SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF

since the conquest of german southwest africa by union forces in 1915, the whole of south africa, except for the portuguese territory on the east coast south of the zambezi, has been under british administration. including northern rhodesia, which is, however, geographically in east central africa, the total area is approx- imately 473,054 square miles. the population in 1921 was a lit- tle over 11,000,000, and of this total the whites numbered about 1,600,000. apart from the portuguese territory the political divi- sions are (1) the union of south africa, established in 1910 and consisting of the former colonies of the cape, natal, orange river (free state) and transvaal; (2) the colony of southern rhodesia; (3) the territory of southwest africa, governed under mandate by the union; (4) the native territories or protectorates of basutoland, swaziland, bechuanaland, and northern rhodesia, governed by the colonial office. all the regions named are noticed separately; the present article deals specially with the union of south africa as an entity. the union is a self-govern- ing dominion of the british crown (for details of constitution see 25.467-468). the population in the census years 1911 and 1921 was as follows:— mixed & others 525,837 | 5,973,394 163,896 | 545,548 | 6,928,580 year native european iqii 1921 1,519,488 | 4,699.433 594 in 1921 the whites formed 21-9% and the natives 67-8% of the total population. of the asiatics 161,339 were indians and of the indians 141,336 lived in natal. of those classed as “ mixed and others,” the majority were the class of mixed european ' and native descent, known as coloured persons (or cape boys). the great majority of them live in the cape province. the returns of religions in 1921 gave the dutch churches 693,898 european members, equal to 54.37% of the white population, an indication that afrikanders of dutch descent outnumber the british descended afrikanders. cp. roc.) i. political history the year rgro saw the attainment of what for halfa century had been the recognised goal of south african statesmanship, both british and dutch: the union of the colonies and (former) republics under a common administration. with this achieved, it was confidently hoped that a country vexed throughout the 1g century with the frequently recurring wars which culminated in the desolating conflict of 1899-1902 would at jast enter upon an era of racial reconciliation and assured material progress. these natural expectations have not been altogether fulfilled. rather it would seem that under the union the course of south african history has remained true to type: alternately stagnant and tumultuous, diversified by strange and unexpected events, but always replete with interest and instruction for the states- man and the student of human affairs. the 15 years (1910-25) under review fall into three well- defined periods. of these the first (1910-14) is distinguished by the activities appropriate to the substitution of a single central administration for the four colonial governments which it replaced; the second (1914-9) by the world war; and the third (1919-25) by the new conditions to which the war gave rise. the transition with the opening of the first union parliament (nov. 4 1910), the administration of the new dominion passed to a predomi- nantly dutch ministry. the party candidates elected to the house of assembly, and the composition of the ministry, must be recalled; since they provide the necessary starting point from which the subsequent formation of parties can be traced. the 121 constituencies returned (sept. 15 1910): south african party (het volk, orangie unie and afrikander bond), 67; pro- gressives (mainly british), 40; natal independents, 10; labour, four. the executive council (or cabinet) consisted of: gen. botha (prime minister and minister of agriculture); mr. j. w. sauer (railways and harbours); gen. j. c. smuts (the interior, mines and defence); gen. j. b. m. wertzog (justice); mr. h.c. hull (finance); and six others. of the 11 ministers four were british. the opposition, on the retirement of sir starr jameson,! was led by sir thomas smartt. the labour party was led, then as now, by col. f. h. p. creswell, the strenuous advocate of the extended employment of white labour in the mining industry. administrative readjustmenis—certain of the administrative readjustments involved in the union of the four colonies had been made in the interval between the coming into force of the constitution act (may 31 1910) and the meeting of the first union parliament. the assets and revenues of the constituent colonies and the administration of native affairs passed at once to the (provisional) union executive; and a common judiciary, with common courts of justice, was set up. the adoption of the new electoral system, with provision for the quinquennial redistribution of seats, necessarily preceded the union and pro- vincial elections; and the provincial councils and executive com- mittees had come into being pari passu with the union parlia- ment and ministry. but the act had left the task of completing the administrative machinery of the union to the central gov- ernment which it created. in particular it remained for gen. botha’s ministry to carry out the great economic reform of eliminating the practice, hitherto necessary, of using the state railways as agencies of taxation; to amalgamate and reorganise the four existing civil services; and to apportion the revenues of 1 tie died during the war. south africa, union of the (former) colonies—other than -their railway and harbour revenues—as between the provincial and central administrations of the union. as, moreover, the readjustments necessary for these purposes had been the subject of discussion and ultimately of agreement between the respective delegacies of the four colo- nies at the national convention (1908-9), both the nature of the readjustments and the principles and methods to be pursued in bringing them about had been laid down in the act. it remained also for gen. smuts in the second year of the union to amalga- mate the existing colonial militia and volunteer forces, and reorganise and expand them into a system of national defence. in preparing the south africa defence act, 1912, by which the new dominion was provided with a citizen army, the union defence minister was assisted actively by lord methuen, whose command of the imperial forces in south africa was ex- tended for the purpose, and by rear-adml. bush, the com- mander of the south african naval station. apart from the avoidance of a ruinous railway and tariff war between the inland and coastal colonies, the great material gain expected from the union was the reduction of taxation to be effected through the substitution of one for four administrations. the transvaal, in addition, looked to the fall in the cost of living on the rand which was to come from the management of the railways and harbours on “‘ business principles ’’ by a board inde- pendent of political interference,*? as a guid pro quo for the surplus millions it had brought to the union exchequer. in view of these expectations, it is not surprising that the first serious criti- cism of the government, and the first division in the ministerial ranks, were occasioned by these administrative readjustments. on the whole, the reorganisation of the civil service, and the adjustment of the financial relations of the union and the prov- inces, were effected without impairing the good results of the co-operation of the british and dutch jeaders in the national convention, or challenging the political convictions of the pro- gressives. on the other hand, the reorganisation of the railways led to dissension in the ministry itself. the finance minister, mr. hull, who was familiar with the conditions of the rand (the great industrial and importing centre of the union), being dis- satisfied with the policy of mr. sauer, the minister of railways and elarbours, resigned, and in june 1912 the ministry was recon- structed. mr. sauer, transferred to the ministry of agriculture, was replaced by mr. burton, a natal englishman; gen. smuts became finance, as well as defence, minister; and by these and other changes the cabinet was reduced from 11 to nine. during the recess a more fundamental dissension appeared. speaking in the transvaal early in dec., gen. hertzog declared that “ when the proper time came south africa would look after ils own interests first and those of the empire after- wards.’ this speech was held by gen. botha to be incompatible with the government’s policy of racial reconciliation and offen- sive to the british-minded south africans who supported it. as, however, hertzog denied this and declined to resign, botha him- self resigned (dec. 14 1912). on feb. 5 1913, at a full meeting of the government’s supporters, botha’s leadership was confirmed by a large majority while hertzog became the head of the dis- sentient minority of “ pure afrikanders.” before the end of the session the resultant nationalist party, on a motion of “no confidence,’ moved in the assembly by a labour member (june 16), commanded 42 votes as against the government’s 68. disturbance on the rand.—the efliiciency, as well as the con- sistency, of botha’s rule was tested in the same year by two con- siderable civil disturbances. a trivial industrial dispute between the managers and the white employees of a rand mine on may 20 developed into a revolutionary movement so threatening that, on june 29, the government requested and obtained from the governor-general (lord gladstone) the assistance of the british regulars. on july 4, at johannesburg, the park railway station and the offices of the star were set on fire with incendiary bombs, and on the next day, after due warning, the troops fired upon, and dispersed, the rioters. the witwatersrand disturbances 21in the almost total absence of navigable waterways, cheap and convenient carriage by rail is of exceptional importance. south africa, union of commission (constituted july 14) found that the trade union leaders had been dominated by revolutionary socialists. it was a syndicalist movement. a compromise,in which all that the (white) miners demanded was not conceded, was followed by the threat, and postponement, of a general strike; by two further commissions; and by the promise to remove valid grievances by remedial legislation. but the smouldering discontent which this compromise left on the rand was kindled afresh by a strike among the coal miners in natal, and when in pretoria,on jan. 7 1914, a strike of al! workers under the railway and harbour board was ordered, the trades federation at johannesburg decided to take ‘‘ sympathetic action ” and ordered a general strike of the white workmen throughout the union. by this time, however, botha’s govt. had completed their preparations. martial law was proclaimed. smuts swiftly mobilised his new citizen army. everywhere the call was obeyed; and the minister of defence was not found wanting. all necessary equipment was ready for the british townsmen at the depdts, and the burgh- ers rode “ with new rifles and belts full of cartridges ” to their rendezvous. the red flag flown over the trades hall in johannes- _ burg was lowered at the sight of a field gun in position; and the executive of the trades federation were lodged in gaol. at a cost of two lives (lost accidentally) the government had won; and the ease and completeness of their victory brought the syndicalists into ridicule and contempt. then a step was taken which aroused public criticism and pro- voked resentment among the (white) workmen in the transvaal. nine of the syndicalist leaders were removed from the custody of the law, placed on board the “ umgeni ” in durban harbour, and sent back to england. the justification for this action was given by smuts. syndicalism was a new offence, for which the law of treason, derived from past centuries, provided no appro- priate punishment. the government, therefore, had to go outside the law and itself devise a penalty. to meet the changed conditions of to-day. the plea was accepted. the indemnity bill, in which also the deported men were declared ‘* prohibited immi- grants,’’ was passed in the assembly by 70 to 12 votes, and re- ceived the governor-general’s assent on march 19. two results of this disturbance must be noticed. (a) in conformity with the government’s pledge, before the session ended (july 7 1914) workmen’s compensation, protection of workmen’s wages, miners phthisis (strengthening the act of 1912), and law of riot acts were passed. (b) the failure of revolutionary methods, and the resentment aroused by the deportations, fostered the growth of the constitutional labour party. from 1914-7 labour was in power, though declining oflice, in the transvaal provincial council; and in the general election of 1920 it secured 21 seats in the assembly. racial questions.—the second disturbance involved a problem which still (1926) awaits solution. in the union, where the white population is outnumbered by the ‘‘ other than white ” in the proportion of one to four, there is a general conviction among europeans that all livelihoods suitable for them should be pro- tected from the encroachment of the non-european races; and in 1913 the government passed an immigrants’ regulation act prohibiting all further asiatic immigration. although the act did not discriminate against indians as such, their interests were directly affected. the status of british indians was no new question in south africa. so impossible was it to reconcile the self-preserving dictates of the european community with the claims of empire citizenship, that the crown administration of the transvaal had done little more than president kruger to sive effect to the unassailable equity of the colonial secretary’s dispatches on the treatment of british indians in that colony. in 1907-8 legislation restricting asiatic immigration evoked a campaign of passive resistance. under the new act not only immigration from india, but the inter-provincial migration of indians then in the union, was prohibited. its enactment was followed by a march of natal indians to the transvaal, in the course of which many indians were arrested, and mr. gandhi and other leaders were put in prison. strikes of indian workers on the plantations and mines of natal led to rioting in which 995 indian lives were lost. the india office and the government of india protested: and, as in the case of the rand disturbances, a commission of inquiry was set up. the report (march 17 1914) recommended the removal of certain administrative griev- ances and of some specific clisabilities imposed by the act,! and these recommendations were accepted by the viceroy. subse- quently an indian relief bill was passed; and before prorogation (july 7) an agreement between smuts and gandhi, in which fur- ther administrative concessions were granted, was made public. the relief act and the smuts-gandhi agreement together con- slituted the ‘settlement ” of 1914. “in south africa,” said lord gladstone, “the bill was an act of justice. but in the imperial interest it was an urgent necessity.” the world war the military operations carried out by south african troops in the world war (aug. 4 1914~nov. 11 1918) are related elsewhere. the campaigns in which south africans were especially inter- ested are treated under southwest africa and east africa, while for the part played by south africans on other fronts refer- ence must be made to western front and other war articles. but certain aspects of the period must be noticed here. to the majority of both dutch and british the issues of the conflict were quite clear. the union campaign against german south- west africa, said botha (july 24 r915) was undertaken “ for the same reasons as hostilities were entered upon by the imperial govt. against germany—to maintain the principles of truth and justice, and the honour once pledged by a nation.’”? but there was a minority among the dutch nationalists who, although they had no great liking for germany, were encouraged by her early success in france to seize what they regarded as an oppor- tunity of liberating south africa from british rule by her assistance. the maritz rebellion—the rebellion (sept.—dec. 1914) was the culmination of efforts pursued by germany since her occupa- tion of the southwest coast in 1884, the purpose of which was to convert africa south of the zambezi into a “ greater germany.” s. g. maritz, an officer in the active citizen force, and the insti- gator of the rebellion, had begun to negotiate with the governor of southwest africa in 1913, and before war was declared he had learnt what arms and ammunition would be placed at his dis- posal. it was the german offensive, and but for the “ miracle of botha ” it might have plunged south africa into a second inter- necine conflict even more disastrous than that of 1899-1902. as it was, the energies of the government were absorbed for three or four months in crushing the rebels and foiling the german plans for concerted action with them; and thus the rebellion, besides causing considerable bloodshed and an additional expend- iture of some millions of pounds, postponed the active prosecu- tion of the campaign against german southwest africa until feb. 3 rors, and the conquest of the colony until july 9. but although the union was the only state within the empire in which british subjects took up arms on behalf of germany, its ministers were to be at least as closely associated with the united kingdom govt. in the conduct of the war as those of any other self-governing dominion. botha and smuts, in common with other oversea ministers of the crown, were members of the imperial war cabinet constituted in 1917. smuts, however, not only commanded the british forces in ger- man east africa (feb. 19 1916-june 20 1917), but alone of dominion statesmen was a member of the british war cabinet of six. he was there, no doubt, in part as a representative of the dominions in general, but chicily because he offered a rare com- bination of statesman and soldier which recalled the personality of his great compatriot, william of orange. economic assistance to the allies —apart from the campaigns against german southwest and east africa, which involved the 1 the most substantial of the grievances removed was the annual £3 poll tax, or licence paid by time-expired coolies who had remained in south africa; and the refusal of the courts to recognise the validity of indian (polygamous) marriages. the effect of this latter was to prevent the children in india of locally-domiciled indians from entering the union under their father’s status. 596 service of 43,000 and 67,000 men respectively, and the subse- quent dispatch of over 30,000 troops to europe the union gave economic assistance to the allied cause. the importance of main- taining the output of gold was recognised at once, and the highly organised mining companies rose to the occasion. at the request of the imperial govt. and to relieve the united kingdom work- shops, the companies themselves undertook to repair the ma- chinery and make the spare parts required by the mines, the railways, and the local industries of the union. the equipment of the forces which reduced german southwest africa was pro- vided, almost entirely, by south africa herself. in spite of the use of substitutes for the explosives required for military pur- poses, and an all-round economy of mining materials, and in spite, too, of the release of white employees for the fighting forces of the empire and of natives for the labour battalions in france (25,090) the output of copper was maintained, that of coal was appreciably increased, and in 1916 more gold was produced in the transvaal (nearly £40,000,000) than in any previous year. in certain respects war conditions led to directly beneficial effects. with the diminution of merchant shipping, the union govt., apart from emergency measures for incrcasing essential food supplics and checking the rise in the cost of living, took action to remove the century-old reproach of the backwardness of boer farming, and to effect a permanent advance in the agriculture and industries (other than mining) of the country. tuer post-war years aftermath of the war.—the union emerged from the world war with less material loss probably than any other dominion. against a considerable, but not oppressive, war debt ({30,000,- ooo of which f21,245,000, representing a capital liability of £22,019,567, was advanced by the imperial govt.) she could place the administration of southwest africa under the mandate of the league of nations, and the prospect of an increase both of revenue and white population from the introduction of more scientific methods of agriculture and the establishment of new indus- tries. her ministers had participated on equal terms with those of great britain, canada, australia and new zealand in the work of the imperial war cabinet and the british delegation at versailles, and had separately signed the peace treaties. she had become a member of the assembly of the league of nations, and in common with the other self-governing dominions had acquired the status of a nation within the british empire. on the other hand administrative difficulties had been augmented in two respects. the relations between the nationalists and the south african party had been embittered by the suppression of the rebellion and the almost complete identification of botha’s ministry with the policy of the imperial government. aspira- tions and ambitions analogous to those which in asia impelled the peoples of india, china and japan to challenge the superi- ority of the european, had been fostered among the non-euro- pean subjects of the union by the levelling influence of world war exigencies. in particular the growth of a race consciousness among the bantu millions emphasised the dangers inherent in the paucity of the white population and increased the urgency of a question which was engaging the attention of the government when the outbreak of the war had caused it to be postponed— the need for a new adjustment of the relations subsisting be- tween the european and non-european populations of the union. nationalist agitation.—the five years’ life of the first union parliament had expired in 1915. the composition of the new house of assembly, enlarged by the quinquennial redistribution from 121 to 130 seats--south african party, 53; unionists (formerly progressives), 38; nationalists, 27; labour, 6; and independents, 6—showed a weakening of the south african party; and, although there was no coalition, the government had been kept in office by the support of the (mainly british) unionist party. the extent of the dissension among the dutch which (as related above) led to the formation of the nationalist 1 of the amount advanced by the imperial govt. {11,884,000, converted into bonds with fixed rates of redemption, remained a liability of the government of the union in 1926. south africa, union of party in 1913, was evidenced by gen. hertzog’s action at the close of the war. in 1919 a congress of this party resolved to petition the peace conference for the independence of the union. that the proposal was contrary to the general sentiment was shown by the repudiation of the movement by 78 to 24 votes in the assembly. in the event, when the nationalist deputation was received by mr. lloyd george in paris (june 5 1919), hert- zog did not press the demand for the independence of the union, but concentrated upon a claim for the restoration of the inde- pendence of the transvaal and orange free state on the ground that the annexation of these boer republics was a violation of the right of small nations to exist. to this lloyd george replied that the british govt. could not intervene to re-open the settle- ment of rgog. “‘ the constitution of the new union was the free act of the whole people of south africa representing both white races and all the colonies.” and in answer to hertzog’s con- tention, that so long as the issues of peace and war remained with the british govt., the self-government of the union was merely fictitious, he said: ‘f the status of south africa, as one of the dominions of the british commonwealth, is... one which enables the south african people to control their own national destiny in the fullest sense . .. and participate in impcrial policy on a basis of perfect equality.” general smuts becomes prime afinister —scarccly three months later botha’s great career was ended by his unexpected death, on his return from the peace conference, at the age of 57 (aug. 28). he was succeeded by his intimate friend and col- league, gen. smuts, upon whom devolved the duty of moving the ratification of the peace treaty. in doing so (sept. 8) the new prime minister took occasion to expound the constitutional implications of the separate ratification, emphasising the rights inherent in the national status acquired by the union, and the work of the british empire as a civilising agency and chief factor in the league of nations. the fact that his speech was, and was intended to be, a formal reply to the contentions of the nationalist party, gave point to the voting; which resulted in the motion being carried by 84 to 19 votes in the assembly, and by 30 to 5 in the senate. but although gen. smuts was now a statesman of international standing, the loss of botha’s personal influence over the back- veldt boers became apparent in the succeeding gencral election (1920). in it there were returned to the assembly (again en- larged from 130 to 134 seats): south african party, 41; unionist, 25; nationalist, 44; labour, 21; and independents, 3. this result left the smuts govt., even counting on the support of the union- ists, with only a slender margin of votes. and, at the samc time, important measures, among which was the native affairs admin- istration bill, postponed by the war, awaited attention. this legislation smuts felt unable to undertake without more assured parliamentary support. before the election he had appealed (sept. 17 1919) to the country for unity on a basis of (1) the british connection; (2) the co-operation of the dutch and british; and (3) industrial development. the appeal had failed; but, in spite of this discouragement, he resolved to repeat it. the re-union (hereeniging) of the two sections of the dutch had been mooted in toro, and in this year (1920), after speeches by smuts in the free state a conference of the nationalist and south african parties met at bloemfontein. on all but one point agreement was reached. the nationalists insisted upon the retention of “‘ independence ” in the (combined) party programme: the south african party refused. smuts then (sept. 29) appealed to the electorate on the single question which has kept the dutch apart—secession. on this issue the unionists were at one with the south african party, and before the end of the year, by the amalgamation of the two, the unionist party ceascd to exist. parliament was dissolved on dec. 31 and the general election (feb. 8. 1921) gave the (enlarged) south african party a sufficient majority (22) over all other partics in the assembly. the labour representation had dropped from 21 to 13. for the time being the union was rid of secession, and smuts was free to attend the first post-war imperial conference which met in june. south africa, union of strike on the rand.