SIERRA LEONE

in ro1r sierra leone acquired the kanre-lahun area from liberia in exchange for a district on the morro river. revised estimates give the area of the colony and protectorate at 27,250square miles. population (1921) 1,541,- 311. there were 1,161 whites and 599 asiatics, mostly syrian traders. the native population had increased by 137,000 since rgir. freetown, the capital and chief port, had 44,142 inhabitants. steady, though somewhat slow, progress has been made since 1910 in education (vocational as well as literary), in sanitation, in communications and in better social conditions generally. in 1920 the importation of “ trade spirits ”’ was totally prohibited; in 1926 the last vestige of government recognition of domestic slavery was withdrawn. political progress was marked by the grant in 1924 of a new legislative council which contained three members elected in the colony on the basis of manhood suffrage, and also direct (nominated) representation of the protectorate. a notable event in 1925 was the visit to freetown of the prince of wales. industry and trade-—commercially, sierra leone is still de- pendent on the products of the oil palm and on kolanuts, while ginger is the chicf of the lesser exports. experiments in the culti- vation of cotton and maize for export were unsatisfactory, but promising new crops were cocoa, swamp rice and cocoanuts. during 1910-3 trade developed satisfactorily, and in this period a railway to serve the northern province was begun. it was com- pleted to kamabai, 182 m. from freetown, in 1916. the world war caused a great shrinkage in trade, germany having taken 87% of the export of palm kernels. the war, however, demon- strated the loyalty of the natives to great britain, and the sicrra leone forces played a prominent part in the cameroons cam- paign. in ror8 there was a severe epidemic of influenza at har- vest time and this, added to adverse weather conditions, led to a famine in 1919, which was marked by serious rioting, the syrian traders being accused of hoarding foodstuffs. the year 1920 was one of great activity andinflated prices. it was followed in 1921-2 by a period of financial stress, but by 1923 trade had revived and in the two succeeding years steadily increased. taking 1913 and 1924 as normal years, imports (which are mainly foodstuffs and cotton piece goods) increased from £1,292,- 000 to £1,475,000; exports from £1,490,000 to £1,510,000. (in 1920 imports had been £3,175,000 and exports £2,916,000). in 1924 great britain took 97% of the palm kernels and supplied 65% of the imports. revenue in 1913 was £618,000 and in 1924 £868,000. expenditure in 1913 was {622,000 and in 1924 £777,000. bibliography.—t. n. goddard, the handbook of sierra leone (1924); h. c. luke, bibliography of sierra leone, 2nd ed., revised sienkiewicz—signalling and annotated (1925); sir a. r. slater, sierra leone, an address by the governor reviewing conditions in 1925 (freetown, 1925); and the annual reports on sierra leone, published by the colonial ofhce, london. (f. rc.) signalling (sce 25.71).—the functions of signal commu- nications in the field are threefold, namely:— (1) to enable information to be transmitted from front to rear, so that the higher command may know the course of events in the forward area and the administrative requirements of the troops; (2) to enable orders to be transmitted from rear to front, so that the higher command may exercise effective control; (3) to facilitate co-operation in battle between different bodies of troops and different arms, and between troops and aircraft. the importance of these functions increases with every ad- vance in the application of mechanical science to war. when armics fought in close order and generals commanded from the sacdle, effective control could be exercised by means of gallopers bearing orders to different parts of the field. to-day infantry and machine-guns, artillery, tanks and aircraft have to act together in a concerted effort which demands the closest inter- communication. a modern commander is provided with an instrument of unprecedented striking power but of such com- plexity that it cannot be controlled without a very complete system of signal communication. provision of signal communications.—in the british army the responsibility for providing signal communications is shared between the royal corps of signals and the regimental signallers of cavalry, artillery and infantry units. the sphere of the royal signals extends from the base forward to the headquarters of reziments, batteries and battalions. within these units com- munication is provided by their own regimental signallers. each formation, whether division, corps, army or lines of communica- tion, has a unit of the royal signals allotted to it to provide communication between its commander and his subordinates as well as with commanders of formations co-operating with him. methods em ployed.—four means of intercommunication are employed. these are: r. message-carrying by runners, dispatch riders and sometimes pigeons. 