RUMANIAN LITERATURE

the revival of ru- manian literature dates back to about the middle of the roth century, when, owing chiefly to the awakened interest in percy's reliques, the poet v. alexandri published his collection of folk poems—baillades et chanis populaires de la roumanie (1855). runciman—rupert this, together with the old chronicles (1845), edited by michail kogalniceanu, constituted a living monument of the vernacular. their importance as an inspiring and stimulating power to the new writers was fully appreciated by titu maiorescu, who be- came the leading critical spirit in rumanian letters. under maiorescu’s influence a group of national writers gath- ered round the newly founded periodical cozvorbiri ltterare. among them were i. creanga, who in amintiri din copilarie (“ recollections of childhood ”) and other tales fresh with many idiomatic expressions embodied the spirit of the moldavian peasantry; i. l. caragiale, who, besides a realistic drama and two volumes of short stories and sketches of unsurpassed crafts- manship, showed in his comedies scrisoarea din urma (the lost letter) and noaptea furtunoasa (stormy night) (collected works, 1908) the grotesque effect resulting from a hasty introduction of western manners into a society still stamped with an oriental character; and above all the poet eminescu. what a magic there was in his verse! the words linked together as by a strange chance, simple in appearance, but suggestive, suffused with emotion, creating a new music of their own, and apt to express— what had seemed impossible with a language as yet rather uncul- tivated—the highest thoughts that ever beset a great spirit. he has often been compared with leopardi, on account of a pro- found, penetrating, overwhelming note of sadness, which affected all his successors, not excepting al. vlahutzd, a poet with a strong individuality of his own. but there is another side to eminescu—his broad conception of the rumanian race. it was this that impressed writers of the later generation such as prof. lorga, who, in his isforia literaturit romine in secolul al xviii. lea, 1688-1821, etc. (1901), arrived at a clearer understanding of what a national literature may be. in his own weekly, sa- manatorul, as well as in such other periodicals as convorbirt literare, under the editorship of prof. mehedintzi, luceafarul and viata romdneasca, was first published almost all the modern writing which artistically reflects the deeper characteristics of the rumanian people. a corner of the humble life of banat is described in i6n popo- vici-banatseanu’s short story, zn lume (out in the worlds); the romantic vlach population scattered throughout the moun- tainous parts of macedonia, epirus and thessaly is represented in marcu beza’s volume of short stories pe drumuri (1914) (on the roads) and his novel, o viata (1921) (a life). transylva- nia has produced the poets g. cosbuc, octavian goga, stephen josif. the first-named started a reaction against the pessimism of eminescu by singing joyfully in rich cadences of everyday peasant life. goga’s poetry, being essentially of an irredentist character, has burned out its flame, its stirring power, in the re- alisation of national aspirations; but there are still in his second volume ne cheama pamentul (the land calls on us), a num- ber of poems imbued with a deep, enduring humanity. he seems for the present lost to poetry, having turned his talent to the writing of vigorous, fiery leaders in his own weekly jara noastri (our country), the name of which speaks clearly of its tendency. to the gentle pen of josif, a transylvanian of vlach paternity, are due the best renderings into rumanian of shakespeare’s midsummer night's dream and shelley’s to a skylark in talma- cirt (1923). it is from the english masters of song, chiefly from keats, that another poet, p. cerna, absorbed and made his own that power of soaring to the higher realms of imagination. his untimely death was a great loss to rumanian literature, as in profundity he ranked next to eminescu. during this period public interest in rumanian authors was awakened, so that even the national theatres of bucharest, jassy and other towns were able successfully to produce plays inspired directly by rumanian history and folklore; such as barbu dela- vrancea’s trilogy, apus de soare, luccafarul, viforul—sunset, the evening star, the storm—in which a strong shakespear- ean influence could easily be detected. victor eftimiu’s poetic excursion into fairyland, imsira-te, margurife!, 1911 (string ye pearls!) is founded on a popular rumanian tale; so is adrian maniu’s versified drama mesterul, 1922 (the masterbuilder). returning to fiction, one has to mention first of all i. al. 397 bratescu-voinesti. in ro25 he was awarded the great prize of the rumanian academy, a well deserved recognition of his work, which, though small in output—comprising only two volumes of short stories, j lumea dreptatii (in the world of justice) (1908) and jn tusnceric $i lumina (darkness and light) (1912) is remarkable for its delicate blending of humour and subdued pathos. duiliu zamfirescu in a series of three novels on din viata comanestilor (the life of comenesti) shows how the kind, god-fearing old boyar gradually disappears, and his place is taken by unscrupulous adventurers of no definite race or religion. liviu rebreanu’s novel jon (1921) deals with the peasants’ love of the land, amounting sometimes to greediness, and fraught consequently with great calamities; it has rather impressed the public by its size, as it appeared in two large vol- umes, an unusual thing in rumanian literature. micheal sado- nuvea is undoubtedly one of the most prolific writers. he pub- lished many books of short stories and narratives, his last, venea o moara pe siret (1925) (‘‘ a mill on the siret ”’), being considered the best. it really gives a vivid insight into the countryside, and one meets now and again with masterly descriptions, which, however, through their profusion, overshadow in a way the movement of the characters. the werld war does not seem to have either altered or much inspired literary production. an attempt to depict the general spirit during the german invasion of rumania was made in a novel, called after the national colours, rosu, galben $i albastru (1925) (“ red, yellow and blue”’) by i. minulescu, known as a disciple of the french symbolists. from the same school proceeded likewise a younger poet, ion pillat, who in his satul meu (1925) (“‘ my village ”’) manifests a definite return to the rumanian tradition. bisliograpny.—winifred gordon, rumania, pp. 40, 45 (1918); m. beza, papers on the rumanian people and literature (1920); and several of the stories cited above are contained in rumantan stories, translated by lucy byng (1921) and m. beza, deda, trans- lated by lucy byng (1925). (m. b.*) runciman, walter (1870- ), british politician, was born at south shields nov. 19 1870, the son of sir walter runci- man, rst bart., a newcastle shipowner. he was educated at trinity college, cambridge, and afterwards joined his father in his shipping business, being from 1896 to r905 managing direc- tor of the moor line of cargo steamers. in 1898 he unsuccessfully contested gravesend in the liberal interest, but was elected for oldham in 1899, although he only held the seat for a year. in 1902 he stood successfully for dewsbury, and retained this seat until 1918. in 1g05 he entered sir henry campbelj-banner- man’s govt. as parliamentary secretary to the local govt. board, he became financial secretary to the treasury in 1907, president of the board of education in 1908, and was pres- ident of the board of agriculture from 1911 to 1914. from 1912-4 he was also commissioner of woods and forests, and from 1914-6 president of the board of trade. on the formation of mr. lloyd george’s ministry in 1916 he retired from the government. in 1920 he unsuccessfully contested north edinburgh and in 1924 was returned for swansea west. he was an active member of the radical group formed within the liberal party, and was thus opposed to the leadership of mr. lloyd george. (see liberal party.) running: see athletics. rupert (1869- ), german prince, the eldest son of king louis iii. of bavaria, was born may 18 1869 at munich. in 1906, after extensive travels in india and elsewhere, he was appointed to the command of the i. bavarian army corps. at the outbreak of the world war he was commander of the ba- varian troops (the vi. german army) and led them to victory in the great battles fought in lorraine (aug. 20-2 1914). in the following oct. he was placed in command on the german front in artois and southern flanders, and, after having been advanced to the rank of field-marshal, was entrusted in the spring of 1917 with the chief command of the northern group of armies on the western front. in 1900 he married marie gabriele, a sister of the queen of the belgians; she died in 1912; and in 1921 he married princess mitonia of luxembourg and nassau. 398 through his mother, the archduchess maria-therese of austria- este, prince rupert was the descendant of the stuart kings of england and, according to legitimist ideas, in the succession to the british crown. (sce frontiers, battles of the.) rural life.—during the period 1910-26 much has been done in great britain to bring to the villages some of the amen- ities of the town, also to arrest the depopulation of the rural districts. women’s institutes —the women’s institute movement came to great britain from canada, where women’s institutes had been in existence for some 25 years, and where their organisation promoted war-time economics and food production and preser- vation. mrs. alfred watt, who had long been associated with the canadian movement, had come to england in 1913 to interest englishwomen in the movement. in feb. 1915 the agricultural organisation society realised its possibilities in rural england. the first women’s institute in great britain was founded in wales at llanfairpwll in sept. 1915; the first in england at wallisdown in nov. of the same year. in jan. 1925 there were 3,476 women’s institutes in england and wales, with a total membership of over 206,000, and the number was growing steadily. in 1917 the board of agriculture became responsible for the propaganda of the women’s institute movement, as part of the work of the women’s branch of the food production department. in 1919 the women’s institute became completely independent, though representatives of the ministry of agricul- ture continued to serve on its executive committee. the impor- tance of the movement lics not so much in the fact that it has given country women a new interest in life, or even that it has set a remarkably high standard in handicraft, as that it has broken down much of the old isolation of village life. women’s institute members form a fellowship from which no woman is excluded by creed or politics, and the habit of meeting together monthly to discuss questions of interest to them as individuals and as members of the community is leading to a sense of the power of co-operation which seems likely to go far. already certain institutes have taken up such questions as water supply, the preservation of footpaths, disposal of rubbish and housing; and on more than one occasion an intelligent district council has sent to the institutes for comment on the plans of cottages they were about to erect, so that the women who would do the work of those houses had a chance to express an opinion on them before they were built. a new sense of public service and a new spirit in local government are slowly making them- selves felt which may do much to breathe new life into parish and district councils. moreover, the linking together of village to village i in groups and in county federations, and of county to county in the national federation, bids fair to give a stability to this movement which has been lacking in previous efforts 1o develop the social, educational and recreational side of village life, excellent as many of these have been. village clubs —an attempt to do something of the same sort for men was made, after the war, by the village clubs associa- tion, but did not prove successful. certain parts of the work it had set before it were, however, being carried out by other organisations, nothing was more striking after the war than the marked increase of interest in adult education (g.v.). an interesting experiment in linking together educational and social work from the elementary school to advanced classes for adults, and including the provision of playing fields, is at work under the auspices of the county council at sawston in cambridgeshire. rural community councils——a tentative effort to establish closer co-operation between the various statutory and voluntary agencies was made in oxfordshire in 1920, when a rural com- munity committee was formed, consisting of representatives of voluntary societies interested in educational and social develop- ment throughout the country, and of the county council. simul- taneously, and independently, nottinghamshire was beginning to move in the same direction. since then rural community councils have been formed in kent, nottinghamshire, derby- shire, leicestershire, gloucestershire, west sussex, hertford- shire, cambridgeshire, hampshire, somerset, forfarshire; and rural life—russell, b. a. w. other counties are in process of forming such bodies. these councils not only pool information, and as far as possible re- sources, thus enabling villages to obtain lectures, concerts, dramatic entertainments and other such things much more surely and economically than could otherwise be the case, but in certain cases they have taken active steps with regard to questions of public health and of rural industries. a further development has been the formation of village community councils on similar lines to the rural community councils. these do not in any sense replace the parish council, but aim at bringing together all sections of village life. there has been a great increase in the number of village halls during the post-war period. many have been put up as war memorials, and many have been provided by the village as a whole, not by individual donors. boy scouts, the church lads’ brigade and young farmers’ clubs are all attempting to deal with various aspects of the problem; but it remains to be seen if agriculture can provide adequate counter attractions to town life. in music, drama and folk dance special efforts are made to cater for the intellectual needs of the villagers. thanks to the enlightened policy of the carnegie united kingdom trust, in every english county but two, rural libraries have been estab- lished, and visits from the village, country town and school con- cert parties, and from the arts league of service, bring music and drama to country audiences. even more significant is the work of the english folk dance socicty, the village drama society and the music competition festivals, which are helping villagers themselves to develop artistic expression. wireless is in its infancy, and its influence in bringing isolated people into touch not only with music but with great national and political events through the broadcasting of speeches cannot yet be estimated. it undoubtedly suggests great possibilities which as yet are realised only to a very slight extent. brpliography.—adult education committee of the board of education reports (nos. 3, 4, § and 6), on the development of adult education in rural areas (1922); the development of adult hduca- tion for women (1922); british music (1924); drama (1926); h. w. ashby and p. g. byles, rural education (1923); jao www. robertson scott, the story of the women’s institute movement (1925); rural industries intelligence bureau, papers; ]1. morris, the } “hage col- lege (1924); national council of school service, the reconstruction of country life (1925); carnegie united kingdom trust, vrual reports; horace piunkett foundation, introduction and report of last dav’s conference on co-operation within the british empire, held at wembley (1924). (g, it.) russell, bertrand arthur william (1872~ ip british mathematician and philosopher, grandson of the first earl russcll (lord john russell) and brother and heir of the second earl russell, was born at chepstow, monmouthshire, may 18 1872. he became a scholar, and subsequently a fellow, of trinity college, cambridge, and with peculiar lucidity pro- pounded the theory of neo-realism. during the world war mr. russell twice infringed the emergency regulations, was for some time in prison, and was deprived of his fellowship in 1916. thereafter he lectured and wrote on the major questions of metaphysics without the support of academic authority. he travelled through china and bolshevik russia and unsuccess- fully contested the chelsea constituency in the labour interests. his most important works are: principles of afathematics (1903); principia mathematica, in which prof. a. n. whitehead collaborated (1910); af ysticism and logic (1918); the analysis of afind (1921); and two books of popular exposition, namely the a. b.c. of atoms (1923) and the a. b.c. of relativity (1925). mr. russell has been peculiarly successful in cliciting from comtemporary physics those theorems that are most nearly con- sonant with his temper. he began by trying to impose upon psychological and metaphysical speculation the orderly logic of pure mathematics. as time went on, he came to despair of a successful issue, and in his later work admits that neither ma- terialism nor idealism can wholly satisfy him. he has therefore tried to formulate a neo-realism, the substance of which is the existence of some primary stuff neither mental nor material. but russell, g. w.—russia temperamentally he is a desperate man, loving extremes, and too many of his speculations are deliberately intended “ 4 epater les bourgeois.” his wo.ks on russia the practice and theory of bolshevism (1920) and china, the problem of china (1922) deepen the impression made by his works on general philosophy. he is, essentially, an intellectual, who believes that the truth may be ac- quired by well disciplined ratiocination, but does not believe that the governments of the world, whether despotic or democratic, will ever attain to the perception of truth. therefore he is a deliber- ately lonely figure, almost querulously criticising the world’s workings, ever ready to champion unpopular causes, slow in accepting any “ fait accompli.” he has with some justice been called a huxley who has not found his darwin. in collabo- ration with his second wife, dora, daughter of sir f. w. black, he wrote the prospects of industrial civilization, 1923. (see knowledge, theory of; relativity.) ch. c. ha.) russell, george william (1867- ), irish writer and painter, known as /e, was born at lurgan, co. armagh, april 10 1867. educated at rathmines school, dublin, he entered an accountant’s office, but in 1897 joined the irish agricultural organisation society, and became an organiser of agricultural societies. from 1904 to 1923 he was editor of the irish honie- stead, the organ of the agricultural co-operative movement in ireland. in 1923 he was appointed editor of the irish stutesman, which post he still held in 1926. russell’s publications include itomeward: songs by the way (1894); the earth breath (1897); literary ideals in ireland (1899), a collection of essays written in collaboration with w. b. yeats, w. larminie and john eglinton; /dcals in ireland (1901), another book of collaborative essays; the nuts of knowledge (1903), a selection of lyrics. in 1904 appeared two books of verse, the divine vision and new poems, an anthology of verses by young irish poets; and a collection of mystical tales, phe mask of apollo. other books of verse include by still waters (1906), collected poems (1913), and gods of war (1015). the hero in man (1909) and fhe renewal of youth (1911) were imaginative musings, as was imaginations and reveries (1915). in 1906 appeared some frish essays, and in 1907 deirdre, a three-act play. co-operation and nationality and the rural community, published in 1912 and 1913 respectively, were pamphlets embodying co-operative ideals, which are further developed in his the national being: thoughts on an irish polity (1917). the candle of vision, an attempt to discover the element of truth in the mystical imagination, appeared in 1918. this was followed by the interpreters (1920), asymposium in the platonic fashion in which world politics are related to motions in the anima mundi. a volume of poems, voices of the stones, appeared in 1925. russell, israel cook (1852-1906), american geologist (see 23.862), died at ann arbor, mich., may 1 1906. russell, william clark (1844-191 1), british author (see 23.865), died at bath nov. 8 rg1r. russia (see 23.869), now officially known as the union of socialist soviet republics (u.s.s.r.) the territory of russia just before the war consisted of about 22,000,000 sq. km., 25.4% of which lay in europe, 74.6°%5 in asia. the war reduced russian territory in iurope, partly by adding parts of it to existing states, but more especially by the creation of new states out of the territory of the former russian empire. as @ consequence of the separation of finland the formation of estonia, latvia, lithuania, poland, the absorption by turkey of the pashalik of kars and the occupation of bessarabia by rumania, russia lost 804,000 square kilometres. ‘the whole territory of the union of soviet socialist republics is now about 21,200,000 sq. km. (8,108,387 sq. m.) with a population of 139,700,000. (for asiatic russia sce siberia). the union of soviet socialist republics (u.s.s.r.) according to the constitution of 1923 and subsequent additions, consists of six independent republics as follows: the russian soviet federal socialist republic (19,700,000 sq. km.), the ukrainian 5. 5. republic (400,000 sq. km.), the white russian s. s. repub- lic (100,000 sq. km.), the transcaucasian soviet federal socialist 399 republic (200,000 sq. km.), the turkoman soviet socialist republic (200,000 sq. km.) and the uzbek soviet socialist republic (331,900 sq. km.), some of these are again federations in their turn. [. divisions of the soviet union the following is a complete list of the territorial divisions of the u.s.s.r. with their capitals as they existed in 1926. the witte russian soviet socialist republic capital—minsk administrative administrative province centre province centre minsk . . minsk mogilev . mogilev slutsk . . slutsk kalininsk . klimovichi mozir . mozir orsha . orsha bobruisk . bobruisk vitebsk . vitebsk borisov . borisov polotsk . polotsk transcaucasian socialist federal soviet republic capital—tiflis constituent republics capital i, azerbaijan sovict socialist republic . baku (2) nakhichevan area nakhichevan (b) nagoini karabakh . khan-kendi 2. armenian soviet socialist republic 3. georgian soviet . erivan socialist republic . tiflis (a) abkhazian (autonomous republic) . sukhum (b) adjarian (autonomous republic) . batum (c) southern ossetian (autonomous region) . pskhinvalt russian soctalist federal soviet republic province capital altai . . barnaul amur . blagoveschensk _ archangel . . archangel astrakhan . astrakhan bryansk . bryansk vladimir . viadimir vologda . vologda voronc] . vorone] vyatka . vyatka gomel : gomel grozni (a town ‘with provincial status) yenisci ; . krasnoyarsk transhaikal - chita ivanovo-voznesensk . ivanovo-voznesensk irkutsk . irkutsk kaluga . kaluga | kamchatka . petropavlovsk-kamchatski kostroma . . kostroma ixursk . kursk leningrad . leningrad noscow . moscow niurmansk . murmansk nijegorod . . nijni-novgorod novgorod . . novgorod novo-nikolaevsk . novo-nikolaevsk omsk . omsk orlovsk . orel penza . penza perm . . perm primorsk . viadivostok pskov . pskov ryazan . ryazan samara . samara saratov . saratov . sverdlovsk . veliki-ustyug . rostov-on-don sverdlovsk severo-i)vinsk . severo-navkaz ( region) smolensk . . smolensk tambov . tambov tver . . tyer tomsk . tomsk ‘tula i: lula tyumen . tyumen ~ ulyanovsk . ulyanovsk . tsaritsin . chelyabinsk . cherepovets . yaroslavl tsaritsin chelyabinsk cherepovets yaroslavl . 400 russia ore © ae oc © ee © eo pa ee ag aa os 4 @ o's tm rino slavs ppt — ale: sanddovsiye “of po bc cs bery, | 6 &l pon r. 2 3 — > weooey 3 yy, % * sas aecinodar ee — ce ok, $———— bf ear w ~. wy bstavropol ww * pac »~— =e am gikop fm + ot o.. © =a isr i, «gh petalpaslias, “7, nomen tu wen & a ———- coun a eeormage ree = nt : rp ‘ df, ee at a cc et 2, 3 by * ‘2 *] e ar ».”.. 2 t srr ‘pd subthum 39 yyy fa a e russia english miles oo. 100 200 300 kilometres 0 100 200 300 main railways republics inthe union =a = = autonomous republres and provinces ie eccuwas trebizond” | alexandropoy ( b gown sc > werfzerum 1v¥as mam un rf autonomous areas within the russia r.s.f.s.r. capital eee . krasnodar (temporary) votsk os . levsk ingush : : : : . beslan kabardin . : : ‘ . nalchik kalmuk _. ; ; , . astrakhan qara-oqirghiz : . pishpek qara-qalpak ; karachaevo-cherkess komi (zirian) . . turtkul . batalpashinsk . ust-sisolsk marisk . krasnokokshaisk oirat . . ulala northern ossetian . vladikavkaz chechen . grozni chuvash . cheboksari autonomous socialist soviet republics within the r.s.f.s.r capital bashkir . ufa mongol- buryat . verkhneudinsk daghestan . . buinaksk karelian . petrozavodsk oirghiz . orenburg (a) adaev county with status of province (6) akmolinsk province . aleksandrovsk fort (uritsk) . petropaviovsk (c)} aktyubinsk province . aktyubinsk (2) bukeev . urda (e) kustanal . kustanai (f) orenburg . . orenburg (g) semipalatinsk . semipalatinsk (kh) uralsk : . uralsk crimea. i. . simferopol german volga . . pokrovsk tatar : . kazan yakutsk . yakutsk turkomanistan soviet socialist republic capital— poltoratsk uzbekk soviet socialist republic capital—samarqand province capital bukhara . bukhara samarqand . samarqand tashkent . . tashkent khwahrezm . khwahrezm ferghana . . khogand tajikstan (autonomous soviet socialist republic) . dyushambe ukraine soviet socialist republic capital—-kharkov province capital volhynia . jitomir donets : . bakhmut ekaterinoslav . . ekaterinoslav kiev . . kiev odessa . odessa podolsk . vinnitsa poltava . poltava kharkov . kharkov chernigov . chernigov moldavia (autonomous soviet socialist republic) balta (x.) the above table is derived from russian official sources. ii. history to the revolution the last years of tsardom.—the transition from an auto- cratic to a constitutional regime was rendered especially difficult in russia by the lack of political education among the people, the doctrinaire fanaticism of the intellectual leaders and the selfish- ness of the government. the first duma had ended in a vain attempt to appeal to the country against the government. the stolypin ministry, which was formed in 1906, started with a programme of co-operation between the government and ‘leaders of public opinion,” and it sought an agreement with the more moderate sections of liberals, especially with the octobrists, the supporters of a policy aiming at putting into prac- tice the manifesto of oct. r905. the failure of this attempt is a fact of historical importance in so far as it showed conclusively how irreconcilable the tendencies of the imperial bureaucracy were with the programme of moderate liberalism. p. a. stolypin 4oi1 was as fine a representative of old russia as the governing class of the time could muster—not a great statesman nor an original thinker, but a fearless, patriotic gentleman with practical expe- rience in provincial administration, accessible to ideas of reform, but constitutionally adverse to radical theories. the repression of revolutionary attempts and of agrarian revolts was taken in hand with ruthless energy, and it succeeded in driving discontent underground and in re-establishing exter- nal order, but it cast its shadow on the constructive work of stolypin’s statesmanship. after the clash with the intractable second duma the electoral system was altered by the manifesto of june 3 1907. this coup d’etat secured to the government a numerical majority in the third and in the fourth dumas, while at the same time it weakened the moral authority of these assemblies and made the moderates more susceptible to the appeals of the lefts. in spite of the outward pacification of the country there was no real settlement, and the flames of political passion burst out occasionally with ominous violence. the close of 1910 was marked by an increased agitation among the students—the most sensitive and audacious element of russian society. har- rowing tales of flogging and tortures practised on political con- victs in the prisons of the north and of siberia had reached the educational centres, and a series of strikes and indignation meetings began in all the various high schools of the empire. the reactionary bureaucrats, however, with m. kasso, the minister of public instruction, at their head, decided to use these sad occurrences in order to overthrow the seli- government of the universities, conceded to these institutions by the imperial ukaz of aug. 27 1905. m. kasso issued decrees ordering the establishment of a strict regime of official inspection, the closing of students’ unions and societies with the exception of the scientific ones, and, eventually, the direct interference of the police for the maintenance of order within the universities and high schools. in moscow the rector (prof. maniulov) and his as- sistants declared that they could not assume responsiblilty for the carrying into effect of the ministerial measures; they were deprived of their chairs; 63 professors and lecturers tendered their resignations as a mark of sympathy with their dismissed comrades. this did not disturb the minister in the least, and he promptly accepted most of the resignations, although this involved the intellectual ruin of the oldest and most famous university of russia. the “pride’s purge’? in moscow was followed by a number of dismissals in other educational estab- lishments. the unsparing scourging of the academic corporations produced the desired effect of outward submission, but it brought the feelings of hatred and humiliation among the intellectuals to the highest pitch, and the outcasts and convicts of the univer- sity “stories ’’ afterwards formed the principal contingent among the embittered intellectual leaders of the revolution. another sign of the times may be discerned in stolypin’s legislation in respect of the zemstvos of the western provinces (kiev, volhynia, podolia, mogilev, minsk and vitebsk). the introduction of a measure of local self-government would have been in itself a boon to the population of these provinces, but stolypin made it an occasion for a renewed humiliation of the non-russian nationalities, strongly represented in these dis- tricts. the project of the government disfranchised the numer- ous jewish population, and drove the poles into a position of inferiority by dividing the electorate according to national col- leges and establishing beforehand the preponderance of the rus- sian colleges by means of an artificial scheme of repartition. the unfairness and political short-sightedness of these restrictions provoked a strong opposition even in the docile third duma. in the council of the empire a coalition between the rights and the lefts led to the rejection of the bill. stolypin did not submit in the face of such an assertion of independence. he prorogued the duma for three days (may 14-17), and in the interval obtained an imperial decree promulgating the law as an emergency measure on the strength of art. 87 of the organic laws. in consequence of this snub administered to the legisla- tive assemblies, the octobrist centre could no longer support 402 the government; the leader of the octobrists, a. guchkov, re- signed the presidentship of the duma, and votes of censure on the government were passed in both houses on the resumption of their sittings. stolypin’s position was made untenable by these events. his victories meant in truth the breakdown of his programme. the premicr had again to rely exclusively on the goodwill of the autocratic tsar as against independent public opinion, and he had to strive for that goodwill in the enervat- ing and treacherous surroundings of court intrigue, in which obsequious chamberlains were more expert and successful than himself. the coup de grdce came from the midst of the secret police, that had become the mainstay of the imperial system in its struggle against growing rebellion. one of the agents of this or- ganisation, bogrov, inflicted a mortal wound on stolypin at a gala performance in the kiev opera house on sept. 14 i911. the hatred of oppressed nationalities and of the humiliated in- tellectual class had armed the hand of the assassin, who was a well-educated jew. the agrarian question the stolypin land reforms.—one part of stolypin’s activity calls for special examination, his land reform, which may be con- sidered as the immediate introduction to the social revolution of 1917. the agrarian revolts of 1905 attracted the attention of the government and of society to the deplorable condition of the most numerous and important social class, the peasantry. the causes of the growing impoverishment of the peasantry are to be sought primarily in the manner in which the emancipation of 1861 had been carried out. the plots of land (#ade/) which the peasants got varied greatly in size in different provinces. “ large”’ holdings ranged between 23 (about eight ac.) and 12 dess. (33 ac.), while minimum holdings corresponded to one-half of the maxi- mum-ones. the landowner’s share comprised, besides his domain land, from one-third to one-half of the land formerly occupied by the peasants, on the condition that the latter should receive no less than the minimum holding. besides these two principal types of holdings the emancipation act of 1861 established also the “ beggarly ”’ or “ gratuitous ” holding, which was to be no less than one-quarter of the maximum one. the gratuitous hold- ing was established by free agreement between the peasants and the landowner; in this case the peasants had to pay no redemption while the landowner kept all the rest of his land. on the whole the quantity of land held by the peasants had been much reduced irom that held before emancipation. | the following figures for the province of saratoff may serve as an illustration :— in 1861 688,826 peasants received begearly holdings; they held 302,383 dessiatines. in 35 provinces 921,826 souls ' were assigned one-half of the large holding each and held 1,530,000, or less than two dessiatines per soul. the peasants’ holdings, which were already whittled down at the time of the emancipation, were further reduced after it by the increase of the population. a commission for the in- vestigation of the conditions and needs of the peasantry described the diminution of the peasants’ holdings in the following man- ner: in 1860, 4:8°% decrease on the average; in 1880, 3-5 decrease and in 1900 2-6 decrease. besides losing a portion of the arable land, the peasant lost at the emancipation the right of using the landowner’s pasturage, of cutting wood in his forest, and some other subsidiary rights important in the living of peasant farmers. the redemption payments were a heavy charge on the peasant’s budget. the agricultural commission of 1872 found that squires had tospend on taxes less than 14-5 kopecks per dess., while the peasants paid more than 95-5 k. per dessiatine. in ad- dition, the peasants had to pay the poll-tax, the amount of which was about 4r. 45k. per soul. the same commission states that in 37 provinces the taxes and redemption payments of the meforr state and appanage peasants comprised 92-75% of their net income from land, the payments of former unfree peasants 1 persons doing the normal work of a villager. russia 198-25%. the govertiment made some futile attempts to re- lieve the peasants’ load of taxes. the salt tax was abolished in 1880, the poll-tax in 1882. but these measures could certainly not solve the financial difficulties of the peasantry. arrears grew rapidly to enormous proportions. in the province of tam- boo, for example, the arrears amounted in 1898 to 244% of the original charge. driven by land hunger, the peasants farmed on lease a large part of the state’s appanages and of squires’ land, but this expedient cannot be considered as an effective help in the solu- tion of the land problem. the rent paid by the peasants to the landowners was usually very high. it is important to notice that certain plots of land, the use and possession of which was an essential necessity for the whole community, for example strips bordering on watercourses remained usually after the emanci- pation in the hand of the landowner. this gave him the power to require exorbitant rent for such land and keep the peasants in permanent fear of losing these grounds, without which village life was practically impossible. this led to continual collisions. under such conditions the backward and extensive methods of peasant cultivation proved very difficult to reform. , one of the most important defects of the peasant's landhold- ing was the intermixture of strips in the open fields. the land of a community lay only seldom in a compact block. it was usually divided into a number of smaller ‘“ shots,’? sometimes mixed up with lands of other villages and landowners. the blocks of land belonging to the same community were again subdivided into strips, which were sometimes two to three yd. broad and some 1oo yd. long. each household held a certain number of strips 20-30-50, sometimes even 100-150. the strips were scattered at a great distance from the farmyard, and the driving to them entailed a considerable waste of time and work; this hampered greatly the farming arrangements of the villagers. the intermixture of strips separated from each other only by narrow balks obliged the whole community to follow the same system of cultivation, which was usually the three-fields one. the very large extent of fallow land, the carelessness of the holders who were not sure of keeping their land permanently— all this had the most ruinous effect on the peasants’ farm- ing. under such conditions, hampering individual energy and initiative, productivity on the peasants’ holdings was very low indeed. in 27 provinces the average value of the gross produce of one dessiatine of peasants’ land was 8r. g9k., while the average cost of production per dess. was §r. 22k.; so that the net produce per dess. amounted only to 3r. 77 kopecks. the productiveness of the squires’ estate was 12-18% higher than that of the peasants, but as a large area of landowners’ land was taken on lease by the peasants, the difference in the results of cultivation would be much greater. , decay of the peasantry.—the impoverishment of the peasantry after the emancipation of 1861 is reflected in a memoir of the zemstvo of tula:— a the peasant’s life is hard and unsightly even in periods of com- parative welfare. generally he lives in a cottage of 8-9 yd. width and no more than 3 yd. in height. cottages without chimneys are still very common, the smoke being let out through a hole in the roof. the roof is almost always thatched. in many provinces the walls are covered with dung for the sake of warmth. a peasant’s family, sometimes a numerous one, is huddled together in a space of 20-30 sq. yards. the floor of the cottage is almost always bare soil, because lambs, calves, pigs and even cows are put in during the cold weather. skin diseases are very common among the population. meat, bacon, oil, butter appear on the peasant's table only on ex- ceptional occasions, perhaps two or three times a year; his usual fare is composed of bread, porridge, kvass, cabbage and onions. a very characteristic symptom of the decay of the peasants’ farming is the reduction of the number of horses and the increase in the numbers of horselcss households. a comparison of the figures of the horse statistics in 1888 and 1893-4 shows that in 31 provinces the number of horses had fallen by 10-88%. the number of horseless households had increased during the same period in 23 provinces of central russia from 21-56% to 26:85°%. more than 25% of the households have no horses at all; another 25°% have only one horse each. russia let us now examine a peasant’s normal budget as it is pre- sented in the remarkable work of mr. f. a. shcherbina (edited by prof. a. j. chuprov):— income from:— corn on his land ‘ 16r. 20 k. corn on household land 16.92" ky, straw and hay 8r. 16 k. gardening 2r.63 k. cattle-breeding gr. 99 k. trade or craft 8r. 47k. sundries . 7 £226 kk: total 55 r. 63 k. expenses :— corn : ’ i8r. 10 k. food for cattle 8r. 45 k. vegetables and fruit its: 20 k. meat... e : 3r.90 k. rent rr. 2k. taxes 26.65 -k: sundries . 20 r. 10k total . 556. 54k. assuming that 19 poods of corn per head are the minimum necessary during one year and that 7-5 poods are sufficient for fodder, mr. maress calculated that 70-7 °% of the peasant popu- lation had less than 19 poods per head, 20-:4% had between 19 and 26-5 poods per head, and only 8-9 % had more than 26:5 poods per head. this means that 70-7% of the farming population could not live on the income from their land and would be reduced to semi-starvation if they could not find any supplemen- tary means of existence. the state of mind produced by this situation among the peas- antry may be gathered from the opinions expressed by peasant deputies in the second duma in the course of the debates on agrarian reform. one of the members of the right, prince sviatopolk mirski, had said that the ignorant and inexperienced mass of the russian people had to be guided by the landlords as a flock is guided by shepherds. kisselev, a peasant belonging to the group of toil, replied :— “we have had enough of that kind of thing! what we want are not shepherds, but leaders, and we know how to find them without your help. with them we shall find our way to light, to truth, to the promised land!” | afanassiev, a non-party deputy, an ex-soldier, said among other things:— | “‘in the japanese war i led a number of mobilised soldiers through estates (of the squires). it took us 48 hours to reach the meeting place. the soldiers asked me, “where do you lead us? ’, ' to japan.’ what for?’, ‘to defend our country.’ they replied: ‘ what is that country? we have been through the estates of the lissetskys, the besulovs, the padkopailovs . . . where is our land? nothing here belongs to us.’ ”’ | the same deputy said on another occasion:— “work, sweat and use the land! but if you do not wish to live on the land, to till it, to work on it, you have no right to own it!” in order to meet this disastrous situation the government made attempts in three directions—the increase of the size of peasants’ holdings, emigration and the improvement of agri- cultural methods. it would be erroneous to think that the deficiency in land could be entirely removed by new distributions from the estates of the squires and the domains of the crown. in 1906 the distribution of land among different classes of land owners was as follows (la reforme agraire en russie, ministere de l’agriculture, 1912):— crown land . oa 133,038,883 dess. peasants’ holdings . : : ; 119,067,754 dess. land bought by communities and associations of peasants . ; . ; o land bought by individual peasants land of the gentry . . ; land owned by other classes 22,664,493 dess. land owned by various institutions 6,985,893 dess. the enormous area of the crown lands was mainly covered by forests or situated in the northern and eastern provinces, so that it could not be used for agricultural purposes; the surface of con- venient land in the hands of the crown was only about 3,700,000 dessiatines. the arable land owned by the church and different ecclesiastical institutions amounted to 1,672,000 dess. (statistics 11,142,560 dess. 12,944,154 dess. 49,287,886 dess. 403 of the holy synod, 1890); the appanages comprised 2,000,000 dess. ofarableland. asalarge part of the land was covered also by forests, we come to estimate the surface of the arable land owned by squires at about 35,000,000 dless. (yermolov.) the sum total that could be disposed of would thus amount to 45,000,000 dess., or about 30% of the area of the peasants’ holdings; divided among the villagers it would have made less than one additional dessiatine per soul. the insufficiency of the land reserve becomes even more evident if we keep in mind that about 85% of the arable land of the crown, 90° of the appanage arable land and a considerable part of the squires’ land were already leased by the peasantry. the peasants’ revolt of 1905 and the new schemes of stolypin gave an entirely new direction to the agrarian policy of the state. the manifesto of nov. 3 1905 suspended all redeeming payments after jan. 1 1906. of the surface of 2,846,620 dess., which the bank sold directly from jan. 1 1906 to june 1 1913, peasants’ communities got 5:5%, peasants’ associations 14:8%, individual owners 79-7%. the peasants also acquired from the jandowners, with some assistance of the bank, 4,375,163 dessia- tine. it is estimated by oganovsky that the result of the bank activity until july 1 1910 was the creation of 45,000 to 50,000 separate farms and of 130,0c0 to 140,000 small compact plots, the owners of which live in hamlets. ee the law of 1889 had subjected emigration to official super- vision. those were allowed to emigrate who were able to pay the expenses of the journey and of the installation ofa new household, provided their departure did not harm the remaining members of the community. no government assist- ance was given to the emigrants. permission to emigrate was refused if the local authorities considered that the emigrants could find work in the old district. those who emigrated without an official permission had to be sent back. these regulations resulted in a great reduction of the emigration movement, which was practically closed to the poorest peasants. the events of rgos and the new orientation of the government brought a great change in the emigration policy. greater facili- ties were granted, and government assistance was promised by the provisional rules of june 6 1906. but the growth of emi- gration which followed the new regulations was obstructed by a complete lack of organisation. | | we have now to consider the third branch of the government activity, directed towards the solution of the agrarian question. the scheme for improving agricultural methods was based on a reform of the distribution of the land. in 1861 a legal confirma- tion of the peasants’ customary commune was considered the best means to secure the return of the money advanced by the state for redemption. the statistics of landownership in 1905 showed that 23:2% of the households and 17% of the land owned by the peasants were held by private tenure; 76-8% of the farms and 82-7% of the peasants’ land were in communal tenure. the right of property was attributed not to separate households but to the whole village community, as a juridical person. in the case of communal land tenure only the house close belonged to households in permanent tenure; other land belonged to the whole community, and was subject to occasional redivisions. former domestic servants were assigned to peasants’ communities, but did not obtain holdings: they formed in this way a village proletariat. in the reign of alexander iii. communal tenure, which had been regulated by the liberation act of 1861, came to be re- garded as a political safeguard, and its decay was considered to be a national danger. the law of dec. 14 1893 made practically impossible any transition from communal to household tenure. but the growing impoverishment of the peasantry gave evidence that the existing land system had ceased to be beneficial. the special conference established by an imperial order on jan. 22 1902 recognised for the first time the necessity of a funda- mental change in the existing land settlement of the peasants. the majority of the conference were of the opinion that the communal tenure and the intermixture of strips were the chief causes of the alarming condition of the peasantry. 404 stolypin’s land settlement—the agrarian disorders of 1906 gave increased importance to the problem, and proved that the settlement of it could not be postponed any longer. in the years 1906-7 the problem of land reform excited the strongest interest in governmental circles, and played a most prominent part in the programmes of different parties and in the debates of the first and second duma. stolypin took the initiative on the part of the government and eventually obtained the support of the third duma. his scheme had a political purpose, the creation of a conservative class of small peasant owners who could be counted upon to defend the existing regime. this class had to be strong and progressive economically, as it was clear that the improvement of the peasants’ condition could be attained only by more intensive farming. some measures had been taken to enlarge the area of the peasants’ holdings without violating the interests of the squires. but government activity was principally directed to a complete reconstruction of relations inside the village, to the creation of separate farms and to the spread of individual ownership. the imperial ukese of nov. 9g 1906, the land law of june 14 rg10 and the agricultural law of may 29 ro11 were enacted for this purpose. the features of stolypin’s scheme were: each householder possessed of land in a village community can demand that his land should be con- stituted a plot in individual property. a simple majority of the village assembly may convert holdings into privately owned land. the land has to be assigned to the claimant, if possible, in a single block. the conversion of the land of the entire com- munity can be decreed by a resolution of the village meeting passed by a simple majority of the members. all the communi- ties where there had not been any redivision of land since 1861 were declared to have passed from communal tenure to indi- vidual or household ownership. formation of compact plots could not be refused if it was asked for by not less than one-fifth of the householders. the land commissions created by the ukaz of march 4 1906 were entrusted with the redistribution of land under the new jand settlement. in the duma the right clung to the opinions which had been prevalent in the time of alexander iii.; the radicals entertained the hope that the communal land tenure might form the cradle of future collectivism. the cadets mostly agreed with the principles of the government scheme, but they objected to the coercive character of its methods. the majority of the house supported the government and carried its bill through the duma. the motives that influenced the deputies of the duma were well expressed by the chairman of the land committee, s. shidlov- sky, in his speech on oct. 23 1908:— ; our attitude as regards the decree of nov. 9 is in substance a favourable one, because this decree aims at the development of individual land tenure and individual land tenure is certainly the necessary condition of improved cultivation, and the latter means the solution of the agrarian problem. . . . the foundation of a state ruled by law consists in a free, independent and energetic personality. such a personality cannot exist unless you allow the common right of ownership, and no one who wishes the state to be ruled by law should oppose the spread of private property in land. land is, after all, only a basis for the application of labour and capital, and labour is most productive when the labourer is placed in favourable conditions. in the forefront in this respect we have to place an open door for personal enterprise, free play for creative energy, security against outside interference, personal interest. ... the avenue towards a permanent improvement in the existence of our peasants is to be found in an immediate increase of production and income from land, and this cannot be achieved without the help of outside capital. . . . a law which opens the way to personal property en- ables the agricultural worker to display his creative force. the reform had apparently achieved an immediate and strik- ing success. before jan. 1 1913 the commission had arranged farms on an area of 7,413,064 dess., held by 738,980 households; strips had been concentrated into blocks on an area of 4,350,537 dess., held by 585,571 households, yet most of those who asked for separation held only a small plot, and belonged to the poorer peasantry. even with government assistance they were unable to start separate farms, as this undertaking involves in the beginning a considerable outlay of capital. besides, the natural conditions in some parts of russia were not favourable to sepa- russia rate farms or homesteads. one of the chief difficulties was ihe lack of water, which in very large tracts of the black soil area can only be found in connection with considerable rivers. this fact, together with the traditional leaning of the peasantry to village life, obliged the land commission to keep up on many occasions the village system even after the concentration of the fields. a memoir drawn up by the conference of old ritualists held at moscow on feb. 22-25 1906 discloses the views taken by the peasantry on the question of communal land tenure. the oppo- nents of the commune suggested that it made impossible any improvements in agricultural methods and diminished the pro- ductive power of the soil; its supporters stated that communal tenure was the only system based on justice; this consideration is characteristic of the traditional feeling among the great russians. the government scheme sacrificed justice for the sake of ex- pected increased production. stolypin himself described the new land settlement as ‘‘ a stake on the strong.” the small size of the holdings of the new farmers and their economic helplessness had, however, a very unfavourable influ- ence on the expected increase of production. a farmer who held only 8-r1o dess. of land could not introduce any extensive im- provements in his household in the absence of cheap credit. stolypin recognised that ‘‘ primitive methods were used by the peasantry as before.” the land settlement of 1906-10 was carried out with uncom- mon energy, but the social needs of the population were not satisfied. the government was accused of having destroyed by a stroke of the pen an institution formed by centuries. the sudden change affected not only the economic conditions of the peasants’ life, but the juridical relations between the members of the family were also shaken. before the new settlement the life of the peasants was based on the participation in the com- mon holding of all the members of the household. the new law substituted for this family tenure the individual ownership of the chief householder. all the other members of the family suddenly lost their rights in the jand. altogether it may be said that stolypin’s agrarian measures could take effect only if they were accompanied by a steady policy making for agricultural education and backed by extensive credit. even in such a case a long time would have been neces- sary to enable them to strike root. their immediate consequence was rather to increase the fermentation in the villages and to excite and embitter the feelings of those who were losing faith in the village community without acquiring any other standard of economic organisation. thus the legislation of 1906-11 helped to prepare the agrarian upheaval instead of preventing it. the struggle for reform the third and fourth duma.—the death of stolypin left a wide gap in the ranks of the government, and the appoint- ment of m. kokovtsov, the minister of finance, to the premier- ship did not result in a rejuvenation of the bureaucratic system. the new premier was in favour of continuity in policy; this meant that he wanted to keep on the lines traced by stolypin’s initiative and avoid new departures as far as possible. he was a trained administrator, placed by chance at the head of the country in a time when caution and routine were certainly in- sufficient to meet the requirements of a critical situation. the principal achievement of the three years of kokovtsov’s rule was apparent success in the management of financial operations. the budget grew every year and reached in 1914 the enormous sum of three milliard roubles, and yet not only was a deficit avoided, but some 1,500 millions in gold were accumulated as a reserve fund to sustain the currency and meet possible emergency calls. the instability of the vast structure buttressed on the chronic alcoholism of the people was duly perceived by public opinion, and a campaign was started in the duma to put an end to this shameful and perilous situation. one of the duma members, chelyshiv, was the soul of an active agitation in the legislative assemblies and in government circles. he succeeded in obtain- ing the formation of a commission to examine and report on the russia subject, but his abolitionist plans were obstructed by the oppo- sition of the finance ministry, which did not see its way to balance the budget without the resources supplied by the monop- oly of the sale of spirits. yet signs were not wanting that the welfare of the country was seriously threatened, in spite of an enormous and duly balanced budget. the harvest of 1911 was so poor that in 1912 russia was visited by a severe famine. yet the government refused to let voluntary organisations assist in fighting the disaster; only as- sociations affliated to the red cross or to the zemstvos were allowed to send agents into the provinces, to collect and to dis- tribute funds. the public works organised by bureaucratic boards were conducted in a very unsatisfactory manner. some progress was made in connection with insurance against ill-health, but in other respects the employers were left very much to their own way, with the result that strikes, which had decreased con- siderably in number and intensity after the collapse of the revo- lutionary movement in 1907, began to multiply again. on many occasions the unrest was quelled by the intervention of cossacks and soldiers. the most terrible case of the kind occurred in the goldfields of a company largely supported by foreign capital— the lena company; a dispute as to wages and maintenance was terminated by a fusillade in which 162 workmen were killed. the third duma had been led by the octobrist party in con- junction with the moderate right. this policy had suffered ship- wreck through the absolutist bent of stolypin’s administration and the colourless leadership of kokovtsov. in the last sessions before its dissolution the duma assumed a frankly hostile atti- tude towards the ministry and the leader of the octobrists, a. guchkov, pronounced thundering indictments against the “ irre- sponsible influences ” which shaped the course of politics from behind the scenes: the egregious mismanagement of the artillery department, presided over by the grand duke serge mikhailo- vich, and the scandalous influence of the empress’s protege ras- putin, gave good grounds for these attacks. on the dissolution of the third duma the intricate and restricted franchise pro- vided convenient handles for the gerrymandering of elections, and the government made full use of them in order to secure a government majority in the fourth duma. the fourth duma.—the bureaucracy and the priests mobil- ised by the procurator of the holy synod were so far successful jn this campaign that, thanks to its pressure and to the evident breakdown of the plan of a coalition with the government, the octobrists were defeated in a number of districts and their leader, guchkov, succumbed at the polls. the party grouping may be tabulated as follows: (1) the right, 67; (2) moderate right, 38; (3) nationalists, 55; (4) centre (kru- pensky’s group), 28; (5) octobrists, 87; (6) progressists, 37; (7) constitutional democrats, 60; (8) social democrats, 14; (9) polish circle, 13; (10) mahommedans, 6; (11) no party, 20; (12) group of toil, 7; (13) of unknown party allegiance, 17. the new duma was thus apparently more reactionary than the one which had preceded it. but public discontent and the inability of the government to frame any effective policy of reform produced the unexpected result that a combination was brought about between the groups of the left, the octobrists, and even, in some cases, the right centre. in a general way the duma assumed an attitude of opposition to the government. this line of policy was especially conspicuous in a long series of interpellations and resolutions of want of confidence carried against arbitrary acts of the authorities. when a bill was passed by the duma to establish rules as to the responsibility of civil servants, the council of the empire refused to sanction the most modest requirements in this respect, although even the minister of justice had expressed his agreement. on the other hand, the government did not scruple to prosecute a deputy (kusnetsov) for a speech he had made in the duma, and the administrative department of the council of the empire decided that members of the legislature were liable to prosecution in such cases. all measures of home policy, even the most urgent ones, were regarded from the point of view of political strife. the educa- tion committee of the duma, in conjunction with the zemstvos, 405 had worked out a plan for the provision and equipment of a suff- cient number of elementary schools in order to secure universal instruction throughout the country. it was calculated that some 10,000,000 children had to be accommodated in the schools, in addition to about 5,000,000 who were already enrolled for a course of three years in the schools of the towns and the zemst- vos. in order to achieve the result by 1924, the duma proposed to develop gradually a network of schools by means of appro- priations successively increased by 10,000,000 roubles a year in the course of 10 to 12 years. this scheme could not be carried out in its entirety and in a systematic form, on account of ob- struction from the board of education and from the council of the empire. these reactionary bodies were opposed to any policy which gave precedence to secular schools over church schools, although it could not be contested that the former were much more advanced and perfect in teaching and organisation. the comprehensive law of consolidation was wrecked by the council of the empire; the “ enlightened bureaucrat ’’ count witte did not scruple to oppose the bill in alliance with the stal- warts of reaction, because, as he expressed it himself, it was an attempt to obtain paradise by means of child-murder, the mur- dered child being the clerical school organisation. thwarted in its comprehensive policy, the duma nevertheless proceeded on its course by granting occasional increase of credits for elemen- tary education. these constant conflicts produced a perceptible sliding towards the left in the ranks of the duma legislators. one of the symptoms of this process consisted in the disruption of the octobrist party. it broke up into three small groups— the left, hardly distinguishable from the cadets;! the centre, which professed to devote its activity mainly to strengthening the zemstvos; and the right, which still clung to the idea of a possible alliance with a reformed government. the dismember- ment of the duma into small groups gave influence to the cadet nucleus, which, though it had few members in the duma, was under strong discipline and was backed by a powerful press. in one direction only the majority of the duma was fairly in agreement with the government, namely as regards foreign affairs and imperial interests. in spite of certain minor disagree- ments between the parties of the left and the centre and right, the duma as a whole was decidedly nationalist. the third duma had bequeathed to the fourth a definite line of policy concerning the finland conflict: the legislature backed the government in its endeavours to subordinate the autonomy of the finnish state to the superior claims of the empire. the view that the union between the grand duchy and russia was a real and not a personal one led to the assertion of the supreme jurisdiction of the imperial senate and of the st. petersburg court of appeal over finnish tribunals; to the passing of laws commuting the obligation of personal military service for money payments; and to the demand that russians dwelling in finland as citizens of the grand duchy should be recognised on equal terms with native finns. even the cadets did not contest the general principle from which such demands were derived, al- though they disapproved of the raising of issues which embittered the intercourse between nationalities and led to unpleasant con- sequences in the shape of passive resistance. finnish officials who refused to recognise the legality of the interference of russian institutions in finnish affairs, apart from the traditional channel of the governor-general and senate as representing the authority of the grand duke, were imprisoned or deported. the creation of the new province of chelm (kholm), separated from the provinces of lubin and sedlitz, envenomed another old national conflict—that between russians and poles. the new government was formed out of districts in which the ma- jority of the population was little russian, although this popu- lation had been included for centuries within the boundaries of the polish state and had been recognised as a part of congress poland annexed to russia by the treaty of vienna (1815). the duma passed the law of separation without taking heed of the violent protests of polish public opinion. 1 constitutional democrats. 406 orientation of the third and fourth dumas was put to the test by the growing entanglements of foreign policy. russia had definitely joined the combination of western powers against the predominance of germany, and opinion in the country fully supported this momentous change of front. the annexation of bosnia and hercegovina by austria under the protection of ger- many ‘in shining armour ” was strongly resented, not only by stolypin and isvolsky as the official exponents of imperial policy, but by the nation at large. in 1911, during the agadir affair, russia was found on the side of kaiser william’s opponents. matters became especially serious when the macedonian hostili- ties, which had been smouldering for decades, burst out into flames in 1912. the coalition between bulgarians, serbians and greeks against turkey had been rendered possible and effective by the support on which they reckoned from russia; and o. hartwig, the minister resident at belgrade, was one of the prin- cipal agents in bringing it about. m. sazonov, the successor of m. isvolsky at the foreign office, cautious, but devoted to the great tradition of russia’s protectorate over the balkan chris- tians, was intent on using to the full the favourable situation created by the union between the three balkan states, the sym- pathy of western liberals and the temporary indecision of the central powers. in this he was supported by the tsar nicholas, who, however, made it clear to his agents that russia would not risk an actual war. the crushing defeat inflicted on the turks by the balkan allies seemed to justify completely the combination engineered by hartwig. but the harvesting of the fruits of victory proved a more difficult task than the actual fighting. the central powers had realised the menace of a permanent balkan league to their ascendancy in the near east. austria vetoed any exten- sion of serbia towards the adriatic. with the support of ger- many she succeeded in depriving the serbs and montenegrins of the position they had wonin albania. at the london conference russia did not dare to back the latter’s claims to the finish and the western powers were disinclined to proceed without russia, the eviction of the serbs from the west proved fatal to the peace of europe. they tried to recoup themselves in the east by de- manding districts of western macedonia which had been pre- viously conceded to the bulgarians. m. sazonov tried to stop the growing animosity between the balkan allies by offering the mediation of russia, and nicholas ii. attempted to exert his personal influence on the wily ferdinand of bulgaria as well as on the serbians. these attempts at conciliation proved unavail- ing: the bulgarians broke away first, but were soon checkmated by a coalition between serbia, greece and rumania. the peace of bucharest, which gave the dobrudja to rumania, western macedonia to serbia and important districts of thrace and mac- edonia to greece, shattered all hopes of an effective balkan league, and laid bulgaria open to the insidious intrigues of aus- tria and germany. m.sazonov manifested the chagrin of russia; but his attitude only emphasised her diplomatic defeat. all these events were watched by russian public opinion with keen interest and warm sympathy for the cause of the slavs. it was realised more and more clearly that the struggle did not con- cern merely the small states of the balkans, but also their big neighbours. m. sazonov found unexpected support from m., milyukov, the leader of the cadets. b. maklakov and v. bobrin- sky came forward as the spokesmen of slavonic solidarity. in this way, when the climax in the antagonism between austria and serbia was reached in the assassination of the archduke franz ferdinand, the russian public was prepared to back the government against hostile acts of the central powers. the outrageous treatment of serbia by austria-hungary was rightly interpreted as a provocation to the entente, and especially to russia. the only person of any weight who advised submission at any price was count witte. everybody else, from the em- peror to the most humble citizen, understood that no choice was left but to fight for existence. (for russian diplomatic action in the critical period before the outbreak of war see europr, pt. ii. ‘the outbreak of war.’’) russia the conflict with the central empires.—the nationalistic | the worlpd war a united russia.—in the light of subsequent events the dec- jarations made on the outbreak of the world war assume a particular significance. the representatives of alien nationali- ties expressed emphatically their resolve to stand by russia in the struggle. the russian groups expressed their resolve to spare no effort in the struggle, and to support the government to the utmost in the task of defending the country. only from the little group of social democrats came threatening notes. their spokesman dwelt on the solidarity of the proletariat all the world round, on the common guilt of all the governments in provoking the war, on the resolve of the proletariat to bring about a speedy peace, on the hope that the present terrible catastrophe would result in the abolition of all wars. these discordant notes were lost in the general display of enthusiasm. the tsar’s government was on the crest of a mighty popular wave; it might have steered a course towards victory and na- tional regeneration if it had possessed the moral strength to throw away the tawdry equipment of despotism. events soon proved that it was not only incapable of such an effort, but that its leadership was in itself a hindrance to success at home and in the war. at the start, however, two steps in the right direction were taken by the gov ernment: the abrogation of the state monopoly of the sale of spirits, and the promise of autonomy to the poles. the gordian knot of the temperance problem was cut by impe- rial decree in spite of the difficulties raised by finance experts. the beneficial influence of the measure on the morals and health of the people and of the army cannot be doubted. the appeal to the poles was made in a proclamation of the commander-in-chief, grand duke nicholas. the grant of au- tonomy was held out as a reward for help against the common enemy, the germans. it would have been better if the promise had come directly from the tsar and if instead of vague words something tangible had been conceded at once. as a matter of fact the high bureaucracy began at once to put obstacles in the way of any reform. the damage done by these vacillations was incalculable. instead of enlisting the wholehearted support of polish patriots imperial bureaucracy drove them into a position of distrust and hostility,which became especially keen in view of the tactless and offensive behaviour of russian authorities in galicia, and could not be placated by occasional concessions in details. this episode may serve as an example of the stupid policy followed by the government in regard to all minor na- tionalities of the empire: their enthusiastic rally was discour- aged in every way, and old enmities were revived and increased at the most critical time. the case of the jews was especially flagrant: numbers of them continued to perform their military duties faithfully and zealously, but many others took advantage of opportunities to spy and to betray their persecutors, and the round of executions and pogroms set in again with increasing force. the effects of m ‘conepnnical: i the field the old cancers of corruption and favouritism were again producing disappoint- ment and disaster. the army did not lack excellent leaders— the chicf-of-staff of the southern command, alexeiev, the corps commanders ruzsky, brusilov, radko dmitriev, were generals of the first rank. the officers and the common soldiers fought with the traditional tenacity and valour; no sacrifices were spared and brilliant victories were won. and yet on decisive occasions incredible things happened. samsonov’s army was destroyed, thanks to a slackness in co-operation between commanders. in jan. 1915 an intelligence officer, miassoyedov, actually sold the plans of the northern concentration to the germans, and brought about a crushing defeat of sivers’ army. worst of all it became clear towards the spring of 1915 that the army was insufficiently provided with munitions, aircraft, artillery and other appliances of war. the onslaught of mackensen’s and hindenburg’s ger- mans had to be met by soldicrs many of whom had to man the trenches with sticks, in expectation that the death of comrades might give the chance of picking up rifles; batteries were for- russia bidden to fire more than a couple of times an hour; the armies were surrounded by multitudes of ‘‘ kids ’”’—marauders and deserters. even in these terrible circumstances the russians fought stubbornly, retreated step by step, and eventually, with the help of alexeiev’s strategy, succeeded in arresting the stream of the invasion on the lines of the dvina and the dniester. but the psychological effect of this desperate campaign was a lasting one. the common soldiers had learned that their blood was wasted without stint by a criminally careless and inefficient govern- ment. the way was opened to the insidious propaganda of de- featists and traitors. the revolution of 1917 was prepared on the battlefields of gorlice and krasnostav. 7 the progressive elements of russian society attempted to save the situation by a great effort. the zemstvo and town unions, which had been doing wonders in hospital work and equipment, offered their services for the fabrication of munitions:— towards the end of may 1915, at a congress of representatives of trade and industry, the discussion of technical questions was in- terrupted by an impassioned speech delivered by one of the leading moscow millionaires, v. riabushinsky, just back from the front and full of the impressions of the life and death struggle against the invaders. “ the whole of russia forms the rear of the army,” he said. “‘ we cannot busy ourselves with our everyday affairs at the preseo moment: every workshop, every factory must be used to reak the enemy’s force.’’ it was not a question of forming this or that committee, but of sinking all differences and appealing to the assistance of every able man, without distinction of parties, as people had done in the west, in france and in england. technical committees were created with the participation of leaders of industry, zemstvo workers, representatives of the working class: they displayed fervid energy and achieved good results. but the main condition demanded by riabushinsky and lvov—mutual confidence between the people and the gov- ernment—was conspicuously absent. subordinate officials joined in the efforts of the unions, but the central government continued to flounder in the morass of court intrigues and su- pine reaction. the worthless minister of war, sukhomlinov, was indeed dismissed and put on his trial; the ancient bureaucrat goremykin had to resign the premiership; but the appointment of his successor, stiirmer, provoked a gencral outburst of indig- nation. he was known for his reactionary opinions, and had shown his mettle in helping to coerce the progressive zemstvo of tver. elis great merit was his subserviency and affected devo- tion to the imperial family, especially to the empress alexandra feodorovna. this hysterical lady meddled more and more with affairs of state, particularly after the assumption of the supreme command by the emperor. and behind her stood various favour- ites, chief among whom was the astute peasant, gregory rasputin, whose exploits had made the petrograd court a place of scandal for the whole world. no wonder that the opening of the duma in feb. 1916 gave rise to manifestations very different from those which had occurred in that assembly in july 1914. the ally of stolypin, shidlovsky, speaking on behalf of the bloc of progressive parties, said: ‘‘ the longing of the entire country towards a situ- ation in which the country could entertain confidence in its gov- ernment, and feel in union with it, has been traduced as an in- citement to seize power. . . . the forces of the nation, bereft of unity, aim and guidance, have been spent in vain, and the great national effort has weakened under the dissolving influence of discontent and indifference.”’ | the discord between the government and the duma found expression on many occasions in connection with important ques- tions of internal policy. a strike at the putilov works, suppressed by military force, gave rise to a heated discussion in which the duma, while condemning the strike as “a stab in the back,” expressed the desire that the legal activity of trade unions should be given free scope and that courts of arbitration should be founded for the settlement of trade disputes. perhaps the most significant pronouncement was made in the course of the debates on the budget of the holy synod. the duma voted a resolution to the effect that it considered necessary a reform of the church administration on the principle of the supremacy of councils and of a wide application of local self-government. for this pur- | 407 pose a national council should be convoked without delay. the reform should extend to ecclesiastical courts, especially in the matter of divorce procedure, and to the ecclesiastical schools; the parish should be developed as much as possible; bishops should not be transferred from one see to another, if the consent of the church had not been obtained. the state should cease to look upon the clergy as a political instrument, and all circulars and orders in this sense should be revoked. the government seemed to take delight in ignoring and thwarting all these resolutions. stiirmer was called to one minis- terial post after the other. in feb. he was appointed home secretary in succession to n. khvostov, in july foreign secre- tary in succession to s. sazonov, who was dismissed because he had urged the necessity of settling the polish question in the sense of definite and real autonomy. altogether ministerial portfolios were shuffled like cards at the bidding of the empress. it may be sufficient to notice the advent of m. protopopov, a convert from the ranks of the liberal bloc to the ministry of the interior (sept. 1916). the dismay and indignation of the country found expression in a series of resolutions demanding the appoint- ment of a cabinet supported by the confidence of the people. even conservative institutions like the council of the empire and the association of the united gentry joined in the chorus. the popular leaders ——before proceeding with the narrative of events which led up to the actual revolution, let us consider the various currents of thought and party organisation of the intellectuals who were preparing for the coming conflict. | it is not necessary to dwell at any length on the octobrists and the cadets. the former drew their main strength from the provincial gentry, the latter from the urban middle class and the liberal professions. the octobrists pleaded for gradual develop- ment from local self-government, while the cadets placed their hopes on the introduction of a constitutional democracy in which actual leadership would fall to the representatives of western culture, but in spite of a recognition of the ‘‘ four-tails ’’ formula (t.e., universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage), the cadets had no hold on the mass of the people, ancl relied on the selection of the educated by the uneducated. 7 _ socially and psychologically, the leading groups of the years of upheaval were bound to come from the midst of the extreme revolutionary intellectuals. three leading currents may be dis- tinguished in the history of revolutionary thought in russia: militant idealism born of bitter resentment at the backward state of russia in comparison with the west; the tendency to seek regeneration in a closer contact with the folklore of the common people; the economic materialism proclaimed by marx. the views of the first group were most vividly expressed by writers like p. lavrov and n. mikhailovsky. they laid stress on the propaganda of progressive ideas in order to form the minds of irreconcilable fighters for emancipation in all fields of human activity. lavrov had initiated a philosophical theory (anthro- pologism) somewhat akin to the humanism of the modern prag- matic school; mikhailovsky had preached ‘“‘ subjective ”’ ideals with great effect as a journalist and literary critic. his violent radicalism was directed not only against the ‘‘ powers that be ”’; he repudiated “‘ class struggle ”’ as a “‘ school of bestiality,”’ from which men issued as “ live corpses with faces distorted by rage.” in contrast to these ‘‘ westerners ’’ appeared a group of writers who clung to the conception of a special aptitude of the russian people for social brotherhood and communal economics (zla- tovratsky, korolenko, kacharovsky): their antecedents must be sought in the romantic teaching of the slavophils as well as in emotional motives in sympathy with the toil and struggle of the peasantry. in the case of active revolutionaries like chernov, the radical- ism of the westerners was allicd with the romanticism of the populists, and in various combinations both tendencies helped to shape the views and the policy of the social revolutionary party. in the beginning of the 2oth century one could distin- guish some five groups representative of this party. their prin- cipal organ (the messenger of revolutionary russia) proclaimed the necessity of close alliance between revolutionary intellectuals 408 conspiring proletarians and the struggling peasantry. it laid chief stress on political rights, democratic organisation and the raising of the status and consciousness of the individual. their methods of terrorism and insurrection were themselves the outcome of the heightened sense of personality and of the impor- tance attached to energetic action and self-sacrifice. the ways of the social democrats were different; they adopted marx’s teaching as a gospel and tried to develop and to apply it in every direction. their chief exponent was for a time g. plekhanov, a philosopher and economist who held strictly to the programme laid down by marx, according to which capitalism appears as a necessary stage in the development of production and gives way to collectivism only when the majority of the workers have been turned into wage-earning proletarians. plekhanov and his followers did not consider the russian people ready for class war against the bourgeoisie, and insisted, on the contrary, on combined action with the social groups possessed of better education and greater political experience. the “ re- visionist ’’ movement, initiated in germany by brentano and bernstein, found adepts in russia (struve, prokopovich). the burden of increasing taxation, the disastrous conduct of the japanese war, the reactionary stupidity of the government— all contributed to revive the revolutionary spirit in the ranks of the social democratic party. the history of this revival may be traced from the appearance in dec. 1900 of the iskra (the spark) a newspaper conducted by lenin and martov. lenin’s pamphlets, what is to be done? (1902) and leiter to a comrade (1903), express one of the leading ideas of his later activity. he pleads in them for centralised directions and decentralised responsibility, that is, for an oligarchy of leaders and strict discipline as regards the execution of their decisions by subordi- nate units. democratic watchwords are set aside and efficiency of organisation is demanded at all costs. this led to the disrup- tion of the party. at the london congress of 1903 the fateful division between ‘‘ bolsheviks ” and ‘‘mensheviks ” was inau- gurated, as a consequence of disagreement concerning the prob- lem of leadership and discipline. the bolshevik (“ majority ’’) group carried its proposals by a very narrow majority, and cap- tured the central council of the party, from which they entirely excluded their opponents. the latter, who had a majority on the staff of the zskra, proclaimed a boycott against lenin and his adherents. the insignificance of the immediate cause of the split was only apparent: in truth the division arose from fundamental opposition between the democratic orientation of plekhanov and the oligarchical spirit represented by lenin. questions of principle arose in the course of the japanese war and the first revolution. while plekhanov and the mensheviks were for co-operation with the liberals in the fight for political freedom and for a gradual introduction of social reforms, lenin set his hopes on the hatred of the peasantry for the landlords, and preached a ruthless jacquerie. in his pamphlet, the agrartan programmes of social democracy, he contended that orthodox marxians had failed to grasp the peculiarities of the russian situation inasmuch as they were still talking about a coalition of the bourgeoisie of the towns, while in russia the moving power was to be sought in the rising of the peasant bourgeoisie against the squires. he contrasted the abstract views of the town pro- letariat with the intense revolutionary temper of the peasants who were “‘ ready to fly at the throat of the landlords and to strangle them.” it is hardly needful to point out the close connection between these literary disputes and the zimmerwald agitation! of 1915-6, 1 the zimmerwald manifesto of 1915 is full of momentous declara- tions. the following are some of them:— ‘the war that has produced this chaos is the outcome of im- perialism, of the endeavours of capitalist classes of every nation to satisfy their greed for profit by the exploitation of human labour and the treasures of nature. ... ‘* to raise welfare to a high level was the aim announced at the beginning of the war: misery and privation, unemployment and death, underfecding and disease are the real outcome. for decades and decades to come the cost of the war will devour the strength of the peoples, imperil the achievements of social reform, and hamper every step on the path of progress. intellectual and moral desola- russia as well as with the eventual overthrow of the old regime in 1917. let us note that the congress of the social democratic party in 1917 sided definitely with lenin and the bolsheviks. the revolution.—the situation in the beginning of 1917 was extremely tense and abnormal. the emperor had left the capital and taken up his residence at the army headquarters in order to see as little as possible of the ministries, the duma or the court, and to lead a “simple life’? among the selected retainers of the stavka; the empress continued to look for hypnotising inspiration to monks and priests and interfered constantly in affairs of state in favour of reaction. even the staunchest conservatives, like trepov, found it impossible to re- main in office under such conditions, and the field was left clear for half-insane subjects like protopopov and bigoted courtiers like prince n. galitsin. the army at the front held on sullenly to its positions, but was war-weary and distrustful of its leaders. | | (po n1) bibliography.