SOMALILAND

the country continues to be divided between abyssinia, great britain, italy and france. the frontier between the italian and abyssinian regions was de- limitated in 1911, when, in the north, it was fixed at 48° e. instead of 47° e. as provided in the 1908 agreement. this placed all the ogaden tribal lands under abyssinian authority. i. british somaliland this district has an area of 68,000 sq. m., and a population ‘(1921) of 346,998, including 2,205 foreigners (european arabs and indians.) berbera, the capital and chief port, has, in the trading season, some 30,000 inhabitants. the policy of “ strict coast concentration ” adopted in roro in consequence of the costly and ineffective campaigns against mohammed bin ab- dullah, the ‘‘ mad mullah,” broke down. efforts to restore order were inevitable; they began inauspiciously. in aug. 1913 a camel constabulary party under r. c. corfield was cut up, corfield being killed. in march 1914 dervish raiders reached the coast and fired into berbera. in may 1914 mr. (later sir) geof- frey archer became commissioner (a title changed in ro91g to that of governor), and on his representations further operations were authorised. major t. a. cubitt inflicted severe punishment on the dervishes in nov. 1914—feb. 1915, but the mullah, who had retired to the border of the mijertin country, subsequently again overran a large part of the protectorate. an end was, how- ever, put to his activities in 1920, when by operations planned by archer and carried out by lt.-col. (later sir) gerald sum- mers almost the whole dervish force was destroyed. the success of these operations was primarily and mainly due to the royal air force. the dervishes, good fighting men, were demoralised by the attacks from the air. the mullah himself escaped, fleeing into abyssinian somaliland, where, at the town of imi, he died in jan. 1g2t. | the overthrow of the mullah marked the deliverance of the country from 21 years of dervish oppression. in 1922 sir geoffrey archer, who had brought about this deliverance, was transferred to uganda. he was succeeded by sir gerald summers, who worked hard and with satisfactory results to improve the moral and material conditions of the somalis. sir gerald died in nov. 1925, and in jan. 1926 mr. h. b. kittermaster, secretary to the administration since 1921, was appointed governor. a considerable number of sheep and goats and a smaller num- ber of cattle are exported, but by far the most valuable export is som bart—somme, battle of the that of skins, the somali sheep and goat skins being of very high quality. ghee, gum and salt (the last named to abyssinia) are other exports. sheeting and longcloth, dates, rice and sugar are the chief imports. the growth of japanese imports of grey sheeting, as opposed to american cloth, which had had a practi- cal monopoly, was very noticeable in 1923 and 1924. in 1910-1 the value of imports was £267,000, of exports £247,000. in 1924 the value of seaborne trade was: imports £333,000, exports £228,000. the transit trade with abyssinia, via zeyla, was val- ued at £33,400. revenue, mainly from customs, was but £30,- ooo in 1910-1, when expenditure was £099,000. for 1924-5 rev- enue was {82,000 and expenditure £150,000. deficits are met by grants from the british exchequer. brbliographyy.—a. hamilton, somaliland (1911); a. h. e. morse, fy somali book (1913); h. f. prevost battersby, richard corfield of somaliland (1914); r. e. drake broekman, british somaliland (1917); major h. rayne, sun, sand and somailis (1921); d. jardine, the mad muliah of somaliland (1923). see also the report on somaliland, issued annually by the colonial office, lon- don. the account of the final overthrow of the mullah is given in a supplement to the london gazette of nov. i 1920. ii. french somaliland the value of this small, largely arid and sparsely populated colony lies in its port, jibuti, the only french port on the suez canal route and the main artery of trade with abyssinia. the railway to addis ababa, owned by a french company, was, after many delays, completed in 1917. four-fifths of the trade of jibuti is in the conveyance of goods to or from abyssinia. it serves also as a coaling station, the coal being previously im- ported. the chief local industries are shark and mother-of- pearl fisheries and the collection of salt from the bahr’ asal; since 1912 the salt exports have risen from 4,000 to some 14,000 tons a year. in 1914, when the railway was open only as far as dire daisa (30 m. short of harrav), the value of exports was 43,600,000 fr. and of imports 28,700,000 francs. in 1922 exports were valued at 170,800,000 fr. and imports at 160,400,000 francs. jibuti had (1921) 8,366 inhabitants, of whom 354 were euro- peans. the population of the colony is said to be about 200,000 —apparently an overestimate—and consists of denakil, somali and galla, who, on the grassland of the higher ground, rear camels, goats and black-faced sheep. . | in rorg the local budget balanced at 2,370,000 fr., in'1924 at 5,015,000 francs. the colony is administered by a governor, assisted by a nominated council composed of official and unoffi- cial members. apart from occasional raids by the nomads, who, away from the railway zone, are left much to their own devices, the colony has been peaceful. lej yasu, the deposed emperor of abyssinia, was in the donakil country in 1917-8, but his efforts to raise the tribes against the french failed. bibliography.