2. visual telegraphy by lamp, flag or heliograph. 3. line telegraphy and telephony. 4. wire- less telegraphy and telephony. a sound signal system demands all four methods, co-ordinated so that each by its special capabilities makes good the weak points of the others. reviewing cach in turn, it may be said that the first, the oldest method of all, remains one of the most important. in the confusion of the infantry fight the runner ts often the only possible means of conveying information and or- ders. at the same time, in the most highly organised signal system the dispatch rider on horse or motor-cycle is indispensa- ble. ilis usefulness lies in the great volume of correspondence he can carry, and his rele is to release the telegraph for its legitimate work of sending short and urgent messages without delay. on the other hand, a dispatch rider may be killed or cap- tured with dispatches on him, while his use may be forbidden by natural obstacles or a hostile population. the use of pigeons 1s limited by the fact that they take a considerable time to learn their way to a loft in a new position. consequently, they cannot be employed in mobile warfare. in static operations between fixed opposing lines they have proved valuable. the next method, that of visual telegraphy; has its chief use in the forward area, where complicated electrical apparatus cannot be carried. a small electric lamp is the most generally used instrument for both day and night, except in sunny climates, where the heliograph is extensively used in daytime. the flag under modern conditions is often too conspicuous for use under fire. an important branch of visual telegraphy is the display of signals on the ground, in the form of white canvas strips, to convey information to friendly aircraft. thirdly, there is wire communication, for which the medium varies from light cables laid on the ground in the forward area to heavy overhead routes of the regular g.p.o. pattern on the lines of communication. communication by wire is the best method of all when it can be established and maintained. it carries a greater volume of traffic than any other means, and it sikhism ylows telephony to be used. it is comparatively secret, and any number of lines can be run in a given area without mutual inter- ference. the military drawbacks are that a great weight of cable and other material has to be carried; the lines take time to construct; their maintenance absorbs many men, and they may be cut by shell fire or bombing, by raids, enemy agents or a hostile population. so vulnerable were the ficld cables to shell fire on the western front in the world war, that in long estab- lished sectors they were buried six ft. or eight ft. under ground. finally, we have wireless. this avoids all the drawbacks of line telegraphy, but it has weaknesses of its own. it is easily intercepted by the enemy, and if cipher is used to counteract this it entails serious delay. communication is liable to inter- ruption by atmospheric disturbance, by our own or neutral stations or by the enemy. the apparatus is delicate, and the technical training of the men is slow and costly. the number of links of communication which can be established in any area, without mutual interference, is limited. but some of these draw- backs should pass in time, and wireless communication has two great advantages. the first is that it is the only effective means of communicating between aircraft and troops; the second is that it reduces the extent to which a commander is tied to a telegraph line. beyond these palpable facts is the less solid, but no less important, consideration that wireless offers the greatest possibilities of development to meet the needs of the future; whereas the older methods have been exploited, so far as can be seen, almost to their limit. the wireless apparatus ranges from light forward sets carried on a pack animal or on men’s backs, for use within brigades, to semi-permanent in- stallations with a range measured in hundreds of miles for use between stationary and widely separated headquarters. princtples of lanployment.—signals, like every other branch of war, are subject to the principles of economy of force, security and co-operation, and certain rules have been evolved under the stress of experience for applying these principles. the means are economised by making no attempt to provide a direct link wher- ever communication is required between two points; a system of signal centres is established instead, connected from front to rear and laterally, so as to cover the theatre of operations with a grid of signal communications. each link of the grid is made as strong as possible by employing on it not one method only, but as many of the four means as are available. every headquarters is then either sited at a signal centre or gains touch with the system through the nearest signal centre. in the back area a signal centre may consist of an important signal office at a junction of