—documents: russian orange book, negocia- tions ayant precede la guerre 10-23 juillet—2q juillet-6 aott 1914 (st. petersburg, 1914); german trans. ‘‘ das russische orangebuch" (berlin, 1915); how the war began in 1914: the diary of the russian foreign office from 3-20 july (o. s.) 19124, english trans. by w. cyprian bridge (1925); e. laloy, ed., les documents secrets des ar- chives du ministere des hi elrangeres de russie, publies par les bolcheviques (paris, 1919); m. pokrovsky, aus den geheim-archiven der zaren (1912-14) (berlin, 1919); j. von romberg, die falschungen des russischen orangebuches (1915); english trans., the falsifications og the russtan orange book (1923); f. stieve, ed., der diplomatische chriftwechsel iswolskis 1911-1914, 4 vol. published under auspices of german foreign office from secret documents of the russian archives (berlin, 1924-5). memoirs: a. a. isvolsky, the memoirs of alexander peed ed. and trans. c. l. seeger (1920); k. nabokov, the ordeal of a diplo- mai (1921); a. nekludov, diplomatic reminiscences before and during the world war, 1911-1917 (1921); count witte, the memoirs of count witte, trans. and ed. a. yarmolinsky (london and new york, 1921); n. f. grant, ed., the kaiser's letters to the tsar (1921); r. rosen, forty years of diplomacy (london and new york, 1922); sir g. w. buchanan, my mission to russia (1923); g. m. paleo- logue, la russie des tsars pendant la grande guerre (1921); english trans. under title an ambassador's memotrs (1923). accounts: p. vinogradoff, seif-government in russta (1915); g.' alexinsky, la russte et la guerre (1915); id. la russie et l'europe (1917); s. fischel, der panslawismus (vienna, 1918); graf f. von. pourtales, am scheitdewege zwischen krieg und frieden (1919); e. j, dillon, the eclipse of russia (1919); oberstleutnant von eggeling, die russische mobiimachung und der kriegsausbruch (1919); m. boghieevit, causes of the war (1920); h. friedjung, das zettalter des imperalismus, 3 vol. (1919 and 1922); s. a. korff, russia's foreign relations during the last half century (1922); k. kramaf, die rus- sische krise (vienna, 1922); montgelas, leitfaden zur kriegschuld- frage (1923);g. frantz, russlands eintritt in den weltkrieg (1924); f. stieve, isvolsky und der weltkrieg (1924). ill. the revolution and after the history of russia after march 1917 divides into three periods. the first, after the spontaneous collapse of the autoc- racy, is filled by the gradual crystallisation of leadership out of the interplay of many parties opposed to or favouring a social revolution in a country exhausted by war and for the most part inhabited by peasants hungry for land. in the second period the party gaining the leadership has temporarily satisfied the peas- ants and ended the war; is forced by a new civil war, which by the intervention of foreign powers becomes a new national war, to identify itself with economic measures that would have alienated the peasantry if it were not that these still feared that defeat would mean a military restoration of the old landlords. ia the third period, military pressure from without has ended, the peasants demand to be allowed to enjoy the fruits of the land which they are no longer in danger of losing, and the victorious party is trying to guide the economic recovery of the country along lines which, while satisfying the peasantry, shall confirm tion, economic disaster, political reaction—such are the blessings of this horrible struggle of nations. .. . ‘in this intolerable situation we have met together, we representa- tives of socialist parties, of trade unions, or of minorities of them, we germans, french, italians, russians, poles, letts, rumanians, bulgarians, swedes, norwegians, dutch and swiss, we who are standing on the basis, not of national solidarity, with the exploiting class, but of the international solidarity of the workers and the class struggle. . 2.” russia instead of liquidating the social revolution brought about during the preceding periods. tue first peritop, marcu 1917-marcn 1918 the collapse of the tsarist regime.—it would scem that asuc- cessful revolution its impossible so long as the existing regime is not rotten throughout. if a regime, however bad, has faith in itself and is coherent, the inertia of tradition will be enough to keep it in place. by the end of feb. 1917 the imperial regime in russia had lost all the circumstances of stability except a tradi- tion that had at least been shaken by the attempted revolution of 1905, by the loss of the japanese war and by a long series of military failures in the war with germany. the imperial family was divided against itself. the government was divided in its views of the imperial family. the duma was divided in its opinion of the government, and was very far from giving it anything like the whole-hearted support that even a good govern- ment needs in the gloomy moments of unsuccessful war. the authority of the church was shaken by a series of scandals which touched not only the hierarchy but the reigning house. the unsuccessful war had affected everybody in the country, and, whereas most of the leaders of the duma were dissatisfied be- cause the war was not better conducted, the mass of the people were dissatisfied because it had not long ago come to an end. the army had lost faith in its commanders, and its com- manders had lost faith in the government that failed to supply them with adequate munitions. petrograd in revolution.—it is difficult to decide who was responsible for giving that final jolt. there are a good many reasons for thinking that the initiative was taken not by the revolutionaries but by the old regime. for some time before march 1917 there had been talk of a revolt in petrograd that could be suppressed and would make less likely the revolution that everybody expected after the war. the police had been trained in the use of machine-guns, and a number of these weapons had been more or less secretly placed in commanding situations in the city—the tops of houses, and, it was believed, in certain bell-towers that would allow them to rake important streets. further, the authorities had arrested just those repre- sentatives of the workmen who had been most active in pre- venting strikes and in furthering the manufacture of munitions of war. miliukov, the cadet leader, found it necessary to declare that someone, disguised as himself, had been urging the workmen to strike. asa matter of fact, the strike, urged by proclamations of the then extremely weak bolshevik party, did not precede but accompanied and grew with the disorders that had had a very half-hearted beginning in the streets. eyewitnesses agree as to the strangely artificial and aimless character of those disorders, at least in their early stages, and agree also as to the presence of police agents in the crowds that gathered in the nevsky prospekt, urging, for example, these most peaceable crowds to overthrow tramcars. a curiously tactless proclamation of march 9 by the military governor khabalov threw the blame for a shortage of bread on hoarders, and thus led directly to looting. this proc- lamation, issued at the request of protopopov, announced that there was plenty of bread in petrograd, and was exasperating to people who found they could not buy it. there was much that suggested conscious provocation. on the part of the authorities. the revolutionaries were later inclined to imagine that the responsibility was theirs alone, and that the revolution was planned and led. they did not make these claims at the time, and the ease with which the duma assumed at least the semblance of authority suggests that the revolting populace were quite unaware that they had had any leaders at all. some of the leaders of the duma have also been ready to claim respon- sibility, but their claim is even less defensible than that of the revolutionaries. the movements of crowds and individuals were, with the exception of the police, visibly without guidance or conscious objective, and the duma leaders were themselves horrified when they realised that they were face to face, not with a change of government, which they sincerely desired, but with a collapse of the whole regime to which they belonged. 409 a few bakers’ shops were smashed on march 8. a strike movement in protest against the shortage of bread was spreading from factory to factory. on friday, march 9, though there were crowds in the streets, it seemed that the authorities wished rather to keep them together than to disperse them. the closing of the bridges seemed to promise that something was expected to happen, and it is possible that this prolonged expectancy had something to do with the ultimate nervous, sporadic, unorganised disaffection of the troops, which developed only gradually into active mutiny. it was remarkable on march 9 that the cossacks were on good terms with the populace and anxious to keep so. it is said that the first blood shed in the revolution (saturday, march 10) was that of a policeman who was attacked by a cossack for striking an unarmed workman. soldiers of the petrograd garrison, when called out on sunday, declared that they would not fire on their brothers. in order to destroy the moral effect of the obvious friendliness of the soldiery, and to prove to the crowd that the troops were still dependable, the police took 150 overcoats from one of the regiments and did some firing when thus disguised. another account has it that soldiers were dressed in police uni- forms, but for this the motive would seem to be lacking. the incident brought the corps concerned and others into revolt. on sunday, march 11, the 4th company of the pavlovsky regiment broke barracks, and after some wild shooting fired at the mounted police. on monday, march 12, almost every factory in the city was idle. the streets were crowded with people without definite objective, waiting to see what would happen. there was no programme. to an observer it was like watching migratory birds instinctively gathering and suddenly resolving on distant and hazardous flight. here and there, in the streets, in different barracks, in different parts of the town, without communicating, men found themselves “ on the side of the people.”” soldiers meeting each other would call out, “ for the people or against the people? ’’ whole regiments marching in perfect order, when they came face to face with the crowds they were called upon to disperse, would suddenly break up and give their rifles with kisses to anybody in the crowd who seemed to want them. small boys were shooting at pigeons in the street with magazine rifles belonging to the guards. it was as if the will of the old regime were paralysed. nothing was left of it but prisons, barracks, government buildings and police stations. soldiers and populace marched from one barrack to another until all had thrown in their lot with the revolution. the prisons were taken one by one, and the prisoners released regardless as to whether they were criminals or political prisoners. police stations were burned. documents of the law courts flung from the windows made grateful bonfires beside the frozen canal. the capture of the arsenal enabled many to experiment with fireatms that they had never handled before. individual police- men, possibly ignorant of what had happened, kept up desultory fire from machine-guns in isolated posts until they were over- whelmed. some of the members of the government went into hiding. others took refuge in the admiralty, where they were besieged for a night, while to the accompaniment of joy-fring without they composed a proclamation ordering the people not to remain in the streets after eight in the evening. the duma and the sovict—the old regime had lost its will, but the revolution was as yet without a mind of its own and uncertain as to what to do withits victory. it had yet to become articulate. in the taurida palace, the seat of the duma, were two groups ready to speak for it, one to persuade it that it had but taken the first step, the other to tell it that its work was done.! the 1 on march 12 the council of elders of the duma chose a temporary committee of members of the duma: rodztanko, shulgin, v. lvov, dmitrukov, shidlovsky, karaulov, konovalov, kerensky, rzhevsky, miliukov, engelhardt, nekrasov and tchkheidze. on the same date was formed the temporary committee of the soviet of workers’ deputies: gvozdev, bogdanov, kapelinsky, grinevich, tchkheidze, skobelev, frankorussky and others. tchkheidze was in both groups. on the evening of this day was the first meeting of the petrograd soviet. the new government formally took over office on march 14, with prince lvov as prime minister. 410 abortive revolution of r905 was in the minds of both. the first of these groups was made up of labour members who, with co- opted friends (a likely man had but to put his head into the room to be co-opted by acclamation), formed a “ temporary com- mittee ’’ of an as yet non-existent soviet (council) of workers’ deputies. these men remembered the part played by the sim- ilar soviet in 1905, and were persuaded that it would be the chief instrument of revolution in 1917. they called upon the revolting regiments to send one representative from cach company and the factories to send one for every 1,000 workmen to the first meeting of the petrograd soviet, which was to be held at once. the second was a much larger group of members of the duma, who remembered with the utmost misgiving the soviet of 1905, and were anxious at all costs to arrest the movement in petrograd and to save what they could of the old regime. they had the advan- tage of being in touch with existing government apparatus, but the disadvantage of being compelled to insincerity in public utterance. in the face of the troops and the populace of petro- grad they had to welcome the revolution which in reality filled them with misgiving and disgust. the essential difference be- tween the two groups in their attitude towards what was happen- ing is best illustrated by their first instinctive actions. the duma group looked in all directions for armed force that would act without “ reasoning why.” the soviet group sought to make the revolution articulate. the duma group asked the tsar to abdi- cate in order to save the country from revolution. the soviet group, exulting in revolution, appealed directly to it to defend itself against the tsar or anyone else. what was an undesirable storm for the one was a fair wind for the other. troops with and without their officers came to the taurida palace, and at the same time declared their readiness to support the duma and choose delegates to the soviet. in the prevailing chaos, duma and soviet were alike crystallising points. neither at the moment had any strength, but they seemed to have direc- tion, and, in the general breakup of the organised will of the old regime, for a thing to seem to have direction was enough to make it a straw for drowning men. the duma rapidly gathered the emblems of power, while the soviet, by identifying itself with the masses of the factory workers and with the garrison by means of its invited delegates, was gathering the reality. this became perfectly clear in the course of the struggle round the throne. while the duma was able to collect promises of support from the heads of the armies, the soviet was able to prevent rodzianko (president of the duma) from going to discuss matters with the tsar. rodzianko had done his best to persuade the tsar to take some action that might at least temporarily have appeased the discontent of which everyone was conscious before the revolution broke out. a bdication of the tsar.—it was now too late to hope to do more than satisfy the revolution with a change of person. the*tsar was to abdicate in favour of his infant son, nominating the grand duke michael as regent. guchkov and shulgin (both confirmed monarchists) were sent on march 14 to the tsar to obtain his abdication. the tsar abdicated (march 15) both for himself and for his son in favour of the grand duke michael, but by the time guchkov and shulgin returned to petrograd the revolution had so far crystallised round the soviet that it was clear that this arrangement for the preservation of the dynasty would not be accepted without a struggle. miliukov, the leader of the party of constitutional democrats (cadets), who con- sistently underestimated the forces that had been unchained, and was perhaps inclined to estimate his influence on the people by the devotion given to him in his own party, by announcing that the duma committee had decided to leave the dynasty on the throne, had lifted the veil that had covered the real feelings of the duma committee, and so had enormously strengthened the soviet. | already the fear of that organisation had induced the duma committee in forming a government (march 14), to include representatives from the left. kerensky, a lawyer and member of the so-called group of labour, had dramatically obtained permission from that other room in the taurida palace before russia taking a part in the government, where he carried particular weight (together with opprobrium) because of his connection with this outside force of which the other members of the duma committee were instinctively and rightly afraid. his attitude to the revolution was not that of his new col- leagues. he could speak with an enthusiasm which they could not counterfeit. he was not hampered, at first at any rate, by a profound dislike of the events that brought him to power. after the return of shulgin and guchkov (who themselves realised that the situation had changed considerably during their short absence from the city) the duma committee laid the tsar’s abdication and the throne before grand duke michael on march 16, and he, perhaps feeling that he was being offered what at that moment no one had the power to take, refused the throne, and was solemnly congratulated by kerensky on his refusal. pushed by events that they were quite unable to control, the duma com- mittee assumed with as good a grace as possible the nominal government of the empire, the soviet contenting itself with insisting that the proclamation of the new government should contain a clause promising that the nation should be allowed to decide the future of the country in a constituent assembly. the provisional government.—in a few days the whole of russia had jearnt that the autocracy was no more, that a new government under prince lvov, with guchkov as minister for war, miliukov as minister for foreign affairs and kerensky as minister of justice was in place not in power, and that there was once again a soviet in petrograd inviting the formation of similar soviets throughout the country. the provisional government, described by miliukov as having been ‘‘ elected by the revolution,” rapidly obtained a fair meas- ure of apparent stability. it was formally recognised (march 22) by the allied governments. the whole civil service transferred to it their former loyalty to the autocracy. its weakness was that it was content with these things, was deceived by the prestige which it enjoyed among a limited class and by its possession of the old administrative machine, and neither, had nor sought to obtain that right to speak and act for the revolutionary masses which was given to the soviets by their direct connection with factories and troops. the only government decrees that had any certainty of fulfilment were those that the sovicts would have been ready to countersign. as the soviet was for a long time unwilling to take supreme control, the result was not ‘ dual power,” but actual though not formal responsibility of the government to a soviet of the very existence of which most of the ministers heartily disapproved. in time of peace the natural slackening of political tension in the masses might have brought about a decadence of the soviets and an eventual concentration of real authority in the hands of the government. but russia was at war, and the con- tinuance of the war made any slackening of political tension impossible. if the war lasted long enough it was clear that the soviets would have to take authority openly into their hands, or submit to being crushed by military forces which would then replace them as keepers of the government’s conscience. it was consequently natural that the first bone of contention between soviet and temporary government should be the control of the army. rodzianko, and after him the temporary government, sought to control the army through its leaders, and hurried to obtain expressions of their allegiance. the soviet could not hope for support from the officers, and therefore sought to make them powerless while assuring itself of the support of the men. remembering 1905, they knew that their existence depended on the inability of their enemies to bring an organised force against them. not pro-germanism, but the events of 1905, dictated the famous prikaz (order) no. 1, (issued on march 18) which hurried towards its end that process of disintegration in the army which had been begun by inefficient government, olhcers who had made themselves hated, over-mobilisation and a long succession of military fatlures.t 1 prikaz no. i was composed by a commission of the petrograd soviet headed by n. d. sokolov. in the name of the ‘ soviet of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies,” it ordered that committees of russia it was proved once again that in the minds of its participants a civil war, and especially a struggle between classes, outweighs any national struggle whatsoever. in the months that followed, the parties of the right were as ready to weaken the front by bringing disciplined troops to suppress revolution in the rear as were the parties of the left to weaken the front by destroying the discipline of the troops. both sides were conscious of enemies nearer and more dangerous than the germans. party demarcations— roughly speaking, there were but two sides to the struggle. there were, however, many parties engaged. scattered remnants of the parties on the right in the old duma had clung to the revolution in time to save themselves from being buried in the collapse of the old regime. on this side the only well-organised party was that of the cadets (constitu- tional democrats), who renamed themselves the party of popular freedom, and, after failing to preserve the dynasty, were now trying to arrest the revolution before it should overwhelm the landlords and the factory owners. the cadets were in open hos- tility to the soviets. then came parties with a foot in both camps, supporting the temporary government but unwilling to see the soviets suppressed, since they were conscious that the parties on their right would not stand on ceremony with them if the soviets were only out of the way. of these the most impor- tant parties were the social revolutionaries and the mensheviks as they were called. 7 the social revolutionaries believed that social revolution was impossible, but desired an agrarian revolution to the advantage of the peasants who were their chicf support. the mensheviks and the bolsheviks were the two sections of the old social democratic party, which was based on the factory workers of the towns. they were temperamentally divided, the former inclining always towards coalition with the bourgeois parties and doubting the possibility of social revolution in a country in which capital- ism was as little advanced as it was in russia, the latter opposed to any coalition with the bourgeois parties now that their com- mon enemy (the autocracy) was no more, and believing that the world war had so shaken the economic system of europe that a social revolution was possible everywhere and most possible in russia. skirmishing between and around these parties were many small sections of social democrats, maximalist-inter- nationalists, groups identified with particular newspapers and loosely organised parties of anarchists. social revolutionaries and mensheviks had taken a line during the war which, in spite of the arrests immediately before the revolution, had made them much less subject to persecution than the bolsheviks, who, in feb. r917 were in a state of almost com- plete disorganisation. nearly all the bolshevik leaders were in prison, in exile or abroad, harried both in allied countries and in those of the central empires because of their doctrine that the war was exclusively to the advantage of the bourgeois classes, that it was a capitalist quarrel and that the working classes should bring it to an end by refusing to fight each other and by turning in each country against their rulers. no fighting country could tolerate such propaganda, and a series of deporta- tions had left the bolshevik leaders for the most part in switzer- land, sweden and america. it was not surprising that swiss socialists were easily able to get leave for lenin to cross germany with this theoretical baggage. trotsky (with almost identical views, though not then a bolshevik) was arrested on allied soil, but allowed to proceed on the intercession of miliukov, an inter- cession which proved sufficiently that real power in petrograd was in the hands of the soviet. soldiers were to be formed in all military and naval units, and to send one representative each to the taurida palace next morning. in their political actions units were to be subject to their committees and to the soviet. orders of the military commission of the duma were to be obeyed only when they did not contradict those of the soviet. arms were to be under the control of the committees and on no account to be given up if demanded by the officers. strict discipline was to be preserved when on duty. salutes, etc., when off duty were abolished. special titles used in addressing officers, ‘‘ your excellency ’ and references to the officer’s noble birth, were abol- ished. officers were forbidden to use the second person singular in addressing soldiers. 4il the return of lenin.—lenin arrived in russia on april 16 after crossing germany in a sealed railway car, and then passing through sweden and finland. he made his first speech at the railway station, where he was met with mixed misgiving and enthusiasm by his old revolutionary associates. he found only a handful of his party in the soviet. from the moment of his arrival the bolsheviks had a definite policy. they set themselves to bring into the open the profound mistrust of the masses that actuated the temporary government. they urged that the soviets should take power (in spite of the fact that they were themselves in a minority) believing that the other parties in the soviets would lose the confidence of the masses by showing that they had no confidence in themselves. they urged the immediate ending of the war. they were at first comparatively few, but they had none of their opponents’ psychological handicap of doubt. revolution had always been to them of greater impor- tance than any war waged by non-revolutionary governments. it was not surprising that they made converts rapidly. the peasants, soldiers and workers had never considered the matter before. russia was not a homogeneous country. even invasion left huge areas of it quite indifferent except to mobilisations and economic troubles, for which they did not blame the invaders. peasants and workers alike were heartily sick of the war, and were besides inflamed by the miracle of the old regime’s collapse. everything seemed possible. the world had been turned upside down, and they had other things to think of than a war in which they had never had any personal interest. throughout the country the peasants began to settle the land question in their own way by taking the land of the squires. the peasant soldiers wanted to get home anyhow, and began to be afraid of missing their fair share of the land if they remained too long away. none of them wanted to die just as a new world was opening before them. they wanted peace, at once, so that they could settle things to their own advantage in that new world. the masses were, as lenin rightly perceived, far more “left” than their representatives in the soviets. continuance of w'ar.—the temporary govt. were quite unable to disguise their disagreement with them. the soviet, however, acted as a buffer between government and masses, and, while not going so far as to demand an immediate end of the war, sought to remove all obstacles to the conclusion of peace by renouncing all claims to territorial or monetary gains. if russia was not to make peace without getting constantinople, the end of the war was not in sight. if she were ready to make a peace based on ethnographical frontiers, she at least would not be to blame for the continuance of war. on april 9 the temporary govt. issued a declaration agreeing verbally to these principles, but on may 3 was published the note with which miliukov had accompanied that declaration in sending it to russian representatives abroad for transmission to the govern- ments to which they were accredited. this accompanying note (said to have been unanimously approved by the temporary govt.) informed the allies that in spite of their disturbing views russia’s position with regard to the war was unchanged. the soviet was indignant. there were angry demonstrations, and miliukov’s resignation (may 15) came too late to undo the work his note had done in helping the bolsheviks by creating distrust of the government. | the government tried to borrow authority from the soviet by borrowing names from it. in the reconstructed government prince lvov now (may 18) had kerensky as minister for war, in place of guchkov, who had resigned in despair (may 12); chernov (social revolutionary) as minister of agriculture; and skobelev (menshevik) as minister of labour. tereshtchenko, a clever young sugar magnate, replaced miliukov at the foreign office. the temporary govt. thus included landowners and men who had spent their lives in preaching that the land belonged to the peasants, manufacturers and men who believed in the socialisation of industry. it was damaged alike by the support and by the criticism of the cadets, and by the support and by the criticism of the socialist parties. a political joseph’s coat of many colours draped a weakness that was betrayed at the ai2 slightest tension in one direction or the other. meanwhile, without the responsibility, the soviets were consolidating their position, though becoming increasingly conscious that the masses, interested mainly in land and peace, were steadily transferring their allegiance from the more moderate parties to the bolsheviks. meanwhile the war continued, though in the russian trenches the din of continual dispute had replaced the silent discontent of the year before. officers’ messes, soldiers’ committees and the soldiers were on the front what government, soviet and masses were in the capital. without the sanction of the committees the orders of the officers were not obeyed. the committees were markedly more inclined to support the officers than were the men whom the committees represented. just as in the rear they could point to the support of the government by the mensheviks and social revolutionaries, so at the front the bolsheviks could undermine the soldiers’ committees by pointing out how they supported the officers. the officers, however, lumped in common detestation the committees with the bolsheviks who were under- mining them, just as in the rear the parties on the right helped the bolsheviks by attacking the soviets, in which as yet the bolsheviks were in a minority. things were moving in a definite direction. their speed was increased by the decision that the russian army was once more to take the initiative on the front. after an extraordinary oratorical campaign by kerensky in june the russians made a spectacular advance! in the southwest, naturally sacrificing in doing so a large proportion of that leaven of officers and men who were still prepared to fight. the political meaning of the advance was illustrated in petrograd by the demonstrations by well- dressed people which accompanied the first news of the victories. but the victories were followed by a series of defeats and a dis- orderly rout, during which hundreds (some say thousands) of fleeing russians were shot down by other russian troops. the morale of the army was finally broken. the struggle in galicia was reflected in an intensification of political feeling in the capital, where, though one side shouted “ war” and the other shouted “ peace,’’ both were less interested in war and peace than in the struggle for power in which all parties were engaged. in these critical days the cadets announced (july 16) their withdrawal from the temporary govt. (disapproving of its policy in the ukraine), thus weakening it by an attack from the right at the very moment when it had to fear an attack from the left. it was in these days that a large part of the petrograd garrison, together with many of the factory workers, paralysed the town on july 16 by demonstrations the object of which was to persuade the soviet leaders to assume the government of the country. the executive committce.—the most important feature of the soviets in the early period of the revolution was that they were in & continuous state of general election. agitation was going on all the time by all parties, and successful agitation ended in the recall of the delegate of one political denomination and his re- placement by a delegate of another. opinions changed from day to day, and many people, not merely those without political experience, slipped rapidly through a whole gamut of political allegiances. the result of this was that the soviets retlected very well the changing political complexion of their constituencies. in the middle of june was held in petrograd the first all-russia congress of soviets, to which delegates came from soviets all over the country. it was mainly menshevik and social revolu- tionary. while in favour of all possible steps towards a general peace, it supported kerensky on the question of national defence. this congress elected an executive committee, which was to act for the congress after its dispersal until the next all-russian congress should meet. this executive committee was thus the chief organ of the soviets, and not subject to any change of political complexion until the meeting of the next congress, whereas the masses for whom it was to speak were changing with extraordinary rapidity. kerensky’s advance on the front, which seemed to the masses to mean the abandonment of any hope of peace, brought the executive committee within a few battles of brzezany (july 1-6) and zborow (july 19-26). russia days face to face with the fact that it would presently be left high and dry by the movement it sought to control and represent. on july 16 and 17 regiments of the garrison, a large body of the kronstadt sailors and bodies of the factory workers made an extraordinary demonstration. for a number of hours the town was entirely in their hands. the government was powerless. yet nothing happened. the demonstrators marched to the headquarters of the executive committee and called upon them to take power. the executive committee replied that they did not wish to do so. the demonstrators, puzzled and disheartened, melted slowly away. finally the authorities gathered courage and hastened their departure. the effect of these events was to confirm the executive committce in its support, such as it was, of the government, but to frighten the government into measures which lost them that support until a new move from the left drove committee and government together again. from this moment, kerensky (on whom more and more fell the whole responsibility of governing), together with the executive committee, was tossed now to the left now to the right by the forces on either side, until by a process of attrition he was left without support and rights and lefts faced each other openly in civil war. the first result, of the fright of july 17 was a desperate effort to make an end of the bolshevik agitation. comparatively un- infected troops were brought in from the front. the offices of the bolshevik newspaper pravda were sacked on july 18. the headquarters of the bolsheviks were seized. trotsky and many bolsheviks were arrested; lenin and zinoviev only escaped arrest by hiding in disguise. kerensky, appointed prime minister on july 21, formed a third temporary government. this gov- ernment too felt the sand slipping from under it, and endeavoured to secure for itself at least a semblance of popular support by summoning a state conference in moscow in the hope that the atmosphere of moscow would be less electrical than that of petrograd. the conference met towards the end of aug. and was a spectacular affair, but illustrated chiefly the increasing loneliness of kerensky. on the one hand general after general expressed his views on the disorganisation of the army and the need for a strong government, and on the other the illusion offpop- ular support was destroyed by a strike of the moscow workmen. on sept. 3 riga was abandoned to the germans. five days later general kornilov advanced on petrograd with the object of establishing a military dictatorship. it is said that this ad- venture began as the result of a misunderstanding (see kornilov). however that may be, it was warmly approved by some of the representatives of the allies in the capital, and led to a strength- ening in the first place of the executive committee and the soviets (to whom kerensky had to turn for support against kornilov), and in the second place of the bolsheviks who had their thesis on the imminent danger of counter-revolution thus illustrated on a big scale. the cadet ministers resigned, and did not attend their ministries. the executive committee suc- ceeded in stopping the kornilov troops by talking to them, and instead of hanging agitators from lamp posts, as had been ex- pected, their representatives came into the town in a motor-lorry to explain that they had been misled. the directorate——the temporary govt. resolved itself into a directorate of five with kerensky at the head of it, and, without waiting for the constituent assembly, declared russia a republic (sept. 15). the growth of bolshevik influence throughout russia was shown by the passing of bolshevik resolutions in both the petrograd and moscow soviets (sept. 13 and 15). these were signs more threatening both to kerensky and to the executive committee elected in june than the abortive demon- strations of july. it was not surprising that when kerensky made yet another attempt to secure for his government founda- tions in popular support, he found the executive committee of the all-russian congress of soviets willing to help him by joining in a conference the obvious purpose of which was to lessen the significance of the soviets themselves. this was the democratic conference of sept. 27, at which were present not only the executive committee, but representa- russia tives of the trades unions, co-operatives, town and rural councils, etc. with great difficulty a resolution in favour of a coalition (i.e., not exclusively socialist) government was passed. it was accompanied by a resolution refusing coalition with the cadets. the two resolutions cancelled each other. out of this conference, with the addition of other elements, grew the council of the republic (nicknamed the predparliament—preliminary parlia- ment)—-which was to be the supreme governing organ until the meeting of the constituent assembly. it too was without roots and without influence. yet another government was formed under kerensky’s premiership, including several cadets. the predparliament met on oct. 20. it was never dissolved but simply faded away. things were moving too fast for anybody to pay much attention to a wholly artificial body. both the petrograd and moscow soviets had elected their local executive committees with bolshevik majorities. it was clear to every body that when the second all-russia congress of sovicts met it would be likely to elect an exccutive committee that would no longer oppose the bolshevik desire that the soviets should take both formal and actual authority into their hands. the november revolution.