—french somaliland, a british foreign office handbook (no. 109), 1920; capt. m. borlee, ‘‘ la cete francaise des somalis,” bulletin soc. rovale belge geographie (1924) and the ““ cete francaise des somalis ” (annual reports by the french colo- nial ministry). ill. italian somaliland revised estimates give the area at some 154,000 square miles. the population is probably overestimated at 650,000. there were in 1921 664 europeans (almost all italians). these figures are exclusive of trans-juba, transferred to italy by great britain in 1925 (see jubaland). the country is divided into southern and northern italian somaliland. in the southern division, a crown colony, under a civil governor since july rg1o, energy was shown in the development of the somewhat scanty natural resources of the land and in the valleys of the webi shebeli, and the juba cotton and rice were cultivated. the chief exports con- tinue, however, to be durra, sesame, ghee, gum, myrrh and hides. from mogadishu, the capital (population, in 1923, 20,700) a railway was built to afgoi, 18 m., as the first section of a line to the abyssinian frontier at lugh. by 1924 some 2,000 m. of roads had also been built. the effect of the transfer of jubaland remained to be seen in 1926; by giving the italians possession of kismayu it placed at their disposal a port superior to any on the 583 benadir coast. the colony had required constant subventions from italy; thus, in 1924, colonial revenue was but 2,857,000 lire, while expenditure totalled 24,000,000 lire. exports were far below imports in value; the figures for 1922 were: imports 51,000,- ooo lire, exports 11,000,000 lire. in part, the exports consist of goods from abyssinia. northern italian somaliland was divided into the sultanate of the mijertin, whose territory included the coast facing the gulf of aden, the nogal territory (in the centre) and the sul- tanate of obbia. the economic value of these regions is not great, but they are famed for the abundance of plants which furnish frankincense and myrrh and also gum arabic. the nogal territory was for some years occupied by the “ mad mullah,” but he failed to agree with mohammed osman, the mijertin sul- tan, and there were intermittent hostilities between them from 1908 to 1919. the overthrow of the mullah by the british left the somalis free to quarrel among themselves. in pursuance of the forward colonial policy adopted by the fascist govt., the italians in 1925 decided to bring the sultanates under direct con- trol. military operations followed, and in oct. 1925 it was an- nounced that sultan ali jusuf of obbia had come to terms. the submission of the mijertins was reported in april 1926. a cam- paign followed in the nogal territory, where the somalis opposed the italians with some stubbornness. bibliography.—relazione sulla somalia italiana, issued by the italian colonial office (1912); g. de martino (sometime governor of the colony), la somalia nostra (1913); g. stefanini and g. paoli, ricerche zdrogeologiche, botaniche ed entomologtiche fatte nella somalia italiana meridionale (florence, 1916); italian somaliland, a british foreign office handbook (no. 128), with bibliography (1920); luigi amadeo (duke of savoy), ‘‘ la somalia,” in le vie d’jtalia (1920); r. cani, ji guibaland (naples, 1921); m. colucci, principi di diretto consuetudinairo della somalia italiana mferidionale (1924); rk. zerbinati, ‘‘ un miracolo del lavors italiana in somalia,” in la vie d'italia (1925); ‘‘ la occupazione della somalia settentrionale,” in l'iiatia coloniale (milan, 1926). (f. r. c,) sombart, werner (1863- ), german economist, was born at ermsleben in the harz jan. 19 1863; he studied in pisa and berlin, and in 1888 became secretary of the chamber of commerce in bremen. he taught at the university of breslau from 1890, at the berlin commercial high school from 1906, and in 1917 was appointed professor at the university of berlin. sombart wrote prolifically on economic, historical and social problems. hlis best known work is der moderne kapitalismus (1902, revised and enlarged ed. 1916). his books are stimulating and fertile in ideas, but many of his views conflict with those of others, and have given rise to a great deal of controversy. sombart’s published works include soztalismus und soziale bewe- gung im 19. jahrhundert; the 1oth revised edition of this treatise, published in 1924, bears the title: der proletarische sozialismus. wirtschaft und mode (1902), die deutsche volkswirtschaft im 19. jahrhundert (1903, 5th ed. 1921), das proletariat (1906), das lebens- werk von karl marx (1909), die juden und das wirtschaftsleben (1911), luxus und kapitalismus (1912), die ordnung des wirtschafts- lebens (1925). sombart is the editor of grundlagen und kritik des sozialismus (1919). somme, battle of the.