{ "system": "GoGuides Verified Text", "api_version": "verified-text-v1", "status": "ok", "response_type": "verified_text_record", "source_key": "britannica_1926", "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926)", "license_code": "public_domain", "attribution": null, "license_url": null, "chunk_id": "1926:strategy:3151c79c6238", "title": "STRATEGY", "section": null, "hash_alg": "sha256", "hash_sha256": "bb8a0d4bade19336b344f186d6ab7e7f3f99f4323d6082825c9f0f42fda3869a", "normalizer": { "name": "ggnorm", "version": "1.0" }, "verified_text": "whilst peace is largely an economic and political struggle between men whose purpose is to gain physical and individual security, war is largely a physical struggle between nations in which the acquisition or maintenance of economic and political security is the aim. in peace man uses his physical force to conquer nature; in war he uses it to conquer his own kind. in the one case the conflict is mainly a material one, in the other it is largely ethical, as it is directed against opinion sustained by force and not against matter merely en- dowed with energy. relationship of peace and war.—tin peace the ethical rights of nations are maintained by force actual or potential according to the political system in vogue; for even in the most democratic nations the power of the majority expressed tn the legislative, police and military forces of the nation is the foundation and guardian of the national will. in peace as in war the final arbiter of law and order is military force. the means differ in degree though the end is the same. the end is ihe maintenance of in- ternal existence, in the one case through prevention of internal disruption, and in the other through the prevention of external pressure. it is for this reason that william james, when discus- sing ““the moral equivalent of war,’ was of opinion that: “every up-to-date dictionary should say that ‘ peace’ and ‘war’ mean the same thing, now i posse, now in actu. it may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive preparation for war by the nation is the real war, permanent, unceasing; and that battles are only a sort of public verification of mastery gained during the ‘ peace’ intervals.” and clause- witz— that war is nothing but a continuation of political inter- course, with a mixture of other means.” and again: “ we see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means . . . for the political view is the object, war is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception. . . . state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creatures in their germs.” if in peace force is essential to the maintenance of tranquillity, prosperity and the security of the social order: in war (the causes of which may always be traced to some discontent in the existing state of peacefulness), the true political object is to create a better condition of peace than that which existed before its out- break. this condition is in nature three-fold—in order that the war may have proved itself economical, then must the peace which follows it be more contented, prosperous and secure than the one the war destroyed. in great civilised nations this de- struction of the conditions of peacefulness—rather than of the material power of the enemy or of the enemy himself, is accom- plished by military pressure and resistance as exerted by the instrument of war, which may be an army, a navy or an air force, or all three combined. to animate this instrument the will of the majority of the nation must support the war; for in democratic countries it is this will, as expressed by the government, which makes war, accepts defeat or insists on victory. further, to maintain the fighting forces which express the national! will through physical action, the economic strength of the nation must be sufficient to provide them with all material needs, and never more so than to-day when the rapid mechanicalisation of the means of waging war is bringing all three services into intimate relationship with civil industry, and through civil industry with each other. the co-ordination of all these means—the will, economic strength and fighting force of the nation—toward the attainment of the political object of the war may be termed grand strategy, or the major movements and higher leadership which control, direct and influence the war. 655 grand strategists of historyy—there is nothing novel in this conception, for as a foundation of military action the co-ordina- tion of political direction and military control are as old as or- ganised warfare itself. but whilst duting the earlier history of war co-ordination was less complex since armies were more inde- pendent and self-supporting, in modern wars its importance has become more and more manifest until its establishment on a scientific footing may be considered one of the most important of military problems. for co-ordination to exist, united control of all the forces expended in war as well as liberty of action in their expenditure are essentials. in democratic nations the first should be the prerogative of government, and the second of military command. in the world war of 1914-8 a lack of strategical direction, especially on the side of the allied powers, was manifested on its outbreak, and was never overcome; for though towards the end of the war marshal foch was appointed generalissimo of the land forces of the allies, no true political unity of control was created or could have been created in the circumstances. fail- ing the establishment of a despotism, which is almost unthink- able among allied democratic powers, this weakness in political control must always constitute the achilles heel of nations tem- porarily confeidlerated to resist the military pressure of a common enemy. in this war we find the allied grand strategy far more rudimentary than that of alexander the great. he, as tyrant of the grecian states, combined in his own person complete political control and unity of command. the grand strategy which he developed stands as a model for all times. he saw that the states and cities of greece could only be con- trolled by outward pressure, and that this pressure could only be gained through the conquest of the persian empire. his method was logical and scientific. first, he established tran- quillity at home, without which his overseas expedition would have had no secure base from which to operate. secondly, he gained command of the sea, and through this command control of the economic resources of egypt, which were vital to the prosperity of greece. thirdly, he gained command of the land, and by ascending the throne of the great king was able to con- trol not only the military resources of persia but also its immense wealth. lastly, he attempted to bound his vast empire by un- attackable frontiers so that it would be secured against invasion, his crucial .idea was the establishment of a more contented, prosperous and secure peace. in the world war of 1914-8 we see no such grand strategy, because unity of political control was non-existent, and failing this unity true liberty of military action was impossible. throughout the entire history of war the most successful of the great captains, such men as alexander, caesar, gustavus, frederick and napoleon, have been despots or autocrats, not because despotism and autocracy are in themsclves military virtues, but because they permit of the closest political contral of the strategy of a war. to-day the difficulties incumbent in grand strategical control are increasing, for whilst in the past military power mainly depended on man-power, which enabled all armies to establish a similar organisation and tactics, industry and industrial wealth are replacing population as the foundation of military strength. this amongst allied powers will frequently mean a divergence in military organisation, a variation of tactics, and consequently an increasing difficulty in control and combined action. problems of grand strategy — though there can be no doubt that the establishment of a more contented, prosperous and secure state of peacefulness is the true grand strategical object of a war, it by no means follows that this has generally been accepted; in fact few wars have led to so desirable a conclusion. the reason for this is twofold. first, no nation has hitherto possessed the grand strategical machinery necessary to co-or- dinate political thought and military action, consequently war- fare has assumed an almost entirely military aspect. secondly, the causes of war have never been scientifically analysed, and have been obscured and hidden beneath the political pretexts and excuses justifying its outbreak, 656 as these justifications are seldom rational or true, a great war has normally been declared when through political obscurantism the mind of a nation is in an irrational mood. the nation is stirred up to fury, and the soldier, stimulated by this national emotion accentuated by the dangers which surround him, seeks a solution to the war in a victory of destruction. he attempts to impose on his enemy not so much his will as his physical force, and the result in the world war of 1914-8 was that the victors suffered but little less than the vanquished. this system of ‘* absolute warfare,’”’? much lauded by clausewitz, and founded on the ideal of absolute