permanent wire routes with a number of telegraph instruments and a large telephone exchange, several long range wireless stations and a group of motor cyclist dispatch riders. in the forward area it may merely have a small man-carried wireless set, a signalling lamp and a few runners. during an advance the headquarters of cach leading formation moves forward by bounds, establishing at each halting place a signal centre connected with its subordinate headquarters, those on either flank and the higher formation in rear. the higher formation moves forward in its turn, takes over and consolidates the gridwork thus formed, and embodies it in the rearward administrative system. co-ordination of the four methods is secured by establishing a signal office at every important headquarters in the ficld. the signal office controls all the available means of intercommunica- tion at the disposal of the headquarters concerned. it contains the line telegraph instruments and telephone exchange; the wire- less stations are sited as close to it as possible, and the dispatch riders are within call. all messages for transmission are hancled in there; they are registered bricily so that they may be traced at any time, and are then either handed to a dispatch nder or a telegraph operator, to go by whichever one of the four methods is most appropriate. all messages destined for a headquarters go first to the signal office, whence they are distributed to the officers concerned. for signalling on railways, (see railways). see h. m. dowscett, itreless telephony and broadcasting, vol. 1 (1923). (c. tr.) 545 sikhism.—when sikhism revived (see 25.84) its divisions also sprang into new life. in the main democratic in political and congregational in religious government, the sikhs had passed through a monarchical phase under maharaja ranjit singh and his successors, a phase reflected dimly in a hinduising tendency in religion. in the soil of india the reformer may graft exotic ideas upon an indigenous stock, but, sooner or later, the alien growth wilts and the old type reasserts its vigour. the sikh, not unlike david deans, prone to evolve his own principles and practice, retained his many sects and orders; but all tended to revert to an indigenous type. the strict sikh neglected all but a few outward signs of his adhesion to the guris, while the laxer brethren became virtually hindus, worshinoping hindu gods and, perhaps more especially, goddesses, early legends attributirg even to gurii govind singh the patronaze of devi, the goddess, and merely adding the sikh guriis and many minor holinesses to the ifindu pantheon. hindutsing tendencies —~one sect indeed retained its vitality. the kiikas or “‘ shouters,” always credited with hatred of british rule, maintained in practice an implacable anti-moslem attitude, which took the shape of carefully planned murders of mahom- medan butchers; it being a characteristic of sikhism that while it disavowed polytheism it retained the ancient hindu venera- tion for the cow and resented the slaughter of kine for food or sacrifice. the sect never regained much influence or repute. its ethical teaching in its inception was probably that of govind singh, but it is said to have fallen to the depths of degradation usual in a secret society. the significance of its emblems, a high, straight turban and a knotted woollen necklace, has never been disclosed, but they suggest a militant asceticism. of still less moment until recently was the fanatical akali order which had given trouble to ranjit singh himself. it had sunk to the rele of mere buffoons at sikh gatherings, recalling the preaching fox in a mediaeval choir, but its latent militancy has proved to be only too easily fanned into flames. on the other hand, the great sikh orders of the hinduising right, the udasis and the nirmalas, the “sad ” and the “ stainless,’ had retained much of their wealth, prestige and even spiritual influence, but tended to approximate to sacred castes on the model of the brahmans. failure of the theocratic ideal—in its ideals a theocracy ruled by its sacred volume, the granif sahib, sikhdom once possessed a convocation in its gurimatta or house of clergy, which mizht have developed into an effective constitutional body by co-optation of the laity but for its complete disappearance under the military chiefs who arose after the death of the last guri.. the sikh monarchs made no attempt to resuscitate it. hence the sikh congregation, lacking any organisation or central control, rapidly disrupted. apart from the great fanes, the village became the only real unit. and the orders were equally unorganised, having at best a titular head whose powers were undefined, no corporate body capable of holding property, and only the weakest agencies for enforcing discipline. thus when a village, as it often did, built itself a gurdwara or *‘ gurii’s portal ”’ for the recital of the sacred books and the teaching of the sacred script, it would elect as its incumbent a brother of a religious