ST. ANDREWS, UNIVERSITY OF

in st. andrews, the chandos chair of medicine has been converted into the chair of physiology and new chairs have been instituted in anatomy and english. in the scientific departments lecture- ships in various branches have been instituted. the gift, by prof. thomas purdie, of a chemical research laboratory gave a great impetus to research work in chemistry, and prof. purdie’s widow bequeathed an endowment fund for the fostering of research. the laboratory has played an important part in the development of research. among the modern additions to the university may be mentioned the establishment of a botani- cal garden and of the gatty marine laboratory. the original scheme of the colleges involved the residence of the students in the college buildings and that system continued till about the beginning of the 10th century. towards the middle of that century an effort was made to revive this system, which, however, was not maintained. in 10921 a residence for men students was established, and in 1926 a beginning was made with the erection of a residence hall on a more extensive scale. dr. and mrs. younger, of mount melville, gave to the univer- sity the site and building of a large graduation hall adjoining the united college buildings. by mr. andrew carnegie gifts were made to the university of a large recreation park with pavilion adjoining, a gymnasium and a very considerable addition to the university library buildings. mrs. carnegie gave to the university a building for a women students’ union or club house. the men students’ union (originated in 1898) has been extended and improved under a gift to the university by dr. william low of blebo. a number of bursaries, scholarships and prizes have been established by the donation of funds to the university, and among other funds is the lady donaldson fund for the benefit of students who fall ill during their college course. at university college, dundee, a chair of bacteriology and a large number of lectureships in vari- ous branches of medical science and practice have been established. | to the original buildings of university college, dundee, have been added a block of medical buildings, an electrical engineer- ing laboratory, a mechanical enginecring laboratory, library, fives court and students’ union. a hostel for women students has been established in dundee. st. germain, treaty of (see also versailles, trianon and neuilly, treaties of).—austria and hungary had up to 1918 formed a diplomatic unit; but in oct. 1918 they were virtually two separate states. the armistice of nov. 3 still recognised austria-hungary as a diplomatic unit, but austria was pro- claimed a republic nov. 12, as was hungary nov. 16. the armistice concluded by the powers direct with hungary (nov. 13) recognised hungary’s de facto independence of austria. all the powers, except the united states, early asserted that the ‘fourteen points,” etc., did not apply to the settlements with austria and hungary. in jan. 1919 it was known that even wilson favoured including in italy part of the slovene popula- tion of istria and carniola, and would make italy further con- cessions. on april 14 he agreed to grant italy the tirol south of the brenner pass, with over 250,000 germans, as well as the trentino, as already agreed by france and great britain. it was known also that the czechoslovak state would include over 3,000,000 germans. austria was to be reduced to some two-thirds of her german-speaking territories. in mid-april 448 m. clemenceau obtained from his allies the further important decision to prohibit union between austria and germany without the unanimous consent of the council of the league. this was embodied in the draft treaty with germany of may 6, and formed article 80 of the treaty of versailles of june 28, appearing as article 88 of the treaty of saint-germain, and article 72 of the tieaty of neuilly. on may 2 the austrian delegation was invited to paris. on june 2 they were presented with a very imperfect draft treaty, followed by a more detailed one on july 20. austria made great protests, turning mainly on two points. she asserted the applicability of the ‘“‘ fourteen points’ to her case, and her tight therefore to retain all her german subjects. president wilson alone was willing to extend the application of the “ four- teen points ” to austria; the treaty assigned 3,500,c00 germans to czechoslovakia, 230,000 to italy. the other main point of dispute was how far austria must accept the responsibilities of old austria-hungary. the allies finally decided that the austrian republic was not a new state but an old one lopped of certain outlying provinces and endowed with a new govern- ment. the allies recognised this government de facto by accept- ing their credentials on may 22 and de jure on sept. 10, by sign- ing the treaty with them at st. germain-en-laye. it came into force on july 16 1920. part i. the covenant, and part xiii. labour, are as in the treaty of versailles. part it. of the austrian treaty details the borders of the new austrian state. part iff, political clauses for europe.—this deals with technical details such as the financial obligations of the former austrian empire, as affecting italy, yugoslavia, czechoslovakia and rumania. articles 49-50 arranged for a plebiscite in two areas of the klagen- furt basin. this plebiscite, taken in 1920, went in austria’s favour. west hungary, with about 333,000 souls, was transferred from hungary to austria but ultimately, in 1921, without its chicf town (see burgenland). further clauses in part iii. dealt with the pro- tection of racial and religious minorities. article no. 88 prohibits austria from alienating her independence (7.e., joining germany) otherwise than with the consent of the council of the league of nations. : part iv. austrian interests outside europe.—as in the treaty of versailles this part provides for a total renunciation of state prop- erties immovable and movable outside europe, and also of treaties, capitulations, concessions, etc., in the following countries: morocco, itgypt, siam and china. part v. military, naval and air clauses followed the general lines of the similar clauses in the treaty of versailles but showed somewhat more consideration to austria. a long-service voluntary . force not exceeding 30,000 was allowed. the manufacture of arms, etc., was confined to a single factory (article 132). the naval clauses were very drastic; the whole austro-hungarian navy was broken up or distributed among the allies, austria only retaining four patrol boats on her inland waters. the air clauses were as in the german treaty. part vf. prisoners of war and graves; part xj, aerial naviga- tion, were asin the german treaty, with a few very small alterations. part vii. penalties provided for the trial before allied military tribunals of austrian offenders against the laws and customs of war. this provision was not executed. part viii. reparations; part ix. financial clauses; part x. economic clauses.—by article 177 austria accepted responsibility for herself and her allies for causing loss and damage to the allied (entente) governments by the war. the rest of the “ reparation chapter "’ followed the corresponding section in the german treaty. no lump sum was fixed, but discretion was, in effect, given to the reparation commission to fix it. austria handed over her whole commercial flect and much livestock to the allies. czechoslovakia, yugoslavia, poland and rumania had, however, to contribute to the expenses incurred by the allies in liberating their territory from austria. the financial clauses involved many complex questions as to the allocation of pre-war debt and the distribution of war debts. all these provisions were somewhat relaxed by the supreme council on march 17 1921, and the process was completed by austria placing her finances under control of the league in sept. 1922 (see austria). | | part xii. ports, waterways and railways, merely stressed some points in the corresponding section of the german treaty. see treaty series, no. 11 (cmd. 400 of 1919); also h. w. v. temperley (ed.), a history of the peace conference of paris, vol. iv. and v. (institute of international affairs, london, 1921). ci. w. v. t.) st. lawrence: see great lakes and st. lawrence; also 24.21. ~ §t. lawrence—st. louis st. louis (see 24.24)—-the population of st. louis july 1 1925 was 821,543 (census bureau estimate), an increase of 48,545 since 1920. the increase from 1910 to 1920 was 85,868, or 12%. the population figures are for limits fixed in 1876, when st. louis city and st. louis county were separated. an amend- ment (adopted in 1924) to the constitution of missouri author- ises the extension of the city limits into the county if the plan is approved by the voters of both city and county. the city, the counties of st. louts and st. charles in missouri and the counties of st. clair and madison in illinois form the st. louis industrial district of the u.s. census. the city charter of 1914 reduced elective officers to mayor, comptroller, president and board of aldermen, collector, treasurer, recorder of deeds, sheriff and coroner with four-year terms. each of 28 wards has a resident alderman elected by citywide vote. the mayor, the comptroller and the president of the board of aldermen form a board of estimate and apportionment with con- trol of appropriations. the board of public service (appointive) consists of a president and four directors of divisions—public wel- fare, public safety, public utilities, and streets and sewers, with departments and bureaus under them. the tax rate of 1925 was $2.57 per $roo assessment. assessed valuation of realty, person- alty and utilities increased from $775, 500,000 in 1921 10 $1,075,- 099,930 for the taxes of 1925. city improvement plan.