SHIPBUILDING

a survey of the progress of mercantile shipbuilding during the years 1910-25 covers a period of unprecedented fluctuation in the number and tonnage of vessels constructed, associated with continued progress in the design of shins and improved methods in their construction. for many years prior to 1914 there was a steady increase in the total mercantile tonnage of the world corresponding to the ever-increasing volume of overseas trade, and although the dis- tribution of this tonnage among the maritime nations varied from time to time, the total bore a definite relation to the ex- panding demand for overseas transport, both of passengers and of cargo. effects of war.—the war caused a practical cessation of shipbuilding in some of the countries involved, and a reduction in others which, combined with the loss of ships due to war perils, involved an actual reduction of vessels afloat after the first year of the conflict. at the same time there was an enormous- ly increased demand for shipping for the transport of troops, munitions and general supplies, while the war casualties rose very rapidly. it thus became imperative that the output of new vessels should be expedited, and the various countries en- gaged in the conflict devoted themselves, as far as possible, to the replacement of lost tonnage, and the facilities for ship- building were, wherever possible, expanded to cope with tne requirements for more ships. the efforts thus mace, extensive as they would have been in normal circumstances, were hope- lessly inadequate to meet the situation, and only by the vast expansion of the shipbuilding industry in the united states was the situation met. 529 expansion in u .s.a.—although shipbuilding has always been carried on in the united states it never developed there into a leading industry. no country in the world, however, offered the same possibilities of increased production, and the energy and initiative of the americans, particularly after the entry of their country into the war, created an expansion in the shipbuilding industry which would have been deemed incredible a few years before. the vast steel industry of america, together with its enormous structural engineering works, was harnessed to the task; new shipyards sprung up almost overnight and an organisation was created for the production of ships on that gigantic scale which is characteristic of the country. the results of that effort are clearly indicated in the following tables, showing the tonnage owned in the various countries at the end of june 1910, 1914 and 1925, the improved position in this respect of the united states being entirely due to the enormous programme of new construction undertaken during the later years of the war. peace conditions —with the advent of peace there was a return to more normal conditions, and the output of new tonnage naturally fell off considerably, with the result that the relative positions as regards shipbuilding became nearly the same as betore (see table ii.). there has been great expansion in the tonnage of vessels devoted entirely to the carriage of goods in bulk, and in particular the transportation of oil has grown enor- mouvsly with the increased use of that ccmmodity. in ror4, oil tankers accounted for a gross tonnage of about 1,500,000, a figure which has increased in 1925 to no less than 5,500,000. experimental research—the steady advance in technical knowledge in all branches of science has led to the devotion of much research on the questions relating to the resistance of ships and the determination of the power necessary to propel a ship at a desired speed. there is as yet no mathematical solution to such problems, which can only be investigated experimentally. a marked step was taken in 1912 by the foundation of the william froude experimental tank at the national physical laboratory at teddington by the generosity of sir alfred yarrow. a number of such institutions were already in existence but were all under either official or private control, while the new tank was founded for the purpose of carrying out investiga- tions for the benefit of the shipbuilding industry generally. much valuable work has been carried out by the staff of the tank, and the results published for general discussion have led to considerable improvements in the form of ships and the design of propellers. much has been accomplished, but there is still a vast field to be explored before it will be possible to formulate the relation connecting the most economical form of ship with horse-power of the machinery, speed and carrying capacity. design.—improvement of design has been steady and con- 1inuous, 1f without any outstanding features. for many years there had been a continuous increase in the safety of life at sea, particularly on passenger vessels. the sinking of the “ titanic ” in april 1912 with 1,500 passengers and crew, led to the im- mediate appointment by the board of trade of a committee to advise the board as to what would constitute efficient sub- division of a vessel, due regard being paid to the nature of the intended service of the ship. this question had been under discussion for some time prior to the loss of the “ titanic,’’ but that disaster naturally focused considerable attention on the recommendations made by what is generally referred to as the 1912-5 bulkhead committee. ; safety problems.—in addition to the task delegated to this committee, a meeting was convened in london in nov. 1913, to consider the problem of securing greater safety at sea. all maritime nations were represented on this body, known as the international convention for the safety of life at sea, which prepared a series of valuable recommeadutions covering not only the construction of passenger-carrying ships but also many points relating to safety of navigation, wireless telegraphy and life-saving appliances. the convention was signed by all nations represented, but the recommendations have not yet been made fully operative, owing to the effect of the war. 530 the bulkhead committee issued in t915 a report containing regulations for the more efficient subdivision of merchant ships, which regulations were subsequently found to apply with undue severity to that type of ship which is dependent for its existence on the carriage of both passengers and cargo, as distinct from the purely passenger trade, such as arises in the north atlantic trade. the regulations were consequently amended and, as now drafted, meet with general approval. on broad lines the object aimed at is to space the bulkheads so that the vessel will remain afloat with either one, two or three compartments open to the sea, depending on the size of the vessel and number of lives on board. much experience of this nature was gained during the war, and ships built in accordance with the new regulations should be safe, except in the case of accident involving very extensive damage. load line regulations.—of considerable interest to the ship- ping community was the appointment by the board of trade, in 1913, of a committee to report on the working of the regulations relating to the load line of ships and as to the alterations clesirable to make the rules more suitable for international usage. the compulsory marking of a load line on a ship’s side only became operative in great britain in 1890 and was followed by similar regulations in many other countries, although even to-day there is no load line law in so important a maritime country as the united states. the load line committee suggested modifica- tions of the existing rules, which removed largely the existing anomalies, but their most important proposal was a standard relation between strength of structure and draught of water. although no legal action has yet been taken by the board oi trade, the principal classification societies have revised their rules to bring them into accord with new standard of strength. probably one of the outstanding features in connection with oo ty h | ey witty oo 10 lo ilo shipbuilding the subjects just referred to is the growing consciousness that the interests of the shipping community of the world are best served by the formulation of regulations for universal applica- tion, so as to afford equality of opportunity to any and every interest and country. construction.—systematic investigation of the functions of the various parts of a ship’s structure, and of the most economical methods of meeting the stresses developed has led to the elimina- tion from the structure of many members which were, at one time, considered indispensable. among changes of this kind are to be recorded the disappearance of web frames and the abolition of the large side stringers which formed so prominent a feature of the steel structure. the whole trend in construction has been to simplify the vari- ous parts of the vessel by redistributing the material, concentrat- ing on the more important parts of the main structure, the re- mainder being treated largely on the basis of local considerations. a widely spread practice has arisen reducing the number of the frames by an increase of spacing, the maximum spacing of 36 in. being very common, and the scantlings are otherwise increased to provide equivalent strength. in the double bottom, the closely spaced solid floors have been partially replaced by floors formed of bulb angle frames and reversed frames, while the number of fore and aft girders has also been reduced. the method of sup- porting the deck by strong girders which, in turn, are supported by large pillars at wide intervals is now almost universally adopted. greater attention has also been paid to questions of strengthening against local damage, particularly at the forward end to provide against pounding and driving in a seaway. the improved distribution of material has permitted a reduction in the total weight of some 5 to 10 % less than was formerly con- sidered necessary—and this without sacrifice of strength. fic. 1.—internal view of an oil tank steamer built on the isherwood principle. shipbuilding plate mm mm ee ee = — fic. 1. s.s. ‘ british aviator,” latest type of oil tank steamer. fic. 2. m.v. “ asturias,” largest and most powerful motor liner completed and in service. fitted with two sets of 8-cyl. double-acting diesel engines, developing 20,000 h.p. (courtesy of—fig. 1, anglo-persian oil co. fig. 2. royal mail steam packet co.) shipping the outstanding feature in construction has been the system initiated by sir joseph isherwood. in the usual method of con- struction, the frames and beams supporting the shell and deck plating are arranged transverscly, but in the isherwood system the frames run longitudinally, and thus support the plating in the direction of greatest stress with increased efficiency. fig. 1 shows clearly the principal features of the design as applied to an oil tanker. this system, as applied to oil tank vessels, effected a saving in the weight of material in the earlier ships of this type over the transverse framing previously adopted of about 12%. this large saving naturally led to improvements with the transversely framed oil vessel and the difference in weight between the two systems was reduced, although it still remains appreciable. the number of vessels built on the longitudinal system increased rapidly, and to-day practically all new oil tankers are of this type. the inumber of longitudinally framed vessels built in the last 15 years is nearly 1,500 with a carrying capacity of 12,500,000 tons, of which 700, with a total capacity of 6,500,000 tons deadweight, are ships carrying oil in bulk. the great success of the longitudinal system has encouraged the intro- duction of designs in which the framing at the bottom and deck is longitudinal, while ordinary transverse framing is retained on the ship’s side. a number of ships on this combination system have been built and have, so far, proved satisfactory. “table i.. gross tonnage of merchant vessels owned in various ' countries on june 30 of each year 1910 ioy4 pone tonnage tonnage cent ‘great brit- ain and ireland british do- minions denmark france | germany holland italy japan . norway spain sweden , u.s.a. (sea) u.s.a. (lakes) . other coun- tries . world table il. gross tonnage of merchant vessels launched in 7 various couniries 41-8 )19,256,766| 39-2 19,440,711 2,781,487 1,059,846 3,511,984 3,973,713 2,600,835 3,028,661 3,919,807 2,680,642 1,184,721 1,301,126 17,516,479 1,495,815 736,562 1,882,280 4,333,186 1,015,193 1,320,653 1,146,977 2,014,533 765,460 918,079 2,761,605 on ° 1,788,283 820,181 2,319,438 5,459,296 1,496,455 1,668,296 1,708,386 2,504,722 898,823 1,118,086 2,970,284 ee nn lea | be an waerntownad oot ete: neta oe ou a ate ava kb wqn of m n 2,256,619 2,352,764) 4-8] 2,364,920 3,749,079 4,728,024] 9°7| 4,744,337 country great brit- ain atid ireland _. british do- : minions. . - denmark :. . france germany ©. ' holland italy japan . norway spain sweden .. u.s.a. (sea) u.s.a. (lakes) . other coun- tries . world 1,143,169 | 58-4) 1,620,442 | 22:7) 1,439,885 44,879 63,937 79,685 175,113 63,6027 82,526 2,757 25,139 3,859 1-3) 358,728 37,766 32,633 : (no retufrns) 137,086 82,713 611,883 57:578 52,609 50,971 3,579,826 495,559 26,343 12,854 $0,751 159,303 79,945 23,019 30,215 36,931 3:234 8,904 177,601 min te test ge nt obne nat cda wo - 26 4-1 8+ 3:6 1-2 1-5 rg “2 ss “j = = 153,717 31,567 1,957,853 | 100-0) 7,144,549 |100-0] 2,247,751| 100-0 m © com m2 o oe hw 031 materials.