—not long after his return an emergency arose which, for the moment, united both sections of the dutch with the british in a common determination to uphold the au- thority of the government and the existing order of society. on dec. 9 1921, the chamber of mines decided that the ratio of col- oured to white labour must be raised; since, if the price of gold (as seemed likely) fell to 85 s. the ounce, 24 out of the 29 producing companies would be working at a loss. this necessary economy in the cost of production led to a strike cf the (white) miners on jan. to 1922. a collision between the strikers’ organisation (which had rigidly enforced the stoppage of work) and the police on feb. 27 developed on monday march 6, into a revolutionary outbreak; and by the end of the week, in the prime minister’s words, with the exception of boksburg and the central district of johannesburg “ practically the whole of the witwatersrand was in possession of the revolutionaries.”” then the government, which had watched and prepared, mobilised all its available forces (nearly 20,000), and on friday (10th) martial law was proclaimed. on saturday smuts left cape town to direct in person the suppression of the strike. leaving the railroad, he passed through the lines of strikers by car in the darkness and reached the central area of johannesburg at midnight (march 11-12). on tuesday the strikers surrendered and on wednes- day suppression of the strike was officially announced. the min- ers’ union repudiated the disorders, and directly the fighting was over the white labourers, freed from terrorism, went back eagerly to work. this affair aggravated communist propaganda acting upon the considerable anarchist element which had clung to johannesburg from the time it was a mining camp and was costly in human life. the casualties of the union forces were 6: killed and 199 wounded; those of the insurgents 138 killed and 287 wounded; and of the non-european population 31 were killed and 67 wounded. there followed two years of comparative calm in which the high cost of living and other dislocating effects of the war were gradu- ally surmounted. in them gen. smuts pursued his high aim of uniting the citizens of all parties in an endeavour to find a larger prosperity in the development of the natural resources of the union, and in mutual goodwill. on the other hand questions of native administration were left in abeyance. apprehension had been aroused by the census of 1921, which showed that, in addition to the great absolute increase, the non-european popu- lation of the union was increasing relatively at a higher rate than the european. in response to the somewhat unreasonable alarm created by these figures, gen. hertzog let it be known that the nationalist party were prepared to introduce changes in the system of native administration, which would erect a permanent barrier against the encroachments of the non-european races upon the industrial sphere of the whites. to the hopes thus aroused, and to an illogical resentment against gen. smuts over the part he played in the suppression of the disorders of 1914 and 1922, and to a certain lassitude—the natural effect of a long and exacting period of office—apparent in the work of the administrative departments must be ascribed the defeat of the south african party in 1924. the nationalist government.the new assembly (135 seats), elected june 17, was composed of: nationalists, 63; south african party, 53; labour, 18; and one independent. as in 1920, labour held the balance of power, but prior to the election a “ pact ” had been made between the nationalist and labour parties to avoid three-cornered contests and to vote for each other’s candi- dates. the pact was to end with the election, but when in the event the nationalists failed to gain a majority over all other parties, it was converted into a coalition government in which at first two, and subsequently three portfolios were assigned to labour. the new ministry was, however, so predominantly nationalist that there was considerable apprehension both in south africa and in england as to what might happen if the demand for inde- pendence, with all its implications, were maintained. in particu- lar it was feared that the visit of the prince of wales, previously arranged, might no longer be acceptable after this verdict of the polls. these apprehensions have not been justified. it is true do7 that the next year’s budget (april 8 1925) included a reduction of the preference given since 1903 to united kingdom goods. but in the matter of secession, gen. hertzog, as prime minis- ter, modified essentially the pronouncements which he had made in opposition. while, on oct. 20 1920 he had said that “‘ if there was a majority of even one for a republic the others would have to give in,” on april 28 1925, he told the assembly that. while any dominion had the right to secede, it would be for the union “a flagrant mistake and a national disaster, should it (a seces- sion) be brought about in circumstances causing either the eng- lish or the dutch section as a whole to feel that the change had been caused by the imposition of the will of the one section on the other.” it must be added, however, that a statement in a precisely opposite sense was issued simultaneously by the secre- tary of the transvaal nationalist party with the approval of its leader, mr. tielman roos, the minister of justice and deputy prime minister. and these discordant utterances were repeated by hertzog and roos after the session had ended. obviously this sharp clivision of the nationalist party on secession would facilitate a hereeniging between the moderate nationalists under hertzog and the south african party; and this, together with the loosening of party ties to be expected from the discussion of the government’s native policy, makes a re-grouping of the elector- ate in the near future not improbable. two days after the prime minister’s reassuring statement in parliament, the prince of wales landed at cape town. so far from his visit (april 30-july 29) giving rise to any untoward incidents, it was productive of a renewed friendliness between the dutch and british. changes in native administration—in the recess (nov. 13) gen. hertzog stated his native policy thus: 1. the “coloured people ’’ to be treated as europeans; being released from all industrial restrictions and, except that a higher electoral qualification would be required of them than of europeans, admitted to the parliamentary franchise; 2. the whole native population of the union to have direct ! representation in parliament. this representation to consist of seven additional members of the assembly (one for the free state, and two for each of the three remaining provinces), such members to be europeans elected by natives only, voting in separate electoral | areas; 3. local self-government on the glen grey principle to be extended to all natives by the constitution of district and general councils and a union council meeting annually; these councils to have only advisory or other limited powers; 4. since, under the constitution act, natives as well as coloured people, are admitted in the cape province to the franchise on the same (low) qualification as europeans, these measures would in- volve the disfranchisement of the natives, and the raising of the qualification for coloured people, in this province. (such legislation can only be enacted under the act by a two-thirds majority of the members of both ilouses in joint session.) it is understood that this political segregation of the natives is to be accompanied by an industrial and territorial segregation; and it is somewhat disconcerting that gen. hertzog should have omitted to deal with this aspect of the subject, since it is here that, in the opinion both of supporters and critics, the main ob- stacle to his proposals is to be found. the total population of the union, 6,928,580 (according to the census of 1921), is made up of 1,519,488 whites, 545,548 “‘ coloured people ” (7.e., mixed european and other races, with the malays of the cape prov- ince), 165,731 asiatics, and 4,697,811 native africans. the whites are, therefore, in a minority of one to four; and the significance of the relative paucity of the european population within the union is emphasized by the neighbourhood of the 750,000 na- tives living in the territories of the high commission. of the natives within the union, 1,017,448 live in the native territories of the trauskei, glen grey and herschel subject to the control of union officials, on lands reserved for them from which euro- peans are excluded; while the rest live in the rural areas occupied by the european population or in urban areas. it is to the 3,700,- ooo natives living gencrally, but not entirely, under european employment in these otherwise european areas, that industrial and territorial, as well as political, segregation is to be applied. ‘under the constitution act they are represented indirecely through the nominated members of the senate. 598 but while all natives living in european areas are to be pro- hibited from pursuing avocations which afford a livelihood to europeans, for those among them who are unwilling to accept the position of unskilled and menial workers, separate areas are to be provided. in these areas (but not outside them) it will be lawful for a native to purchase or lease land, to practise any skilled handicraft, and to pursue any trade or profession. thus, without injury to the progress of the detribalised native in civili- sation, a more rapid increase of european population would be assured by protecting the european in european areas from the competition of trained and educated natives. to accomplish this object, however, without grave injustice, with the probable sequel of insubordination, the areas to be reserved must be suffi- ciently extensive and fertile to provide the displaced natives with the means of existence within them. otherwise segregation would become merely an agency for imposing conditions of life upon all non-tribal natives, which would compel them to continue to serve the europeans upon terms definitely excluding any oppor- tunity of rising to positions for which their skill or professional ability might qualify them. and as evidence of the difficulty of finding these self-sufficing areas, critics of the policy recall the commission appointed to delimit such areas under the native land act of 1913; and the subsequent withdrawal of the native affairs administration bill which was to have given effect to the findings of the commission. with every desire to do justice to the claims of both parties the commissioners were able to assign only a bare 13 %% of the soil of the union to the 4,500,000 natives as against 87% to the (then) 1,250,000 europeans. although the four bills embodying this policy were merely fabled in the assembly (june 2, 1926) with a view to subsequent consideration within and without parliament, two measures inspired by the fear of non-european encroachment upon the industrial sphere of the europeans were dealt with in the session of 1926. the first, the mines and works act, rort (amendment) bill, legalises the transvaal mining colour bar clause which (in effect) prevents any “‘ coloured person,” however competent in fact, from being deemed competent for employment in mines, factories or industries using mechanical propulsion; such legalisa- tion having been made necessary by a judicial decision pro- nouncing the clause in question to be wlfra vires. but since it also permits the transvaal practice to be applied throughout the union, it was opposed by the south african party and twice rejected by the senate. in the event this “ stowe bar ” bill was passed on may 13 in a joint session of the two lower chambers by 83 to 67 votes. the second, the arcas reservation (asiatic) bill, applies the segregation principle of the native land act, 1913, to asiatics domiciled in the union, and would prohibit the indians in natal and the transvaal from acquiring or leasing land except in speci- fied areas. in answer to the protests of the indian community in south africa and the press and government of india, the union govt. made the very same proposal which, early in the century, the crown administration of the transvaal in the like circumstances had made (unsuccessfully) to the colonial secre- tary; viz.: that representatives of the protesting government should visit south africa and study the question on the spot. as the result of the visit of the official deputation sent from india ior the purpose, and of subsequent negotiations, dr. malan (minister of the intcrior) announced on april 23, 1926, that a conference of representatives of the two governments would be held to seck a solution of the indian problem on the basis of a recognition of the need of safeguarding in south africa “ western standards of life by just, legitimate means.” ife added that the government had decided not to proceed with the bill until the results of this conference were available. | later in the session a bill to provide the union witha national flag from which the union jack was to be excluded aroused so much opposition among the british, that the measure was tem- porarily withdrawn. but, as we have seen, in 1926 the native question dominated the field of south african politics. and in view of the difficulties of the segregation policy as a means of increasing the european population of the union, the success of a south africa, union of recent effort to promote the same object by the settlement of british farmers must be put on record. in commemoration of the centennial anniversary of the albany settlement, the ‘ 1820 memorial settlers association ”’ was founded in 1920 for the pur- pose of introducing men and women of the right type into south africa by judicious and soundly conducted migration and land scttlement. up to 1926 2,077 settlers and their dependents had been permanently established, with a total capital of £3,500,000. in 1925 the association was so encouraged with the success achieved that it acquired three farms and established them as training centres... see the vearbook of the union of south africa, annual, and the various official publications and parliamentary papers. (w. b. w.) ii. defence the establishment of the union in south africa in 1910 involved a fusion of the different military systems then obtaining in the four colonies which became original constituent provinces of the union. the cape colony and natal, and that part of the trans- vaal (chielly the witwatersrand) witha large british population, maintained volunteer forces which differed only slightly, if at all, in their essential features from the old volunteer force of great britain. in each of the three colonies there was also a cadet organisation. in the greater part of the transvaal and in the orange river colony, renamed in the union the orange free state, the burghers, organised on the lines of the old republican forces, constituted the military forces of the state. in all the colonies the liability of every able-bodied male to be called upon to render military service to the state in time of peril was ac- cepted and recorded in the law. a small permanent force was kept in the cape colony, and on even a smaller scale (being con- fined to staff) in natal and the transvaal. on june 14 i912 the south africa defence act 1912 became law, and in that act were reaffirmed the general principles which char- acterised the different colonial military systems, the act provided for a permanent force, divided into staff and mounted rifles, of which latter there were five regiments. the south africa defence amendment act 1922, an amending act framed in the light of experience gained in the world war, effected radical changes in the composition of the permanent force, which was so altered as to pro- vide a nucleus of trained and permanently serving units of every arm essential to a modern army and capable of combining with the bulk of the military force of the state, the citizen force. the permanent force now consists of the south african staff corps, instructional corps, naval service, field artillery, mounted riflemen (one regiment), garrison artillery, engineers, air force, service, medical, ordnance and veterinary corps and an administrative, pay and clerical corps. in other respects the act of 1912 practically stands, every citizen of the union between the ages of 17 and 60 (both included) is liable to render personal service in time of war in defence of the union in any part of south africa, and the national reserve is composed of all citizens so liable who do not belong to any other portion of the forces. the citizen force is the real military force of the state, and consists of units of the active citizen force, the successor of the volunteer forces already mentioned, and of rifle associations which may be regarded as carrying on the commando system of the old republican burgher forces. every citizen is liable to undergo, beginning in his 21st year, four years’ “ peace training’ in the active citizen force, but may enter for the training voluntarily in any year from his 17th to his 21st year (both included), the number to be trained is placed in the act at 50% of the total number liable, but parliament may in- crease this number. a ballot is provided for in case of shortage of entries. after ‘' peace training ’’ has been completed the trained man goes to class “ a" of the citizen force reserve, where he re- mains until his 45th year. *‘ peace training ”’ may also be performed in the coast garrison force or the royal naval voluntecr reserve. the latter unit may be placed at the disposal of the royal naval 1 the importance of this effort cannot be realised without reference to the past history of south africa. ‘‘ the mere presence of the natives, in addition to furnishing a chronic source of contention be- tween the british and the dutch, by providing a cheap supply of manual labour blocked the way against british emigration on a large scale; since the labouring class emigrant, who was the chief means of peopling australia and canada, could find no market for his manual labour in south africa, and so, by a strange irony of fate, justice to the natives deprived the british administration of the readiest and most satisfactory agency for the solution of the nationality difficulty — a rapid introduction of a british population large enough to have converted the dutch into an appreciable, but politically impotent, minority.”’—worsfold, union of south africa (all red series), igt2. south africa, union of 599 authorities in time of war, and is part of the royal naval reserve sopeucutee under the naval forces act 1903 (great britain and reland). a citizen who at the age of 21 has not entered the active citizen force is compelled to serve for four yeats in a rifle association, where he is taught the use of military weapons of precision. on completion of this service the rifle association member is trans- ferred to class ‘‘b’”’ of the citizen force reserve, where he too remains until he reaches his 45th year. in addition to the reserves already mentioned, provision is made for a veteran reserve. cadet service (13 to 17) is compulsory, but exemption is procurable at the request of a parent or guardian. : ii. education under the union, control of education “ other than higher,” a definition interpreted as all education below university stand- ard, was left to the provincial councils, with the result that each province has a different system. they have, however, features in common. each province provides elementary, secondary and high schools for white children and training colleges for teachers. technical, art and other vocational schools were also provided, but in april 1925 the union education department took over responsibility for vocational education. education for white children is compulsory between the ages of seven and 15 (16 in the cape and free state provinces). primary education is every- where free; in the transvaal secondary education is also free. religious instruction is allowed and, in certain conditions, may be in the cape province of a sectarian character. the bilingual difficulty, acute at first in the orange free state, has been over- come in all the provinces by the use of the home-language, eng- lish or dutch, as the medium of instruction in the lower standards. the dutch taught is afrikaans, not netherlands dutch. the education given is in general sound, and the provincial councils have adopted ingenious methods for securing instruction for the white children scattered in small numbers in remote areas. for non-europeans the facilities afforded for schooling varied con- siderably, but tended to increase, notably in the cape province. the education of natives is largely in the hands of religious bodies who in the cape also maintain training schools for native and coloured teachers. state expenditure on education in the four provinces combined rose from {1,500,000 in 1910 to {6,400,- ooo in 1922, when 331,000 european and 251,000 non-european children were attending school. about one-twelfth of state expenditure was for non-european schools. in 1924 the union parliament made provision for a uniform scale of salaries for teachers. | university education.—when the union was established the only university in south africa was that of the cape of good hope, an examining body with afhhated colleges, of which the oldest and best known was the south african college at cape town. the demand for greater facilities was insistent, while rival claims provoked much heated controversy. a solution was found in 1916 in the passing of an act to establish three univer- sities, namely, the university of south africa, the university of cape town and the university of stellenbosch. the university of south africa, which was formally established in april 1918, is the legal successor of the university of the cape of good hope. lis headquarters are at pretoria, and it at first embraced the fol- lowing constituent colleges: grey (bloemfontein), huguenot (wellington), natal (pictermaritzburg and, for certain subjects, durban), rhodes (grahamstown) university (potchefstroom), transvaal (pretoria) and the south africa school of mines and technology (johannesburg). the university of cape town was formed by the incorporation in 1916 of the south african college, and under the act of incorporation new buildings for the university were to be erected on the rhodes estate above groote schuur, probably the most beautiful site for a university in the world. the building began in 1922, in which year the s.a. college of music was amalgamated with cape town university. besides the usual facilities, the university has a school of african life and languages. a large hospital close to the groote schuur build- ings will serve as a clinic for the medical school. stellenbosch university, created in 1918 by the incorporation of the victoria college of that town, is attended very largely by dutch-speaking students. its special features are its agricultural and theological faculties. the desire of the rand for a separate university led in 1922 to the incorporation of university college, johannesburg, (as the school of mines and technology had been renamed) as the university of the witwatersrand. it has all the usual faculties, but is specially noted for original work in metallurgy, geology and allied sciences. the joint matriculation board and the joint committee for professional examinations are bodies representa- tive of all the universities. the union maintains five agricultural schools and experimen- tal farms, and in connection with them awards scholarships and provides for laboratory research. there is an institute for medical research at johannesburg, to which is attached the miners’ phthisis medical bureau. there is, further, a research grant board. the south african public library, cape town, is a na- tional institution. it has over 140,000 volumes, contains the grey and other valuable collections and is the largest and oldest library in the union, having been founded in 1878. several large sums were given or bequeathed by private citi- zens for university purposes—mostly for capital expenditure. state outgoings on higher education rose from £104,000 in 1912 to £253,000 in 1923. in the same period the number of university students increased from 1,285 to 4,166. (see the official year book of the union of s.a., reports of the education adminis- tration commission, 1923 and 1924; also the reports of the phelps-stokes commissions on african education, published in new york.) cfr. ce iv. economic history general conditions.—in the decision to establish the union the advantages to be derived from 4 single authority to control financial, commercial and other economic relations played an important part. unity assured internal free trade and a common tariff for external trade. special customs agreements regulated the relations of the union with neighbouring british possessions (rhodesia’and the native protectorates), while south-west africa, on coming under union mandate, was included in the free trade area. the union govt. assumed responsibility for the transvaal-mozambique convention of 1909, which provided for free trade in the products of the soil of mozambique and the transvaal, for the recruitment of natives of portuguese territory for the rand mines, and for the regulation of trade with lourenco marques, the one port in foreign possession serving the union (sce lourenco marques). the provinces retained their administrative identity, but had no power of taxation or other means of raising revenues except such as were given them by the union parliament. the finan- cial relations act of 1913 specified these powers and provided for a subsidy from union funds of one-half of the ordinary annual expenditure of the provinces. ‘the baxter commission on pro- vincial finances in 1923 recommended the termination of this arrangement, and in 1925 the £ for £ subsidy was replaced by a per caput grant for education and a new scheme of provincial taxation, calculated to lessen provincial autonomy. the act of union placed harbours and railways—nearly all state owned—under the control of a single ministry, with the provision that they were to be worked on strictly business lines. among the first measures taken by the ministry were extensions to assist trade and especially agriculture by building branch lines and by improving port facilities. as large areas of the coun- try are subject to droughts ancl irregular and, at times, exces- sive rainfall, farming has not the stable conditions which prevail in most countries; hence the greater need for scientific methods and for aid to the farmers. a union land bank was established in 1912 which gave liberal advances to the farmers and pastoral- ists. by this means, by its agricultural colleges, and in other ways the union govt. did much to increase efficiency. large irrigation works were also carried through, costing between 1910 and 1926, over {12,000,000 in capital expenditure. | while the permanent well-being of south africa depends prob- ably upon agriculture, the mining industry occupies a unique position, south africa is the chief source of the world’s supply of 600 diamonds, and produces half the world’s goldoutput. inno other country does so large a proportion of the people depend for a livelihood upon gold mining, which from its essential nature is a wasting asset. other branches of mining, however, may be ex- pected to develop as gold mining declines. coal is of great actual, and greater potential, importance. it is mainly due to the exist- ence of cheap coal that the large output of gold and diamonds has been made possible. in addition, considerable quantities are used for ships’ bunkers and there is a growing export. all economic developments in south africa are conditioned by a labour situation which is unique. the direction and organi- sation of all important industries is in the hands of europeans; but the great bulk of the labour is supplied by natives, asiatics, and other non-europeans. in the cape province the ‘‘ coloured ”’ people, while they engage in semi-skilled and skilled labour, sup- ply the great bulk of the unskilled labour force; the sugar plan- tations in natal are worked mainly by natives, though some indians are still employed; the mines are entirely dependent upon an adequate supply of native labour. throughout the union farmers depend almost entirely on natives (or, in the western province, coloured workers) for manual labour. thus the furo- pean has been restricted almost entirely to the work of super- vision and the skilled crafts; and white workers who fall out of these classes, especially white men and their families who lose their footing on the land in some period of agricultural distress, have a difficulty in finding employment, and constitute the in- tractable “‘ poor white ” problem. tue pre-waar situation trade.—the first five years, 1910-4, of the union were marked by steady progress. both agriculture and mining were in a healthy condition. there was little unemployment, and indus- trial unrest was confined to the rand. the average annual im- ports were £37,935,000, average annual exports 56,022,000. the excess of exports was a constant feature, representing inter- est on british and foreign capital invested in south atrica. the whole of the gold output was shipped to london, where all for- eign trade accounts were adjusted. some 60% of the imports were supplied by great britain, which took 88% of the exports. of british dominions there was a considerable trade with india and australia, while foreign countries, headed by germany and the united states, supplied 29% of the imports, but took little over 6% of the exports. the imports were of a very general nature; the chief exports were gold, diamonds, coal, wool and sheepskins, mohair, maize and ostrich feathers. the value of the gold output had increased from £31,900,000 in 1910 to £35,600,- ooo in 1914; diamonds exported reached their highest value, just over {12,000,000, in 1913. at this period, considerably more than half the capital in these industries was still held by investors dwelling abroad. production.