—in 1923 st. louis voted $87,000,000 in bonds for a great scheme of city improvement. the bonds provided $8,500,000 for widening and $5,800,000 for improving 69 m. of streets; $12,000,000 for waterworks on the missouri river, doubling the present supply of water taken from the mis- sissippl; $11,000,000 to put underground the river des peres in the western suburbs; $2,600,000 for a plaza and park fronting union station; $2,500,000 for new parks and playgrounds, with $1,300,000 for improving old ones; $8,000,000 for city-wide electric lighting; $8,000,000 for reconstruction of sewers; $400,000 for an aquarium; $4,000,000 for eleemosynary institutions; and $1,250,000 for city markets. the bonds voted provide also $5,000,000 for a memorial plaza occupying 9 city blocks (27 ac.) between market and olive streets, west of twelfth street boule- vard. the new buildings on the plaza will be a courthouse, $4,000,000; and auditorium and convention hall, $5,000,000; and a world war memorial, $1,000,000. existing public buildings in the plaza group include the municipal courts, the city hall and the public library. | municipal improvements accomplished since roro include a permanent open-air theatre in forest park with seats for 9,275; a free steel bridge costing $7,500,000; viaducts over railways, $700,000; and new school buildings, $5,000,000. additions to washington university were endowment gifts ($1,500,000) and new buildings for the medical, art, biological and other depart- ments, costing $3,000,000. to st. louis university james campbell left an estate of $10,000,000 for a hospital and the advancement of medicine and surgery. three new hospitals— barnes, the jewish and the children’s—represent, with endow- ments, $5,000,000. irom the surplus of the louisiana purchase exposition the jefferson memorial was built, costing $500,000, for the missouri historical society. trade and industry— the total resources of banks and trust companies in 1925 were $523,114,561; deposits, $536,701,672; capital stock $42,950,000. clearings for 1924 were $7,174,034,- ooo. in 1925 st. louis industries included the largest plants in the united states for the manufacture of shoes, street cars, stamped ware, stoves and ranges, drugs, tobacco, lead and brick. operating 11 tanneries and 4o factories, the leading shoe company reached a production of 150,000 pairs daily in 1925. recent development in metals has been marked, giving st. louis the largest steel-casting plant in the world. an industrial district employing 55,000 has developed in northwest st. louis since 1915. rail freight tonnage received increased from 43,- 000,000 in 1920 to 52,000,000 in 1923; shipments out increased from 29,000,000 to 35,000,000 in the same years. receipts of grain in 1924 were 113,974,000 bushels. receipts of hogs in 1923 were 4,800,000. (w. b. st.) st. mihiel, battle of—st. paul st. mihiel, battle of.—for four years the st. mihiel salient had projected 28 km. deep into the french lines. its original purpose, to serve as one of the jaws of a nutcracker attack on verdun having failed, it was used in 1916 as the anvil against which von falkenhayn sought in vain to drive home his hammer blows against verdun from the north. in the spring of 1918 ludendorff again hoped through its possession to gain ver- dun, and much more by the wider encircling attack in cham- pagne of july rs, but again the attack failed. during all these years the salient had been not only a threat of further german aggression but a serious interruption of french railway commu- nication with both the verdun and lorraine front. in 1915 the french army had twice attacked to compel evacuation of the salient, but both attacks had failed, the first, made in april at les eparges, with serious losses. tactically the salient afforded the germans a strong defensive position. the cete de meuse, a range of hills rising abruptly 1,600 ft. above the meuse valley, afforded strong supporting points on the western face of the salient, while mont sec and the lower-lying hills south of the rupt de mad were well adapted to a strong defensive organisation (see western front campaigns). the attack assigned to the a. e.f.—to the general staff of the american expeditionary forces, even before its arrival in france, the reduction of the st. mihiel salient had appealed strongly as a favourable initial operation for the american army as soon as sufficient forces should have arrived to undertake it. the reason for this selection was in part that the nature of the salient enabled an offensive to be undertaken there with relatively small forces such as the a.e.f. might hope to have by the following spring, but mainly because at this point the eventually preponderant american forces could strike a most serious blow by the capture of metz, which was not only important as a railway centre, but the heart of a vital industrial region. the staff further deemed it important to begin at once the installations and lines of com- munication necessary for both the reduction of the salient and the subsequent operations. gen. pershing discussed this view with gen. petain in june 1917, and, after a further study of the front, port facilities and railway lines, it had been adopted as a working plan. however, the success of the german offensive operations in the spring of 1918 caused the plan temporarily to be laid aside, and during both the spring and summer of that year american troops in france were scattered along the western front to meet needs of the moment. by the end of july the situation had stabilised sufficiently in favour of the allies to enable the question of reuniting the troops of the american army to be again discussed. on july 24 foch confirmed the understanding arrived at the previous year that the first independent american operation should be the reduction of the st. mihiel salient. a few wecks later he authorised the transfer to the american i. army of the sector of the allied front facing the salient. this transfer was made on aug. 30. | the allicd plan —by this time the american army consisted of forces far beyond the number required for the mere reduction of the salient, and the question of their subsequent employment had to be considered. pershing had naturally desired to exploit the st. mihiel attack to the utmost. foch, with other plans in mind, limited the attack strictly to the reduction of the salicnt. by foch’s direction, petain on sept. 2 issued the directive for the operation, which called for a main attack on the south to debouch from the plateau seicheprey-limey toward the objec- tive vigneulles-thiaucourt, and a secondary attack, to debouch from the vicinity of eparges-mouilly toward the southeast and, in connection with the main attack, to effect the cutting off of the german forces in the salient. to the main attack there were assigned eight american divisions; to the secondary, one amer- ican and one french; the french troops occupying the interme- diate sector were to exercise pressure against the enemy forces in the apex. the wording and date of this directive and the dis- proportionate number of american divisions assigned to the main attack, which alone could hope speedily to reach the mfichel siellung, across the mouth of the salient, suggest that it was 449 originally drafted with a view to at least a partial exploitation of the attack, to include the seizure of the afiche/! stellung, but that in a subsequent alteration, to conform to foch’s insistence on a more limited scope to the attack, only the names of the objec- tives were changed. dispositions of the opposing forces-—gen. pershing’s order for the attack assigned the main attack to the i. and iv. corps, each of which were given four divisions, including two regular divisions, and the secondary attack on the cote de meuse, to the v. corps, the attacking troops of which consisted of one american national guard div. and one french division; the french if. colonial corps in the centre was to guard the adja- cent flanks of the main and secondary attacks, to execute deep raids, and to be prepared to follow up a withdrawal. at the disposal of the american i. army for the operation were 2,971 guns, mostly french artillery. the i. army also had a marked superiority in aviation, thanks to french co-operatien and the assistance of the british independent air force. on the german side the salient was held by army detach- ment c, under gen. fuchs, comprising eight divisions on the line, organised into three corps groups, and three divisions in reserve. as early as sept. 1 a deserter had given the germans warning of the impending attack, and ludendorif had at the {ime seriously considered ordering a withdrawal from the salient, but was deterred by the representations of the army detachment and army group commanders, who were confident of their ability to hold. by sept. 8, however, the evidences of the coming attack on the salient had become unmistakable, and army detach- ment c was ordered to withdraw to the afichel stellung. no need for haste was felt and the preparations were deliberate and methodical. the night preceding the attack the dismounted batteries were being withdrawn, and consequently could not be used in the battle. launching of the alfack.