—this cngagement, an offensive on the part of the british armies, with some assistance from the french, opened on july 1 1916. between ham and arras the river somme runs first from south to north as far as peronne and then bends sharply to the west, in which general course it continues to the sea. from peronne a low range of hills runs somewhat to the north of west, forming the watershed between the somme and the basins of the scarpe and the schelcle. this ridge had fallen into german hands in oct. 1914 in the course of the operations usually described as “ the race to the sea ’? and the line in this quarter, indeed on the whole front from arras southward to the oise, had remained substantially unal- tered during 1915, the chicf change being that in july 1915 a british ji. army had been formed which relieved the french between the ancre and the somme. subsequently a iv. army was also formed, and early in 1916 the british had relieved the french x. army on the arras front, making thcir line continuous from ypres southward. .the right boundary between the british and french had varied considerably and in june 1916 was near 584 an, em, mw wv vat : hc “aner, ts as¢t prerre divion®, 4, 07° daccint y *- rs ‘ge aad ria oe y \ pschwaben. & redoust ns \ roby ss ly » zr % 8 aye somme, battle of the e transloy y \: sp poouet ati queers ; ‘ ’ zollern = engelbelmer’ ihiepval hgoulean = = . — te >7 hy, ves, =_e* = bae ss =“ maiuquet fi ~s sams +s se p mi, > oe ns cae : rp 0 ine, > % ‘ 8g op fp = e = ye ‘ cr, =< ae pozieres oe % ats a rl roe hte : » s) y= f) ay ty ff no a y : wee pans z ae abusineson: ’ = bazentin- v7 morval the r= no an ‘ovi jig is. le petit » yeo: ba, ms aioe osselie p a ae a bz ~ bh s, | a batt basen = = meg qs; 4, a g fcontdimaizon le-grand longudval ip" assy, wg @ quadrilateral fz iy, i 2 es 4 ¥ anh) 5 fee wg a lt mia baisseile lamers: ite <4 boulesux wy, \: save s -¢, 4 00 ah ty sof oe ry iy > z ne ae 1, shs ve ig fiers f v7 rs ol, [ tig roddy ~ % . pe emente at meg bl e ke j a ed fy, om sen wb aa = mag albert faitgnonk 3 z wet / ge . ze cays : ty z a s87 dovage ta y sine oed frico rey, lz: ee 2 fz 3 wood \ + « mametz eles se x att "hf ons n hardecourt may epasi® 4 or ns ux bois og ss ws e cq ly tis “tire w © a in, bouch sudan nes battle or tuz somme english miles makies. ree ir wide we me, ne fy awe kilometres. pouserne foie yi bray-sur-so ailways a: ve -sur-samme original line st july!916ameuaumamam ez, line on 14th july —_— =< aw | »n » 18th septemberseanvenas \ " » 72h november ao o am 0 am maricourt, about 3,000 yd. north of the somme. i[lcre the | midable. their defenders had been in undisturbed possession allied linc, which southward of this point ran north and south, turned sharply and following the lower slopes of the watershed already described ran west for another 7,000 yd. to make another sharp turn at fricourt, whence it ran north for 10,000 yd. to the ancre, which pierces the ridge between thiepval and beaumont hamel, continuing definitely in a northerly direction north of that river. reasons for the british offensive—when the german attack on verdun opened in feb. 1916, neither the artillery and am- munition situation of the british nor the training of many of the more recently arrived “ new army ”’ divisions was such as to permit of their giving relief to their allies by taking the offensive on a big scale. their help had consisted in the taking over of a long stretch of the french line, but as the spring turned into summer it had become evident that more than this would be necessary, for the french defence, though determined and resourceiul to a high degree, was being very severely tried and the position was [frequently critical. sir douglas haig therefore agrecd to set on foot plans for an offensive on a very large scale, although from the purely british standpoint it was doubtiul whether such an effort was not still somewhat premature, neither the ammunition output nor the supply of guns being as yet equal to starting a serious offensive at more than one point, so that once the point of attack had been declared the advantages of surprise and the initiative would be largely discounted. german positions —the german positions on the frontage to be attacked, a distance of some 25 m. in all, were extremely for- for over a year and a half, they had had ample time therefore 1o turn to advantage the natural features of the ground and to supplement them by artificial means. woods and villages had become fortresses, two elaborate trench systems had been con- structed about two to three miles apart, each containing several lines and connected up by intermediate lines or “ switches ”’ which greatly complicated the task of the attacker who should penetrate any part of the front. deep “ dug-outs,” casy to con- struct in a chalk country, protected the trench garrisons against the heaviest bombardments, broad belts of barbed wire ob- structed the approaches, the lines bristled with well-placed and protected machine-guns, and every point of tactical importance had been specially fortified. the advantage of the ground as regards facilities for observation lay with the germans, although south of the somme where the french were to attack