order or even a spiritually minded layman. the village temple —this humble temple it endowed with a glebe, but, just as the orders had no written statutes, so the temole rarely, if ever, had a written grant. the incumbent was trustee of the glebe and shrine, but no law of trusts existed. at best he was under the de facto control of the village congregation and less definitely under that of his order. but the principles of each order varied. some leaned towards congregational control, others towards priestly authority. sometimes a vacancy was filled by the clisciple designated by the last incumbent, with or wichout ratification at an assembly of priests convoked from nei thbouring shrines; at others it was filled by a loosely con- stituted gathering of all who frequented the temple. at times efforts were made to set up something not unlike episcopal con- trol or a royal right of presentation. yet, whatever the founders’ intentions, the terms of the traditional grant, the unrecorded rules of the order, or the unvoiced wishes of the worshippers, 546 the succession both to the spiritual power of the first incumbent and to the temporal benefits of his endowment tended more and more to vest in a holy family by physical inheritance. even “ celibate ’’ udasis founded families who are owners of wealthy religious properties and rich refectories, though bitter dispute as to division of the inheritance and the right to succeed to the office of chief abbot may from time to time impair their re- sources. under sikh rule such matters were doubtless settled not by rule of law, but by the ruler’s will. still they were settled, and popular feeling probably kept his caprice within bounds, just as it constrained him to prevent gross abuses. with that achieved he and his subjects were content, and if he failed to do more he had before him a precedent in the history of the ten guriis themselves. no one of them had established any rules for the succession to the guriship or method for election to that office. : the pontificate itself hwereditary.—the first, nanak, had ap- pointed his successor and clearly did not intend the pontificate to become hereditary, yet that principle was promptly asserted by the udasis, who ascribe the foundation of their order to his eldest son and set but little esteem upon the teachings of govind singh. and the succession to the guriship itself soon became almost rigidly hereditary after the 4th gurat. the eastern feeling that holiness runs with physical descent was doubtless further strengthened by the rise of the sikh aristocracy and monarchy, both hereditary and impelled by self-interest to suppress the elective principle. hence the history of every ecclesiastical office tended to reproduce in miniature that of the guris’ dynasty. but this did not result in reducing all the sikh endow- ments to personal appanages of saintly families, and many re- mained under the rude but effective control of the monarch, the orders and even the people, until power and responsibility passed into british hands. the act of 1863.—in 1863, however, the british govt. passed an act to divest itself of the management of religious en- dowments, and thereby denuded itself of all power to prevent waste or malversation. the sikh layman or the religious brother who witnessed the decay of his village gurdwdra or the house of his order falling into disrepute could indeed have recourse to the regular law courts, but the complexities of his suit would make it costly beyond the measure of ordinary litigation. to a court trained in the subtleties of ecclesiastical and canon law as laid down for the diverse denominations and varying statutes of re- ligious fraternities in the west the questions arising in such a cause would have been difficult of decision. the lay tribunal’s failure to prevent abuses —to courts innocent of such a learning they were insoluble. the arraignecl incumbent would deny his pursuer’s membership of his congrega- tion or order, the right of any such member to call him to account and plead his own unworldliness as explaining any deficit in his funds or defects in his administration. but matters were worse when the shrine had become in effect purely private property. as their inheritance followed no law but indeterminate custom the courts adopted the fatal principle that in all points each shrine was governed by its own customs, without regard to the general tenets of sikhism or the particular rule of the order. the minor temples were in effect freed from all control, and to such a depth of corruption did some sink that a professedly celibate priest was heard to depose that no udasi was truly qualified for spiritual office until he had seduced a married woman of his flock. many endowments were wholly alienated to pay for open de- bauchery, a result the more regrettable in that the beautiful hindu temples of the punjab himalayan cantons owe their preservation to the fact that the executive has retained control of their secular affairs, leaving religious matters to their priests, but nominating their bursars and auditing their accounts. sikh protests and lack of unity.