SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY

investigation of many peoples by a rigorous linguistic and statistical technique has produced a mass of accurate information that may be quan- titatively gauged by comparison of the first and second editions (1910 and 1922~3) of g. buschan’s jilustrierte v dlkerkunde. there naturally followed co-ordination from both historical and psychological points of view, and, though in reality intertwined, these are best treated under separate heads. culture history as substitutes for the “ evolutionary ”’ syntheses of men like e. b. tylor and lewis h. morgan, several “ diffusionist ” schemes have been elaborated. however, this label, though con- venient, fails to define the essential difference, since the earlier writers also used the principle of transmission even to the extent of deriving all clan systems from one centre (morgan). what really characterises them is the belief in historical laws. human institutions, tylor held, follow one another “ in series substan- tially uniform over the globe.’’(‘) knowing the formula of progress, the anthropologist can predict the future and recon- struct prehistory—as when morgan infers a matrilineal stage of hellenic society. the notion of laws of sequence is amenable to the direct test of pre-history, and stands refuted by it. while in europe stone tools are succeeded, first by copper (bronze), and then by iron tools, the african negroes passed directly from the stone to the iron age. similarly, in italy the solutrean period of the palaeo- lithic is lacking, and so forth. thus, tylor’s “ substantial uni- formity ’’ is not demonstrated: if laws exist, they are masked by incalculable disturbances that render them metaphysical] rather than scientifically useful concepts. modern diffustontsis—the “ difiusionist ’” reconstructions, then, spurn formulae of sequence and view cultural phenomena as historical, z.e., individual events. one school, fathered by the late w. h. r. rivers, is headed by g. elliot smith and w. j. perry; a rival system outlined by f. graebner has latterly been amplified by father w. schmidt. both schemes ignore the possi- bility of independent duphcation. similarities are ipso facto evidence of transmission, and the proof is perfect when not merely single traits but complexes recur—megalithic monuments and a suncult, conical roofs avd a solar mythology, rectangular huts and a division into matrilineal moieties. (?) apart from their antipathy to independent invention, the two schools differ profoundly. the british diflusionists are pan- egyptians,(3) an “ archaic civilisation ” evolved in egypt prior to 2600 b.c. and then spread to the four quarters of the globe, reappearing elsewhere in varying degrees of decay; the ruder cultures are not “ primitive,” but degenerate. before contact with “ the archaic civilisation,” the australians lacked magico- religious beliefs and practices, and a dual organisation, “‘ when discovered in some outlying part of the world, would be sufficient witness of the existence of egyptian influence(‘).”’ in contrast to this monism, graebner and schmidt are plural- ists. to follow schmidt(*), a primeval culture corresponded to the hunting type of life of recent pygmies and pygmoids. from this there branched off at different times and localities three ‘ pri- mary ’’ cultures. one was based on woman’s invention of tillage, with consequent development of a matriarchal polity, female deities and a lunar mythology. another culture evolved from the perfection of primeval hunting methods, the rise of masculine crafts, patrilineal descent—associated with totemism, male deities and a solar mythology. a third group of hunters domes- ticated livestock and became pastoral nomads. the subsequent course of history consists in the spread and interaction of these three kulturkreisen. by fusion of the first two there arose social anthropology village life, with its combination of husbandry and craftsman- ship; while the impact of nomadism upon this joint product laid the foundation of the near oriental proto-civilisations. solid achievement must be credited to both diffusionist schools. while the complexity of culture had been discovered before graebner and rivers, their insistence has made historical analy- sis a commonplace of anthropological research. again, elliot smith’s denial of laws due to the “ psychic unity ” of mankind has exposed the impotence of that principle so long as it is impossible to explain why a constant factor does not yield uni- form results. above all, diffusionists have envisaged all culture as a connected whole. nevertheless, fatal defects of method make acceptance of either scheme impossible. the pan-egyptian view implies a complete passivity of all non-egyptian peoples, yet many in- genious devices current in ruder cultures and rooted in local conditions disprove this corollary. indeed, the irreversible flow of cultural elements from the more complex to the ruder cul- tures is refuted in history. the caucasians borrowed maize and other cultivated plants from the american aborigines, and b. laufer’s studies show that the chinese repeatedly profited by contact with peoples of inferior level(*). again, the procedure of both schools in segregating a selected number of features as an historical unit is arbitrary. thus, graecbner and schmidt have it that totemism was originally joined with paternal descent. what, then, of the matrilineal totemic tribes in northwestern america and the pueblos of arizona and new mexico? schmidt assumes that in either case matri- lineal descent was introduced by athabascan neighbours. but since most athabascans lack definite rules of descent, his logic is radically unsound; for by inventing auxiliary hypotheses ed hoc, it is manifestly easy to prove anything and everything. an equally vital defect lies in the vagueness of the concepts used. to say that two peoples share a sun-cult or a solar mythology is to hide possible diversity under a label of merely descriptive. utility. proof of transmission depends on the comparison of phenomena, the sharpness of whose definition guarantecs identity. independent origins.