—of at least equal importance to the well-being of the people are the industries in which the capital is south african. of these, the chief is the breeding of woolled sheep with the subsidiary but valuable trade in sheepskins. in 1913 there were over 28,000,000 woolled sheep in the union, mostly in the cape and orange free state. the mohair industry continued to flourish in this period, but the angora goat is more dependent on good seasons than is the sheep; severe droughts were mainly responsible for the decrease in the number of angora goats from 4,395,000 in 1912 to 2,844,000 in 1916. ostrich farm- ing, almost confined to the cape province, attained its highest degree of success in 1913, when 1,023,000 ib. of feathers, valued at £2,953,000, were exported. subsequently the war and the change of fashion made the trade very uncertain, and the tend- ency has been to substitute dairy or other forms of farming for ostriches. of cereals, only maize was grown for export. this export trade had started in 1904; by 1914 it was firmly established and had begun to occupy the position in farming in the union that wheat occupies in canadian and australian farming. but the uncer- tainty of the seasons renders maize a very unequal crop, abundance one year being followed by dearth in the next. next to maize, south africa, union of oats and wheat are the chief cereals; with the aid of a protective tariff, enough is usually grown to supply most of the home re- quirements. owing to the sparse population and, in large areas, to the defective quality of the soil, the cultivated area is still small—in 1921 only 13,000,000 ac. out of a total farm area of 261,000,000 acres. with better means for the prevention and control of stock diseases cattle breeding had become more profit- able; in r914 the export of beef for the first lime reached notable figures. dairying, too, had ceased to be regarded as a “side line” by farmers, and in 1914 five-sevenths of the butter consumed in the union was home produce. of other products, tobacco, grown mostly in the transvaal, was developed and became better known. sugar production tn natal and zululand largely increased and tea maintained its position. besides supplying the bulk of the protected home market there was beginning to be a surplus of sugar for export. the union govt. from its establishment made efiorts to promote cotton cultivation, but in 1914 the industry, though promising, was still in its infancy. attention was also paid to better means of dealing with fresh fruit for export. it may be added here that in 1922 the union govt. denounced the mozambique conven- tion, which lapsed in 1923. thereafter the imposition of a tariff on mozambique sugar gave additional protection to natal sugar. industry —manufacturing industries were encouraged by the union legislation; but the chief development was in factories engaged in the preparation of food and drink for the local market and in the production of heat, light and power (specially for the rand mines). while manufactures were still on a comparatively small scale, the value of the gross output was estimated at over £17,000,000 in 1911, when 21,000 europeans and 44,000 non- europeans were returned as engaged in factories. the war period the world war had, in south africa as elsewhere, a marked effect on economic conditions. some industries, such as gold min- ing, sheep farming, beef production and manufactures, it stimu- lated; others, such as the trade in diamonds and ostrich feathers, it depressed. the general rise in the prices of commodities in 1916 and following years render comparisons in terms of sterling of limited value; the rise in the average annual value of imports in the five years by less than £4,500,000 shows a restriction of imports, while the rise of £27,000,000 in the average value of ex- ports reflected higher prices rather than increased production. as an example, in 1915, before prices had begun to soar, the 170,- 000,000 lb. of wool exported fetched £5,380,000; in 1919 the 184,- 937,000 ib. of wool exported fetched £17,919,000. trade.—the direction of trade in the war period showed im- portant changes. british manufacturers, engaged intensively in meeting war demands and in supplying goods previously obtained from germany, lost ground in south africa, and ger- man trade ceased. the united states and japanese trade in con- sequence gained; they also became large purchasers of south african goods. gold.—to the general rule of increased prices there was one exception; throughout the war the system by which all the gold produced in south africa was pledged to the bank of england at a fixed sale value (a little under 85s. an ounce) was main- tained. but the cost of production had risen some 25%, and this, together with a stationary price for the metal and the low grade of ore in many mines, threatened a crisis. some mines ceased working and the closing of about 20 more mines was con- templated. but the continued and instant demand for more gold from all countries had its effect; when war ended, the arrange- ment for a fixed sale price was terminated, and from july 191g gold fetched its market value. this so-called ‘‘ premium on gold,” the additional price it fetched in sterling, not only saved the jow-grade mines, but had an important effect on industry in general. gold reached its highest price, 130s. an ounce, in feb. 1920. from this point deflation began, and as sterling ap- proached parity with the united states dollar the premium de- creased and finally disappeared with the resumption of the gold standard after may 18 19295. south africa, | the return to normal conditions , the year toro had been a disappointing year to the general community in south africa. the inability of british traders at once to supply the goods required for re-equipping works was noticeable. merchants in the union who had heavy stocks realised very high prices. there was a brief spurt in the ostrich feather trade and a recovery in the diamond trade, but general conditions were unfavourable and agriculture and pastoral pur- suits suffered from severe drought, followed early 1n 1920 by excessive rains—which cause almost as much damage as drought. the year was marked by much industrial unrest, which would have been much worse but for the increased price obtained for gold in the latter half of the year. if r919 had proved a difficult year 1920 was even more abnor- mal. it began with a great and unhealthy boom in trade and ended in depression. for the first time imports exceeded exports in realised prices, the figures being, imports £105,927,000, ex- ports {98,997,000; of the imports over {75,000,000 was spent on manufactured articles and {10,600,000 on raw materials and articles used in agriculture. of the exports over {64,000,000 represented the products of mines, while {25,600,000 represented the sale of agricultural and pastoral produce. the sums realised by exports rarely indicated increased production. much of the trade was speculative, and with the collapse of the ‘* boom” a period of financial stringency followed. this condition contin- ued throughout 1921. owing to the premium the gold industry was least affected. the output had been decreasing since 1916, when the gold exported was valued at £38,100,000, but in 1920 the effect of the premium was that {42,273,000 was realised for a smaller output; in 1921 the gold fetched £41,1g1,000. other in- dustries were severely hit. the diamond and ostrich feather trade collapsed, and while the maize crop exported exceeded all previous amounts and there was a large increase in the exports of wool and mohair, most commodities, including wool, had to be sold for little more than half the prices realised in 1920. there was indeed much difficulty in selling the wool and mohair at all; eventually the british govt. bought the unsold portion of the wool crop at about 1914 prices. the period of deflation was painful but inevitable. it was hastened, and the consequent suffering rendered much more acute, by the disturbances which stopped gold-mining on the rand, an account of which is given above in the first three months of 1922. the gold industry was put on a paying basis again, with benefit to the whole country. working costs, which had reached 25s.8d. per ton milled in 1920, had fallen by 1924 to 19s.7d. ratlways—apart from the rand disturbances, 1922 was a year of reconstruction, this was seen, for instance, in the scheme for railway extension and harbour improvements sanctioned by the union parliament in july 1922, in which year the railways of south-west africa were incorporated in the union system. the two systems had been joined physically in 1915 by the build- ing of a railway (primarily for military purposes) from prieska to kalkfontein. between 1910 and 1916 over 2,000 m. of new railways had been built in the union. construction had then practically stopped, but in 1922 the building of 853 m. of new lines at an estimated cost of over £4,000,000 was sanctioned. there were 23 separate schemes, mostly agricultural railways— the shortest but 2 m., the longest 71 miles. two of these lines (in the transvaal) were built with ‘‘ poor white ” labour instead of by natives. in 1922 also power was taken for the electrification of railways—the first section to be electrified was the natal main line from maritzburg to glencoe. harbours.—varbour improvements, hindesed by the war, were again taken in hand, the expert services of sir george bue chanan being engaged to examine the existing harbour facilities and to suggest future developments. the union castle mail service to and from england was regularly maintained, while there were direct services to india, australia and america. the number and tonnage of ships entering union harbours was al- most the same in 1913 and 1923—4,106 vessels of 12,205,000 tonnage | in 1913 and 4,377 vessels of 12,092,000 tonnage in 1923. over 75% of the shipping is british. union of 601 recovery in production.—notwithstanding the loss occasioned by the rand disturbances and a bad maize season, the year 1922 closed with more hopeful prospects and 1923 is regarded as repre- senting the return to normal. the gold export, which, owing to the strike, had fallen to £30,000,000 in 1922, rose to over {30,- 000,000; and in maize the exports reached 1,128 million |b. (a higher total than previously recorded) and realised over £3,000,- ooo. there was also a record export of coal. excluding gold, the volume of exports was equal to the pre-war average, but at an average increased price of 65°; the volume of imports was about 15% less than before the w ar, at an average increased price of 85%, normal conditions in south africa include, unfortu- nately, drought, excessive rain and locust plagues; 1924 experi- enced a partial failure of the maize crops and witnessed the most severe locust plague known. it was, however, a good wool and mohair season, and the general trade figures for 1924—imports £65,800,000, exports £78,000,000 reflected a real advance. there had been a eousiderable after-the-war expansion of business by the union with rhodesia and kenya colony; in other respects the direction of trade from 1922 had reverted to pre-war channels. the united kingdom largely recovered its losses, taking some 70% of the exports and supplying about 55% of the imports. germany again became the union’s best foreign customer, the united states falling to second place. the year 1924 saw the first substantial results of the careful nursing of the cotton industry in natal and the transvaal, some 3,300,000 lb. of cotton being exported. in 1924, too, a platinum reef was discovered in the lyndenburg district of the transvaal, which gave promise of becoming the world’s chief source of platinum supply, though the production stage had not been reached up to 1926. the year 1925 was marked by another record maize crop, the maize exported realising £6,000,000. it was also noted for the highest output of gold from the transvaal mines—9g,599,- 702 0z.; and for an interruption of exports by a strike of british seamen in the month of september. the increased volume of manufactures, due to natural growth of population and the war- time restriction of imports, has been well maintained in the post- war period. at the same time, agriculture has become more in- tensive, the development of fruit and citrus farming, both in volume and quantity, being especially marked. finance.—among the financial measures taken by the union in the period of reconstruction was the establishment of a branch of the royal mint at pretoria, which began operations on jan. 1 1923. at the same time, the gold mining industry established co- -operatively a refinery at germiston. meanwhile, an act passed in 1920 had established the south african reserve bank 1o co-ordinate credit facilities and exercise the exclusive right to issue bank notes. specie had thus no longer to be imported— in fact, in 1925 pretoria was exporting gold coins to india—and when exchange rates on london were unfavourable the mines found it more profitable to sell gold to the south african reserve bank than to export it. the embargo on the export of specie, which had been imposed in ro14 as a war measure, was removed at the end of june 1922, at which date also the right of private banks to issue notes ceased. in 1926 the national bank, one of the two most important private banks, was amalgamated with barclays bank (dominion, colonial and overseas). labour.—inquiries into industrial conditions, especially that following the rand disturbances of 1922, had led to renewed in- terest in conciliation machinery for disputes between employers and employed, and a conciliation act destined to encourage col- icctive bargaining was passed in 1924. in 1925 a wage act was passed setting up a permanent wage board to fix legal minimum wages in trades where wages were low and to impose binding de- cisions in other trades when voluntary negotiations had failed to effect a settlement of a dispute. as a preliminary for the new wage board’s activities, an economic and wage commission was appointed to investigate conditions, the chairman of which was mr. stephen mills, c.m.g., an australian civil servant and prof. henry clay, an i:nglish economist, one of the members. the commission’s report, issued in march 1926, contained an extensive survey of south african economic conditions. the 602 two overseas members and one of the local representatives con- demned as unnecessary and impracticable the policy of attempt- ing to substitute white for native labour in unskilled employment and reported against any restriction of the native’s economic opportunities. the majority recommended that the wage board should concentrate its efforts on the lower-wage and unorganised occupations. they held that if regulations were applied to force higher the rates of the more highly paid workers those of un- skilled workers were likely to be still further depressed. the lead- ing recommendation in the minority report urged the govern- ment to stop the importation of native labourers. the govern- ment had already refused to allow any increase in the importation of the only native labour which counted, namely, that of africans from mozambique for work in the transvaal mines. it may be added that the overseas members of the commission came away convinced that the economic condition of the country was very healthy and much impressed by the agricultural development. public finance.—the economic burdens of government and the taxable resources of the country had been unevenly distributed while the four colonies retained their autonomy. the union effected a great improvement, and the new government found its financial task relatively easy. in the first full year, customs brought in £4,500,000, mining revenue over £2,000,000, the rail- ways paid interest and sinking fund as their debt and in addition made a contribution of over £1,000,000 to the general revenue. in the first five years the average total expenditure of the union and provinces was {16,322,427 and revenue £16,975,507. the war led to a great increase. expenditure reached its maximum in 1921-2 at £34,228,307, revenue a year earlier at £33,272,952. the net public debt of the union increased from {119,366,000 in 19144 to £196,843,000 in 1924; a large part of the increase was due, however, not to war expenses, but to public works (the in- crease after 1918 being £45,000,000), and of the total two-thirds may be regarded as productive. provincial expenditure grew in even greater proportion, from an average figure of £3,205,000 in the first years of the union to £8,819,0001n 1921-2. the increased expense of the government was met by a general increase in tax- ation and by the introduction of a graduated income tax in 1914, which yielded nearly £7,000,000 in 1921-2. the collapse of trade in 1920 and the following years led to a succession of deficits, which in turn led to a check to the growth of expenditure. in the railway administration in particular dras- tic economics were effected, which reduced working expenditure by over {3,000,000 between 1920-1 and 1922-3, and, with the re- vival of trafic in 1924, converted a heavy deficit into a surplus. until 1925 the customs tariff, though productive in its effect, had been designed primarily to raise revenue. the government that came into power in 1924, on the advice of a reconstituted board of trade and industries, revised it in such a way as defi- nitely to make it protective, and at the same time included pro- visions for extending, raising or withdrawing a duty by admin- istrative action with a view to encouraging a new industry or checking an unsatisfactory industry. the general preference on british goods was removed and a limited list of items sub- stituted. the united kingdom was also promised “ most fa- voured nation ” conditions. bibliography.—the official year book of the union of south africa, published by the office of the census (no. 7, 1925, 5s.), con- tains a remarkably comprehensive account of every aspect of economic life with full bibliographies; the south and east african year book and guide (union castle steamship co. ltd., 5s.) contains useful chapters in less detail. among official reports the most useful are report of the economic commission (1914); low grade afines commission (1919); drought commission (1922); and economic and wage commussion (1926). the british department of overseas trade publishes periodical reports on south africa. r. a. lehfeldt’s national resources of south africa is the most valuable brief survey of the country in its economic aspects. (for: cat cl) south african literature: afrikaans.—the rapid rise of the south african form of dutch, known as afrikaans, as a literary and official language has forced dutch (nederlands) into the background; and since 1910 there has been singularly little literary activity in the older form of the language. in the prose anthology of koekstra and viljoen (zuidafrikaanse south african literature prozabundel) about a dozen well-known south african writers in dutch are represented; but the popular form of the language, spoken throughout the union, has now practically captured the literary field, and has in a comparatively short time produced more than so writers, some of them of outstanding merit. as with all young languages, afrikaans began its literary life with poetry. j. f. celliers, who in 1906 had been a pioncer with his die viakte, has produced die rivier, unie kantate, die saater (1923), liefdelewe (1924), topie touric, en ander nuwe gedigte (1920), and afartjie (1912), besides a few prose works. j. d. du toit (totius), who was the second in the field in 1908 with by die monument, has since published potgicters trek, wiulgerboom-bogies, rachel and trekkerswee. c. l. leipoldt has followed up oom gert vertel of 1911 by dingaansdag, uit drie werelddele and die heks, a tragedy. celliers and totius may be regarded as typifving the conservative element in afrikaans literature; they are largely subjective and introspective, essentially patriotic, and intensely religious, with a rigid calvinistic bias that colours their idealism. in local colouring and in lyrical expression the poems of leipoldt seem more native that those of his contemporaries. d. f. malherbe has written aarroo blommetjics (1909), vergeet nie, klokgrassies, and vir vrij- heid (1919); while h. h. joubert has published verse oor piet retief, dageraad en sonneshyn en andere gedigte (1018). these two, with a. d. keet (gedigte), a. g. visser (gedigte 1925), and possibly f. van den heever, are poets whose output and techni- cal capability ensure them a place in the catalogue of afrikaans writers. the number of minor poets is large and growing. of the older generation, in purely humourous verse the work of melt brink and of f. w. reitz must be cited. in prose the productions of permanent merit are not numerous. afrikaans has not yet evolved a prose style comparable with dutch prose. c. j. langenhoven has written on a great varicty of subjects in prose and in rhymed and unrhymed verse, and his works have attained a measure of popularity. probably his best books are die lig van verre duc and ons weg deur die wereld (1919), a volume of didactic essays. in biography f. s. malan’s mezrou koopman de wet, j. d. kestell’s christiaan de wet (1920) and g. preller’s pict retief are the only works that can lay claim to consideration. in fiction afrikaans has been less fortunate. its novels show little originality, and some of them make an appeal chiefly because of their intense national sympathy. stories with decided literary merit are sadie bosman’s onder bevoorregte mense (1925) and langs kronkelende wegen (1916); leon mare’s die nuwejaarsfees (1919); e. marais’ margriet van laastelust (1922); r. j. van reenen’s die lokaas; j. van bruggen’s teleur- gestel (1918) and afit anvsie (1923); j. lub’s oom frikkie (1918) and n. hofmeyr’s fannie (1925). good work has been done in natural history by a. a. pienaar (sangiro), whose ocrwotud en viakte has been translated into english and german; in native, especially bushman, sociology by g. r. von wicelligh; and in the study of language by s. p. boshoff and d. b. bosman. some 25 dramas have been published in afrikaans; of those that deal with specific south african subjects or situations none has sufficient artistic or literary merit to attract an audience that has outgrown early viclorianism on the stage. south african literature: english.—the great po- etical activity of the years rgto-26 in england had its parallel in south africa. a recent anthology, the centenary book of south dlfrican verse (1925), edited by francis cary slater, contains poems by 68 writers, most of whom were still living in 1926. mr. slater’s own poetry is saturated with the feeling of the country to which he belongs. his later works include settlers and sunbirds (rg19), and the karreo, and other poems (1924). arthur shearly cripps, a missionary in mashonaland, wrote poetry in which the influence of oxford is blended in a surprisingly beautiful way with that of the country of his adoption. pilgrimage of grace (t912) and lake and war (1917) are two of his later volumes. he also wrote stories of life in those remote parts, including faervlands forlorn (1910) and cinderella in the south (1918). cullen gouldsbury, for several years a native commissioner in southam pton—south carolina rhodesia, showed poetical gifts of a high order in his songs out of exile (1912) and from the outposts (1914). mary rosalie boyd, in her poem the veld, which won the capetown bardic chair in 1921, has finely expressed the fascination exercised by south africa upon those who come to make it their home. charles murray, for many years chief of the union govt. public works dept., has written poetry mainly in a scots dialect. a sough o’ war (1917) and in the country places (1920) are his latest vol- umes. yhe flaming terrapin (1924), by roy campbell, one of the youngest of south africa’s poets, is a somewhat chaotic work, containing, nevertheless, passages of remarkable force and beauty. of the fiction produced in south africa some few works reached a high level. afargaret harding (1911), by perceval gib- bon, and god’s step-children (1924), by sarah gertrude millin, deal with the difficult problems arising out of the contact of the white races with the black. pauline smith, a young writer born in the district of oudtshoorn, published some short stories under the title of the liitle karroo (1925) marked by a fine sympathy and sincerity. among many other writers of south african stories may be mentioned gertrude page, ethelreda lewis, f. horace rose, and william westrup. some valuable work was done in history and biography. sir george cory’s rise of south africa (1910, etc.) deals mainly with the development of the eastern part of cape colony, and gives the results of many years of patient research. another work of outstanding importance is lord de villiers and his times (1925), by eric a. walker, professor of history in the university of cape- town. an extensive literature has gathered round the name of cecil john rhodes, including lives by sir lewis michell and sir thomas fuller. ian colvin’s life ef jameson (1922); earl bux- ton’s general botha (1924); and dorothea fairbridge’s lady anne barnard at the cape of good hope (1924) are also of im- portance. frederick charles kolbe (monsignor kolbe), a poct ind critic of distinction, also wrote a delightful autobiography en- titled up the slopes of mount zion (1924). education in south africa 1652 to 1922, by ernst g. malherbe, is a useful survey of an important subject. among many works dealing with the difficult and complex problems involved in the relations between the europeans and the natives may be mentioned black and white in south east africa (1911) by maurice smethurst evans; the education of the south african native (1917) by c. t. lo- ram; and the history of native policy in south africa from 18 30 to the present day (1924) by edgar if. brookes. the views of the natives themselves have found expression in the black problem, by d. d. tengo jabavu, and in other works. a h1s- tory of christian missions in south africa (1911) and thrice through the dark continent (a record of missionary travel), by prof. j. du plessis (1917), deal with another aspect of the same subject. (hg n) southampton, itngland (see 25.491), has included south stoneham, part of north stoneham, swaythling, buitterne, sholing, [tchen and woolston, and weston and newtown within its boundaries since 1920, and has now an area of g,192 ac. (exclusive of tidal water and foreshore); the population was 160,994 in 1921. in 1912, seven civil parishes were united as the civil parish of southampton; the area of the parliamentary borough, which includes itchen and returns two members, is 8,032 acres. woolston, with large shipbuilding and engincering works, is growing rapidly. a museum was opened in 1912, a roman catholic church in portswood road in 1910, a large sailors’ home in oxford strect in 1910, hollybrook cemetery in 1913 and new offices for the harbour board in 1925. the cor- poration have acquired tudor house, a fine old mansion, and proposed in 1925 to erect a town hall in west marlands. a memorial to the pilgrim fathers, a column surmounted by a cupola, was unveiled on the west quay in 1913, a memorial of the wreck of the titanic in the east park in ror4 and a war memorial, 150 ft. high, in the west park in 1920. southampton university college removed to new buildings at highfield in ror4. during the war they were used as a military hospital, and were not reoccupied by the college till 1919. lord swaythling pre- 603 sented south stoneham house, in grounds of 110 ac., as a uni- versity college hostel. the port.—there has been a great increase in both goods and passenger traffic through the port of southampton, which is now a port of call for the p. and o. far eastern service and the chief transatlantic lines. recent improvements in the harbour in- clude the extension of the quays in the itchen and the test to 4,132 {t. and 4,420 ft. respectively, to provide better accommo- dation for liners; the enlargement and deepening of the turning area off the ocean dock; and the widening of the old extension quay. in 1925 powers were obtained to reclaim about 460 ac. in the test between the town pier and southampton west rail- way station for the construction of docks and five jetties, each 1,000 ft. long and 260 ft. wide, with 45 ft. of water alongside at low tide, and a deepwater channel, 600 ft. wide, to give access to them. two of these jetties are to be taken in hand first, and will add four deepwater berths to the five which the port possesses. part of the reclaimed land will be utilised for industrial estab- lishments. the west station has been rebuilt, and the line to milbrook is to be altered to give further traffic facilities. it is proposed to dredge the harbour to provide a minimum depth of 35 it. between the docks and farley. a floating dock, with a lifting capacity of 60,000 tons, was finished in 1924. south- ampton has an air service which operates from woolston aero- drome to the channel islands. the harbour was taken over by the naval and military authorities on the outbreak of the world war. a train ferry to dieppe, which conveyed great quantities of heavy guns, tanks, etc., was opened in 1917. south australia (see 25.492), a state of the australian commonwealth. its area is 380,070 sq. miles. the population in 1925 was 543,122. adelaide, the capital, is a well-planned town with a population, at dec. 31 1924, of 289,914. other towns of importance are port adelaide, the principal overseas port, and port pirie, the port for the broken hill mines and the centre of the broken hill smelting industry. on jan. 1 1911, the northern territory, which had from 1863 been incorporated in the state of south australia, was transferred to the common- wealth. south australia was the first state ta enfranchise women (constitution amendment act, 1894), and much of the ‘“‘ social reform ”’ legislation in australia originated there. production and indusiry.