchendaele had exposed a weakness in light railways—that they had to work along defined tracks which could be intensively shelled by the enemy—and therefore it was decided to trust more to motor transport. there was effected a complete re- organisation of it with the central idea of doing away as far as possible with the ‘‘ earmarking ” of motor vehicles for particular units or particular tasks and making its total strength comovletely mobile and liquid. vehicles saved by this “ pooling ” were formed into a g.ii.q. motor reserve. in the spring of 1918 this g.h.q. motor reserve was able to take up part of the traffic load and was largely responsible for saving the situation. (sce mootor transport.) transport values —one of the most interesting problems of supply and transport is that of the relative value of roads (motor and horse traction), light railways and broad-gauge railways. light railways (g.v.) at one stage of the war were perhaps over- estimated. ‘there was an inclination to regard them as all- suflicing. the british system ultimately gave to them what was considered their proper rele, recognising that they were most valuable when the line of battle was stabilised for some length of time, but tended to be less valuable as the war became one of movement. ‘in the spring of 1918 the british army had 920m. of light railways in operation: in the summer, 100 m. less. its advance was planned on the principle of concentrating labour in pushing forward the broad-gauge railways and then the roads from them, trusting to motor transport and to horse transport to carry on the load from broad-gauge railhead. earlier in 1918, controversy on the subject was keen and the french were in- clined to take a differing view. the germans were tied to light railways, for they had not the means to extend their motor traction. the position on nov. 11 1918 seemed to justify the british view. from a transport point of view the british force was at that date in the best position of all the allics to make a further advance. position in 1918.—the autumn of 1918 will be the most useful date to compare the administrative machines of the allied armies. both french and american systems kept a dividing line as re- gards administration between base and the fighting line. the british system had abolished that in 1916 (with the post of inspector-general lines of communication). the french divided the zone of the armies into the zone of the advance and the zone of supplies (with sometimes an intermediate zone). in the zone of the advance, administration wasin charge of the aide major- general charge de la direction de u’arriere at headquarters. but his administration had no functions of procurement, only of dis- tribution. in some points of administration the dividing line between the zone of advance and the zone of supplies was abolished, ¢.g., all motor transport and all light railways, wherever operating, were controlled from headquarters. the french system of supply and distribution was fashioned for war in the home country or near to it; when it was transplanted (for instance to salonika) it was adapted nearer to the british system. the american system put administration on the fighting line under an assistant chief of staff (g.4) at g.h.q., and on lines of communication under a general commanding service of supply (corresponding in some degree to the old british inspector- general of communications). under the american system the chiefs of the supply service were not at g.h.q. but at the i1.q. of service of supply. with both the french and the american systems, evacuation and hospitalisation of casualties were purely “ q” services; in the british army they were under the adjutant-general, assisted by the quartermaster-general. some other differences came from geographical reasons. the americans had to have their real sup- ply base in france (for the british, the united kingdom, and for the french, france was the ultimate supply base); so they held great stocks in depots, 15 days of supplies in advance depots, 30 days of supplies in intermediate depots, 45 days of supplies in base depots. the american army relied more largely on local supreme council purchases (from the allied armies and from european civilian sources) than did the armies with their home bases nearer at hand. general pershing founded a general purchasing agency to control these purchases. in 1916, of 17,600,000 ship tons used by the american army, only 7,600,000 tons came from the u.s.a. and 10,000,000 tons were purchased locally, and to the end of the campaign the american army drew largely upon british and french supplies. relations with navy.—the british administrative machine in one point was inferior to the american machine in 1918. under the british system the navy had control of all supplies by ship until discharged from the transport. the navy could put a supply ship into any port it pleased and naturally was mainly guided by shipping considerations. the american system put the supply ships under army direction when they came within the three-mile limit from shore, and shipping could then be directed to the port of supply which was most convenient from the army point of view. the french and the americans used the railway regulating stations as depots, the british used them as sorting stations only. the bntish used the base ports to sort goods to a great extent; the amcricans did not do so. in the autumn of 1918 they found their one great depot and sorting and regulating station at is-sur-tille insufiicient for the needs of their growing army and they were proceeding with the organisation of another station when the armistice came. the staffs of the various combatant nations are working out the lessons of administration as taught by the world war. one principle seems to be generally accepted, that it is wise to centralise all administration of supplies and transport under one head over the whole war area, trusting to him to devolve and co- ordinate. another conclusion is that if civilisation has ever to face another great war it will be, even more than the contest of 1914-8, a war of material, a struggle in which supply and trans- ' port will be the governing factors. (tr, ©) supreme council.