—still more unfortunate is the denial of independent origin, though this is demonstrable for the dual organisation that plays so prominent a part in both schemes. thus, the probably once exogamous pezoma and pepfiima moic- ties of the angami of assam are no longer so, hence in one village all the people were marrying among themselves if of different clans; and since these numbered only two, they correspond ex- actly to the classical form of dual organisation(*). but in the hopi village of shipaulovi the same result was achieved by the extinction of one of three clans. the dual division accordingly cannot figure as the invention of one people, but is a recurring institution that may have arisen five hundred times in the course of human history—now by a reduction of clans, now by the fu- sion of two intermarrying groups into one tribe and again by other processes. conver gence.—we have here a perfect example of convergence, a process which f. boas(*) and a. a. goldenweiser(’) have power- fully argued to establish as a reality. they have shown that in many situations confronting man the possible number of solu- tions is so small that any particular one has a high degree of proba- bility and is likely to be duplicated. independent origin is also demonstrated by linguistic phenom- ena, which are merely a specialised department of culture. if the dual number could develop independently in greek and in shoshoni (idaho), if the use of reduplication in takelma (oregon) is not derived from contact with ancient greece(*)—then, too, storics about the moon or the conquest of monsters cannot be offered as evidence of cultural connection. a sense for historical reality must, then, reject as equally dogmatic the assertion of uniform sequences and the derivation of all similarities from a single invention. historical realism will rigidly exclude as useless for comparison any but sharply indi- vidualised features; it will trace distributions over continuous areas, whl appeal to the ascertained facts of linguistics and other 567 sciences; and, above all, will use the findings of archaeological stratigraphy as the surest point of departure and ultimate arbiter in questions of chronology. auxiliary tests of relative antiquity are not lacking(°). the most important of these is the assumption that the range of dis- tribution 1s proportionate to age. though challenged and liable to correction in specific cases, the general utility of this criterion is guaranteed by supplementary checks. thus, kroeber argues for the antiquity of girls’ adolescence rites in california(4), not merely because of their universal distnbution but from the con- comitant fact of local differentiation. in general the appeal to pre-history supports the correlation of age with range: a uni- versal trait, such as the use of fire, dates back to mousterian times. the dog is at once the most general and most ancient of domesticated animals. the bow, at least of azilian antiquity, has (barring australia) a comparable range. in ancient egypt the plough is seen as anewcomer crowding out the hoe; and the hoe remains, until recent times, the most common implement of husbandry. since europe remains the only major area sys- tematically explored by stratigraphic methods, historical recon- struction must remain tentative. facts of distribution the facts of distribution themselves may suffice for chronological inferences. the sinew-backed bow, which in egypt goes back to the second millennium b.c., is char- acteristic of many asiatic peoples, and occurs in the new world only north of mexico and west of the missouri. it may, there- fore, be interpreted as a comparatively recent acquisition from asia that failed to establish itself beyond the far west of the united states. from the same angle, systematic comparison of north and south american ethnography is bound to yield interesting results. the absence of the tambourine from south amcrica indicates that it can hardly belong to the oldest “proto- american”’ layer of culture. on the other hand, e. norden- skidld’s discovery of gran chaco games that almost exactly duplicate north american forms(!*) places these traits as definitely older, even though we are unable to give a precise definition in chronological terms. still more remarkable are the implications of gusinde’s and koppers’(!’) researches in tierra del fuego: the yahgan at the extreme tip of the continent are found to share with the indians of british columbia initiation rites during which the novice is obliged to drink through a tube and to scratch his head with a special “‘ head-scratcher.”’ the specific character of these features and the arbitrariness of the association leave little doubt as to the identity of the phenomena; and it is reason- able to ascribe to them a very great antiquity. established facts as to the history of domesticated animals and cultivated plants are rightly reckoned among the most valuable aids in the tracing of cultural connections. thus, the cultivated banana is invariably propagated from side-shoots and has long ago become seedless; hence its range over a wide area in southern asia and polynesia is incontrovertible evidence of diffusion. moreover, the cultivated banana of africa cannot possibly have been derived from the botanically distinct wild banana of africa, which produces no side-shoots; its importation from asia is accordingly demonstrated(#). apart from the histori- cal evidence that the banana was indigenous in america, fossil banana seeds have been found in tertiary—perhaps oligocene— beds in colombia. this does not necessarily prove that south america was the region of origin(#*). similarly, the humped var- lety of cattle found in parts of africa has been identified with the zebu of india, while the long-horned breed can be traced with practical certainty to egypt, if not beyond. whenever a route of migration has thus been ascertained by objective methods, it is proper toinquire for additional traits that may have travelled along the same path. if we are sure that the zebu came from india we shall be on the lookout for other elements of culture from that source, such as cotton and the loom; while the affinity of south african with egyptian cattle enables us to trace the history of bantu head-rests as well. use of linguistics —an unquestionable linguistic relation- ship likewise serves as a secure starting-point for ethnographic comparison. as tylor showed long ago, the malagasy share 568 with their fellow-malayans a type of bellows utterly distinct from any on the neighbouring mainland, hence the invention must have spread to madagascar from a malaysian centre. in the case of so specialised a device as this “‘ piston-bellows,” mere recurrence in the same general part of the world is adequate proof of transmission; accordingly, the nagas of assam appear as cultural kindred of the indonesians, and this conclusion is cor- roborated by other points of community, such as the equally distinctive terraced irrigation system of the angami nagas and the malay-speaking ifugao of the philippines.('5) by concen- trating upon points of unmistakable identity miss laura watson benedict("*) has succeeded in demonstrating the generically indo- nesian substratum in the religion of mindanao natives, has sep- arated later hindu accessions and rendered probable an infil- tration of indo-iranian ideas. modern methods of divination in indonesia have been identified with babylonian hepatoscopy of about 2000 b.c.,(!7) and r. andree(?8) follows the distribution of shoulder-blade divination from bering strait to northwestern europe. the cultural bond of western and eastern asia, of asia and africa, of easternmost siberia and europe, is thus definitely established, and the sinew-backed bow has been cited as evidence of connection between the two hemispheres. indeed, the joint study of the old and the new world has already produced posi- tive results of considerable importance. the lapp’s tambourine is not only widely spread in both siberia and north america but appears with curious frequency in association with the sham- anistic office, a combination not easily explained except by con- tact of the cultures in question. over a large part of the same territory hunters exhibit a characteristically apologetic attitude toward a slain bear, and practice similar rites of propitiation. above all, the systematic investigation of hundreds of myths has led to some astonishing conclusions. the koryak of siberia, whose material life is very much like that of the eskimo, are mythologically much more closely allied to the indians of south- ern british columbia. an ancient contact of these now widely separated populations is thus demonstrated, the connection being broken by a possibly retrograde movement of the eskimo.(?%) in the case of one story shared by european, siberian and american folk-lore—that of the magic flight—even so stout- hearted a champion of independent origin as andrew lang admitted dispersal from a single centre. the deluge m yth—among the stories discussed by jochelson(?°) the deluge myth is one of the most interesting. it is not merely a narrative of a general flood, which would be devoid of historical cogency, but contains the specific detail of animals diving for mud to be used in the rehabilitation of the earth. this charac- teristic episode occurs in north america from the atlantic to the pacific, and also among the chukchi, yukaghir, buryat, turkic and finnic tribes. it is now possible to add two bodo tribes of the tibetto-burman family—the garos and the kachar- is.(4) moreover, mr. hutton has mentioned naga parallels to tales recorded among the lapps, whose original home lies in or near siberia. (?*) as corroboratory testimony from another field may be cited the religious sanction of homosexual inversion in north america, siberia and indonesia, and the striking resemblance between the priestly activities of the inverts in borneo and among the chukchi.(#3) considering the historic migration of buddhism from india to mongolia, a cultural bond between siberia and southern asia cannot be waved aside as inherently improbable. but if we admit the possibility, an alternative is supplied for the speculative attempts to interpret mythological and other coin- cidences between asia or oceania and america by contact through a direct water route. it is then possible to proceed on the orthodox principle of tracing continuously distributed traits over demonstrated paths of dissemination. orthodox principles of comparison, then, suffice to span con- tinental distances and to co-ordinate the ethnographic and archaeological data of the globe; and if the chronological results lack a spurious completeness, they have a compensatory solidity. in one respect historical realism enjoys a definite superiority social anthropology over the extremist schools. diffusionism, in asserting the