government, has toned the whole course of warfare since his day. the solitary exception was the cam- paign of 1866, in which moltke’s object was not to destroy aus- tria, but to gain her over as an eventual ally. as long as this barbarous system of grand strategy endures great wars will be concluded by vindictive peace treaties out of which further great wars will evolve. no modification or reduction of arma- ments can ameliorate this system, for its betterment must be sought in a change in the political brain—in the theory of war, and not in its tools. granted a political organisation which can co-ordinate, con- trol and direct the forces of war, the next problem in grand strat- egy is the co-ordination, control and direction of the means. hitherto military means have been mainly considered, but dur- ing the world war it became apparent that economic and ethical action played as important a part. to compel an enemy to accept defeat his national will must be broken. the traditional method has been to destroy the enemy’s armed forces—the shield which protects this will. though during the world war this method was universally adopted, as the war proceeded, the economic attack by blockade, bunker control and unrestricted submarine warfare, and the ethical attack by insidious propa- ganda became formidable instruments in undermining the na- tional morale of the belligerenis. in the case of germany and her allies these means led to their defeat as much as did military pressure, because they directly attacked the national will to win. the co-ordination, control and direction of the fighting forces themselves is the next problem, and here grand strategy merges into grand tactics, and policy into plan. in the case of great britain there was no grand tactical control during the world war, because no organisation existed which could co-ordinate naval and military force or action. the result of this was that directly power of movement ceased on the western front, com- mand of the sea at once suggested, as it had done during the napoleonic wars, a change of the theatre without reference to the grand tactical objective, which remained the defeat of ger- many. this lack of grand tactical co-ordination undoubtedly prolonged the war for many months. once given a political organ which can formulate policy, and a military brain which can produce a co-ordinated plan in which the fighting forces are considered as one force, the next problem is the execution of the plan. this demands expenditure of force, and here grand strategy and grand tactics merge into strategy and tactics as these are generally understood. expenditure of military force —expenditure of military force is an art, and like all other arts it is based on science. the science of war is the science of human conflict in all its forms, whether the battle is a fight between two men or two or more nations. without this science warfare must largely remain in an alchem- ical state, and be governed by chance and not by law. if force has to be expended ijn war, then the side which can best econo- mise its force is the side which is more likely to win. economy of force is, therefore, the governing law of war. granted this law the next question is to decide on the nature of force; and as an army is but a number of men, the forces of war are to be sought in man himself. human force is threefold in nature, it is mental, moral and physical, and no one of these forces can be expended without influencing the remaining two. economy in the expen- diture of these constitutes the central problem of strategy and tactics. the expenditure of force presupposes pressure and resistance, and these two govern the direction force eventually takes. in strategy war each side must have an object which provisionally fixes the direction of military operations. to maintain this direction pressure and resistance must be exerted. these two factors if correctly employed lead to an economical distribution of force from which concentration of force may be developed. thus are obtained three principles of war, namely, the principles of the direction, distribution and concentration of force, and these should control the formulation of all plans of war. these three principles are, consequently, closely related 1o the mental sphere of force—to the thoughts in the head of the general-in-chief out of which he evolves his plan. before this plan can be transformed into physical action, that is executed by the men themselves, the troops must not only be willing but determined to carry it out. to do so their morale must balance their fear, consequently their determination to act must be supported by moral endur- ance. further, to economise this endurance, they should aim at surprising the enemy, that is demoralising him. in the moral sphere of war we thus obtain three principles closely related to the former ones. they may be called the prin- ciples of the determination, endurance and demoralisation of force. it isin this moral sphere that the decisive battle is waged. to attack the enemy’s determination to win, physical action must be brought into play. men must move, and movement depends on how far offensive action can be protected. thus are obtained three physical principles of war, namely, those of mo- bility, security and the disorganisation of force (offensive action). nine principles of war, therefore, govern the expenditure of force. three are related to pressure, three to resistance and three to the control of their resultant—the direction of the oper- ation, the determination of all ranks to attain the object in view, and movement towards the objective itself. these nine principles, which are expressions of the law of economy of force, form the foundations of the science of war, without which the art of war is solely determined by individual predilection or chance. this science is expressed as an art through the instrument of war, the military organisation at the command of the general-in-chief, who, to act rightly, expends its force by applying the principles of war according to the ever-changing conditions which surround him. these conditions can either assist or resist him, and by a correct, that is, an economical apph- cation of principles to conditions, he abstracts the highest assist- ance from all the forces which surround his army. for him to do so with true economy it is necessary that the organisation of his army should be suitable to the nature of the operation in hand. this suitability consists in power to develop protected offensive action in the shortest possible time and at the highest possible speed. from these considerations we see that not only are strategy and tactics complementary halves of the art of war, but that the geometric strategical ideas so favoured in former days, such as interior and exterior lines, lines of operation, concentric and eccentric attacks, etc. etc., are but details of the art of war, which should be as ‘ fluid” as any other art, and is so when it is based on a full understanding of the science of war instead of on a personal improvisation. all that is necessary to prove the close inter-dependence of strategy and tactics is to turn to the history of war and examine its course. history of tuctics—the tactics of the roman legion were based on the strategical mobility which their magnificent roads allowed. this mobility could only be maintained as long as troops were concentrated in large bodies. once defensive tactics led to an over-distribution of force, through the establishment of a cordon system along the frontiers, the gothic horse rapidly overruns the empire, and after the battle of adrianople (378) an infantry decline sets in. thence onwards, except in moun- tainous and swampy countries, infantry degenerate into camp followers. as the roman roads fall into disrepair the use of cavalry becomes general; further, all nomadic warriors are horsemen. influence of the horse.—the influence of the horse on tactics is profound, and through tactical change strategy and organisa- {ion are modified, and the first post-classical cycle of war is stratford-on-avon—stresemann entered. the superior carrying power of the horse at once sug- gests the general use of armour from which to develop the offen- sive power of the soldier. the armoured horseman changes the whole organisation of war. armies grow smaller since armour is expensive; casualties amongst armoured horsemen grow less and less, and the strength of a nation depends more on its ability to produce armour than on its man-power. two defects are, however, never overcome, the first is the armouring of the horse, the second the difficulty of an armoured man using missile weapons when mounted. strategy, save as stratagems, disap- pears; the tactical shock becoming the sole purpose of battle. this condition of war lasts for 1,000 years, when the long bow and pike attack the unarmoured parts of the horse, and gun- powder attacks armour itself. the result is the reappearance of infantry. by the date of the battle of agincourt (1415) the mobility of the armoured horseman is reduced to zero. the second tactical cycle is now entered. protection by ar- mour is by degrees replaced by protection through fire power, from which the shock of the pike-men is developed. as the mus- ket, and later on the bayonet, are comparatively cheap weapons, armies grow