on a front- age of nine miles, conditions were less in their favour and their defences less formidable. for an attack on such positions the most elaborate prepara- tions were necessary, both tactical and administrative. roads and railways had to be made, vast dumps of ammunition and stores collected and protected, gun positions selected and dug, bivouacking and encamping grounds prepared, the water supply expanded. it was not till the endl of june that the offensive could be started; and it had been practically impossible to conceal from the germans the scale and nature of the preparations or the in- tended extent of the attack, although such precautions as were possible had been taken. somme, battle of the i. the first attack | after a week’s preliminary bombardment of unparalleled inten- sity the allied attack was delivered on the morningof july1. on the british left north of the ancre the viii. corps attacked from serre to beaumont hamel, but though its centre penetrated some way into the german linesnorth of beaumont hamel the flanks were checked and the central division was finally dislodged. equal ill- success attended the x. corps south of the ancre and the left of the iii. corps on its right, in their attacks on the formidable defences of thiepval and ovillers. however, on the right centre just north of la boisselle and between la boisselle and fricourt lodgements were not only made but maintained by the right of the iii. corps and the left of the xvii. east of fricourt, again, the three british divisions attacking in a northerly direction were all successful, mametz and montauban were taken and all the objectives secured, while beyond them the french astride the somme fared brilliantly, reaching hardecourt and curlu north of the river, while south of it they actually penetrated to and captured six miles of the german second line. the germans had apparently not expected a french attack and were less well prepared on the fricourt-montauban front than on the line running north from fricourt, where both their positions and their fortifications were strongest, and the sub- stantial success achieved by the british right and by the french went some way towards compensating for failure elsewhere. sir douglas haig, realising the formidable nature of the frontage astride the ancre, concentrated his attention on exploiting the success of the right and in the course of 10 days of hard fighting in which some six fresh divisions were thrown into the struggle important gains were made: fricourt, la boisselle and contal- maison were reduced, several woods were cleared and the line was advanced on a front of over six miles to within reach of the enemy’s second system of defences on the southern crest of the main ridge. second line of defence assaulfed.—this system, less strong than that stormed on july 1, was formidable enough and the stubborn resistance of the germans in their front system and mtermediate lines had allowed large reserves of men and guns to be brought up and the defence to be reorganised. however, the attack on the second system, delivered at dawn on july 14, established the british on the bazentin ridge on a 6,000 yd. frontage, cleared the bazentins and longueval, penetrated into delville wood on the right and to high wood in the centre and compelled the surrender of ovillers, already isolated. but though at one time it looked as if prompt exploitation of the success might yield far-reaching results, reserves could not be thrown in quickly enough to make good and retain high wood and before long the germans started counter-attacking in great force and with much determination. several weeks of hard fight- ing elapsed during which the british were unable to make more than very gradual progress at disproportionate cost. these weeks, the second half of july, all aug. and the begin- ning of sept., saw desperate contests for delville wood at the salient angle on the british right, for igh wood in the centre, for pozieres and mouquet farm further to the left in the thiep- val direction. the lodgement gained on the main ridge needed to be extended, especially on the flanks, but the germans had brought up large reserves, were employing a great weight of artillery and still enjoyed great advantages in position. the british progress was slow, especially on the right, where ginchy, guillemont and falfemont farm formed a_ barrier against which many attacks were shattered even after delville wood had been won. it was important to extend on this side to get touch with the french who were gaining ground north of the somme: pozieres equally was a stumbling-block to the advance of the british centre and behind pozieres were all the formidable defences of which thiepval was the centre. division after division was thrown into the fight, fought desperately, lost heavily and apparently achieved little, though pozieres was taken by the australians before the end of july and other gains were made beyond its ruins. but the strain was telling heavily on the ger- mans: they checked the allied progress but their resources in 585 men, guns and ammunition were, by ludendorff’s own admis- sion, taxed to the utmost