—preceded by a four-hour bombard- ment the main attack was launched at 5 a.m. on sept. 12; the secondary attack at 8 am. deprived of most of its artillery sup- port the german infantry, although ordered to hold, made vir- tually no resistance. the american i. army on the right made its objectives in a few hours and, in spite of german counter- attacks brought by two of the divisions in reserve, begged per- mission to continue its advance; but, because of the precise instructions by which pershing felt himself bound, this permis- sion was refused. the iv. and v. corps also made at an early hour their first-day objectives and halted awaiting further orders. instructions were al once dispatched for the two corps to join hands at vigneulles to cut off the apex of the salient. these instructions did not reach the troops until after dark on the 12th, so that the connection, though unopposed, was not effected until the morning of the 13th. meanwhile the german commander had ordered the complete evacuation of the salient, which had not been attacked from the front, and the movement was suc- cessfully carried out during the night. in the course of sept. 13 and 14 troops of the american iv. and y. corps and french ii. colonial corps moved forward without opposition to the line designated by foch, facing the michel stellung, which the i. corps had already reached on the r2th. of the troops engaged on the allied side 555,000 were american, and r10,o00 were french. american losses were 7,511, of which considerably more than half were borne by the i. corps, which received the brunt of the counter-attack; french losses were 597. the captures included over 15,000 prisoners and 443 guns. brnliograpuy.—j. a. de peireton chambrun and charles de marenches, the american army in the european conflict (1919); f. palmer, our greatest battle (1919); final report of general john j, pershing (1919); a. w. page, our 110 days fighting (1920). | | (ashes) st. paul, minnesota, u.s.a. (see 24.35), had in 1920a popu- lation of 234,698, of whom 51,722 were foreign-born (swedes and germans predominating) and 3,376 were negroes. the cen- sus bureau estimate for 1925 was 246,001. bank clearings in- creased from $538,600,000 in 1910 to $1,659,900,000 in 1924. 450 the factory out put was valued at $58,990,000 in 1909; $149,638,- 000 in 1919; and about the same in 1923 ($1 50,355,075), represent- ing recovery after the depression of 1920-1. building permits in the five years 1920-4 represented new construction valued at $96,691,000. a new charter establishing a commission form of government was adopted in 1o12 (in effect jan. 1 1914). in 1921 a proposal to change back to the federal form was defeated at the polls. the city planning board (created by an ordinance of 1918) sub- mitted in 1922 a city plan with many interesting features, includ- ing suitable approaches to the state capitol (based on the sug- gestions made by the architect of the building, cass gilbert, in 1905, when it was completed) and to the new union depet, and designs for a city and county administration building. a zoning ordinance was adopted in 1924. the desirability of a metropoli- tan planning commission for the twin cities and their environs was under discussion. ‘the amherst h. wilder charity (in- corporated 1910, with an endowment of $2,778,018) erected an administration building (1913) which became a central ‘ chari- ties building ”’ for the city, where other agencies are housed with- out charge for rent;it made surveys of housing conditions (1917) and of health (1919) besides establishing a day nursery, public baths, etc. st. paul, like minneapolis, has a low general death rate, a low infant mortality and relatively little child labour and illiteracy; iis percentage of home ownership is appreciably higher. st. petersburg: see petrograd. st. quentin, battle of: see german offensive. saint-saens, charles camille (1835-1921), french musical composer (see 24.44), died in algiers dec. 16 1921. saionzi, kimmochi, prince (1840- ), japanese states- man, was born in oct. 1849 at kyoto. when less than 20 years of age, he took part in the councils which led to the restoration, and at 19 was commander-in-chief of an imperial army. in 1881 he commenced his official career, and in the following year ac- companied mr. (afterwards prince) ito to europe and the united states to investigate the parliamentary system. in 1885 he was appointed minister to austria; three years later he became vice-president of the house of peers and was raised to the privy council in 1894. in the same year he received the portfolio of education in the second ito cabinet. in july 1903 he became the leader of the seiyu-kai and in 1906 formed his first cabinet as prime minister; he was again premier in rgrr to 1912. in 1919 he represented japan as chief envoy at the peace conference and was invested with the grand order of merit. he was made prince in 1920 in recognition of his services in connection with the world war and the peace conference. saito, minoru, viscount (1858-— ), japanese sailor and administrator, was born a commoner, at iwata ken. he joined the navy in 1873, and proceeded steadily towards the highest advancement, being gazetted commander in 1897. the discipline of the japanese navy, strict as it was, still left something to be desired, and when he became captain in 1898, saito declared his intention of revising some of the existing regulations and enforcing a stricter observance of others. in the same year he was appointed vice-minister of the navy under adml. count yamamoto. two years later he was gazetted rear-admiral in recognition of his valuable services in the development of the navy along western lines. he was promoted to vice-adml. in 1904 and became adml. in 1912. he received several dec- orations for his services in the russo-japanese war, where he profited by his experience as naval aide-de-camp to the emperor in the chino-japanese conflict. he was minister for the navy in 1913 and ror4. after the upheaval of koreans in 1919 under the rule of marshal hasegawa, baron saito was appointed governor-general of korea. his chief concern was education; there were only 250 schools in the peninsula at the time of his appointment, but by 1926, there were nearly five times that number. he was created baron in 1907, and was raised to the rank of viscount in 1925. sakhalin or saghalien (see 24.54), a pacific island, area 24,560 square miles. in oct. 1905 russia ceded to japan that por- st. petersburg—salisbury, marquess of tion of the island lying south of the parallel of 50° n. lat., known officially as karafuto, with an area of 13,158 sq. m. and popula- tion (1920) 105,899. sakhalin contains important coal-fields, the three exploited in 1925 producing about 114,000 tons annually; iron pyrites in the notoro peninsula; alluvial gold in the river beds; and oil-bearing strata which were first discovered in large areas in anshi and notosanu in 1913. natural resources of karafute.—in karafuto the chief indus- try is that of the fisheries. about 43,000 ac. of land were under cultivation in 1922, the main crops being barley and wheat. about goo,000 ac. suitable for cultivation and pasturage were still available. there were over 8,000,000 ac. of practically untouched forest. the wood-pulp manufacturing industry was growing. the japanese treasury makes a fixed annual grant to supplement taxes and sources of revenue. the budget for 1924-5 balanced at 19,948,463 yen. salandra, antonio (1853- ), italian statesman, was born at troia, puglia, in 1853. he first entered parliament as member for lucera, and from the beginning of his political career was a liberal of the right wing. when baron sonnino became treasury minister in the crispi cabinet of 1893, salandra was chosen under-secretary in that department. he was minister of finance in the first sonnino cabinet of 1906 and treasury min- ister in the second (1909-10). when in march ror4 sig. giolitti resigned, sig. salandra was called upon to form the new cabinet, and he was premier on the outbreak of the world war. it was the salandra cabinet which took the momentous decision of bringing italy into the world war on the side of the allies. on resigning office in june 1916, he continued to support both the boselli and the orlando cabinets. during the disturbed period from 1919 to 1922 salandra upheld the principles of orthodox liberalism, and opposed the policy of the various cabinets who truckled to the extremists. he succeeded senator tittoni as italian delegate on the league of nations council and assembly, and represented the italian thesis in the italo-greek conflict arising from the massacre of the tellini mission in epirus in aug. 1923. the fascist movement was supported from the first by sig. salandra, but he did not join the fascist party, and when he felt that fascism was incompatible with the old liberal tra- dition, especially after mussolini’s speech of jan. 3 1925, he withdrew hissupport, without, however, abandoning the chamber. salford, england (see 24.67), with an area of 5,202 ac., including pendleton and broughton, incorporated in 1919, had a population in 1921 of 234,045. suggestions for its amalgama- tion with manchester, or for the inclusion of eccles, swinton and pendlebury in salford have not come to fruition. large clearances of insanitary and overcrowded areas have been made, and the death-rate has fallen to about 13 per 1,000. a wide new road was opened at pendleton in 1925, and further road improve- ments were under consideration in 1926. there are 297 ac. of parks and recreation grounds in the borough; these include 46 ac. at pendleton, bought before the war and laid out after it; langworthy park, pendleton (6 ac.); wallnes lane, salford (12 ac.); an extension of peel park; and the light oaks estate, pendleton. the power station at agecroft, one of the largest in the country, was finished in 1925. the salford war memorial ward at the royal hospital was opened in 1922. salisbury, james edward hubert gascoyne-cecil, ath! marquess of (1861- ), british politician, eldest son of the 3rd marquess, the prime minister (see 24.76), was educated at eton and university college, oxford. he was a member of parliament from 1885, with the exception of one year, till he succeeded his father in 1903. he fought in the south african war with the 4th battalion of the bedfordshire regiment, and was mentioned in dispatches. on his return to england in 1900 he became under-secretary for foreign affairs, a post which, on succeeding to the peerage, he quitted for that of privy seal in the cabinet of his cousin, mr. balfour; and he held, for some months in 1905, the presidency of the board of trade. lord salisbury, who had not made his mark in the commons, gradually came to occupy a position of considerable authority in salisbury—salonika campaigns the lords. in the crisis over the parliament bill he threw in his lot with the ‘‘ die-hards.’”’ during the early years of the world war he was energetic in the discharge of his military duties as lieutenant-colonel of his yeomanry regiment. he did not join either coalition government, but was critical of both, taking an independent line. in the last months of the war and during the early years of peace he gradually came to assume the infor- mal leadership of the conservative opposition first in the house of lords, and afterwards in the party generally. as the reluctance of the conservatives to support the coalition grew, the discontented rallied round him; and, in a speech on oct. 16 1922, he categorically demanded the freedom of the party. three days later the policy was accepted at the carlton club meeting. he became lord president of the council in mr. law’s cabinet and continued in the same post in mr. baldwin’s first cabinet. in mr. baldwin’s second cabinet he was lord privy seal, and on lord curzon’s death in 1925 he succeeded to the leadership of the house of lords. he married in 1887 lady cicely alice gore, daughter of the 5th earl of arran, and had two sons and two daughters. he was created k.g. in for 7. salisbury, rhodesia, the capital of southern rhodesia (see 23.260), lies 374 m. northwest of beira and 301 m. north- east of bulawayo. in 1921 the white population was 6,462. situated at an altitude of 4,700 ft. above sea level and at the foot of a kopje, the town is well laid out, has many handsome public buildings and possesses nearly all the amenities of a european town. there is an excellent water supply. govern- ment house, at the northeast end of the town, a large single- storey building, dates from ro10. the churches include an anglican cathedral (not completed in 1926). the private residences are mostly of the bungalow type set in large gardens. salisbury is the centre for a large mining and agricultural district. the jesuit industrial mission farm at chishawasha, 16 m. distant, is noted. the first parliament of southern rhodesia met here in 1923. salmon fishing: see angling. salonika (see 24.85), a seaport of southeastern europe. when the first balkan war broke out in 1912, salonika sur- rendered to the greeks on the festival of its patron, st. deme- trios, nov. 8, after 482 years of turkish occupation. king george i. proceeded to what was now the second largest city of his kingdom, but was assassinated there on march 18 1913, by a greck, named schin4ds, to whom he had once refused money. the treaty of london of may 30 1913 assigned salonika to greece, and the battle of kilkis in the second balkan war of that year prevented the bulgarians from approaching it. salonika was becoming more and more hellenised when the world war brought it into prominence as the base of the allied operations in the near east. on oct. 5 1915, despite a merely formal protest from m. veniselos, then premier, allied troops landed there and a few days later gen. sarrail arrived and subsequently took over the duties of commander-in-chief. the war council of the allies decided to hold it, and held it was, despite several air raids. the allies arrested and deported the four enemy consuls, occupied all official buildings and proclaimed martial law. in 1916 a veniselist revolution against king constantine broke out there, and on oct. 9 m. veniselos arrived and formed a provisional govt., which the allies recognised, and to which lord granville was accredited as british representative. from salonika this national govt. declared war on nov. 23 against bulgaria and germany. on aug. 18 1917 a great fire de- stroyed a large part of the city, including the ancient church of st. demetrios. after the war an arrangement was made, by which yugoslavia, now only three hours distant by rail, should have a so-called “‘ serbian zone” in the harbour. but the question of the railway from salonika to the frontier at gjevgjelija was one of the obstacles to the renewal of the greco- yugoslav alliance. after the proclamation of the greek re- public, salonika, as an important military centre, often had a decisive voice in politics, and the large immigration of greek 451 refugees from asia minor has further hellenised the country round it, now 90% greek. salonika is rapidly becoming a great modern city, and it is proposed to endow it with:a univer- sity. the population at the last census was 174,390, but it is now much larger. see general sarrail, mon commandement en orient, 1916-8 (paris, 1920); p. risal, la ville convoitee, salonique (paris, 1914). (w. mr.) salonika campaigns 1915-8.—under the heading of serr- bian campaigns the collapse and subjugation of serbia in 1915 is related tn this work. the present article describes the campaigns in salonika which formed the sequel to this allied disaster. the narrative is presented in four sections, under the headings: i. objects of the expedition; ii. the retreat to salonika; iii. the first and second allied offensives; iv. the defeat of bulgaria. i. objects of the expedition although undertaken for political objects—to bring relief to a hard-pressed ally and to check the influence of germany in the balkans—the salonika campaigns were ultimately crowned by the first decisive military success of the world war. for on the macedonian front the continent-wide trench barriers of the central powers were first breached beyond repair, and there too was knocked away the first national prop—bulgaria—of the germanic alliance. to disentangle cause from effect is difficult where moral, military and economic threads are so closely inter- woven as in the years 1914-8, yet the fact at least stands out that the overthrow of bulgaria began the series of national capitu- lations which ended with that of germany on nov. 11 1918. if salonika was for several years an unproductive field of mili- tary effort, an infringement of the law of economy of force, which in some measure justified the german gibe that it was their largest concentration camp—‘‘ an enemy army, prisoner of it- self ’—the historian, when weighing his verdict, must throw the counterpoise of 1918 into the scales. and not this only, for it must be remembered that the allied occupation of the salonika front made possible the rebuilding of the serbian army—from the ragged and disorganised survivors of the 1915 winter retreat through albania to the well-equipped and irresistible force which broke through the vardar front in sept. 1918. on the credit side also must be set the fact that the salonika expedition prevented the danger that greece might become a submarine base for the central powers, one which would have lain in deadly proximity to the british artery of communication with the east via the suez canal. and again, that the allied force contained the bulk of the bulgarian army—although it is perhaps doubtful whether these would have placed their services at germany’s dis- posal for any front more remote from their homeland. origins.—lf the salonika expedition was the direct outcome of the serbian debacle of sept.—oct. 1915, the idea had an earlier origin. for salonika was not only the one feasible channel of allied communication with and supply to serbia, but that front offered a possible strategic flank for attack once the trench line’ on the western front had been welded into a seemingly impene- trable barrier. as far back as 1914, british and french naval missions, with guns, had been sent to support the serbians, and they had also been supplied with munitions by the salonika route. the question, too, had been mooted of a larger employ- ment of military force in that theatre, but british commitments at gallipoli led to this project being shelved—until the bulgarian mobilisation for war on the side of the central powers. bulgarian intervention.—throughout the summer of rors the two warring coalitions had been bidding for bulgaria’s support, and in this diplomatic bargaining the entente suffered a moral and a material handicap—the first, their obvious failure at the dardanelles; the second, serbia’s reluctance to concede any part of bulgarian macedonia, which she had seized as her share of the spoils of the second balkan war of 1913. as this was the one prize on which the bulgarians had set their heart, and as austria had nothing to deter her from offering territory that belonged to her enemy—serbia—the entente offers failed to attract bulgaria. her intervention on the opposite side meant that free communi- 452 pngish as 406 kilometres 40 60 hy % hig ey ‘t= te se - a bri dx salonika campaigns i ~ 7% in ostur: pem ees a te oss at one oe ; ~ sed =. as l ae ; i doran pa ‘nea “wpeirar ie ‘ : ce sw bs re metux ~ ar. e. 3 rs fe he imor taken wad fei won ) floring, ee wracae al: o5cpovo = = of be i ; a) , = any 2 ope & ie vt “ aagta-* % i *., 8 : = = 23 uke (ee ; : a fe a “* e = fea" att 3 ' 4 oa . is . “vbe \ oe or ae ms, \ maa —2 salonika? %, "3. . “, ? ee a ae et longitude e_22°of greenwich (d cation could be easily established between germany and turkey, and as a consequence that the entente forces on the gallipoli peninsula were imminently menaced. il. the retreat to salonika faced with this critical situation, the french and british govts. decided, albeit tardily, to succour serbia with an expedi- tionary force. allied expeditionary force.