—sikh discontent at this state of things was expressed against the administration of the khalsa college and the golden temple, both at amritsar. the council of the former was reconstituted to the general satisfaction, but owing to internal dissensions the latter offered a knottier problem. for years its calm had been disturbed by theological sikhism disputes, the more orthodox sikhs resenting its adornment with pictures from hindu myths painted at the instance of hinduising brethren, and other lapses from strict monotheism. eventually a provisional advisory committee of 175 members, partly nominated by government, was accepted by a large mecting of sikhs. it was to draw up a scheme of management, but never functioned. at critical junctures the manager, a government nominee, had intervened on the side of law and order, exasperat- ing some sikh feeling by bestowing a dress of honour on gen. dyer, after the affair of jallianwala bagh, and other steps. whether the sikhs had any just cause to complain of his acts as manager is not apparent, but in 1920 on mahatma gandhi’s sug- gestion a sikh public meeting held at amritsar appointed _a shiromani gurudwara parbandhak committee—“ for the management of shrines.”’ : high-handed acts of shrines committee—this committee, swollen to 240 in number by 60 co-optations, claiming to have been chosen by universal adult suffrage, seized the golden temple and other places of worship. but it went beyond mere irregularities in procedure when it reorganised the ak4lis into lawless gangs or jathas recruited from more dubious elements than all sikhdom could supply. one of its earliest steps, in 1921, was an attack on the very birthplace of sikhism—nankana, the home of nanak’s mother. dissatisfied with the udist mahant's regime the committee called on him to institute reforms, failing which it would eject him on a certain date. fearing an attack the abbot enlisted mercenaries, many of whom were moslem afghans. this roused fresh resentment that one of the holiest places should be so guarded, and precipitated matters. a gang of sikhs seized the sanctuary several days before the date notified. they achieved their purpose but made the enclosure their sepulchre. massacred by the mercenaries, not one escaped. in this encounter 130 lives were lost. the facts that the makant was defending his property and that the initial aggression was on the akilis’ side were ignored, and feeling against many mahants, especially those of the udasi order, was aroused. trouble at gurit kd bagh and the dodba.—other lawless seizures of shrines followed. that of gurii ka bagh in 1922 jed to much unnecessary suffering, fortunately without loss of hfe. in feb. a band of akdlis had captured that gurdwdra, but the mahant retained its house and lands. the committee took steps to seize some land, claiming it as appurtenant to the shrine. the law was vindicated but 5,000 akdlis were arrested. by then, however, the akalis had thrown out a new and more dangerous offshoot in the babbar (“‘ lion ”’) akali jatha, devoted to the task of murdering village officials and others known to be loyal to government and virtually defenceless in their isolation. its proceedings deepened the terrorism already imposed by akali bands on the fertile country known as the doaiba, between the sutlej and bias rivers, and beyond it, full advantage of the temporary paralysis of the administration being taken by the lawless elements in general to commit murders and organise gang robbery. misplaced economy reduced the police force to a cadre inadequate to protect life or property, and marked men were assassinated openly and with impunity, the employment of soldiery merely maintaining some semblance of order. yet when in 1923 riots between hindus and moslems occurred at am- ritsar the akalis not only held aloof but aided the authorities. the jattoke affair.—in 1924, however, their sympathies were aroused by the abdication of the misguided raji of nabha, who had been levying private war against the sister sikh state of patiala. the shiromani committee, exceeding its mandate to secure reforms of endowments, espoused the raja’s cause and asked the sikhs to conduct perpetual recitation of the sacred volume in all temples for his restoration. this behest was carried out in a temple at jaitoke in the state territory, a manifesto of revolt against the new ruler. the recital was not in fact interrupted, but a seditious meeting was broken up. “ mar- tyr’ bands of akdlis were thereupon organised to march to the temple and continue the recitation. one band, numbering 500 men, was reinforced as usual by a huge mob, and the latter charged the state forces. fire was opened on it and it lost some silesia, upper 50 men, including 21 killed; but of the jatha nucleus only three or four fell. the shrines act.