—a large portion of the state hes within the “ dry belt,’? where wheat growing has been found to be possible with a low average rainfall. the area under wheat in i9ii was 2,104,719 ac., and in 1925, 2,499,852 ac., with a yleld of 30,528,625 bushels. south australia is the principal wine producing state in the commonwealth, and great progress has been made in this industry as the result of irrigation along the valley of the murray river. vhe area under vines in 1011 was 22,952 acres. in 1924 it was 49,303 ac., and the production 10,756,538 gallons. the dried-fruit industry has also made con- siderable progress in the irrigation areas, where large numbers of ex-soldicrs were settled after the war. in 1924, 125,000 cwt. of raisins and 131,000 cwt. of currants were produced, as aeanst 58,503 and 80,400 cwt. respectiv ely in 1920. i;xtensive deposits of iron ore exist: the reserves of ore in the tron knob and iron monarch deposits are estimated at 133,- 000,000 tons, with an average content of 63 to 64% iron. the broken till co. utilises ore from these deposits at its iron works in newcastle, new south wales. in 1921, 506,993 tons were raised. large quantities of salt are obtained from the shallow salt lakes, chiefly on yorke peninsula. over 50,000 tons of crude salt, valued at £113,000, were produced in 1923. lake hart, 60 sq. m. in area, situated about 120 m. northwest from port augusta, contains immense supplies of salt of good quality, but owing to distance from market it has no economic value. the total value of the output of factories in 1924 was £29,650,- 995. metal works and machinery accounted for £8,919,965 and food and drink £7,116,910 (see australia). south carolina (sce 25.499), a state of the united states of cyc the population in 1920 was 1,683,724, an increase of 11-1% in the decade, as compared with 13-1% and 16-4% in the two recline decades. the estimated population in 1925 was 604 1,779,084. in the decade 1910-20 the whites increased from 679,161 to 818,538, or from 44-:8% of the total population to 48-6 percent. the density in 1920 was 55-2 per square mile. the urban population was 17-5% of the whole, as compared with 14:°8% in toro. the population of charleston in 1920 was 67,957, and the decennial increase 15°5°%%, the white increase being 28:3°4 and the negro 4 per cent. the white population, increased by war industries, was 52:4 °% of the whole, constituting a majority for the first lime in about 200 years. the population and decennial increase forthe other leading cities were as follows: columbia, 37,324 (42:6); greenville, 23,127 (46:9%); spar- tanburg, 22,638 (29:2); florence, 10,968 (535-7 %); anderson, 10,579 (9°5%); sumter, 9,508 (17-3 %). manufactures —testile mills paid very large dividends in 1917~20, and in addition doubled or trebled their capitalisation. wages rose greatly, but fell 30 to 50°%4 in the depression of 1920-1. the number of spindles in 1924 was 5,272,481; of operatives, 64,780. the bales of cotton consumed increased from 765,966 in 1908 to 1,003,375 in 1924. cotton textiles constitute over 71°% of the value of all manufactures. timber, cotton seed oil and fertilisers are important. the capital invested in industry in 1924 was $179,000,000, and the value of products $217,000,000. over half the motive power was hydroelectric; in 1920 out of an estimated potential development of 1,260,000 h.p., 450,000 h.p. had been developed. the state board of conciliation, created in 1916, arbitrates labour disputes on invitation, or investigates them on its own motion or by order of the governor. women are forbidden to work in stores after 10 p.m. or over 12 hr. in one day. children under 14 may not work in any mine or fac- tory. no labourer may work in a textile mill more than 55 hr. a week. . agriculture —the war-time rise in prices of cotton was suc- ceeded by a decline from about 40 cents to ro or 11 cents a ib. in six months (1920-1). legislation (1912) sought to stabilise agricultural prices by a system of state warchouses for holding products for a favourable market. co-operative marketing has made considerable progress. the boll weevil became a scrious menace in 1920 in the southwestern counties, from whence it soon spread over the whole state, with most scrious damage in the southern and eastern sections. under the law of 1920 extensive drainage projects were undertaken. agricultural methods have improved and banks now finance the farmer directly at greatly lower rates than formerly charged by the ‘lien merchant.” south carolina jed all the states in 1917 in crop values per ac. with a value of $63. the value in 1919 was $78.79, exceeded by three states only. according to state government estimate, cotton covered in 1920 45% of the cultivated acreage, and represented 50% of the value of the 13 leading crops. in 1924, 831,000 bales of cotton were raised, not much over half the highest record before the advent of the boll weevil. other crops in 1924 were: corn (maize), 21,862,000 bu., tobacco, 45,600,000 |b., oats 7,704,000 bu., sweet potatoes 6,230,000 bu., irish potatoes 3,885,000 bushels. the figures for corn and tobacco are hardly two-thirds of the maxi- mum. in r920 average monthly wages for adult male farm labour without board were $41.80. during ro1o—20 the number of farms increased from 176,434 to 192,603; improved land from 6,097,999 ac. to 6,184,159 ac., average value per farm from $2,223 to $4,046; average value per acre from $29.02 to $76.70. by 1925 the number of farms had decreased to 172,766. education.—in 1919 an act was passed making four months’ school attendance each year compulsory throughout the state. among other improvements were night schools for adults; an in- creased number of high schools; special teachers and inspectors in rural and textile districts; enlarged facilities for agricultural, vocational and home economics training; state standard certi- fication of teachers; and more effective state supervision. the expenditure for common schools in the year 1923-4 was $12,962,- 000, in addition to which there remained almost $2,000,000 in hand to be expended on buildings. enrolment in common schools in 1923-4 for whites was 238,909 and for negroes 228,516; in 1924-5, 245,619 for whites, 234,977 for negroes. in 1923-4 over south carolina 13,000 students, of whom 28% were negrocs, were enrolled in the 36 colleges in the state. | the religious denominations added materially during 1910-20 to their extensive work in college education. all but 11 of the 36 institutions for higher education in the state were under church control in 1920, and these institutions contained several hundred more students than all state and other non-sectarian institutions combined. social legislaiion.—ln 1912 race-track gambling was for- bidden. in 1913 the penitentiary hosiery mill was abolished as harmful to the health of the prisoners. the state board of charities and corrections, created in 1915, was reorganised in 1920 as the board of public welfare. the state hospital for insane was entirely remade, matcrially and administratively, during 1915-9. the placing of orphan and homeless children was taken over by the state in 1920. in 1918 a reformatory institution for white girls was established, and the reformatory for negro boys was reorganised. the probate judge in each county is constituted a juvenile court. penal and charitable institutions (including church and private charitable institutions) have been under state inspection since 1915. the age of consent was raised in r92r to 16 years. no city had, by 1926, acted on the permission granted in 1915 to segregate whites and negroes by city blocks. finance —the budget system, adopted in 1919, tended to economy and system. the state tax commission, created in 1915, improved the administration of the tax laws. the assessed taxable value of all property in 1924 was $428,601,274, being a fourth, or perhaps less, of the market value. in 1925 the receipts were $24,491,562; the disbursements $22,333,208. the bonded debt was $5,384,125. political history.—the class fecling that has so frequently been strong in south carolina politics found violent manifesta- tion during the governorship of coleman l. blease (1911-5). the legislature was at all times controlled by his opponents and passed many measures over his veto. resigning without giving an explanation, he was succeeded for five days by licut.- gov. c. a. smith. in 1918 mr. blease ran for the senate, opposing the country’s participation in the world war. he was overwhelmingly defeated, but was elected senator in 1924. richard i. manning was elected governor in 1914. gov. man- ning’s two administrations were marked by constructive legis- lation and effective co-operation with the national government. gov. robert a. cooper was elected in 1918 on a platform that made education its chief plank, and announced that as a result of progressive legislation taxes would be higher. he was re- elected without opposition in 1920, but resigned in may 1922 to accept a federal appointment, and was succeeded by licut.- gov. w. g. harvey. cooper’s chief policies were the strength- ening af the public schools, the creation of a budget system and the consolidation of the management of charitable and correctional institutions. the australian form of ballot was put into force (1921) in primaries but not in general elections, the latter being merely ritification of the former, as the democratic nomination is equivalent to election. thomas g. mcleod was elected governor. in 1922 and again in 1924. his principal policies consisted of liberal appropriations for cducation, the consolidation and systematising of state administrative offices, the improvement of prison conditions and the promotion of tax equalisation. re- newed efforts for changing from annual to biennial sessions of the legislature failed in 1925 because of unforeseen technical dif- ficulties. constitutional amendments changed the terms of the governor and other state officials from two to four years, begin- ning with those elected in 1926. the governor is not cligible to re-election. an extensive system of improved highways was un- der construction for about ro years, and was still far from com- plete in 1926. see yates snowden (cditor), [zistery of south carolina (5 vols., two of history and three of biographies); w. g. simms, the [7istory of south carolina, ed. m. c. 5s. oliphant (1918); public documents of south carolina. (d. dlw.) south dakota—southwest africa south dakota (sce 25.506), a state of the united states of america. the population in 1925 was 681,560 (south dakota state census), as compared with 636,547 in 1920 and 583,888 in 1910. the average density in 1925 was nine per square mile. the rural population in 1925 was 561,870, and the urban 119,690, as against 534,675 and 101,872 in 1920. i'rom rg91o to 1920 the rural population increased 5§-4° and the urban nearly 33%. the chief towns and their populations in 1925 were sioux falls 30,127; aberdeen 15,035; watertown 10,319; huron, 10,204; and mitchell ro,r1r9. the foregn-born population, consisting very largely of scandinavians, germans and russians, decreased until in 1925 it constituted less than one-eighth of the total. communications.—there are 4,486 m. of steam railways; the road mileage is 115,390, which is maintained by direct and indi- rect taxation. more than $15,000,000 has been expended through federal, state and county aid and by private individuals, in the construction of good roads, bridges and culverts. four large bridges have been built across the missouri river, and two others were in progress of construction in 1925. the first and best of the six bridges was built at yankton, connecting south dakota with nebraska; it is on the meridian highway, which crosses the state and extends from winnipeg, canada, to the gulf of mexico. the state legislature of 1921 provided for a tenth of a mill tax for the purpose of creatinga bridge fund. five bridges were built as a result—the wheeler (or rosebud), pierre, mo- bridge, chamberlain and forest city. they are on the main highways crossing the state from east to west. in the first nine months of 1925 licences were issued for 149,370 automobiles, 13,300 trucks and 320 motor cycles. education.—the total expenditure on education in 1923-4 was $18,425,309. in that educational year the 5,305 elementary schools contained 137,460 pupils and 7,046 teachers; 624 second- ary schools had 1,348 teachers and 25,128 pupils. between the ages of 8 and 16 attendance at a public day school is compulsory on all not otherwise taught. a griculiure.—the farm acreage in 1925 was 34,636,491 of which 24,101,202 ac. were improved land. in 1925 there were 76,174 farmers, of whom 41,751 were owners and 34,423 renters. farms have become more numerous and, on the average, some- what smaller: more are now worked by renters. the table below shows the principal agricultural products of the state and their values in 1920 and 1925. corn (maize) . 1925 83,405,000 bu. $50,043,000 1920 105,600,000 bu. 46,494,000 wheat 1925 32,378,000 bu. 41,429,000 1920 29,790,000 bu. 38,727,000 oats. 1925 100,198,000 bu. 28,055,000 1920 75,446,000 bu. 26,406,000 barley 1925 23,608,000 bu. 11,096,000 1920 22,825,000 bu. 13,695,000 potatoes 1925 3,965,000 bu. 7,137,000 1920 8,904,000 bu. 8,637,000 flax seed : 1925 3,801,000 bu. 8,552,000 1920 2,220,000 bu. 3,630,000 hay 1925 3,268,000 tons 30,704,000 1920 1,750,000 tons 14,875,000 the receipts from dairy produce in 1925 were estimated at $31,000,000. there were 745,000 horses, 14,000 mules, 682,000 sheep, 2,400,000 swine, 461,864 dairy cows, and 1,246,000 other cattle in the state on jan. 1 1925. manufactures.—the principal industries in 1925 were packing and canning goods, flourmill and gristmill products, bread and other bakery products, printing and publishing, automobile and truck repairing, cars and general shop construction and re- pairs by steam railway companics, lumber and timber products. the bank deposits were $219,504,3t4 in 1922; $233,804,397 in 1923; $177,806,095 in 1924, and $180,841,520 in 1925. the total assessed valuation of all taxable property was $1,977,127, 560 in 1922; $1,940, 998,027 in 1923, and $1,876,112,- 764 in 1924. the tax levied in 1921, 1922 and 1923 was $33.- 006,021; $32,724,800, and $32,568,923. the expenditure for the 605 state govt. educational, charitable and penal institutions was $9,711,064 in 1920; $18,389,586 in 1924. the state’s bonded in- dcbtedness in 1924 was $62,350,000, $47,500,000 of which was loaned by the rural credit board to farmers; $2,000,000 was in- vested in cement plant; $5,950,000 was used for construction of highways; $6,000,000 for soldiers’ bonus and $900,000 for sol- dicrs’ land settlement. the debt had been reduced to $61,500,000 by 1925. political historv-—the republican party remained in con- trol of the state govt. from 1909 to 1926. the governors were robert s. vessey, 1909-13; frank m. byrne, 1913-7; peter norbeck, 1917-21; william mcmaster, t921-5; carl gunderson, 1925. norbeck was elected to the united states senate in 1920, and mcmaster in 1924. (cee southend-on-sea, england (sce 25.510), with a populatien of 106,010 in 1921, estimated in 1925 at 117,000, and an area of 7,082 ac., has grown with great rapidity. jt was created a country borough in r9r4, leigh and part of eastwood having been included in 1913. the parishes of leigh, prittlewell, south- church, and part of eastchurch, have been constituted one parish with that of southend, so that the boundarics of the parish and the borough are now conterminous. southend has returned one member to parliament since 1918. practically the whole of the cliffs from the alexandra yacht club to sharefields are in the hands of the corporation, and a scheme of improvements is being carried out: there are nearly seven miles of esplanades. eleven acres of land off sutton road were given to the town in r9ot4 and opened as a recreation ground in 1920, and the victory sports ground was given in 1921. the belfairs estate of 270 ac., to the northwest of leigh, was acquired by the corporation in 1919; prittlewell priory, presented to the borough in 1917, has been restored, andl now houses a museum removed from the public library; southchurch hall, a medieval house, and its grounds were acquired in to25. a war memorial on the cliffs was unveiled in i921. in 1925 a new arterial road to london was opened. there were a number of air raids over southend during the world war, and 32 people were killed in one which took place in 1917. south sea islands: see ocfania. south shields, england (see 25.516), a thriving port and the chief outlet for the collicries of northumberland and dur- ham, had a population of 116,635 in 1921, and an area of 2,339 ac. of land and inland water (not including the area added in that year). in 1r918 cleadon park of 196 ac., with a mansion since made into a tuberculosis sanatorium, to the south of harton, was bought for a housing scheme. an isolation hospital was built on part of the estate, and a light railway of 13 m. has been laid. in 1921 the new suburb and ilarton village were added to the borough; the number of aldermen was in- creased to 15, and of councillors to 45. twenty ac. of land were acquired for a cemetery in 1917, and readhead park of 73 ac. in 1922. new municipal buildings were opened in westoe road in 1910, and a statue of queen victoria unveiled in front of the main entrance in 1913; the old town hall is used by a branch of the imperial merchants’ service guild. a cenotaph in memory of men from the western end of the town was erected at tyne dock in 1921. constant dredging is carried on to maintain a depth of 30 ft. in the channel of the tyne as far as the north- umberland dock. southwest africa (sce 11.800c), a mandated territory in south africa, formerly german southwest africa. the admin- istration of the country is vested in the government of the union of south africa, under a mandate conferred by “ the allied and associated powers,” which took effect from dec. 17 1920. no change has been made in the area of the territory, which covers 322,393 sq. miles. the administration of the north- western extension towards the zambesi, known as the ‘ caprivi zipfel ” (10,573 sq. m. in area) has been delegated to the high commissioner for south africa, and attached to the bechuana- land protectorate, while walvis bay (374 sq. m.) is included in the mandated territory. the area of the territory administered by the mandatory is therefore 312,194 sq. miles. population 606 (census of may 3 1921) 227,739, of whom 19,500 were whites and 5,000 of mixed native and european descent. i, political history after the conquest of german southwest africa in july, 191s, the administration was carried on under martial law to the end of 1920. by the treaty of versailles (article 119) germany ceded her colonies to the allies, and article 22 indi- cated southwest africa as a territory which should in future be administered under the laws of the mandatory, as an integral part of its own territory. accordingly, on dec. 17 1920, a mandate was conferred on his britannic majesty “ for and on behalf of the government of the union of south africa,” that government having already (sept. 1919) been authorised by its parliament to accept it (act 49 of 1919). | _ the mandate conferred full powers of administration and legisla- tion, subject to the mandate, which prescribed the prohibition of the slave trade and of forced labour for any purpose other than essential public works and services; the control of the traffic in arms and ammunition; prohibition of the supply of intoxicating liquor to natives; prohibition of military training of natives except for police and internal defence, and of military and naval bases in the terri- tory; freedom of conscience and worship; and finally that an annual report on the administration should be submitted to the council of the league of nations. the union govt. by act no. 40, acquired parliamentary sanction to delegate its authority, but all laws were to be submitted to parliament, and specific authority was required before the administrator could grant state lands or min- _ erals, or any trading or other concessions, or alienate native reserves. in jan. 1921, by proclamation of the governor-general, martial law was replaced by a civil administration under an administrator, to whom his powers of legislation were delegated. in accordance with the recommendations of a parliamentary com- mission set up in 1920, an advisory council of eight unofficial, and one official member, representing the native interests, was appointed by the administrator to advise on general policy, on the raising and expending of revenue, and on any other matter on which its advice might be asked. law.—the law of the territory consists in part of acts by the union parliament, and in part of ordinances enacted by the administrator and approved by parliament. the more important of the former are act 12 of 1920, which constituted the supreme court of the union as an appellate court for the territory; act 35 of 1921, which included it in the customs union; act 20 of 1922, which vested the railways and harbours in the union government and placed them under its management; act 27 of 1923, which amalgamated the civil services; and act 30 of 1924, relative to the status of germans. this last demands a word of explanation. it was the declared policy of the union to accept the germans “as part of the people with the same privileges and the same responsibilities as the others.’”” german immigrants had been welcomed, and 1,361 had arrived from overseas by the end of 1922. the question of their status was the first and most pressing problem. it was decided, with the consent of the league council, to enact a law by which every german should automatically ac- quire the status of a british subject in the union, unless he declined it before a given date. the proposal was opposed by the germans at windhoek, though welcomed by others, and it was not till oct. 1923, that an agreement was reached be- tween general smuts and two representatives of the german government. the mandatory pledged itself to allow german to be an official language and used in german schools; it accepted liability for the pensions of german ex-civil servants, and agreecl that germans should not be liable for military service against germany for 30 years. the agreement was given legal sanction by act. 30 of 1924. form of government.—the settlement of this question enabled the mandatory to turn its attention to the form of government which should replace the transitional rule of the administrator. in 1924 the premier, general hertzog, toured the country, and declared that the demand of the europeans for some form of self-government ought to be satisfied. an act, no. 42 of 1925, was passed the next year. the territory was divided into 12 southwest africa constituencies, each electing a member for the legislative assem- bly, to which six more were nominated by the union govern- ment. certain subjects were absolutely reserved to the cape parliament. these were the control of mines and minerals, rail- ways and harbours, the public service, the courts of justice, the posts and telegraphs, defence, immigration, customs tariffs, currency and banking, and native affairs. education, police, aviation, the disposal of land and the control of land banks, were temporarily reserved. an executive of five members, under the chairmanship of the administrator, is elected by the assembly. the administrator also exercises executive functions in respect of reserved subjects, and is then aided by an advisory council of four executive coun- cillors and three nominees of his own, including one with knowl- edge of native affairs. the native population, which outnumbers the europeans by ro to one, has neither direct representation nor the right to vote. the total number of the adult male europeans who exercise that right is 6,500. the union govt. retains full powers of legislation and veto, since as mandatory it alone is responsible to the league of nations. revenue and defence—the revenue of the territory is about £850,000, nearly half of which is derived from royalties on the diamond mines. the ordinary expenditure has been in the neigh- bourhood of £650,000, and a considerable surplus has accumulated. the police force consists of about 280 white, and 240 natives. native farm labour is paid 10s. to 20s. per month with food. the administration is endeavouring to create adequate reserves for the natives and coloured people, and large areas of waterless land have been reclaimed for this purpose by well boring. native risings-—the administration has been faced with two native risings. the first, by a small body of bondelzwarts, who were irritated by certain regulations regarding cattle branding, taxes on dogs, and other matters, was suppressed with con- siderable loss of life, which pave rise to some adverse criticism. the second, by a small body of “ bastards ” (rehoboths) who claimed complete autonomy, was dispersed without bloodshed. ii. production and trade southwest africa is largely a cattle-raising and sheep-farming country. the absence of water renders large-scale agriculture almost impossible, for the only rivers with a constant flow are the kunene and okavango in the extreme north: the territory depends for its permanent supply of water upon subterranean streams, which are tapped by sinking wells and boreholes. small crops of maize, pota- toes, cotton, pumpkins and beans are raised, and with the develop- ment of irrigation considerable possibilities should arise for the cultivation of wheat and the extension of cotton. dairy farming is making progress and several creamcries have been established; the production of butter and checse is increasing. the territory contains extensive mineral deposits. the most valuable product is diamonds, the value of which in 1924 was £1,224,440. copper and lead (value £571,152), next vanadium (£83,435) and tin (£31,400) are also worked, while silver and other minerals are believed to exist, but are not exploited. the gold exported in 1922 amounted to 147 ounces. large deposits of guano are found along the coast. the bulk of the trade of the territory is with the union of south africa. the development of agriculture is indicated by the increasing imports of agricultural machinery and implements, fertilisers, power lorrics and steam wagons: the increase in the export of cotton from 914,268 ib. in 1921 to 3,299,388 lb. in 1924 shows the steady develop- ment in the cultivation of cotton. the larger imports of mining machinery and the increased exports of copper, lead and vanadium also indicate the development of the mineral resources of the ter- ritory. the progress made by cattle raising and sheep and dairy farming is shown by the increasing exports of cattle, sheep and butter to the union of south africa. the export of diamonds, valued in 1924 at £1,395,846, was entirely to the united kingdom; copper ore was mainly exported to belgium, and vanadium ore to ger- many and the united kingdom. communications and finance.—the railway system of the terri- tory, before the occupation by the union, linked up the ports of luderitz and swakopmund with kalkfontein in the south, windhoek in the central area, and tsumeb and grootfontein in the north. in 1915 a linc was completed between kalkfontein and pricska, a dis- tance of 3153 m., connecting the system with that of the union. a short line was also constructed from walvis bay to the former german system, thus completing a network of railways which links up walvis bay and luderitz with cape town, port elizabeth, durban and other south african ports, and with lourengo marques and beira on the cast coast. the chief ports are walvis bay and southwest africa, campaign in luderitz: swakopmund has been permanently closed as a port, and the whole of the landing and shipping work transferred to walvis bay, which is now the regular port of call for mail steamers. a wireless station has been erected there. branches of the national bank of south africa (now barclay’s dominion, colonial and overseas bank) and the standard bank of south africa have been established in the chief towns, bibliography.