—it would almost appear that the limit of economy arising from distribution of material has now been reached, and that any further saving can only be attained by the employment of a quality of material superior to that now in use. progress has already been made in this direction by the introduction of a new type of steel which can expcrience a stress of 15 tons per sq. in. without any permanent deformation, as compared with a much lower figure for ordinary mild steel. vessels have been built of this material which show a saving in weight of stcel of about 10% and should prove quite satisfactory, although the limited experience available does not yet permit of any definite conclusion. cw. s.a.) shipping (sce 24.983).—the movement of oversea commerce dominates the building and running of trading ships, and to understand the shipping problems created by the world war, . the nature, volume and distribution of oversea commerce of the world before, during and after the war must be realised. al- though trade is based on individual needs, and those needs must be satished by individual enterprise, it can be measured by the total volume passing between the countries, and for a period of stable exchange and comparatively steady prices, values can be taken asa measure of fluctuations in volume. it has been estimated! that in the 10 years preceding 1914 the total international trade of the world increased in value from {5,000 million to £8,000 million, and that 80% of such trade was seaborne. of this trade the share of the united kingdom in 1913 was £1,400 million, and for that year the volume of her exports was estimated at 94,000,000 tons, and of imports was estimated at 56,000,000 tons, giving a total of 150,000,000 tons weight. if the volume of british oversea trade be taken as typi- cal of that of the world, and there are reasonable grounds for such an assumption, then the volume of the seaborne trade of the world in 1913 represented about 700,000,000 tons weight. on this basis of comparison the same cargoes appear as both exports and imports, and therefore the weight carried was about 350,- 090,000 tons. | | . for the carrying of this seaborne trade, steam tonnage under all flags had in the same to years increased from 17,000,000 to 25,000,000 tons net register. | er: ! in the table on p. 532 the size of the ships is given in tons net register, the method commonly adopted in official returns, as it is upon such tonnage that port and other dues are generally levied throughout the world. in lloyd's register, ,the size of ships is given in gross tons register, whilst in other returns used by the shipping industry sometimes gross tonnage and some- times dead weight carrying capacity is used. for general pur- pose the relation between these different methods of measurement may be taken, roughly, as 100 tons net register=164 tons gross measurement or 250 tons dead weight carrying capacity. but no method of measurement represents the cargo-carrying capac- ity of the ship during a given period, as such capacity is depend- ent on the number of voyages made. it follows, therefore, that an estimate of the yearly cargo-carrying capacity of the shipping of the world is a matter of difficulty, but it is indicated very roughly by the recorded entrances and clearances of the ships under all flags in the ports of the world. these records are not complete, and they are not in all instances strictly comparable, but to some extent they can be tested by the records of the ship- ping passing through the suez and panama canals and by figures issued by the various authorities that control the shipping of the world. | | as oversea trade developed, the energies of commercial enter- prise were devoted to perfecting transit facilities. ports and facil- ities for distribution from them were built and added to, to meet the requirements of the areas they could best serve. the energies of commercial enterprise were directed on maintaining a steady flow of traffic through the ports, and minimising the dis- tances over which land distribution must be made. ' parliamentary papers cd. 8128, 7786, 7525, summarised in report of committee of chamber of shipping of the united king- are easeteoet steam ship owners association, july 1917, vol. ., p. 79. : 532 shipping the following table gives the steam tonnage owned by each country in 1904, 1913, 1920 and 1925:— countries united kingdom british dominions and possessions . british empire total russia including finland norway : sweden denmark . germany . netherlands belgium france portugal spain italy austria hungary . greece turkey. : ? : united states gncluding great lakes) : ; japan : : ’ brazil argentina chile : other countries total . * 5 a tj s s o « » . . * ~ - =. ~ - . 16,822,445 1904 8,751,853 74,620 ee ee ee ce 9,426,473 444,555 642,657 408,124 320,291 1,774,072 341,289 99,893 696,059 49,454 430,153 462,259 252,899 87,762) 223,020 57,970 3325493 478,419 84,110 44,678 42,164 123,652 tons, net register io13 11,109,560 915,950 12,025,510 462,022 1,122,577 551,964 415,880 2,877,887 794,840 186,581 1,029,113 53/903 506,073 773,843 629,444 443,771 65,402 1,280,958 956,702 188,645 107,172 63,834 243,337 24,791,601 1920 11,043,079 1,135,199 12,178,270 360,890 1,207,049 607,575 438,685 255,758 1,081,336 250,258 1,806,846 143,718 o7 1,512 1,291,725 303,046 7,564,708 1,826,755 289,770 79,340 54,030 1,161,658 31,472,937 the table below shows the total! tonnage of ships cleared with car- goes from all the ports of the world. cleared with cargoes 1925 11,771,138 1,429,757 13,200,895 269,968 1,596,613 764,573 622,937 1,833,091 1,577:920 328,166 9,024,173 162,994 696,905 1,787,095 545,452 $0,338 712753342 2,390,120: 272,899 123,593 107,159 836,661 36,490,900 ee es ee 0:2 om om ty ty dr wr cast on dein ty oci ey eet “ihe btn goo tse tn on © ga 00 o000n" percentage of total aorn aes es ma so hw wo mo now = a 4°90 cn average: 1905-9 1910-3 year: 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 british 35,375,867 37,709,690 21,962,895 23,532,459 24,282,304 36,817,495 42,139,130 41,732,088 41,413,566 tonnage foreign 19,738,097 23,901,933 12,599,212 13,193,076 12,115,137 22,864,635 28,251,848 23,566,671 20,897,199 total 34,562,107 39,725,535 36,397,441 59,682,130 70,390,978 65,298,759 62,310,765 for 1926 the figures are not yet available. percentage of total a a | e british | foreign nationaljty british danish dutch . french german italian . japanese norwegian . swedish usa, < other total igi3 1920 44°81 35°09 3°69 3°60 43°50 38-69 1-87 i-15 4°53 3°84 2°23 1-93 1:63 1°39 11-61 o-:si 3°21 3°43 0-75 8-30 4°15 5°74 0-22 0:46 2°04 1:32 3°12 4°10 2°54 : 1-79 0:96 0:26 ; sigs 24°04 3°56 5:81 0:7 0-92 0:43 0:2 0-28 o-:17 1-00 3:6) 100-00 100-00 tercentacge of total vere age 1923 | 1924 | rpm rere fs | ere — —ee 11,568,291/13,193,457|14,067,405 130,417 1,083,229 839,480 2,897,513 231,397 339,365 2,648 109,156 2,670 i ,215,127 211,380 18,489,293121,302 299,095 2,175,234) 2 1,281,223 1,213,691] 1 981,355] i 986,283 335:597 275,264 349,224 344,560 487,352 1,495,116 ,646,872 472,703 871,529 347,418 270,197 485,083 320,111 no oe or ae oo conatnomi a wt te oe os et _ pe ra sn ysn orwarat ons ee ee nationality british : chilian. danish . dutch ‘ french. german italian japanese . norwegian peruvian . spanish swedish other a ad he total excluding u.s.a. u.s.a.! total a ne ec coc (ec ocs nations excluding ,760,188 212,000 32,221 152,535 114,664 52,755 98 ,692 §15,243 397 o32 1‘)1,689 106,651 76,825 43,861 4,754,956 3,791,058 8,546,044 tonnage 1923 1924 4,892,338 6,097,611 201,411 176,472 240,053 245,92 510,970 551,761 253,333 386,640 336,149 660,156 117,782 164,448 753,219 815,468 5971359 546,533 216,829 189,046 41,20! 172,572 130,361 161,993 107,245 173,251 8,397,250 10,341,950 10,208,536 15,806,899 18,605,786 26,148,879 5:949,391 129,183 160,299 531,251 489,806 723,067 241,054 823,869 672,663 188,784 139,579 225,593 10,583,764 12,271,387 22,855,151 _ ahh ~2o nn = nw ot © dawor com whe wn = | 54:9 1923 1924 1925 » §3°3 58°9 56-2 2°4 1:7 i<2 296 2°4 rs : 6-1 5°3 5-0 ; 3°0 3°7 4:6 4:0 6-4 6-8 : 14 1-6 2°3 ; 9°0 79 78 | zl 573 6-4 2-6 1-3 1-8 od or 15 : 15 1-6 2:1 : 1-3 7, 20%: 100-0 t00:0 100:0 percentage of total | 60-4 | 53:6 1 includes vessels engaged in trade between the atlantic and pacific coasts of the united states, which, as ‘' coasting trade,"’ is reserved exclusively for ships under the united states flag. shipping effect of the world war it is difficult to estimate the direct effect of the waron the volume of international trade, and on the ship-carrying power under all flags. on the declaration of war the great bulk of the oversea trade of russia, belgium, germany and austria-hungary ceased, and their merchant fleets disappeared from the high seas. their trades together represented about 23% of the total international trade of the world, and their shipping about 16% of the ship-carrying power. the international trade of the british empire represented about 29% and of france about 7% of the total, and their shipping 52% and 4% of the ship-carrying power. the international trade of the non-belligerent countries repre- sented the remaining 41 % and their shipping the remaining 28% of the shin-carrying power. the international trade of thcse countries was seriously restricted by the war cutting off the sources from which they had obtained the greater part of their imports of manufactured goods, and the markets in which they had sold a considerable part of their exports of food supplies and raw material, and by the general curtailment of international credit, without which oversea trade became difficult, if not im- possible. but the whole of their ship-carrying power remained available, while about one-fifth of that of the british empire and france had to be given up to direct war services. no records had been published by the end of 1925 upon which the volume of the international trade of the world during war years could be calculated, but it would appear probable that its decrease was greater than the decrease in the shipping available, even after deduction of shipping directly given up for war serv- ice. but another factor of the first importance had also to be taken into account; foras the war proceeded it became apparent that the carrying power of the ships had been seriously dimin- ished—that is, the number of cargoes that each individual ship could deliver within a given period of time had materially decreased. not only had more time to be spent on the actual voyage, in the avoidance of war perils and in serving more dis- tant ports, but the ports, and the railway communications with those ports, were frequently being overwhelmed with war or other unaccustomed traflic. this general slowing down in opcra- tions was the principal adverse factor affecting ship-carrying power throughout the war. the result was that the ship-carry- ing power available was insuflicient to meet demands, and in consequence frcights advanced all over the world, and, what was of far greater moment, the volume of supplies delivered fell short of the world’s requirements and thereby prices were forced up by actual shortage. the position could be met by decreasing the demand for ship carrying, or by speeding up the “ turn round ” of the ships in port. great britain.—speeding up in the ports of great britain be- came more and more impossible as the control of the state over the ships and the cargoes they carried increased, notwithstanding the efforts of the ministry of shipping. the demand could be lessened in one of two ways: by advancing the freights, or by placing restrictions on the volume of the cargoes carried. each method involved a selection amongst the cargoes oficring, and both were open to objection. if the first were followed, then al though ability and readiness to pay the increased freights were evidence of the pressing character of the demand for certain kinds of commodities, they were not necessarily evidence of a real national need for those commodities. the second method involved the rationing of the consumers, and that could only be done by the state. the shipowners had neither the knowledge nor the authority to make the selection; and governments shrank from assuming responsibility. up to the end of 1916 the government relied in the main on the first method, but it en- deavoured more and more to combine it with the alternate and inconsistent policy of fixing the freights at which particular classes of imports were to be carried. from the beginning of 1917, the government assumed full con- trol over all the ships under the british flag; it determined the voyages to be made, fixed the freights charged, and rationed the nation. as the freights fixed were substantially below the rates ruling in the open freight market of the world, no attraction was 00 offered to ships under foreign flags, which therefore transferred their carrying power to trade with other countries in which they could earn far higher freights with less risk. the result was that the ship-carrying power available was reduced, while the organisation set up to deal with the imports carried at fixed freights, and still more those set up under the rationing policy, intensified the congestions in the ports. in ror4 great britain had about 3,600 steamships, represent- ing some 10,000,000 tons net register, employed in ocean over- seas trades. of these 1,698, representing 4,300,000 tons net register, were lost through war perils, two-thirds of those losses occurring after jan. 1917. by that time the war demands on the shipbuilding yards and engineering shops were so heavy that replacement was impossible. to mect this loss, and that of the ships under foreign flags driven away by the fixing of freights, ships under the british flag were withdrawn from eastern and other trades, and concentrated on the shortest routes over which the country could obtain, on credit and not as a commercial operation, its oversea supplies: and in consequence the ports serving the north american route were still further congested. allies and neutrals —the allies and the non-belligerent coun- tries did not attempt