in size, numbers of men rather than skill become the aim of the military organiser; roads grow in importance to maintain these masses, and casualties increase as fire power is developed; ultimately we enter the period of absolute warfare. the introduction of railways and steam power generally is fol- lowed by an enormous increase in the size of armies and in the perfection of weapons and equipment. hordes of men are poured on to the battlefield, their control is difficult, their supply even more so, and, as fire power increases, the protective power of firearms is supplemented by the trench, and strategy vanishes through a general inability to move. by the year 1915 the zero point of movement through rifle and gun power is reached. as the second cycle was introduced by the discovery of gun- powder, the third is introduced by the discovery of petrol. the first tactical cycle, based on armour, was protective in nature; the second, based on gunpowder, was offensive; and the third which has now begun is based on petrol, and its predominant quality will be mobility. in the world war the transition be- came apparent when a solution to static warfare was sought in prolonged artillery bombardments. the railways could amass thousands of tons of shells at the railheads, but from these points forward hurdreds of lorries had to be used to move them. the shell failed to solve the problem of mobility, since in destroying the enemy’s defences it simultaneously destroyed the surface of the ground, rendering it unfit for wheeled traffic. eventually the tank solves the problem, as it can dispense with roads and move across country. this power, the ability of developing offensive action from protected cross-country movement coupled with the power of aircraft to attack an army in rear without engaging its front definitely ushers in the third tactical cycle which must profoundly influence strategy. the passing of linear warfare.—from the days of the ro- mans to present times the network upon which strategy was woven has been the road systems existing at any specific date. armies advanced and retired along roads, their power of manoeu- vre being largely limited by their number and condition. from road columns they deployed into battle lines, and in classical times line met line in a hand to hand struggle. after the intro- duction of firearms, a space, or no-man’s-land, was developed between the contending forces, possessing in the days of ired- erick the great a depth of some so paces. this space profoundly influenced tactics, for the side which could make the better fighting use of it generally won. to take advantage of this area weapons were improved, and accuracy, range and volume of fire increased, until in the world war its depth extended over 1,000 paces. gas as a weapon was then introduced to obliterate whatever human resistance existed in or on the other side of this space, and eventually tanks were built to cross it and pass threugh the hostile battle-front and attack the enemy’s rear organisation and _ services. aircraft could do likewise by passing over in place of, through or round the enemy’s line. the line had, in fact, reached its zenith, and 657 was no longer an economical formation, since it could not guar- antee the protection of the area in rear of it. the influence of these tactical changes must pronouncedly modify strategy, as linear warfare will be replaced by area warfare, the strategy of which being to a large extent independent of roads and railways will become two and three dimensional. these changes in the art of war face all civilised armies to-day, and it is for this reason that a science of war is necessary, so that the past history of war may be methodically analysed, and future tactical, administrative and strategical tendencies predicted. without such a science, supported by sound political control, strategy must remain, as it has in the past, either the perquisite of genius or the plavthing of chance. see war. (j.f.c.f.) stratford-on-avon, england (see 25.998), had a popula- tion of 9,392 in 1921 and an area of 4,013 acres. a summer season of the shakespeare festivals, which have been under the control of mr. bridges adams since sir frank benson’s resig- nation in to19, has been held since rg10. nash’s house was adapted for public use in 1912. in march 1926 the shakespeare memorial theatre was destroyed by fire; but the library and museum, in adjacent buildings, were saved. a water supply scheme, by gravitation from a reservoir at snitterfield, was completed in 1923. strathcona and mount royal, donald alexander smith, 1st baron (1820-1914), canadian statesman (see 25.1000), died in london jan. 21 1914. his barony passed by special remainder to his daughter margaret charlotte, wife of robert jared bliss howard of montreal (d. 1921). strauss, richard (1864- ), german composer (see 25.1003). his opera, ariadne auf naxos (1912), was produced at his majesty’s theatre, london, by thomas beecham in may 1913 and the same year der rosenkavalicr, first produced at dresden in 1910, was performed at covent garden with great success, eight performances being given; in point of fact, this proved to be strauss’s most popular opera. his other works in- clude festliches praeludium, for orchestra (1913), and josephs legende (i914). in addition to the works enumerated, mention should be made of kine alpensinfonie, (1915, op. 64); and the three-act opera, die frau ohne schatten, libretto by hugo von hofmannsthal (1916, op. 65). in the winter of 1920-1 strauss visited south america, where he officiated at buenos aires as opera conductor, subsequently returning to vienna. stravinsky, igor fedorovich (:882- ), russian composer, was born at orantenbaum, near leningrad, on june 5 (old style) 1882. he began to study composition privately under rimsky-korsakov in 1902 and four years later produced his first work, a symphony. this was followed in 1908 by a fantastic scherso, the dirge in memory of rimsky-korsakov and the orches- tral tone-picture, fireworks. much of his subsequent music was composed for serge diaghilev’s russian ballet, and includes te fire bird (1910), petroushka (1912), and the rite of spring (1913). stravinsky’s music aroused a great deal of controversy, chiefly owing to a peculiar originality of structure which im- pressed his audience by the sense of surprising novelty which it conveyed. among his later works are renard (19015), l’ histoire du soldat (1917), the symphony for wind instruments to the memory of claude debussy (1920), afatra (1921) and les noces villageoises (1923). street: see road construction. street traffic: see traffic problems. stresemann, gustav (1878- ), german statesman, was born in berlin may ro 1878 and studied political economy in berlin and leipzig. after completing his studies he went on the management of an industrial association, and in 1903 became secretary to the bezirksvereins des bundes der indusiriellen (district association of the league of industrials) in dresden. hfe soon succeeded in organising the sechsischen landesver- band des bunudes der industriellen (saxon provincial union of the league of industrials) out of the different district organisa- tions. thanks to his far-reaching organising activity strese- mann secured a prominent position for these associations in the economic and political life of saxony. the union in 1925 658 numbered about 7,000 industrial undertakings with some 600,000 workmen. stresemann’s excellent organising successes brought him more and more influence in the headquarters of the union of industrials in berlin. provincial unions were founded on the saxon model in wiirttemberg, silesia and thiiringia, strese- mann playing a prominent part. in the further course of his activity in the field of political economy, he was founder and first president of the german-canadian and the german- austrian-hungarian economic association (wirtschaftsver- band) and vice-president of the german-bulgarian league in berlin. he was also prominent in the organisation of the german fleet league (flottenverein). in ror3 stresemann and rallin, the general manager of the hamburg-america line, founded the german-american economic association, which was destined to be expanded into a german world commercial association, a plan prevented by the out- break of the world war. in 1907 stresemann had been elected to the reichstag as member of the national liberal party, where he often spoke for his party on questions of public economy and foreign policy, and enjoyed increasing respect. he soon became a member of the central executive of the party, and bassermann, recognising his great talent as an organiser and speaker, trained him, so to speak, as his successor. during the war stresemann pursued a vigourous nationalist policy, and was one of those who brought about bethmann hollweg’s fall. after the collapse he founded the german people’s party (deutsche volkspartei), becoming its president, having been, after bassermann’s death, president of the national liberal party. . the german people’s party, led by stresemann, played a decisive part in germany’s internal policy after the war. it was opposed to the weimar constitution; on principle it re- mained long in opposition to the governments of the left. when the ruhr conflict reached its climax, stresemann published a series of articles which