to do so, while they had to relinquish entirely their attacks on verdun, the cessation of which was ordered almost immediately after the supersession as chief of the staff (aug. 27) of falkenhayn by hindenburg. tl. the second and third stages with sept. the allies began to reap the fruits of their struggles. on sept. 3 a renewed attack astride the ancre by the v. army, recently formed out of rawlinson’s iv. army and placed un- der sir h. gough, was unsuccessful, and the centre made little progress. however, the right at last mastered guillemont and in the next few days added falfemont farm, ginchy (sept. 9), leuze wood and bouleaux wood to its gains, while the french made substantial progress north of the somme and gained a big success south of it, taking 7,000 prisoners and storming three m. of the old german front line as far as chaulnes. these successes removec the main obstacles to the advance of the british centre, freeing it from the menace—the falfemont farm—of being en- filaded from ginchy line. the british were now well established on the forward crest of the main ridge and could prepare to attack the villages on the northern slopes of the watershed. the third phase in the offensive was ushered in on sept. 15, by an attack on a broad front in which 10 divisions took part. the special feature of this attack was the employment for the first time of “ tanks,” (q.v.) the reply to the problem of the machine- gun behind barbed wire. the new weapon achieved a modified success, not all that had been hoped by its designers but enough to encourage the allies and to shake the morale of the germans, besides yielding valuable lessons for its future development and use. on the left and centre the attack did well, courcelette, martinpuich, high wood and flers were all taken with many prisoners. on the right, however, lesboeufs and morval were not reached and only after sharp fighting was the line straight- ened by the capture of the quadrilateral (sept. 18.), which had held up this wing. this obstacle at last disposed of, a fresh attack on sept. 25, swept over morval, lesboeufs and gueude- court and by joining up with the french who had again secured substantial successes both north and south of the somme, com- pelled the germans to evacuate combles (sept. 26). success of the v. army—simultaneously with this success operations on a big scale were resumed by the v. army on the british left and thiepval was at last taken (sept. 26) with the zollern, stuffand schwaben redoubts behind it. this important success left the germans with only the scantiest foothold on the main ridge and was followed by further gains by the left of the iv. army astride the albert-bapaume road. thus by the be- ginning of oct. the enemy has been driven back to his last com- pleted line of defences, which ran from sailly-saillisel on the right, past le transloy and in front of bapaume: he was busily engaged on fresh lines further in rear but as yet these were far from ready or formidable. it really seemed therefore as if oct. might see the allies reaping full harvest of their earlier efforts. the rearward german de- fences could not be compared with those already penetrated and there had been some indications that the german morale was be- ginning to decline: there had been less stubbornness in the re- sistance encountered, less vigour in the counter-strokes. unluckily an exceptionally wet oct. robbed the allies of the spoils which seemed in their grasp. continuous and heavy rain combined with the eflects of the bombardments to make the ground a sea of mud, across which guns and transport could hardly be moved, and even lightly equipped men could only struggle slowly for- ward. attacks under such conditions were terribly handicapped; that most of them failed was not remarkable, for when a trench was taken the difficulties of consolidating it were greater than ever. what was more remarkable and a great tribute to the valour and determination of the troops engaged was that some progress was made, despite all obstacles. on the right the british established themselves on a spur running north-west between gueudecourt and le transloy, in the centre eaucourt l’abbaye (oct. 3) and le sars (oct. 7) were taken, though 586 repeated attacks on the butte de warlencourt were foiled by the mud. on the left regina trench was taken, the western portion on oct. 21, the eastern three weeks later, but the weather was becoming very bad and further operations were more difficult to carry out. iii. the last offensive by about the middle of nov. the british had secured almost the whole of the main ridge and had advanced quite far enough to make the german defences north of the ancre into a pronounced salient with its apex at beaumont hamel. hac oct. 1916 been as fine as oct. 1914 or oct. 1918, it is probable that the allies might not only have pierced the le transloy line but by advancing on a wide front to the north and northeast they might have outflanked the beaumont hamel position and the whole german frontage as far as arras. the rains had prevented this, but with the allies in possession of thiepval it was possible when at last the weather