to fix frei:hts gencrally on voyages to and from their ports. they suffered heavily from the loss of ships and the slowing down of oversea transport, but they had not sufficient shipping under their own flags to tempt them to run the risk of driving from their trades ships under other flags by refusing to pay current rates of freight. the allics made enor- mous demands on british ships to carry war material and na- tional supplies, with the result that, while neither the allies nor the non-belligerent countries suffered towards the end of the war as heavily as great britain from the lack of ship-carrying power, they suffered almost as heavily from the closing of mar- kets, in which they had been accustomed to trade as both sellers and buyers. they were unable to find new sources of manufac- tured goods, which resulted in the development of home indus- trics in all countries, and a general decrease in international trade all over the world. the war, and in particular the policy followed by the british govt. in regard to british merchant shipping, caused nations to attach an exaggerated importance to the ownership under their own flags of ship-carrying power, and ships were built without any regard to the economic forces controlling shipping. the diagram on p. §34 shows the tonnage launched by the principal nations of the world. although therefore it is difficult to estimate the direct effect of the war on the volume of international trade and on the ship- carrying power under all flags, it is clear that it was enormous. so far as great britain and the central powers were concerned, it disorganised almost every trade in which they had been engaged, some of which were entirely destroyed. new competitors arose amongst both sellers and buyers, the united states and japan, in particular, greatly increasing their trade, and ship- carrying power far in excess of the world’s requirements was brought into existence. suippinc after tie war great britatn—in march 1916 the shipping industry ap- pointed a committee to advise as to the measures requisite for the maintenance, after the war, of a mercantile marine adequate to the empire interests in peace, as well as its needs in war. in their report, made in july 1917, this committee said:— experience during the war, of the state as a manufacturer, a merchant and a shipowner, has demonstrated the impossibility of government controlled business ever holding its own in international commerce. the ruling principle of our trade policy after the war should therefore consist in the maintenance for each individual citizen, be he producer or consumer, manufacturer, trader, banker, underwriter, shipowner, employer or workman, of the fullest pos- sible opportunities for the exercise of his energies and enterprise in the markets of the world, subject only to such restrictions as must be imposed in the interest of national safety. this policy is now generally accepted in principle; but it took years for the nation to realise that any other policy must result s tons los. thousands of g. s 8 8 s 8 tg et ee f| 4900 f ‘ / s022 reset secc ery p| aux ae ttn =e abe bf nn i 1 iu i t \ hl 497. rm lois 1918 ee 19/8 1s yeor fic. 1.—graphs showing tonnage launched each year from 1913 to 1925 in the principal shipbuilding countries. only vessels of 100 tons gross and upwards are included in the figures, taken from the league of nations monthly bulletin of statistics, upon which the chart is based. the united states coast and great lakes tonnage launched are given separately. the canadian tonnage launched on the great lakes is included in the graph of the british empire. in disaster, and indeed it is open to doubt whether that fact was fully recognised by 1926. the governments of the day would not face the position. no doubt the transition from war to peace conditions was full of difficulties, and even dangers, and it was in the hope of mitigating these dangers that department control was continued throughout 1919 and a part of 1920. | . the british shipping industry by the end of 1920 had replaced its war losses of 4,000,000 tons net register, but at the cost of from two and a half to three times that of the ships replaced, and of nearly double the amount it had received from the war risk insurances on such ships. the profits of the industry during the war had been kept down not only by the taxation of all excess profits, but also by the imposition of exceptional conditions of employment at rates of freight calculated on a peace basis. in the result, the industry had neither the means nor the credit to do more than make good its war losses; but the tonnage built was sufficient to place again at the disposal of the country and of the world at large, by the end of 1920, at least as much ship- carrying power under the british flag as was in being before the war. | ae other countries —in other countries not only were the-war losses replaced, but the shipping under their flags was greatly added to, in part out of the unrestricted profits earned by their shipowncrs during the war, and in part out of national funds. but in those countries the cost of building was also far in excess of the value of the ships based on their future carning power, and much of the tonnage built could never meet the needs of international trade. by reason of the building under other flags, when the war ended the steam tonnage of the world shooting in existence, notwithstanding all the war losses, was in excess ot that which had been available at the opening of the war, and by the end of 1920 it exceeded 31,000,000 tons net register, of which great britain owned 11,000,000 tons net register. by the end of 1920, the replacement of the british ships and the complete withdrawal of all state control provided efficient tonnage far in excess of the world’s demand for oversea carrying power. freights accordingly fell by upwards of 60% and went on falling, and ships began to be laid up, as the earnings were insufficient to cover the cost of running. the following table shows the laid-up tonnage of the principal maritime countries on jan. 1 of 1922, 1923, 1924 and 1925:— jan. i 1922 ig2 1924 1925 net tons| net tons} net tons| net tons united states 3,237,000 | 3,249,000 | 2,604,000 | 2,575,000 united kingdom 1,079,000] 616,000} 554,000] 430,000 france 662,000] 445,000| 274,000| 190,000 taly . : 357,000| 288,000] 260,000] 137,000 netherlands 199,000| 201,000] 143,000 40,000 norway 126,000 32,000 31,000 15,000 sweden 124,000 13,000 a 12,000 greece 104,000 46,000 74,000 15,000 japan 73,000 60,000 18,000 15,000 belgium 168,000] 104,000 53,000 16,000 denmark . 98,000 10,000 8,000 es spain . 323,000} 317,000 78,000 36,000 australia n/a 65,000 52,000] 101,000 all other countries . 117,000} 120,000 51,000 63,000 total . | 6,667,000 | 5,566,000 | 4,200,000 | 3,645,000 percentage ; ; 100 84 63 «55 (n. h.) shooting.—a definite stage in the history of the sport of shooting was marked by the world war. in scotland and northern england during the years 1914-8 most of the grouse moors were not shot over, and the majority of the keepers were away at the front. this led, in some places, to over-stocking, which brought in its train disease; elsewhere there was a large increase in hooded crows, black-backed gulls and other enemies of game, which it took the keepers, on their return from the war, some time to reduce. within two or three years, however, the course of the grouse-shooting scasons became normal, and, with an increased demand for moors, the rentals for shootings rose to figures considerably exceeding those obtained before the war. but the chief change wrought by the war belonged not so much to scotland as to estates in england. before 1914, the sport of pheasant-shooting had, in the opinion of a good many people, assumed rather unnatural proportions. on some estates pheasants were hand-reared in such immense numbers that the principal days’ covert-shooting ceased to possess the element of wildness and uncertainty that is the true charm of the sport. during the war, no pheasants were reared by hand, and in the years that immediately followed most of the birds which were shot were wild. concurrently, a good deal more attention was turned to the best methods of managing partridge manors and increasing partridge stocks. with the gradual resettlement, however, the hand-rearing of pheasants began again, and the industry of the game farmers, producing a yearly supply of game eggs and birds for shooting estates, grew and thrived. the year 1926 saw more game farmers in existence and doing good busi- ness that any previous year, while the number of game and gamekeepers’ licences taken out in england and scotland in- creased from 62,873, with a revenue of {162,901 in 1g10, to 70,178, with a revenue of £190,479 in 1924. (3.2) united states —in the united states conditions in field shooting are vastly different from conditions in europe. there are no grouse moors in the united states, there are not as many private shooting lodges, and but very few persons make a business of game breeding. wild life has always been regarded as common property, free to be shot by anyone. ‘though hunters take, it is estimated, game worth about $100,000,000 from the shorey—siam fields annually, though vermin is credited with taking a toll 10% greater than the sportsman, and though the automobile and good roads have brought the game ficlds closer, there is more small game to be shot at now than a half century ago. in 1924 from the fields of six states that maintained records of what the hunters bagged, 12,058,512 pieces of game were taken. it 1s conservatively estimated that 25,000,000 rabbits, 20,000,000 quail, 15,000,000 squirrels, 15,000,000 ducks, 12,000,000 grouse, 10,000,000 geese and 100,000 deer are bagged yearly, as well as millions of other game animals. the total number of hunters who took out licences in 1922 was 4,207,200. this number increased in 1923 to 4,490,707, in 1924 to 5,321,196 and in 1925 to 6,003,737. these individuals paid more than $7,000,000 for hunting licences alone. millions of dollars are being spent by the various states to re- stock the fields. game is increasing in all but five states, and mississippi and north carolina are the only states without game commissions. pennsylvania estimates that the game within its borders is worth $150,000,000. since the beginning of the present century great efforts have been made to secure better and more uniform game laws, and this has caused a deeper interest in the conservation of wild life. there are more than 800 sanctuaries in the united states where game is being propagated and protected in addition to the united states forests where protection is given to more than 700,000 head of game. cpg) shorey, paul (1857-— ), american classical scholar, was born at davenport, ia., aug. 3 1857. he graduated from harvard university in 1878, and was admitted to the chicago bar in 1880. he then continued his studies at the universities of leipzig (1881) and bonn (1882) and the american school of classical studies, athens (1882-3), proceeding thence to the university of munich (ph.d., 1884). he was professor of greek at bryn mawr college 1885-92, resigning to fill a similar chair at the university of chicago. he became head of the classical depart- ment at chicago in 1896, and was appointed by columbia uni- versity roosevelt professor in the university of berlin (1913-4). shorey wrote de platonis idearum doctrina (1884); the idea of good in plato’s republic (1895); the odes and epodes of hor- ace (1898); the unity of plato’s thought (1903); and the assault on humanisn (1017), the latter a brilliant but bitter polemic directed chieily against those who minimised the value of humane studies in the educational system. he became managing editor of classical philology in 1898, and was a constant contributor to its columns. shrapnel: see ammunition. siam (see 25.2), an independent kingdom of southeastern asia and a member of the league of nations. area 200,148 square miles. population (estimated) 9,223,170. i. political history on king chulalong korn’s death on oct. 23 1910 he was suc- ceeded by one of his sons who had been nominated in 1895 as heir-apparent. the latter was known during the first few years of his reign by his personal name of vajiravudh, but in 1916 this sovereign issued a decree that “ ramadhipati”’ (king rama) should be the dynastic title of his line, and that each previous monarch should be known as ‘‘ king rama,” with the requisite numerical figure signifying the order of reigning. thus he was known as rama vi. until his death on nov. 26 1925, when, hav- ing no male issue, he was succeeded by his younger brother, prajadhipok, prince of sukhodaya. during the 15 years of king rama vi.’s reign, siam’s progress externally towards what may be termed treaty independence, and internally towards political and economic development, pro- ceeded without interruption. though arrangements with cer- tain foreign powers made in the years immediately preceding the world war contributed to the partial abolition of extraterri- toriality, the complete disappearance at no distant date of the jurisdictional restrictions acquiesced in by siam in the middle of the roth century was ensured by treaties concluded after 1918. the most important modern treaties are those made with the 935 united states (1920), japan (1924), denmark, france, great britain, holland, portugal and spain (1925). in 1926 treaties were being negotiated with belgium, czechoslovakia, italy, norway, sweden and other european nations. <a provisional economic arrangement was made with germany in 19253. the treaties have in common agreement on the part of the foreign power to an increase in siamese tariff rates, and to the subjection of its nationals to