—lenin from his hiding place had been pressing for some time for an immediate seizure of power. at last he was able to get the bolshevik central committee to agree with him. on oct. 29 this committee, together with delegations from the factory committees, the trade unions, the railway workers, etc., agreed upon immediate action. the petrograd soviet had formed a military revolutionary com- mittee, which, since its first object had been to prevent troops being moved from petrograd to the front to be replaced by others on which the government could rely, had no difficulty in assuring itself of the allegiance of the garrison. the government showed their lack of confidence by finding it necessary to issue orders to the troops to take instructions only from the district staff. as the second all-russia congress of soviets was to meet on nov. 8 everyone in the town knew when to expect the revolt. kerensky in the predparliament demanded extraordinary authority for its suppression. the predparliament desperately resolved to ask the allies to open peace negotiations and to hand over the land to the peasants without delay. it was too late. the trial of strength came at once. the government ordered the suppression of two bolshevik newspapers. the military revolutionary committee replied by ordering the government troops to protect the bolshevik newspapers. the papers came out as usual. the revolutionary committee made its final arrangements openly over the telephone, and on nov. 7 detachments of troops and workmen took possession of the government buildings. on that day lenin, who had left finland some days before and was living in hiding, came to the smolny institute. the second congress of soviets met in petrograd (nov. 7) with a big bol- shevik majority; the old executive committee was replaced by a new one largely bolshevik; most of the representatives of the other parties walked out; the government was declared over- thrown, and a council of people’s commissars was elected by acclamation (nov. 8). lenin presided over the council, which was at first exclusively bolshevik, but presently included some left social revolutionaries, representing that wing of the social revolutionary party which approved of the assumption of authority by the soviets. some members of the kerensky govt. were besieged in the winter palace and captured there. kerensky himself escaped almost alone to meet the troops he had ordered up for the suppression of the revolt. he joined general krasnov at gatchina on nov. 8 or 9g. for a few days it seemed possible that general krasnov’s force of 1,500 cossacks would succeed in conquering the utterly un- disciplined forces of the revolution, which consisted of soldiers who did not want to fight and workmen who wanted to fight but did not know how. with the help of sailors from kronstadt and helsingfors the cossacks were, however, defeated. krasnov was taken prisoner on nov. 14, and released on parole, an act of generosity which the bolshevik leaders subsequently had cause to regret. there was little serious. fighting. it was a struggle 413 between two weak forces, of which one, krasnov’s, had discipline but no convictions and the other convictions but no discipline. the latter were able to make a slightly better show in numbers. victory in a skirmish at pulkovo decided the event. kerensky had fled in disguise before the defeat of krasnov. the cadet and the menshevik parties supported several abortive attempts at a rising in the town of which the most important was a revolt of the cadets of the mikhail or other military schools. in mos- cow there was nearly a week of street fighting before the soviets were in undisputed possession. elsewhere the new turn in events was rapidly reflected through- out the country, except in the cossack districts, where genera] kaledin had been able to organise resistance, and in the ukraine, where the expression of separatist tendencies had produced a rather more strongly supported government than there had been in petrograd. it was not until feb. that the whole of the ukraine was in the hands of the soviets. the events in petrograd spread like a spark in a fuze along the siberian railway, though officers of the old army seized power in the far east. in various parts there were encounters between forces supporting the soviets and small bodies migrating from the front towards the cossack country, which became the natural focus of the counter-revolu- lionary officers. but these forces were as much opposed to kerensky as they were to the soviets, and within a few days there was no town in russia that still recognised the temporary govt., though, so huge is the area of russia, so limited the means of communication, that years after it was still possible to find in remote districts people who had hardly realised that anything in particular had happened since 1914. the bolshevik government—the council of people’s com- missars set up by the congress of soviets was now the only government in russia, but did not, like the temporary govt. at the beginning of the revolution, find itself in possession of an almost undamaged administrative machine. its opponents, re- gardless of the fact that russia was still at war, seemed deter- mined to justify the bolshevik claim that the new government and the old represented hostile classes—whose hostility was more pronounced than any that could exist between warring countries. the whole of the civil service went on strike with the exception of about a dozen young women. in many cases the civil servants deprived the new government not only of their services but also of the petty cash of the ministries to which they belonged. a new civil service had to be built up in a hurry out of nothing, and in the beginning the whole of it was housed in the smolny institute, formerly an educational establishment for the daughters of the aristocracy and latterly the headquarters of the petrograd soviet. in one room was the president, in another the home office, in a third trotsky was conducting foreign affairs, in a fourth a few youthful doctrinaires were covering reams of paper with sketches of what they thought should be state finance, in a fifth was the war office and the general staff, wrestling wildly with the defence of the capital and very resent- ful of the president, who insisted on bringing a kitchen table into this room and taking an active part in the military de- liberations. in a big room in the building meetings were in con- tinual progress, and one after another the members of the government would gallop down the long corridors to address excited crowds and then hurry back to go on with their work. many of them slept in these improvised offices, and, having at first no time for proper meals, lived on enthusiasm, sandwiches and weak tea. | with none of the emblems of authority, but with the con- fidence given by victory in petrograd and by the bolshevik majority in the congress, which promised victory in the pro- vinces, lenin began at once to speak in the tone of an established government. ‘“ we are strong,” he said, “ when we express that of which the masses are conscious.” he was not handicapped as kerensky had been by pressure from both sides. he did not claim to be representing all classes, but saw his government as an instrument of revolution, with the immediate task before it of strengthening itself by trying to carry out the desires of those classes which had put it in power and by destroying the means 414 of resistance of those classes which would otherwise destroy it. hostility between classes was to him a strength, not a weakness, and if the bourgeoisie had not helped him by so clearly showing their hostility he would have had to provoke them into doing so. the sovict govt. proceeded at once (nov. 8) to declare that all land belonged to the people, to to be used without payment; this decree legalised the agrarian expropriation begun early in the summer, which was the chief thing that the peasants thought to gain by the revolution. the soviet govt. decreed an eight- hour working-day (nov. 11); it abolished titles other than that of “ citizen ’’ (nov. 23); the workers were to control the factories (nov. 29), placing them under the general guidance of a council of public economy (dec. 18); it made labour a condition of political rights; it decreed a general arming of the “ working ” and a disarming of the “ possessing ” classes; it annulled all secret treaties; it disclaimed responsibility for loans made to previous governments; it nationalised the banks (dec. 30); declared the independence of finland (jan. 4 1918); it introduced the western european calendar (feb. 14); it separated church from state and school from church (feb. 5 1918); and while setting up a federation of soviet republics in the place of the old russian empire, left the question of entry into that federation to the soviets of the nations and districts concerned. this was a beginning sufficient to secure the hostility of all foreign governments and of all but the working classes in russia, and the instinctive support of most socialists everywhere. the bolsheviks, now in almost absolute control of a government, had spent 20 years in ceaseless debate as to what a revolutionary government should do, and they set about putting their decisions into practice as fast as they could write the necessary decrees — 193 decrees were issued between nov. 8 and dec. 31 1917. when, as in the case of the land, they issued a decree that did not represent their own views, they issued one that satisfied the peasant and ensured unwillingness on his part to help in any attempt to replace them by another government that might issue a decree of a less desirable character. attitude towards the war—the downfall of the kerensky govt. and the accession of a government supported exclusively by the working classes naturally brought about a radical change in the attitude of the bolsheviks towards the war. they had from the beginning seen the war as a struggle between capitalist groups, and had declared that revolutionaries in each of the countries engaged should desire the defeat of that country on the ground that the defeat of one capitalist group by another would weaken it not only among its peers but also in the face of revolution from below. they had assumed that german socialists would desire the defeat of the kaiser, that french socialists would desire the defeat of the french republic. for themselves they did indeed desire the defeat of the tsar. the year 1870 had given france the experience of the commune which for 70 days had ruled paris. the defeats of the japanese war had resulted in the events of 1905 and the first serious attack on the autocracy. during the war defeatism in russia had spread far beyond the bolsheviks, when the most loyal of liberal monarchists could not help observing that defeats on the front meant that the voice of the duma counted a little in the palace, whereas success meant an immediate hardening of the autocracy. the downfall of the autocracy was for the bolsheviks only a preliminary to the social revolution. their defeatism continued until the downfall of the temporary government. that down- fall meant for them that power had shifted from the autocracy to the bourgeoisie and now to the working class. further defeatism would now be possible only to the enemies of the working class, who would reason that defeat would now be to their advantage. from the moment that the bolsheviks took power the defeat of russia ceased to be desirable by them, whereas the german empire became the most dangerous enemy of the revolution, because it was the nearest and most powerful non-revolutionary state. on the other hand, a victory of russia in concert with the allies was equally undesirable, because it would discredit the revolution in the eyes of the german working class. the russia only possible course for the revolution was to retire from the struggle if it could, and to use the steps it could take towards peace as a means of rousing the working class of other countries to impatience of the continuance of the war. to understand what followed it is essential to remember that there was for the bolsheviks no difference in kind or quality between the govern- ments of ihe allies and those of the central empires. all were equally rapacious. some of the bolsheviks even thought it possible that in the presence of social revolution in russia the two camps would hurriedly compose their differences and crush the revolution before it had time to entrench itself. at the moment of taking power, the revolution was powerful against its enemies inside russia, for these were divided and impotent. but the shaking to pieces of first the autocracy and then the classes that succeeded the autocracy had been accom- panied by the complete ruin of the army. after the first month of 1917 desertion had been a rapidly growing tide. the vague idea of land distribution crystallised an already existing weariness of war into a blind determination to leave the front. even before the nov. revolution kerensky’s war minister had told him that the only thing to be done with the old army was to disband it and start afresh to build a new one. the nov. revolution found the army all but disbanded, in spite of kerensky’s efforts to keep it together. the trains were crowded with soldiers, many of whom took their weapons with them. most of the men were straggling back to their villages if they knew how to get there. others simply travelled, boarding any train if it had room on its buffers or on the roof of its coaches, and changing from one train to another without care for its ultimate destination. sta- tions were camps of migrating scldiers. officers were going southwest to the cossack country to raise forces against the revolution. the germans could easily have walked into petro- grad, and been welcomed as they were welcomed in kiev by everybody who preferred being ruled by a boergnee to being ruined by a revolutionary. : peace with germany.—the bolsheviks seisidmeiy proceeded at once to keep their promise to take immediate steps to bring the war to an end. trotsky as commissar for foreign affairs sent out (nov. 9) alike to the allies and to germany an invita- tion over the wireless to conclude an immediate armistice. ger- many agreed. the allies did not reply except by remonstrances, presented through their military representatives to general dukhonin, against a separate peace. an appeal was sent (nov. 28) by wireless to the peoples of the allied countries urging them to compel their governments to bring the war to an end. the russian commander-in-chief, dukhonin, while himself agreeing that an immediate peace was necessary for russia, refused for technical reasons to take steps for concluding an armistice along the front. he was dismissed, arrested and lynched while under arrest. krylenko, a rather elderly sub-leutenant, was made commander in chief. an informal armistice began at once, a formal one being concluded a few days later (dec. 5) for the whole front, from the baltic to the black sea. the germans w ere ready to accept in principle the russian for- mula of a peace “‘ without annexations or contributions on the basis of the self-determination of peoples,” but soon showed that they, like the allies, had altogether underestimated the bolsheviks’ sincerity. they believed that the bolsheviks would be ready to hide under that formula the sort of peace that was desirable by the german general staff. in this they were wreng.! the bolsheviks promptly announced (jan. 27) both to russia and to the world that the peace the germans were offering was the sort of peace offered by a wolf to a sheep, too big to be eaten all at once. they hoped that the german working classes would be roused to action on finding that the greed of their rulers prevented the signature of peace. the bourgeois government of the ukraine signed a separate peace (feb. g) after it had been driven over the ukrainian frontier, and invited the germans to enter the ukraine to replace it in power (see brest-litovsk). the bol- sheviks declared (feb. 10) that they would no longer fight but 1 an account of the negotiations in brest-litovsk which opened on dec. 21 will be found under that heading. russia would not sign the peace. the germans advanced and could, no | doubt, have come to petrograd and put a russian bourgeois government in power to make peace with them. after a fierce struggle in the central committee of the communist party, lenin persuaded the bolsheviks that the best thing they could do was to sign peace at once if the germans would let them. this was done. the peace signed (march 3) was worse than that originally offered, and, thanks to the action of the ukrainian rada, worse even than it seemed on paper. the germans occupied the ukraine, and russia lost the baltic prov- inces. petrograd was left subject to attack from the finnish border, only a few miles away, and from the estonian border, less than a day’s journey. the government moved to moscow! {march 9) where on march 15 assembled the fourth congress of soviets, which ratified the peace. the left social revolutionaries resigned from the government, which was henceforth exclusively bolshevik. the constituent assembly.—by adopting as soon as they came to power the social revolutionary land programme, the bol- sheviks had assured themselves of the passive support of the peasants and, in the first moments of the revolution, of part of the social revolutionary party. the signing of the brest peace, against the will even of those social revolutionaries who sup- ported the bolsheviks, but to the profound satisfaction of the peasants and the soldiers of the old army, destroyed the hold of the social revolutionaries on the peasants. these two actions prevented the dissolution of the constituent assembly from having immediate political consequences in russia. ‘the idea of a constituent assembly played a part in the russian revolu- tion profitable at different times to different parties. in march 1917 the promise of a constituent assembly made possible that agreement between the soviets and the temporary govt. on which the very existence of that government depended. as it was clear that immediate elections to the assembly would have given an immense majority in the assembly to parties represented in the soviets, the parties on the right desired to postpone it, while the demand for its immediate summoning became a useful lever against them in the hands of the bolsheviks. as the soviets became more bolshevik the postponement of the con- stituent assembly became less desirable except by those who hoped that it would be possible by some military coup to sup- press the parties of the left before the elections. when, after the failure of the kornilov adventure, these hopes were dashed, the constituent assembly became in the minds of the anti- bolshevik parties a means of drowning the extremist vote of the towns in the slightly more moderate vote of the peasants, and active preparations for the elections were at last begun. when the soviets took power in nov. the bolsheviks, who now regarded the constituent assembly as unnecessary and even dangerous since it might mean what was to them a retrograde step from the hegemony of the towns to a democracy in which the towns would be outvoted, were a httle hampered by the momentum of the agitation they had carried on formerly against its postponement. they decided to hurry on the elections, to split the peasant vote and simultaneously to declare that the soviets were, in a revolution, a higher authority than any assembly in which the possessing classes could take part. if by hook or crook they could get the assembly to confirm the author- ity of the soviets, well and good. if not, they would use the methods of cromwell. meanwhile the rival parties prepared to make the assembly a rallying point for a struggle with the soviets in the capital. the social revolutionaries obtained 21,000,000 votes on a party list which included supporters of the bolshevik revolution, the bolsheviks 9,000,000, and the cadets under 2,000,000. roughly speaking, the cadet vote was that of the propertied classes, the social revolutionary vote was 1 moscow had been the capital until peter the great built st. petersburg on the swamps at the mouth of the neva. the soviet govt. housed itself where it could. hotels and private houses became government offices and lenin himself lived in a room in the hotel national before moving into the kremlin. 415 that of the peasants, and the bolshevik vote was that of the towns and of a considerable part of the army which, of course, was mainly composed of peasants. the cadets represented a force active but very small, the social revolutionaries a class large but unorganised, scattered and passive, the bolsheviks a class extremely active, comparatively well organised and, by its domination of the towns, holding all the most valuable strategical positions. the assembly met on jan. 18. as soon as it had de- clared its complexion by electing a right social revolutionary, tchernov, instead of a left member of the same party in marie spiridonova, as president, the bolsheviks and the left social revolutionaries allowed it to be told to go home (jan. 19) by its guards, who expressed the opinion that it had talked enough. an attempt at a demonstration by its supporters was a complete fiasco. it became thenceforward a watchword used indiscrimi- nately by all the anti-bolshevik parties. the dissolution of the constituent assembly, the temporary settlement of the land question and the signing of the brest peace marked the end of the first period of the revolution. the autocracy had gone. the struggle for leadership had ended. government in russia was neither half-hearted nor divided against itself, but was a homogeneous body to whose support were committed the most active and determined sections of the town population, while it had definitely assured itself of the neutrality of the peasantry. marcy 1918 to marrch 1921 the second period of the revolution begins with the transfer of the government from petrograd to moscow and the ratifica- tion of the brest peace. there had been since the overthrow of kerensky three congresses of soviets attended by delegates from all parts of the country. the first had appointed the council of people’s commissars, and the second and third had approved their activities. in all three there had been a considerable and outspoken opposition, but the essential quality of that opposition, had been that it was an opposition of politicians and that the main point at issue (the making of peace) was one on which the govern- ment was taking a line that would have been incumbent on any government whatsoever. argument as to responsibility for the past was irrelevant to the plain issue as to whether or not russia was in a condition in march 1918 to remain fighting. the opposition accordingly was not one of which the government had any need to be afraid. it had been able to destroy all armed opposition within the country because the forces that opposed it were less willing to fight than its own, weak as these were. it was beginning to build up a new armed force. the cheka and the red guards.—the first nucleus of this force was the institution afterwards known as the cheka (chresvy- chainaya kommissia), meaning “ extraordinary commission,” formed in the beginning in the first weeks after the fall of kerensky to deal with the attempts to organise drunken pogroms in the capital. the cheka was given control of the only reliable regular troops, the lettish rifles. the leaders of the cheka included bolsheviks and social revolutionaries, who retained their position in this organisation after the members of their party had resigned from their posts in the government. for practical purposes 1t was from the beginning controlled by the bolshevik party. the scope of its work rapidly widened, and it became in the end the organising’ centre of the political police and the instrument of the terror which followed on the begin- nings of intervention. the forces that fought in the earlier stages of the civil war were made up from parts of those regiments that had earliest declared themselves against the temporary govt., together with * red guards,” workmen who had had a day or two of drill and the military equipment of a rifle and a cartridge belt, led by a heterogencous collection of officers who felt that the future of the country was with the revolution, of officers who felt that they could damage the bolsheviks most by getting control of their armed forces and of enthusiastic bolsheviks who had or thought they had some slight knowledge of military technique. it was very soon discovered that dissatisfaction with one a416 government is not a sufficient motive to induce a soldier to risk his life for another. the “ red guards” were extremely in- efficient, and the demobilisation that accompanied the brest peace scattered what was left of the old army over the russian railway system. the soldiers found their way home as seemed best to them, on the roofs and buffers of trains already crammed. during the winter months many froze to death in these positions. every station was a disorderly camp and groups of soldiers would often be found travelling without particular destination on any train they had been able to board. there was no material for an army to be found in these migrating masses. an army had to be formed from the beginning with people willing to fight. local soviets formed small bodics independently. guerilla warfare in the ukraine formed a training ground for many. as early as jan. 23 a decree had been issued calling for a volunteer army. by march the sovict govt. could command the com- paratively stable allegiance of 100,000 men. the dispossessed classes —meanwhile there was a steady exodus from russia of the classes who had lost property or privilege through the revolution. some made their way across the deserted trenches to the germans. some joined the germans in the ukraine. some made their way into finland. some tled eastwards through siberia. all took with them a belicf, belied by their flight, that the bolshevik regime could last only a few weeks at most. they played the same part as the refugees from france played in the time of the french revolution, and even used the same phrases, which were received with the same credulity by governments similarly disturbed by similar events. representa- tives of the allies in russia had naturally better means of know- ing the old governing classes than the new, and were thus hedged by russian malcontents from an accurate knowledge of what was happening at their doors. in a revolution the relativity of truth is carried to its utmost limits. even for the most honest men engaged in a civil struggle the truth tends to be anything _ that tells against their opponents. in russia in 1918 it was im- possible to expect dispassionate witnesses. the jandlords had seen their estates taken from them by a rabble of peasants who, only 80 years before, had been only serfs, a species of domestic animals rather less valuable than the best horses. manufacturers had seen their factories turned into de- bating clubs and themselves and their managers at the mercy of committees appointed by the workmen. politicians who had spent the best years of their lives in attacking the autocracy had been swept out of the way in favour of men whose theories they despised and of whose incompetence they were convinced. revolutionaries with a long record of prison and exile were outraged to find that the revolution could do without them. shortage of everything and rapidly rising prices were natural sources of wide but impotent discontent. add to all this the fact that the german advance in the west in march 1918 made the representatives of the allies desperately aware that the country to which they were accredited had by withdrawing from the war eased the task of the germans, and it is not surprising that, in spite of the jesson of 1917, they were ready to listen to those who promised that if only foreigners would help them to throw out the bolsheviks they would be able to undertake themselves the more difficult business of fighting the germans. ; diplomatic relations —intervention did not begin at once, and the bolsheviks were so far persuaded that germany would attack them again the moment she felt strong enough to doso, that they were building their new army in the belief that germany would be the first foreign enemy they would have to meet. when the germans were advancing in the last days before the signing of the peace, the french military mission offered trotsky french and english instructors for his newly formed regiments. this offer was accepted by the russians, but was withdrawn. now, when the germans were still advancing (in the ukraine) piatakov, whose brother had been fiogged to death there, asked for quick- firing rifles to use against the germans in guerilla warfare. his request was refused, and it gradually became clear that inter- vention might come equally soon from either side. the bol- sheviks became increasingly conscious that russia’s diplomatic russia relations with the allies were of a most abnormal kind. the soviet govt. had not been recognised by the allies, whose representatives, however, were in touch with it, but were in much closer touch with those groups of russian subjects who were opposed to it. the british embassy left through finland. the french was just too late to get through before the germans occupied finland on the invitation of the white finns. english diplomatic representation was entrusted to mr. lockhart, formerly consul- general in moscow, who with a small staff accompanied the soviet govt. when it moved to moscow. the american, french and other embassies and legations moved to vologda, a little country town which offered the advantage of two possible lines of flight, to archangel and through siberia, and was a very long way from the new capital of russia. in moscow there were several military missions of the allies, and consulates of various nations took upon themselves the management of international politics. if it had not been that serious things were at stake the diplomatic corps in moscow and vologda in 1918 would have provided good material for comedy.- some nations (including great britain) had several representatives of widely differing political convictions, and as the hopes of each tended to become beliefs it was hard to tell what was or was not the policy of any particular country. the only properly accredited ambassador in moscow was count mirbach, the german, whose business it was to observe, to report and to keep the bolsheviks aware that they lived under the continual threat of a renewal of the war. the months of march and april in central russia were spent comparatively peacefully, though the bloody suppression of the finnish revolution, the advance of the germans through the ukraine! and the resuscitation of white forces in the southeast were a clear warning of what was to come. still, a british and american mission travelled from moscow far into siberia, and reported perfect order until it reached the district affected by the raids of white officers from over the chinese frontier (sce siberia). the new organisation.—over a very large area the revolution had a few weeks in which to establish itself. the soviet system showed itself capable of replacing the old administrative machine. the government in moscow was rapidly organising a new civil service. in the country the peasants were settling the land question in their own way. the railways were gradually dis- burdening themselves of migrating soldiers. the scizure of the banks and the rapid inflation of the rouble were showing them- selves more powerful than the decrees that accompanied them— and, as it were, explained their efiects—to bring about a social revolution in the towns. saved money was like fairy gold that turned to dry leaves in the night. the very unwillingness of the propertied classes to believe that the communist regime could last more than from one week to the next contributed to their disaster. their action, which consisted in doing nothing, may be described as a general strike of the propertied and privileged classes at a time when their strike funds were not only being spent day by day but were also rapidly turning into waste paper. inability or unwillingness of private manufacturers to keep their factories working under conditions which deprived them of effective control eased the task of the government in nationalis- ing large industry. the workmen saw in nationalisation a guar- antee that they would at least get paper salaries regardless of the rapid fall in productivity, a fall due in part to the effects of the war and in part to the effects of the revolution, the disappearance of incentives to production and the substitution of political for productive activity. shops were closing down for lack of goods, but there was as yet small sign of the ‘‘ militant communism ” that was to come. speeches by lenin make it clear that, given peace, he was prepared to proceed at once with what became known years afterwards as the “ new economic policy.”’ inter- vention and the consequent growth of civil war on an enormous scale made that impossible. ! the ukrainian rada which had invited the assistance of the germans was replaced (april 25) by the dictatorship of gen. skoropadsky. russia intervention.—intervention was begun by the french use of the troops of czechoslovak prisoners of war that had been formed in russia to fight against the central empires. immediately after the signing of the peace of brest (march 3) these troops declared themselves under the french supreme command, and preparations were made, in spite of german protests, to send them to france. russia was at this time at least formally at peace with germany, and as a neutral country could not properly allow the transit of armed troops. the troops, however, were allowed to start on the way to vladivostok, and had reached various stations on the siberian railway and branch lines leading to it when signs of impending trouble caused trotsky to order their disarmament. this was the signal for them to seize (in the last days of may) a long stretch of the railway and a number of towns. they did not proceed towards vladivostok, but actual- ly advanced westwards, taking samara on june 8, where a number of members of the constituent assembly formed a government while, similarly sheltered by these disciplined troops, a temporary siberian govt. was formed on june 15. dutov raised the orenburg cossacks. krasnov renewed activity on the don. the germans had pushed eastwards through the ukraine, and within a few wecks the territory held by the soviets was only a small part of russia, consisting for the most part of districts in normal times cither not self supporting or barely capable of self support. the revolution was cut off from the main sources of iron, coal, cotton, oil, meat and bread. the social revolutionaries’ revolt—the critical month was july 1918, when the soviet govt. was faced within its now strictly limited territory by a revolt from the left, which had as its object the provocation of further intervention by germany, and revolts from the right, which had as their object the en- couragement of further intervention by the allies. the revolt from the left came first. the left social revolutionaries who had opposed the peace of brest and wished for ‘not war but revolt.” believing that the cause of revolution would be best served by inducing a german occupation of russia and destroying that occupation by guerilla warfare of the kind that was keeping the ukraine in flames, decided to force the communists into accepting their point of view. at the fiith congress of sovicts which met in the first week of july they made a violent demon- stration against mirbach, and accused the bolsheviks of doing nothing but obey his orders. on july 6 one of them assassinated mirbach in the house in which the german embassy was lodged. on the same day they raised a revolt in moscow, seized a considerable part of the town, and even fired with artillery into the kremlin. meanwhile the communists put a cordon of troops round the congress. all communists left the building, and the bulk of the social revolutionary members were thus detained. the revolt was suppressed by the evening of the next day, a final engagement taking place outside the town. on hearing of this revolt, muraviev, a romantic adventurer who had taken an active part in the defence of petrograd and in the fighting in the ukraine and was now commanding the red forces against the czechs, mutinied unsuccessfully and shot himself. mean- while social revolutionaries of the right, encouraged by french promises and believing that their rising would be the signal for an immediate advance of interventionist forces from the north, attempted revolt in several towns. they were most successful under boris savinkov in jaroslavl, where they obtained posses- sion of the town, killed a number of supporters of the soviets, and were only defeated after a siege, the town suffering severely on account of the inexperience of the troops who, deserted by their officers, did not know when to stop bombardment and blew part of the town unnecessarily to pieces. while the revolt in jaroslavl was still in progress an attempt was made to persuade the colony of allied representatives at vologda to come to moscow. there were several motives for this besides the naive belief that these representatives would be less hostile to the soviet govt. if they were in closer con- tact with it than with its enemies. on the one hand the bolshe- viks did not know how the germans would react to the murder of their ambassador, and in the case of a renewal of the war they 417 would have been prepared to ask for allied help in organising and arming their defence. on the other hand they feared that the left social revolutionaries would be likely to blow up an allied ambassador or two in order to prove that they had not been agents of the allies in killing mirbach, and in order to force the revolution to stand alone without dependence on “ im- perialists of either camp.” such an event would force allied intervention on a large scale, which the bolsheviks still hoped to postpone. they believed that they could better guard the representatives in moscow than in an isolated village like vologda in a district where the jaroslavl revolt showed that their authority was none too secure. the allied representa- tives, however, reasoned that the murder of mirbach in moscow was by no means a justification for their going to that city. intervention had already begun, and was going to develop, and they determined to stay where they were. a british representa- tive (independent of the lockhart mission in moscow) was at vologda, and a british commercial delegation of four arrived to investigate conditions. it came to moscow, stayed two nights there and left for the north. the allies had landed additional troops at murmansk, and were preparing to take archangel. the japanese had sent warships to vladivostok in nov. 1917, made a landing on april 5 and on june 29 rgt8 helped the czechs and others to overthrow the soviets in the town. the terror follows intervention.—as in the french revolution, the intervention of forcign powers increased the bitterness of the struggle. political opponents became traitors, and in russia were repeated all the horrors that followed intervention in france. the deposed tsar with his family had been moved from tsarkoe selo to tobolsk during the kerensky regime. in the spring of 1918, for fear of counter-revolutionary rising in siberia, they were removed to ekaterinburg (may 2). the advance of czecho- slovak troops and of white troops formed after the czechoslovak revolt put that town in immediate danger of white occupation, and the local soviet, rather than risk their falling into the hands of the other side, shot the whole family at night on july 16 in the basement of the house in which they had been interned. the fact was announced on july 18 to the pracsidium of the central executive committee in moscow which, in view of the circum- stances, approved the action of the local soviet. the news of this killing, horrible in itself, aroused more excitement abroad than in russia, where, in the prevailing dearness and precariousness of living, life was the only thing that was held cheap (see nicrrotas it.) on july 2 allied troops had landed at murmansk}, on the 31st they took onega, on which day the czechs took simbirsk on the volga. on aug. 1 the czechs took ekaterinburg, on the 3rd archangel was occupied by the allics. on the roth kazan was taken by the czechs, and troops advancing southwards from archangel took shenkursk. it seemed that the revolutionary troops could do nothing but retreat when faced by forces stiffened by a leaven of foreigners. the bolsheviks had proceeded from voluntary enlistment to conscription, and now mobilised ex- officers of the old army to supply, under compulsion, the lacking knowledge of military technique. to these officers they attached commissars whose business it was to inspire the soldiers and to watch for treachery on the part of the officers, the sympathies of many of whom were naturally on the side of the whites. work- men from the factories, partisans driven from the ukraine and sailors from kronstadt had to fill the part on the red side that was taken by trained foreign troops on the side of the whites. the republic, almost throttled at the start, learnt to fight in the course of the war. civil war is necessarily of a different character from that of an ordinary war between nations. mobilisation of conscripts on both sides formed a huge mass of potential de- serters. the smallest initial victory was enough to set this current of desertion flowing, while a successful counter-attack ! the detachments which had been in murmansk during the war had remained. they were now largely reinforced after agreement with the local soviet which imagined that they were to serve as a defence against the germans in finland and by no means for inter- vention in russia. 418 would be enough to turn the tide and set it flowing in the opposite direction. much depended on the administration of occupied territory in such a way as to prevent the growth of discentent in the rear of the fighting forces. in the territory occupied by the whites, the peasantry were soon given reason to fear that a white victory would mean the return of the landlords. this fear out- weighed the requisitions of food, beasts and men, which were carried out by both sides. in the end, it probably decided the issue of the war. on aug. 30, a woman social revolutionary attended a meeting of working men addressed by lenin in moscow, and, waiting for him as he came out, fired two bullets into him at scarcely more than arm’s length. lenin was very badly wounded, and for some time it was thought impossible that he should survive. on the same day another social revolutionary killed uritsky, one of the chief communist leaders left in petrograd. these two events were the signal for a wholesale revolutionary terror. five hundred per- sons were executed in petrograd alone as an immediate reprisal.! the diplomatic and consular representatives of the allies, who had hitherto been unmolested in moscow in spite of the fact that the powers they represented were actually at war with the republic (archangel had been taken a month before), were arrested, mr. lockhart being accused of complicity in a plan to raise a mutiny in the lettish troops and to seize the bolshevik leaders. all were subsequently released, mr. lockhart’s mission being exchanged for bolsheviks arrested in england. the soviet govt. abandoned all hope of coming to an arrangement with the allies, and realised that it was already engaged in a struggle from which it would cither emerge victorious or not emerge at all. progress of the civil war.—it was as if this psychological burn- ing of boats had an almost immediate effect in stiffening the red troops. during this grim month and the month that followed they obtained at least small victories on all the fronts that were more immediately dangerous. by the recapture of kazan, sama- ra, simbirsk and sysran they recovered the volga as a line of defence behind which they could prepare for an advance towards the urals. at the same time they made impossible a juncture between the troops advancing from archangel and those which had been advancing from siberia under cover of the czechs. the archangel front moved southwards, but was not of great importance, being in a district with only the most limited ways of communication, besides being isolated and far from any vulnerable nerve centre. when, on nov. 6 1918, the all-russian congress of soviets met in moscow, the republic was holding its own, and news was coming from the west that greatly strengthened its belief that it had only to hold out a little longer before the idea which it represented was victorious throughout europe. austrian and german regiments exposed to the infection of revolutionary ideas had mutinied in mohilev and rovno six weeks before. the discipline of these troops in the ukraine was falling to pieces. now came news of the formation of soviets in kiel, berlin and budapest, the abdications of the german and austrian i:mperors and the armistice on the western front. the congress was one of the wildest enthusiasm. for it, not allied victory but revolu- tion in germany had made a scrap of paper of the peace of brest, which it now (nov. 13 1918) formally annulled. lenin seemed justifed. russia was no longer alone. the membcrs of that congress could hear the tramp and see the banners of that world revolution on which their hopes were based. it took several years of bitter disappointment to dim the sound and vision of that triumphal march. although the collapse of germany made it impossible for russian emigres to continue to persuade the allies that in fight- ing the sovict govt. they were fighting the germans, its im- mediate effect was that allied ships passed through the dar- danelles into the black sea and through the belt into the baltic. 