abso- lute singularity of cultural events, bars causal explanation. if, say, agriculture and pottery arose jointly only once in the history of mankind, their association may be a chance occurrence; and their joint diffusion is due to chance contacts. on the other hand, if like features arise independently and linked with the same con- comitants, a functional relationship may be demonstrable. thus, there are tribes in assam, california, nebraska and south africa(*4) who, in their kinship terminology, fail to distin- guish the maternal uncle from his son; while in arizona, mon- tana, california and melanesia others class the paternal aunt with her daughter. the former peoples are patrilineal, the others matrilineal: the kindred included under one head are in both cases in the same clan. this is not a /aw for we cannot predict that a given patrilineal or matrilineal tribe will so fuse distinct generations; but we can predicate a correlation between types of fusion and rule of descent. similarly, tylor’s correlation be- tween moieties and unilateral merging of lineal and collateral kin holds if, with rivers,(*’) we substitute clans for moieties. in the statistical determination of such correlations hes one of the most fruitful lines of future research. psychological problems a decade ago anthropology seemed to have few points of con- tact. it had become clear that racial differences, even if ascer- tainable by unequivocal tests, could not explain the history of a people’s culture, which varies too rapidly to be correlated with hereditary changes. the uncertainty of the psychological inter- pretations offered bred an aversion from psychology, whic: was enhanced by the desire of a new science to assert its individuality. hence, such declarations of independence as a. m. hocart’s “psychology and sociology’’(#°) and a. l. kroeber’s ‘‘ the super- organic.(?7) rivers went a step further, maintaining that only through the study of cultures could the psychologist understand the workings of the human mind.(*8) today psychologists admit that culture co-determines the individual’s mental life;(?9) while anthropologists have fallen back from their intransigeant posi- tion. even kroeber(*) finds a non-psychological treatment of society sterile. this is not surprising; for the very phenomena formerly en- visaged from a purely historical angle harbour a host of psy- chological questions.(2!)_ why do peoples adopt alien features? why are some traits accepted while their concomitants are spurned? can the mere idea of, say, pottery be transmitted without instruction in the technique? such are among the prob- lems that beset the historian, who, consciously or unconsciously, must turn psychologist. the late dr. rivers furnished partial solutions: primitive peo- ples, he contended, would readily adopt foreign elements, even when introduced by small bodies of immigrants, provided these possessed a material culture that powerfully impressed the abo- rigines. since, however, transmission is by no means regularly the result of movements of population, this theory has at best limited applicability. more damaging still is the adherence to custom by the american natives, swamped, not merely visited, as they are by possessors of a superior technology. culture contacts —boas has indicated the selective character of borrowing, and suggests that people are receptive toward ele- ments more or less prefigured in their culture. this, however, is avowedly rather a formula defining a programme of observa- tion than a causal explanation. what is required is the careful analysis of concrete instances. pioneer service has been rendered by p. radin, whose “‘ sketch of the peyote cult of the winne- bago ’’(3?) illustrates how a borrowed culture may be levelled to a cultural pattern of long standing. but contact may prove a creative factor. “ the introduction of new ideas,” says boas, ‘‘ must by no means be considered as resulting purely mechanically in additions to the cultural pat- tern but also as an important stimulus to new inner develop- ments.’’(3) thus, the fusion of diverse types of social organisation on the west coast of canada has led to novel arrangements. similarly rivers() shows how certain art styles originate from social anthropology the mingling of two melanesian trends. in east africa the sub- jection of one people by another has repeatedly created a caste system unparalleled in the previous polity of either conqueror or vanquished. re-valuations ensuing upon the borrowing of ceremonial traits have been illustrated by l. spier.(*) in the do- main of technology the chinese derived glazing from western asia; but centuries of experimentation culminated in a creative synthesis—the invention of porcelain.(#*) in the north american plains area the introduction of the horse proved at least a potent factor in the spread of cultural features.