attracted much attention, urging a radical change in german policy; after the fall of cuno’s cabinet, in germany’s darkest hour, he became chancellor of the reich with a ministry of the so-called ‘‘ great coalition,” including all parties from the social democrats to the german people’s party. as chancellor, he wound up the ruhr conilict. after a bare two months the social democrats abandoned him because he had had to take strong measures in the name of the reich against the manifestations of bolshevism in saxony and thur- ingia. he formed, however, a second cabinet, which lasted till the end of nov. 1923. in marx’s cabinet, which followed his own, stresemann became foreign minister. his was the guiding influence on the foreign policy of this cabinet. he was largely instrumental in bringing about the acceptance of the dawes plan by germany and the conference of london in aug. 1924. after marx’s resignation he refused to form a new cabinet, and used his influence to get the german nationalist party included in the government. he felt the valuable economic forces of this great party should not be condemned to eternal fruitless opposi- tion. he himself remained foreign minister in luther’s first and second cabinets. during the long governmental crisis he sent the famous feb. memorandum of 1925 to the entente, which laid the foundations of the pact of locarno. throughout 1925 this policy initiated by stresemann was the focus of interest, not mercly of germany, but of the whole world. the conference of locarno brought success. on dec. 1. 1925 the pact of locarno was solemnly signed in london. a man with many bitter enemies as well as sincere admirers, it must be agreed that stresemann carried out a consistent policy without regard to party hostility. he can thus claim the merit for having freed the ruhr district and the first rhineland zone from foreign military occupation, for having laid the political foundations for the stabilisation of the currency and for having brought about less strained political relations between germany and the outer world. one of the best speakers in germany, he also possesses great political ability and practical streuvels—strikes and lockouts common sense. he wrote on the pact of locarno for this excy- elopedia. (if. kle.) streuvels, styn (1871- ), pen name of frank lateur, flemish writer, was the nephew of the priest-poet guido gertelle. for a long time he worked as a pastry cook at avelghem in flanders and then settled down at ingoyghen, close by, in order to devote himself entirely to literature. essentially a man of the soil, he nevertheless possessed a clelicate artistic sensibility and acquired considerable literary culture. he is the most popular contemporary writer in flanders and enjoys a great reputation throughout holland, although he frequently introduces the western flemish dialect into his writings. many of his novels have been translated into german. his descriptions of the coun- trvside, no less realistic than poctical, are presented with enor- mous vigour and pungency in a style which seems to echo the rhythms of nature herself. de vlaschaard (1907) is considered his best work. strikes and lockouts (sce 25.1024).—the period under review has been characterised in all industrialised countries by an endemic condition of industrial warfare. despite all the machinery of conciliation and the immense amount of both voluntary and legislative effort to secure the peaceful and equit- able settlement of disputes between employers and workers, the organic development of the economic system is. continually being interrupted by trials of strength which bring widespread distress both to those directly involved and to the rest of the community. the following article is confined to a statistical statement and description of the principal strikes and lockouts which have occurred between 1907 and 1924. for a discussion of the broader questions involved see industrial relations and trade unions. i. great britain and northern ireland the following table brings together the gencral totals for the strikes and lockouts which have occurred in cach year under review in great britain and northern ireland.' aggregate duration in number of | total num- working y disputes ber of days of all =a beginning | workpeople | disputes in in year involved progress during the year 1907 585 146,000 2,150,000 1908 389 293,000 10,790,000 1909 422 297,000 2,690,000 i9io 521 514,000 9,870,000 iqii 872 952,000 10,160,000 i9t2. ; ‘ s34 1,462,000 40,890,000 i9il3.. ‘ ; ‘ 1,459 664,000 9,800,000 iqoi4. : e : 972 447,000 9,880,000 i9i5 672 448,000 2,950,000 1916 532 276,000 2,450,000 1917 730 872,000 5,650,000 1918 1,165 1,116,000 5,880,000 i919 1,352 2,591,000 34;970,000 1920 1,607 1,932,000 26,570,000 192i . , : 763 1,801,000 85,870,000 1922. ‘ ; ‘ 57 552,000 19,850,000 1923 ; 628 405,000 10,670,000 612,000 8,320,000 the great majority of the disputes were relatively unimpor- tant; roughly 90% of all the disputes involved less than 1,000 workpeople, and only about 2% involved more than 5,000. 1 the exclusion of the area now forming the irish free state does not materially affect the figures except in 1913, when a “ gencral strike '’ occurred at dublin, 7.e., a strike aimed at dislocating the whole of the trades of a city or territory—the only instance before the gencral strike of 1926 of such a strike on a considerable scale in the british isles. the strike (which was unsuccessful) involved about 20,000 workpeople, and included, at the time of its maxi- mum extension, tramwaymen and other transport workers, and the employees of flour-millers, coach-builders, biscuit-manufacturers, coal-merchants, steamship companies, master builders and several other trades, including even farmers in county dublin. strikes and lockouts these latter disputes, however, though so few in number, ac- counted for five-sixths of the time lost by all the disputes, and it is mainly these large disputes which account for the variations between the figures jor the different years in the last column of the table. | the low totals for the war years 1914-8 contrast with the high figures for the three years immediately after the war, viz.: 19ig~21. since then the amount of industrial disturbance due to disputes has diminished very substantially. the loss of time through disputes, in all but five of the years included in the table amounted to the equivalent of less thun one day in the year, if spread over the entire working population; that is to say, to less than the effect of a single public holiday, an almost insignificant loss by comparison (for example) with the loss through sickness or through involuntary unemployment. the statistics relating to the causes or objects of disputes show that wages questions account for about two-thirds of the total num- ber of strikes and lockouts. in years of good or improving trade, such disputes largely arise out of demands for advances in wages; and it is worth noting, in this connection, that no important disputes arising out of resistance to a reduction in wages occurred’ between 1908 and the end of 1920. disputes arising out of questions of hours of labour were unusually frequent in 1919, when the movement towards shorter hours was at its height: 10% of all the disputes of that year were due to questions of hours. in other years the propor- tion averages less than 3°, of the total number. disputes arising on questions of particular classes or persons (¢.g., demarcation dis- putes, strikes for the removal of an unpopular foreman or for the reinstatement of a dismissed fellow-worker) account for about 15%; and other disputes (largely concerned with questions of trade union principle) for a similar proportion of the total. of all the disputes, about 25% ended definitely in favour of the workpcople, about 30% in favour of the employers, and about 45 % were compromised. even this large figure, however, docs not fully represent the predominance of compromised settlements, because the tendency to settlement by compromise is greatest in the case of the larger disputes; hence of all the workpeople directly involved in strikes and lockouts about 65 °% resumed work after a compromised result, while about 20% resumed after a settlement definitely in their favour and about 15° sustained defeat. the great majority of the disputes—bet ween two-thirds and three- quarters of the total—were settled by direct negotiation between the parties or their representatives, and one-half of the remainder by conciliation or by arbitration, other methods by which strikes and lockouts have been terminated in recent years have included unconditional surrender of the workpeople, the closing of works and the replacement of workpeople. during the war years a number of disputes were terminated by administrative decisions of the government. one of the greatest disputes, viz.: that in the coal- mining industry in 1912, was settled by the enactment of the coal mines (minimum wage) act. particulars of industrial disputes in great britain will be found in the official abstract of labour statistics and in the monthly ministry of labour gazetie; the issue of the labour gazette for july 1925, contains a review of the disputes of the 15 years 1910-24, and that for jan. of each year, which contains a review of the disputes of the previous year. principal disputes in the united kingdom.