improved a little to renew the attack on beaumont hamel with better chances of success. the last im- portant operation in the somme offensive took the shape, there- fore, of an attack by seven divisions on nev. 13, which proved most successful on the right and centre, clearing the germans olf their last foothold between thiepval and the ancre and taking st. pierre division, beaumont hamel itself and beaucourt-sur- ancre with 7,000 prisoners. on the left, however, serre again prov ed impregnable; but by ludendorti’s own admission the loss of beaumont hamel was a severe blow. however, before the success could be much further expanded the return of bad weather again put a stop to active operations, which were not resumed on any considerable scale until well after the new year. in the two months which pre- ceded the german retreat to the hindenburg line (march 1917) much was achieved which the bad weather of the autumn had then rendered impracticable and these operations, which had brought the british within striking distance of the last line cover- ing bapaume and peronne before the germans anticipated an enforced evacuation by retreating, may really be regarded as the belated culmination of “ the somme.”’ unluckily in march 1917, the germans had a hindenburg line to fall back to—there would have been none in existence had oct. 1916 been dry. results of the somme battles —the allicd offensive on the somme may not have yielded all the immediate results that had been hoped for. progress had been slower, casualties infinitely heavier, gains of ground far smaller than were anticipated. never- theless the three main objects had been achieved: the pressure on verdun had been relicved, the enemy’s main forces had been pinned down to the western front, his powers of resistance had been substantially reduced. ludendorff himself has testified to the effect of the long struggle on the german morale and it is only necessary to compare the gencral strategical situation on dec. 31 1916 with that of july 1, to sec what a change had come over the war. it had been effected in the stubborn and apparently disproportionately costly struggle for the watershed between the ancre and the somme, and not outside france where the russian offensive had been checked, rumania had collapsed, the italians had been held up and the capture of monastir had been a mere flash in the pan, powerless even to help rumania. kut was still untaken, the british had not yet reached palestine. it was the somme which had wrought the change, even if bad weather had prevented the immediate exploitation of the success earned be- tween july 1 and oct. 1, and even though early in 1917 changes of command and of plan were to throw away much that the campaign on the somme had placed within reach of the allies. for the fighting sometimes known as the second battle of the somme, see german offensive and victory, advance to. bibliography.—e. von falkenhayn, general headquarters, 1914-6, and its critical decisions (1919); sir douglas haig, despatches, 1g15-ig (1919); p. von ilindenburg, out of my ‘life (1920); ef. ered my war memories (1922). see also worrld war; biibliograpiiy. (cot. a) somov, konstantin andreevich (1869- _—s+),:«russian painter, was born in st. petzrsburg (leningrad), nov. 30 1869, somov—sopwith his father being director of the hermitage museum. early in his career he worked under ilia repine, the realist painter and professor of the academy of arts. the spirit of the 18th century attracted him strongly and he was greatly iniluenced by the masters of the “ fetes galantes”’ and by the modern art of aubrey beardsley and charles conder. the retrospective qualities of ,his style are well illustrated in ‘“‘ rainbows ”’ and “‘fireworks,” which were his favourite subjects; while his portrayals of italian comedy in rococo environment show a sympathetic understanding of the subject. somov was one of the founders of the group known as “ the artistic world.” in 1919 he issued the book of the marquise, which he illus- trated with a number of characteristic drawings. his best por- traits, which are drawn in coloured crayon, show remarkable delicacy of execution and masterly delineation of character and bear comparison with the work of clouet and ingres. somov, who was a connoisseur of ceramics, also produced a number of groups painted on china. sce oscar bie, constantin somoff (1907). sonic depth finder: see sound ranging. sonnino, sidney, baron (1847-1922), italian statesman (see 25.416). during the debates on giolitti’s steamship sub- sidies bill in the spring of 1909, it was baron sonnino who con- ducted the most vigorous attacks against the government, ex- posing the radical defects of the measure, and when giolitti resigned on dec. 2 it was sonnino who was called upon to form a ministry, for the second time. but he did not enjoy the favour of the still giolittian chamber, and his cabinct was defeated over the new shipping bill. qn march 21 1910 he resigned, again after 100 days of office. he continued to take an active part in the debates in the chamber, and was a stern but just critic of giolittian political methods, although during the libyan war