siamese courts; though certain jurisdictional limitations will remain in effect until the publication of all the siamese codes, viz.: the penal code, the codes of procedure, the law for the organisation of courts and the civil and commercial code, and for five years thereafter. the eventual result will be the submission of all foreigners residing in siam to siamese law administered in siamese courts by siamese judges. as regards siamese law and its development, it is interesting to note that, whilst urgent situations have been met by the issue of legislative measures in the form of royal decrees, siam has already published and brought into effect several of the codes here mentioned, and three books of the civil and commercial code. this latter code represents many years’ work on the part of a joint siamese and french commission but awaits a satisfactory translation into siamese for its final publication. the siamese declaration of war in july 1917 against germany and austria-iiungary had amongst other consequences the effect of automatically terminating the extraterritorial treaties with those powers. all enemy subjects residing in siam were interned, and a quantity of german shipping was seized and condemned as prize. much useful legislation has been enacted, and expetitieneal municipalities have been set up in several of the larger provincial towns. important indications of the awakening and develop- ment of the country are: the abolition of the gambling farms; the withdrawal of opium from public tender to government monopoly and progressive restriction of facilities for its use; the gradual extension of a national and, where conditions are suit- able, compulsory system of education; a general application of free, compulsory vaccination; the royal encouragement of ath- letics, more particularly of football; the inauguration by rama vi. of a now flourishing boy scout movement under the name of wild tiger corps; a marked modernisation and expansion of the siamese language induced by closer contact with the modern world; the introduction of the use of surnames, many thousands of which were devised and assigned by rama vi.; the rise of a native journalism and press, not devoid of some boldness in criticising high personalities or official laxities. on sept. 28 1917 a change was made in the national flag. ilitherto all siamese flags had borne in some form or other the device of a white ele- phant; the symbol was retained for the royal flags and for mili- tary and naval services only. the national flag for general use now consists of a horizontal stripe of dark blue, flanked on either side by a narrower white horizontal band, and outside each of these by a red horizontal band. ii. economic and financial history communications.—in 1892 the construction of the first state railway was commenced, a project of 264 km. from bangkok north- eastwards to korat. in 1924-5 the length of state line open to traffic had advanced to 2,490 km.; 588 km. were under construction, and schemes involving over 3,000 km. further extension were under contemplation. the northeastern line from bangkok to korat was in 1926 being extended by some 300 km. in a due easterly direction to ubon near the french boundary on the mekong river; at a point 90 km. from bangkok a line diverges to chieng mai, the principal town of north- ern siam, distant 750 km. from bangkok. this line, on which through traffic to chiene mai was opened in jan. 1921, passes in its northern section through picturesque mountains; and amongst its tunnels is one 1,354 metres in length. a sleeper service is available for the journey ‘between bangkok and chieng mai, which oecupics 26 hours. an eastern line from bangkok runs 168 km. to m. krabin, and was being extended to aranya prades on the cambodian frontier, at which point it was due to arrive early in 1926, it is the ambition of the french colonial authorities to bring either their railway or their road touring system out to this frontier, and thereby render it 530 possible to travel entirely by rail or car between singapore and saigon by way of bangkok. these railways, all lying to the east of the me nam, were at first built standard gauge, but are being rapidly altered to the metre gauge adopted for the siamese southern railway, which has its terminus on the west side of the river. the southern railway tra- verses the length of siamese territory in the malay peninsula, and brings bangkok in touch with the straits settlements. i[t connects with the federated malay states railway system at padang besar, on the kedah-purlis border for penang, and another branch goes southeast to the border of ixelantan at sungei golok. the length of this railway is about 1,200 km.; construction began in 1908, and by 1918 through communication between bangkok and penang was established. the rolling stock now includes comfortable sleeping carriages, and the journcy is timed for 36 hours. a large bridge begun in 1923 spanning the river me nam chao bhraya, on the northern outskirts of bangkok, will enable the southern line trains to avoid the present terminus on the west bank of the mle nam chao bhraya, and bring passengers direct to the central station in bangkok. the royal siamese railway department is run with marked efficiency, and the annual return on the capital expended ranges from 3}% to 4}°%, a remunerative state investment. under this department there has also been organised a bureau of roads and highways, which hopes to develop a policy of road construction whereby hizhways wiil be brought into being as feeders to the rail- ways at the more important trading centres. there has been a steady and consistent improvement in postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication throughout the kingdom, wireless installations are found at bangkok, also at singora, in the extreme south of siamese territory and althouzh these are under the control of the naval and military authoritics their use under emergency may be granted to the public. parcel post and money order services have been extended to many remote parts of the country, but the principal innovation in this respect is the adaptation of aviation to postal communication. siam now possesses a very efficient aviation force; the chief aerodrome at dorn muang, 22 km. north of bangkok, has become well known as an air station since aviators from great britain, france, portugal, holland, italy, argentine and u.s.a., attempting long flights, have made it a port of call. many towns in the interior have prepared aeroplane landing laces, and much valuable service is performed and uscful experience is obtained by the aviation force in maintaining regular postal com- munication with remote provincial places. production and trade.—the bulk of the trade of the country passes through the port of bangkok: the addition of 10% or 15% to the bangkok trade figures will give fairly accurate totals of the trade of the whole kingdom. siam bie an agricultural and non-manu- facturing country, the amount and value of two or three natural products, e.g., rice and teak, give the measure of its productivity, as do the imports of its prosperity and purchasing power. ‘the following figures show the steadily expanding volume of siam's production and commerce:— total march 31 1911] tcs.108,907,821| fcs, 63,205,328 | tcs.177,113,149 = {3,324,074 = £5,213,090 | = £13,537,164 march 31 1921] tcs.66,138,000 | tcs.147,332,000| tcs.213,470,000 iex, 9°58 tcs. = {i year ending i-xports imports =f15,379,100 | =£122,282,860 march 31 192£] tcs.165,931,496) tcs.153,006,530| tcs.318,938,076 ex, 10°72 tcs, ={1 = {15,478,675 | =£14,272,450 | =£29,751,125 in terms of currency the 1925 import figures are a record, the hitherto record year, 1920-1, being some 6,000,000 ticals below the, 1925 fizure. of the 1925 import total nearly 67° or 102,000,000 ticals came from british ports: hongkong 37,000,000, great britain 26,000,000, singapore 22,000,000, india 14,000,000, other british possessions 2,000,000. these statistics do not, however, especially in the case of hong kong, necessarily indicate a british origin for the goods imported. the import item of highest value was cottons at 26,000,000 ticals, followed by provisions 14,000,000, iron and stcel 11,000,000, cotton yarn 6,000,000, machinery 3,000,000. the average import for five years ending march 1920 was tes. 100,381,000. the average import for five years ending march 1925 was tcs. 140,806,800; 125,900,000 ticals, or nearly 76%% of the total 1925 export figure, went to british ports, hong nong taking 61,500,- 000, singapore 54,500,000, great britain 3,500,000, india 2,000,000 and other british possessions 4,000,000. of the total exports for 1924-5 rice of various grades represents in value no less than 134,876,000 ticals (£12 570,000), or in weight 18,727,000 piculs (1,114,700 tons); this was less than the previous year by 2,983,000 piculs (about 180,000 tons). in explanation of the diminished value appearing under exports for the year ending march 1921, it should be stated that abnormal floods in 1917 had partially diminished the grain reserve of the coun- try, and the two years prior to [920 were years of scarcity in india. sibelius—siberia countries bordering on siam sought to draw from her supplies which normally would have been obtainable clsewhere. the result was that°rice, though seasonally abundant in siam, went up to famine prices, and prohibition of export was of necessity imposed from july i9gtg onwards, to preserve the food supplies of the country. after deducting the value of rice from the export total in the 1925 figures, only 31,000,000 ticals remain to represent all other exported siamese products, of which sum teak is responsible for 6,500,000, re-exports 7,500,000 and “all other goods ’’ 16,000,000. the teak forests are carefully conserved, so that on the whole there is little scope for the average annual output to vary. in connection with rice production due account must be taken of the irrigation schemes which have been or are being carried out in the delta provinces of the country, whercby extensive areas of cultivable land, hitherto dependent upon the uncertainties of the annual rainfall, can count upon an assured supply of water. upon the chief project, known as the south prasak scheme, undertaken in ig13 and completed nov. 1924, approximately £1,200,000 was expended, and it is calculated that an area of 240,000 ac. will benefit. work is proceeding on what is known as the suphan programme, the estimated cost of which is about £1,040,000. finance,—-the revenue for 1908-9 amounted to 58,000,000 ticals or {4,300,000 at the then rate of exchange of about 13-30 ticals={1. the actual budget figures for the financial year 1923-4 were: revenue, 83,417,733 ticals = {£8,186,827 at exchange 10-80 ticals={1, and expenditure, 91,053,133 ticals = £8,430,845. revised estimates for the year 1924-5 place the revenue figures at 90,800,000 ticals and expenditure at 94,100,000. though recent years have shown a budget deficit varying between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000 ticals, skilled attention is being paid to the questions of economy and finance generally, and when allowance is made for siam’s favourable annual trade balance it is reasonable to expect an early return to the former state of things when siam almost invariably had a favourable balance at the end of her financial year. the currency position is a strong one. at the end of march 1925 the total net issue of notes was 100,968,727 ticals against the possible redemption of which siam holds a foreign reserve of 56,000,000 ticals. there is also the gold standard reserve, the special object of which is to support the exchange value of the tical currency, amounting to £1,410,000, in a.iilition to coin and bullion held in the currency reserve in siam. the country’s indebtedness at the end of march 1926 was com- posed of a balance of £721,220 of the 1905 loan, a balance of £2,303,- ojo of the 1907 loan, a balance of £4,303,833 of the 1909 loan, 2,000,000 and £3,000,000 of the 1922 and 1924 loans, aggregating 12,328,093. see the reports of the various departments published by the siamese govt. and obtainable through the siamese legation; statistical year book of the kingdom of siam (annual 1916 onwards); siam (british foreign office handbook, 1920); siam directory (pub- lished by siam observer, annual); directory of bangkok and siam (published by bangkok times, annual). (t. h. l.) sibelius, johan julius (1865- ), finnish composer, known as jean sibelius, was born at tavastehus on dec. 8 1865. iie studied music under wegelius at helsingfors 1885-9, under becker 1889-90 in berlin and under fuchs and goldmark in vienna 1890-1. in 1893 he became a teacher of music at hel- singfors. the entry of sibelius into the musical world marked the appearance of a national inspiration, combined with a strong personality and an accomplished technique. as his genius devel- oped sibelius became not only an unrivalled master in scandina- via, but an outstanding personality among the composers of the world. the characteristics of his music are wide imagination and powers of expression, a masculine sentiment and a respect for his art which never allowed him to abuse his profound techni- cal powers for the display of mere virtuosity. among his com- positions are: 10 symphonic poems, seven symphonies, a violin concerto, a string quartet, voces intimae, valse triste, several works for choir and orchestra, the music to pelleas and melisande, “ls you like it, the tempest, the pantomime, scaramouche, numerous songs and miscellaneous pieces. siberia (see 25.10), the name usually applied to russia-in- asia, with the exception of those districts of central asia that are grouped under the name of turkestan. siberia is divided into seven governments, three autonomous republics and the autonomous republic of oiratsk; it covers an arca of 2,809,227 sq. m., and has a population of 7,607,919, of whom 1,005,354 are classified as urban. the average density is just over 2-7 per sq. m., but the population is very unevenly distributed, the density being as high as nine in the novo niko- lacvsk govt. and only o-5 in the yenisei region; vast tracts in the north are almost entirely uninhabited. the principal towns are omsk (143,380), irkutsk (88,358) and tomsk (89,877). siberia ha, s menoansk \ > o k s. : i "s eashoret “he sake i : hat eed colieti yo | a ene tm. lo > ¢ s koman (gukfica__ pre“ org —=s sis pepe eooremnny nip hand ” ee ae dy anor y) por sl am take foe v.42 afghanistan sinkiang as persia t 1 8b £t 8. adaev poy, ~~ fo i qe sed: : foy ske” pinchatsk = sketch map showing internal divisions en¢lish miles b 2o0 400 500 kitometres china lic. 1.