—lt has already been pointed out that a very small minority of the disputes account for by far the greater number of workpeople involved and of days lost; two or three big disputes, indeed, commonly account for an altogether disproportionate share of the days lost in any year. the most remarkable example of this occurred in 1921, as will be seen from the following figures:— workpeople | man-days involved lost one coal-mining dispute . 1,150,000 72,000,000 one cotton dispute 375,000 6,750,000 761 other disputes . . 276,000 7,120,000 total 1,801,000 85,870,000 on the other hand, in some years there were no disputes of outstanding importance; the years 1907 and 1gog are examples, though it will be observed that both these years had more industrial disturbance, so far as mere number of disputes goes, than the intervening year, 1908. bricf comments are appended on some important disputes. the cotton strike of 1908 is memorable as having been, with two other disputes of the same year, the last important dispute, for the 659 long space of 12 years, arising out of resistance to a reduction in wages in that trade. the seamen’s and transport workers’ strike in 1911 began with the seamen striking in support of a demand for a conciliation board. dock labourers and other transport workers joined in the strike, partly in sympathy with the seamen and partly in support of their own demands for improved conditions. there was a good deal of dissatisfaction with the working of the agreements reached in settlement of these disputes, and further strikes occurred in the following year, particularly on the thames and medway. the rail- waymen in ig1t struck for an improvement in the railway con- ciiation board scheme, which had been sct up in 1907. the cotton dispute of 1911-2 began with strikes of weavers in lancashire against the employment of non-unionists, to which the employers replied by a general lockout. the coal strike of 1912 arose out of a demand by the miners’ federation for the payment of an individual district minimum wage for all underground workers in mines, irrespective of the question whether the men's working places were abnormal or not. the dispute was settled by the passing of the coal mines (minimum wage) act 1912, which provided for the setting up of joint district boards to determine the minimum rates of wages of underground workers in coal-mines. the world war, as will be seen, by no means put an end to strikes; but most of them were small, and were speedily brought to an end. iience the aggregate duration was brought down to a very low point in 1915 and 1916. ‘there were, however, several unauthorisechstrikes in the engincering and munition trades in 1917, which caused great concern at the time, though only one was of very serious importance as measured by aggregate duration. it was in these disputes that “shop stewards ”’ (sometimes acting in defiance of their own trade- union executives) first came prominently into public notice. there were many industrial disputes in 1918, but the great major- ity involved small numbers and were of short duration. in i91g and 1920, on the other hand, there were many serious disputes. a great railway strike occurred in sept. and oct. 1919, the national union of railwaymen being dissatisfied with the new standard rates pro- posed for certain grades. there was also a prolonged ironmoulders’ strike, which lasted for four months, and seriously dislocated the engineering industry. in the same year there was a great strike in the cotton trade, both the spinning and the weaving branches being affected. the operatives asked for a reduction in hours and an advance of 30° on list prices. the advance was granted, and the hours reduced to 48 per week (instead of 463, as asked). the principal dispute of 1920 and again of 1921 was a national strike in the coal-mining industry (see coal). the cotton dispute of 1921 arase out of a demand of the employers for a reduction of 95°% on the standard lists of wages (equivalent to about 30° on the rates then actually being paid). this was reduced to 80° during the subsequent negotiations. the dispute was finally settled by the operatives accepting a reduction of 70% (60% at once, and another 10% after six months). the engineering dispute of 1922 arose out of the rejection by the members of the amalgamated engineering union, on a ballot vote, of a provisional agreement on overtime and the exercise of managerial functions which had been reached between the executive of the union and the engineering and the national employers’ federations in nov. 1921. the members of the union were, therefore, locked out on march 11; and members of other unions employed in federated enginecring shops were also locked out on the following may 2. on may 17 the employers put forward new proposals, embodying the principle of prior consultation with the workpeople when a proposed change involved the displacement of one class of workpeople by another. these terms were eventually accepted by all the unions concerned, and work was resumed at various dates in june. the shipbuilding dispute of the same year arose out of a proposed reduc- tion of wages; a modified reduction was accepted after a stoppage of six weeks. the shipbuilding dispute of 1923 was confined to the united society of boilermakers and iron and stecl shipbuilders, which refused to accept an agreement with the shipbuilding employers’ federation relating to overtime and night-shift working, which had been signed by the other shipyard unions. the lockout was settled, after a stoppage of nearly seven months, by the federation agreeing to reconsider, in consultation with the boilermakers’ society, five points which were alleged to need correction or adjustment in their application to the members of the socicty. the general strike of 1926 the great coal dispute of 1921 was terminated (see coal) by the signing of an agreement between the miners and the mine- owners, providing for the automatic regulation of wages from one period to another on the basis of the ascertained costs of production, proceeds, etc., in an earlier period. in jan. 1924 the miners’ federation gave three months’ notice to the mining association to terminate the agreement of r921. in june 1924, after prolonged negotiations, a new agreement was made, which 660 was, in the main, much more favourable to the men than the agreement of ro21, though it contained some provisions intended to benefit the owners. unfortunately, not long after the new agreement came into force the industry entered upon a period of very severe de- pression; and the agreement, therefore, with its improved terms to the miners, proved extremely onerous to the owners. on june 30 1925 the owners gave the miners one month’s notice to ter- minate the agreement; and on the following day they com- municated to the miners their proposals for a new agreement, which were rejected by a delegate conference of the miners’ federation. on july 30 the prime minister offered financial assistance to the industry until april 30 1926, to allow time for a full investigation to be made; and on the following day (the day when the owners’ notices to the men would otherwise have expired) the terms were accepted, and arrangements were made for work to be continued. the total cost of the subvention, from the beginning of aug. 1925 to the end of april 1926, was £ 24,000,000. the samuel report-—on sept. 5 1925 a royal commission was appointed, under the chairmanship of sir herbert samuel, “ to enquife into and report upon the economic position of the coal industry and the conditions affecting it, and to make any recom- mendation for the improvement thereof.” the royal commission issued its report on march 6 1926, suggesting a number of measures that might be taken for the improvement of the in- dustry, but also expressing the opinion that an immediate re- duction of working costs, by means of a revision downwards of the minimum percentage addition to standard rates of wages, was essential, as a temporary measurc, to save the industry. they considered it essential’ that, though national wage agrce- ments should continue, there should nevertheless be, as hitherto, considerable variation in the rates of wages in the several dis- tricts, and laid it down that, ‘‘ before any sacrifices are asked from those engaged in the industry, it shall be definitely agreed between them that all practicable mcans for improving its organisation and increasing its efficiency should be adopted.” the report was accepted by the government in its entirety, but only subject to acceptance by the other two parties. the owners issucd a statement expressing gencral agreement with the report; but they at first desired to initiate negotiations with the miners on district lines. later, under pressure from the government, they withdrew from this position; but the best terms which they were able to offer represented a severe reduc- tion of wages in most districts; and, owing to the delay already mentioned, these terms were not presented to the miners, na- tionally, until the owners’ notices were on the point of expiring. the miners were strongly averse to any reduction of wages or any increase of hours; they also wanted assurances that were not forthcoming as to the measurcs of reorganisation mentioned in the paragraph quoted textually above. no scttlement was found possible; and the owners’ notices, which they had issued in anticipation of the termination of the subsidy period on april 30, took effect on that date. a general sirike called.