—a, j. toynbee, survey of international affairs, 1920-3 (1925), pp. 397-417, where a list of documents is given. l.) southwest africa, campaign in.—for some time before the year 1914 the proximity of the german [protectorate of southwest africa, sharing a common frontier on its southern and eastern borders with the union of south africa, had been recognised by the government of the latter country as an im- portant factor in its military arrangements. on aug. 6 1914 the union govt. undertook to assume all obligations resting upon the british regular garrison in south africa, and, on aug. 10, to send a military expedition of its own against german southwest africa. the british govt. accepted both offers, and indicated the enemy seaports and the wireless installation at windhuk as the first objectives of the military venture. early action was vital in view of the position of south africa on the ocean route between europe and asia, and the necessity for denying harbours and facility for long range communication to the enemy naval squadron in the south atlantic. 7 arrival of british troops—between aug. 31 and sept. 18 a mixed force under brig. gen. lukin was disembarked at port nolloth and disposed thence eastwards along the southern enemy border to steinkopf, the line of observation being con- tinued to upington by another force under lt. col. maritz. the first union troops to occupy enemy tcrritory were those com- -manded by col. beves, which landed unopposed at luderitz- bucht on sept. 18. on sept. 9 maritz, with the greater portion of his command deserted to the enemy, actuated by the same mo- tives as induced a small part of the dutch population of the union, which had displayed strong antagonism to the war policy of their government, to go into rebellion in october. though only some 11,000 rebels took the field, 30,000 loyal troops were needed to quell the rebellion, and offensive action against the enemy was delayed for four months. a strong ad- vanced union detachment with 2 guns was captured in enemy territory at zandfontein on sept. 26, a reverse to which the treachery of maritz was largely contributory. meanwhile louis botha had assumed command of all the south african forces on the outbreak of the rebellion, and on its conclusion on teb. 3 1915, left cape town to conduct the postponed offensive against the enemy. the leading units of the force which was to operate under his immediate command reached walvis bay in union territory on dec. 25 under col. skinner, who on jan. 13 occupied the northernmost enemy port of swakopmund. gen. botha reached swakopmund on feb. 11. disposition of forces ——the position then was that the north- ern force (gen. botha) held walvis bay and swakopmund, fac- ing the troops of the enemy chief command (lt. col. franke). the central force (brig. gen. sir d. mckenzie) occupied luderitzbucht with its forward troops at tshaukaib, 40 m. inland, in touch with the enemy on the railway line to keetman- shoop. the southern force (brig. gen van. deventer) watched the german force (major ritter) on the southern enemy border. the eastern force (col. berrange), considerably smaller than the rest, was mobilising for an advance along the kuruman and molopo rivers against the eastern border of the enemy, whose detachments here lay at rietfontein and hasuur. the northern and central forces had strong infantry formations, though mounted troops predominated in the former, while the two other forces were composed of mounted units. heavy and field artillery were allotted as the nature of the task of each force suggested, and valuable aid was afforded by the presence of officers from the royal marine artillery in the heavy batteries. the royal navy conveyed, escorted and disembarked the whole of the forces and their supplies from the base at cape town. 607 the scene of operations.—the greater portion of the theatre of the campaign’s 322,350 square miles in area is a plateau 3,500 ft. above sea level. a barren waterless tract, 40 to 100 m. broad on the coast side and 200 inland, intervenes between the first rise to the plateau and the border. water is extremely scarce everywhere, and the water holes were well known and far apart. the country is very sandy and often rough. the climate is dry and healthy for man and beast, though malaria occurs in the wet season in the north. cattle were plentiful, all other supplies, including fodder, scanty. the scene of operations was thus badly watered, difficult to move in and devoid of supplies, and the interior was protected by a desolate belt of desert. a railway (3 ft. 6-in. gauge) ran from luderitzbucht to keetmanshoop in the south, thence north to windhuk and from there west to karibib. an extension to kalkfontein in the south branched from the luderitzbucht-keetmanshoop section at seeheim, a total length of 800 miles. from swakopmund a 2-ft. gauge line ran to karibib and thence north to tsumeb and grootfontein, a total length of 420 miles. the lines were much damaged by the enemy and the union engineers repaired 1,040 m. and laid 340 m. of new line during the campaign. the enemy forces consisted of 2,000 soldiers and 140 officers and in addition 7,000 male europeans, many with military training. of military material and equipment the german commander had abundance; he en- joyed throughout a substantial advantage in respect of artillery. botha’s campaign.—on feb. 23, gen. botha moved from swakopmund and secured ressing on the railway line and husab on the swakop river. the river route was selected for the main advance, and on march 18, after careful and tedious preparations gen. botha again advanced and heavily defeated the enemy at riet and pforte in the swakop valley, capturing 2 guns and 284 prisoners. sixty miles of the river route were now secured, and, after another period of preparation, a third advance was made on april 26 and karibib occupied on may 5, after a series of rapid turning movements by mounted troops. the enemy withdrew to the north and windhuk was occupied on may 12. the auxiliary movements —gen. botha’s infantry (skinner) had meantime advanced along the railway and occupied usakos. on march 30 the central force occupied aus, and on april 26 at gibeon, mckenzie’s mounted troops, after rapid sustained marching, overtook and heavily attacked the enemy retiring from the south. the eastern force (berrange) left kuruman on march 6 and joined hands with the southern force on april 20 at kabus. the southern force (gen. smuts) defeated the enemy at nabas on march 8 and at kabus on april 20. the capital occu- pied, all the country to the south fell into gen. botha’s hands. a conference between the union commander and gov. seitz at giftkuppe on may 21 proved abortive and the final stage of the campaign against the enemy, now concentrated in the north, ensued. after reorganisation and settlement of the occupied territory, gen. botha advanced from karibib on june 18. the main body (mounted troops and infantry) moved in the centre with the commander-in-chief, while strong mounted forces operated to the east and west commanded respectively by myburgh and brits. the enemy retired rapidly, and on june 27 brits was ordered to move widely to the northwest and head the enemy off at namutoni, while myburgh was to swing in on tsumeb from the east. these movements were carried out exactly and the enemy, defeated on july 1 at otavi by the lead- ing mounted brigade of the centre, forestalled at namutoni, and having lost tsumeb, surrendered on july 9 1915. concluston.—the campaign had been won with little loss ol life—127 union soldiers were killed in the rebellion and in german southwest africa, but it will repay study as an instance of success in spite of difficulties in climate and terrain, and for the experience which it afforded of the value of fertility of re- source and power of adaptation. some of the obstacles which were surmounted seemed almost impossible to deal with, and the methods adopted in connection with water supply are worthy of close attention. some magnificent marching was a striking feature of all the operations. brits’s force on the final advance marched 340 m. in 20 days; mckenzie’s mounted troops covered 608 200 m. in 12 days; while the infantry brigade in the centre in the concluding operations in 16 days marched 230 miles. finally, the campaign reveals the extraordinary mobility of mounted riflemen when good horsemen are directed by a master hand. bibliography.—m. ritchie, w7th botha in the field (1915); w. whittall, with botha and smuts (1917); r. hennig, deutsch stid- west im w eltkriege (1920); t. scitz, stidafrika im weltkriege (1920). see also world war: bibliography. gedec:) sova, antonin (1864- }, czech poet, began his literary career early in the ‘nineties with descriptive verse, the subject- matter of which was derived from the streets of prague and from his native region of southern bohemia. ilis introspective poems, notably those contained in the volumes lyrics of love and life, mastered sorrows and once again shall we return, include some of the finest lyrical poems in the czech language, and have been compared, not without justification, with verlaine. the dis- illusionment caused by the poet’s contact with the realitics of life drove him to seek escape in a dream-world of his own, and this theme was treated in a series of visionary poems which reveal sova as a master of symbolism. in 1913 appeared harvesis, a volume in which moods of a mature reconciliation predominate. in the succeeding decade sova exhibited an unusual fecundity. the poems of this later period are written with the crystalline simplicity of folk songs, and there are others in which sova is shown as one of the most enlightencd spokesmen of czech aspira- tions. he also wrote a number of novels and short stories. soya bean: see oils and fats. spa, conference of (july 5-16 10920).—this was the first occasion after the war of 1914-8 on which the heads of the german and allied governments negotiated on a formal footing of equality. at the same time, at spa, as at versailles, the allies resorted to dictation, and negotiations resulting in an agreed settlement did not take place until the london reparations conference of july and aug. 1924. the germans were repre- sented by the chancellor, herr fehrenbach; the foreign minister dr. simons; and the finance minister, dr. wirth. the crucial questions at issue were the execution of the disarmament clauses and the coal delivery clauses of the treaty of versailles, and in both cases the germans were compelled to sign protocols dictated by the allies under threat of military sanctions which were set out in the documents and in both cases included an eventual allied occupation of the ruhr basin. in the coal negotiations, the allies were exasperated by the pugnacious tone of herr stinnes, who gave evidence on behalf of the german coal-owners, but the protocol afterwards signed was remarkable inasmuch as it provided for partial cash payments by the allies. a german proposal for the general settlement of the reparation problem was rejected, but on this occasion no general alhed counter-proposal was put forward. in regard to reparations, the chief permanent achievement at spa was the inter-allied agreement regarding the allocation of prospective german payments, an agreement which has since been modified in detail, but which still governs the situation. it was provided that france should receive 52% of sums obtained from germany, the british empue 22%, italy 10% and belgium 8%, while the remaining 8% was to be divided between the other allied powers. by a siteecient agreement among the several members of the british commonwealth, 86-85% of the british empire’s share was allocated to great britain. another article in the spa agreement provided for the allocation of reparation payments from austria, bulgaria and hungary, and “cost of liberation ” pay- ments from italy, czechoslovakia, rumania and yugoslavia. at the spa conference the supreme council also came to an agreement with germany regarding the trial of war criminals, dealt with the teschen question and rejected the objections of the constantinople govt. to the draft treaty of sevres. ajit space-time (see 25.525)—all our thoughts and concepts are called up by sense-expericnces and have a meaning only in reference to these sense-experiences. on the other hand, how- ever, they are products of the spontancous activity of our minds; they are thus in no wise logical consequences of the contents of sova-—space-time these sense-experiences. if, therefore, we wish to grasp the essence of a complex of abstract notions we must for the one part investigate the mutual relationships between the concepts and the assertions made about them; for the other, we must investigate how they are related to the experiences. so far as the way is concerned in which concepts are connected with one another and with the experiences there is no difference of principle between the concept-systems of science and those of daily life. the concept-systems of science have grown out of those of daily life and have been modified and completed accord- ing to the objects and purposes of the science in question. the more universal a concept is the more frequently it enters into our thinking; and the more indirect its relation to sense- experience, the more difficult it is for us to comprehend its mean- ing; this is particularly the case with pre-scientific concepts that we have been accustomed to use since childhood. consider the concepts referred to in the words “f where,” “ when,” ‘ why,” “being,” to the elucidation of which innumerable volumes of philosophy have been devoted. we fare no better in our specu- lations than a fish which should strive to become clear as to what is water. i. space in the present article we arc concerned with the meaning of “‘ where,” that is, of space. it appears that there is no quality contained in our individual primitive sense-experiences that may be designated as spatial. rather, what is spatial appears to be a sort of order of the material objects of experience. the concept ‘“‘ material object ” must therefore be available if concepts con- cerning space are to be possible. it is the logically primary concept. this is easily seen if we analyse the spatial concepts for example, ‘‘ next to,” “ touch,” and so forth, that is, if we strive to become aware of their equivalents in experience. the concept “ object ” is a means of taking into account the persist- ence in time or the continuity, respectively, of certain groups of experience-complexes. the existence of objects is thus of a con- ceptual nature, and the meaning of the concepts of objects de- pends wholly on their being connected (intuitively) with groups of elementary sense-experiences. this connection is the basis of the illusion which makes primitive experience appear to inform us directly about the relation of material bodies (which exist, after all, only in so far as they are thought). in the sense thus indicated we have (the indirect) experience of the contact of two bodies. we need do no more than call attention to this, as we gain nothing for our present purpose by singling out the individual experiences to which this assertion alludes. many bodies can be brought into permanent contact with one another in manifold ways. we speak in this sense of the position-relationships of bodies (lagenbeziehungen). the general laws of such position-relationships are essentially the concern of geometry. this holds, at least; if we do not wish to restrict ourselves to regarding the propositions that occur in this branch of knowledge merely as relationships between empty words that have been set up according to certain principles. pre-scientific thought—now, what is the meaning of the con- cept “ space” which we also encounter in pre-scientific thought? the concept of space in pre-scientific thought is characterised by the sentence: “‘ we can think away things but not the space which they occupy.” it is as if, without having had experience of any sort, we had a concept, nay even a presentation, of space and as if we ordered our sense-experiences with the help of this concept, present a priori. on the other hand, space appears as a physical reality, as a thing which exists independently of our thought, like material objects. under the iniluence of this view of space the fundamental concepts of geometry: the point, the straight line, the plane, were even regarded as having a self- evident character. the fundamental principles that deal with these configurations were regarded as being necessarily valid and as having at the same time an objective content. no scruples were felt about ascribing an objective meaning to such statements as ‘three empirically given bodies (practically infinitely small) lie on one straight line,” without demanding a physical definition space-time for such an assertion. this blind faith in evidence and in the immediately real meaning of the concepts and propositions of geometry became uncertain only alter non-euclidean geometry had been introduced. reference to the earth—ii we start from the view that all spatial concepts are related to contact-expericnces of solid bod- ies, it is easy to understand how the concept “‘ space ” originated, namely, how a thing independent of bodies and yet embodying their position-possibilitics (legerungsmeglichkeiten) was posited. if we have a system of boilics in contact and at rest relatively to one another, some can be replaced by others. this property of allowing substitution is interpreted as “‘ available space.” space denotes the property in virtue of which rigid bodies can occupy different positions. the view that space is something with a unity of its own is perhaps due to the circumstance that in pre- scientific thought all positions of bodies were referred to one body (reference body), namely the earth. in scientific thought the earth is represented by the co-ordinate system. the assertion that it would be possible to place an unlimited number of bodies next to one another denotes that space is infinite. in pre- scientific thought the concepts “‘ space ” and “ time ” and “ body of reference ” are scarcely diffcrentiated at all. a place or point in space is always taken to mean a material point on a body of reference. euclidean geometry.—lif we consider euclidean geometry we clearly discern that it refers to the laws regulating the positions of rigid bodies. it turns to account the ingenious thought of tracing back all relations concerning bodies and their relative positions to the very simple concept ‘ distance ” (strecke). distance denotes a rigid body on which two material points (marks) have been specified. the concept of the equality of distances (and angles) refers to experiments involving coin- cidences; the same remarks apply to the theorems on congruence. now, euclidean geometry, in the form in which it has been handed down to us from euclid, uses the fundamental concepts “straight line’ and “ plane” which do not appear to corre- spond, or at any rate, not so directly, with experiences concern- ing the position of rigid bodies. on this it must be remarked that the concept of the straight line may be reduced to that of the distance.!. moreover, geometricians were less concerned with bringing out the relation of their fundamental concepts to experience than with deducing logically the geometrical proposi- tions from a few axioms enunciated at the outset. let us outline bricily how perhaps the basis of euclidean geometry may be gained from the concept of distance. we start from the equality of distances (axiom of the equality of distances). suppose that of two unequal distances one is always greater than the other. the same axioms are to hold for the inequality of distances as hold for the inequality of numbers. three distances ab!, bc!, c.\! may, if ca be suitably chosen, have their marks bb?, cc!, aa! superposed on one another in such a way that a triangle abc results. the distance ca! has an upper limit for which this construction is still just possible. the points a, (bb’) and c then lie in a “ straight line ” (definition). this leads to the concepts: producing a distance by an amount equal to itself; dividing a distance into equal parts; expressing a distance in terms of a number by means of a measuring-rod (definition of the space-interval between two points). when the corcept of the interval between two points or the length of a distance has been gained in this way we require only the following axiom (pythagoras’ theorem) in order to arrive at euclidean geometry analytically. to every point of space (body of reference) three numbers (co-ordinates) x, y, z may be assigned—and conversely—in such a way that for each pair of points a (x;, y1, 21,) and b (xs, ve, ze) the theorem holds: measure-number ab = ¥/ (x2—x1)? + (ye— yi)? + (22-21)? 1a hint of this is contained in the theorem: “ the straight line is the shortest connection between two points.” this theorem served well as a definition of the straight line, although the definition played no part in the logical texture of the deductions, 609 all further concepts and propositions of euclidean geometry can then be built up purely logically on this basis, in particular also the propositions about the straight line and the plane. these remarks are not, of course, intended to replace the strictly axiomatic construction of euclidean geometry. we merely wish to indicate plausibly how all conceptions of geometry may be traced back to that of distance. we might equally well have epitomised the whole basis of euclidean geometry in the last theorem above. the relation to the foundations of experi- ence would then be furnished by means of a supplementary theorem. the co-ordinate may and neast be chosen so that two pairs of points separated by equal intervals, as calculated by the help of pythagoras’ theorem, may be made to coincide with one and the same suitably chosen distance (on a solid). the concepts and propositions of euclidean geometry may be derived from pythagoras’ proposition without the introduction of rigid bodies; but these concepts and propositions would not then have contents that could be tested. they are not “ true” propositions but only logically correct propositions of purely formal content. | dificulties—a serious difficulty is encountered in the above represented interpretation of geometry in that the rigid body of experience does not correspond exactly with the geometrical body. in stating this i am thinking less of the fact that there are no absolutely definite marks than that temperature, pressure and other circumstances modify the laws relating to position. it is also to be recollected that the structural constituents of matter (such as atom and electron, g.v.) assumed by physics are not in principle commensurate with rigid bodies, but that never- theless the concepts of geometry are applied to them and to their parts. tor thts reason consistent thinkers have been disinclined to allow real contents of facts (reale tatsachenbesteinde) to corre- spond to geometry alone. they considered it preferable to allow the content of experience (/irfahrungsbestdende) to correspond to geometry and physics conjointly. this view is certainly less open to attack than the one repre- sented above; as opposed to the atomic theory it is the only one that can be consistently carried through. nevertheless, in the opinion of the author it would not be advisable to give up the first view, from which geometry derives its origin. this con- nection is essentially founded on the belief that the ideal rigid body is an abstraction that is well rooted in the laws of nature. foundations of geometry —we come now to the question: what is a priori certain or necessary, respectively in geometry (doctrine of space) or its foundations? formerly we thought everything—yes, everything; nowadays we think—nothing. already the distance-concept is logically arbitrary; there need be no things that correspond to it, even approximately. some- thing similar may be said of the concepts straight line, plane, of three-dimensionality and of the validity of pythagoras’ thecrem. nay, even the continuum-doctrine is in no wise given with the nature of human thought, so that from the epistomological point of view no greater authority attaches to the purely topological relations than to the others. ltarlier physical concepis—we have yet to deal with those modifications in the space-concept, which have accompanied the advent of the theory of relativity. for this purpose we must consider the space-concept of the earlier physics from a point of view different from that above. jf we apply the theorem of pythagoras to infinitely near points, it reads dst=ds?4-dy?4dz® where ds denotes the measurable interval between them. for an empirically-given ds the co-ordinate system is not yet fully determined for every combination of points by this equation. | besides being translated, a co-ordinate system may also be rotated? this signifies analytically: the relations of euclidean geometry are covariant with respect to linear orthogonal trans- formations of the co-ordinates. * change of direction of the co-ordinate axes while their orthog- onality is preserved. 610 in applying euclidean geometry to pre-relativistic mechanics a further indeterminateness enters through the choice of the co- ordinate system: the state of motion of the co-ordinate system is arbitary to a certain degree, namely, in that substitutions of the co-ordinates of the form x’=x—vt y'=y 3 z=z also appear possible. on the other hand, earlier mechantes dil not allow co-ordinate systems to be applied of which the states of motion were different from those expressed in these equations. in this sense we speak of “‘ inertial systems.”’ in these favoured- inertial systems we are confronted with a new property of space so far as geometrical relations are concerned. regarded more accurately, this is not a property of space alone but of the four- dimensional continuum consisting of time and space conjointly. appearance of time.—at this point time enters explicitly into our discussion for the first time. in their applications space (place) and time always occur together. every event that happens in the world is determined by the space-co-ordinates xx, y, z, and the time-co-ordinate t. thus the physical description was four-dimensional right from the beginning. but this four- dimensional continuum seemed to resolve itself into the three- dimensional continuum of space and the one-dimensional con- tinuum of time. this apparent resolution owed its origin to the illusion that the meaning of the concept “‘simultaneity ” is self- evident, and this illusion arises from the fact that we receive news of near events almost instantaneously owing to the agency of light. this faith in the absolute significance of simultaneity was destroyed by the law regulating the propagation of light in empty space or, respectively, by the maxwell-lorentz electro- dynamics. two infinitely near points can be connected by means of a light-signal if the relation ds? = c*’dt?= dx?— dy?— dz?7=o0 holds for them. it further follows that ds has a value which, for arbitrarily chosen infinitely near space-time points, is independ- ent of the particular inertial system selected. in agreement with this we find that for passing from one inertial system to another, linear equations of transformation hold which do not in general leave the time-values of the events unchanged. it thus became manifest that the four-dimensional continuum of space cannot be split up into a time-continuum and a space-continuum except in an arbitrary way. this invariant quantity ds may be measured by means of measuring-rods and clocks. four dimensional geometry—on the invariant ds a four- dimensional geometry may be built up which is in a jarge measure analogous to euclidean geometry in three dimensions. in this way physics becomes a sort of statics in a four-dimensional con- tinuum. apart from the difference in the number of dimensions the latter continuum is distinguished from that of euclidean geometry in that ds? may be greater or less than zero. corre- sponding to this we differentiate between time-like and space-like line-elements. the boundary between them is marked out by the element of the “ light-cone ” ds?=o which starts out from every point. if we consider only elements which belong to the same time-value, we have — ds?= dx?+ dy?+- dz? these elements ds may have real counterparts in distances at rest and, as before, euclidean geometry holds for these elements. effect of relativity, special and general.