—map showing the present (1926) divisions of the vast territory usually known as siberia. the autonomous province of oiratsk contains 77,529 inhab- itants, all of whom are classified as rural. there are no towns, and the capital of the province is the village of ulala. the former far eastern province is divided into four governments; it covers an area of 804,140 sq. m., and has a population of 1,781,324, of whom 385,864 are classilicd as urban. the largest town is vladivostok, with a population of 98,922. the average density is 2:28 persons per sq. m., though in kamchatka the density is only 0-06. political hisiory.—after the establishment of the provisional govt. in leningrad (petrograd) in march 1917 (see russ:a) asiatic affairs first came to the fore with the establishment of an all-russian moslem council in may, but no special measures were taken in regard to siberia and the far east. the bolshe- vik revolution had also little repercussion there at first; a rising took place in vladivostok in march 1918, which was liquidated by british and japanese naval forces, who remaiacd in effective control of the port till the following august. meanwhile semenov (himself a buryat) had raised anti-bolshevik forces east of lake baikal in february, but was forced to retire to the manchurian frontier in may, following a bolshevik rising in trans-baikal. in march a czechoslovak force, drawn from the austrian pris- oners of war in russia, was formed, and began a trek to vladi- vostok, with the intention of fighting on the western front; they scized authority at many points of the railways to and in siberia. | a provisional socialist govt. of siberia was formed at novo nikolaevsk on june 3, and by the end of the month the czechs were in effective control of the line of the trans-siberian railway from om3k to vladivostok. in july and aug. allied troops landed at vladivostok with the intention of proceeding west to reconstitute the eastern front against the central powers. by the beginning of sept. the anti-soviet forces had re-estab- lished communications along the whole trans-siberian railway and had made some progress into russia proper. on sept. 24 a congress of all russian and siberian parties invested the gov- ernment in a directorate of five at omsk, but in the middle of nov. this directorate was overthrown and admiral kolchak appointed supreme ruler. in the spring of 1919 kolchak’s offen- sive reached its zenith, and by may he was in full retreat to omsk. ineflicitency in command and administration and violent discontent in the rear prevented any further serious attempts at regaining lost territory. in nov. the sovict forces took omsk, and in dec. tomsk, while by the middle of jan. 1920 they had established their authority in kamchatka. from this time on the area west of lake baikal became part of the r.s.f.s.r. it was, however, more difficult for the soviet govt. to estab- lish its authority farther east, and in may a far eastern re- public was formed. this republic seems to have maintained close relations with moscow, but was not soviet in constitution and was more moderate in its administration and conduct of aifairs. semenov’s bands continued to give trouble during 1920, but in oct. he was driven out of chita, which in the following month became the capital of the far eastern republic, whose area was declared to be all russian territory cast of lake baikal. elections for a constituent assembly took place in jan. 1921, and it met at chita on feb. 12. vladivostok had remained in a spe- cial position under japanese occupation. the local provisional govt. was overthrown by semenov and kappel in may 1921, and a new government established under merkulov, which lasted till june 1922, when it was overthrown, only to be re- established within 10 days. it finally resigned in aug., after a zemstvo conference had elected general dietrichs dictator of the maritime province. shortly afterwards the japanese troops began thcir evacuation, and on its completion at the end of sept. soviet forces entered the town. sovict power was now consolidated over the far east, and on nov. 14 1922 the constituent assembly of the far eastern republic declared its absorption into the r.s.f.s.r. natural resources.—the immense potential resources of this area still remain almost entirely undeveloped. the area under grain cultivation in 1924 was 4,812,500 desyatins and the crop 232,200,000 poods, but much land suitable for cultivation is still untouched. of 538 the estimated forest areca of 313 million acres some 209 million have been surveyed but only a fraction of this area is under regular forest supervision; plans have, however, been drawn up to develop these areas, the output of the kuznetsk coal basin has been raised from 27-2 million poods in 1913 to 62:2 million in 1923, and the coke works near kolchugino are again supplying the steel works in the urals. gold production has been continued on a reduced scale, but in 1925 a concession to work their old properties was granted to the lena gold-fields and production may be expected to increase. communications.—the trans-siberian railway is now functioning regularly, and the journey from moscow to vladivostok takes 11 days. plans have been made to improve transport conditions, which remain the principal hindrance to the economic development of the country, but actually all that is being done is to endeavour to main- tain existing services and to recondition the existing tracks. in- vestigations have been made and plans drawn up with a view to establishing a trans-siberian air service. feducation.—educational facilities are being steadily developed, and there are now in siberia six institutions of quasi-university stand- ing, three at omsk, two at tomsk and one at irkutsk; while in the far eastern province there are two, one at vladivostok and the other at chita. siberia’s autonomous republics yakuisk autonomous socialist soviet republic.—this republic was established by a decree of the all-russian central executive committee on april 27 1922. its territory lics to the west of the meridian of irkutsk and to the north of the trans-siberian railway, and comprises inter alia the whole basin of the lena river. it is roughly triangular in shape; the western side marches with siberia, the eastern with the far eastern province, and the arctic ocean forms the northern boundary. theareaof the republic is 1,457,068 sq.m. and the population is 266,504, of whom 11,242 are classified as urban. the capital is yakutsk on the lena (pop. 9,247). the climate suffers from great extremes of temperature; the june average is 15° c,, the jan. average —52° c. mongol-buryat a.s.s.r.—this republic was established by a decree of sept. 12 1923. it is a wedge of territory running up north from the mongolian frontier of the u.s.s.r. and to the east of lake baikal. it comprises 152,768 sq. m., and is inhabited by mongol buryats, who were formerly nomads, but who are now settling down; cattle breeding is still the chief occupation. the population is 446,373 and the capital is verkhneudinsk (pop. 22,500). arghiz a.s.s.r.—this republic was established by a decree of aug. 26 1920. it comprises the southwestern portion of russian territory north of old russian turkestan and stretches from the caspian to mongolia, but lies south of the trans-siberian railway. it includes the autonomous provinces of qara-qalpak and qara- qirghiz, the latter (which was granted full autonomy at the end of 1924) comprising the eastern portion of what was formerly russian turkestan. the area of the republic is 860,161 sq. m. and the population ts 4,945,753, of whom 431,588 are classified as urban. it is divided into nine governments, of which semipalatinsk and akmolinsk, each with over 1,000,000 inhabitants, are the largest. the capital is orenburg (pop. 106,256), and the other important towns are semipalatinsk (pop. 56,436), petropavlovsk, the capital of akmolinsk (pop. 35,884), and uralsk (pop. 32,208). the average density of the population is 5-6 per square mile. a test census carried out in 1920 revealed an increased population of about 4%» compared with 1913; this republic was the only part of the territories now part of the union of socialist soviet republics to show an increased popu- jation in this census, oqirghiz, the republic, lies practically entirely in the steppe region, and except near the caspian, where the soil is arid, it is for the most part cultivable. some of the population retain their nomadic cus- toms and breed camels, horses and sheep, but the majority are settling down and taking to agriculture. the climate is very dry with a large range of temperature between extremes, vegetation is scanty and there are frequent salt lakes. in the north the soil is the black earth, and in 1924 the area under grain was 2,092,000 desyatins and the crop was 58,700,000 poods. the mineral deposits are con- siderable; copper, silver, lead, tron, coal and naphtha being found, but development is only just beginning and the output is irregular. rock salt is mined near iletsk. orenburg is a great cattle market, over 35,000 head of horned cattle and 30,000 sheep are slaughtered there annually. sickert, walter richard (1860- ), british painter, was born at munich may 31 1860, the son of the painter, oswald adalbert sickert, a contributor to fliegende blditer, and grand- son of johannes sickert of altona, painter and lithographer. sickert studied under whistler in chelsea, but in 1885, following the advice of degas, began to paint from drawings instead of from nature. his subject pictures include “‘ mamma mia po’areta’”’(1903), “‘ noctes ambrosianae ”’ (1906), ‘* the camden town murder ” (1906), “‘ army and navy ” (1913), “ ennui ” (x914), ‘sinn fein” (1g15), “ pierrots on brighton beach at sickert—siegecraft and siege warfare night’ (1915), baccarat at dieppe” (1920) and ‘ supper at the casino ”’ (1920). he aiso produced some architectural paint- ings, including “‘ hotel royal, dieppe ” (1g00), ‘ lansdowne crescent ” (1917) and “ pulteney bridge ” (1918). he became a member of the societe du salon d’automne, the society of twelve and the international society, and a fellow of the roval society of painters, etchers and engravers. as a teacher he exercised a strong influence over the younger british painters. he was elected a.r.a in 1924, and exhibited characteristic etchings in 1925. sickles, daniel edgar (1825-1914), american soldier and diplomatist (sce 25.36), died in new york city may 3 1914. sidgwick, arthur (1840-1920), british scholar (see 25.39), died at oxford sept. 25 1920. siegecraft and siege warfare.—the earlier article on fortification (see 10.679) deals with the history and development of siege and siegecraft, and summarises the views prevalent just before the world war of 1914-8. changes due to the great eco- nomic and industrial developments of the latter half of the roth and early 20th centuries were affecting, not only the design, but the rele of permanent fortification. the conception of a fortress as a ring of defences protecting an important point, and capable of withstanding an investment unsupported by a field army, though by no means abandoned was being modified. the ring fortresses of the napoleonic era, which protected important places such as capitals and arsenals and served as secure bases for ficld armies or refuges for beaten ones, were no longer capable of fulfilling their rele. these changes were due to two main rea- sons. firstly, the increased size of armies provided by universal service necessitated the employment of several lines of communi- cation, wide bases and large areas for their concentration and deployment. secondly, the greatly increased range and destruc- tive power of artillery necessitated the extension of the perim- eter to such a degree that for the defence of a fortress a field army was required, at the beginning of the war, therefore, zone fortification was beginning to be established in the highly organ- ised industrial areas of western europe. reliance, however, was still placed in self-sufficing girdle fortresses, such as paris, ant- werp and belgrade, and in the less organised areas of russian poland. use of fortified areas —before examining the history and trend of opinion on permanent fortification during and since the war, it is advisable to consider the use and limitations of fortified areas. it is a principle of war that “‘ victory can only be won as the result of offensive action,” but a defensive attitude may at times be necessary or even advantageous. fortresses can never win a victory; their use is to gain time and economise force. 1. to delay the enemy on tmportant lines of advance, such as the barrier forts of the alpine passes, or the fort of manonvillers, which commanded the main line of railway from strasbourg to paris. 2. to protect vital points such as paris and antwerp. 