—this term was evolved to denote the organ of supreme control at the peace conference at paris in rg19. it was thought by some (and the idea was subsequently expressed by sir maurice hankey, the secretary to the council of four at paris) that this device was a new one, and the phrase “diplomacy by conference” was coined to express it. but, in fact, a similar procedure was followed at vienna during 1814-5 and subsequent years, with strikingly analogous results. lord castlereagh devised the system in the autumn of 1814 of discussing large questions of policy with the plenipotentiarics of the other great powers—austria, prussia and russia. these meetings were of the nature of conversations and were quite informal, but were generally responsible for the decisions that were taken. in jan. 1815 talleyrand, the representative of france, was admitted as a fifth member to the inner cabinet of four. castlereagh was so pleased with this system that he en- deavoured to prolong it by arranging for “ periodic reunions ” of the great powers (article vi.of the second treaty of paris, 181s). these reunions resulted in congresses and were, for a time, successful in settling the affairs of europe. but from 1818 onwards difficulties began to appear. castlereagh insisted that the british representative at the congress of troppau (1820) and of laibach (1821) should be mercly a spectator. at verona (1822), canning, who had succeeded castlereagh as british foreign minister, instructed the british representative to dissent from the proceedings, and this action, in effect, ended the system of “ periodic reunions’ which had obtained between 1814 and 1822. the experiments between the years 1919-22 followed an almost exactly similar course. the pcace conference-—yhe peace conference which opened at paris in jan. totg started by excluding all but the great powers from anything but formal deliberations. the original supreme organ was known as “ the council of ten ”’ and con- sisted of the heads of the delegations of the great powers and of their respective foreign secretaries. this body was found too unwieldy, and it was considered that its numbers caused leakage and undue publicity. to mect this difficulty president wilson proposed, and mr. lloyd george supported, the experi- 685 ment of a council of four (“ the big four’), who were the above named, together with m. clemenceau (france) and signor orlando (italy). by this device business was trans- acted rapidly and informally and secrecy effectively preserved. after the departure of president wilson and mr. lloyd george on june 28 1919, the council of four was superseded by a council of five which included japan. the leading diplomat of each great power attended on behalf of his country. this arrangement ended in jan. 1920, and the united states then withdrew her representative altogether. the supreme council (as it was now called) did not, however, die at once, though it ceased to sit at paris cx permanence. parts of its functions were transferred to the ambassadors’ conference (qg.v.) and part to the league of nations (g.¢.). attempts were, however, still made to establish a system of ‘““ periodic reunions ” between the premiers or leading men repre- — senting each great power. this was exactly on the lines pre- viously attemped by lord castlereagh, but the mectings were actually much more frequent. there were nine such in 1920, of which three were in england; six in 1921, of which three were in england; two in 1922, of which none were in england. the “ periodic reunions” of the castlereagh era were suc- cessful until the then enemy (france) had paid a considerable part of her indemnity, that is, up till 1818. after that date divergences between the great powers began to appear. so also during the years 1919-21. at the conference of london (feb. 21-march 14 1921) it became quite clear to the great powers that germany had, in the military sense, become in- capable of resisting them. it was also doubtful whether any forcible measures could actually produce substantial sums by way of reparation. on this point, grave divergences appeared between england and france. the supreme test came at the conference of paris (aug. 8-13 1921). at that mecting there was a complete division between the french and british views over the assignment of territory in silesia respectively to ger- many and to poland as a result of plebiscite. finding agreement impossible mr. lloyd george appealed to the league of nations to settle the silesian boundary, and m. briand agreed to accept the award of the league on behalf of france. mr. lloyd george’s appeal showed quite clearly that the supreme council was no longer a body able to settle disputes between its members, in spite of the informal and unofficial character of its proceedings and of the close personal intimacy between its members. none the less two further mectings took place. that at cannes (jan. 6-13 1922) failed because m. briand was overthrown by the majority in the french parlia- ment, while the council was actually sitting (jan. 12). a des- perate effort by mr. lloyd george to retrieve the situation by summoning a new council at genoa (april 1o-may 19 1922) fuiled because of french hostility to the proceedings. the failure of the supreme council would appear to have been inherent in the very circumstances of its origin and con- stitution. like the similar organism created by castlereagh, it was evolved to meet a certain need, and decayed when that need ceased to be imperative. it was necessary at vienna in 1814 and at paris in 1919 to devise some method by which the work of the peace conference could be rapidly thrown into shape and decided without too many plenipotentiaries encum- bering the discussion and too much outside pressure cmbar- rassing the decision. during periods of stress of this kind, more- over, diplomats are much more ready to arrive at agreement than during periods of comparative peace. hence so soon as the fear of the armed enemy disappeared, divergences began to appear among the allies. this was the case in 1818 and again in 192t. the fact is that “ diplomacy by conference ” is a method, a system or a means for oiling the wheels and for easing the pressure. but it cannot, of itself, remove pressure or create harmony. the history of the supreme council, alike in 1815 and ror1o, shows that to eschew formalities and to decide great issues in _'the japanese occasionally sent a representative when their interests were involved, thus making a fifth member. 686 secret is a good method for transacting the business of a peace conference. it is not, and cannot be, a permanent system for conducting the affairs of the world. bibliography.—a,. j. toynbee, survey of international affairs 1920-3, references in index, p. 516 (1925); sir e. satow, ‘‘ peace- making old and new,’ cambridge historical journal, no. 1 (1923); sir a. w. ward, s.p.c.k., '' the period of congresses,” ie/ps for students of history, nos. 9, 10, 11 (1919); c. k. webster and h. w. v. temperley, ‘‘ the congress of vienna 1814-5’ and “ the conference of paris, 1919," leaflet no. 56 of itistorical association (1924); sir m. hankey, diplomacy by conference, institute of inter- national affairs (1920); h. w. v. temperley, izistory of peace con- ference, vol. 6, references in index, pp. 691-2 (1924). (h. w. v. t.)