—the french took the lead, nominat- ing as commander gen. sarrail, the former chicf of the ill. armyin the verdun sector. sarrail’s political activities had earned him the distrust of the military authorities; but the same factor, through his influence with the parties of the left, made it diffi- cult to ignore him completcly. his removal by joffre from the iii. army command placed the government in a temporary dilemma, and they eagerly seized the opportunity of placating sarrail and his political supporters by appointing him to a con- veniently distant theatre of war. while the constitution of sarrail’s force was still under discus- sion, the bulgarian mobilisation on sept. 22 forced the hands of the entente governments. a hurried order was sent for the dispatch to salonika of contingents from gallipoli, preliminary to the arrival of reinforcements from france. preceded by staff officers, the british roth and french 156th divs. began to disembark at ‘salonika on oct. 5, and they were followed by the french 57th division. on the same day, however, the greek promise of aid to serbia, made by m. veniselos, was repudiated by king con- stantine, and the veniselist govt. fell—to be replaced by that of m. zaimis, which took neutrality as its keynote. this reacted at once not only on the franco-british plan but on their opera- tions. the greek officials, civil and military, at salonika did their best, or worst, to obstruct the disembarkation of the allied contingents. to increase the confusion, the intended concentration point was several times changed by successive orders from paris until, on sarrail’s arrival on oct. 12, he decided, in view of his slender resources and the doubtful attitude of the greek army in his rear, to concentrate no further forward than the demir qapu (demir kapija) defile. the limited object was to protect the railway and to ease the pressure on the serbian forces to the north by repelling a bulgarian advance from strumitsa (strumi- ca)—which would sever that line and so the serbian line of retreat. meanwhile, the british troops under gen. mahon began moving up to doiran, in echelon behind the right of the french. the reircat.—on oct. 14 the leading french troops came into action at strumitsa station (in serbia), driving back a bulgarian reconnaissance, and on oct. 17, in response to serbian urgings, a brigade was sent forward beyond the demir qapu defile as far as krivolak. reinforced by the arrival of the french r22nd div. sarrail began, on nov. 3, an offensive northward to facilitate the serbian retreat. but the seizure of the babuna pass by the bulgarians closed the channel of southward retreat for the main serbian army, and finally shattered the hope that the serbians might fall back on the relieving force, as was the advice of their allies. sarrail was thus faced with a difficult problem. on the one hand the gallant french efforts to break through towards the babuna had failed and they were forced on the defensive, and, on the other, he received news of the serbian decision to retreat westward through albania towards the adriatic. with his small force thus isolated he took the only possible decision—to fall back towards salonika. this decision raised further problems. were they to hold on there, or evacuate greek soil altogether? with the disappearance of serbia beneath the enemy flood, the entente powers could no longer claim that they were at salonika merely to use a line of communication to which serbia was by treaty entitled. the other justification, that they had come at the request of the greek govt. was now nullified by the downfall of veniselos. considerations of prestige and their desire to use salonika as a base for diplomatic operations in the balkans led the entente govts. to remain, but without any clear policy as to the future. even with the decision to retreat taken, the franco-british forces were not “ out of the wood.”” the withdrawal had to be made down a single-track railway, through a country without roads—converted by the autumn rains into a swamp—and in face of a pursuing encmy. the retreat was made by echelons, in four stages, and only by a narrow margin did the french frus- trate bulgarian efforts to outflank and cut their retreat, first at the demir qapu defile, and again at strumitsa station. the british, too, on the right were heavily attacked, and any weaken- ing might have been fatal to the extrication of the allied forces from the noose into which they had been pushed. fortunately, once the greek frontier was regained the pursuit halted—mainly because the germans were reluctant to under- take further commitments in the balkans to the detriment of their strength in other theatres. falkenhayn held that the mace- donian operations should be left to the bulgarians, but this policy salonika campaigns overlooked the fact that the greeks, however friendly to the germias, would have resented any invasion of their territory by the bulgariaas. thus by dec. 12 the retreating forces were safely out of reach of their pursuers, facing them across the frontier. after pausing for a few days on a line stretching roughly from sorovieevo to lake doiran, the withdrawal was resumed, and by dec. 18 the forces of sarrail and mahon were back in the vicin- ity of salonika. covering this base an entrenched line was con- structed, on an 89 m. arc stretching from the mouth of the vardar throuzh dozaaji to the gulf of orfano, and occupied early in the new year. allied reinforcements arrive-—the delay in the expected enemy offznsive enabled the entente force to receive reinforce- ments, not only french and british but serbian, for the remnant of their army, after resting and being re-equipped at corfu, was brought round to salonika. from april onwards the stream steadily swelled until by july their strength on the salonika front reach2d a total of 152,000, divided into three armies of two divisions each. the french had four divisions. the british had been raised to five divisions (roth, 22nd, 26th, 27th, 28th), and later a sixth (69th), organised in two army corps; in may lt.-gen. g. f. (later sir george} milne took over command as general officer commanding british salonika force. the total allied force was thus a little over 300,090 men. opposing it early in r916 were the bulzarian i. and ii. armics and the german xi. army—a total of some 285,000 men—aligned on a front from lake oxhrida on the west to the point where the struma enters bulzaria on the east. but from march onwards the drain on the g2rman forces at verdun led falkenhayn to withdraw the germin troops, all but one division; by 1918 the xi. army, though germin in name and in staff, contained only one com- plete german battalion. on the entente sidz the reaction of verdun took the form of. orders from joffre to sarrail to pin down the enemy on his front, in order if possible to prevent falkenhayn drawing upon the forces there. accordingly the french moved out west of the vardar towards vodena and the british advanced north to ku- kus. this advance althouzh it lengthened the front to be de- fended and the lines of communication was of essential value for the security of the allied force, for the entrenched position at salonika itself was dominated from the mountains east of the town, and might become untenable if these heights were occu- pied by the enemy. but in how small degree the allied advance fixed the germans can be gauged from the previous paragraph, and sarrail, who had been placed under joffre’s supreme com- mand in dec., received instructions to act more vigorously and prepare a definite offensive in conjunction with the anticipated entry into the war of rumania. effect of the action of greece.—mcantime, however, the situa- tion was complicated by a greck incident; from now on until 1918 politics were to play a larger part in the macedonian the- atre than warfare. the neutral greek forces, five corps, were distributed throuzhout the rezion, in theory to guard the fron- tier; and such a situation, while gilbertian in its absurdity to the distaat observer, was a source of serious anxiety to the franco- british forces on the spot. feeling that they would be safer without such dubious protection, they brought diplomatic pres- sure to bear o1 the greek govt. for the withdrawal of the greek forces from macedonia and their demobilisation. reluctantly the greeks complied, but while the allies occupied certain of their forts the bulzarians seized the opportunity to cross the frontier, and appeared before fort rupel, which commanded the strum. gate into the macedonian plain. the greek commander thereupon handed over the fort to them (may 26). this unfriendly act bared the eastern flank of the entente army, and gave the whole of eastern macedonia into the hands of the enemy. to meet the danger the british occupied the strum2 line in force. further, the entente govts. instituted an economic blockade of the greek coast, sent a brigade to athens, and by the ultimatum of june 21 enforced the demobilisation of the greek army and the resignation of the government. as it proved, however, the seizure of rupel and eastern macedonia 453 did not develop into a general offensive by the german-bulgarian forces. problems facing the expeditionary force.