—mcanwhile, the general council of the trades union congress, who had already come to the assist- ance of the miners in july 1925—the miners’ federation had ‘“nlaced their case unreservedly in the hands of the gencral council’ at that time—again intervened; and prolonged nego- tiations followed. on may 1 1926, with a view to assisting the miners, the general council issued instructions calling out on strike the railway and transport workers, the printing and paper trade unions, some branches of the metal and enginccring and of the building trade workers, and some other classes; and it was intimated that other classes of workers would be called out later, if necessary. this was the first example of a general strike in great britain, though there had been a strike of this kind in dublin in 1913, involving about 20,000 workpeople. the stoppage on the railways and at the docks, of tramway and omnibus services, and of printing, was at first nearly com- plete; though there was some recovery as the strike went on. volunteers, and men who had refused to come out or had gone strikes and lockouts back to work, maintained or restored a skeleton service on the railways and omnibus routes, and on some of the provincial tramways; some work was also done by volunteers at the docks. apart from this, the government were able to introduce an emergency service of motor transport, sufficient to censure a supply of necessary foodstuffs; and many thousands of volunteers offered themselves for work in all sorts of capacities, and as special constables. strict orders were issued by the trade unions to their members to refrain from provocation, and cases of serious disorder or violence were rare. the success of these measures, together with a judgment given by mr. justice astbury declaring the general strike to be illegal and not covered by the protection of the trade disputes act, and pronouncements in the house of commons to the same effect, no doubt hastened the termination of the strike. the gencral council had also been in touch with sir herbert samuel, who had been acting, unoflicially, as a mediator, and had agreed with him on a formula which, it was hoped, would enable negotiations to be resumed. in this hope the general council informed the prime minister on may 12 that they had decided to call off the strike unconditionally. sir herbert samucl’s formula was not, however, accepted by the miners; nor was it adopted by the government, who, on the termination of the general strike, immediately re- sumed negotiations with the miners. some difficulties arose in connection with the resumption of work after the general strike. the most important source of dis- location, at least on the railways, arose from the fact that, partly owing to the lack of coal traffic and the necessity of economising coal, a great reduction in the railway services was in any case inevitable, and it was, therefore, impossible to re-employ im- mediately all those who had gone on strike. on may 14, however, the railway companies came to an agreement with the three railway trade unions, on the basis of undertaking to take back the men as work could be found for them; the trade unions also acknowledged that they had been guilty of a “‘ wrongful act ”’ in bringing their members out on strike without the usual notice. similar agreements were made with the other trade unions. the strike of the miners, however, still continued. if, foreign countries a brief account is given below of strikes and lockouts in the years after the war in the principal european countries, other than great britain, from the ollicial statistics available at the beginning of 1926:— | belgium.—the average annual number of labour disputes in the post-war years (1920-4) in belgium was 261, directly affecting an average of 145,105 workers. particulars are not available as to the number of working days lost. there were no features of particular interest in connection with the disputes; 1920 was the year most affected (517 disputes directly affecting 296,192 workers). france.—the latest figures available for france are for 1922. for the four post-war years the figures are as follows:— number of | aggregate wink number of | workpcople | duration in ° disputes directly working affected days i9i9 2.653 1,206,175 (6,128,638 1920! 1,924 1,487,996 | 24,563,527 ig2! 576 453,504 8,092,388 1922 711 307,056 3,335,902 1 figures for 1920 and subsequent years include alsace-lorraine. a noticeable feature in france has been the tendency to strike among employees of public bodies. germany.— during the post-war years (1919-23) the average annual number of disputes in germany was 3,762, which directly affected 1,657,469 workers and involved a loss of 23,158,100 working days on the average. the years 1919, 1921 and 1922 were the most serious. it should be noted that political motives were the cause of many german strikes in those years, e.g., the kapp putsch and the occupation of the ruhr. strikes and lockouts the netherlands —the average annual number of strikes in the post-war years (1919-24) in the netherlands was 380, which directly affected 50,567 workpeople and involved a loss of 1,687,983 working days on the average. in the year 1923 a dispute occurred in the textile industry, which affected 22,200 workpeople and caused the loss of 3,119,100 working days. the last figure is greater than the total loss in any other of the six years in all industries. scandinavian countries —widespread disputes in the spring of the year, when most collective agreements terminate, are a marked feature in the scandinavian countries: in denmark, for example, in the spring of 1925 an almost general dispute (strikes and lockouts) directly affected 93,000 workpeople and involved a loss of 4,021,900 working days. the average annual number of strikes, workers affected and days lost in these countrics in the post-war years was as fol- lows:— | number of | aggregate country number of | workpeople | duration in and years disputes directly working affected days denmark, 1919-24 . 164 27,748 892,609 norway, i921-4_. 58 61,168 2,405,946 sweden, i9qi9-24 78,724 4,114,706 a great lockout (feb. 14 to may 27 1924) in norway affected 39,476 workpcople and involved a loss of 2,962,263 working days. compulsory arbitration was in force in norway from 1916-21, when the act was allowed to lapse. it was renewed in 1922 for a year, but an attempt to renew it in 1923 failed. in sweden the peak year of the period was 1920, when 486 dis- putes occurred directly affecting 139,039 workpeople and causing a loss of 8,942,543 working days. spaint.—the average annual number of disputes in the post- war years (1919-23) in spain was 380, which directly affected 149,371 workers and involved the loss of 3,952,986 working days on an average. ill. british dominions canada.—the average annual number of disputes in the post-war years (1919-24) was 163, which directly or indirectly affected 52,580 workpeople and involved a loss of 1,716,577 working days on an average. the year 1919 alone accounted for more than one-third of the total number of working days lost. australta.—the average annual number of disputes in the post-war years (1919-24) in australia was 477, which directly and indirectly affected 137,226 workpeople, and caused a loss of 2,010,036 working days on an average. the year rotg alone accounted for rather more than half the total number of working days lost (6,308,226 out of 12,060,216). south africa.—the average annual number of disputes in the post-war years (1919-23) was 30, which covered 33,680' workers and involved a loss of 565,832 working days on an average. the year 1923 was distinguished by having only two strikes affecting 50 workers and involving the loss of 740 work- ing days. bintiocraphy.—great britain: the seventeenth abstract of labour statistics of the united kingdom, cd. 7733 (1915); twenty-sixth report on strikes and lockouts of the united kingdom, cd. 7658 (1914); the ministry of labour gasette, passtm; the international labour review, passim, studies and reports, series a, nos. 5, 7 and 10 (international labour office, geneva, 1920); report on conciliation and arbitration, 1920 (if. c. 185 of 1921); report of the afintstry of labour for the years 1923 and 1924, passtm (cmd. 2481 of 1925); reports of courts of inquiry under the industrial courts act (1919). europe: annuaire statistique de la belgique (1920-1 and 1922); reone du travail, passim; statistique des greves (1915-8, 1919, 1920 and 1921-2), issued by the french ministry of labour and health; statistisches jahrbuch fiir das deutsche reich (1924 5); werkstakingen en mitsluitingen geduyende het jaar (1923), issued by dutch central statistical bureau; fdem (1924); statistiske ifierretninger (july 24 1925) and statistisk aarbog (1924), issued by the danish statistical i shap ae ne ne sige ae er eee 1 jt is not stated whether this is the number of workers directly affected, or the number directly and indirectly affected. 