(?’) human invention to turn to another aspect of the subject, anthropologists must take cognisance of the differences in outlook between partici- pants of the lowlier and the higher cultures. if these are not to _ be correlated with inborn differences, how shall we appraise them? l. levy-bruhl(**) assumes that ruder peoples are possessed of a pre-logical mentality. r.r.marett(#*) and goldenweiser, (") however, have shown that primitive man displays in everyday life precisely the same sort of thinking as ourselves, while his irra- tional speculations are paralleled by equivalent phenomena in the highest civilisations. in short, there is at best a difference in degree, not in kind. even our advanced technology establishes no basic group difference, for its psychological correlates are confined to narrow bodies of specialists. apart from the effects of intensive specialisation, human in- vention does not seem to differ in principle throughout the course of history. there is certainly no inexhaustible reservoir of ideas for effective adaptation to environment: the fuegian shivers without manufacturing adequate dress; the navaho fails to util- ise stone material for masonry; european peasants do not auto- matically conceive advanced sanitary regulations. between maximum exploitation of the environment and that minimum prerequisite to continued existence there lies a vast scale of cul- tural values. mankind is certainly prone to muddle along with traditional devices, and in so far graebner and elliot smith are right in challenging the assumption of an indefinite inventiveness. nevertheless, the fact remains that most peoples are not meerely passive recipients of foreign culture; everywhcre we en- counter adaptations that could only have originated on the spot. snow-goggles were not invented in egypt for export to the arctic. in south america the poisonous manioc becomes, through an elaborate treatment, the staple diet. in brazil and the chaco lack of stone leads to the perfection of wooden tools, even where foreign influence is certain, the re-working of the received elements, as in the case of porcelain, may involve a creative syn- thesis. this conclusion must re-act upon our interpretation of similarities: if primitive tribes have sometimes ingeniously solved their problems, why insist that certain solutions were beyond them simply because they had already been achieved elsewhere? psycho-analysis.—naturally the progress of psychological sci- ence itself has reacted upon anthropological interpretation. re- ligion is hardly intelligible without the concepts of suggestion and hypnotism, and with the rise of psycho-analysis came new explana- tory principles. unfortunately the ethnographic naivete of psy- cho-analysts has discredited their interpretations of culture, while rivers achieved little more than to paraphrase cultural phenom- ena in the new phraseology.(*1) genuine illumination is, however, afforded by b. malinowski,(#) who shows that the results of re- pression and conflict must vary with sociological differences, and suggests comparative analysis of patrilineal and matrilineal communities. to the impetus of psycho-analytic thinking must also be credited c. g. seligman’s attempt to record primitive dreams— an undertaking of first-rate significance in view of the part dreams play in aboriginal life.(*) finally, one cardinal doctrine of psycho-analysis is amply corroborated by anthropological data. decorative designs, rituals, tales that have been diffused from one centre become secondarily linked with new symbolism, cosmic or biological explanation.(“) thus, “ rationalisation ” ' merges in boas’ still wider principle of secondary association. 569 the orthodox psychology of a past generation is still capable of stimulating anthropological inquiry. quite recently gustav theodor fechner’s work in experimental aesthetics has suggested measurements and detailed comparison of the decorative pat- terns found in plains indian rawhide cases. thus, there has been secured a more exact definition of local styles and a clearer con- ception of the subjectively significant elements of decoration.(*) similarly, galton’s descriptions of colour and number associa- tions in his fnguiries into human faculty have an obvious bear- ing on relevant ethnographic data. ° the value of the individual—of deeper import is the gal- tonian theory of individual differences that so largely dominates psychology to-day. thanks to father schmidt, marett, boas and others, the dogma that on primitive cultural levels the in- dividual is completely submerged in the group is definitely shattered. boas has stressed the skilled craftsman’s influence on the development of art.(46} radin has studied individual liter- ary endowment through distinct versions of the same tale,(*”) and has propounded the theory that monotheistic beliefs are correlated with a definite temperament, and accordingly may be expected to occur with a certain frequency, irrespective of cul- tural plane.(4*) r. thurnwald(*’) accepts the varying capacities of, say, papuans as an established proposition; and r. 11. lowie(®) systematically surveys individual variability as to sensory type, suggestibility, intellect, idiosyncrasies and leadership. in short, modern anthropology accepts personality as one of its irreducible phenomena and recognises in the interaction of individuals and the social tradition they confront, combat, succumb to or domi- nate, one of its perennial problems. these attempts to saturate ethnography with psychological points of view are as yet merely inchoate gropings toward a fuller comprehension of the subject. they are far from affording an insight into the spirit of other cultures. no wonder that those of little faith have grown restive and are blaming anthropological technique: a liberation from methodological bondage is their recipe for “‘ a proportionate rise in creative ideas.’’(*') this hope is a delusion and a snare. there is no royal road to an alien peo- ple’s true inwardness. only by piecemeal labour on the elements of culture and their concrete psychic correlates can we rise above the impressionist’s pseudo-synthesis, and by reliving aboriginal experience with its affective tinge attain that union of intellectual and imaginative enlightenment which must be our goal. bibliography.—(1) jour. of the royal anthropological institute of great britain and ireland, vol. 18, pp. 245-272 (1889). 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