1latsis (two years struggle on the internal front) says that 8,389 persons were shot by the extraordinary commission (tcheka, later ogpu) in 1918 and 1919 in the 20 governments of central russia alone. seventyefive per cent of these were shot in the later months of 1918. russia the germans in the caucasus were replaced by the allics. the anti-bolshevik governments of the baltic states were supported by the allies instead of by the germans, and the revolution rolling forward on the heels of the retiring germans found itself arrested by forces that the allics were now able to equip abundantly with the material no longer needed for the war with germany. this continuance of the war on the part of the allies after the annul- ment of that excuse for interference that was provided by the brest peace had two other effects. on the one hand it strength- ened opposition to this new war in the allied countries, whose peoples to a large extent considered that the defeat of germany and not interference in russia was the object for which they had been enrolled. on the other hand it gathered to the support of the bolsheviks a great number of officers who had considered that the brest: peace was the main reason for opposition to them and held that, the german question being eliminated, the war in russia was 2 national war in which the soviet govt. was resisting foreigners who were using russians as their instruments in weakening a country that had been a great power until it had overstrained itself on their behalf. they were prepared to accept the revolutionary watchwords for the inspiriting of a national defence. nor were these officers alone. in the south the forces opposed to the bolsheviks were headed by a scrics of dictators, l. kornilov, alexciev, denikin, surround- ed by persons who made no secret of their distaste not only for the bolsheviks but for politicians far to the right of them. in the east, the committee of members of the constituent assembly had been succeeded by the directorate, which took over the four existing white governments in siberia, and admiral kolchak had been proclaimed supreme ruler at omsk on nov. 18. members of the constituent assembly had been taken from prison and killed by officers who were allowed to go unpunished. the result of this was that members of the constituent assembly escaping from kolchak publicly threw in their lot with the forces on the other side of the barricade. even in archangel a comparatively moderate government under n. tchaikovsky was seized by a group of officers and only released on the insistence of the allies. it rapidly became clear that the choice was not between the bolsheviks and a more moderate government, but between the bolsheviks and extreme reaction. the red terror was matched by a white terror that affected far larger sections of the popula- tion. refugees from the country held by the whites brought into sovict russia accounts of such treatment of the working classes as chormously increased the will of those in soviet russia to see the struggle through regardless of the daily increasing hardships of a starving and beleaguered camp. if 1918 saw the beginnings of intervention and civil war on a large scale and the gradual growth of disciplined forces during a period of extremely unstable internal equilibrium, r919 saw those forces become armies to mect more scrious attacks from without, which, however, were accom- panied by increasing stability within. the revolution owed much to its opponents, who repeatedly gave it proofs that it was forced to fight in self defence. an ex- ample of this was given by the reaction of reds and whites to mr. lloyd george’s and president wilson’s proposal (jan. 22 1919) that representatives from either side should mect tor a conference on feb. 15 on the island of prinkipo near constanti- nople. the reds expressed their willingness to come to that aloof island (though they would have preferred a place where their negotiations would have had a better chance of being overheard by the working classes of other countries, to whom they looked to bring intervention to an end), provided that the powers on their side would undertake not to intervene in the internal affairs of russia. they even offered to negotiate on a basis of frontiers to be determined by the position of the various forces at the time, which would have given the whole of siberia and huge districts of european russia to their enemies. the whites, confident in the attacks they were preparing, encouraged also by promises of further assistance from the allies, refused through their representatives in paris to consider any negotiations what- soever, and thereby knocked the bottom out of any agitation in soviet russia for an end of the civil war. the moderate socialist russia parties in russia naturally declared that, while disapproving of the bolsheviks, they would yet support them against all inter- vention from without. the war continued. huge supplies of military equipment were given to the whites. the archangel front had been pushed southward. kolchak was striking across the urals, and when the white forces in the south promised to move northwards it was confidently assumed abroad that the end of the struggle would come during the summer. that assumption was based on a comparison of material forces. it did not allow for that strange, incalculable x of revolutionary enthusiasms which, in russia in the 2oth century asin france in the 18th, continually provided miracles for the discomfiture of logicians. in russia, thanks to the domination of a single party, there were none of the struggles between tendencies and, thanks to the extraordinary discipline of that party, none of the strug- gles between individuals that made unity among the whites impossible. enthusiasm was not dissipated piecemeal, but di- rected hither and thither where it was most needed. the communist party took every member it could spare from the work of organisation, and sent him to the weakest place in the defence. the trades unions did the same. throughout the civil war the communists adopted the opposite method to that of rulers who exaggerate victories and minimise defeats. huge maps were sect up on boardings in the strects of the towns with a thick black line to mark the encircling front. day by day during the white advances the black linc was moved nearer to moscow. defcats intensified instead of disheartening the de- fence, in spite of the appalling conditions in the besieged camp. in this war few of the wounded could hope to survive, for the blockade did not allow the importation even of anaesthetics or the necessary drugs. outside the territory of the soviets to be a member of the communist party was a crime punishable by death. captured communists were shot at once. yct at the worst moment, oct. t919, when white forces were within striking distance of moscow and of petrograd, thousands of working men poured into the party. the year r919 began with the advance on a wide front of kol- chak who, with the whole of siberia behind him, pushed his lines far into european russia, and in april reached kazan and samaraon the volga. the communists threw all that they had against him, denucing their other fronts, and in july threw him back over the urals just in time to let them reorganise to mcet the rapid advance of denikin from the south. denikin, thanks to a destructive cavalry raid behind the red front, advanced with extreme rapidity, and in the autumn took orel (oct. 13) within easy reach of moscow. here he was held for just long enough to allow the effects of his administration in the country he had occupied to show themselves in his rear. so long as denikin’s army consisted exclusively of officers it was a de- pendable force, but with successive mobilisations as he advanced his swelling army became much less unanimous in wanting him to win. the peasantry judged by the behaviour of his officers what fate awaited them in the event of his victory, and mutinies and revolts soon made his threat to moscow much less formidable than it seemed upon the maps. he was pushed back from orel (oct. 19), and having once begun to retreat could not stop. but the blow from the south was still to be parried when, with the help of english tanks, an army under yudenich moved on petrograd, took krasnoe silo (oct. 16) and came within sight of the cathedral of st. isaac. yudenich seems to have believed that petrograd would rise to welcome him. no doubt there were plenty of people in petrograd who looked forward eagerly to his arrival. but these were a small minority who remained indoors while children ran about banging tin cans and waving red rags and their elders dug trenches, set up barricades and prepared for street fighting. trotsky went to petrograd to organise the defence. it is possible that even if yudenich had entered the city his forces, which were not large, would have been destroyed in the streets. at the same time there were several days (oct. 16-21) when all moscow believed that petrograd had fallen or was on the point of falling. preparations had actually been made for the housing of the refugees. yudenich was defeated at pul- 419 kovo (oct. 21), driven back over the estonian frontier, after his officers, before retreating, had sacked the palace of gatchina. collapse of the white armies —the yudenich adventure may on the whole be considered as having been a help to soviet russia. in failure it destroyed many illusions, and while it still seemed likely to be successful it had greatly contributed to the desire of the estonians to conclude peace. estonian troops had advanced with the russian whites, but yudenich’s officers, unwisely, did not conceal their contempt for the “ potato republic” (an allusion to the chief agricultural produce of estonia) and, resent- ful of the national airs put on by what they regarded asa russian province openly spoke of settling accounts with the estonians as soon as they had dealt with the bolsheviks. the estonians realised that there was little to be gained for estonia by helping reactionary officers to conquer russia. in spite of warnings, even threats, addressed to them by the french, they began negotia- tions with soviet russia on oct. 5 1919, which ended with the signature of a peace treaty on feb. 2 1920. estonia’s belief that peace was possible made war more difficult for other small powers. on jan. 16 1920 the blockade was formally lifted by the supreme council. the ring surrounding soviet russia was no longer complete. england had already given up active inter- vention. meanwhile soviet russia was rapidly recovering the old russian frontiers. kolchak had never recovered after the blows of june and july. the burning of villages, wholesale floggings and shootings had roused the whole of siberia against the whites. soviet russia recovered omsk on nov. 15, semipalatinsk on dec. 11, tomsk on dec. 20, krasnoyarsk on jan. 8 1920. on the same days in the south the red cavalry entered rostov. on feb. 19 soviet troops entered archangel. on march 2 they took irkutsk, on march 13 murmansk, on march 24 vladikavkaz. with the withdrawal of foreign support and disorders in their own rear, the whites collapsed with such suddenness that town after town was taken by internal revolt long before their in- adequate transport allowed the regular troops of the reds to reach it. three psychological moments tended towards the abandon- ment of intervention: (1) discontent in all countries at what seemed to be an unnecessary prolongation of war after the defeat of germany; (2) a wide feeling among the working classes of all countries that a war against the revolution in russia was in- directly a war against even non-revolutionary labour at home; (3) growing impatience with the russian whites who, wherever they were in power, showed an incapacity for government equalled only by their capacity for quarrelling among themselves. it came to be realised by a growing section of opinion in great britain that the fact that russian whites asked for foreign help against their own countrymen was in itself a sufficient proof that such help ought not to be given. two powers only were unwilling to give up intervention in russia. of these one was japan, which had definite territorial designs in eastern siberia and re- tained for some years the russian part of the island of sakhalin. the other was france. the french were more grievously affected than the english by the non-payment of interest on the tsarist debts. they were also afraid of a german revenge for the peace of versailles and horrified at the thought that they had lost their russian ally. they had therefore set their hands to the carrying out of a contradictory policy, on the one hand to create a big poland to take russia’s place in germany’s rear and on the other to help in the creation of a new russia which should feel gratitude to france. expressions of these policies were the polish attack on russia in 1920 and the desperate recognition of wrange! (aug. 11) by m. poincare immediately before that general was driven into the sea.! the polish war.—yor a few wecks in the spring of 1920 it seemed that this was to be the first year of comparative peace, and in that hope the russians offered to conclude a treaty with 1 nevertheless poland and the baltic states received a formal warning from the supreme council in london in feb. 1920 advising them not to continue a war which might be injurious or to make any aggression against russia. : 420 poland on the basis of the frontiers the poles then held, which included a good deal of ethnographically non-polish territory. the french, however, had not accepted the estonian peace- making with equanimity, and the poles, assured of french good will, money and munitions, and still dreaming of a great poland which was to stretch from the baltic to the black sea and bea sort of hadrian’s wall against the barbarians of the east, ad- vanced further into russia, and on may 8 took kiev. this attack by the poles had the effect of further consolidating ele- ments in russia otherwise hostile to the revolution in support of what was, after all, the only existing russian government. the poles completed that nationalisation of the soviet govt. which had been begun by the interference of the allies. in a few weeks the russians routed the poles, and found themselves in a position to invade poland. trotsky was against pushing on. lenin allowed political considerations to outweigh the views of the military experts. his view, strongly supported by the many polish revolutionaries who were on the russian side and played in this matter the same part that the russian emigres had played in persuading the allies to intervention, prevailed. a few weeks later the russians were at the gates of warsaw. but the advance of the russians into poland had the same re- sult as the advance of the poles into russia, a consolidation of national feeling inthe invaded country. the french, besides guns and ammunition, sent the poles a leader, general weygand; and wrangel from the crimea, acting (whether he intended this or not) as an ally of the poles and the french against russia, began an advance in which he had very considerable technical assist- ance. the russians’ retreat before warsaw was as rapid as their previous advance, and raised in the minds of their enemies hopes of an immediate and general collapse. this, however, did not follow. the poles were held and in oct., by the peace of riga, agreed to frontiers which were approximately those which they could have had without fighting in feb.; and by oct. 17, the revolutionary army had occupied the whole of the crimean peninsula, wrangel with the remains of his troops escap- ing to constantinople. peace with lithuania and latvia had been signed in july and aug. during the polish war. peace with finland was signed in october. raids continued to be made into russia over the fronticrs of countries nominally at peace with her; much of the banditry that naturally follows civil war remained to be put down; but civil war on a large scale had ended. war communism.—it is usual, even among communists, to describe the period of civil war as one of * militant communism.”’ but when the economic measures of those years are separated from the words that accompanied them, it appears that there was little difference in principle between them and measures adopted in other countries during the world war, which again were not different in principle from those that are forced upon any be- sieged community. russia suffered from seven years of war. it is not surprising that measures of rationing, of monopoly, had been carried further in russia than in countries which sufiered from only four. industry in russia was not highly developed before the war. russia was accustomed to export agricultural produce and raw material and to import manufactured goods. during the war she could do neither the one nor the other. her own industry suffered from lack of transport, fuel and raw material and from a catastrophic fall in the productivity of labour. the one industry that had to be maintained at the ex- pense of all others was that of munition-making, which does not provide goods in exchange for which peasants will willingly give corn. in such circumstances whatever measures may be taken amount in the long run to the requisitioning and rationing of existing stores. the towns being unable to produce goods to exchange for corn, agriculture, like industry, became a state monopoly in the sense that all produce over and above the needs of the producer was taken by the state to feed the armies and the towns. private trade in bread was forbidden because its existence made it more difficult for the state to obtain corn. the co- operative societies were turned into a distributing apparatus to serve the whole of the town population. the rationing of the in- adequate supplies distinguished in other countries between the russia civil and the military population. in russia it had to go further, and among the civil population to distinguish between those whose work required more physical effort and so more food than those whose work could be got through with less. with a view to the future, milk in the towns was distributed exclusively to children. all these were practical measures which would have been forced on any country similarly impoverished and besieged. in all countries similar measures taken during the war tended towards state and away from private control. the difference. between these measures in russia and in other countries lies in the point of view of the government applying them with regard to what may be called their by-products. the russian govt. was not like the governments of other countries, anxious to dis- burden itself as soon as possible of the factories that during the war had come into its hands. it rejoiced instead of lamenting over the rapid inflation of the currency because this, making money meaningless, facilitated the weakening of the propertied classes. the requisitioning of corn was in the hands of committees of the poorer peasants to whose interest it was to see that the rich peasants did not hold back their stores. the result of this was a general levelling among the peasantry, during which the conflict of interests between rich and poor peasants guaranteed the government against active resistance by the peasantry as a whole. it must not be imagined that the communists were able to make of these measures a complete system. an essential link in the system was missing in the failure of the towns to produce goods to be distributed to the peasants. the factories handed over what they made, but they did not make enough, and a proportion even of what they made was stolen by the hungry workers to exchange for food on the markets that still existed as safety valves for the private trade which, though forbidden, was carried on by “ bagmen’”’ who themselves brought sacks of produce to the towns, running the gauntlet of railway and town police and taking back to the country whatever they could get. the existence of this illegal trade meant that the peasant had a chance of getting something for his produce and, while it kept the peasant cultivating, compelled even the government organs of supply to have recourse to the very markets that it had for- bidden. if the system could ever have been put into complete operation money would have ceased to be necessary at all. as it was the printing presses supplied the government and its employees with the means of buying on the illegal markets the food they had not been able to bring to the towns themselves. money tended to become valueless (it was easier to buy things from the peasants with a cake of soap or a little salt), but the existence of the illegal market made a use for it and a demand for it just sufficient to keep the rouble alive. poverty and privation following the civil war.—life in russian towns reached its lowest level in 1920. the almost complete breakdown of transport made it impossible to bring to the towns | even the whole of the inadequate supplies that the government apparatus had been able to get to the railways. in jan. 1920, the number of locomotives in working order had fallen from 17,000 (1914) to under 4,000, less than a quarter of the number that had been barely sufficient to maintain a very low standard of transport at the beginning of the war. the enlargement of the revolutionary area of russia that accompanied victory in the civil war increased the length of the lines of communication much faster than it added to the rolling stock. at the worst moments of the civil war, 80% of the railways had been in the hands of the whites, and during the struggle, apart from damage to rolling stock and lines, 3,672 railway bridges were destroyed and 381 railway depets and repairing shops. military operations had to come first, and the towns had to do with the crumbs from the soldiers’ miserable commissariat. every town dweller was underfed. there was no fodder for horses. sledges disappeared. the cleaning of the streets was left to the spring thaw and the autumn rains. all shops excepting state bookshops and a few half empty co-operative stores were closed. wooden houses were being pulled down to serve as fuel, lack of which prevented the proper heating even of government offices, brought the tram- russia ways almost to a standstill and cut down the supply of electric light. actors played in unheated theatres to audiences shivering in out-door clothes. typhus carried off thousands of the popu- lation. the very working class on which the government based itself began to disappear, the town workers—most of whom in russia retain a connection with their villages—returning to the country, where there was food enough and a skilled man could easily earn a living. during the previous year one in every three workmen had left moscow or ceased to be a workman. wagons clogged the stations, because there were none to unload them. food rotted, and timber lay where it was useless, because neither food nor fuel could be brought to the places where they were desperately needed. the problem before the revolution was to get work done when it was impossible that it should be immediately rewarded. a comparatively efficient organisation of the factories had been worked out; the more extreme forms of workers’ control ceased, the technical staff in the factories as in the army being freed from dependence on the caprice of their subordinates. but the rewards were small and uncertain, and the actual physical capacity of the underfed workers was low, and much of it had to be spent in pursuit of food to supplement their rations. by propaganda and example the communists succeeded in inducing a high level of self-sacrifice among their own rank and file. groups of com- munists undertook what became known as saturdayings, when, in holiday hours, they combined in all kinds of labour, shifting wood, unloading trucks, etc., and many non-communists joined voluntarily in what presently became a duty for members of the party. as the civil war slackened armies not actually fighting were turned to doing whatever work could be done wherever they happened to be. these were called ‘“ labour armies,’ and issued “ bulletins from the labour front ’”’ announcing the building of a bridge as formerly they had announced the capture of a town. | from these beginnings came industrial conscription, a measure never put into general practice but designed in the first place to prevent the complete exodus of the workmen from the towns and to secure the preparation of fuel by peasants in the neighbourhood of the railways. if it had been possible to feed as well as to conscript something might have come of it. asit was, it was found useful in getting things done that were urgently need- ed. it failed as a general means of organising labour, and was probably more useful to the opponents of the revolution abroad than to the communists in russia. its chicf supporter in russia was trotsky, who certainly succeeded in getting valuable work in the restoration of the railways done by the labour armies, and was also able to raise the number of repaired locomotives and wagons. transport was in 1920 the key position of the struggle and though trotsky’s critics pointed out that the productivity of a man in a labour army was less even than that of an ordinary workman, he could reply that it was better to get work done slowly than not to get it done at a]l. in transport things did by the end of 1920 show unmistakable signs of improvement and improvement here promised it everywhere clse. during this period were finished the land works for a huge electric power station on the volkhov, a power station at kashira and another on the shatura peat mosses (which was promptly destroyed by fire). in circumstances in which it seemed possible that russian civilisation would disappear altogether, starving and ragged engineers were planning the future electrification of russian industry and rationalisation of russia’s industrial geography. march 1921 to marcu 1926 peasant discontent—the end of the civil war removed a motive that had partially reconciled the peasants to much that they disliked in the revolution. they had no longer need to fear a return of the former landowners and, whereas during the war they had grudgingly submitted to the scizure of such corn as they could not hide, they were very certain that they had no - intention of feeding the towns in peace-time for nothing. what, they asked, was the good of getting rid of the landlord if you were not allowed to do business with your own crops? nor was a21 this the feeling of a small class of rich peasants alone. the general levelling brought about during the years of the war had made the peasants more or less homogencous and united, though not organised, in sullen discontent. their mood was naturally re- flected in the army which was largely composed of their sons. at the same time the removal of the driving motive of the war freed other discontents for expression that would not have been risked while there was still an armed enemy to profit by it. shortage both of food and fuel in the winter months brought about a crisis. not only were the peasants hostile, but the cold and hungry workmen of the towns were near the end of their patience. in feb. 1921 there were strikes in ane petrograd factories. there was similar trouble in moscow, where some of the regi- ments, without revolting, showed their very natural sympathy with the workmen. then, in march trouble in one of the battle- ships turned into a general revolt at kronstadt (march 2). this in its beginnings was explicitly a family quarrel within the revolution, and had none of the aims of a white revolt. but the enthusiasm with which it was greeted by the whites outside russia brought about instant calm in both capitals, where the workmen realised that it might mean a resurrection of the civil war. kronstadt was retaken (march 17) after a first attack over the ice had failed, and once more there was apparent peace. the new economic policy—the tenth congress of the communist party (at that time 730,000 members) met on march 8 1921 in the atmosphere of those events, and on the invitation of lenin took the first step towards that new economic policy which had been in his mind and on his lips in 1918 when intervention and the consequent development of the civil war had postponed it for three years and brought about the greater part of what was known as “ militant communism.” this first step did not seem a very big onc, nor did it promise much more than to lessen the discontent of the peasant and supply him with a motive for increasing instead of decreasing the area of land that he thought it worth while to till. instead of the system of assessing the surplus corn and requisitioning it (at a fixed price in practically worthless paper money) it introduced the payment of a tax in corn, which was to be less in amount than the previous assessments and was to leave the peasant free to dispose of what he had left after the tax was paid. the deficit in the state’s supply of corn after receipt of the tax was to be made up by ex- changing manufactured goods for corn, and this operation was te be left to the co-operative organisations. this meant that buy- ing and selling of corn would no longer be a criminal offence and that the state would have to compete with private local traders for the surplus corn that the peasant had to sell. weakness in the co-operative organisations, lack of manu- factured goods, together with the famine of 1921, presently hurried the party along an road on which they had hus tenta- lively set foot. reopening of external relations —another iiluence in the same direction was the reopening of relations between russia and the rest of the world. kronstadt was still in the hands of the mutineers when, on march 16 1921, a trade agreement between russia and england was signed in london and a treaty between russia and turkey was signed in moscow. the signature of england was an encouragement to the small border states who had felt hitherto that they were risking the disapproval of eng- land as well as of france in withdrawing from a suicidal conflict with russia. the trade agreement, while not establishing normal relations, sect up a modus vivendt which made trade possible be- tween the two countries. on may 6 the treaty of brest-litovwsk, denounced in 1918, was replaced by a new agreement between russia and germany, signed at berlin. a treaty with hungary, arranging for the return of hungarian prisoners of war, was signed on july 28. norway followed on sept. 2, a treaty with mongolia on nov. 6 and a preliminary trade agreement with italy on dec. 6. at an economic conference held at riga with the baltic states (oct. 24-31) the basis of an agreement on transport questions, essential to russia’s export, was reached. foreign trade presupposed the possibility of russian export. 422 russian export presupposed a surplus in the hands of the russian govt., which retained a monopoly of foreign trade. that sur- plus had to be paid for and the need of payment became the dominating motive of the next period of the revolution. the georgian revolt—at the moment of the revolt in kron- stadt there was in progress a revolt in georgia which had im- portant economic consequences of a different kind. the with- drawal of the allies after intervention had left a menshevik govt. in georgia which country by the accident of its position controlled the pipe line from the baku oilfields to batoum. the revolt in georgia answered the question whether russia or western european powers were to control directly or indirectly the south caucasian oilfields. on feb. 16 tiflis was seized by the revolutionaries. on march 19, the revolutionaries now helped by the russians, were in batoum.! baku oil was later on to be one of russia’s most important exports, as it had been before the war. the famine of 1921.—the extreme drought of the summer of 1921 affected districts that should normally have been granarics for the rest of russia. the long series of rainless months turned the volga country into a desert with neither food for man nor fodder for beasts. the people crowded to the river banks and died there. women fought for scraps of horse dung and cooked them in the contaminated water of the volga to postpone their children’s deaths. the starving population had no strength to resist the ravages of typhus. fridtjof nansen, the american relief administration, the quakers and othcrs, organised assist- ance to the starving districts (see relief). the russian govt. had to face not only a complete failure of its plan of obtaining corn by exchange, but also a big reduction in the corn tax which, even in the original plan, was less than their needs. they were unable to supply the factories with the grain they needed for their work- men. they were forced to buy grain where they could, and to buy that grain for money. “‘ we had to grab at the straw of what value was left in the sovict paper roubles.”’ saving the rouble—it was clear that the rouble, which had been rapidly dying, and was already a very ghost-like thing, could no longer be considered as a parting guest to be speeded on its way, but had to be saved at all costs. factories for a time paid their workmen in factory products which the workmen sold on the market and with the resulting money bought bread. it was obvious that the only hope of lasting salvation lay in a stable currency. a stable currency demanded a balanced budget and a stoppage of the printing press, on the activity of which in producing paper money faster than it became valueless the very existence of the state depended. this meant that factories must pay for themselves. lenin told the party that they “ must learn to trade.”” the state was forced to compete in buying. it must also compete in selling, with the private person. no longer were railway tickets to be free and unobtainable, electric light free and without lamps, trams free and not running. everything had to pay for itself and so be paid for by whoever used it. free trade of all kinds was legalised within the country. revival of privaie enter prise.-the streets of the towns began to change their appearance in the summer of 1921. shutters came down from the closed shops and behind the broken and patched windows appeared all kinds of secreted ancient stores. inessential things appeared first, because it had been easier to keep them hid. toyshops were among the first to open, together with hat shops, and it was possible to buy cosmetics in old boxes with faded labels long before it was possible to buy the saucepans and kettles and clothes that were really wanted. private book- shops sprang up in all directions. private restaurants opened, where better meals could be obtained by those who could afford to pay for them than at any of the state refectories which con- tinued to function. pedlars flourished exceedingly, no longer slinking round corners out of sight of the militia. the state re- tained the monopoly of foreign trade, heavy industry and much light industry. but heavy industry was run at a loss, light in- dustry was producing only a very small proportion of its pre-war ~1the turkish treaty of march 16 provided that batoum was to be ceded to georgia under conditions of local autonomy. russia output, and though there were plenty of shops belonging to co-operatives and to the state, and though the private shops were handicapped by high rents and high taxes, it seemed to the outside observer that in the competition between the state and private enterprise, the state would go to the wall. the new con- ditions benefited the peasantry, whose discontent with the soviet govt. grew rapidly less. they benefited the large class of persons who had previously made a surreptitious living by buy- ing cheap and selling dear when both operations were forbidden. their beneficial effects were felt later by the workmen, and the new conditions were for some time actually injurious to the large mass of small government officials, who had not time for trading in their off hours and soon found themselves compelled to pay rent for their rooms, and to buy their food instead of having the necessaries of life provided free. both in town and village this new economic policy ended the process of social levelling and started a new process of differentiation into classes. to people both within and without the communist party, who had identified “ communism ” with the economic methods of the civil war, these changes seemed to prove that the revolution had changed its mind. outside the communist party and particularly outside russia, it was assumed that russia would rapidly “ drift back to capitalism.’”’ inside the party among the rank and file there was a fecling that everything they had risked their lives for had been abandoned. once more rich men were driving in cabs while poor men walked, rich men were fat while poor were thin. lenin himself had none of this fecling of defeat. intervention had ended, and he was returning to the plans that it had interrupted. but for his prestige it is doubtful whether the party could have stood the shock of this sudden change of course. later, as the party learnt to adapt itself to new conditions and saw the effect of those conditions in a rising stand- ard of life and in russia’s economic recovery a new hopefulness took the place of the old fanatic enthusiasm. but, from the beginning of the new economic policy, there existed ground for disagreements on questions of principle more serious than any of the disagreements on questions of tactics which had accom- panied the period 1917-20. in the ensuing period the history of the revolution is not one of startling events but of slow processes, a long struggle between state and private industry and trade, a gradual development of diplomatic relations between russia and the rest of the world, a series of debates in the communist party, reflecting the new tensions and readjustments due to changes not only in russia but outside. the year 1922 found the soviet govt. with a programme that included the establishment of a stable currency, a pruning of state apparatus, complete legalisation of free trade within the country and the renting out of some of the nationalised facto- ries, etc., to private persons and co-operatives. all these planned measures aimed at the economic recovery of russia, that is to say, at putting russia’s town population in a position to satisfy by import or by manufacture the needs of russia’s peasantry. it was hoped further to bribe foreign capital to help in the economic development of russia by giving concessions of a kind which while allowing the concessionaire to enrich himself, should on the expiry of a definite period leave the state the richer by technically equipped and going concerns. none of this programme had anything in it shocking to the western world, and, if that had been all, there would have been no difficulty in the way of secur- ing every kind of co-operation from western governments and capitalists. the third international—but the soviet govt. was an ex- pression not only of russia but of the communist party, and the very nature of that party implied a further programme. it had created the soviet govt.; it had also created the communist international. if the programme of the soviet govt. was a national programme, that of the international was one of in- ternational revolution. founded in 1919, the communist international was intended to unite and strengthen communist parties in all countries. it sought to make itself a supreme general staff for all its members. it aroused greater anxicty in its russia opponents than any previous international revolutionary associa- tion, because it had its headquarters in a revolutionary country, though its attempts to enforce the strict discipline learnt by 20 years of struggle in russia on the parties of countries which were less afraid of freedom of opinion, led to many schisms and quar- rels in those parties. still, its very existence served as a reminder to foreign governments that russia’s revised economic pro- gramme did not alter the fact that the ruling party in russia had by no means abandoned its revolutionary aims. at the same time countries with colonies in the east were unpleasantly aware that russia’s policy of ostentatious disinterestedness tended to make oriental nations conscious of a contrast between russia and countries with large interests in the east which they were unwilling to give up. russia’s policy tended to increase nationalist feeling in all subject countries. in the east, russia, apparently renouncing claims for matcrial advantages, had actually become more dangerous to the position of western countries there than had been the old grasping empire of the tsars. (see tutrp international.) the genoa and hague conferences —economics and politics accordingly became contradictory motives reacting in positive and negative fashion on the re-establishment of russia’s relations with foreign countries. these motives were illustrated in the conferences of genoa (q¢.v.) and the hague (q.v.). at cannes, mr. lloyd george had declared the impossibility of the recovery of western europe without eastern europe. on april to 1922, russia met the other powers in conference at genoa. the french insisted that nothing should be done that could in any way affect the versailles treaty. it was stated that the recognition of russia’s foreign debt must be a starting point for any fruitful debate. thereupon germany and russia came to a separate agreement in the rapallo treaty (¢.v.) signed on april 16. germany and russia mutually cleaned their slates. germany gave up all claims for damage done by russia to german interests inside russia, unless in the future russia were to satisfy claims of this kind made by other states. diplomatic relations were fully resumed. the treaty included a ‘“‘ most favoured nation ”’ clause, subject to a limitation in favour of countries that had been part of the old russian empire, of soviet republics and of asiatic states bordering on russia. the german govt. declared its readiness to facilitate agreements with russia made by private firms. this agreement led to the exclusion of germany from further discussions of the russian question at the conference in order to calm the french, who declared that they saw in rapallo an attack on versailles. the genoa conference closedon may 19 without further result, excepting an agreement that there should be no aggressive acts on the part of russia or of any of the governments taking part in the conference for four months after the close of discussions. a non-russian commission was appointed, and russia was invited to appoint a russian commission, both to meet at the hague on june 26 to consider the questions of debts, foreign property sequestrated in russia and credits. at this further conference, russia was ready to agree (1) not to ask for com- pensation for damage caused by intervention and the blockade; (2) to recognise pre-war debts, without the addition of accumu- lated interest; and (3) to satisfy foreign ex-owners of confiscated property by giving them in preference their former undertakings as concessions. after much fruitless debate in sub-commission the russians asked for a plenary sitting. they were told that a plenary sitting would be held to consider any further proposals they might have to make. it was held on july 109, and brought the conference to an end. a suggestion made by litvinov for a new formula on compensation to foreigners for property national- ised led only to a misunderstanding. neither side was ready to recede from its position, the one being unwilling to undertake obligations that would cripple its efforts towards economic re- covery, the other believing that russia’s economic position was so bad that time would bring about a capitulation not merely on financial questions. the new currency.—in the meantime the soviet govt. were proceeding slowly with the realisation of their internal pro- 423 gramme. they printed (according to decree of oct. 11 1922) banknotes with a definite cover in gold, foreign currency and foreign securities. these remained stable side by side with the rapidly soaring paper currency! in which the bank notes were quoted day by day. prices were given in gold roubles, represented by the banknotes (a tchervonetz equals 10 gold roubles), and were translated into terms of the ordinary paper roubles. gradu- ally the paper came to be used exclusively as small change was replaced by smaller notes with similar cover (decree of feb. 5 1924) and was finally withdrawn from circulation. it became possible at last to issue a silver coinage of values from a rouble down to ten kopecks and copper coinage of values from five to one kopeck. the years 1922-4 saw a rapid reduction in the amount of the deficit that had to be made up by emissions of paper roubles, and the existence of the stable tchervonetz side by side with the unstable soviet rouble made possible an increasing normality in trade long before the stabilisation of the currency as a whole. this process of stabilisation lasted from 1922 to 1924, when the soviet roubles were finally withdrawn. organisation of industry.