—more seizures of shrines followed, but with- out untoward results, and in 1925 the sikh gurdwaras and shrines bill became law. it might equally well have been enacted in 1863. it provided, for the first time in sikh history, legal methods for controlling sikh religious endowments. un- fortunately, it confessedly allows the minority—the udiasi and other orders—to go to the wall. for this result the failure of the sikh orders to devise and enforce statutes for their self-discipline and to secure the rights of their congregations is mainly to blame. the udasi order is conspicuously distracted, having four or more suborders, bewildering varieties of garb, usage and doctrine, and tendencies to further disruption. so nebulous a body does not lend itself to legislative incorporation. the revival anti-brahmanical.—briefly, the genesis of the reform movement may be explained. during the past two dec- ades the sikhs have swung distinctly to the left, 2.c., towards a more democratic, militant, un-hindu platform. in 1909 their representatives obtained validation by a statute of the marriage ceremony called enand—“ rejoicing.”? in sikh eyes its validity (quite unnecessarily questioned in the courts) consisted in sub- stituting their sacred writings for the sacred fire of the hindus and in not employing brahmans at weddings. this simple “reform ”’ was carried by the efforts of the singh sabha or true sikh union, which aims at purifying sikhism of accretions. the revival of sikhism has thus some analogies with that of the wabhabi sect in islam. going back to the teachings of the great guriis, the sikhs are more attracted to the militant teach- ings of govind singh than to the quietist doctrines of nanak. sikh services in the war.—to this rekindling of the martial spirit may be fairly ascribed the fact that while the punjab as a whole mobilised one man in 28 as against the rest of india’s one in 150, the sikhs in 1917 had supplied about one-sixth of the fighting forces of the indian empire with less than a hundredth of its population. and their contribution was almost entirely to fighting units. as an emigrant also the sikh has achieved much. with the general anti-government movements in india the sikhs have had no close solidarity. to a great extent the sikh liability to paroxysms of popular passion is due to lack of education which makes no marked progress among the com- munity, though it is one of the few in india which gives its women instruction in its sacred script. nevertheless it is markedly less apt to be swept off its feet by incredible rumours or tendencious canards than some better read denominations. at his best the sikh is dignified, level-headed, and in action sedate. but he has the defects of his qualities. he is reticent, and it is difficult to fathom the real grievances underlying discontent. bibliography.—the sikh has produced little recent literature, but khazan singh’s history and philosophy of the sikh religion (lahore, 1914) is valuable. gokul chand narang, transformation of sikhism (1912) and “sikh relics in eastern bengal,’’ dacca review (1916), also throw light on sikh history. (he ayr) silesia, upper (sce 25.90).—article 88 of the treaty of versailles (1919) provided that the inhabitants of upper silesia (pop., in 1919, 2,280,902) should be called upon to decide by plebiscite whether they would belong to germany or poland (see paris conference). the purely german districts of falk- enberg (pop. 37,526), grotthau (pop. 40,610), neisse (pop. 7,781), part of neustadt (pop. 25,000) and hultschin (pop. 45,- 552), in northern and western upper silesia were exempted from ‘the plebiscite. up to the day of the plebiscite the supreme au- thority in the plebiscitary area was to be vested in an inter- allied commission, consisting of one representative of france, great britain and italy respectively. in this commission france was represented by gen. lerond, great britain by col. percival and italy by gen. de marini. on feb. t 1920 allied troops occupied the plebiscitary district. the local german officials were then subordinated to the inter-allied authorities. the german police was replaced by a special polling police (abstimmungspolizei), composed half of german-speaking, half of polish-speaking inhabitants. 547 the plebtscites —on the whole, the collaboration of the inter- allied control and the german officials proved satisfactory; but various differences arose, such as that which led to a strike of judges in may 1920. both the poles (under korfanty) and the germans opened an active canvassing campaign; and under polish pressure the germans in the southern and eastern dis- tricts were subjected to oppressive treatment. on aug. 19 1920 the poles made an attempt to seize the country by force. bands, chiefly recruited from congress poland, usurped authority. a number of germans were forcibly carried into poland, and many were killed. order was not restored for several weeks. in jan. 1921 the date of the plebiscite was fixed for march 20 1921. the polish terrorism immediately revived, especially in the district of rybnik, pless, kattowitz