661 dept.; megling og voldgift tariffavtaler og arbeidskonflikter (1924), issucd by norwegian central statistical bureau; arbetsinstillelser och kollektivavtal ar 1924, issued by swedish dept. for social affairs; anuario hstadistico de espaita (1923-4). british dominions: labour gasette (feb. 1925); labour report (1924), issued by commonwealth of australia bureau of census and statistics; official yearbook of the union of south africa (1910 24). j. 1 iv. the united states the distinction, for statistical purposes, between a strike and a lockout is often difficult to make and therefore, when figures for several years are presented, strikes and lockouts are grouped as ‘industrial disputes.” table i. sets forth the number of strikes and lockouts and the number of workers involved, during the period 1914-24. table i. number of industrial disputes and number of employees affected tol4-24 year disputes employces [involved i9i4 1,204 1615: . ie 1,500 i oig 4 ek 2,667 1,599,917 i es oe 2,325 1,227,254 i918 . tt 2,151 1,239,989 igig_ , ; 2,665 4,160,348 1920 2,226 1,463,054 1921 1,785 1,099,247 1922 865 1,608,321 1923 1,132 744,948 1924 872 654,453 compiled from the bureau of labour statistics, monthly labour review. the distribution of these disputes among the several more important industries of the united states is illustrated by table il.:— table ii. number of disputes in the more important industries 1qrj-24 number of disputes +] wir! nm] cal a alal « : -_ — = an tl ies | es] c7 lat | cy industry halal al dl aai sd al an — | = beet loud ne ee tte sel geel eee 275/2311394| 46814341473, 5211583] 113/206) 267 a2 building 21 78|139]227/495/436 36/2.40)215/357|22: clothing furniture . : 18} 20] 50] 43] 26] 35} 26] 17| 4) 121 34 fron and steel . 14} 30] 72) 56) 74) 76} 25) 25) 10) io] 7 leather ; 34| 19] 16} 27] 32] 26) 17| 17] 5 lumber. 40] 14} 441299] 76} 46] 38) 25| io) 19) 6 afetal trades 129)321/547/515/441/580/452| 194] 82/111] 57 mining 51] 67/416]449]/208/176]183) 95) 49])159]177 paper mfg. ..4.. | s4l 41! 4ol 47] 39] 42] 12} 16) 6 printing .° . . | 20f 7] 271 41] 40] 71] 83/506] 56] 19] 12 shipbuilding . z1/106|14o]}1o9} 45} 20f 4] 6) 1 meat packing . me 70) 38] 42] 74] 42) 30) 6} 11] 14 stone ; : ra rae 61| 26] 14) 13! 29) 34) 61) 15) 15 textile 54| 84)261/247/212|273/211 tobacco .. | 63) 47| 50) 58) 38) ig} 12] 16) 12 transportation 52| 18]228]343/227/191)241 compiled from the bureau of labour statistics, monthly labour review. during 1910 the most important strikes occurred in the bitu- minous coal-mining industry and in the new york and chicago clothing industries. on april 1, 300,000 miners went on strike to support wage demands. in most districts the operators soon eranted the wage increases but 45,000 men remained out until september. the columbus street railway employees struck in april, may and july because of discharges of union members. in 1912 the textile strike at lawrence, massachusetts, and the anthracite coal strike were most important. ‘the lawrence strike lasted g weeks, affected 12 mills and involved 23,000 workers. a state law limiting the hours of work for women and children to 54 a weck taused a reduction in wages against which the workers had struck. asa result of this strike 30,000 employees received wage increases of from 5° to 20% and increased pay for over- time. the unskilled workers received the largest increases. the 662 anthracite coal strike began march 3r 1912, and lasted seven weeks. some 170,000 workers went out. the strike resulted in wage increases, abolition of the sliding scale and establishment of a grievance committee. a strike in paint creek and cabin creek, w.va., from april r9r2 to july 1913 was marked by the loss of 13 lives. its violence attracted much attention and the u.s. senate ordered an investigation. in 1913, 25,000 workers in the silk factories of paterson, n.j., struck for shorter hours and increased wages. the strike failed. in september, the employees of the colorado fuel and iron co. struck for recognition of the united mine workers’ union, in- creased wages and observation of state mining laws. both sides committed violence. john d. rockefeller, jr. at first declined to intervene. state troops were brought in and killed a num- ber of strikers and members of their families. president wilson then sent 2,000 federal troops to restore peace. his proposal for settlement was accepted by the miners but rejected by the operators. after an investigation by the u.s. commission on industrial relations, john d. rockefeller, jr., visited colorado and instituted a system of employee representation; the workers were granted the basic eight-hour day and a check-weighman, but the union was not recognized. in 1915 there were 102 strikes and six lockouts of machinists between july and october. in nearly every case the basic eight- hour day was gained. the coal strike in that year involved 350,000 men. when the united states entered the world war in 1917 the american federation of labour discouraged strikes in the essen- tial industries. a number did occur, however, and these were mediated by government committees. on the whole the war period was one of industrial truce. during the war the greatest number of disputes occurred in the metal trades, building, cloth- ing, textile, transportation and mining industries. in 1917 a very violent disturbance occurred in the mines at jerome and bisbee, arizona. in july of that year 1,200 bisbee strikers were loaded on cattle cars by armed citizens and transported across the desert to columbus, new mexico. here they were taken over by sol- diers and fed on army rations for three months, after which they scattered. when the war was over the war labour adjustment boards were dissolved and workers, who had been prevented from strik- ing by the promise of peaceful sctilement, felt that the govern- ment and employers had broken faith. some 176,000 employees struck in the clothing trades, 150,000 in the textile industry, 100,000 marine workers anid 100,000 shipyard workers. the employers launched the “f american plan” of open shop and industrial unrest grew apace. in sept. 1919 the steel strike began as a result of the united action of 24 international unions. some 365,000 men left their jobs but gradually they went back to work. by jan. 1920 the remaining 100,000 men still out were sent back to work and the strike ended. in seattle a general sympathetic strike with the shipyard workers, involving 60,000 people, was called and lasted from feb. 6 torr. thestrike failed. in aug. 1910, although for- bidden by their national officers, 250,000 railway shopmen went on strike because of the delay of the wage adjustment board to reach a decision on the demands of the men for increased pay. after six days the strike was called off and the men returned! to work. at the request of president wilson the demand for a wage increase was postponed to give the government an opportunity to reduce the cost of living. in nov. 1919, 435,000 bituminous coal-miners struck for wage increases of 60%, the six-hour day and the five-day week in order to distribute work throughout the year. aninjunction was issucd to prevent the use of union funds for; strike benefits. in march 1920 an agreement was reached providing for a 27° increase in wages. in sept. rorg, 93° of the boston policemen struck for the right to organise and afhhate with the american federation of labour. their places were filled with other men. the coal strike of 1922 began on april 1, involving 600,000 men and effecting a complete tie-up of the central competitive (bitu- minous) field and of the anthracite industry. the operators strindberg—stsherbatsky wanted the creation of a permanent arbitration board, and the union wanted the creation of a government fact-finding com- mission and the continuation of collective bargaining. this, rather than wages, came to be the real issue in the anthracite strike. an agreement was reached on sept. 2, providing for the continuation of existing wages and ‘recommendation to congress that a coal commission be appointed. the bituminous operators wanted district agreements, the union wanted a national agree- ment. the union demands included also continuation of existing wages, the six-hour day and five-day week. an agreement was reached aug. 15, providing for cessation of the strike, and appoint- ment of a joint committee to negotiate a wage scale to go into effect april 1 1923. the strike of the railway shopmen began july 1, involving 500,- coo men and constituted the most complete tie-up of that branch of the railway industry that the united states has ever seen. the shopmen struck primarily against the road’s practice of con- tracting out work to non-railway shops and against the basic wage of $800 a year established by the railroad labour board. on sept. 13 the unions and 50 railways signed an agreement which 126 roads signed by oct. 27. the most important strike in 1923 was that of 155,000 an- thracite coal-miners in september for the check-off of union ducs and a 20% increase in wages. the strike was settled after three weeks on a compromise basis, the miners securing a 10% wage increase. in may, 50,000 new york city clothing workers struck for a 10% wage increase. the strike lasted two weeks, embraced 2,000 shops and was won by the workers. the most important strike of 1924 was in the ladies’ garment industry. on july 8, 50,000 workers led by the international ladies’ garment workers union struck for an increase in wages, a 40-hour weck and unem- ployment insurance. the strike