—the restoration of the currency was accompanied by, was dependent on and itself assisted radical changes in the organisation of industry. if russia were to have a stable currency she could no longer afford to leave costs out of account and to make up for industries run at a loss by printing paper roubles. industry had to be put strictly on a basis of profit and loss. the first step was to distinguish between paying and non-paying industries, the second to make industries them- selves interested in their own successful working. the unwieldy mass of moribund nationalised industry was split into sections called trusts and allowed a certain amount of liberty. at first they were free to do what they could with all surplus production over the amount that corresponded to the amounts of raw material, etc., supplied to them by the state. it presently ap- peared that the state could not supply them with raw materials, so that they were compelled to supply themselves, thereby to a very large extent becoming independent in their operations and called on by the state to account only for their results. these organisations were financed by the banks, all of which were in the hands of the state. the flax trust was the first of these organisations. it was soon followed by the timber trusts, textile trusts, tobacco trusts, etc. the co-operatives, similarly dependent on credit from the state and similarly independent in their opera- tions, became huge trading concerns, buying in russia and selling abroad, and buying abroad and selling in russia under the state monopoly. in the first year after the introduction of the new economic policy production in russia increased by approximately 46% (oct. 1921 to oct. 1922). in the second year production was 44% higher than in the first year. russian exports and im- ports which had fallen to nil during the blockade and the civil war rose in the year 1922-3 to 9% and 12% of her exports and imports in 1913. in 1923-4, export had risen to 24% and im- port to 16% of its value in 1913. in 1923 russia exported 170,000,000 poods of corn, as against 40,000,000 in the preceding season. consciousness of the be- ginning of economic recovery and anxiety lest that recovery should be jeopardised by any worsening of her international relations, dictated her attitude in the first political crisis of that year and in the second showed that it might come into collision with the revolutionary interests of the communist party. the first crisis was brought about by a british threat to annul the trade agreement, the second by a mistaken belief in the im- minence of further revolution in germany. relations with great britain.—on may 8 1923, lord curzon sent an ultimatum to the soviet govt. (which in dec. 1922 had become the government of the union of socialist soviet re- publics) in which he referred to anti-british propaganda and demanded the withdrawal of certain russian diplomatic repre- sentatives in persia and afghanistan, recognition of the three- 1 thus on may 5 1923 one tchervonetz was worth 485 roubles of the 1923 issue and on aug. 28 it was worth 1,850 such roubles. a rouble of 1923 was worth 100 of the 1922 roubles, which were each the equivalent of 1,000,000 roubles of any previous issue. 424 mile limit in territorial waters, compensation for trawlers seized and accidentally sunk when found fishing within the twelve- mile limit which the russians claimed, and compensation for an englishwoman who had been imprisoned and an englishman who had been killed in russia, together with the withdrawal of a note in which a minor official of the russian commissariat for foreign affairs had referred to the imprisonment of irishmen in english prisons in answer to a note from the british commission- er in moscow on the subject of a russian espionage trial. in the event of non-compliance with these demands the soviet govt. was threatened with an immediate rupture of anglo-russian relations, which for two years had been those outlined in the trade agreement of march 1921. the soviet govt. replied in terms which, while not accepting all the english demands, made rupture extremely difficult, and the conflict was abandoned after a russian note of july 18. | : on may to two days after the delivery of the curzon ultima- tum, vorovsky, who had gone to lausanne as russian representa- tive to attend the conference that was among other things settling the future of the dardanelles (in which it was recognised that russia was interested), was murdered by a certain conradi. it was felt in russia that the lack of precautions taken by the swiss police to protect a man who, though not a fully accredited dele- gate, had yet received a swiss diplomatic vise on his diplomatic passport was a reflection of the hostile attitude of the great powers. in this way the murder of vorovsky was connected in the russian mind with the curzon ultimatum. a street in moscow in which many of the foreign missions live was renamed after vorovsky. just as, during our own cromwellian revolution england protested in vain when english whites in holland killed a representative of the commonwealth, so russia’s protests to the swiss govt. did not prevent the acquittal of vorovsky’s murderer, in spite of his admitted guilt. all swiss subjects with the exception of workmen and old residents were expelled from russia, trade with switzerland was prohibited, and it was an- nounced that until satisfaction had been given russia would send no diplomatic or trade representatives to that country. the convention concerning the dardanelles was eventually signed by a russian representative in rome. this convention, against russian wishes, opened the straits to warships, whereas before the war, against russian wishes, the straits had been closed to them. | russia’s relations with the east—within a few days of their taking power, the soviet govt. foreshadowed the character of their eastern policy in a declaration to ‘“ the mussulmans of russia and the east,” issued on nov. 22 1917. that policy differs from that of the old russian empire and from that of western powers in its ostentatious refusal of all privileges (capitulations, for example) and its insistence that relations be- tween russia and eastern nations are relations between equals. it is a policy that makes more difficult the traditional eastern policy of western nations, who have been accustomed to treat the eastern nations, with the exception of japan, as races on a lower level of civilisation than themselves. the first practical illustration of this policy was given on jan. 27 1918 in a note from trotsky, then commissar of foreign affairs, to the persian charge d’affaires in petrograd, denouncing the anglo-russian treaty of 1907, which divided persia into british and russian spheres of influence. a treaty between russia and persia was signed on feb. 26 1921. on may 27 1919 a russian declaration recognised the sovereign rights of afghanistan, and by the end of that year there was a russian envoy in cabul and an afghan envoy in moscow. a russo-afghan treaty was signed on feb. 28 1921,2 and friendly relations have in general continued, despite some mutual exasperation when afghanistan sheltered the forces of the deposed emir of bokhara and gave at least moral support to enver pasha in his attempt to create a pan-islamic movement in bokhara. both in persia and in afghanistan russian policy came into conflict with british. 1see british white papers 1869, 1874, 1890 of the year 1923. 2 translation of the texts in manchester guardian of march 31 1921 and l’europe nouvelle of may 28 1921. | russia turkey was one of the signatories to the brest peace whereby she gained considerable russian territory, and though a turkish envoy accompanied count mirbach to moscow in 1918, russia’s relations with turkey were those of a defeated country with a vassal of the conqueror until after the peace of sevres, the dis- persal of the turkish parliament by the allies and the formation of the new turkish govt. at angora. early in 1920 an emissary from angora (halil pasha) reached moscow, and by nov. of that year there was a russian mission in angora and a turkish am- bassador had been appointed, though he did not reach moscow till early in 1921. friendly messages passed throughout the year, and on march 16 1921 a russo-turkish treaty was signed, by which russia, in accordance with her general eastern policy, renounced the capitulations and further renounced all claim to the payment of turkish debts. on jan. 2 1922 a treaty was signed between turkey and the soviet govt. of the ukraine, and on july 9 1922 a railway, post and telegraph convention was concluded between turkey on the one hand and the r.s.f.s.r. and the trans-caucasian republics on the other.’ from april § 1918 till oct. 25 1922 there were japanese troops in vladivostok. during the period of intervention, japanese troops pushed far inland, and until may 15 1925 the japanese re- tained northern sakhalin, which they had seized pending satis- faction for the nikolaievsk massacre. when the russian red army reached irkutsk, early in 1920, japan had proposed the setting up of a buffer state, and the far eastern republic was created, which, however, instead of falling under japanese in- fluence, remained closely tied to moscow and eventually, after the withdrawal of japanese troops from the continent, was declared a soviet republic by a constituent assembly. nego- tiations initiated in the autumn of 1922 broke down, but niko- laievsk was evacuated by, the japanese on sept. 27, and the maritime province on oct. 25. on feb. 4 1923, m. joffre was invited from peking to tokyo by viscount goto, and there were official negotiations from june 28 to july 31 of that year which were without concrete results. the japanese earthquake and the refusal by the japanese govt. of assistance offered by russia to japanese ‘‘ workers ” marked the beginning of a new period of hostility on the part of japan, but the japanese elections of may 1924 and possibly the american immigration act of that month brought about a change of government and a renewal of negotiations. these resulted in the russo-japanese treaty of jan. 20 1925 signed at peking, which came into force on feb. 26. (for the terms see japan, section relations with russia.) in accordance with this agreement the japanese evacuated north sakhalin on may 15 1925. soviet russia’s relations with japan are the same in character as the relations with the big western powers. her relations with china illustrate her policy towards “‘ oppressed ” as distinguished from ‘‘ exploiting ’’ nations. on july 26 1921 the soviet govt. informed the chinese govt. that russia would not in future require payments on account of the boxer indemnity of 1900, and renounced all special privileges in china. a treaty between russia and china was delayed by the influence of the western powers in china, by minor conflicts and by changes in chinese administration. a treaty was finally signed in peking on may 31 1924. at the same time an agreement was signed concerning the chinese eastern railway establishing the equality of russia and china in the management of the railway, abolishing the extra territorial rights of the railway and putting it under the pro- tection of chinese soldiery. this agreement could not be put into practice for some months because marshal chang tso lin, commanding in manchuria did not recognise the authority of the peking government. with that government’s approval a separate agreement to the same effect was signed by russia and chang tso lin at mukden on sept. 20 1924. there have been several conflicts concerning the railway, of which the most serious was that of jan. 1926. (see china; chinese eastern railway.) 3 for details of these treaties see a. j. toynbee, survey of inter- national affairs. at the same time (march 1) a turkish-afghan treaty was signed in moscow. russia expectation of revolution in germany.—in the autumn of 1923 the russian communist leaders believed that there would be a revolution in germany, as a result of the occupation of the ruhr and the separatist intrigues in the rhineland, which accentuated the economic crisis in germany. they expected that poland and france or poland alone, would attack the german revolution, and the soviet govt. sent victor kopp as plenipotentiary to seek an arrangement with the countries lying between russia and germany, whereby russia should be able to send corn to ger- many, no matter what german govt. should be in power. the communists could not have remained indifferent if an attempt had been made to blockade a revolutionary germany and, being extremely anxious to avoid war, hoped in this way to be able to make such a blockade ineffective without being themselves drawn into an armed struggle. some of their small western neighbours were glad of even this frail guarantee of peace, but nothing was actually signed, and the motive for seeking such an agreement was removed when the expected day came and there was no german revolution. from that moment the soviet govt. began to build alike its external and internal policy upon a belief that for a very much longer period than it had at first anticipated it would be the only communist govt. in europe. there had been a feeling in the minds of the masses that n.e.p. (new economic policy) would be thrown overboard as soon as a german revolution made it possible to exchange russian corn for german goods in an economically independent, self-contained socialist world. n.e.p. now gathered an atmosphere of perma- nency, and was henceforward more confidently developed. economic recovery.—although in lenin’s mind it had always been the policy of a prolonged period, the phrases used in intro- ducing it ( retreat ” “‘a manoeuvre ” and “ outflanking ”’) had delayed its acceptation as such. for some time revolutionary hopes and doubts were reflected in alternating moods of re- pression of and exultation in the growing commercial activity of the towns. for some time minor authorities were not quite clear as to what was and what was not allowed by the new economic policy. private traders who were too successful found themselves welcomed by the state trusts anxious to sell them goods, arrested as if at haphazard by the administrative authori- ties, and heavily taxed by those who had charge of the state finances. as one of them put it: ‘“‘ there was sunshine in the morning, but thunder in the air, and you never knew when you would have to take shelter from a downpour.” it was only after the definite political stabilisation of germany that they began to lose this feeling of precariousness. on the other hand they were enjoying a freedom they had not known under the civil war, the rewards were large, and in spite of the way in which the state weighted the scales against them and in its own favour they were extremely active. it was a long time before the state shops could outlive the bureaucratic manners of the period of militant communism. it was for a long time pleasanter and quicker to buy things from a private trader than from a state shop or a co- operative store, and the state had to learn that not in industry alone is it necessary to provide the stimulus of personal interest. but the machine, though at first those of its wheels creaked in which the state was particularly interested; began to move with increasing speed. the measures introduced as a concession to the peasantry were resulting in an extraordinary resuscitation of the towns. as early as 1923 the streets were full of jostling, hurrying crowds, and impartial observers were of the opinion that a stoppage of the new economic policy was beyond the power of the communists even if they had wished it. increasing activity in the towns, rapid growth of the tilled areas in the country, and the economic recovery of russia in general were accompanied naturally by a series of growing pains. the first of these was a crisis which from an image used by trotsky came to be known as the crisis of the “ scissors.”” the two blades of the scissors represented the prices of agricultural products and the price of manufactured goods. at one time during the civil war a peasant could get a grand piano from its starving owners in exchange for a few sacks of potatoes. with the new economic policy there came about a sharp change. 425 agricultural products became very cheap and manufactured goods very dear, so dear indeed that the peasants could not afford to buy them. part of the high price of goods was due to the enormous overhead cost of distribution through the co- operative organisations, part to high cost of organisation, low productivity of labour, etc., etc., and to the new anxiety of the state trusts to show profit, which led them to screw up the price of goods instead of reducing the cost of their manufacture. the result was a market crisis, in which goods remained unsold in the factories. the communists were threatened with a rapid growth of private trade unless they could reduce the overhead costs of sale, and with a stoppage of factories unless they could bring about a closing of the scissors—a lessening of the unequal balance between prices of corn and of manufactured goods. at the same time the country was in the throes of its struggle to stabilise the currency, so that there was a shortage of moncy which resulted in very natural strikes by workmen who had not been paid their wages. the most serious effect of the crisis was a loss of faith on the part of the peasantry, who felt very keenly that they were being exploited by the towns. party dissensions—these growing pains were reflected in discussions within the communist party. it seemed to some of the communists that the result of the new economic policy had been to turn the state apparatus into a capitalist organisa- tion, whose interests were no longer those of the working class. the trade unions had already ceased to be part of that ap- paratus, and had returned to the task of defending the interests of the workers against their employers, whether those were private persons or state trusts, but this did not prevent the formation of two surreptitious groups in the party with a tendency towards syndicalism. these did not include any of the better known leaders. much more serious for the party was the opposition that appeared in the autumn of 1923, which included members of the central committee, and in particular trotsky. the varicty of opinions united in a single block in this opposition was itself a proof that its underlying motives were not those openly put forward and that it reflected a widespread discontent in the ranks. it soon appeared that this opposition questioned the right of permanent leadership that seemed to be claimed by the “ old guard.” the discussion was used by the “ old guard ”’ chiefly to destroy the overwhelming prestige of trotsky, which, outside the central committee, was second only to that of lenin whereas inside it was never forgotten that trotsky had only sunk his differences with the party in 1917. stalin, zinoviev and kamenev fell upon trotsky with great vigour, and were still attacking him when, on jan. 21 1924, lenin died. if lenin had planned the manner of his dying with the object of preventing his death from shaking the soviet govt., he could not have done better than he did. his illness did not take him from the leadership until he had already set the party, the government and the country on the new road towards russian economic recovery that the end of the civil war made possible. it took him away for a few months, as it were temporarily, and then allowed him to return. it again removed him and allowed the country to accustom itself for a year to the idea of a council of people’s commissars over which lenin did not preside, and the communist party to the idea of looking for directives to a central committee which lenin no longer personally inspired. if he had died earlier, especially if he had died during the war, there might have been trouble over the succession. as it was, trotsky had been politically discredited by the central com- mittee ‘* just in time,” and there was no immediate dispute over the leadership which fell naturally to stalin, zinoviev and kam- enev, rykov taking the part of president of the council of people’s commissars. at the moment of lenin’s death, when it might have been expected that the position of the party would be shaken, the party was able to throw its gates open to new members from the working class. many thousands enrolled themselves within a few weeks, and by 1926 the party, which had been reduced to about 400,000 by the purge that accom- panied the introduction of the new economic policy, had grown to over a million. lenin died, and it was presently seen that 426 nothing had happened to weaken the government. there was a moment of expectation outside russia, a moment of fear inside russia among those who had come to look on lenin’s life as a sort of guarantee of russia’s new found stability. both were unjustified, and within a few weeks it was realised, outside as well as inside russia, that practically lenin died not in 1924 but nearly two years earlier, when, in 1922, he had first felt ill. great britain recognises the soviet govt-—on feb. 1 1924, less than a fortnight after lenin’s death, the new labour govt. in england signified its recognition of the soviet govt. as the de jure government of russia. italy, norway, austria, greece and sweden had taken the same step before the end of march. others followed. many countries, following the lead of italy, at once appointed ambassadors. england postponed doing this until outstanding questions should be regulated, and a conference for this purpose was called forthwith. these negotiations, which became the subject of bitter political controversy in england, began in london on april 14. the russians, as in former nego- tiations, insisted that the two questions of recognition of debts and the provision of credit for development of the power to pay must be considered together. meetings between the russians and the bondholders ended in a deadlock. after extreme diffi- culty, two agreements between the governments were signed on aug. 8—a general agreement, and one on trade and shipping, which provided for the application of the export credits act to trade with russia. russia was to continue negotiations with the bondholders, and an agreement with them was to be included in a further treaty and to be a condition on which the british govt. would be prepared to recommend parliament to guarantee the interest and sinking fund of a private loan. on nov. 4 mr. macdonald resigned, and the conservative govt. that suc- ceeded him did not offer the treaties for consideration by parlia- -ment.! the position remained what it had been before the negotiations began. sir robert hodgson in moscow, and the russian representative in england were still in 1926, two years after formal recognition of the soviet govt., enjoying only the privileges given to charges d’affaires. the economic position.—in 1925 russia was a very different country from the russia of the politically chaotic period that immediately followed the feb. revolution of 1917 or from the desperate, starving russia of the civil war. both in agriculture and in industry she had recovered a level of productivity only about 30% below the level she had reached before the war. the mist of cross purposes that hung over the visible bustle of the towns had cleared sufficiently to show that the new eco- nomic policy had not been a simple retreat towards capitalism, and that russia’s undeniable development had been along lines fundamentally different from those followed by other countrics. that difference was much more marked in the towns than in the country. it may be said that the towns in russia formed islands experimenting in a new economic organisation but sur- rounded and fertilised by an immense sea of agricultural life which was as yet only very slightly affected by these experiments. no great progress had been made in collective agriculture among the peasants, who, after the general levelling of the revolution, were working exactly as they had worked before it, some showing a tendency to get rich, others becoming impoverished and ready to work for hire instead of for themselves. in the towns, how- ever, were definite signs of the consolidation of a new system, and the fact that the towns controlled export and import gave them an influence in the villages that showed (1926) no signs of diminishing. . 1 during the election campaign which followed the defeat of the labour govt. in great britain on oct. 8 1924, there was published (oct. 24), under a covering letter addressed by a foreign office official to mr. rakovsky, the soviet charge d'affaires in london, a provocative letter purporting to be addressed to the central com- mittee of the british communist party by the praesidium of the third international over the signatures of zinoviev, mcmanus, and kuusinen. jts authenticity was denied, but the publication roused national wrath in great britain, and the conversations were not renewed. for the official correspondence and the text of the “‘ zino- viev letter '' sce a. j. toynbee, survey of international affairs 1924 (oxford, 1926), (ed. e. b.) russia in russian industry the relative proportion of private to state and co-operative industry seemed to be growing less. in the year 1923-4 it was estimated that 76.3% of industry was in the hands of the state and the co-operative organisation. in the year 1924-5, this percentage had increased to 79:3. in trade, whereas in the first six months of 1923 50% was in private hands, and the second six months 34%, in the year 1924-5 only 26° was in private hands, while there was an absolute increase in the trade turnover. individual interest remains the primary motive of production and trade, in town as in the country, but not many persons are able to live by allowing someone else to use their money for productive trade purposes. unearned incre- ment is rare. inheritance is allowed with a scale of high and rapidly increasing death duties. the clash of interests between classes inherent in the ordinary system is present in russia also, where it is artificially reflected by a conflict of motives between different organisations, mutually independent but subject to partial control by a single centre. thus, whereas the managers and directors of the trusts are chiefly interested in cheapening and increasing production, the trade unions are chiefly interested in seeing that these objects are not achieved at the expense of the workers employed, while the trading organisations are chiefly interested in preventing high prices from lessening their turnover. the central authority, by controlling credit, can bring pressure to bear on the trusts, while by buying and selling it can influence the market. rates of pay are for the most part decided by collective treaty under the supervision of the trade unions. arbitration is used for the settlement of disputes. the economic crisis of 1925.——the concentration of industry and trade in the hands of the state gives to economic crises a character differing from that of such crises in other countries. in other countries a crisis in one industry is felt only in a lesser degree by others. in russia, by affecting import and export, it affects the whole economic body of the state. since no part of that body is without some sort of contact with the communist party every such crisis is at once reflected in a conflict of views within the party. towards the end of 1925 the communists were faced by the most serious crisis for several years. they had counted, in view of a fair harvest, on being able to buy enough corn from the peasants to increase very largely russian export. assuming that they would have this largely increased export they planned a lavish import of machinery, etc., confident that they could afford this without risking the favourable balance of trade which they regarded as essential to the stability of their currency. they gave large orders, undertaking big obli- gations, their confidence being increased by each month of favourable weather. then, after the harvest, it appeared that the peasant was in no hurry to sell. his taxes had been lowered. he had no urgent need of money, knew that the government needed the corn and hoped that the longer he held the higher would be the price. the favourable trade balance vanished. it could be restored only by a sharp cutting down of import and that meant a loss of slowly gained confidence abroad and the slowing down of the tempo of economic recovery at home. fur- ther, obligations had to be met in foreign currency, on the pos- session of which depended to a large extent the stability of the russian bank-note. the peasant, straw in his hair and sun- flower seed in his mouth, had put a spoke in the wheel of the whole community. this was the economic crisis that sharpened the dispute in the communist party with which the year 1925 closed. it united in opposition to the central committee, though with widely different views, some of its members who, by reason of their particular work, felt the crisis most intimately. kamenev, as president of the council of labour and defence, with an economic report in his hands (that he was now allowed to present to the party congress) was very conscious that the peasant had put a stop to what had promised to be a triumphal, uninterrupted progress. sokolnikov, responsible for finance, saw the peasant threatening the stability of the currency. zinoviev, of the third international, felt that peasant domination was likely to injure the prestige of the russian party in the minds of the communist russia parties of western europe. the peasant’s application of blue pencil to the soviet govt.’s export plan raised anew the whole question of the new economic policy. there was no question of abandoning that policy. the question was whether, under n.e.p. the communists were doing enough to ensure that the general progress of the country was in the direction of socialism or were allowing the strengthening of a class which would even- tually compel the country to move in the other direction. the question raised was, “ which class of peasants was most profiting by n.e.p.?”? the central committee held that there was no need to exaggerate the influence of the rich peasants, who were in a small minority among those fairly well off, who profited by n.e.p. the economic recovery of the country, and particu- larly the development of industry was the surest means to acquire a dominating influence over the peasantry. the interests of industrial development were paramount in a situation that made it clear that for along time to come russia could not expect revolution in any of the big industrial countries. the leaders of the opposition were attacked and discredited in the same way as trotsky had been attacked and discredited in earlier discus- sions, and the new economic policy received a further confir- mation. (a. r.) bibliography.—the principal authorities are russian documents; also files of izvestiya and pravda. a great mass of books on russian subjects have been published in other languages. the following selec- tion does not pretend to be exhaustive. general. l. pozvolsky, the economics of communism (new york, 1921); h. n. brailsford, the russian worker’s republic (london, 1922); r. luxemburg, die russische revolution (berlin, 1922); v. antonov-ovsyeenko, der aufbau der roten armee in der revolution (hamburg, 1923); a. rothstein, ed., the soviet constitu- tion (london, 1923). history and politics. n. bukharin, vom sturze des zarismus bis sum sturze der bourgeoisie (zurich, 1918); l. trotsky, the bolshevtkt and world peace (new york, 1918); id. the history of the russian revolution to brest-litovsk (london, 1919); id. die geburt der roten armee (vienna, 1924); id. lenin (london, 1925); a. t. kerensky, the prelude to bolshevism (london, 1919); a. m. ransome, six weeks in russia in rgrg (london, 1919); id. the crisis in russta (london, 1921); m. p. price, afy reminiscences of the russian revolution (london, 1921); s. zagorsky, l'evolution actuelle du bolshevisme russe (paris, 1921); m. gorky, eertis de revolution (paris, 1922); p. n. milyukov, russia to-day and to-niorrow (london, 1922); id. geschichte der zweiten russischen revolution (vienna, 1922, etc.); l. pozvolsky, russta tn the far east (london, 1922); c. radek, wege der russischen revolution (hamburg, 1922); g. a. aleksinsky, du tsarisme au communisme (paris, 1923); m. farbman, bolshevism in retreat (london, 1923); also after lenin. the new phase in russia (london, 1924); a. l. p. dennis, the foreign policies of soviet russia (london, 1924); o. bauer, bol- schewismus oder soztaldemokratie? (vienna, 1920); m. eastman, since lenin died (london, 1925); dr. c. kramaf, die russische krisis (munich and leipzig, 1925); j. mavor, an economic history of russia, 2nd ed. (london and toronto, 1925, etc.); a. j. toynbee, a survey of international affairs, vol. 2, part 1 (london, 1926). law. dr. w. hahn and a. v. lilienfeld-toal, regelung des han- dels und verkehrs in russland (kiel university, 1921); l. bach, le droit et les institutions de la russie sovietique (paris, 1923); dr. h. freud, russlands friedens—und handelsvertrdge (breslau, 1924). trade. la dette publique de la russie (paris, 1922); league of nations, report on economic conditions in russia with special reference to the famine of 1921-22 and the state of agriculture (geneva, 1922); r. claus, die kriegswirtschafit russlands bis sur bolschewis- iischen revolution! (bonn and leipzig, 1922); k. leites, recent economic developments in russia (carnegie endowment for [inter- national peace, oxford, 1922); l. b. krassin, die aussichten fiir die russische ausfuhr (berlin, 1923); l. trotsky, die neue dkonomuische politik sowjetrusslands und die weltrevolution (hamburg, 1923); l. pozvolsky and h. g. moulton, russian debts and russian recon- struction (institute of economics, new york, 1924); l. sesal and a. a. santalov, ed., commercial year-book of the soviet union. see also international labour office, co-operation in soviet rus- sia (studies and reports, series h. no. 3); id., russia, nos. i-5 (legislative series, 1922); industrial life in soviet russia (studies and reports, series b. no. 14, 1924); trade union congress general council, the official report of the british trade union delegation io russia in nov. and dec. 1924 (london, 1925). for british relations with russia, see cmd. 1602 of 1922; cmd. 1846, 1869, 1874 and 1890 of 1923; and cmd. 2215 of 1924. iv. the constitution the constitution of the union of soviet socialist republics, drawn up on july 26 1923, was confirmed on jan. 31 1924. this 427 unites in a single body a number of ethnographically and admin- istratively distinct states with essentially similar constitutions. the congress of soviets —the supreme legislative power rests with the congress of soviets, which, when not sitting, delegates that power to an executive committee, made up of the unton council and the council of nationalities. the union council is elected by the congress of soviets. the council of nationalities is made up of five representatives from each of the united and autonomous republics and one each from the autonomous districts. the execu- tive committee can veto decrees, etc., passed by its praesidium or by individual congresses of soviets of republics, or their executive committees within the territory of the union. it is itself responsible only to the congress of soviets of the union. this congress meets not less than once a year, for which purpose it is elected. in each year there are three sessions of the executive committee of the union. in the intervals between its sessions its authority is delegated to its praesidium of 27 members. the council of peoples’ commis- sars is the executive organ of the central executive committee of the union. it consists of the president of council of peoples’ commis- sars, vice-presidents and ten peoples’ commissars. the separate republics —each of the republics forming the union is ruled by its own congress of soviets in matters that do not con- cern the union as a whole. the congress of a republic elects its central executive committee and this in turn its praesidium and its council of peoples’ commissars, to which it admits, for purposes of co-ordination plenipotentiaries of the union peoples’ commissars for foreign affairs, military and naval affairs, foreign trade, ways of communication and posts and tclegraphs. the franchise-—every working citizen, male or female, who has reached the age of 18 has a right to take part in elections to the soviets unless he or she makes profit out of the use of hired labour, out of religion or out of usury (persons living on interest from capital or dividends), is a member of the one-time ruling house in russia, has served under the old regime in the police, secret police, or corps of gendarmes, or has been convicted of taking or offering bribes, banditry, espionage, etc. the most elementary form of soviet is the village soviet, to which, roughly speaking, every 100 electors send one delegate. the village soviets in a rural district (volost} send one representative for every 300 inhabitants to a volost congress of soviets, which meets once a year and elects a volost executive committee, which is the chief authority for that district. a town soviet is made by the election of one member for every 1,000 persons. town and village soviets unite in a district (ouyezd) con- gress of soviets, though not on equal terms. the town soviets send one delegate for every 200 electors, whereas the village electors are represented through the volost congresses of soviets, which send one delegate for every 1,000 of the population. the owyezd congresses elect executive committees, which are the supreme authority over the territory of the ouyezd. the government congresses of soviets, subject only to the supreme organs of the republic, are elected by the town soviets and the ouyezd congresses, the town soviets sending one delegate for every 2,000 electors and the ouyezd congresses one dele- gate for every 10,000 of the population. these congresses elect executive committees, in whose hands is their authority until the succeeding congress. the congress of soviets of a republic, like the congress of soviets of the union, is elected by the town soviets and the government congresses of soviets. the town soviets elect one delegate for every 25,000 electors, and the government congresses one delegate for every 125,000 of the population. the effect of this constitution is to give increasing weight to the voice of the industrial population of the towns in the higher organs of authority while leaving very great freedom to the peasants to conduct things in their own way in the villages. the proportion of communists in the village soviets is extremely small. in the town soviets it is large. it is larger in the government congresses than in those of the ouyezds cannons) and larger again in the congresses of republics or of the nion. the communist party.—with the gradual disappearance and break- up of other parties and the certainty that a communist majority in the congress of soviets of the union and in the central executive committee would invariably support the views put forward by the communists, public interest in the congress of soviets grew less, and interest in the congresses of the communist party increased. it was clear that what the communists decided to-day the representa- tive institutions would decree tomorrow. communist congresses were still held behind closed doors, but their debates were reported at very great length. the mechanism of the communist party began to be as important as that of the constitution, since, for prac- tical purposes, it was the actual, though not the formal, govt. of russia. a congress of the communist party is attended by delegates from the local branches. it is met by the central committee appoint- ed by the previous congress, and hears reports which represent the views of the majority of the central committee. it takes these reports as the starting points of its debates. at the end of the debates it passes resolutions which represent compromises between differing views (if such obtain) made with the object of finding formulae that will be supported by votes as nearly unanimous as possible. these resolutions are considered as directives binding upon the central committee, which the congress then proceeds to elect, it elects a 428 central committee (63 members with 43 deputies), a central control commission (163 members and a central revisional committee of seven members). (these figures are those of the congress that met at the end of 1925.) thereafter is held a ‘‘ plenum” of the central com- mittee, together with members of the pracsidium of the central con- trol commission and the members of the central revisional commis- sion. this “ plenum " elects the political bureau of nine members with five deputies, the secretariat of the central committce of five members with two deputies, the general secretary of the central committee (stalin, 1926) and an organising bureau of eleven mem- bers with five deputies. it further appoints the editors of the party newspapers and the representatives of the party newspapers and the representatives of the party in the executive committce of the third international. great efforts are made to preserve unanimity in the central com- mittee, and party discipline is extremely strict. a dissenting member of the committee is considered to have infringed discipline if he presses his views outside the committee without its permission. that permission is usually given before a congress, and it is under- stood that in the event of those views being rejected by the congress the dissenter will wholeheartedly support whatever other views are accepted. by accumulated prestige, fear of schism, control of pub- lication and control of promotion in the party, the central committee is in a very strong position in the party in the matter of obtaining support, the political bureau is in a strong position in the com- mittee, while the general secretary has an overwhelmingly strong position in both. : the result is a highly centralised instrument for making political decisions which are reflected in the congresses of sovicts and carried out by the council of peoples’ commissars. but this instrument is also used in the reverse way, namely, to obtain a wide understanding and support for all the measures of the government. every phase in the government’s activities is debated from top to bottom of the party. no important event or change of policy (forcign or internal) takes place without a series of conferences at which the line of the central committee (which controls the government) is explained and discussed. the rank and file of the party are thus kept in close touch with what is going on over their heads, while through these conferences the feeling of the rank and file is reflected back to the committee, and when this feeling seems at all uncertain studied campaigns of explanation are undertaken. this process is carried further through the part played by the rank and file in non-party organisations (trade unions, soviets, ctc.) until behind the decisions of the central committee is ranged the whole strength of the party and that of a considerable proportion of the non-party workers. this sort of ‘‘ democratic centralism " ts not something newly worked out, but is a fundamental principle of a party which long before the revolution believed at the same time in mass movement and in highly centralised leadership. (atk) v. defence it is difficult at the present time to obtain entirely accurate statistics of the armed forces of the union of socialist soviet republics or to gauge their military value. the political isola- tion of russia from the rest of europe precludes many of the normal sources of information. the following outline may, therefore, be only approximately correct. control and administration.—the central executive com- mittee, which is virtually the supreme governing body of the union, exercises its control over the armed forces through the people’s commissariat for military and naval affairs, at the head of which is a commissar, corresponding to a defence minister. he has under him two assistants and a revolutionary military council, from which depend the inspector general, the staff (z.e., general staff) and the chiefs of political work and of supply. the inspector general has under him inspectors for naval affairs and for the air force, cavalry, artillery, etc. there is also a body termed the commissariat for labour and national defence, charged with the duty of co-ordinating all activities in the sphere of national defence, and in that of national economics. in its essentials, therefore, the soviet system is, in theory at least, very similar to that of other countries. its peculiar fea- tures are the combination of the three services, army, navy and air force, under a single head, and the prominence of the political department of the military council, which controls political instruction in the services, watches over the political orthodoxy of the forces and has no counterpart in the military system of other countries. the political department has its own troops. terms of service.