and beuthen. it reached its climax in the days preceding the plebiscite. voters from other parts of the german reich were frequently refused admission to the polls; sometimes they were maltreated or even murdered; and houses where outvoters were staying were set on fire. the day of the plebiscite passed, however, with- out disturbance except at a few places, such as rybnik and pless, but on the following day the polish excesses recommenced. the poll showed 717,122 votes for germany and 483,514 for poland. in 664 districts there was a german, in 597 a polish majority. practically all the towns voted for germany. there was a polish majority in the administrative districts of rybnik, pless, beu- then, tarnowitz and gross-strehlitz. the decision of the inter- allied commission as to the allocation of the disputed regions was delayed by differences within the commission itself. the french representative, lerond, who had from the first been accused of tacitly supporting the poles, wished to allot the whole of southern and eastern upper silesia to them, while the british and italian representatives wished to apportion the industrial region to germany. protracted diplomatic negotiations between paris, london and rome led to no result. at the end of april a report became current that the council of ambassadors had given only the districts of rybnik and pless to poland. korfanty’s insurrection.—in consequence of this rumour the first days of may witnessed a new and more serious polish insur- rection. korfanty had secretly raised a well-organised polish force which received arms and reinforcements from poland. he now occupied the whole southeastern part of upper silesia, on a, line extending from the south of the district of kreuzburg through gross-strehlitz to the oder in the south. he nominated himself dictator of the districts under polish occupation, took over the administration, and treated even the allied officials with such scant consideration that they were obliged to with- draw to oppeln and the regions not occupied by the poles. it was only in the larger towns that the allied troops, supported by the german population, were able to maintain themselves. a further polish advance was prevented by the german defence force (selbstschutz) under gen. hofer, composed of upper silesians and volunteers from other parts of the reich. there was severe fighting between this force and the poles, especially round ratibor and gross-strehlitz. col. percival, the british representative, was obliged to resign owing to ill-health, and was succeeded by sir harold stuart. attempts by the inter- allied commission to put an end to the insurrection by negotia- tions with korfanty having failed, the allies dispatched rein- forcements of french and british troops to upper silesia. after lengthy negotiations which were carried on with the german defence force, which refused to withdraw unless guar- antees were secured that the poles would first quit the field, an agreement was ultimately effected with regard to the evacuation. by june 20 the british troops had again occupied the larger towns, while the poles commanded the rural districts. as a result of difficulties in paying and provisioning his followers korfanty now lost control over them. independent bands plun- dered the villages, ill-treated the germans and mardered many of them. in the industrial districts work in many of the mines and iron works came to a standstill. by the end of june the loss suffered by the industrial region was estimated at three milliard marks. | 548 the decision of the league of nations the french persisted that the greater part of the indus- trial region should be assigned to poland. great britain, on the other hand, firmly maintained that such a partition would, as mr. lloyd george publicly expressed it, be “ unfair ’”’ to germany on the basis of the treaty of versailles and the result of the plebiscite. there were at one time three rival proposals for partition: (a2) the korfanty line, the extreme polish demand; (b) the sforza line, a proposal put forward by the then italian foreizn minister; (c) the british proposal, giving poland only the southeastern corner with the towns and districts of pless and rybnik. france was ultimately left in a minority of one on the -supreme council, italy and japan having adhered to the british view. after prolonged debates and open diiferences among the principal allied powers it was arranged, at a paris conference in aug. 1921, that the solution should be entrusted to a commission of the council of the league of nations. this commission was ulti nately constituted by the representatives of japan, brazil, china, spain and belgium, with the japanese representative, baron {shii, as chairman. on oct. 20 1921 the text was published of the documents containing the award of the league of nations on the partition. the area assigned to poland contained at least 75% of the ag zregate material wealth of the disputed territory. the division here made in the industrial