-—while these exter- nal troubles with greece beset the entente powers, they were far from the sum of the handicaps which hindered effective action by the salonika force. the idea of an offensive was con- stantly discussed between the french and british govts., as also between joffre and sarrail; but, apart from reluctance to provide adequate forces, it depended on too many contingencies,. in particular the uncertain and often postponed intervention of rumania. furthermore the internal troubles of the salonika force were notorious. sarrail had the title of ‘‘ commander-in- chief of the allied armies in the orient,” and with him cordon- nier commanded the french forces; but his status was a nebulous one. not only was the british commander to all intents inde- pendent, but also the italian—a detachment arrived from italy in aug. 1916. apart from the defect that sarrail’s orders were issued from french headquarters without consultation with the other allied powers, sarrail’s own personality was not such as to weld this loose understanding into an effective co-operation. in a hetero- geneous force, composed of french, british, italians, serbians and russians, it was hardly a recommendation that the chief commander should be known not to have the confidence of his own supreme command, and that even the suspicion should exist that he was conducting operations with one eye on the political game at home. the british, by polite but firm insistence on their independence, maintained tranquil relations; wrangles and dis- putes between the other allied commands were continual, and the majority were unfortunately attributable to the policy or tactlessness of sarrail. the bulgarian altack.—while the alhes were still debating, the opposing armies moved, on aug. 17, to forestall and dislocate the allied offensive, which they judged would synchronise with rumania’s intervention. the bulgarians made their effort on the two wings. the eastern wing from rupel drove back the french cavalry on the east of the struma and pressed down towards its mouth. but they dissipated their force by detaching part to seize the coastal strip of kavalla, and the stout resistance of the british prevented them forcing the river line. on the western wing the position was more critical, for the bulgarian advance from the monastir area drove the serbs out of florina and reached lake ostrovo before they were ultimately held. ill. the first and second allied offensives these reverses caused a further change in sarrail’s plan for the allied offensive; the forces east of the vardar were merely to contain the enemy, while those west of the vardar carried out the offensive. thus to all intents it became no more than a counter- offensive to restore the impaired situation in this sector. to release additional french troops the british extended their line west from doiran to the vardar; sarrail was thus enabled to form an offensive group (of 2} french divisions, one serbian division and a russian brigade) under cordonnier, in addition to the serbian striking force of four divisions. | sarrail’s tactical errors—on sept. 10 the british detachments crossed the struma in raids at six points to divert the enemy’s attention, and on sept. 11 the real attack developed west of the vardar. the serbs, skilled mountain fighters and inspired by the closeness of their native soil, made good progress, and on sept. 14 gained the pass of gornieeyo, breaking through the hostile front. but the cordonnier group was slower, partly be- cause of transport difficulties and cordonnier’s own inclination for the secure methodical advances he had practised successfully in france. asaresult, however, the bulgarians, broken by the serbs at gornieeyo, were able to fall back across cordonnier’s front and re-establish their lines on the brod. sarrail, incensed, ordered fresh attacks by both groups, which were repulsed by heavy loss—as cordonnier, protesting, had prophesied. between sept. 30 and oct. 8 the british x vi. corps (briggs) ad- vanced its front to the line agho mahale-ormanli, asa fixing move, coincidently with a fresh attack on the main front by the french 454 and serbs from kaimakealan westward. the pressure of the serbs turned the bulgar left and forced a further slight withdrawal, but a franco-russian attack on oct. 6 failed. cordonnier urged the idea of a wider turning manoeuvre, but sarrail, in the mis- taken belief that a bulgarian collapse was imminent, ordered a fresh blow on oct. 14. this was a costly failure and led to a vio- lent scene between sarrail and his subordinate. cordonnier left for home a few days later. this internal friction caused a tem- porary breakdown of action, and the serbs were left to fight unsupported, until sarrail took the step of putting the whole at- tacking force under the serbian gen. michich—a man of real military genius and with the knack of inspiring not only serbian but other national forces. michich attacked in the crna bend on nov. 12 while, to aid this offensive, milne’s troops made local attacks and raids as a diversion on the struma. despite rain and snow the serbs pressed on, turning successive positions, with the french, russians and an italian brigade on their left. monastir was outflanked and on nov. 19 was found evacuated—the first important serbian town to be regained. for a moment there was a real opportunity of exploitation, as the bulgarians were in full retreat towards prilep; but the immediate attacking forces were tired and hungry, and sarrail suspended the advance—to the annoyance of the serbs, who, in default of receiving fresh reserves, tried to press on unsupported until exhaustion stopped them. by this time the rumanian collapse, under pressure of the convergent german and bulgarian attacks, was clear, and on dec. 11 sarrail received instructions to consolidate a defensive line embracing as much of the regained territory as possible. this line stretched from lake prespa—just north of monastir— north slopes of kaimakealan—to the vardar, and thence by doiran to the struma and down to the sea. its worst feature was that the commanding heights were held almost everywhere by the enemy. this front was to remain practically unchanged until sept. 1918. preparations for 1917.—apart from the incident of a threaten- ing greek concentration in thessaly—settled by a fresh ultima- tum—the winter months of 1916-7 passed quickly, and the op- portunity was taken to reorganise and regroup the forces. from the gulf of orfani to the vardar the front was held solidly by the british, owing to milne’s insistence, but on the rest of the front sarrail followed his usual plan of interspersing detachments of the various nationalitics—presumably on the principle “ divide et impera.”’ whatever its personal advantages it was hardly conducive to prompt and effective action. reinforcements had now brought the french up to a strength of eight divisions, while there were six serbian and 1} italian divisions—making with the british 213 divisions, plus two russian brigades. the total al- lied strength was approximately 600,000, while the greek na- tional defence, or veniselist army, was in process of formation. this concentration afforded adequate reserves for a resolute offensive in the spring. confronting the allies were still the nominal german xi. army, and bulgarian i. and ii. armies, comprising the equiva- lent of one german and 13 bulgarian divisions,’ of which prac- tically half faced the british. apart from the ii. army, these forces were under a german commander-in-chief, gen. von scholtz. on their side no large move was considered, partly be- cause the bulgarians had already achieved their principal ter- ritorial aims, and merely desired to hold tight, while the germans were satisfied with immobilising so large an allied force at no expenditure to themselves. allied attacks renewed.—sarrail’s plan was for a preliminary flanking move on the extreme west, between lakes okhrida and prespa, to shake the enemy’s hold in the monastir area; following this was to be the main fixing attack by the british on the doiran front; then the french, russians and italians in the southwest of the crna bend were to advance; and finally the serbs were to strike the decisive blow to the west again. 