—compulsory service is in force, and a man’s military obligations practically begin at 16 years of age. between the years of 16 to 18 he has to do preparatory physical training for a period of four wecks or 160 hours, and from 18 to 20a more advanced russia course of “ pre-conscription training,’’ lasting 10 weeks. service with the colours in the regular army is for two years in the infantry, artillery and cavalry, for three years in the air force and for 4} years in the navy. men then pass into the reserve, where they remain up to the age of 40. those who are not required for the regular army do four years’ service in the territorial army; three months in the first year and a total of five months in the remaining years, all men over 40 are still liable to service in a form of landsturm, up to the age of 46. the principle theoretically followed is that only workers, peasants and cossacks may bear arms in the defence of the republic, the bourgeoisie to carry out non-combatant duties. man-power.—the population of the countries which now acknowl- edge sovict rule is approximately 130 millions. the full strength of the annua! contingent, after allowing for medical rejections, comes to about 725,000,! of which it is estimated that some 400,000 are called up, the remainder being exempted for various reasons. there are, at the present time, probably over 10,000,000 men between the ages of 18 and 31 who have received some form of military training and are available to fill the cadres in the event of a general mobilisa- tion, organisation of the armed forces.—(a) the land forces consist of the regular army, the territorial army, and certain special troops. the first two of these categories correspond generally to the same categories of the british army, but the special troops of the political department form an entirely exceptional body. their rele is that of internal security, the quelling of civil disturbances, the service of frontier guards and coast guards, intelligence, police and escort work. they are under the control of the ogpu, and come under the control of the military department only for operations. they are in fact the pillar on which communist rule rests, and they comprise the staunchest elements of the communist party.2, they are or- ganised in regiments, battalions, batteries, etc. on the same lines as eat forces, and include a proportion of armoured cars and air- cralit. for administrative purposes, russia is divided into eight military districts and two ‘armies,’ viz.: the moscow, leningrad (st. petersburg), western, volga, ukraine, north caucasus, siberia and wirghiz military districts, the independent caucasus army and the ist turkestan army. these districts are again subdivided into areas corresponding to the territorial divisions and regiments recruited from them, the authorities in which are responsible for all mobilisation preparations and arrangements. the highest peace formation is the corps, of which there are 22. they consist normally of three divisions and corps troops. these latter include medium artillery, tanks and armoured cars, and a gas regiment, there are 12 cavalry divisions, nine independent cavalry brigades, and 66 infantry divisions (regular and territorial). a cavalry division consists of six regiments and includes 12 guns and nearly 200 machine guns, heavy and light. an infantry division comprises three regiments, each of three battalions, with 48 guns and some 450 automatic weapons. the three regiments of the division are each entirely complete and self-contained with their own mounted scouts, close support artillery, transport and so forth, so that they can operate independently. one result of this is the very large amount of transport in a division, over 3,000 vehicles and 9,000 animals. , the total peace strength of the land forces is approximately as follows: regular forces 400,000; territorial forces (including regular cadres) 470,000; special troops (including their reserves) 150,000. in addition, the milizie (armed constabulary) number 200,000. (b) atr force.—the soviet authorities are making great efforts to create a powerful air force. the peace establishment of personnel is about 10,000. the total number of serviceable aeroplanes available is at present probably about 550, organised into between 40 and 50 air squadrons. squadrons are allotted in peace to the various military districts. in war they would srceunably form “ army ” and “corps " troops. ; | (c) naval forces—the russian navy is divided into two main fleets, the baltic fleet and black sea fleet, with strengths as follows:— baltic fleei:— black sea fleet:— 2 battleships, 2 armoured cruisers, from iqii, 3 gunboats, 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 2 gunboats, 5 submarines, and = small 13 destroyers, craft (minesweepers, etc.). 8 torpedo boats, 9 submarines, a number of auxiliary craft (minesweepers, etc.). both dating the caspian and oxus flotilfas consist of a few small armed vessels. 1 the total annual class numbers about 950,000; owing to the huge distances, the lack of up-to-date instructors and other considerations the actual contingent is reduced to the figure indicated above. 2 the percentage of communists in the ranks of the army is only about 8 per cent. in the ogpu troops it is much higher; also in the higher command and in certain technical units, #.e., armoured forces. russia estimate of efficiency of soviet forces.—it is difficult to arrive at a just appreciation of the actual military value of the red forces. the chief features of their organisation are the high proportion of cavalry, to which arm great value is attached; the equipment of the smaller formations, such as the regiment, for independent action; the large numbers of automatic weapons; and the preparation made for the use of gas as an offensive weapon. in this deadly branch of modern warfare, it is believed that great progress has been made. to sum up, the russian army on paper is very thoroughly organised and appears for- midable. on the other hand, no amount of paper organisation will at once remove failings inherent in the national character or disabilities in the economic pasition of the country. the old imperial russian army suffered from a shortage of educated officers and non-commissioned ofhcers and of skilled technical personnel; in present-day russia this defect must be far more pronounced. the lack of power to manufacture her require- ments in munitions and the backward state of the communica- tions of the country were fatal to russia’s armies in the late war; it can hardly be said that the manufacturing strength of the country has increased under soviet rule, while the transport system went from bad to worse, though transport was reorgan- ised by dzerjhinsky and much improved 1923-4. it seems unlikely that discipline and morale are as high as under the old regime. on the whole, therefore, it may be doubted whether the red forces would be as formidable in the field as they are imposing on paper. but the bolshevist authorities have brought to a high degree of efficiency a strategical weapon which is often of more value than armies, that of subversive propaganda. the founder of soviet policy, lenin, laid down that “‘ the soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disin- tegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy.” in other words, the army is intended only as a consolidating agency to occupy the ground already won by political propaganda. russia’s defence problems.—russia’s chief economical and strategical need has always been a free outlet to the oceans of the world. her northern shores are ice-bound for a great part of the year; and the baltic on the west and the black sea on the south are closed waters of which other nations control the exits. only in the far east, at an uneconomical distance from her main centres of population, is an unimpeded outlet to the high seas possible. on land, russia’s unwieldy size and the poor development of her communications have been serious handicaps to offensive action on her part, but have, on the other hand, always in the end baffled enemics who have sought to invade her. the value of the mounted arm in this country of wide plains and great distances has always been expressed by the high proportion of cavalry in the russian army. the changes brought about by the war on the european frontier of russia have considerably simplified her defence prob- lem on that side, since she is now bordered by a series of small and comparatively weak states, of which poland is probably the strongest. the finnish frontier comes uncomfortably close to the former capital (now leningrad) and to the naval fortress of kronstadt, but aggression on the part of finland is hardly a probable contingency. in the south, the possession by rumania of the former russian province of bessarabia may at some date prove a subject of contention. but the western frontier cf russia certainly lies under no such threat as it did in 1914 from germany and austria. on the caucasus frontier russia is faced by a much weakened turkey, with whom, moreover, she at present maintains close relations. in the east, the activities displayed by the soviet authorities in endeavouring to extend their influence over persia, afghan- istan and the chinese empire may ultimately bring them into clash with great britain on the frontiers of india, or with japan in manchuria or china. the bolshevists will, however, assuredly seek, for as long as possible, to gain their ends by propaganda and by fostering internal disorders rather than by an open resort to arms. 429 in conclusion, an important tendency of the present rulers of russia may be noted, since it may have eventually no small strategical consequences. it is their policy of encouraging amongst the non-russian races which form part of the union the creation of national forces; they have even indicated an intention to place the whole of the armed forces on a territorial basis. this is a complete reversal of the tsarist policy, which was to split up the non-russians and incorporate them in small proportions in russian units. the new system obviously has great advantages from the point of view of morale and efiiciency; on the other hand, it may make it easier in the future for terri- tories with a non-russian population to break away from the former russian empire. for the laws regulating military and naval service, sce izvestia sept. 30 1922, march 23 1924, aug. 8 1923, sept. 23 1925. the report on military and naval affairs submitted to the 3rd assembly of the u.s.s.r. is printed in jzvestia may 22 1925. see also arma- ments year book (league of nations, geneva 1926), (a. p. w.) vi. economic history population. —the population of russia on jan. 1 1913, accord- ing to the official census figures, was 178,400,000. the popula- tion of the separated territories according to calculations dating from the years 1915-9 were as follows:— finland . 3,368,000 estonia . 1,750,000 latvia 2,500,000 lithuania 2,246,000 poland . 16,022,000 ars 492,000 bessarabia : , 2,213,000 total . . 28,591,000 the population of the union of socialist soviet republics and its principal parts was, in 1924:— russian s.f.s.r. : ‘ ukraine s.s.r.. : ‘ ‘ white russian s.s.r. a transcaucasian s.f.s.r. , turkoman s.s.r, : ; . : . “a uzbek s.s.r. e bi. &:. a : ; totdl. we. a: ae ok, se. . 139,700,000 the comparison of these data, which cannot, however, pre- tend to a great degree of accuracy, shows that in the 1o years the population of the formcr russian empire has not increased. it is very probable that growth had already ceased during the war. it is certain that the population decreased in the period 1918-21 during the civil war and the famine of 1921-2. increase only began again in 1922. on the eve of the war the rural population was 86-3°% of the whole, the town population 13-7%. according to statistics of 1923 83:6% lived in the country districts, 16-4°4 in towns. no deductions, however, can be based on these figures as to changes in the distribution of the population between town and country, for during the revolution many villages were changed into towns. these figures notwithstanding, the town population has probably decreased of late years. this is in any case true of large towns. dlgriculinve —the most important facts are stated in tabular form in which figures are given for the quinquennium before the war 1909-13; the year of the revolution, 1917; the year 1021, when the soviet govt. gave up the policy of war communism in favour of the so-called ‘‘ new economic policy ”’; and for the subsequent years as far as 1924. all the figures in this and the following tables relate to the present territory of the soviet union:— 96,700,000 27,700,000 4,200,000 5,400,000 joo,000 ‘ 4,800,000 hrg2t!1922)1923 1924! ee, 1909-13] 1917 area sown (in million desya- tines). . 831 | 79-41 58-3) 49°3}60 [77-2 total yield of all cereals (in milliard poods) . .. 3°9 3-4] 1-7] 2:2) 2-8) 2-8 wheat ; : : ; 1-1 0) cc) cr | 9 6) rye . : p ; : i-i io} 6-6; oq] «tsi] fr barley : , : : ; 5 7 hr) >” 2 | re) oats . : ; : : : “$3 7 en, ee | | maize. ‘i “i] eh) o:3i] oe] et | potatoes “i| i: rt ‘9 430 the reduction of the area sown went on systematically till 1922. in 1923 the turning point came and the sown area began to increase. in 1925 it was about the same as in pre-war times. as to the yield of cereals, the lowest figure is for 1921, when the country suffered from the failure of the harvest. 1924 was again a bad year, so, notwithstanding the increase in the area sown, the yield of cereals was the same as in the previous year. the yield of 1925 was almost as much as in pre-war times. the table shows a marked increase during the last five years in the cultivation of potatoes. in regard to crops not shown in the table it should be said that flax, hemp and sugarbeet rose quickly after 1922, but up to 1923 had not attained their pre-war levels. there has been an increase not only in the cultivation of potatoes, but also in that of suntlower for seed. cattle-raising also fell off very much in the time of war and revolution. in 1924 the number of horses had not reached the pre-war level. the quantity of other animals had either reached their pre-war numbers or had exceeded them, but it must be admitted that these figures are not entirely trustworthy. (in thousand heads) 1913 | i917 31,307] 15,804) 18,933] 15,600] 20,035/23,854 large horned cattle | 50,284] 25,648] 36,817] 33, ost 38,567|51,420 smaller horned cattle} 83,045] 44,442] 49,721] 40,022] 56,744|/78,847 pigs . 19,274] 12,696] 12,491 7,637 9,105|17,672 mining —the effects of the war and revolution were even more severe in the mining industry. its restorations began soon after the introduction of the new economic policy, but the results obtained did not in any branch equal pre-war production. the information given before for the period beginning in 1921 refers not to calendar years but to vor beginning on oct. 1 and ending on sept. 30. yield in million poods 1921 number of horses . 1909-13] 1917-8 | 1921-2 | 1922-3 | 1923-4 | 1924-5 oil . | 547°6 | 422:'6 | 276-1 | 315-4 | 362-9 | 424°2 coal i 778 ‘sur is8e 9 | 588-7 | 659°8 | 938 956 iron ore o-4 10-9 26:1 55°7 | 109°1 1for 1913. industry also was very much reduced in 1920-1, and before the introduction of the new economic policy this, together with the decrease in the productivity of agriculture, was one of the chief causes of the renunciation of the economic methods of war communism. according to the calculations of authoritative economists the production of industry in 1921 only reached 20% of its pre-war level, taking the total of the chief branches. it may not be out of place to call to mind that at this time no mar- kets existed in soviet russia, and the small quantity of goods produced by the factorics and workshops was divided among consumers according to “ cards” and “‘ orders” under a plan worked out by the organs of the central government. the numbers of workers in industry in the years rg1o-25 do not give a fair picture of the actual extent of production and the increase which has taken place since 1921. this is due first to the fall in the productivity of labour which accompanied the general disorganisation of all economic life, and secondly to the fact that many persons included in the numbers of industrial workers were unemployed in the most difficult years. number of workers in industry 1913 ; . 1,889,000 1923-4 . 1,263,000 1921-2 829,000 = 1924-5 1,493,000 1922-3. « ~=— ~:1,120,000 1925 (end of the year), 828,000 production (in million poods') 1909-137! 1921-2 | 1922-3 | 1923-4 | 1924-5 cast iron 233:6 | 10-6 18-3 4orl 70-6 iron and stecl 204 °6 19-3 36-0 60-1 1 a pood is 36 ib. or roughly ¢'y of a ton. 2 the data refer to the territory of the former russian empire, i.e., they include the production of poland, about 10% of the whole. russia in order to complete the comparison of the present state of production (1923-4-5) with its condition just before the war, it will be useful to quote some calculations of the state general organising commission of the autumn of 1925. one of the chief tasks of the commission was the comparison of present with pre-war data. we will here confine ourselves to percentages. pre-war production is taken as that of 1913. the data for 1924-5 are still provisional only. relation to pre-war production chief cereals potatoes flax cotton . . goal: 2. a. ga oil d cotton spinning and weaving . sugar . , : ; foreign trade.—the foreign trade of the soviet union almost disappeared during the civil war and so far is still much below the pre-war level. the statistics quoted below are given as the actual prices for the years before 1914 and for the subsequent years at 1913 prices in millions of gold roubles. (in millions of gold roubles) imports exports turnover 1909- 3 1,139°7 i,501-0 2,640-7 i9i4 1,098-0 956°1 2,054°1 iqt5 1,138-6 401'8 1,540°4 1916 ; ; 1,716°5 476°4 2,192: 1917 ° 1,965-°8 464-0 2,429°8 1920 : 29°90 5 30°5 1921 210-0 20:2 2302 1922 269-8 81-6 351-4 1922- 147°9 133°3 281-2 206°8 332°9 356: i the import and export of commodities under the chief groups are distributed during the last two years as follows:— (in million roubles at 1913 prices) 1923-4 1924-5 import | export |] import | export foodstuffs 17°5 195-2 86 104:2 raw material and_half- 7 finished pao ‘ 126°3 136-4 156-7 213: various. ee 63 r3 113-4 3:0 total ; ina . | 206-8 332-9 356-1 320-2 the large amount of imported foodstuffs in 1924-5 is explained by the bad harvest of that year and the consequent necessity of importing wheat flour to feed the large industrial centres. the currency of the soviet union is made up of several parts. (1) bank-notes issued by the state bank in a monetary unit called the chervonets. (2) treasury notes issued by the peoples’ commissariat of finance in a monetary unit called a rouble. (3) silver and copper money. one chervonets is the equivalent of ro roubles. bank-notes are issued in denominations of from one to 25 chervonets; treasury notes in denominations of one rouble, three roubles and five roubles; silver money from tro kopeks to one rouble; copper money from one kopek to five kopeks (one rouble = 100 kopeks). bank-notes must have a minimum cover of bullion and foreign exchange as to 25° 4, the remainder must be covered by short dated bills and easily realisable commodities. the law has not laid down any obligatory cover for treasury notes. except, however, for 48,000,000 roubles issued for the redemption of the former paper money in 1924 and for replenishing the state treasury prior to july 1924 all the remaining treasury notes russia have been issued through the state bank; e.g., they bear a direct relation to the value of business transactions. on jan. 1 1926 the issue of bank-notes amounted to 781,363,600 roubles (the cover consisting of 216,131 roubles’ worth of gold and platinum and 48,874,700 roubles’ worth of foreign currency, dollars and sterling); 387,737,300 roubles had been issued in the form of treasury notes, 1 1,419,481,800 roubles in silver coins and 7,623,700 roubles in copper. the budget.—the state budget for 1924-5 was passed at 2,558,525,034 roubles. the revenue is made up as follows:— a. ordinary receipts:— 1. direct taxes bs : ‘ 442,729,000 2. indirect taxes . : : ; , 525,500,000 3. taxes on transactions 100,655,000 4. post and telegraph . 88,400,000 5. transport . ‘ 855,000,000 6. state property and undertakings 188,948,000 7. other receipts . 33,279,406 total ordinary 2,234,511,406 b. extraordinary receipts :— 1. realisation of state funds 23,000,000 2. credit operations 141,000,000 3. reccipt from currency issues. 80,000,000 total extraordinary . grand total 244,000,000 2,478,511,406 the budget for 1925-6 is not yet passed in its final form. it probably approaches four milliards. nominally it will exceed the last pre-war budget (1913), which showed as receipts 3,452,577,000 roubles and expenditure 3,382,912 thousand roubles. in reality, however, it is less than the pre-war budget by about one-quarter, if we take into consideration on the one hand the loss of territory and population, on the other the different pur- chasing power of the rouble in r913 and 1925. the russian national debt (beginning with the loans con- cluded in 1922) amounted on jan. 1 aoe to 437,200,000 roubles. ln) agrarian policy one of the first decrees of the soviet govt. was the decree on lands (nov. 8 1917) under which private ownership in land was abolished without compensation and private, crown and church estates passed into the hands of the commune and district councils for distribution to the peasants. the decree registered (see potitrcat history above) a process which was already in the course of being accomplished. the fundamental law on land socialisation was promulgated on feb. 19 1918. the abolition of private ownership was strongly confirmed; possession was only granted to those who cultivated by their own labour. no pri- vate transaction in land was permissible. distribution was to be on the basis of the work-power of the family; taking a man as a unit, the work power of women, youths, girls and boys were assessed at +80, :75, -60 and -5o0 respectively. collective farming.—in addition to the distribution to families the law contemplated the grant of land to associations of agri- cultural labourers, and a scheme was drawn up for the settlement of farming communities. under the regulations for the socialist agrarian organisation of the land laid down on feb. 14 19109 provision was made for the taking over of large model estates, the best conducted estates of the former landowners, which it was obviously bad policy to divide, into soviet farms, the man- agement of which lay with provincial committees and in some cases directly with the commissariat for agriculture in moscow. the managers were appointed from moscow, and the interests of the workers were entrusted to a workers’ committee on each 431 farm. the farms leased to the co-operative societies, which by a decree of sept. 7 1921 were allowed; to resume their pro- ductive activities without restriction, were run on a similar basis. further, by an agreement with the nansen action in moscow in 1923, two large estates in the saratov and ekaterinoslav govts. (about 50,000 ac.) were taken over for a period of years by that organisation with the object of demonstrating modem produc- tion methods and of assisting the neighbouring peasants by tractor ploughing and harvesting. similar large scale develop- ments were undertaken on a concession basis by krupps in the kuban and by other companies. on both the state and the co-operative farms overhead charges for the supervising per- sonnel tended to be high, and the hired labour expensive, with the result that some enterprises had to be abandoned. the three-shift system of labour which had to be adopted in order to meet the requirement of an eight-hour day entailed heavy ex- penses. the importance of the maintenance of model and experi- mental farms in a great agricultural country need not be stressed. the chief mistake in the soviet farms system seems to have been the policy of excessive centralisation. other forms of collective farming exist. the law permitted the leasing of land to associa- tions of peasants acting as an arfel for the purpose of farming, or to rural communes as such, in which case a general scheme of tillage and of rotation was prescribed. important as these experiments are from the point of view of the development of better methods of cultivation, the improvement of stock and the introduction of riodern machinery and methods, they only cover a very small part of the field. the total area occupied by collective farms of various kinds is still only about 5% of the total farmed area. position as regards 19,800,000 farms out of 22,700,000—100,200,000 inhabitants out of 114,200,000—and 41,700,000 workers out of 45,900,000: 1924-5 group iv. of more than 15 dess. per- cent- age (group it, of size 4-1-8 dess. group itt. of size 8-15 dess. group i. of size o-4 dess. per- cent- age per- cent- age per- cent- age mil- lions mil- lions mil- lions miul- lions r so ns nn ns sol ce 6:2 11-9 6:9 15:2} 08 bf*3:| 2°70 25°8] 9-6 9°8 19°9 no. of farms . no. of workers area sown draught animals 31°3 28-5 49°5 47°7 1-7 | 27-4 | 46-3 2-9; 191} 7-0] 45:0 23:7 | 1:7 international labour office, industrial and labour information, vol. xiv., no. 13. 4:0 6°5 16:2 tis2 although the 1917-8 distribution increased the total area of the peasants’ holdings in eee oe 70 to 06% of agricultural land, and in ukraine from 55-5% to 96%, the average increase for each holding was very eral. moreover, it varied from province to province and from district to district with the type of farming, the nature of the soil, and according to the former existence there or not of great estates. in addition, the famine sent into the country many new claimants for land. redistri- bution involved the redivision of the existing peasant lands. a final and equitable settlement could hardly be reached in the period of revolution and civil war. the new economic policy—during the period of war com- munism, levies of food in kind had increased the general dis- location of production. under the n.e.p., a decree was issued by the soviet govt. on march 21 1ro2r introducing a tax in kind, graded according to the extent of the sown area and the livestock in each holding, the assessment to be made with the assistance of local peasant committees. the total food tax in great russia (the r.s.f.s.r.)was fixed at 240,000,000 poods of grain. a year later (may 22 1922) a new agrarian code laid. down exact regulations on the terms on which land may be held, the forms of land tenure and the machinery for distribution, the conditions of labour and the legal rights of the peasant household, the movement of rural populations and the regulation of disputes (sce the agrarian code of the r.s.f.s.r. moscow, 432 1923, in russian); see also the report on economie conditions in russia (1922) of the league of nations. the agrarian code introduced two fundamental changes. it permitted the letting of land on a cultivating lease to a tenant who can cultivate the holding by the labour of himself and his family for a maximum period of six years. a peasant may let his whole farm under certain emergency conditions. part iii. of the agrarian code also sanctioned the employment of “ aux- iliary ” labour on farms. this, however, was subject to numerous restrictions. further, the agrarian code contained no details as to the rent conditions of the employment of paid workers, and could be interpreted in a very arbitrary manner. a decree of the council of people’s commissaires of the soviet union dated april 18 1925 and entitled provisional rules for the employment of auxiliary labour in agriculture completes the agrarian code and determines its interpretation. under the decree in certain circumstances, by agreement between the parties, hours of work per day may exceed eight, the wages paid may not be less than the official minimum wage, wages may only be paid in kind if the wage earner consents to it, the employer is to find suitable accommodation for the worker; if the employer has at least three wage-earners, he must insure them with an insurance fund which will cover all his risks. the most striking feature in this decree is that the government has now almost without reserve authorised the employment of paid work in agriculture, and is endeavouring to fix certain rules for this employment. these two points institute a radical change in soviet policy. | the code provisions for land settlement proceeded on tradi- tional lines with the object of improving the position of the communities. in the years that followed the settlement of small villages and of individual settlements went on side by side. where the land is rich and the water supply good, as in the ukraine and white russia, individual homesteads have been in- creased although tenure by the community is still the rule; in the volga districts village settlement is the rule; the tendency to collective cultivation is stronger in the central industria) dis- tricts than elsewhere, though here agriculture is usually a part- time employment. in some districts, where the holdings were remote from the village, new villages have been established in a better position. to facilitate land. reorganisation the russian and the ukraine agricultural banks issue loans to individual peasants and collective farms. the single tax—the agrarian code was followed by the regulations for the collection of the food tax. with the option to pay in money the amount of the tax collected in kind de- creased, and in 1924 moncy payment entirely superseded col- lection in kind. for a full list of the various publications on russian agricul- ture and russian land settlement, see m. tcherkinsky, ‘ agra- rian policy in soviet russia,” in international review of agri- cultural economics (rome, oct.—dec. 1924). (jet. go.) vii. russia’s foreign debts foreign debt before the war.—an estimate made by the bankers’ trust company of new york?! places the national debt of russia on jan. 1 1914, for which the state was directly or indirectly (by state guarantee) responsible, at $6,568,000,000, of which probably from 44 to 50% was in foreign holdings. of the total interest, about $199,000,000, paid annually on the external part of this debt—62- 79% was remitted to france, 7-75% to great britain, 11-63 % to holland and the remainder to other countries. thus france was by far the most considerable creditor. of the gross total $4,541,000,000 was direct debt, 63°% of which had been incurred for the general needs of the state, especially for military expenditure, and the re- mainder for railroad construction. the latter charge may be taken as partly a defence measure, since the railways were largely strategic. the guaranteed debt amounts to $2,026,506,000; the state, having uaranteed issues made by the railroads themselves amounting to 965,816,000, undertook in 1913 a further liability as guarantor for $423,912,000 bonds for the nobles land bank and for $636,838,000 bonds of the peasants land bank. since the national wealth of russia before the war was estimated at 58,400 million dollars—approximately equal to that of france— a lei, e. fisk, the inter-ally debts (1924). russia the direct debt of the state, 4,541 million dollars, was not excessive when compared with that of france, but the large percentage held abroad made russia’s debt potentially a much heavier burden. up to 1917 payments were punctually made. war debts —during the war large commitments were incurred to the principal allies, especially to great britain, france and the united states, as follows: great britain, $2,766,000,000; france, $762,000,000; united states, $279,000,000; making, with advances from italy and japan, a total of $3,969,000,000. this external war debt was principally incurred for financing the purchase of war materials in allied countries, though there was not necessarily a direct correspondence between the obligations incurred in any one country and the purchases made there. great britain, in fact, acted as an intermediary in the balance of accounts. the details of the credits advanced to russia were discussed at successive allied con- ferences, notably at paris (feb. 1915), london and boulogne (sept. 1915) and london (july 1916), under which russia obtained the credits indicated. in connection with the arrangements made by the russian finance minister, m. bark, with great britain ? certain shipments of gold were made to great britain, amounting in all to $292,000,000 in addition to a purchase of gold of $39,000,000 made by the british government against credit in oct. 1914. the last gold shipment was made in feb. 1917 on the eve of the revolution. these shipments, except for the farst delivered in liverpool, were made from vladivostok to japan and canada on account of the sub- marine danger. in the united states russia opened certain credits in new york through a syndicate of banks during the early part of the war. after the entry of the united states into the war, the american govt. opened a credit of $325,000,000 on russian behalf. by nov. rather more than half of this credit had been exhausted, and the issue of credits ceased with the bolshevik revolution in that month. commercial investments in russia.—russia entered the world market principally as a grain exporter, and it is by her grain exports that russia has continued to finance her need for extensive credits abroad. these needs have been, and are, conditioned mainly by the huge area and the need of communications in sparsely populated and undeveloped districts, and by the impossibility of jevelonine the immense mineral wealth of the country with russian capital. rail- way and municipal investment has already been mentioned. the following estimate of the distribution of foreign pre-\war investments in russian commercial enterprises was made by the soviet govt. in 1922. the largest amount was invested in mining and cognate industries: then, in order of importance, real estate, banking and the textile industries. geographical distribution of foreign pre-war investments in russian commercial enterprises (in “ currency ” dollars—ooo,000 omitted). amount © france $377 32-6 great britain : : 261 22:6 germany .. , a2 ag : 22 19°7 belgium. : : ; 165 i4°3 united states. : : ; ; 61 5°2 holland 3 : a 19° 1-6 switzerland 17 i°5 sweden 12 tl denmark 8 0:7 austria 4 0:4 italy i o-l norway if ol finland i ol total soviet estimate . $1,154 100-0 2** a consideration received by russia (under the 1915 agreement) was an arrangement by which the british govt. agreed to open in favour of russia a non-negotiable credit for $973,000,000, which appeared on the balance sheet of the bank of the state as ‘ gold abroad’ and afforded a basis for the issuance of bank notes in russia. this plan was made effective in the following manner— great britain made an exchange of obligations with the russian govt., the russian govt. depositing with the british treasury non- interest bearing russian treasury bonds, while the british govt. gave in exchange intangible credits. this arrangement was to expire not later than one year after the conclusion of peace, when these obligations of equal value of both parties were ta be redeemed. thanks to this arrangement, which was pure camouflage, in banking parlance ‘ kiting,’ the decrease in the gold stock resulting from the exportation of the gold was not perceived by the public at large. indeed, the decrease of specie under the heading of ‘gold coin, ingots and vouchers of mines’ was more than compensated by the increase in the quantity of specie under the heading of * gold abroad.’ this was one of the financial secrets of the war, which only came to light after the fall of the tsarist govt.” —the inter-ally debis, pp- 137-8. russia, campaign in classification by industries of pre-war investments in russian commercial [enter prises (in *‘ currency dollars—ooo0,000 omitted) amount mining. : $429 37:2 metallurgy . 202 i7°5 real estate 134 ii-5 banks ; : : . 122 10:6 textile industries. ; : ; 99 8-6 chemical industries . . ; ; 43 3-7 commercial [industries . , 42 3°7 manufacturing of foodstuffs . ; 19 1-7 printing ; : : 2 f 16 1-4 shipping. ; : : : : 14 1-2 lumber industry ; 13 a mineral exploitations —. ' ; 9 0-8 animal products ; , : 7 0-6 insurance ‘ ": french capital was dominant in the metallurgical, locomotive and shipbuilding industries; english capital was principally invested in the petroleum, copper, thread and tobacco industries; belgian in- terests were extremely various; and american investments were mainly through insurance companies. though germany came third on the list of investors, her financial and industrial influence was by far the most important because of the direct participation of german banking interests in russian industry, and of the number of germans engaged in the management of finance. german per- meation succeeded because of direct and personal contact. repudiation.—on feb. 8 1918 the soviet govt. issued a decree repudiating the state internal loans, the guarantees given to various concerns and foreign loans. certain modifications were cleclared with regard to internal indebtedness, but the repudiation of the foreign obligations of the state was absolute. it may be pointed out here that in any apportionment of russian debt under post-war conditions, a certain proportion, especially of the guaranteed debt for railway construction and municipal enterprise, harbours, etc. would fall on poland, the succession states on the baltic and rumania. debt negotiatiens.—although the sovict govt. repudiated the debt of their predecessors, they came to realise that foreign capital was essential if the devastation of war, revolution, famine and civil war was to be repaired. in 1919 a tentative suggestion of the general settlement which the soviet govt. were prepared to accept was tele- graphed from helsingfors to the american delegation in paris. it included, subject to the acceptance of the existing position in russia, the raising of the blockade, a general amnesty and the restoration of diplomatic relations, an offer to recognise the responsibility of the financial obligations of the former russian empire to foreign states parties to the agreement. the offer was subject to a time limit (april 10), and lapsed. in the anglo-russian trade agreement of march 16 1925 the soviet govt. recognised its obligation to com- ales private citizens to whom payment for goods and services is due. in the proposals for a european economic conference which pre- ceded the genoa conference (see genoa, conference of), the fundamental conditions of success faid down by the principal allied powers included the statement that governments desiring foreign credit must ‘ recognise all public debts and obligations which have been or may be undertaken or guaranteed by the state, by munict- palities, or by other public bodies, as well as the obligation to re- store or compensate for loss or damage caused to them when prop- erty has been confiscated or withheld.” the genoa conference failed. in the rapallo treaty signed with germany there was a mutual shelving of public claims, subject to the reservation that in the event of a debt settlement with other countries germany might claim equivalent advantages. at genoa and at the subsequent conference at the hague a formula might probably have been reached on the pre-war tsarist debt, given de jure recognition by the powers concerned of the soviet govt., as the writing down of war debts was a foregone conclusion; the failure came nominally on the question of compensation to former owners of nationalised property. in the draft treaty between great britain and russia signed on aug. 8 1924, but never ratified, the soviet govt. recognised the claims of british holders of russian state and guaranteed loans “other than holdings acquired by purchase since march 16 1921 and were in other than british ownership at that date.” the actual settlement was to be by negotiation between the partics concerned, but the british govt. had to be assured that the terms were accepted by the holders of at least one-half of the capital value of the loans. the whole of the war debts and claims were reserved for future discussion, including the gold transferred to london, and the gold handed to germany after brest-litovsk. the financial settlement was subject to the floating of a russian loan on the london market. after the failure to secure ratification conversations were not re- 433 newed. steps were, however, taken by the russian govt. to initiate conversations in paris. | there seems to be no reason to suppose that, given an improvement in russian trade, russia would not be economically able to renew payments of interest on her pre-war loans, subject to certain necessary adjustments. the question of war debts, as other inter- ce i eae have shown, is another matter (see inter-allied ert), see british public accounts (annual); h. moulton and l. po7vol- sky, russian debts and reconstruction (1924); h. ef. fisk, the inter-ally debits (bankers’ trust company, new sr io aa russia, campaign in.—the campaign in north russia con- tinued long after the signing of the armistice in 1918. it must not be regarded as an isolated incident of the world war, but as a definite part of the allies’ plan for the defeat of the central powers, and although the direction of the operations was en- trusted to the british authorities the campaign was interna- tional. contingents were sent from great britain, the united states, france, italy and serbia, whilst detachments were also formed from polish, finn, czech, russian and chinese refugees. position after the russian revolutiton.—the revolution in russia had brought about the collapse of the eastern front, and the separate peace concluded between germany and the soviet govt. in 1917 had enabled the germans to transfer large forces from east to west, thereby rendering the position of the allies in france most difficult. the future attitude of the soviet govt. towards the remaining combatants being uncertain, it was felt by the allies that the building up of even a portion of the old russian front might prevent further transfers of german troops to the west. an allicd contingent in north russia might certainly hope to obtain assistance from all russian elements dissatisfied with the soviet rule and the great stores of war material accumu- lated at murmansk and archangel would be saved from falling eventually into the hands of the germans. allied expeditionary force -—the original force consisted of rso british marines who landed at murmansk in april 10918. they were followed by 370 more at the end of may, with a fur- ther reinforcement of infantry and machine-gunners to the num- ber of 600 on june 23. the strength of the forces gradually grew until the maximum strengths reached by the main contingents were as follows: white russians, 20,000; british, 18,400; united states, 5,100; french, 1,800; italian, 1,200; serbian, 1,000. maj.-gen. f. c. poole, the commander-in-chief of the allied forces in north russia, arrived at murmansk on may 24 1918 and found that the allies were holding the kola peninsula with detachments at kandalaksha. he pushed southwards down the petrograd railway, and by the end of june had secured kem and soroka, the point where the road to archangel via onega branches eastwards. the ice-free port of murmansk was thus fully protected against any possible raid by the german forces in fim- land and the stores on the quays rendered secure. there could now be no chance of german submarines being sent up by rail for employment against the allied shipping ffom a new and dan- gerously situated base. poole then turned his attention to archangel. leaving the murmansk area in charge of maj.