—this is the modifica- tion which the doctrine of space and time has undergone through the restricted theory of relativity. the doctrine of space has been still further modified by the general theory of relativity, because this theory denies that the threc-dimensional spatial section of the space-time continuum is euclidean in character. therefore it asserts that euclidean geometry does not hold for the relative positions of bodies that are continuously in contact. for the empirical law of the equality of inertial and gravita- tional mass led us to interpret the state of the continuum, in so far as it manifests itself with reference to a non-inertial system, as a gravitational ficld and to treat non-inertial systems as space-time equivalent to inertial systems. referred to such a system, which is connected with the inertial system by a non-linear transforma- tion of the co-ordinates, the metrical invariant ds? assumes the general form :— ae ds? = > gurdxydxy er where the gu»’s are functions of the co-ordinates and where the sum is to be taken over the indices for all combinations 11, 12, ...44. the variability of the gy»’s is equivalent to the existence of a gravitational field. if the gravitational field 1s sufficiently general it is not possible at all to find an inertial system, that is, a co-ordinate system with reference to which ds? may be expressed in the simple form given above:— ds? = c? dt? — dx?— dy?— dz? but in this case, too, there is in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of a space-time point a local system of reference for which the last-mentioned simple form for ds holds. this state of the facts leads to a type of geometry which riemann’s genius created more than half a century before the advent of the general theory of relativity of which riemann divined the high importance for physics. riemann’s geometry.—riemann’s geometry of an n-dimension- al space bears the same relation to euclidean geometry of an n- dimensional space as the general geometry of curved surfaces bears to the geometry of the plane. for the infinitesimal neigh- bourhood of a point on a curved surface there is a local co- ordinate system in which the distance ds between two infinitely hear points is given by the equation ds? = dx?+ dy? for any arbitrary (gaussian) co-ordinate-system, however, an expression of the form ds? = gudx?-+ 2b 2d x1dxe-+ bodx-? holds in a finite region of the curved surface. if the gyv’s are given as functions of x; and x2 the surface is then fully deter- mined geometrically. for from this formula we can calculate for every combination of two infinitely near points on the surface the length ds of the minute rod connecting them; and with the help of this formula all networks that can be constructed on the surface with these little rods can be calculated. in particular, the “ curvature ” at every point of the surface can be calculated; this is the quantity that expresses to what extent and in what way the laws regulating the positions of the minute rods in the immediate vicinity of the point under consideration deviate from those of the geometry of the plane. this theory of surfaces by gauss has been extended by riemann {o continua of any arbitrary number of dimensions and has thus paved the way for the general theory of relativity. for it was shown above that corresponding to two infinitely near space-time points there is a number ds which can be obtained by measure- ment with rigid measuring-rods and clocks (in the case of time- like elements, indeed, with a clock alone). this quantity occurs in the mathematical theory in place of the length of the minute rods in three-dimensional geometry. the curves for which fds has stationary values determine the paths of material points and rays of light in the gravitational field, and the “ curvature ” of space is dependent on the matter distributed over space. just as in euclidean geometry the space-concept refers to the position-possibilities of rigid bodies, so in the general theory of relativity the space-time-concept refers to the behaviour of rigid bodies and clocks. but the space-time-continuum differs from the space-continuum in that the laws regulating the behaviour of these objects (clocks and measuring-rods) depend on where they happen to be. the continuum (or the quantities that describe it) enters explicitly into the laws of nature, and con- versely these properties of the continuum are determined by physical factors. the relations that connect space and time can no longer be kept distinct from physics proper. spadini—spain nothing certain is known of what the properties of the space- time-continuum may be asa whole. through the general theory of relativity, however, the view that the continuum is infinite in its time-like extent but finite in its space-like extent has gained in probability. : time the physical time-concept answers to the time-concept of the extra-scientific mind. now, the latter has its root in the time- order of the experiences of the individual, and this order we must accept as something primarily given. i experience the moment ‘‘ now,” or, expressed more accurate- ly, the present sense-experience (sinnen-hrlebnis) combined with the recollection of (earlier) sense-experiences. that is why the sense-experiences secm to form a series, namely the time- series indicated by “ earlier”? and ‘ later.”” the experience- series is thought of as a one-dimensional continuum. experience- series can repeat themselves and can then be recognised. they can also be repeated inexactly, wherein some events are re- placed by others without the character of the repetition becom- ing lost for us. in this way we form the time-concept as a one- dimensional frame which can be filled in by experiences in various ways. the same series of experiences answer to the same sub- jective time-intervals. the transition from this “ subjective ” time (zch-zcit) to the time-concept of pre-scientific thought is connected with the for- mation of the idea that there is a real external world independent of the subject. in this sense the (objective) event is made to correspond with the subjective experience. in the same sense there is attributed to the ” subjective ” time of the experience a ‘‘ time ’’ of the corresponding ‘‘ objective ” event. in contrast with experiences external events and their order in time claim validity for all subjects. this process of objectification would encounter no difficulties were the time-order of the experiences corresponding to a series of external events the same for all individuals. in the case of the immediate visual perceptions of our daily lives, this corre- spondence is exact. that is why the idea that there is an objec- tive time-order became established to an extraordinary extent. in working out the idea of an objective world of external events in greater detail, it was found necessary to make events and experiences depend on each other in a more complicated way. this was at first done by means of rules and modes of thought instinctively gained, in which the conception of space plays a particularly prominent part. ‘this process of refinement leads ultimately to natural science. the measurement of time is effected by means of clocks. a clock is a thing which automatically passes in succession through a (practically) equal series of events (period). the number of periods (clock-time) elapsed serves as a measure of time. the meaning of this definition is at once clear if the event occurs in the immediate vicinity of the clock in space; for all observers then observe the same clock-time simultaneously with the event (by means of the eye) independently of their position. until the theory of relativity was propounded it was assumed that the conception of simultaneity had an absolute objective meaning also for events separated in space. this assumption was demolished by the discovery of the law of propagation of light. for if the velocity of hight in empty space is to be a quantity that is independent of the choice (or, respectively, of the state of motion) of the mertial system to which it is referred, no absolute meaning can be assigned to the conception of the simultaneity of events that occur at points separated by a distance in space. rather, a special time must be allocated to every inertial system. ii no co-ordinate system (inertial system) is used as a basis of reference there is no sense in asserting that events at different points in space occur simul- taneously. it is in consequence of this that space and time are welded together into a uniform four-dimensional continuum. see relativity. (a. e.) spadini, armando (1883-1025), italian painter was born in florence july 29 1883. he first studicd art in his native city ol! but was chiefly inspired by the great venetian artists, partic- ularly by giorgione and paolo veronese. his painting entitled “giovani al bagno ” secured him the pensieriato artistico na- zionale, in 1910. he developed rapidly an art which was full of grace of line, sunshine and brightness of colour, and specialised in the painting of children. two important pictures “‘ figure and bambini,” are in the national gallery of modern art in rome, ‘ musica al pincio ”’ is in the new mussolini museum also in rome, while others are in the florence modern art gallery, in the luxembourg, and in the lima museum; but his most important paintings are in private collections in rome. he died in rome on march 29 1925. spain (sce 25.527), a country of southwestern europe and a member of the league of nations. its area is 191,893 sq. m., and the population 21,966,000 (1925 estimate). i. political iistory at the close of the year 1910 sefior canalejas resigned in order to reconstruct his cabinet. this second ministry, during which (jan. 7-13) the king visited melilla, lasted till april 3 rorz, when it fell on the occasion of a debate on the ferrer case, the army officers having resented the half-hearted attitude of can- alejas on the matter. the incident was typical of much that was to come. the attention of parliament was diverted towards moroccan affairs. ‘the french were preparing their advance on i'ez, and spain was forced to an active policy, the first signs of which were received with ill-humour by the french press. the gov- ernment, in the teeth of popular opposition, were sending troops to morocco, and on june 9 a spanish force landed at larache. france was prevented from taking strong action by the agadir incident (see europe, history), but a certain tension prevailed between france and spain during the summer. anti-war meet- ings took place in barcelona and madrid, and a republican rising, plotted by the lower deck of the cruiser ‘‘ numancia ” anchored off tangier, though unsuccessful, startled public opin- ion. a campaign of strikes led to grave disorders in bilbao, catalonia and valencia, notably in cullera, where a magistrate was mobbed to death. the government met the situation with coolness and resolution, and towards the end of sept. the strike fever had abated. the moroccan operation prepared as a consequence of the disembarkation in larache began successfully on dec. 6, but collapsed a few days later after a gallant attempt to force the passage of the river kert, not without leaving behind an atmos- phere of ill-feeling clue to the belief, current in the spanish army, that the moorish troops were provided with french arms and ammunition. under such unfavourable conditions began the negotiations for a franco-spanish agreement following upon the franco-german treaty on morocco. after a reshuffling of his cabinet (march 11) canalejas adjourned parliament until may first. during the interval don melquiades alvarez, a moderate republican, launched the reformist party, aiming at bringing a certain important portion of republican opinion into the fold of the monarchy. the parliamentary session opened with the dis- cussion of the bill called de afancomunidades, ostensibly allowing ‘ diputaciones ”’ (elected provincial councils) to unite into groups for purposes of common administration, but jn reality constitut- ing a sop to catalonia, which under the bill could set up a kind of local parliament. with the summer a period of strikes, cul- minating in a grave railway strike, set in. canalejas met it by applying article 221 of the recruiting law allowing the drafting into military service of all men of military age working in indus- tries of public importance in cases of danger or abnormal circum- stances. on oct. 14 the autumn session began with a fresh dis- cussion of the bill de mancomunidades, but the session was brought to a close by the murder of canalejas on nov. 12 1912. the romanones ministry.—count romanones replaced cana- lejas, first in a somewhat temporary, then, after the franco- spanish treaty on morocco had been signed, in a more perma- nent capacity, having been confirmed in power by the king. this royal decision contributed to weaken the liberal party by 612 strengthening the division between the romanones and garcia prieto groups within it, and led to a sensational protest by sefior maura, who expected to be called to office. sefior alvarez, on the other hand, took the opportunity to accentuate his evolu- tion towards the monarchy, helped by the king, who, at the moment, was seeking the advice of several prominent men known for their advanced views. count romanones took a good share of whatever merit there was in this policy, as well as in the success of the king’s official visit to paris on the conclusion of the franco-spanish treaty (may 6-9). he resigned on may 31, after a strong speech of opposition from maura who restated his position of ‘‘ implacable hostility ” to a policy of co-operation with the parties of the anti-dynastic left. the next day the king asked him to return once more, after the crisis caused by a split in the liberal party on the question of the bill de afan- comunidades then before the senate (june 11). count romano- nes was reinstated by the king, but this time it was generally realised that this step was simply an expedient necessitated by the coming visit of m. poincare to madrid. m. poincare, president of the french republic, arrived in madrid on oct. 7. he left spain by way of cartagena, where he embarked on the battleship “‘ diderot,” spain being represented by the battleship “espafia ”’ and england by h.m.s. “ inflexible.” both the king and the president emphasised the fact that cartagena had, six years earlier, witnessed the franco-anglo-spanish agreement on mediterranean policy. the latent liberal crisis broke out as soon as m. poincare icft spanish soil. on oct. 25 the cabinet resigned, and the king,) after attempting in vain to reconcile the parties, realised that the liberal policy which he had constantly followed since rg09 was at an end. he first summoned maura but found his views on policy so dangerous that he turned to sefior dato (oct. 27), a choice which initiated the disintegration of the conservative party. the new government granted a decree giving validity of law to the bill de afancomunidades, dissolved the cortes (dec. 31 1913), and came back after a general election with a sufficient majority in both houses. it met with considerable opposition owing to several royal decisions which were interpreted as acts of personal power in military matters. but its internal difficulties were soon to be merged into the all-absorbing pre- occupation of the world war. the world war.—the international situation of spain at the outbreak of war was defined by two sets of circumstances: official, and national or popular. the official situation was ruled by the cartagena agreement of 1907, confirmed by the conversations held there in 1913 between m. poincare and count romanones. these agreements and conversations stipulated that “ should new circumstances arise tending to alter the territorial stalus gua” in the mediterranean or in the european and african coasts of the atlantic, the three powers concerned (spain, france and england) would ‘ enter into communication ” in order to take any measures that might be necessary. the war was obviously a “circumstance” falling within the limits of the above defini- tion. yet spain did not “enter into communication ” with france and england, for the two powers most interested in the matter, france and england, made no sign to set in motion the cartagena agreements. seftor dato promptly declared for an absolute neutrality; spain was, in fact, the only european nation which had no stake in the war. on the other hand, the nation was divided as to its feelings. the working classes, most of the intellectuals and the trading communities, were pro-ally. the clergy, most of the army and of the burcaucracy and the “ idle rich,” were pro-german. thus, the country was split into a re- actionary or conservative pro-german wing and a democratic or “ advanced ” pro-ally wing, and, as this division was real, and not fictitious as were the party groups, it cut across the parties. on one definite point everybody agreed. spain was to keep out of the war. a “‘ committee of initiative ”’ was created for the study and co- ordination of efforts to deal with war problems. parliament re- sumed its sittings on oct. 30 1914 and unanimously endorsed the foreign policy of the government. the country was meanwhile spain getting used to abnormal conditions. metals, raw and manu- factured, clothes and boots, all kinds of foodstutfis, horses and mules, poured into france, under the “ neutral”’ eye of the government. the government introduced and passed a bill which gave them special powers to deal with customs tartfis, railway rates, state purchases of food, shipping and expropriation of foodstuffs. the great increase in exports contributed to the rise in the value of the peseta, which gave the government an opportunity to repatriate the public debt, by enacting that all spanish government stock held by foreigners which was payable in francs or sterling should become payable in pesetas in the spanish market. though the cortes was closed, great political activity was displayed by all parties, stimulated by an active german propaganda, soon to be imitated by similar endeavours on the part of the allies. but though the excitement produced by several outbursts of partisan feeling did not go very deep, the government decided to deny all permits for meetings on neutral- ity and the war. a crisis was, however, precipitated on the refusal of the business community to co-operate with the government in the launching of a loan. the main cause of the failure seems to have been a reluctance of business circles to subscribe under conditions which were not considered generous enough for the subscriber. thercsignation of the government (june 22) was quickly followed by a reinstatement of the same cabinet. the situation of the treasury was by no means flourishing. at the end of the year revenue remained at 1,202,000,000 pesctas whiie expenses, not including government purchases of foodstuffs, rose to 1,556,000,- ooo pesetas. the government had to fall back on treasury bonds negotiated through the bank of spain. yet the work of the country was in full swing under the stimulus of war orders. thus, the shipowncrs announced to the government (aug. 1915) that the premiums granted them by the shipping acts as a measure of protection were no jonger necessary and would not be cashed. this meant that such premiums were no longer worth the sacrifice which they en- tailed of the shipowner’s liberty to trade as he pleased between foreign ports. great shipping profits ensued, and torpedoings followed. on aug. 17 the s.s. “isidoro” of bilbao was sunk by a german submarine. on aug. 20 the s.s. “‘pefia castillo” of santander sank in obscure circumstances. several efforts made to reunite the liberal groups into one party again failed. count romanones then prepared a plan of campaign against sefior dato’s government on the military reform bills which was ultimately successful, and the govern- ment fell on dec. 6. ‘the crisis ended in the formation of a united liberal ministry. count romanones took the premiership, and in order to counterbalance the effect of his well-known pro-ally views, assigned the foreign office to sefior villanueva, a notori- ous pro-german. ' ina sense, the inclusion of sefior urzaiz, the finance minister, who, though a liberal, was a party unto himself, and of admiral miranda, a conservative, initiated the period of mixed ministries, which was about to open as a logical consequence of the gradual weakening of the old parties, and in its turn tended to accelerate the process of their disintegration. urziiz came into conflict with his chief, and was dismissed before he had time to resign (veb. 25). itis successor, senor alba, with a bill on war profits, aroused the opposition of all the minorities except the socialist. but the cortes was closed, a general railway strike having suddenly upset all government plans on july 13. the strike was over one week later, and the autumn session dragged on till dec. 19. the government reappeared before the house on jan. 19, but in the meantime count romanones had resigned and accepted office again with the same ministry. this crisis was probably devised by the prime minister as a means to recover from the king the moral authority which some thought he had lost at the hands of the pro-german press, which accused him of drawing great profits as a business man from his foreign policy as a prime minister. count romanones wore his neutrality with a difference, and, though the inheritor of sefor dato’s policy, he did little to spain conceal his pro-ally views. by september, 1916, spain had lost more than 30,000 tons of shipping by torpedoing, and more than 50,000 in circumstances which were, to say the least, obscure. the shipping interests asked for government help. a period of government activity set in. on jan. 31 germany sent in a note establishing an “‘ absolute blockade ” of the allied coasts. count romanones was committed to a policy which implied a firm answer to such a note. he gave it in the note of feb. 6. but the prime minister realised that this firmness meant nothing unless backed with the will to fight if necessary and that public opinion would not follow him so far. he resolved to leave the govern- ment there and then, at the top of the wave of his own policy. cemmittces of defence.—other considerations of home policy were perhaps not altogether without effect on his decision, nota- bly, the first signs of a military conflict, which was fundamentally to alter spanish politics for years to come. when on april 19 count romanones resigned, he took the easiest path. his fall, however, cost him the leadership of his party. the new ministry, under the premiership of sefor garcia prieto, was frankly neutralist, and germany, rightly interpreting the position, felt freer to intensify her submarine campaign. but the government had to concentrate on the situation created by the so-called committees of defence. ‘towards the middle of 1916, a system of infantry committees of defence appeared, which soon evinced a tendency to interfere with the government in such a manner that, towards the end of the vear, count romanones, then in oflice, insisted on their dissolution. general aguilera, the war secretary in garcia pricto’s administration, ordered the leaders to be arrested. but meanwhile, probably owing to royal hints, a less dis- ciplinarian line of action was taken, and the arrested men were released. it was known later that an ultimatum had been placed in the hands of general marina, captain general of barcelona, with a time-limit of 12 hours (june 1). not unnaturally the government resigned. dato, called to office, capitulated before the juntas, and accepted their regulations in full. this victory of a movement which, in its essence, was revolutionary, had an immense effect on immediate events as well as on the political evolution of the country. the revolutionary ferment was stimulated. political manifestos asking for a renovation in government and constitution followed each other (socialists june 12, catalanists june 16, left-coalition june 16). al but three of the deputies and senators for catalonia met on july 5 at barcelona, and passed a resolution asking for an immediate meeting of the cortes, and declaring that, should the govern- ment refuse to comply with this request, a meeting of all the deputies and senators composing the cortes would be called at barcelona on july 19. the government allowed it to be known that should the assembly meet it would be considered as re- bellious and treated as such. the assembly met, 13 senators and 55 deputics attending, including all the socialist, republican and reformist members of the cortes, voted resolutions asking for a reform of the con- stitution, and set up three commissions to prepare reports on re- forms to be submitted to a second meeting to take place later. at one moment it looked as if these 68 men would take the leac of the revolutionary spirit which the bold action of the army officers had stirred in the country. but the mass of the assembly was too dull, and no real leader manifested himself. thus two attempts, one military, one middle-class, both directed against the evils of the old regime, failed through lack of co-ordination and mutual understanding. a third attempt, and a third failure, was still to come. on aug. to the railwaymen of the northern railway went on strike. on the 13th, a general strike, clearly revolutionary, was suddenly launched in the whole country, the country was declared in a state of war, and the military crushed the rebellion with a ruthless hand. by aug. 19 the situa- tion was wellin hand. the net result was to prove that the only real force in the country was the army committee system. on aug. ro, the council of ministers passed a special credit for military expenses. the committee, conscious of their strength, asserted themselves in the field of civil politics. the scandal 613 became public on the government lifting the censorship. the committees attempted to deliver a message into the hands of the king. dato had to resign on a “ perfectly constitutional ” hint by the king. in point of fact he was expelled by the army committees. the crisis was long and laborious, and in the midst of it, the parliamentary assembly met in madrid (oct. 30) in its second session. the cabinet was at last formed by garcia prieto. it was a coalition ministry composed of maurists, liberals, and catalanists, in which, in order to give satisfaction to the new demand for an impartial general election, a non- political judge was given the post of home secretary. sefior la cierva, who took the war office, was the real head of the cabinet. his policy consisted of ingratiating himself with the committees of defence, so as to become their leader and repre- sentative. juntas were soon formed by the civil servants of nearly all government departments, and on jan. 12 1918, on the occasion of a difference between the postmaster-general and his sub- ordinates, an agitation began which was ultimately to cause the downfall of the government. on feb. 21 the telegraph officials went on strike—by meticulously carrying out official regulations. on feb. 24 the general election took place under these abnormal conditions. for the first time a coalition government presided over an election, and great hopes were entertained as to the re- sult. the new chamber, however, was but an average of the preceding ones, different only in that no party in it had a clear majority. la cierva began then to act as the self-appointed leader of the committees. after provoking two partial crises, he committed the government to a policy as firm towards the civil juntas as it was weak with the military ones. on feb. 17 the postal services declared a strike. la cierva’s efforts to cope with this by means of military improvisations ended in utter failure and the government fell, march 18. all possible combinations were tried and failed, until on march at at midnight, at a meeting of ex-prime ministers called by the king in his study, after, it is said, having threatened his abdication, king alfonso succeeded in forming a “‘ ministry of all the talents.” this government had agreed on a concrete programme: reform of the standing rules of the cortes, amnesty, military reforms, budget. the government carried them all but the fourth, alba having left the cabinet on their refusal to pass his education plans (oct. 8), which ultimately brought the cabinet to its end on nov. 6. the new government, presided over by garcia prieto, had to be formed amid the sensation caused by the arrival in madrid of the news of the kaiser’s flight. the world being full of the idea that the triumph of the allies meant that of democracy, the government published an “ advanced ” mani- festo, but the ministry fell on dec. 3 1918, and count romanones formed a stop-gap cabinet so as to pass the budget and leave the king free for a change of policy. the first important act of count romanones was his visit to president wilson, then in paris. it is to the credit of the successive governments which ruled spain during this period that they succeeded in steering clear of all obstacles, home and foreign, overburdened as they were with home problems and foreign advice not always distnterested. on june 29 1917, a german submarine “ uc52 ” arrived in cadiz for repairs. dato allowed its arrival and departure within 24 hours, and thereupon had a royal decree signed forbidding submarine navigation in spanish waters. the next incident of the kind was the escape of the u53,”’ which had been interned in cadiz under the above roval decree. on the initiative of the romanones administration a treaty had been negotiated in london between the marques de cortina and the english government. this agreement was signed on dec. 6. its importance lay in the fact that it legalised in the eves of the pro-germans all trade with england, which reccived food and ore in exchange for coal. torpedoings continued all the same, and the spanish govern- ment decided to apply to germany the claim of ton for ton. germany had agreed to the ton-for-ton indemnity when the end of the war came. the spanish merchant marine had lost 65 ships representing 140,c00 tons. from the material point of view, the neutral attitude adopted by spain contributed to 614 accelerate the progress which was observable in her economic development in the pre-war years. this period of exceptional activity comprises two coincident movements. one is a some- what artificial “inflation ” of spanish industries, due to the demand of the allics. the other one is the continuation of a development already noticeable before the war. ‘thus certain industries, really national, such as that of olive oil, succeeded at last in establishing themselves in forcign markets. troubles tn barcelona.