1 a bulgarian division had almost twice the infantry strength of a french or german division. salonika campaigns the preliminary move began on march 12 and was soon sus- pended, achieving little apart from a creditable french local success on a spur west of monastir. then came the british turn— to attack the key position formed by the dub and lesser ridges which commanded the passage between lake doiran and the vardar. milne had rejected an alternative proposal of sarrail’s that he should attack to gain seres, which while attractive as a political advertisement had no military value, and being dom- inated by the hills behind would have been difficult to hold. after a two days’ artillery preparation, in vile weather, the british infantry advanced to the assault, on a two-division front (22nd and 26th), at 9:45 p.m. on april 24, the late hour being to gain surprise and protection. on the left the enemy’s first position was gained and held, but in the centre and right the difficulties of the jumeaux ravine and the strength of the resistance foiled the attackers. worst of all, their sacrifice was in vain and their “ fixing ” role rendered abortive because the attack west of the vardar was postponed by sarrail, ostensibly for climatic reasons. not until may 9 did the other attacks develop. sarrail had rejected the italian proposal for a flanking manoeuvre, in preference for a frontal blow, and this, made by the french and italians, was a costly failure. the serbian attack was even less effectual, in fact hardly developed, partly owing to internal political troubles then rife and partly to their want of confidence in the higher direction and in the genuineness of its intention to support their efforts. once more the british, on the night of may 8, had delivered a fixing attack, and once more their heavy sacrifice had been purposcless. the offensive was definitely closed down by sarrail on may 24. the bulgarians, content with the prestige of this successful repulse, attempted no counter-stroke, and as the allied forces “were neither in the mood nor the condition for further efforts, the front relapsed into stagnation for the rest of the year. the only minor incidents were a successful local advance in sept. by the french on the extreme left, west of lake okhrida, and milne’s withdrawal of his right from the marshy valley to the foot-hills west of the struma, a precaution to lessen the danger of malaria and dysentery. the focus of interest again became political—common action was taken to settle the simmering menace and intrigues of greece. in june, allied troops invaded thessaly, but the abdication of king constantine was forced without fighting, and the veniselist govt. returned to power. the consequent reinforcement of the allies by the greek army came as a prospective counterpoise to the contemplated with- drawal of two british divisions in sept. for the projected offensive in palestine. y, sarrail superseded.—at the end of the year the new clemen- ceau ministry recalled sarrail, in response to the renewed re- quests of the british and italian govts., which were sup- ported by foch. his successor was gen. guillaumat, who had distinguished himself as an army commander on the verdun front. his first aim was to restore confidence and cohesion in the allied forces at salonika, while hastening the reorganisation and training of the greck army. ilis second, to think out and prepare the plan for a fresh offensive, adopting in its main out- lines one which gen. michich had suggested in 1916. but to obtain the sanction of the allied govts. was more diffi- cult, obsessed as they were with the threatened german offen- sive in france, and in any case dubious of the effectiveness of any major operation in macedonia. while biding his time, however, guillaumat scized the opportunity to ‘‘ blood” his new greck troops in an ably planned coup de main against the srka di legen ridge. supported by a powerful concentration of french artillery it was completely successful, and guillaumat withdrew the attackers into reserve before any possible counter- stroke might dilute the moral tonic. on the main front there were no other incidents of note between jan. and sept. 1918; but away on the adriatic coast, in albania, ferrero’s italian xvi. corps, aided by a french division, advanced in july from the viosa to the line of the semeni and devol rivers; an austrian counter-offensive late in aug. regained most of the lost ground. saloun—salt lake city in july also, gen. guillaumat, his task of reorganisation completed, was summoned back to france, to be entrusted with the defence of the capital in view of the critical situation caused by the german offensives. a man who put first not his own interests, nor even those of france, but his duty to the allied forces as a whole, his military ability had won the respect, as his character had won the esteem, of the multifarious contin- gents. he was succeeded by gen. franchet d’esperey, who if, perhaps not possessing the exceptional tact and supra-national outlook of guillaumat, was yet an able strategist, and well able to maintain allied cooperation. he adopted and put the fin- ishing touches to guillaumat’s offensive plan, while the latter utilised his position at the centre of policy to gzin sanction for its execution. winning over m. clemenceau, he then went to london and rome on the same mission, and at last on sept. 1t franchet d’esperey was authorised to attack—if there was still little confidence in its success. iv. the defeat of bulgaria the military situation on the eve of the offensive was numeri- cally little changed. the bulgarians had a ration strength of some 700,000 and a rifle strength of 200,ooo—divided into the same three armies. the allies had a ration strength of about 574,000 and a rifle strength of 157,000, although against the inferiority of numbers they could put a slight preponderance in artillery and a heavy one tn aircraft. but the real defect on the enemy’s side was the first underlying war-weariness of the bulgarians and their dissatisfaction with their german directors; and secondly the divided command by which the so-called german xi. army and the bulgarian i. army—from doiran westwards—were under von scholtz, while the bulgarian it. army and the coastal detachments were under the bulgarian commander-in-chief, gen. gekofi. allied offensive plan.—franchet d’espercy’s plan was first to strike a concentrated blow with a franco-serb group under michich on a narrow front of seven miles along the sokol- dobro polje range, aiming at a tactical break-through and a subsequent expansion of the breach to gain and clear the tri- angle formed by the crna and the vardar. this would menace the enemy’s communications on both flanks, and the offensive would then be taken up in turn by the other forces along the front. the initial objectives were relatively modest, for the pos- sibility of a strategic break-through, ending in the overthrow of the enemy armies, was no more than an idea in the commander’s mind. the immense difficulties of the terrain and the scantiness of reserves made even this limited aim far from certain of success. but franchet d’esperey’s plan, made possible by the whole- hearted co-operation of the other allied commanders, was an admirable fulfilment of the principle of concentration. on the vital sector six serbian and two french divisions with 600 guns—more than a third of the total artillery strength in mace- donia—were concentrated against one bulgarian division, and to do this the other sectors were almost stripped of their artillery. opening of the attack —on sept. 1 the british 27th div. made a feint attack in the vardar valley to divert the enemy’s atten- tion, and on the night of sept. 14 a heavy bombardment was begun on the real front of attack. next morning at 5:30 a.m. the french divisions assaulted and after hard fighting gained the dobro polje ridge, the sokol also falling by the evening— opening a path for the serbian divisions of the [. army, hitherto in reserve, to be pushed through. at the same time the serbian il. army ‘advanced to the attack. by nightfall on sept. 16 a penetration of five m. had been made. british and serbian successes —the serbs, now inspired by success and the sight of their homeland, swept forward with such e/am that by the night of sept. 17 they were 20 m. forward, and the breach had been expanded to 25 m. by greek and french divisions on the flank. after the initial clash resistance was feeble, partly because the mountains hampered the lateral movement of reserves. by sept. ro the left wing of the attackers had reached across the crna, while the right wing was rolling up 455 the front eastwards towards the vardar, and between the two wings the serbian cavalry had penetrated to kavadarci in the apex of the crna-vardar triangle. meanwhile on sept. 18 milne’s troops attacked on the whole front from the vardar to lake doiran in order to prevent the bulgarians withdrawing troops to dam the breach west of the vardar. facing the british were the pick of the bulgarian troops and also the strongest fortified positions, so that although they penetrated the enemy’s lines along most of the front, it was little wonder that lack of reserves and artillery compelled them to yield up the larger part of their gains. but they had fulfilled their mission of pinning down the enemy including the reserves during these critical days, sept. 18 and 19, and by sept. 21 the whole of the enemy’s front west of the vardar had collapsed under the convergent pressure of the exploiting serbs and of the french on their flanks. collapse of the bulgarians.—by the afternoon of the same day the collapse spread to the doiran—vardar front, and the british aircraft spread havoc among the troops of the bulgarian vi. army falling back through the narrow kosturino pass. similarly, on the extreme west, facing prilep, the italians joined in the advance. from now on the advance became a strategic pursuit, now fast, now slow, in which successive rearguard resistances of the enemy were outflanked. on sept. 23 the serbian spearhead reached gradsko, and veles three days later. seizing their opportunity, a french cavalry brigade under gen. jouinnot- gambetta made a dash for skoplje (uskiib), and seized this vital centre of communications, the key to the whole front, on sept. 29. this definitely separated the xi. army from the remainder of the bulgarian forces, forcing them on divergent lines of retreat. to the southeast the british had already invaded bulgaria itself, taking strumica on sept. 26. that night a bulgarian staff officer arrived at british headquarters to ask for an armistice, and three days later the bulgarians capitulated, accepting the allied terms unreservedly. the first national prop of the central alliance had fallen. while the reoccupation of serbia proceeded rapidly, a mixed striking force was rapidly organised under milne’s command to advance through thrace on constantinople, and had pressed as far as the maritsa, seizing the bridgeheads, when turkey—her force in syria already annihilated by allenby—surrendered on oct. 30. bibliography.