lasted 13 days and was a success. industrial disputes were in general less numerous and less severe in 1925 than in any preceding year except the very quiet year of 1922. during the first half of 1925 some 720 strikes and lockouts involving 199,500 people took place. during the third quarter of the year 363 disputes occurred. the principal cis- putes were in the clothing, textile, building and coal-mining in- dustries. ‘the most important strike was that of 148,000 an- thracite coal-miners which began sept. 1, in a demand fora 10% wage increase, the check-off of union dues, two-year contract and complete union recognition. the strike lasted 170 days and covered the entire commercial anthracite area. an agreement ratified feb. 17 1926 continued the terms of the previous con- tract, and sect up a board of conciliation and other arbitration machines. the agreement is to be in force until aug. 31 1930. new york dressmakers, numbering 30,000, struck on march ro in 2,000 shops to enforce a provision in the joint agreement. the strike was novel in that the strikers reported at their places of work each morning and sat at their machines for six days with- out working. the strike was asuccess. (see insurance, social.) (j... rco.) strindberg, august (18409-1912), swedish author (see 25.1038), died at stockholm may 14 1912. his plays have been translated into english by e. and w. oland (1912-3) and h. b. samuel (1914). see a. henderson, european dramatists: august strindberg (1914); c. d. marcus, strindbergs dramatik (1918); c. l. schleich, drinie- rungen an strindberg (1917). strzygowski, josef (1862- —+),:- austrian scholar, was born at bial, near bielitz, march 7 1862. in 1892 he became a pro- fessor at graz, and in 1909 was appointed professor of art at the university of vienna. he wrote numerous works on art, dealing especially with oriental influences on western art (see byzantine art, 4.907; roman art, 23.475). his works include: byzantische denkmdler, 1-3 (1891-3): hellen- astische und koptische kunst in alexandria (1902); koptische kunst (1903); die bildende kunst der gegenwart (1907); orsprung der christlichen kirchenkunst (1920, swedish and english trans.); ed. early north european church art and wood architecture (1925). stsherbatsky, fedor ippolitovich (1867- _—+), -rus- sian orientalist, was born at st. petersburg (leningrad) sept. sturdee—submarine 19 (old style) 1867 of a family of old nobility. ife was educated at tsarskoye selo, and studied philology at the st. petersburg university, specialising in sanscrit under prof. i. p. minajev. he graduated in 1889 and studied three years abroad, first at vienna under prof. g. biihler, then in bonn, under prof. h. jacobi. in roo4 he became professor of indian literature at the st. petersburg university, and in 1916 was elected member of the prussian academy of sciences. the years roro-1 were spent in british india for scientific research. his knowledge of tibetan languages and of buddhism enabled him to enter into friendly relations with the leacling buddhist priests. he was invited to meet the dalai-lhama, with whom he had several interviews without any interpreter. his thorough understand- ing of buddhism makes his work, the theory of knowledge and logic according to the later buddhists (1899), a most valuable book (german translation, 1924). he has published many sanscrit mss. in the bibliotheca buddica of the academy of sciences. in 1923 the royal asiatic society published his work, the central conception of buddhism, and in 1926 was published the conception of nirvana. sturdee, sir frederick charles doveton (18s50- 1925), british sailor, was born at charlton, kent, june 9 1850, and entered the navy in 1871. he was promoted licutenant (1880), commander (1893), captain (1899), rear-admiral (1908), vice-admiral (1913), admiral (1917) and admiral of the fleet (1921). he saw service in egypt (1882) and in samoa (1899), when he was in command of the anglo-american force. he was assistant director of naval intelligence to the admiralty (t900-2) and chief of staff, mediterranean fieet (1905-7) and channel fleet (1907). in 1g10 he became rear-admiral of the first battle squadron, and commanded the 2nd cruiser squadron (1912-3). during the world war sturdee was made chief of the war staff in nov. 1914. as commander-in-chief in the south atlantic and pacific, he led the squadron which won the battle of the falkland is. dec. 8 1914, and he was in command of the 4th battle squadron when it took part in the battle of jutland. he was created k.c.b. in 1913, k.c.m.g. in 1916, and a baronetcy was conferred on him in 1916, with the title “of the falkland is.” from to1r8-21 he was commander-in- chief at the nore. he died may 7 ro25. sturdza, demetrius (1833-1914), rumanian statesman (see 25.1051), died at bucharest oct. 21 1914. sturgkh, carl, count (1859-1916), austrian politician, was born at graz oct. 30 1859, of an ancient noble styrian family, and in 1881 he became an official of the statthalterei at graz, and later of the ministry of education. he left the state service in 1891, when he was elected as a representative of the loyal land- holding interest to the reichsrat. he attached himself to the left of the german party, and came forward as a keen opponent of universal suffrage. he was from feb. 10 1909 to nov. 3 1911 minister of education, and a zealous advocate of the humanistic education traditional in the gymnasia. on nov. 3 he became prime minister. stiirgkh was one of the committee of five min- isters who decided on the dispatch of the ultimatum to serbia and the declaration of war, which brought on the world war. he was killed on oct. 21 1916 by a shot fired by the social democrat freidrich adler, a son of the social democrat leader, viktor adler, as a protest against stiirgkh’s government without parlia- ment (see austrian empire). stursa, jan (1880-1923), czech sculptor, was born at nove mesto in moravia. in 1899 he entered the academy of fine arts at prague as a pupil of myslbek. his early works manifest the influence of the symbolic literature of that period, but by 3905-7 he had already attained an individual expression in such works as “ puberty ” (1905), ‘‘ the melancholy girl ” (1906) and “ primavera” (1907). a journey to italy in 1907 was the opening of a new epoch in his creative work. he was captivated first and foremost by the warm magic of femininity which is manifested in “ eve” (1908, state gallery, munich), “* hetaira ” (1909), “‘ messalina ” and the monumental represen- tation of the dancer “ sulamith rahu” (1911), now in the gallery at venice. at the same time he interpreted the oppo- 663 site feminine type, the intellectuality of which is incorporated in the monument to hana kvapilova (1912), the famous czech actress. during the same period stursa produced the group of statuary for the pylons of the hlavka bridge at prague. in 1916 he was appointed professor at the academy of fine arts in prague, and it was in this period of his artistic maturity that he created the “‘ wounded man.” he also produced a number of portrait busts, the most noteworthy of which is that of president masaryk. the leader of the modern school of czech sculpture, he died in 1923. sturzo, luigi (1870— ), italian priest and_ political organiser. born at caltagirone, sicily, on nov. 26 1870, he entered the priesthood at an early age, but soon took to politics and showed from the first a marked ability in creating diocesan committees, co-operation unions, etc., and guiding the masses in the direction of christian democracy. ie was practically unknowh outside his native province, until on the outbreak of the war, he came to rome as secretary of the azione cattolica. after the armistice he was chosen political secretary of the partito popolare italiano, founded early in rgtg. there had been a political catholic movement in italy even before the war, but it was due to the organising genius of don sturzo that the partito popotare made such rapid progress in so short a time. the general tendency of the party was christian socialist, and don sturzo advocated social reforms of a radical nature, espectal- ly in agriculture, as the majority of the party’s adherents were peasants; unlike the socialists, he demanded the expropriation of the land with compensation for the landlords, collaboration of capital and labour in industry and a patriotic foreign policy. but an extremist wing, led by sig. miglioli, soon arose, and don sturzo, although mildly critical of its bolshevik methods, never definitely disowned it. at the elections of nov. t9109, thanks to the proportional system introduced by nitti, the partito popolare secured 101 seats, and subsequently, by holding the balance between the various parties, became a dominant force in italian politics. when sig. bonomi was trying to form a cabinet after the fall of giolitti in feb. 1922, it was don sturzo who dictated its composition to him and became his eminence grise after it was constituted. in the early days of fascism don sturzo did not oppose it, although there were frequent affrays between the black-shirted squadre and the migliolini. after the march on rome he allowed several popolari to enter the cabinet, but his half-hearted support of the mussolini govt. resulted in their withdrawal, and don sturzo and his party definitely joined the opposition.