3. to canalise the attack and force the enemy—unless he wishes to spend the time and men necessary for the deliberate attack of fortresses—to advance by certain specified lines. the trouee de charmes between toul and epinal is an example. 4. to act asa pivot of manoeuvre. it was for this purpose that the germans used the metz-thionville zone. i. fortresses in the world war defences of belgium.—the fortresses of belgium consisted of those covering the crossings of the meuse at liege and namur and the entrenched camp of antwerp. liege and namur—com- menced in 1890, to close a probable line of advance between france and germany—were officially described as “ simple pivots de manoeuvre des places d’arret,”? while antwerp formed a secure base for the field army and an ultimate refuge for the government. at the beginning of aug. ror4 liege with its 12 armoured forts, on a perimeter of 30 m. was defended by some 25,000 troops. owing to the rapidity of the german attack little could be done to provide field defences for the intervals between the forts, and on aug. 5 an attempt was made to capture the for- tress by a “‘coup de main,”” this was repulsed, but the following siegecraft and siege warfare 539 ——- —..,3 “i, ‘ ‘nss a eae it pra holland 1 le "antwerp be / y a = * am, ne | ~. sn ra, 4" 1 / atu tm tr n id —* si’ = \. g a %: 5 nae sere xe brussels o ( i = lille g',> 4 = \ = ‘ b e l g l u m us , ~~ = ft de mauldey aie flines eis = fide curgies® p)conde g namun bfuyswtm ze, = yy valenciennes sambre . . ae & i hq scarpe & t os | sn ez: ! sn aubeuge a 3 bj > j > or ee / v {gives oe ee! ee pe re ° 9 r » f / 23 on 4 e wats operonne., © ftd hirson 7 | ae of en of , %, w & eek “3% h “a “ ezieres aco “luxem 2 “en * meus s. 4 pamye|puxe ui a =: wih, phtmaed rs ¥ [i aa hs ; % re pag fee ange ini be . hy, ee vers. ; ¢ o ; ot £5: see trouee * thionvdle 2 5 si, (bonndary ) p| ==: rein yee ogy de stenay : oon bg es 53) - gelmepsheit wif : 14, 3% 7 ‘its ues: 3]” marne r.~) v3 verdun 34° ss = £ : fe ma metz a ry .* bernay f¢degenicourt: °/ rn embour sas “fede troyont-. qs ese, stmihi y == ‘du camp des romain » se mihiel “un %, == fideliouwfle «. ze 6 of ft de gironville ohno ew oe bs it ‘toul t den es % ss: fede la bi. cote . fide glint si toute og ssp es ie ,, . \ charmes ss ss ‘de bourlemont) », repatead see = ss epinaly, sf £= c e p brtg’archesd so ae, ; os" ye 1 reihicemoht =weut « zlangres ssf s&s: . - if “pt forts de la ah ss: = ee eo haute-moselle) 3, es the fortifications of belgium aa sn oe n.e. france 1914 belforto sk!) cfestelstein »f . ‘ | tm. basle -= ne fi i . ftdela chaux : ep: ahi . eng sat) miles io ft du mont-bart smonebeliard a a. : __, kilometres hee tt fi dy lorisat vs 23 8€8650~c*«ss 0 fa ade 0 arg forts ) > f day a brigade of infantry penetrated the interval between two forts, and, reinforced by other troops, succeeded in gaining possession of the city, though none of the forts had fallen. heavy artillery was then brought up, and on the 8th the first fort fell. by the 13th all the forts to the east and south had been ren- dered untenable, and by the 16th—eleven days after the opening attack and eight days after the first use of heavy howitzers—the remaining forts were compelled to surrender. namur, though somewhat smaller (having nine forts on a perimeter of 25 m.), also had a garrison of about 25,000 men. the germans, profiting from their experience at liege, waited until their heavy howitzers were in position. on aug. 21 the bombard- ment commenced, and within 24 hours five out of the nine forts were reduced to ruins. by the 25th the remainder had been destroyed. in both cases the rapid result had been brought about by the overwhelming power of the 12-in. and 17-in. howitzers, which the steel and concrete forts, only designed to withstand 8-in. shells, were powerless to resist. on the other hand, the few days gained were of incalculable value to the allies. antwerp, on which much money had been spent, had a perimeter of 60 miles. the germans opened their attack with heavy howitzers against the southeastern section on sept. 28, and three days later had eras besancon & i: rendered four of the forts untenable. meanwhile the belgians, assisted by men of the royal naval division, had entrenched a position on the line of the rivers nethe and rupel, some two miles in rear of the forts. several attacks were made on these field de- fences, and it was not until oct. 6 that the germans were able to cross the nethe. the city was now open to bombardment, and the majority of the defenders having been withdrawn across the schelde the city surrendered on the oth. here again the armoured forts were unable to resist the fire of the heavy howitzers and fell in three days, while the hasty defences of the nethe were able to hold out for six. permanent defences of northeastern france-——these were planned by general sere de rivi¢re in 1874 in three main posi- tions—the first close to the german frontier consisting of the linked fortresses of verdun-toul and epinal-beliort, with two premeditated gaps, one to the north, the trovnee de stenay (20 m. wide), between verdun and the forest of the ardennes, and the other the trouee de charmes (30 m. wide) between toul and epinal. behind these were the la fere-laon-reims line, with the escarpment of epernay-nogent and the fortresses of langres and dijon to the south; and finally the defences of paris itself. the northern frontier was protected by the neutrality of belgium, but as this was one of the historic lines of invasion into the rich 540 industrial areas of flanders and artois it was considered that lille, valenciennes, maubeuge and mezicres should be strength- ened and their intervals covered by inundations and detached forts—flines, hirson, etc. in addition, certain barrier forts, as longwy and manonvillers, were reorganised or built. however, in 1912 it was decided not to maintain the fortresses of the second line la fere-laon-reims or the detached forts on the belgian frontier. dijon and langres were already third class, and lille on april 3 1914 was declared open, only to be reclassed as a fortress on aug. 21 and again declared an open town three days later. the defences of the verdun-toul zone, which were the most modern on the french fortresses, were organised in depth with two or three lines of works in which the forts formed centres of resistance. with the exception of an occasional 75 mm. or 155 mm. gun in a steel cupola for direct fire, and “ traditore ” guns in bourges casemates for the defence of the flanks, the artillery was situated outside and in rear of the forts. the forts themselves were generally small—vaux was designed for a garrison of 150 men. they contained concreted underground galleries and case- mates protected by masonry arches three ft. thick, with a three ft. cushion of sand between them and the main protective layer of eight ft. of concrete, and were enclosed by ditches 30 it. wide and 20 [t. deep, which were in turn flanked by fire from concrete counterscarp casements. : the existence of the fortified zone on the franco-german frontier undoubtedly exerted a profound influence on the ger- man plan of invasion. moltke, ina memorandum written in 1912 on the subject of the violation of belgian neutrality, which is quoted by ludendorff, remarked that an advance through bel- gium was likely to be more successful than an attack on the french fortified zone, which would degenerate into fortress war- fare, cause great delay and lower the offensive spirit and initiative of the army. general von kuhl, in der marne feldzug, also states that “‘ even the fortresses which were not attacked exer- cised a great influence on the operations. the existence of the line verdun-toul, epinal-belfort forced us to undertake the invasion of belgium.” | while the main german attack was from the north, prepara- tions for a subsidiary advance through the trouee de charmes were made by the reduction of the barrier fort of manonvillers. this concreted fort with its steel cupolas and casemates was re- duced in two days to ruins by the fire of the heavy german howitzers. the main zones verdun-toul and epinal-belfort, however, though they formed pivots for the successful defence of the trouee de charmes, were not seriously threatened. later, during the battle of the marne, the centre of the verdun-toul line between the forts of troyon and liouville was violently attacked. troyon, flanked by fire’from fort genicourt, held but the germans succeeded in capturing the fort du camp des ro- mains and secured a crossing over the meuse at st. mihiel. this gap, however, was too narrow to be of further use. maubeuge.—on the northern frontier the only french fortress subjected to siege was maubeuge. with a garrison of 40,000 men of low category, with few guns, and with defences completely out of date as shown during gen. fournier’s trial, the fortress held out for 11 days. this was largely due to the energy of the commander, who from the first day of mobilisation employed every available man on constructing a system of field defences and wire obstacles, providing communications and collecting supplies. on aug. 25 the town was invested, and three days later the heavy artillery bombardment began. energetic sorties by the garrison kept the besiegers at a distance and compelled them to reinforce their troops. by sept. 5 the bombardment had rendered the defences on half the perimeter useless and the defenders began to be pressed back. desperate fighting con- tinued for the next two days and the town finally capitulated on the 7th. this delay was of the greatest value to the allies. strong german forces were absent from the marne and the blocking of the important line of railway made the supply of von kluck’s army a matter of great difficulty. verdun.—the comparatively rapid and shattering fall of the belgian fortresses in 1914 caused a complete revulsion against siegecraft and siege warfare the use of permanent fortification. it was considered that under the fire of heavy modern artillery the demolition of fixed defences was a foregone conclusion. instructions were therefore issued by the french command that reliance was to be placed on continuous zones of field defences, and that any permanent forts were to be incorporated in these zones, their permanent garrisons abolished, armament that would be of use in the field removed, and any clements remaining which might be of use to the enemy pre- pared for demolition. it was under these conditions that verdun was attacked on feb. 21 1916. the lines of trenches and field defences which had been established some 4 m. beyond the outer forts were thinly held. under the cover of an intense bombard- ment by weapons of all calibres up to 17 in., the main attack was jaunched on the east bank_of the meuse. after four days’ bitter fighting the line was pushed back about four m. and tort douau- mont, undefended, was occupied by the germans. on the follow- ing day, in view of the possibility that fort vaux might shortly fall into the hands of the enemy, orders were issued for its com- plete demolition. these, however, could not be carried out, as it was fourd that a 17-in. shell had destroyed the electric cables and means of firing the charges. meanwhile, it had been discovered that the con- crete casemates and cupolas of the modern forts had suffered little damage in spite of the violent and persistent bombardment by shells up to 17-inch. general petain, who assumed command on feb. 26, therefore ordered the forts to be reoccupied, put in the best state of defence possible at the time and the demolition charges removed. the intervals between the forts were also to be held to prevent any infiltration. lt.-col. tournes, in an article in the revue mil. francaise of may and june 1923, vividly de- scribes his experiences while holding fort vaux, emphasises the great value of the protected observation posts and shell and shockproof casemates, and deplores the lack of any telephonic communication, subterranean passages to the rear and the absence of the flanking guns which had been removed from the bourges casemates. after months of heavy fighting verdun was successfully held. the permanent forts with their shell-proof casemates and protected observation posts had proved their value as a part of the trench zone, and had probably saved many casualties. on the other hand, purely field defences such as those of mort homme, sited in equally important natural positions, resisted the fiercest attack for many weeks, and exacted an even greater toll of lives before they fell. defences of the german western frontiers—in 1870 moltke wrote: “‘ the most powerful defence is a network of good rail- ways, and the best protection of these railways is the offensive.”’ however, in 1895, von schlieffen, whose plan it was to invade france through belgium, considered it necessary for the suc- cess of his plan to have in alsace-lorraine a pivot of manoeuvre which could be held with the minimum of troops and strong enough to withstand any attack by the french. metz and strasbourg were therefore strengthened, and in 1g00 their radius of action increased. at the same time the defences of metz were extended 25 m. northwards along the moselle to connect with thionville, while 10 m. west of strasbourg the new fortress of mutzig was built to close the road over the vosges across the col de saales. in these defences a new form of fortified work known as the “‘ feste ’’ appeared. this, as its name indicates, is rather a self-contained fortress on a small scale than a fort in the old sense. the “ festes ’’ built just prior to 1914 covered a large irregular areca some 1,200 yd. in depth and width. within their wired perimeter were sited all the elements of the defence both for infantry and artillery. strong self-contained infantry works were situated at each of the salient angles; while the batteries (generally 6-in. howitzers and 4-in. guns) were dispersed within the area with their weapons in revolving steel cupolas em- bedded in concrete. ditches 20 ft. deep, wired at the bottom and flanked by loopholed galleries, protected the outer face of the in- fantry works. each battery and work was surrounded by wire, and the main perimeter wire sunk 6 ft. deep and flanked by the redoubts. there were numerous steel and concrete command and observation posts for the artillery and infantry, and casemates protected by 9 ft. of concrete were provided for the whole garrison. deep under- ground galleries and a complete telephone system connected the various parts of the “‘feste.”’ siegecraft and siege warfare these ‘‘ festes ’? were never subjected to the test of war, but the fortifications of thionville-metz fulfilled their rele as a pivot of manoeuvre and prevented any [french advance while the great wheel from the northward was being carried out. : ‘ ex e e, 4 i, f 4, —f — ppg ae wey beers va le ge fic. 1.—plan of ‘‘feste”: concrete casemates. ci, c2, etc., armoured batteries (c5., dummy). di, d2, artillery observation posts. e1, e2, etc., armoured infantry al, a2, main infantry works, bt, b2, etc., o.p.’s. f1, fz, etc., posts for enfilading obstacles and ditches. g, infantry look-out posts. german-austrian- russian frontier.—the fortresses of poland and galicia differed from those of france and belgium in that they were purely ring fortresses, designed to hold the few and therefore very important road and railway junctions of poland. of these modlin (nowo-georgiewsk) was invested and rapidly fell by siege, brest-litovsk and grodno fell as parts of the battle line, deblin (iwangorod) was evacuated by the threat of an en- circling movement, while przemyel alone was successful in with- standing a siege. in sept. 1914 the austrians, driven back in galicia, left a garrison of about 60,000 men in the fortress. the defences consisted of 65 forts of the early brialmont pattern (1854) disposed on a perimeter of 35 miles. the concrete was thin and few shelters were capable of withstanding 6-in. howitzers. during the first months of the war, however, trenches protected by strong wire entanglements had been dug in the advanced positions and in the intervals between the forts. przemysl, invested by the russians on sept. 24, held out against vigorous attacks for three weeks until relieved, caused the attackers 70,000 casualties and detained 250,000 men from the main russian offensive. in the interval between the first and second sicges, ammunitions and rations for 2} months were brought into the town. on nov. 4 the fortress was again invested by a force of 83 russian divisions, but without super-heavy artillery. the defenders, by a very active defence and constant sorties, held out for 4} months, until the last ounce of food, including 21,000 horses, had been eaten and all the ammunition expended. on march 22 1915, having blown up all the guns and the greater part of the works, the defenders sur- rendered. they had caused the besiegers heavy casualties, blocked the communications of the main russian army, and detained a force of twice their own number. przemysi, now held by the russians, was attacked a third time on may 14 1915. the principal forts which had been demolished in march had not been repaired, and ammuni- tion was lacking. the austro-german army brought up 12-in. and 17-in. howitzers and bombarded the defences. by the 31st the ruins _ of the three northern forts were captured, and the russians, remov- ing their guns, stores and ammunition, withdrew. the value of both ficld defences and an active defence is clearly brought out in the first two sieges, while the overwhelming power of superheavy artillery is shown in the third. on the german frontier the fortresses of the vistula—torun (thorn) and grau- 541 denz,—were neverattacked. of the forward line, however, kenigs- berg held two russian army corps from the battle of tannenberg; and the small fortress of letzen, with a strong line of field de- fences, flanked by the lakes, never gave way. trench systems.—while fortresses and permanent works were falling into disrepute, and the forts gradually merged into the ficld defences, the continuous trench lines of the western front were assuming the aspect of a fortress. the german wotan- siegfried (hindenburg) lines were deliberately planned, with concrete machine-gun and observation posts, masses of wire, deep trenches, tunnelled communications and dug-outs, and were essentially a part of the fortress of germany besieged by the allies. a properly organised trench system, having depth and well placed wire and machine-guns, provided its flanks were secure, was found capable of resisting the strongest attacks even after a heavy bombardment. this was the case in all theatres of war, whether in france, gallipoli or mesopotamia. the old methods of siege warfare, attack from parallels with bomb and mortar, sap and mine, were therefore revived, and it was not until the advent of a new weapon—the tank—and the arrival of unlimited artillery ammunition that these defences were definitely overcome. the resistance of these field defences to shell fire due to their disper- sion and concealment was remarkable. of their elements, two stand out as of the greatest value—the concrete “ pillbox ” or machine-gun emplacement and the deep dugout, the one as a protection for the weapons which were required to fire at short notice and the other for command centres and the counter- attack reserves. effect of bombardment on forts —the difference in the degree of resistance to shell fire shown by the various forts is remarkable. manonvillers, though not entirely modern with its two steel cupolas, disappearing 6-in. guns and casemates protected by 8 ft. of ordinary concrete, became a blazing inferno under the rain of 17,000 shells directed upon it. the garrison, after two days, blinded by the dust and fragments, asphyxiated by the fumes of the constantly bursting shells and almost demented by the con- cussion, were rendered quite incapable of defending the fort, which was captured by the germans without the loss of a single man. the forts of liege and namur similarly, when subjected to the concentrated fire of 17-in. howitzers, were soon rendered untenable; casemates were penetrated, cupolas overturned and the whole structure reduced to ruins. on the other hand, the more modern forts of verdun appeared to have withstood the heaviest bombardments without vital damage. french writers claim that of the steel gun cupolas orly one was permanently de- stroyed. forts moulainville and vacherauville received 6,000 to 8,000 shells, each of which, in the case of moulainville 330, were 17-10., without permanent damage to casemates or turrets. in fort vaux the only cupola that was destroyed was one from which the demolition charges laid by the french had not been removed. these charges were detonated by a german shell. the difference in the performance of the forts was due to the higher quality of the french concrete, which was mixed with a large proportion of cement and laid with the greatest care to en- sure that the masses were monolithic without lines of cleavage. also to the great thickness and to the large masses which are necessary to withstand the overturning ard disruptive effects of bombardment. the trench cupolas had 30 cm. thickness of steel compared with the 22 cm. of the belgian ard german ones. the belgian forts were large, crowded and conspicuous targets; they contained guns of the main artillery armament and were sited on commanding positions. in spite of the lessons of port arthur, they were only built to withstand shells up to 8-inch. the italian barrier forts in the battle of the isonzo failed be- cause their armour and concrete were not sufficiently thick and there was no protection against gas, while the small austrian works in the south of the tirol, although bombarded by 12-in. howitzers, held out for months. ii. principles of modern fortification value of permanent works.—from the lessons of the value of permanent works in the war there have grown two schools of 042 thought. on the one hand it may be argued that the fortresses on the franco-german frontier completely justified the money exp2nded on them. by their existence they forced germany to violate the neutrality of belgium and so brought the british em- pire against her. the more modern forts proved their ability to resist bombardment by the heaviest shells and saved many casu- alties. verdun as a pivot of a battle line was of incalculable value during the decisive battle of the marne, and later as a bastion in the trench system. liege, in spite of its comparatively rapid fall, gained the allies at least four days, enabled the french v. army to change front and the british to comeinto line. antwerp kept two german corps from the decisive front, and “every day gained at antwerp meant a french port saved.’ maubeuge, przemyel, kenigsberg all detained important forces from the battles of the marne, cracow and tannenberg. strasbourg and metz-thionville fulfilled their rdle as the immovable pivot for the great german wheel. the expenditure on keeping these for- tresses up to date was not great. the average annual amount spent on the defence of verdun and the heights of the meuse for the 4o years prior to the war was £200,000, 7.e., less than the cost of a destroyer; while the total spent on metz was about equal to the cost of a modern battleship. battleships are not expected to last more than 12 to 15 years; they are then considered obsolete, and replaced. | the other school of thought point out that the inherent weak- ness of fortresses is in their immobility. once built they remain, and when war comes may not be in the right place. they con- travene many of the important principles of war—offensive action, surprise and mobility. their position and extent is ac- curately known. they rapidly fall out of date and are expensive and difficult to renew. apart from the expense involved, their reconstruction is a heavy feat of engineering, and not only takes time but frequently renders them useless for the period of the repairs. in ror4 four of the principal works of belfort were out of action as they were being rebuilt. new weapons for their de- struction are rapidly invented and made. manonvillers, liege, namur and modlin (nowo-georgiewsk) were destroyed with ease and rapidity. reliance based on the security afforded by fortresses may be a delusion. of the three great entrenched camps of antwerp, paris and bucharest, designed as a refuge for the government and army, not one performed its rele. antwerp, on which much money had been expended—and therefore con- sidered by the belgian nation as up-to-date, was given up by the field army and government as soon as it became a question of withstanding a siege or continuing the war in the open. bucha- rest was surrended as the result of a battle in the foreground; while paris, though it held as a part of the battle line, was evacuated by the government. field defences, by their conceaiment, dispersion and facility for rapid renewal, are just as effective for defence as permanent fortification. it was not the permanent forts of verdun and przemyel but the trench lines of the advanced positions and in- tervals that stopped the enemy. at verdun the important tacti- cal position of mort homme, defended by nothing but field de- fences, held out against the heavicst bombardments and attacks for six weeks, and caused the attackers terrible casualties. the expenditure is undoubtedly great, and the money could be more profitably spent on the field army, since if the field army is over- whelmed the fortresses must fall. the answer probably lies between these two points of view, and the line taken will depend on the situation of the country which has to solve the problem. for france and poland, in close prox- imity to powerful and potential enemies, the matter is an actual- ity; while for great britain or the united states, except in regard to coast defence, it borders the realm of theory. fortresses are expensive and slow to build; if they fail to gain the time they were calculated to gain, or require for their defence more men than the enemy would require to mask or neutralise them, they have been built in vain. it is the difficulty of estimat- ing the time that fortresses are likely to hold out against the un- known weapons of the future that makes their value doubtful. for it will always be easier to make new guns or other weapons siegecraft and siege warfare to overcome the protection than to increase the thickness of armour or concrete. there are, however, occasions when material defensive prepa- rations in peace time will have to be made and areas held for mili- tary, industrial or political reasons. munitions play so vital a part in modern war that the retention of certain areas of manu- facture or supply may be essential. in other places, where for purely military reasons it might be wiser to withdraw and de- molish the communications, public opinion may insist on a for- ward position being held. again, the effect of the systematic destruction of industrial areas by an invader is now so great that victory even cannot efface all trace of his presence. every effort will therefore be made to fight on enemy’s ground. but to protect areas until the effect of the offensive is felt, and to economise men so that the striking force is at a maximum, some form of permanent fortification built in peace will at times and in certain places be required. the question is, what form will it take? ring fortresses obsolete-—from the lessons of