he generally abstained from opposition for patriotic motives. in the autumn of 1914, after the death of the marquis di san giuliano, the premier, salandra, assumed the foreign office for a short time, but when he reconstituted his cabinet on nov. 5 he offered that portfolio to sonnino, who accepted it. his con- duct of the foreign office was characterised by sincerity of pur- pose, high principles, unswerving patriotism and a wide knowl- edge of international politics. he had not, however, a free hand. he was still foreign minister, under orlando’s premiership, during the peace conference, which he attended as second italian delegate from jan. 18 to june 19 1919. on the fall of the or- we cabinet (june 19 1919) sonnino retired into private life. he died nov. 24 1922. the irritation of the whole of italy against the policy of the allies towards italy at the peace conference reacted to some extent against the nation’s representatives at paris, and sonnino himself came in for a large share of unpopularity also, on account of a certain caustic hardness of manner and his strong objection to compromise in any form, although the more intelligent and better informed part of public opinion realised the great difh- culty of his task and the inadequate support afforded him by or- lando, as well as the value of his actual achievements. he did not stand for parliament at the elections in nov. 1919, but was subsequently made a senator in 1920. in spite of what was re- garded as his failure to overcome the obstacles of the peace con- ference, he enjoyed the reputation of being the greatest minister for foreign affairs that italy had had since cavour, with the pos- sible exception of crispi, while as a financier he ranked very high. as early as june 1922 he realised that if italy was to be saved from catastrophe some form of coup d'etat was necessary. when the fascists seized power in oct. following, he viewed the move- ment with sympathy, although he was no longer in active poli- tics. he was also a man of wide reading and culture, and a dis- tinguished dante scholar and bibliophite. sopwith, thomas octave murdoch (1888- ve british airman and inventor, was educated at cottesmore and at seafield engineering college. having won the baron de torest prize of £4,000 for a flight from england to the continent in 1910,in 1912 he founded the sopwith aviation co., ltd., at kkingston-on-thames. during the world war this firm designed sorabji—sound and produced large numbers of aeroplanes and seaplanes for the british government. sopwith also became joint managing director of the h. g. hawker engineering co., ltd., kingston- on-thames. in 1918 he was made a c.b.e. he married in 1914 beatrix, daughter of the 8th baron ruthven. sorabji, cornelia (1866- ), indian author and publicist, bornat nasik, was the fifth daughter of the rev. sorabji kharsed)i, an agent of the church missionary society at poona converted from zoroastrianism, and of francina sorabji, a hindu convert and educational pioneer. the first girl student of the deccan college, poona, cornelia graduated in 1887, went to somerville hall, oxford, in 1888 as a scholar, and in 1893, received the b.c.l. of oxford. in 1904 she was appointed a legal adviser to the court of wards, bengal, and later held the same position in bihar and orissa, and assam. in these and other provinces she rendered very effective service to female landowners who suffered from the handicap of the purdak system. miss sorabji was awarded the kaisar-i-hind gold medal in 1909 and received the bar of the first class in 1922. she was enrolled in 1921 as a vakil of the allahabad high court. in 1923, soon after the removal of the sex disqualification she was called to the bar by lincoln’s inn, and returned to india to practise in the high court, cal- cutta. both in her writings and her speeches, she showed a re- markable gift for graphic and sympathetic depiction of widely varied types of indian life, with full appreciation of the value of the british connection. her best known books were love and life behind the purdah (1901) and sun-babies (1904), of which there was a second series in 1920. she also published between the twilights (1908), indian tales of the great ones (1916), the purdahnashin (1917) and therefore (1924). sorolla y bastida, joaquin (1863-1923), spanish painter (see 25.434), was engaged for practically the whole of the dec- ade 1910-20 on work for the hispanic society of america. it includes a series of portraits of spanish writers and a “ panorama of the forty-nine provinces of spain,’’ consisting of 49 immense compositions, each representing views, costumes and customs of a different province. this great undertaking was completed before paralysis brought the artist’s painting to an end. impor- tant exhibitions of his work were held at the grafton galleries, london, 1908; in new york, 1909; in chicago, 1913; and he was represented by two typical works in the 1920-1 exhibition of spanish paintings at burlington house. he died at madrid aug. 10 1923. see hispanic society of america, eight essays on joaquin sorolla y bastida, 1909; a. de beructe y moret, sorolla y bastida, 1920.