area, previously german, was such that the council of the league declared it to be desirable that measures should be taken to guarantee the continuity of the economic life of the region during a provisional period of read- justment, and to provide for the protection of minorities. it was recommended that a general convention for this purpose should be concluded between germany and poland, so as to place upper silesia under a special regime during the transitional period, and that an “ upper silesian mixed commission ”’ should be set up as an advisory body, composed of an equal number of germans and poles, with a president of some other nationality to be des- ignated by the council of the league, together with an arbitral tribunal for settlinz private disputes occasioned by the temporary 2asures. the provisioial or transitional period was to be 15 years, and certain stipulations were laid down by the league of nations for the economic arrangements during that period in the “ plebiscite area.” (1) railway and tramway systems, privately owned or municipal, were to continue under the terms of their concessions, and the ger- man state railways were to be put under a joint system of operation. railway rates were to be uniform. the state insurance of employees in the silesian railway system was to be undertaken by that system. a single accounts office was to be set up for the whole system. expenses of new construction were to be charged to a separate account, and borne by the state in whose territory it was carrie out; the working capital for operation to be lent by the german state, and interest charged to the account of this system; profits or deficits ty be divided between the two countries in proportion to the lenzth of line and amount of traffic belonging to each. (2) the german mark was to be the only legal unit of currency, and poland was; to recognise the rights of the reichsbank for a period not exceejinz 15 years, but by agreement the two governments might modify this arrangement earlier. (3) while the german monetary system was maintained in the polish zone, the postal, telegraph and telephon2 charges should be in german currency. (4) the customs frontier should coincide with the political frontier, and the german and polish customs law should apply, with certain exceptions. for six months incoming goods from other countries, on which german or polish duties had been paid previously to the partition, should cross the frontier without duty. for 15 years, natural prod- ucts originating or coming from one of the two zones of the plebis- cite area and destined for consumption in the other should cross the frontier free of duty. for six months, raw, half-manufactured and unfinished products of industrial establishments in one zone, des- tined for industrial establishments in the other, should cross free of duty; and this should continue for 15 years when the products, as finished, were intended for free importation into the country of origin. natural or manufactured products originating in the polish zone should, on importation into the german customs territory, be exempt from duty for three years from the date of the frontier-delineation. as regards export, the two countries should facilitate for 15 years the export of such products as were indispensable for industry in either zone. (5) poland was to permit, for 15 years, the exportation to germany of the products of the coal-mines in the polish zone, and germany similarly to poland in respect of the mines in the german silk zone. (6) tor the 15 years, any inhabitant regularly domiciled or ‘occupied in the plebiscite area should receive a “ circulation permit,” free of payment, enabling him to cross the frontier without other see ee (7) generally, the two countries should respect private nents. the league followed up its recommendation by organising a ger- man-polish conference, which met at geneva on nov. 23 1921 under the presidency of m. calonder (former president of the swiss confederation), and resulted in the signature of a detailed conven- tion on may 15 1922. the subsequent friction between the two parties living under this convention was not more than was to be expected, considering the antecedents of the league’s award. the most serious incidents were a strike in the polish area over the ques- tion of lengthening the hours of work, which lasted from april to aug. 1924, and an appeal by the german govt. to the permanent court of international justice under art. 23 of the convention of may 15 1922. this article provided for recourse to the international court in case of disputes over articles 6-22 of the convention, which dealt with the rights of poland to expropriate private property. the germans claimed that these articles were being infringed, while the poles contested the court’s jurisdiction in the matter. the german case was filed on may 16 1925, and on july 18 the court found that it did possess jurisdiction, so that the trial of the case proceeded. (see germany; polaxd.) py ba da