the war it ap- pears that ring fortresses are doomed. it was not verdun the ring fortress, but verdun as a solid bastion of the battle line, that resisted all assaults. the immense perimeter now necessary as a protection against long-range guns requires a vast garrison, and for the ammunition and supply of this garrison for any length of time railway communication must be kept open. moreover, an extended perimeter is no protection against bombing aircraft. there are, however, rare occasions when for political considera- tions it may be necessary to hold a ring fortress for a limited but definite time. in the northern salient of poland it is conceivable that the poles for political reasons alone might wish to retain command of wilno (vilna), while withdrawing from the salient until their field army was mobilised and ready to take the field. zone fortification has its uses, but the maintenance of an un- broken front depends on the security of the flanks. where a position is long and open, its defence by a continuous zone is im- practicable. but when the flanks are secure, as with the chatalja lines of constantinople or on the viborg isthmus between lake ladoga and the gulf, a fortified zone is of great value. in other cases defensive curtains or limited zones of defence may be essential to delay and impede an enemy’s advance; but when these zones are turned and surrounded they will be of no further use. some form of parabolic front of defence may, there- fore, delay this end. for the same reasons the construction of barrier positions in undeveloped or mountainous countries, com- bined with a complete destruction of communications in front of the positions, may be advisable. the difficulty and time taken to bring up heavy artillery for their reduction would enable them to justify their rele of delaying action. had the rumanians forti- fied the passes of the carpathians before or directly after their declaration of war, the german attack of nov. 1916 might have failed. butifin the future anti-aircraft artillery is unable to pre- vent accurate acrial bombing, the use of barrier positions will be further restricted. the devastation of zones and communications will, however, remain a powerful weapon of defence. this can seldom be carried out in industrial arcas, but in less developed countries or where communications are restricted thorough and complete demoll- tions will cause a modern army considerable delay. the thorough demolition of a tunnel will take months to repair, and the delay caused will be greater than that affected by a barrier fort. in 19t8 the destruction of the roads and railways by the retreating german armies delayed the allies more than their resistance; while the total destruction of the communications in the area between maubeuge and the ardennes in 1914 would have had far-reaching effects. the value of field defences, which can be rapidly made in accordance with the latest tactical ideas and sited in positions found most suitable at the time, is undoubtedly very great. with well sited and concealed machine-guns, anti-tank guns and ob- ~ stacles, covered by the fire of artillery (itself protected by mobility and concealment), positions will have considerable powers of resistance. these will be increased if certain previous work can be carried out in peace time. siegecraft and siege warfare preparations in peace times.—the degree of material prepa- ration attempted in peace time will vary considerably; but in all places where a defensive attitude is considered likely the most important means will be the preparation of complete plans and schemes of defence. the position of battle headquarters, ob- servation posts, machine-guns, batteries with several alternative positions, infantry localities, lines of communication and zones of obstacles will be selected, and large scale maps prepared ready for issue. arrangements will also be made for the work to be done at the shortest notice, and for the defence schemes to be revised and periodically brought up to date to keep pace with modern requirements. where it is decided that for military, economic or political reasons some degree of permanent fortification in peace time is necessary, the limitation of military expenditure will control the amount that can be carried out. within these limits the fol- lowing will probably be considered :— (a) the provision of an obstacle against a ‘‘ coup de main ” carried out by cross country armoured vehicles. waterways and inundations such as those of fortress holland or the yser afford protection, while judicious afforestation would limit the lines of approach. where these are lacking, ditches with one vertical face or minefields covered by fire would be required. (6) arrangements for air defence, gun and searchlight emplace- ments, telephonic communications and sound-location installations. (c) the provision of observation posts for artillery, infantry and intelligence services—concealed, dispersed and protected by armour or concrete, with sufficient interior space for the observers to use their glasses and maps and remain in comfort for some hours at a time, (d) the provision of road, rail and tramway communications or improvement of existing ones, both laterally and from front to rear, in order to facilitate the rapid movement of troops, artillery, am- munition and stores. (e) the provision of a complete system of signal communication with cables buried eight feet deep, connecting all headquarters, observation posts, artillery positions, anti-aircraft defences, sound- ranging and fiash-spotting posts. ( arorestation to give cover from aeroplane observation to facilitate surprise; and the control of building and planting so as to keep clear the ficld of fire or view. (g) construction of shell-proof cover for command posts, signal offices, observation posts, artillery and machine-gun personnel and local reserves, either in mined dugouts 50 ft. deep or in conercte chambers. to give protection against bombardment by the heaviest weapons of the present day at least 6 ft. thickness of ferroconcrete is required, and large masscs are necessary to mitigate the effect of concussion and overturning. (kh) construction of subways 50 ft. deep to give protected com- munication from the rear to important infantry localities, and to connect up the various dugouts. some of these subways would contain tramways, and their entrances and exits would be carefully concealed. (1) arrangements for the electric lighting of all subways, dugouts and chambers, their gas-proofing and the supply of pure air. (j) provision of landing grounde for aircraft kept free of obstruc- tions and provided with sunken sites for hangars to minimise the lateral effect of air bombs. | (k) organisations of important infantry tank-proof localities with obstacles, fire trenches and alternative and concealed machine-gun positions. whatever the form or degree of fortification adopted may be, one can seldom rely on the theory of complete protection, or say, like petain at verdun, ‘‘ on ne passera pas.”’ to gain time and economise force are the objects of fortification, and the essence of defence lies in organisation, concealment, observation, com- munication and the stout hearts of well-armed men. il. military mining mining in trench warfare—although no new methods had come to light, considerable experience had been gained as to the value and practice of mining during the sicge of port arthur, and the conclusions reached up to 1910 are described in 10.716. at the commencement of the war the power of the heavy howitzers, which had so rapidly destroyed the belgian forts, appcared to indicate that for the reduction of fortresses mining would be un- necessary. it soon, however, became evident that with the ad- vent of position warfare, and the difficulty of making any advance above ground in the face of machine-guns and barbed wire, the 043 attack of important localities by mining would be advantageous. further, the opposing trench lines approached each other so closely that a bombardment of the hostile front trenches could not be carried out by either side without damage to their own. the tactical conditions, which resembled those of fortress war- fare, being favourable, the germans commenced mining in 1914, and by dec. had exploded mines in several sectors along the front. as a result the allies were compelled to countermine in reply. at first these mine systems were shallow—rarely being deeper than 20ft.—but by 1915 there were a great number of them, and special units and tunnelling companies were formed to carry out the work. for these r.e. units coalminers were enlisted, and the officers selected from those who had mining enginecring ex- perience in all parts of the world. in addition, for work in the clay areas, a number of specialists known as “ clay kickers ”’ were included. ‘these men, working on their backs and sup- ported on a board, could make rapid and silent progress by using their feet to push a special shovelintotheclay. to co-ordinate the work along the whole front a mining staff was established and the advice of expert geologists obtained. by the middle of 1916 the british had 25,000 troops on underground work, and probably over 60,000 men were so employed on the western front. during 1915 and 1916 mining continued on an unprecedented scale, and deep systems down to 200 ft. were made. mines were effectively used in the opening stages of the battle of the somme, 1916, and some brilliant mine attacks were carried out by the french. a few instances of mining also occurred on the italian front and in the dardanelles campaign. it was, however, during the attack on the messines ridge in 1917 that mining reached its greatest achievement. at 3:10 a.m. on june 7, on a front of 9 m., and within an interval of 30 sec. no less than 20 mines, containing 1,000,000 lb. of explosives, were detonated. the largest of these mines (at st. eloi) was 125 ft. deep, took months to complete, and contained 43 tons of ammonal, while the earth shake was clearly felt at cassel, 16 m. away. the use of these enormous mines, whose destructive effects could not be definitely foretold, wasa matter of some anxicty, but they were certainly successful. lucendorff writes in his memoirs: ‘* we should have succeeded in retaining the position but for the exceptionally powerful mines used by the british which paved the way for the attack. . . . the moral effect of these explosions was simply stagger- ing. at several points our troops fell back before the onslaught of the enemy’s infantry.” with the introduction of tanks and certain changes in the tactics of the defence, offensive and defensive mining declined. the tactical results obtained by mining had seldom been worth the labour, time and material expended, and when the front line was no longer strongly held mining objectives were lacking. the mining units were consequently employed on the provision of underground protection against the increasing bombardment by artillery and bombing aircraft. deep dugouts for the protection of reserves, headquarters, signal offices, dressing stations, etc., and subways for underground communications were constructed. these subways, lighted by electricity, and containing water mains, telephone cables and tram lines, were of considerable extent. on the vimy front there were 12 subways with a total length of 6 m., while east of bethune it was possible to patrol four m. underground. use was also made of the old underground quarries of arras, which, provided with bunks, cookhouses, latrines, telephones, lighted with electricity and connected by subways to the front line, could accommodate 11,000 men. technical progress —efforts to speed up the work at the mine face with the help of mechanical instruments have so far been unsuccessful. the labour and difficulty of disposing the spoil and concealing it from air observation make it essential that the gallerics should be small in section— 4 ft. 10 in. by 2 ft. 9 in. the normal size. in this confined space it is difficult to use a machine, and reliance is still placed on the miner with his pick, shovel and grafting tool. while the actual method of making mines has altered but little, considerable improvements have been made in instruments and 544 accessories. the miner’s dial and ‘‘ dumpy level ” facilitate the accurate alignment and levelling of shafts and galleries. light is provided by electricity, and ventilation improved by means of mechanical fans and blowers. ammonal and other high explo- sives have replaced powder. for mine rescue work, to overcome the great danger of gas poisoning by carbon monoxide, proto and salvus sets are used; while mine stretchers enable a man to be dragged along a gallery and lifted out of a shaft. but perhaps the most important ad- vance is in the provision of listening apparatus. two types are used—-the geophone, which works on the principle of the stetho- scope, and the seismophone, which is an electrical detector. with two geophones the direction of the source of the sound can be obtained, while with seismophones (which do not give direction) one operator can listen in several gallerics if they are connected up to the switchboard of a central listening chamber. | brbltiograpiy.—general benoit, la fortificatzon permanente pendant la guerre (1922); revue du genie milttarre (aug., sept., oct. 1922 and oct. 1925). the work of the royal engineers in the war toi14g-9, section ‘‘ military mining” (1922); r. p. pakenham-walsh, royal engineers journal (sept. 1923); revue militaire francaise (may, june 1923, and may and june 1925). for german mining see m. schwarte, militarischen lehren des grossen krieges, chap. 2 (1920). ce pik: sienkiewicz, henryk (1846-1916), polish novelist (sce 25.54), died at vevey, switzerland, nov. 15 1916.