—g. w. price, the story of the salonica army (1917); c. price, serbia's part in the war (1918); m. p. fe. sarrail, afon commandement en orient (1920); l. villari, the macedonian campaign (1922). see also world war: bibliography, (b. h. l. h.) saloun, ladislav (1870- ), czech sculptor, was born at prague, and was a pupil of the sculptor b. schnirch. he first became known in roo1 when he won the competition for a monument of jan hus. this group of statuary which dominates the old town square of prague forms an example of that plastic impressionism which saloun represented. he also pro- duced a number of portraits which are distinguished by an acute sense of reality. salt lake city, utah, u.s.a. (sce 24.92), the manufacturing and trading centre of the western inter-mountain territory, in- creased in population to 118,110 in 1920, of whom 10,897 were foreign born; and to 130,948 in 1925 (census bureau estimate). products manufactured within the city had a value of $13,- 351,000 in 1909, $33,357,000 in 1919, $31,130,287 in 1921, $47,- 572,228 in 1923 and $106,000,000 in 1924.. many important plants were established after the world war, increasing the aggregate factory pay-roll by about $4,000,000 per annum. electric light and power were supplied by an interconnected hydroelectric system with an installed capacity of 250,000 h.p., supplemented bya steam emergency plant of 50,000 horse-power. an additional generating station, to add 45,000 h.p., was under construction in 1925. the retail trade for 1924 was estimated at $52,312,000; the wholesale and distributing business at $148,116,000. a branch of the federal reserve bank of san francisco was established here in 1918. the parks and playgrounds of the city itself by 1925 456 contained 1,035 ac., and expert supervision was provided for organised play. there were 58 public schools, including two high and seven junior high schools, with an enrolment of 30,218 pupils. the university of utah had a registration of 2,692, exclusive of the summer school. a state capitol, built of marble and utah granite, well placed on an eminence, was completed in 1916. in igri the city adopted the commission form of government. salvador (see 24.96), the smallest of the central american republics. salvador became a member of the league of nations in 1920. during the world war the republic maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the united states and the allies; but in a note of aug. 24 1917 the foreign minister stated that the govt. of salvador would permit the vessels of the united states to enter or remain in salvadorean ports irrespective of their condition of armaments. area, officially estimated, 13,176 square miles. the population in 1923 was 1,506,176, indicating a population denser than that of any amer- ican republic except haiti. the estimated population of the chief cities in 1924 was: san salvador, 82,000; santa ana, 71,000; san miguel, 35,000; san vicente, 31,000; la paz, 30,000. in 1923 the births numbered 56,184; deaths, 25,296; nearly 60%% of the births were illegitimate. half-castes or lavinos and indians constitute the bulk of the population; but most of the educated classes are of european descent and reflect european influences. political history.—the presidential succession after 1900, when gen. fernando figueroa held the presidency was mainly peaceful. figueroa was succeeded in ror1 by dr. manuel en- rique araujo, who was murdered in feb. 1913. the vacant presidency was filled by the vice-president, carlos melendez, who resigned in aug. 1914. alfonso quifiones molina governed as temporary president until 1915, when carlos melendez was elected to office. in march ro19 jorge melendez was inaugurated for the term 1919-23, and was succeeded for the term 1923-7 by alfonso quiiones molina, the vice-president. salvador alone of the central american republics declined to declare war on germany, though she allowed u.s. war vessels the use of her ports. the inclusion, without definition, of the monroe doctrine in the covenant of the league of nations, led salvador to interrogate the united states govt. as to the inter- pretation of the doctrine. in 1920 salvador attempted to renew the central american court of justice established by the treaty of 1907. this movement gave place to that of the central american union (g¢.v.). salvador signed the “tacoma” agree- ment of aug. 20 1922, but did not approve all the resolutions of the washington conference on central american affairs of 1922-3. in the general treaty of peace and amity she failed to approve the international central american tribunal and the international commissions of inquiry. she also rejected the agreement not to recognise the election to the presidency of leaders of revolts or high government officials involved in them, and she declined to set a constitutional limit to re-election. she also rejected the convention relative to the preparation of elec- toral legislation and convention for establishment of free trade. approval was given to limitation of armaments, the establish- ment of permanent central american commissions, the extra- dition agreement, the convention establishing agricultural exneri- mental stations and thit rezulating the practice of the liberal professions. several of the conventions still awaited approval in aug. 1925. a loan of $6,000,qoo was effected in oct. 1923, throuzh a new york banking firm. it was secured by a first lien on 70° of the total customs. the contract provided for underwriting the loan by the united states; differences concerning interpretation of the terms were to be submitted for ruling to the chicf justice of the u.s. supreme court. the proceeds were used in consoli- dating and paying the outstanding loans. education has long been nominally free and compulsory, but until 1919 received little attention from the government. in i91t there were 486 schools with 21,569 pupils, out of a total of 173,495 children of school age. in 1919, a law for eradicating illiteracy was enacted, anda campaign begun to reduce the proportion of illiterates, then 70°, of the population. in 1924 there were 733 primary pubiic salvador—salvaging schools with 1,110 teachers, the registered pupils numbering 44,791 with an average attendance of 30,070. there were 37 private primary schools and 38 municipal schools, in addition to normal, technical and continuation schools. ‘the national university at san salvador has faculties of medicine, chemistry and pharmacy, law and social sciences, engineering and industry. in addition the popular uni- versity for working men offers lectures on personal and shop hygiene and the duties and rights of citizens. finance.—in_ 1919 the colon was fixed at the value of $0.50 american, and by the law of july 16 1920 was made the monetary unit, and given a fineness of goo milesimos and a content of 836 milligrammes. it is issued in denominations of 5, 10, 20 and 4o colones, with auxiliary silver and nickel coins. united states gold and silver coin is legal tender up to 10° of payments. the national revenue and expenuiture tur the three years 1920-1, 1924-5 and 1925-6 was:— 1925-6 1924-5 1920-1 revenue 18,205,860 | 16,464,034' | £2,945,234 expenditure 18,166,715' | 16,414,034' | £3,245,516 1 estimated in colones. the total debt dec. 31 1922 was 34,259,059 colones. the foreign debt on dec. 31 1925 was as follows: bonds in the hands of english creditors to the amount of $1,008,314; other foreign debts $13,683,900. customs receipts from jan, i 1923 were $3,776,819. interest and sinking fund on the loan above-mentioned required $682,000. for the first six months of 1924 customs receipts were $3,180,008, and loan requirements $411,599. agriculinre and commierce.—agricultural production for 1923 was valued at $36,699,000. coffee, the principal crop, totalling 60,000 metric tons, was valued at $16,800,000; corn, totalling 250,000 metric tons, was worth $12,500,000; cattle were valucd at $2,500,000. cotton production has been encouraged for sevcral years; the crop in 1923 was 55 metric tons, worth $33,000. sugar production reached 20,000 tons, valued at $2,000,000. other agricultural exports are tobacco, henequin and rice. lumber, balsam and hides are also exported. foreign trade was chiely with great britain, the unite | states and france. the movement of trade in the period 1912: 24 was: — | year imports exports 76,744,859 | $9,942,184 5,668,000 9,970,000 8,486,453 8,479,548 10,958,500 | 24,367,674 communications. —with the opening of the third section in 1922 of the line from san vicente to cojutepeque, the international rail- ways line from cast to west was completed. there were 253 m. of narrow gauge railways and 1,476 m. of national roads in the republic in 1925, also 2,401 m. of telegraph lincs and a little greater extension of telephone lines. there were 20 wireless receiving stations. ma- terial for 200 m. of railway to guatemala had been ordered before june 1925. the lines from santa lucfa, santa ana province, to ahuachapan and from santa lucia to metapan were soon to be completed. biibliography.—p. f. martin, salvador of the twentieth century (1911); j. leiva, the republic of il salvador (1913); f. gavidia, tfistoria moderna del salvador (1917); d. g. munro, the five re- publics of central america, carnegie endowment for inter. peace: div. of iscon. and history (oxford, 1918); l. quinefiez, la cuesiion econontica (1919); department of overseas trade reports. annual series (london, 1923-); h. g. james and p. a. martin, the repub- lics of latin america (1923); l. e. elliott, cestral america (1924); w.s. robertson, z7istery of the latin-american nations (1925). (hi. 1. p.)