—count romanones did not precisely find in paris in 191t¢ the diplomatic triumph which he had ex- ected, but neither did he return wholly disappointed. the found the country astir with a mixture of two political currents, one a demecratic, constitutional agitation, born of the allied victory, another one a revolutionary agitation which could be traced to the unwholesome effect of the juntas’ pronunctamientos. the main effect of these two movements was felt in barcelona and was represented by catalanist propaganda, a military under- current of opposition to it, and lastly syndicalist agitation which made the two former forget their mutual enmity and unite against it. a violent conflict arose between the military and th civil authorities of barcelona on the occasion of a strike, and when the strike had been settled by the latter, the government suddenly resigned. it was known afterwards that this resiena- tion was due to the military having expelled the civil authorities from the town. maura took office on april 15, asked for a cdeerce dissolving the cortes, and to the consternation of all partics, obtained it. this amounted almost to a coup d’efat on the part of the king. after a general election held under a strict censorship, under the protest of all the left parties (including the monarchical liberals), and with the use of electioneering methods which had been long forgotten in spain, maura failed to bring to the new cortes more than about one-eighth of its total membership under his banner. his government fell under a discussion of his electioneering methods (july 20), and sesor sanchez de toca (dato being ill) formed a conservative cabinet, which had to deal with a grave situation in barcelona, where syndicalist trouble was again brewing. but a new outburst of the juntas forced the government to resign, and sef:or allendesalazar (a follower of maura) took office with a coalition cabinet. the change of policy which the change of cabinct implied aggravated the conflict. murders continued. a mutiny organised by syn- dicalist soldiers took place in a barracks in saragossa. disorders broke out in valencia and santander. another militarist out- burst ended the life of the cabinet, which, having passed the budget, left office on march 4 1920. the king called dato to power. but the general election at the end of 1920 showed that the mainspring of the old system—i.c., the docility of the elector- ate to any kind of government—could no longer be counted upon. dato failed to obtain a working majority, his supporters numbering 177 members out of 405. all his efforts were accord- ingly bent towards thercconciliation of the several factions within the conservative party. while engaged in this task he was assassinated by anarchists on march 8 1921. decay of the party system—this murder accelerated the disintegration of the system of rotation of the two political partics, which, as arranged by canovas and sagasta at the death of alfonso xii (pacto del pardo), had stood the mon- archy in good stead as a substitute for a real constitutional practice on the lines of the english monarchy. the lack of an objective policy, or even of objective principles, which had all along been a cause of weakness in the two political parties of the restoration and the regency, became more and more apparent as death, whether by natural or by criminal means, thinned out the ranks of the leaders and delivered the parties to the intrigues of understudies and second-rate politicians. while the old system deteriorated day by day owing to its own internal weakness, the forces which attacked it from the outside gradually gained strength. these forces were of three different kinds: first, the anti- dynastic elements, once heaped together under the common name of republicans, now moving towards socialism on the one — spain hand and on the other towards different varicties of social revol- tionaries such as syndicalists, anarchists and even professional agitators without any particular political or philosophic bias; secondly, the catalan homcrulers, gradually evolving from autonomy to separatism; finally the movement of what might be called military syndicalism embodied in the famous justas de dcfensa, to the intervention of which in active politics many of the political crises of the period have becn due. the death of dato (march 8 1921) was to reveal the interplay of these forces. the conservative party found itself suddenly deprived of its chief. the king called on maura, who made it clear from the outset that he would constitute a national coalition or no govern- ment at all and, finding no support in the liberal party, had to withdraw from the field. a purely conservative government took office under the leadership of allendesalazar. during whose administration some of the symptoms of the crisis through which the very constitution of the country was soon to pass, began to appear on the political horizon. thus in a famous speech delivered on the occasion of a banquet in cerdoba, may 23 1921, the king referred to the working of the spanish parha- ment in terms of scathing criticism. the melilla withdrawal.—the greatest event of the vear was the military disaster which the spanish troops met in morocco in july rg21. it entailed the following immedhate effects: the withdrawal of the spanish troops from all the zone previously occupled by the commanding-olflicer in melilla; the death of the commanding-olficer in melilla, general silvestre, a brilliant cavalry officer, who committed suicide at the beginning of the precipitate withdrawal of the spanish troops effected in most painful conditions at heavy cost of men and material; and firally considerable moral effects both in spain and in the rif—in spain because from that moment onwards the moroccan problem be- came the very centre of national politics; in the rif because the collapse of the spanish troops in anoual raised the prestige of abdel-krim. the country was suddenly brought to compare these results with the cost of the army which, after the reorgani- sation effected in 1918, rose to a figure of about 700,000,000 pesetas yearly. the cmotion due to these events swept away the inadequate government of allendesalazar. a stronger conservative gov- ernment was constituted under maura who was enabled, by a public opinion strongly roused by the situation in morocco, to send to the rescue of the troops there an army of 140,000 men. but at the same time an energetic demand for an inquiry which would ruthlessly bring out the responsibilities for the disaster mide itself heard. as a set-off against this current of civilian opinion, the juntas de defensa began a campaign of threats and accusations against parliament, which they considered responsi- ble for the general disorganisation leading to the moroccan crisis. the gradual revelation of the magnitude of the defeat; the growing number of details published concerning the disorganisa- tion of the auxiliary services in the moroccan army, and particu- larly those of health and commissariat; the inopportune propo- sals of the war minister, la cierva, who, in nov. 1921, before any adequate inquiry as to the responsibility for the disaster had been decided upon, submitted to parliament a bill for military rewards; the warm and public welcome given by the king and his government to general berenguer, who was commander-in-chief of the military forces in morocco at the time of the anual disaster, before any authoritative pronounce- ment had been made as to the extent of his responsibility in the matter; these and other factors of a similar kind so strengthened the demand for an inquiry that the government decided to ap- point general picasso as an official investigator to report to the government on the operations and the responsibility for them. gencral picasso carried out his task with a high sense of duty and impartiality, and his report was received by all parties alike as a fine example of patriotic courage. but this display of energy on the part of the government in- creased the opposition of the military juntas de defensa. the cabinet sought a clumsy solution of this problem by a so-called “disbandment ” of the justas and their replacement by juntas spain informativas publicly and legally recognised and placed, at least in theory, under the authority of the war minister. this solu- tion satisfied nobody. parliamentary opinion did not fail to see its purely superficial character, while the officers themselves, though in no way deprived of their organised power, resented the humiliation imposed on them by the new measures. ‘the maura cabinet resigned on a conflict with them in jan. 1922, and though it continued in office by express wish of the king, had finally to disappear in the month of march of the same year, leaving office to another conservative cabinet under the leader- ship of sefior sanchez guerra. the juntas.—the new prime minister was known to be an energetic man, strongly opposed to any undue interference of the military in political matters, but he took office at a time when parliament was exceedingly weak. this fact was not without influence in the movement towards a federation of all the groups into which the liberal party had split up since the death of sagasta. in april 1922, these liberal groups came to an agree- ment, not only among themselves, but also with the small but influential reformist group, headed by alvarez. meanwhile, the juntas de defensa of the infantry officers, authorised by the previous war minister, met in an assembly which adopted a number of resolutions, two of which may be given here as an indication of their general attitude: (1) every infantry officer to be boun:! to affiliate to the jisifas, or otherwise to be prosecuted before a tribunal of his brother officers; (2) no promotion to be authorised in the army save by seniority. it became more and more apparent that in the justas, the army officers had set up a form of military syndicalism which, owing to the material strength that it wielded, was a state within the state. the parliamentary debates on morocco became more and more searching on the publication of the figures relating to the expenses during the fiscal year 1921-2 amounting to 519,- 681,839 pesetas as against 173,190,000 in 1920-1. simultane- ously with this revelation, the news of a considerable defalcation in the offices of the commissariat in larache was made public, while parliament had at the same time to deal with a deficit in the budget amounting to 1,101 millions. all these facts con- tributed to give substance to the demand for bringing home political responsibility which up to the moment had met with the obstacles imposed by the traditional co-operation and com- radeship prevailing between the two main political parties since the pact of el pardo. the report that had been prepared by picasso was submitted to a parliamentary commission on which all the parties were represented. the long-drawn debates of this commission led to three different draft reports, and this lack of unanimity increased ‘the difficulties in which sanchez guerra’s cabinet was at the time entangled. the prime minister had courageously applied to the situation which he found on taking office methods borrowed from the policy of his liberal oppo- nents. thus he restored the constitutional guarantees which had been in suspense for over two years and he recalled from the civil governorship of barcelona general martinez anido who had established a certain amount of order in that unhappy city but by methods which had aroused considerable criticism, saen- chez guerra was also responsible for a decree dissolving the military jusfas, and prohibiting officers of the army from entcr- ing any association whatsoever connected with their profes- sion. the parliamentary debates on the three reports submitted by the commission on responsibility gradually warmed the polit- ical temperature of the congress of deputies to such a pitch that men of a conservative turn of mind like sefores maura and cambe rose to indict the political system in general and (in the case of cambe) the cabinet in office in july 1921. public opinion outside followed with intense interest the proceedings of parliament. the more popular part of the campaign was led by the ateneo de madrid, an intellectual club which has always played an important part in the literary, artistic and _ political leadership of the country. but the debate in parliament de- generated towards its close into a political fight of such violence that the government collapsed and parliament was dissolved. 615 liberals and morocco —the liberal coalition which had been created in april of the same year then took office (dec. 1022); in its official declaration to parliament the new government made it clear that it would uphold the parliamentary pro- cedure adopted in regard to the conduct of the moroccan campaign. popular fecling did not lag behind and promptly backed this attitude of the new government. a popular pro- cession organised by the atenco de madrid showed the enormous hold that this question had obtained on the people. sefor lerroux, a well-known republican leader, in a speech delivered in seville, in jan. 1923, went even so far as toinvolve the king in part of the responsibility for the disaster and a conserva- live paper la accion, published in feb. of the same vear a sensational article in which it advised the king to give up all idea of abdication, an intention which, according to this news- paper, the king had more than once expressed in private conversation. la accion took this opportunity of pointing an accusing finger at certain politicians in order to screen the king, and thus the estrangement between the king and the political circle of collaborators who had stood him in good stead from the beginning of his political life, ard even from the beginning of his life (for king alfonso was born a king), began to show itscli in the press. the new government had to face a crisis on their proposal for the amendment of article 11 of the constitution deeling with the toleration accorded to other religions than that of the roman catholic church. the clergy protested, and the govern- ment, having withdrawn the proposal, the minister of finance, sefior pedregal, who represented the reformist group in the cabinet, left the ministry, though the reformist group, realising that the liberal party had in any case an uphill road before them, continued 1o give their active help to the administration. the elections helclin april 1923, led to a liberal-reformist majority, but its sensational feature was the success of five out of cight socialist candidates in securing election in the capital, attributed by the socialist party to the strong line which they had taken against the war in morocco and in favour of a searching inquiry. after the opening of parliament the high court for the war and the navy (tribunal supreno de guerra y afarina) demanded from the senate authority to prosecute general berenguer, ex- high commissioner and commander-in-chicf in morocco, who, as a senator, could not be prosecuted until the senate withdrew from him his parliamentary immunity. generals began to appear in the forefront of politics, foreshadowing what was to come. a notorious personal incident, involving general aguilera, presi- dent of the supreme military court, saanchez guerra and an- other ex-prime minister and ex-president of the scnate, sefior sinchez ‘toca, was the herald of the coming political storm. the difficulties arising out of this phase of the moroccan ques- tion, were considerably increased by other events in the sume field. during the summer of 1923 the liberal govt. had en- deavoured to strengthen civilian and to reduce military action in morocco. from 1909, when military action was started on a large scale, until 1923, morocco had consumed more than 2,500,000,000 pesetas and the yearly figures showed a definite tendency to increase; thus the average yearly expense had been from 1909 to 1913 75,000,000, from i914 to 1918 146,000,000 and from 1919 to 1923 358,000,000 pesetas. the outlook was therefore black for spanish finance, particularly as the budget for the year 1922-3 showed a net deficit of 920,000,000 and a total of actual expenses estimated at 3,373,000,000. the increase in military and naval expenditure for the period 1915 to 1922-3 had been 167%, while the net revenue of the state had only increased about 100%. | the burden which the moroccan question imposed on the treasury was aggravated by other problems which the nation was unable to put aside. the railways were face to face with a severe crisis due to a variety of reasons, industrial and financial. a system of recoverable advances to the companies established in 1920 had resulted in the shifting of part of the financial bur- den of the railways from the private companies to the state. in three years the treasury had handed over 173,000,000 to the 616 companies. moreover, in april 1920, confronted by a dangerous conflict between the owners and the men, the government had consented to meet any additional expense caused by increases in the wages of all railway servants. asa result of this decree of april 1920, the treasury had to disburse from the said date until sept. 13 1923,asum of 328,000,000 pesetas. the economic situation had somewhat improved since 1920-1, when the tension between owners and men was at its highest, particularly in catalonia, where professional agitators victimised both owners and men to such an extent that in the year 1921 there were in catalonia alone 145 attempts on human life causing 90 deaths. in sept., 1923, the debates of the parliamentary commission on the disaster of 1921 were drawing to a close and the com- mission was ready to draft its findings and submit them to parliament. several well-known politicians were stated to be deeply involved either for lack of foresight or because they had allowed too much freedom to the military or—and this was perhaps the most dangcrous element in the situation—because they had accorded too much unconstitutional initiative to the king. other difficulties, no less grave, were raised owing to the ill-feeling with which the army received any parliamentary or civilian criticism of its action in morocco. while the nation was anxiously wondering what was going to be the next devel- opment of this long-drawn conflict, a dramatic stroke brought suddenly to an end the system under which the country had lived since 1875. primo de rivera—the captain-general of catalonia, don miguel primo de rivera (marques de estella) rebelled against the government, threatening its members with jail, and seized power first and office afterwards. don miguel primo de rivera had already once or twice appeared in the limelight owing to declarations on such questions as the giving up of morocco, on which he held, from the first, courageous if unorthodox views, and on the interchange of gibraltar and ceuta. this last ex- pression of opinion had caused his removal from the position of military governor of cadiz which he then occupied. at the time of the coup d’etut gencral primo de rivera was captain-general of catalonia, his headquarters being in barcelona, where he wielded considerable political influence. there is no doubt that he utilised his office as the jumping-ground for his bold adven- ture, for his first steps were certainly taken in agreement with, if not with the full concurrence and help of, the conservative homerulers of catalonian politics. in the early morning of the 13th, the government published the news that the captain-general of catalonia had risen in arms against the government, that the government would not leave its post and that the king, who at the moment was in san sebastian, would arrive in madrid the same day. the military authorities of bilbao and saragossa, it was reported unoflicially, had sided with the rebels and in madrid a council of military commanders of the madrid garrison were acting for primo de rivera. the captain-gencral of madrid, general mufioz cobos, maintained a cautious, though dubious attitude. a manifesto published the same day by primo de rivera declared that it was indispensable to liberate the country “‘ from the professional politicians, the men who, for one reason or another, are responsi- ble for the period of misfortune and corruption which began in 1898 and threatens to bring spain to a tragic and clishonourable end.” the general added that ‘‘ the wide net of greedy politics has caught in its meshes and imprisoned the royal will itself.” he announced the constitution of a military directorate in madrid which was to find for the problem of morocco a “ quick, dignified and sensible ’’ solution and was to bring home respons!- bility “‘ promptly and justly’ by the formation at an early date of “ tribunals of recognised moral authority.”” he brought accusations of a grave character against the foreign secretary, don santiago alba, who had taken a strong stand against military action in morocco, and announced that alba would be prosecuted immediately, as well as the prime minister himself, marques de alhucemas, for the support he had given to his foreign secretary. immediately after the king's arrival (dlelayed 24 hours) the spain prime minister called on his majesty and proposed strong action against the military rebels, but the king asked for time for reflection and the government resigned. two hours later a deputation of generals was received at the palace and, as a result of this visit, the king requested primo de rivera, still in bar- celona, to take oflice, while accepting the authority of the military directorate which had been previously constituted by him. upon his arrival in madrid on sept. 15, primo de rivera proceeded to transform the military directorate both in its per- sonnel and in its constitution. the first directorate was confined to the military commanders in madrid; the one founded by the general represented all the branches and all the garrisons of the army: it contained a brigadier-general from each military district belonging each to a different branch of the service and a representative of the navy, in the person of admiral marques de magaz, a member of the permanent advisory commission on military, naval and air questions of the league of nations. from a constitutional and administrative point of view, the directorate struck an original note. the only minister was primo de rivera himself. as a whole, the directorate was the equivalent of the council of ministers, but the directors were not cabinet ministers. the various ministcrial departments were entrusted to the care of under-secretaries, but final decisions were always taken by the directorate as a whole, after a special report had been received from one of the directors, not necessa- rily always the same for the same department. the under-secreta- ries in charge were in some cases genuine permanent officials, in other cases minor political or semi-political figures eager for advancement. the ihlome office was entrusted to general martinez anido. public opinion received the change in absolute silence, save for a protest from the socialist party. the other political parties remained silent, except the followers of maura who, without the approval of their chief, declared in favour of the new administration because “f the crown had accepted it and the unmistakable majority of the country was behind it.” the directorate’s policy—meanwhile the directorate began to assert itself. it declared the country in a state of war. the press was put under astrict censorship and all public demonstra- tions of a political character were forbidden. a government manifesto was addressed to the working-classes foreshadowing, if necessary, the enforcement of compulsory laws in order to fix the hours of work and rate of wages. <all provincial governors were dismissed and their authority handed over to the military. the municipalities, which were considered by the new administra- tion as nests of political corruption which the directorate had come to destroy, were the object of systematic scrutiny. no fewer than 11:5, municipalities were thus closely inspected by the military, who failed however to bring forth proof of any substan- tial local corruption. nevertheless, the directorate replaced most of the municipalitics of the country by a new personnel chosen amongst local people who happened to be trusted by the military delegates, and appointed officers to take supreme control over local politics and administration. military men were also ap- pointed to a considerable number of high public offices. in order to forestall possible trouble in the lower ranks of the army, a substantial rise in pay was granted to non-commissioned officers. a heavy budget for public works, amounting to 54,000,000 pe- setas, was set aside for morocco. on nov. 13, two months after the coup d'etat, count roma- nones and don melquiades alvarez, the presidents respectively of the senate and of the congress of deputies, called on the king in order to remind him that the crown was under a personal constitutional obligation to call the cortes together within three months of their dissolution. the two presidents drew the atten- tion of the king to the fact that this article of the constitution had always been scrupulously respected during the 47 years it had been in force. ‘the king referred the matter to the directo- rate, and an official note from the government was published to the effect that these two statesmen who were deprived of their posts and privileges were the representatives of a decaying parliamentary system and their visit an ingenious move in favour of a political regime which had passed away. spain the king and his premier went on an official visit to the court of italy in nov. 1923. three sets of facts must be recorded in connection with this visit. first, the public and private expressions of approval from the king and from primo de rivera for the success and methods of fascismo. ‘thus the king declared to general italo balbo: * i admire fascismo. you are happy here in being so near the end of your labours. we are just beginning.” then the political activity of the king and his premier in regard to the vatican. the king read a sensational speech in the presence of the pope which met with considerable criticism, not only in vatican circles but also in spain and south america. spain was offered to his holiness in the event of a new crusade being necessary. the answer of the pope was a discreet, broad-minded pronouncement. finally, it was widely believed that as a result of this visit a definite political programme of international co-operation between the two mediterranean peninsulas was being prepared, a view belied by subsequent events. the next important step in the foreign policy of the directorate was the signature of the tangier convention in dec. 1923. this convention, which was severely criticised in the country, excluded tangier from the spanish zone, estab- lishing for it an international regime. public opinion in spain on the other hand had alwavs considered that the alternatives for spain in morocco were either giving up the whole adventure or else remaining in morocco with tangier as the basis for action. in spite of the strict censorship, the hostility of public opinion became clear and the directorate took great pains-to explain away the awkward fact that, although the country was at the moment governed by a strong dictatorship, its strength could not reach beyond the frontiers and indeed seemed in the inter- national sphere to be weaker than the old system which it had replaced. itome affairs —in home politics the government continued to repress all hostile expression of opinion. the agitation for an inquiry into the moroccan campaign remained active and had for its centre the ateneo de madrid. the directorate, after having vainly attempted to obtain from the ateneo its consent to a curtailment of its liberty of speech, closed the club—the first time since its creation in the second half of the roth century. don miguel de unamuno (q.v.), the famous author and professor of salamanca university, whose strong stand against the directo- rate, expressed in indignant and sometimes offensive articles in the press of south america had greatly incensed the directorate, was exiled to the canarv islands. ; though the activities of the government were mainly con- centrated on morocco it did not, however, neglect internal mat- ters. thus in march 1924, the council of national economy was created in order to co-ordinate the activities of numerous economic organisations working under several departments. the council of national economy was divided into six sections: tariffs, valuation of goods for tariff purposes, statistics, commer- cial information, defence of production, treaties of commerce. the directorate freed itself from any legal restrictions in the matter of accountancy and financial administration and its decrees had the full force of law. it found a treasury heavily burdened with military and moroccan expenditure and a budget with a regular deficit. in april 1924, it floated an internal loan of 700,000,000 pesetas of four-vear-term bonds at 5°% and 1% sinking-fund, in order to meet the treasury bons issued bv them in oct. 1923. this loan was covered nearly eight times over. further in 1923 the directorate organised a national rail- way council in order to regulate and co-ordinate the administra- tion of the railway companies, the state and the companies sharing in the administration and the state participating in the financial liabilities and assets of the companies. as a result of this step the government launched a railway loan (oct. 1925) to the amount of 300,000,000 pesctas at 5% free from tax. this loan had but a moderate success in contrast with the success of the loan of treasury bonds made in nov. 1924, mainly owing to the fact that the economic crisis through which the country was passing, due among other reasons to excessive protection and continual deficits, had become graver. 617 elated by the success of the loan floated in nov. 10924, the directorate then began to consider the possibility of perpetuat- ing their regime by the creation of a political party outside the framework of the old ones which they christened the “ patriotic union party,” while refusing to other political organisations the right to address public meetings. in the old city of medina del campo representatives of many civilian municipalities met the president of the directorate and asked him for tariff protection and agricultural credits. a similar movement aiming very much at the same ends, was active in andalusia, supported largely by the great land-owners anxious to obtain some betterment of the financial and economic conditions of agriculture, but oblivious of what is perhaps the most important factor in the agricultural situation of spain, namely the conditions under which land is held by the small land-owner and cultivated by the labourer. new phase in morocco—the problem of morocco, however, soon monopolised the attention of the president. the expenses continued to increase. the budget of 1923-4 had to face a de- ficit of 576,000,000 pesetas, compared with a deficit of 920,000, - ooo in the budget of 1922-3, and of 1,101,000,000 for 1921-2. the decrease in the deficit in 1923-4 was not due toa reduction in expenses, but to a considerable increase in receipts due to the rise in the assessment of the tax on ufilidades (a kind of tax on incomes) and to a better assessment of local and urban taxable property. <s for the vear 1924-5, while financial papers estimate the deficit at 1,000,000,000, the directorate declares that it does not zo beyond 600,000,coo. there is no doubt, however, that the figures show a considerable and continuous increase in the military and moroccan expenses of the country. general primo de rivera tackled the problem of morocco with characteristic courage. in the summer of 19024 he decided to carry out what had always been his plan, namely, a considerable withdrawal and a curtail- ment of military liabilities. two obstacles lay across his path. the first was that in taking this decision he was but following in the wake of the foreign secretary whom he had violently ex- pelled from power, since the policy of an agreement with the rifian leaders and of withdrawal from the more inaccessible parts of the spanish zone, as well as the transformation of a military occupation into a civil administration, had all along been advo- cated by alba. the second obstacle was that the spanish army in morocco did not consider that it had sufficiently avenged the disaster of anual and would not hear of any proposals for withdrawal. in the face of these two obstacles, primo de rivera resolved to carry out his policy and he deserves all credit for having succeed- ed first, in imposing his views on the spanish army in the field at the risk, not only of his popularity, but even sometimes of his life, and also for having most skilfully conducted a difficult military retreat covering all the zone between tetuan and nauen. later events, however, obliged general primo de rivera considerably to modify his policy in morocco. in the summer of 1925 a sudden attack launched by abdel-krim against the french forces in the french protectorate, led to the combined action of the two countries interested in morocco. the french govt. sent to spain m. malvy, who negotiated with general primo de rivera an agreement for military and political co-operation which led to the recovery of the french territory lost during the first onslaught of the rifian troops, and to the occupation of abdel-krim's headquarters, after a brilliant landing in alhucemas bay by the spanish troops. (for later developments see morocco.) from the political point of view, this episode in the moroccan war may be considered as one of the many instances of spanish co-operation in international politics with france and england. since the war the foreign policy of the spanish govt. has fol- lowed the lines of this co-operation. the first neutral state to join the league of nations, spain has occupied since an elective seat in the council and, partly owing to its neutrality in europe, and partly owing to the ability of its representative in the council, sefior quifiones de leen, has often played in the league the rele of “ honest broker ” in questions in which there was a difference of opinion between the great powers. this was 618 so in the question of upper silesia, in the case known as the “ corfu case,’”’ and in others of smaller importance. munictpal reform.—wduring to25 the directorate embarked on a thorough-going reorganisation of the provincial and municti- pal administration of the couniry. the government promulgated two decrees. the first deals with municipal reform and aims at establishing a system cf municipal autonomy, delegating to municipalities the right to levy certain rates, thus enabling them to set up their municipal treasurics; and establishing female and proporticnal suffrage in municipal stations. a similar decre has been promulgated concerning provincial administration, the most important effect of which was the abolition of the afan- coniunidazd, a kind of catalonian local partament. in its catalo- nian policy the directorate soon reverse: the pro-home rule crien- tation which had inspired the first utterances of primo de rivera. the conservative home-rule elements of catalonia, in supporting the first steps of primo de rivera, had uwn:loubtedly hoped that the president of the directorate would facilitate a policy of devolution. he, however, found considerable opposition to such a course amongst the military forces which surrounded him for, gradually, the sympathies of the directorate towards the cata- louian autonomist movement disappeared and made way for a rezime which was described in catalonia itself as one of system- atic persecution, the country owes to (he directorate a fuller measure of internal peace than it had esjoved under the old systera, and this fact ceriainly helps to facilitate its task. nevertheless the military government, though with the best intentions, is inflicting on the country grave harm in depriving it for such a long time of the normal channels for the expression of public opinion. with the press gagged, and political leaders of the country deprive:! of their right to address the public, public opinion cannot exist, ict alone express liself. rumours are astir all over the country, as is always the caze when news is controlled by official means. local risings such as that of vera in 1924 which, though a purcly locil affray between civil guards end obscure men, ended in the execution of three misguided individuals, and widely spread military conspiracies such as that discovered in nov. 1925, which led to the imprisonment of several generals in madrid and of a few professors in barcelona, revealed an unhealthy state of allairs. though the president of the directorate cften deseribes the system for which he is responsible as the first phase in a new order of things, it would be more accurate perhaps to describe it as the last phase ef the old order. nor js this observation in any way weakened by the choice of his collaborators in the recent transformation of the directorate into a ministry or cabinet. on dec. 3, primo de rivera paried from his military team and formed a ministry of which, apart from himself and the ministers of war and marine, a fourth soldier was a member in the person of martinez anido, who be- came home secretary and vice-president of the council. the other members of the cabinet were for the most part young and unknown men drawn from the extreme right of the old partly system. primo de rivera, in becoming president of the council, made it perfectly clear that he meant to retain full powers as dictator, and he emphasised, in particular, that the press should remain under the same system of strict censorship. during 1926 the censorship, both of the press and of persons, was vig- orously used, especially in catalonia, one eminent professor being exiled. it seems obvious that the country must pass through more dangerous waters before coming to calm seas again. but, one of the hopeful signs is the calmness and apparent indiflerences with which spain is accepting its present trials, for it shows that the nation, after a long period of agitation, has at last come to realise that political progress is a matter of silent and daily work rather than of dramatic action and violent enterprise. bibliography.—e! ajfio politico, published yearly by fernando soldevilla; count romanones, fi ejercito y la politica (1921); f. de leon y castillo, afis tiempos (1921); count romanones, las responsibilidades del antiguo regimen (1924); francisco cambo, en torno del fascismo italiano (1928); g. maura gamazo, /7/storia critica del reinado de don alfonso xiii, (1925). (s. de m1.) spain if. education from the beginning of the 20th century there has been marked educational activity in all parts of spain. a large number of students and teachers are sent abroad to study every year, and they constitute a reserve from whom teachers and research work- ers are being recruited. with the help of the “ commiitee for the extension of scientific study and research ” (an autonomous but official body), departments for the study of mathematics, biology, physics, cheniustry, betany, philosophy, philology, history, archaeology, palacontology and law are being founded. the same commitice was responsible for the founding of the tnstitnto-escuela in 1917—-an establishment for secondary ed- ucation which, attended by hundreds of girls, is rapidly trans- forming old educational methods, particulerly. it exercises considerable influence over othcr secondary education centres. primary education is also improving in respect of the numbers, silaries and training of teachers. the number of teachers in 1917 wis 26,253; in 1920, 28,202; in 1924, 30,180; and in 1925, 31,180. illiteracy is decreasing, but only slowly, owing to the lack of suflicilent schools and the number of poor familics who are com- pelled to send the!fr children of school age out to work. the statistics for literacy, which is of course most marked in the rural centres, are us follows:—in 1887, 68-01%; in 19c0, 63-78%; lil toto, §6°35%,, and in 1920, 52°23 “a. the jruntade pensiones paral ngenicros v obreros gives assistarce for technical and professional training and sends the most suita- bie engineers and the moat intelligent and industrious workmen, including those who are engeged in agriculture and its subsidiary industries, to the best industrial centres for purposes of study and training. the 11 existing universities have, according to the last complete census, that of 1923, 25,690 students, recording a steady increase since rotti-3, when the number was 20,497. ‘the normal schools for male teachers, numbering 42, have passed through a critical period owing to the poor pav of the teachers, but since the increase in their commencing salaries—3,0o00 pesetas and residence—in 1923, the number of entries has in- creased, exceeding 5,700 in 1922, and 7,000 in 1925. the 48 normal schools fer women teachers had 12,100 pupils in 1922, and over 14,000 in 1925. all these schools are recruited from all classes of the community, and a considerable number of the pupils come from good upper-middle-class families. secondary education also has its diflicufties, and as the 60 existing tisftfudtos or state secondary schools are unable to provide for more than 22 to 35% of the scholars available (54,602 in the last census), many have to take their educational courses in private schools. the 37 schools of art and industry, which teach some 40,000 pupils, are unable to absorb the large number of applicants from the working classes. there are 23 commercial schools, two schools for the training of industrial engineers and one each for the following:—mines, fores(s, roads, canals and ports, and agriculture. it is interesting to note that there is a revival in the study of the old spanish industrial arts—ironwork, artistic textiles, leatherwork, embroiderics, lace, carpets, ceramics, ete. cael aa ill. economic iwistory population.—according to the census of 1910 the population of spain was 10,995,686. by 1920 it had grown to 21,380,812, and according to an estimate of 1925 it was 21,966,000. the principal centres of population are:— inhabitants inhabitants madrid 750,896 barcelona . 710,335 valencia 251,258 seville 205,529 malaga 150,554 sarayossa . 141,350 murcia 141,175 granada . 103,308 these are the only cities whose population exceeds 100,000. the population of the large towns is increasing, and whereas in 1900 to ro1o the provincial capitals accounted for 16% of the total population of the peninsula, in 1920 this percentage had increased to 18-8 and it was calculated that in 1925 1t would have approximated to 20%. the population is most dense in the province of biscay, with 189 inhabitants per sq. kilometre; barcelona, 175; guipuzcoa, 137; madrid, £33, and pontevedra, spain 121. it must be remembered, however, that it is barcelona and madrid that are responsible for the density of the population in two of these provinces, and that in the same way biscay contains bilbao and guipuzcoa contains san sebastian. pontevedra is the province with the greatest actual density of population per kilometre, followed by la corufia, while those with the lowest density are soria with 14, guadalajara, cuenca and ituesca with 76, albaccte with 19 and cacerias with 20. the average birth-rate for the period 1918-22 was 29-2 per 1,000 inhabitants, and the mortality 24-4—a high rate which ts leading to a demand for hygienic reform among the more enlightened sections of the community. agriculture—the abnormal profits made during the war led to an extension of the areas under cultivation, some of them un- suitable, and also to the uneconomic exploitation of ferests, with the following three results: (a) the extensive purchase and use \ of agricultural machinery; (}) the introduction of better methods of culiivation; (¢) hygicnic improvements on the farms, and the provision of water for irrigation purposes. much benefit is ex- pected when the following irrigation works are completed:— (1) the central canal of aragon, with its smaller offshoots, which, with the ebro, will water 300,000 hectares of upper aragon. (2) the irrigation works of alicante and murcia, now almost com- pleted, which are turning the steppes of those provinces into orchards. (3) the series of reservoirs and canals, some of them completed, like that at jerez and others under construction, which will irrigate ; ’ & 100,000 hectares in the fertile valley of guacdalquivir. (4) the works already begun for making the guadalquivir navi- ganic up to cerdoba, the construction of weirs to regulate the course of the river and reservows from the springs feeding the cruadal- quivir which will provide cicctrical power and aiso heip navigation. the works under (1) and (3) are state; (2) and (4) are private enterprises, in old castile and in the ‘‘ reino ” de leen the experimental i farms of palencia, valladolid and zamora are introducing new arable methods, and there is noticeable progress in all parts, though in the north and noriheast, with their smal! holdings and lack of credits, the advance is not so rapid. the average production of wheat was:— 34,119,556 metric quintals . 38,061,869 metric quintals - 35,437,531 metric quinials pigeon. « : . in 1918-9 . : , in 19g1y-24 . : ; : ' an increase that has rnade spain self-supporting in cereals apart frora bad harvest years lke those of 1922 and 1924. spain has now attained first place in the world production of olive oil, with marked clfects on its trade balance. the average production of oil in metric quinlals was:— 1905-9 ; 1,961,985 1915-9 3,105,313 1glo-4 ; 2,132,960 1920-4 3,034,751 the olive cultivation areas were: 1914, 1,453,000 hectarcs; 1917 over 1,504,273 hectares; 1924 over 1,624,233 hectares. andalusia alone produces two-thirds of spain’s output of an averace of 300,000 metric tons per annum, which is more than 435° of the world’s production. the valuable wine trade suitered from the same crisis which affected both france and italy, but production is increasing, the average figures (incomplete) being: for 1915~—9, 20,072,703 hee- tolitres; for 1920-4, 23,882,000 hectolitres. the production of bect sugar is increasing, and in the valley of the guadalquivir 1s very profitable, owing to the high sugar content. this success reacts on the industry throughout spain, because of the cheapness of the arid land on which beet cultiva- tion was first started. the average value of agricultural products was estimated at 3,824,304,425 pesetas for 1903-07, it 7,07 5,623,025 in 1916 and at 9,291,476,000 in 1923. comumerce.—the character of spain’s foreign trade changed during the war, for the balance hitherto always unfavourable save at exceptional periods, as for example, when the french vines were attacked by phylloxera, became favourable. average imports in pesetas average exports in pesctas 1910-4... . 1,868,446,602 i910-4 1,092,129,014 i9i5-9 i, 110,239,020 iqi5-9: <: . 1,263,546,880 1920-4 2597315275339 1920-4. i, 306,689,864 619 it must be remembered, however, that the imports for 1915-9 include the large remittances of gold which the bank of spain amassed during the war. the commercial jandslide from which the country suffered after the war can be gauged from the fact that whereas in 191g the balance of exports over imports rose to 235,000,0c0 pesetas, the imports in 1920 exceeded exports by 420,000,000 and in 1924 by 1,199,000,000. spain met this un- favourable balance by invistbie imports such as the freights earned by her mercantile marine, and by the large remittances sent by its emigrants in america, to the value of over 200,000,000 of pesctas for the northwest region alone, this latter source of revenue is continually increasing owing to the growing custom of the emigrants of leaving their families in spain for the first few vears, and also owing to the increasing economic impertance cf definitely spanish centres in certain countries such as cuba, mexico and argentina. ‘the following figures (pesetis) are for the last year available, r924:— iinports pesetas livestock . : ; : : 14.503,260 raw materials . ; : . ; : ‘ 955,c41,063 mianufactured articles. , t,497,559,893 foodstuffs . ; : ; ; : . 476,052,258 gsold in bullion and coin : ; ; 2,146,090 silver in bullion and coin : . : 123,380 totals a bee fg ek. sy ong 5,00} fuxports pesetas livestock , . ; . 3,631,220 raw materials . : : . : 350,105,003 nmanulactured articles. : ; , 4ao1,245,505 foedstuffs . ; : : : : d : 992,234,057 geld in bullion and coin. 2,442 silver in buliion and cotn ; ; : ; ; 262,380 total. : ; ofl : ts9 650,177 or thus, agriculture alone supplied in foodstuffs 56°% of the total exporis, whereas manufactures contributed only 22%. of the imports in 1924 great britain contributed 17-16%, the united states 16-55, france 13-74, germany 5-90 and argentina 4-70. of the exports, great britain absorbed 21-80%, france 19°79, the united states 10-01, cuba 6-03, argentina 5-71 and germany 5°66. spain has had considerable tariff difficulties with other countries. an anglo-spanish commercial treaty was ratified in april 1924, and remains in force for three years from the date of ratification. tndustyy.—since the war spain has tended to become self- supporting, and there is a general tendency to substitute goods of spanish origin for forcign imports. many industries however have been passing through periods of severe depression due to some extent to the poor purchasing power of the middie and working classes. the textile industries of catalonia more particu- jn riy have been suffering from an inadequate home demand and also from a reduction in exports, leading to a strong demand for protection. the equipment of this industry is not sufficiently up-to-date, as only a small proportion of the spindles in use are of recent construction. moreover spanish textiles are not con- centrated in large concerns, but divided among smallfirms. the war, however, gave the textile industry a period of prosperity hitherto unknown. ‘taking the 19r3 index as 100, the following table shows imports and exports:— eaee rer eran 1914] 1915| 1916] 1917. 1918, 1919! 1920 cotton textiles: imports . ; exports . : ‘woollen textiles: imports e-xports 92°2/150-4 1il-5|107- 93°5/316-8 246-9/258- 67°-7| 93 |102:7| 66- 1838-9|]583-5)411-11342- in the years 1922-4, cotton manufactured goods were exported to the value of 54, 56 and 54 millions of pesetas, and woollen to the value of 33, 37 and 43. the sugar industry continues to grow, the average annual production of sugar for the period 191 5-9 being 121,789 and in 1920-4, 174,213 metric tons. the iron and steel indusiry benefits from the high tarifi, and has been erecting more factories, but the latest statistics, those for 1922, 620 do not include the new plant installed in the northeast and in biscay, and make no mention of the extensions rendered pos- sible in biscay and barcelona by the construction of new locomotives for the railways, or of the huge electrical plant erected in cerdoba. mining.—the output of minerals in 1923 was 1,900,000 tons in excess of that in 1922. the following are the values for 1922 and 1923:— pesetas pesetas minerals 290,391,411 | 389,370,340 metals 460,708,518 | 730,021,550 751,099,929 it, 119,391,890 this apparent increase of 368,000,000 ought to be reduced to 140,000,000, owing to the inclusion in the 1923 figures of certain items which did not appear in those for 1922. the production of coal represents 50° > of the total mineral production of the country, but the coal industry whose output, including lignite, was 1,600,000 tons more than that in 1922, began to experience difficulties in 1924, owing to a variety of causes, such as the re- sumption of imports which tended to close the poor pits exploited during the war, the gradual re-adaptation of industry to peace conditions, and the general causes which depressed the industry throughout the world. consequently some mines were closed down, there was a decrease in employment, followed by an increase of production per head of labour employed. thus in 1920, when the highest price per ton was reached, namely 70 pesetas, the production of asturias—the district accounting for 50° of the national production—was 2,900,000 tons for 39,000 miners; and in 1924 the production was 3,900,000 tons for 30,000 miners, while the price per ton fell from 70 pesetas in 1920 to 27 in 1924. national production, which was 4,200,000 tons in 1914, rose to 6,200,000 in 1924, but does not meet the national con- sumption, which is increasing, for, whereas in 1920 it was 5,800,000 tons, in 1924 it rose to 7,600,000, the difference being mainly imported from england. apart from coal, the principal minerals are pyrites, zinc, iron ore, copper and lead. communications. —the network of main roads maintained by the state, which at the beginning of the war totalled 51,634 km., rose in 1919 to 58,022, and at the end of 1925 exceeded 60,000. the railway lines according to the 1923 statistics covered 15,300 km., excluding the construction of the double line which is well on its way. the average annual number of passengers carried from i9i15-9 was 72,045,742, rising in 1920-4 to 103,583,881 and the tonnage of goods carried, which was for 1915-9 34,345,- 773, rose in 1920-4 to 35,262,932 (figures incomplete), despite the rise in tariffs and the industrial crisis of 1920-1. revenue per kilometre has risen from 27,602 pesetas to 51,828 and ex- penditure from 14,850 to 37,550. the outstanding feature of railway administration in 1925 was the railway statute passed by the military directorate which provides for the participation of the state in the financing and management of the railways. in connection with the first issue of railway bonds by the state in oct. 1925, the government was able to vote 300,000,000 pesetas for improvements in the transport service, which is still inadequate for the industrial] necessities of the country. _ shipping.—spanish shipping is still in a backward state, the percentage of ships over 20 years old being 52-27, compared with 21°72 %, the average calculated for the rest of the world. conse- quently, though the spanish merchant marine is absorbing the coastal trade, in the ocean-going trade there is an increase in the number of vessels under foreign flags which enter and leave spanish ports with cargoes of spanish imports and even with a considerable portion of the exports. the result is that the ship- ping interests are insisting more and more on protection. sailing ships steamships number | tonnage number | tonnage 1914 ; 237 32,974 633 747,022 1925) dl 95.775 687 1,141,529 spanish literature banking.—the bank of spain which in 1913 held 472,000,000 gold pesetas, held in 1920 over 2,448,000,000 and at the beginning of 1925 2,558,000,000, representing a reserve of over 58 °% of the 4,352,000,000 pesetas in note circulation at the same date. the guarantee credits which in 1915 were 166,000,000 rose to 1,830,- 000,000 at the beginning of 1925, and the current credit accounts rose from 689,000,000 to 1,209,000,000. the dividends since 1900 have never fallen below 19%, and were 44°% in 1921, and despite the rise in the shares, they continued to pay 28% in 1922 and 1923. the fall in the prestige of spanish private banks, due to more than one failure, and the large number of bankruptcies since 1922, have compelled the directorate to take steps for exercising closer supervision over private banks. savings bank returns show an increase from 525,372,000 pesetas in 1915 to 756,000,000 in 1918, 1,456,000,000 in 1922 and, it is calculated, ovet 2,000,000,000 in 1925. towards the close of 1923, and up to the end of march 1924, the peseta gradually weakened, but in april there was a sharp recovery, due to government measures to regulate speculation in exchanges, which was followed, however, by a gradual de- pression. the peseta, whose par of exchange in sterling is 25-224, fluctuates from about 33-50 to about 34-50, and in view of the strong position of the bank of spain and the improvement in the trade and budget deficits, it is difficult to explain its de- preciation. (f. de los r.)