-gen. c. m. maynard, he oc- cupied the port on aug. 3 with a force of 1,500 men under brig. gen. r. g. finlayson, supported by british and french warships and a force of serbs and russians under col. thornhill moving overland via soroka and onega. the bolshevik govt. in arch- angel was overthrown by the local inhabitants and replaced by a provisional govt. under m. tchaikovsky. columns were at once pushed out to the south to secure adequate protection. onega, obozerskaya on the vologda railway, bereznik, at the junction of the rivers dvina and vaga, and pinega were occu- pied in turn. the safety of the port and the town with its many refugees was thus assured. although the bolsheviks had evacuated the town of arch- angel hurriedly, they offered an obstinate resistance to finlay- son’s troops fighting for elbow-room. conditions of great heat, myriads of mosquitoes and bottomless bogs in the deep forests followed one another as summer turned to autumn, and by the end of oct. tropical rains had rendered all movement except 434 by water impossible. operations had perforce to stop until the coming of the snow. transport vehicles and river vessels had to be collected in great haste and manned by available volunteers. the difficulties of language were often acute, for in addition to the several tongues of the allies there was the main language, russian, to be considered and none of the contingents were any- thing but poorly equipped with russian interpreters. early in oct. 1918 gen. poole proceeded to england, and in nov. maj.-gen. w. e. ironside, who had been chief general staff officer in north russia, was appointed to succeed him. the com- mands of archangel and murmansk were then made independent of one another. the question of the maintenance of the allied forces in north russia had been early considered by the authorities. murmansk, being an ice-free port, could be used all the year round, and the troops based upon it could be withdrawn at any time. but with archangel the case was different. the port becomes frozen up from early nov. till late april of each winter, access being at all times difficult and often impossible even with the help of modern ice-breakers. the war in france had not yet come to an end in oct. 1918, nor could it be said with certainty that it would cease before the spring of 1919. it was of the utmost im- portance to prevent the resources of russia becoming available to the germans, should they be able to continue fighting through- out 1919. the decision was therefore made to remain at arch- angel during the winter. the expedition to north russia in the summer and autumn of 1918 undoubtedly did much to complicate the plans of the ger- mans, who feared an overthrow of the soviet govt. and a general reconstruction of the eastern front. there is definite evidence that the german military authorities were unable to continue the transference of troops from east to west in the final stages of the war, despite the urgent demands of hindenburg and luden- dorff. the original object of the expedition was therefore fully achieved. peculiar difficulties of the campaign.—the winter campaign in north russia may well be termed unique in the history of war. never before had troops been called upon to fight under such severe climatic conditions. the armistice in europe also, com- ing as it did just at the closing of the white sea with ice, could not be acclaimed joyiully as it was on other fronts. for the north russian force a new campaign was beginning, and all knew that relief could not come for at least six months. the feeling that demobilisation was being carried out on all other fronts had a demoralising effect upon all ranks of the force. further- more, the object of the campaign was obviously no longer the same. germany as an enemy had disappeared from the scene, and the allied troops were never again quite clear as to the rea- sons for the continuance of the fighting. jn their efforts to recon- struct the eastern front, the allies had espoused the cause of the white russians and had called upon the czech ex-prisoner of war units in siberia to march westwards to join them. in this action they had come into conflict with the soviet govt. and they could not now abandon the white russians who had joined them in the campaign. it was thus that the bolsheviks became the new adversaries of the allies. for the british authorities the campaign was a serious respon- sibility. food, clothing and munitions had to be unified as far as possible for the simplifying of supply. each contingent required special items in its ration—rum for the british, wine for the french, coffee for the united states troops, onions for the ital- ians and a double ration of bread for the russians. the town of archangel contained at least three times its normal population owing to the influx of refugees, andit was impossible to let the population starve. large supplies had to be imported for this purpose. winter of r918-9.—the transition stage from summer to win- ter proved a difficult period for the allies. the freezing of the dvina came unusually late in nov. 1918 and the allied gunboats were withdrawn too soon for wintering in archangel. the bol- shevik gunboats were thus enabled to descend the river from their more closely situated winter quarters and bombarded the allied russia, campaign in positions with their long-range guns with impunity. many casu- alties were caused and much damage was done to the carefully prepared winter quarters of the troops. the situation was at one time critical, british and americans, supported by canadian artillery, fighting desperately to maintain their positions. at archangel during the winter the attitude of the allies was purely defensive, covering the mobilisation and training of the new troops of the north russian provisional government. in the murmansk area their task was to maintain a perpetual threat towards petrograd and to divert as much of the bolshevik forces as possible from archangel. fighting continued through- out the winter in both areas at irregular intervals, the enemy be- coming steadily more efficient and exerting greater and greater pressure on the allied columns. the intense cold and the con- tinual darkness tried even the stoutest heart. exposure after a wound meant certain death, and to touch metal with the bare flesh was to brand oneself as with a red-hot iron. the curious noises in the forest in intense cold made sentry duty most trying. machine guns could only be used in warmed blockhouses, the field of fire of which might be destroyed in a night by a heavy fall of snow. flying conditions were intolerable, even with elec- trically heated clothing. aerodromes were only made possible for starting and landing by marching whole battalions over the snow. only the strictest discipline could save the troops fram heavy casualties through frostbite and sickness. the war-worn allied troops may well be proud of their efforts during this critical winter. all the main archangel positions were maintained intact against the repeated attacks of a superior enemy. in may rg19, when the frost broke, the forces of the provisional government had been raised in numbers to 20,000 men of all arms, properly clothed, equipped and crganised. in the murmansk area, gen. maynard’s troops had succeeded in seizing the northern end of lake onega, thus making their threat against petrograd an effective one, and containing a considerable force of active bolshevik forces. arrival of relieving force.—the general thaw commenced in the first week of may, and by the rath the river was free of ice. two relief brigades under brig.-gens. grogan and sadleir-jackson arrived at archangel on may 26 and june ro respectively, having had to force their way through the pack-ice of the white sea. evacuation of all troops which had spent the winter in north russia commenced at once. evacuation ef north russia.—the evacuation of all allied personnel from north russia before the arrival of winter in 1919 having been ordered, preparations for this were at once begun. the old contingents were embarked in turn, the british being the last to leave. then followed those elements of the popula- tion which had elected to leave the country. in all, some 17,000 persons were transported from north russia in british ships at a time when shipping had been much reduced through the ger- man submarine campaign. by the end of july nothing remained but the fighting troops of the relief force and a few necessary administrative services. it had been hoped to make a junction with adm. kolchak’s troops advancing from siberia, but the defeat of the siberians made this impossible. nothing remained but to disengage the british troops from their advanced positions with a view to leav- ing the local russian troops in the best defensive positions pos- sible. a gradual substitution of russian for british troops and administration was therefore commenced, the process being ac- companied by several outbreaks of mutiny amongst the new troops. the fronts of the various columns were cleared by vig- orous action on the part of brig.-gens. graham and sadleir-jack- son, ably supported by the naval flotilla under capt. altham. by aug. 1o the russian commanders were handed over a satis- factory situation, and the withdrawal of the british troops to the inner defences of archangel commenced. gen. lord rawlinson arrived at archangel on aug. 12 and approved of the plans already arranged. withdrawal continued without a hitch, and on sept. 27 the last 5,000 men were cm- barked simultaneously from 13 different points and the evacua- tion of archangel was complete. the long withdrawal in the russia in asia—russian literature murmansk area was then completed under the direction of brig.- gen. h. c. jackson, who had replaced gen. maynard on sept. 20 owing to the latter’s illness, the last man leaving the port on oct. 12. bibliography.—b. heroys, lenin’s fighting force (10919); j. pollock, the bolshevik adventure, 1917-19 (1919); british parliamen- tary papers, no. 2,246, the evacuation of north russia, to1q (1920); a. f, kerensky, soviet russia in rorg (1920); j. ward, with the die- hards in siberia, 1918 (1920). (w. e. i.) russia in asia (sce 2.741).—the greater part of the asiatic possessions of the former russian empire were incorporated under the soviet system in the russian socialist federated sov- iet republic (r.s.f.s.r.), which is a constituent state of the union of socialist soviet republics (u.s.s.r.). these territories are divided into siberia and the far eastern province, which are directly under the moscow govt. and the autonomous socialist- soviet republics of yakutsk, mongol-buryats and qirghizstan, which enjoy considerable local autonomy under the general direction of the r.s.f.s.r. the country known as russian turkestan consists of two independent socialist soviet repub- lics, turkomanistan and uzbegistan, which are constituent states of the u.s.s.r. (see siberia; turkestan.) russian literature! ( see 23.914).—the death, in rgro, of tolstoy, is not a landmark of russian literary history. ever since his conversion he had, as it were, passed out of time into eternity, and ceased to fit into the scheme of literary values. the publication of his posthumous work (three vol. 1911, and a fourth 1926) in spite of its immense intrinsic significance, stands outside the current of history. but the influence of tolstoy, especially that of his later work, ivan ilyich (1891, eng. trans. 1895), and master and man (1895, eng. trans. 1895), is very apparent on the one hand in the problem stories of andreyev, bunin, artsybashev and sergeyev-tsensky; on the other, in the philosophical writings of shestov. the realists—the traditions of the older realistic school were continued into the 20th century by numerous writers of the older generation, none of whom are of importance, except vladimir korolenko (1853-1921). his autobiography the history of my contemporary (five vol. 1909-22) is his longest and one of his best works. . . at the end of the roth century the realistic narrative form had been reformed and renewed by anton chekhov and about the same time a group of young writers came forward, whose work, realistic like that of the older tradition, but cruder and less reticent, produced the impression of a literary renascence. its chief exponent was maxim gorky (b. 18609), whose early work (1895-1901) took the russian and foreign reader by storm and was one of the greatest booms of the european book market. it was inspired by a semi-romantic spirit of freedom and revolt, which in conjunction with an audacious realistic style was what made for its success in russia. after 1900 gorky became ab- sorbed in politics. his work of 1904~12 is tendencious and revo- lutionary. it marks a distinct decline and coincided with an eclipse of his popularity. but in 1913 gorky published af y childhood (eng. trans. 101s), the first volume of an autobiography, which revealed him once more as a powerful and, this time, quite unromantic realist. it was followed by two more autobiographical volumes a song strangers (1915) and my universities (1922), a volume of recollections (1924) and fragments from my diary (eng. trans. 1924). these books are objective, dispassionate, unswectened paintings of russian life. the author is present in them only in so far as he sees with his eyes and selects out of his store of vision. his atti- tude may be described as a fascinated disgust at the ugliness of russian life, and an equally fascinated attraction towards all the great, the good and the original, that stands out in bold relief against the drab and joyless background. the volume of recol- 1tn this article the titles of all works have, for the convenience of the reader, been translated into english, although the books themselves may not have been so treated. when, however, they have been translated the date of the publication of the translation is, as far as possible, given. 435 lections contains a memoir of tolstoy which is one of the best things ever written of that great man. of the other writers who gathered about 1900 round chekhov and gorky the most famous is leonid andreyev (1871-19109). his best stories are in the tradition of tolstoy’s death of ivan ilyich and the kreuzer sonata. once upon a time there lived (1901); 72 the fog (1902); the governor (1906, eng. trans., 1921); the seven who were hanged (1908, eng. trans., 1909) are problem stories of death and sex written in a sober realistic style. but andreyev early succumbed to the lure of a cheap and rhetorical “ modernism” and his style degenerated into a tedious succession of gaudy and insincere cliches (the red laugh, too4, etc., eng. trans., 1905). the main theme of andreyev is the vanity of life and of all earthly things and the “ craving void ” of man before the elemental forces of death and madness. more artistic and more traditional than andreyev’s is the work of ivan bunin (b. 1870), a disciple of turgenev and of gon- charov, as much as of the older tolstoy. a sense of the vanity of all earthly values in the presence of nature and death is as appar- ent in bunin as in andreyev. but it is diluted by his senti- mental attachment to the decaying life of the provincial gentry. bunin’s most important works are the village (1910, eng. trans., 1923), and especially sukhodol (1912), which, together, give an impressively gloomy picture of the spiritual decay and cultural poverty of the russian peasantry and provincial gentry. they are among the most terrible pieces of special pleading against the whole of russian life ever written. a more detached and less local style is that of the gentleman from san francisco (1915, eng. trans., 1922), a story, in the tolstoyan tradition, of the vanity of the things of this earth before the face of death. the same theme of vanity and empti- ness moves many other writers of this group, among whom the best known is michael artsybashev (b. 1878). in his drearily didactic novel savin (1907, eng. trans., 1915), he preached, in a style unintelligently aped from tolstoy, the gospel of complete submission to sexual impulses. more significant and sincere are his stories of death: the death of lande (1904, eng. trans., 1015); breaking point (1911-2, eng. trans., 1915). on the whole artsy- bashev is a very inferior writer, but he is representative of the devastated generation of russian intellectuals who had lost their old revolutionary faith and acquired none instead. more significant is the work of s. sergeyev-tsensky (b. 1876), a writer of real originality and, unlike the foregoing, the master of an individual style. the theme is again death and the vanity of life, but it is treated with greater sincerity and imaginative power. the masterpiece of his early period movements (1910) is one of the most powerful stories of dying after the death of ivan llyich. since then he has struck a more optimistic note, but he has also lost much of his power over words (the inclined flena, 1914, transfiguration, 1923). of the other writers belonging to the “ realistic party ” alex- ander kuprin (b. 1870) acquired great popularity by his novel of army life published during the japanese war (the duel, roos, eng. trans., 1916), and by the cheaply realistic and journalistic brothel story yama (1913). but in his shorter stories he has shown himself an excellent master of simple and forcible narrative of a kind that is rare in russia and which recalls kipling. other “‘realists” are semen yushkevich (b..1868), stories of jewish life, especially the adventures of leon drey; ivan shmelev (b. 1875), the waiter (1912), that which happened (1921, eng. trans., 1926), one of the best war storics in russian; v. ropshin (pseudonym of the terrorist and politician boris savinkev 1879-1925), the pale horse (1909, eng. trans., 1915) largely autobiographical, a powerful revelation of the terrorist mentality, and the black horse (1924), a story of the civil war; boris zaytsev (b. 1881), stories of “ atmosphere,’”? which become almost flabby in their tendency, often present in rus- sian fiction, to do without skeleton or outline; and the humorist teffi (pseud. of mme. buchinsky). the mystics —while the “ realists occupied the front of the literary stage, a movement was going on that was to transform the appearance of russian literature. it is difficult to define it 430 in a word. those who did not belong to it called it “‘ modern- ism.” it included a great variety of currents, but they all have this in common, that they brought forward precisely those cultural and spiritual values that had been neglected by the “intelligentsia ’ civilisation of the roth century. in terms of personality it was largely an assertion of the spirit of dostoievsky as against that of tolstoy. it was also a victory of mystical and metaphysical religion over ethics, and of aesthetics over politics. in its first stages it brought with it a great wave of new foreign influences; ibsen, wilde, baudelaire, and above all nietzsche were the most important. one of its first spokesmen was dmitri merezhkovsky (b. 1865) who in the ’nineties and at the beginning of the 20th century did excellent work as the interpreter of for- eign cultural values—the historical novels julia (1895) and leonardo (1901). his later work, dominated by a sophisticated and essentially hollow “ religious ” philosophy, is of much less value. alexander i. (1913), 14 december (1918, eng. trans., 1923), are interesting fo1 their historical material, but their style is disagrecably hysterical and the construction disfigured by artificial and meaningless “ ideas.” as a “ religious ” philos- opher, merezhkovsky is an obvious nonentity. the real revivers of russian mystical and religious thought were, after vladimir soloviev, vasili rozanov (1856-1919), and leo shestov (b. 1866). rozanov is also the greatest modern master of russian non-narrative prose. his later works, espe- cially alone with m yself—uedinennoe (1912) and fallen leaves (1913), place him in the front rank of russian prose-writers of all times as well as in that of the greatest thinkers and dis- coverers of the human soul. by rejecting what he called the “‘ guttenberg ” style he made prose as flexible, unexpected and spontaneous as spoken language. he was a profound irrationalist, organically adverse to logical constructions, but possessed of a sense of intuition and insight unequalled by any man. his religion was mainly a religion of sex and procreation, but he had a deeply ingrained sympathy for the traditions and the soul of russian christianity. shestov is also a mystic and an irrationalist, but he is as spiritual as rozanov is vital. in his war against reason he uses with consummate skill the weapons of the enemy. the central impulse of his work is the search for god, who is above good. his style is akin to tolstoy’s and is admirable for its lucidity and pungency. rozanov and shestov are the biggest figures of the “ religious- philosophical ”’? movement begun about 1903, which has very largely displaced the traditional agnosticism of the russian intelligentsia by some kind of mystical religion. it produced numerous writers, who, though they are not comparable in significance and originality to these two, have had a notable part in the history of the russian mind. the most noteworthy are sergius bugakov (b. 1870), who, beginning as a marxist later became an orthodox priest; paul florensky, a mathemati- cian, who likewise became an orthodox priest, the author of a most remarkable, sophisticated and subtle book of theology, the pillar and foundation of truth (1913); nicholas berdyaev (b. 1874); michael gershenzon (1869-1925); and vyacheslav ivanov, who besides being a remarkable poet is the most mag- nificent contemporary master of ornate russian prose. a correspondence between two corners, by gershenzon and ivanov (1920) is a remarkable book discussing the value of culture before the terrible realities raised by the revolution. the symbolists——the most important expression of the “ modernist > movement was the symbolist school of poetry. the name came from france, but except in its first stages the russian movement was not derivative and its most significant poets were the genuine heirs of the great national tradition. at first the symbolists (or decadents as their enemies called them) were regarded as mountebanks and charlatans and were not admitted into the literary rank. but to-day it is universally recognised that the poetry of the symbolists was the most im- portant thing in russian literature in the 10 or 15 years preceding the great revolution. the symbolist movement was, first and foremost, a general revival of poetry and poetic culture aiter the ignoble stagnation of the later 19th century. but besides that, russian literature the symbolist poets have certain characteristics common to all of them; these are the “ symbolist ” attitude, 7.e., a per- ception of the world as a system of symbols and “ correspond- ences”? (the word came from baudelaire’s well-known sonnet); and a predominance of the musical over the logical, of the “romantic ” over the ‘ classical’ element of poetry. in its early stages russian symbolism was imitative of foreign (french and english) models. the work of the first leaders of the school, constantine balmont {b. 1867) and valeri bryusov (1873-1924) have a translated and un-russian flavour. balmont, a genuine poet with a great gift of song, wrote his best poetry between 1894 and 1904, bryusov, a laborious crafts- man who compared his inspiration with an ox in the plough, in the first decade of the 20th century. the importance of these two poets was chiefly that of a ferment. they liberated poetical understanding and taste and raised the general interest in problems of form. bryusov, especially, had a powerful technical influence; few poets who began writing verse in the first decade of the century escaped it. for many years he was practically dictator of the advanced literary world of moscow. by their side there were other poets of a more original and at the same time more native and traditional inspiration. fedor sologub (pseudonym of fedor teternikov, b. 1863) who is also one of the most remarkable modern novelists, is the most traditional and the most perfect of the symbolist poets. his poetry is sober and severe and almost classical in its adequacy of expression. it is dominated by a complete and consistent conception of the uni- verse, which is its essence is manichaean. the evil world of life, diversity, desire, light and heat, symbolised in the hateful dragon of the sky, the sun, is opposed to the blessed realm of death, coolness and peace. zinaida hippius (in russian gippius, maiden name of mme. merezhkovsky, b. 1867) is also a meta- physical poet. intensely intellectual, in her best poems she is one of the most genuine and powerful spiritual children of the darker side of dostoievsky. she is also a craftsman of great originality and has had an appreciable influence on the evolution of poetical technique. another metaphysical poet is vyacheslav ivanov (b. 1866). sophisticated and complex, soaked in knowledge and in culture, his poetry is the expression of a mystical -philosophy that aspires to the synthesis of all religions. of all russian poets he is the most full of greek reminiscences. his style is archaic and magnificent, the most artificial and ornate style in the language. from 1906-12 he was as much a dictator of poetry in st, peters- burg as bryusov was in moscow. his principal works are pilot stars (1903); cor ardens (1911); and winicy sonnets (1920). the poetry of innocent annensky (1856-1909), like v. ivanov a scholar and a translator of euripides, is curiously devoid of all classical influences. exiguous in extent, it all belongs to the last years of his life (the cypress chest, 1910). it is an infinitely subtle personal poetry of emotions, free from metaphysical sophistica- tions, but condensed and elliptical to the point of obscurity. he is the subtlest and most refined of the symbolists, but for intensity of human appeal he has no equal except blok. alexander blok (1880-1921) is unquestionably the greatest poet of modern russia. his carly work verses of the beautiful lady (1904) was inspired by a mystical love for a feminine hypostasis of the deity in the vein of vladimir soloviev’s mystical poctry. it is purely immaterial and musical, woven of the thinnest atmospheric gossamer, and to the immediate per- ception almost elusive. but soon blok lost his mystical visions, and his later verse is full of a passionate home-sickness for the lost ideal. it is distinctly romantic in style and in matter domi- nated by the unbridgeable and hopeless opposition between life and the higher reality lost touch with. much of his later poetry +3 “ realistic? and instinct with a grim and hopeless irony. more than any other poet, blok was a “ prophetic soul.”? he lived the life of the nation with passionate intensity, and much of his verse reads strangely in the light of later events. the third vol- ume of his collected poems (1908-16) contains most of his best work. he accepted the revolution as an expression of the russian literature mystical and craving soul of russia, and in 1917 wrote his most widely famous and in certain respects his most significant poem the twelve (eng. trans. 1920), a sublime symphony made out of realistic dirt. after 1917 he wrote practically nothing. besides his lyrical poetry he wrote several lyrical plays the puppet show (1906); the stranger (1907); the rose and the cross (1913), in which he gives the most powerful expression of his “romantic irony,” and a narrative poem retaliation (containing the life story of his father), at which he worked for over to years and left unfinished. it contains passages of exceptional historical intuition. closely connected with blok is the personality of andrey bely (pseudonym of boris bugaev, b. 1880), the most original and “advanced ” of the younger symbolists. his poetry is mystical in content, experimental in form, and {frequently realistic and humorous in tone. he carried the musical and antilogical tend- encies of symbolist poetry to their furthest limits, and in his efforts to do altogether without the cement of sense has much in common with theearly futurists. his principal works, however, are his novels. most of the inner symbolists followed in the footsteps of bryusov and v. ivanov. their poetry is intensely, often coldly, formal and is chiefly concerned with the visual symbolism of abstract ideas. the most notable are maximilian voloshin (b. 1877), whose poems on the revolution (10917 and following), splendidly ornate and highly sophisticated, became widely popu- lar among the emigres; and vladislav khodasevich (b. 1886), who treats dostoievskian “ underground ” themes with a neat and abstract “‘ wit ”’ reminiscent of the 18th century, and is the favourite poet of the unpoetical reader. post-symbolist poetry—the exclusively metaphysical char- acter of symbolism produced a reaction towards more con- crete and less sophisticated poetry. the tendency appears already in the affectedly naive and exquisitely refined poetry of michael kuzmin: alexandrian songs (1906); the seasons of love (1907). about 1912 it took form in the movement that called itself the acmeists and centred round the poets’ guild in st. petersburg (leningrad). its leader was nicholas gumislev (1886-1921, executed by the bolsheviks), the only russian poet to have fought in the world war. his poetry is a strange mixture of aestheticism with a manly romanticism. it is ‘the most “masculine”? poetry in the language. his best books, the quiver (1915), the pyre (1918), the pillar of fire (1921), con- tain poems of great force and vitality. he was a great craftsman, and all the younger poets of st. petersburg were deeply in- fluenced by his example and his teaching. the poetry of anna akhmatova, exiguous in extent and exquisite in form, is also an assertion of the human against the mystical poetry of the sym- bolists. it is personal and emotional. by far the greater part of it is concerned with love. it is marked by a reticent and con- densed intensity of emotion and by an exquisite and delicate economy of poetic means: beads (1914), the white fleck (1917), anno domini (1922). like almost all the greater contemporary russian poets, akhmatova has also written remarkable poems inspired by the great sufferings of her country. connected with the poets’ guild is also the poetry of osip mandelstam (the stone, 1916; tristra, 1922), the greatest master in modern russia of the grand oratorial style, which, how- ever, is combined in his poems with a construction along purely associational lines that makes his poetry akin to the tendencies of early futurism. the futurists —russian futurism dates from soon after 1910. in st. petersburg it was mercly an assertion of the rights of vulgarity. the poetry of igor severyanin (b. 1887), the thunder- seething cup (1912), which at one moment fascinated even the most discriminating critics, is merely the expression of the mentality of a shop assistant, who happens to be endowed with exceptional rhythmical power. much more significant are the moscow futurists. victor khlebnikev (1885-1922), whom they regard as their founder, was a delver in language rather than a poct. his poetry, which is purely linguistic, is caviare to the gencral, but has been a powerful stimulant to his’ fcllow- — 437 craftsmen. his historical importance lies chiefly in the fact that he started the movement of what may be called the ‘“‘ de-ital- lanisation ” of russian. to give the language of poctry a more rugged and virile accent and to tear it away from the withering background of traditional associations was the principal task of the futurists. besides trying to transcend the limits of sensible language, they destroyed the traditional conceptions of the * poetical ” and the “ musical,” introduced the vocabulary of the street and new subject-matter from all quarters of life. the most outstancing of the futurists is vladimir mayakovsky (b. 1893), a poet with powerful lungs and a voice like the roar of waters. his powerful, unrefined, hammering poetry ts at its best in his own delivery. he is a poet of the street and of the open air. much of his verse is political; like most of the futur- ists, he is a communist. totally lacking in the “ finer touch,” it is intensely original and skilful and is one of the most vital and vigorous literary growths of modern russia. ‘though loyal communists, the futurists are regarded by the soviet author- ities with distrust as too individual and undisciplined. an official effort was mace from the beginning of the new regime to create a more reliable ‘‘ proletarian culture’ and “ prole- tarian poetry.” the “ proletarian poets’’ are numerous and have been regularly trained by masters of the craft, such as bryusov, in the secrets of verse writing. but in spite of this, all they write is nothing but rhetoric. the only exception is vasili kazin, a young workman of moscow, who is free from rhetorical ambition and has written lyrics of exquisite freshness not unlike those of mr. w. h. davies. peasant poets.—another group of poets connected with the revolution are the “‘ peasant poets’? who saw in it an assertion of the mystical aspirations of the russian people. of these peas- ant poets nicholas klyuev is a genuine mystic and genuine poet, imbued with the traditional lore of north russia. the other peasant poet, sergey esenin (1895-1925), was only transiently attracted by the conceptions of mystical socialism. he was a purely lyrical poet akin to the russian folk song, to blok and to the tradition of the roth century. his best verse has an ex- quisitely piercing lyrical accent. a wistful and uneasy melan- choly dashed through by a dare-devil “ hooliganism ”’ are the main motives of his poetry. at one time esenin was connected with the “ imagist ’’ move- ment, which is spite of its noisy prominence in the years im- mediately following the revolution produced no poet of impor- tance. in general, except the futurists, most poets of the post- symbolist generation belong to no movement or school, and display a great variety of individual genius. the most abso- lutely independent of all is perhaps tikhon churilin, whose spring after death (1915) breathes the spirit of genuine madness and startling originality. externally connected with futurism, but in essence quite independent, is the poetry of boris pasternak (b. 1891), in the opinion of most fellow-craftsmen the greatest poet of the young generation. his principal book of lyrics, my sister life, was written in 1917 and published in 1922. few russian poets have escaped its overpowering influence. paster- nak’s poetry is marked by an absolute freshness of perception and vision combined with a tensity of lyrical emotion that is to be found only in the greatest lyrical poets. he sees the world in his own way, like adam or a new-born child, and his poems sound as if no verse had ever been written before them. but he does not always succeed in keeping in control the excessive abundance of his poctic vision and becomes at times incohercnt and confused. equally original and equally fresh is the poetry of marina tsvetayeva, the only important poet of the younger generation living outside russia. the variety and richness of her rhythmical imagination, the spontancity and abundance of her inspiration, combined in her latest work with an unerring mastery and discipline of form, the absolute originality of her accent, the vitality and exuberance of her genius, make her one of the most powerlul of the poets of to-day. this vitality and high-spirited- ness is 2 common feature of almost all the major poets of the younger generation and marks them off distinctly from the 438 symbolists. marina tsvetayeva’s latest poems are her best: am olodets, a fairy tale (1924), the poem of the end (1925), the ratcaicher (1925). among the very youngest poets the most important seem to be nicholas tikhonov and ilya selvinsky, both of whom have written some powerful and concentrated ballads of the civil war. the new prose —many of the symbolists wrote prose fiction but they failed to create a new school of prose. some derived from dostoievsky (z. hippius), others indulged in ‘‘ impres- sionism”’; others again fell back on foreign or ancient models and wrote what is called in russian “ stylised ” prose. the most remarkable of the “‘ stylisers ” are valeri bryusov, whose historical novel of the german renaissance, the fire angel (1917), is no doubt the best russian novel on a foreign subject and the most genuine work of the author; and michael kuzmin. the greatest of the symbolist novelists is fedor sologub. tis principal novel, probably the greatest russian novel since dos- toievsky, the little demon (1907, eng. trans 1916), has all the appearance of a realistic story of provincial life, but is subor- dinate to a symbolistic conception. the central figure, the schoolmaster peredonov, the incarnation of joyless evil, is one of the grimmest and weirdest creations of the russian imagination. others of his stories have a more or less fantastic or conventional setting. the series, the created legend (drops of blood, queen oriruda and smoke and ashes) (eng. trans. 1916) is a strange symbolical novel dominated by the same manichaean philosophy that permeates his poetry, but couched in the form of a thrilling romance of intrigue of the “‘ prisoner of zenda ” type. the revolution that corresponds in russian prose to the symbolist revolution in poetry was started by two men of the younger symbolist generation, bely and remizov. both of them use, in their principal work, the material of contemporary life, and both have greatly intensified the expressive means of russian prose. their prose is what has been called “‘ ornamen- tal” (not ornate), that is to say it is always charged with the utmost expressiveness and saturated with the most varied effectiveness; 1t is the antithesis of the transparent prose of the realists of the roth century. bely has been strongly influenced by gogol. unlike the other symbolists, he has a genuine gift of humour. his first novel, the silver dove (1909), is the story of an intellectual allured and enmeshed by mystical sectarians. petersburg (1915), the atmosphere of which is reminiscent of dostoievsky’s the double, is a symbolic story of petersburg, as the incarnation of “nihilism.” aotik letaev (1917) and its sequel the crime of nicholas letaev (1922) are written under the influence of the anthroposophy of steiner. the rhythmical inten- sity of the style reaches its farthest point. it 1s the story of a childhood, and of the gradual formation of the child’s idea of the world. besides these novels bely has written the remarkable recollections of alexander blok (1922). alexey remizov (b. 1877) is a writer of great complexity and versatility. all his work is marked by a supreme sense of style and an exceptional mastery of russian idiom. he rejects the ordinary literary syntax of latin and french extraction and aims at creating a written russian that will be more akin to the genius of the spoken language. the variety of his work is very great. it includes novels of ‘‘ compassion ”’ in the line of dostoievsky, the pond (1905), the sisters of the cross (1910); stories of provincial life, the story of stratilatov (1909), the fifth pestilence (1912) in a manner that has more than anything else affected the destinies of russian prose; ln a field azure (1922), the delightful and simple story of the childhood of a little girl; adaptations of folk tales and legends; dreams that are real dreams with all their illusive logic; recollections (especially kukkha, 1923, about rozanov); poems in prose; plays, based on the popular russian theatre. more than anyone remizov has been a sensitive record of the ordeals of his country’s life tn the terrible years 1917-21, and the book, including his diary of these years and stories of dying st. petersburg (russia in the tornado, to be published in 1926) is one of the greatest books produced by the revolution. remizov (especially as a stylist and as the author of the russian literature story of stratilatov) has had an enormous influence on almost all subsequent fiction. a new realism, emancipated from the “civic”? ideas of the roth century and attracted by the charac- teristic and grotesque rather than by the commonplace, arose about 1910, largely owing to him. the most popular and gifted of these neo-realists is count alexey tolstoy (b. 1882), who began with a delightful book of folk tales (magpie’s tales, 1909), and has written more stuff that is at the same time generally readable and intrinsically valuable than any other living russian author. at times he becomes ridiculous, but the verve and vitality of his narrative manner is inimitable. one of his best books is nikita’s childhood (1922) that holds its own by the side of the best ‘“ childhoods ” in russian liter- ature. more remizovian is the work of michael prishvin (b. 1873), whose the beast of krutoyarsk (1913), the story of a dog, is the masterpiece of russian animal fiction, and the early work of evgeni zamyatin (b. 1884), who later developed into an original and independent master. he is an imagist and im- pressionist trying to attain the maximum of intensity by the use of significant detail and by constructing his stories round a unifying symbolical image. his principal work, we, a novel of the future, was still unpublished in 1926 owing to the soviet censorship. the world war remains almost unreflected in russian literature, and russia has little to compare with the war literature of the western nations. the only war poetry of any merit is gumilev’s. the very few war books that deserve notice are letters of an artillery subaltern, by fedor steppun (1918); the face of war, by ilya erenburg (1920); and the people at the war (1918) by sophia fedorchenko, a wonderful collection of fragments of conversations overheard by an army nurse from private soldiers. the revolution of march 1917 remained as alien to the russian imagination as the war. not so the bol- shevik revolution of eight months later and the ensuing civil war. the external result of these events was the division of all intellectual russia into two hostile camps, which has now be- come a geographical division between those who have remained in the u.s.s.r. and the emigres. roughly speaking, it may be said that the older generations are pretty equally divided between the two sections, but the younger generation (under 30) is pro- ducing valuable work only at home. of the vast memoir literature created by the revolution and civil war the most significant books are 1920 (1921) by the monarchist deputy of the duma, vasili shulgin, and a sentimental journey (1923) by the gifted and influential critic victor shklovsky. with the memoirists may also be counted mark aldanov (landau), who has written clever personal articles on contemporary public men and histor- ical novels of the age of napoleon. . the years of the civil war witnessed the almost complete disappearance of prose fiction, but since 1921 a galaxy of young novelists have come up who choose their subjects almost ex- clusively from the revolution, the civil war and contemporary soviet life. the majority of these writers have been more or less influenced by remizov, bely or zamyatin and belong to the ‘ornamental ”’ school. their besetting sin is their inability to tell a story, and an over-emphasis on style and formal originality. the most typical of these writers are boris pilnyak (b. 1894), vsevolod ivanov (b. 1895) (stories of civil war in siberia), and leonid leonov (b. 1899). more original is the work of con- stantine fediin (b. 1892), whose cities and years (1924), an ambitious and in many ways successful attempt to show the evolution of an ‘‘ intelligentsia ’? mind against the background of war and revolution, is the most notable russian novel written since the revolution. isaac babel is the author of tales (1925) of the cavalry army of budeny. for the most part they are ‘intensified anecdotes ” written with great artistic concentration. their atmosphere is mingled horror, irony, and hero wor- ship. he uses dialect in an imaginative way that is reminiscent of synge. the young communist, artem vesely (whose work at this time was uncollected), has a unique genius for the painting of mass scenes and is a consummate master of janguage. quite apart from the others stand the zales (1925) of the poet boris russo-polish campaign pasternak. they are written with the same freshness and novelty of vision that mark his poetry. the childhood of luvers (1918), the story of how a little girl forms her perception of the world around her, is particularly remarkable. the greatest part of modern russian fiction is conspicuously devoid of nar- rative interest, and it is no wonder that the soviet reader prefers less original and intense or careful work as long as it is “interesting.” their tastes are best met by the novels of ilya erenburg (b. 1891), whose adventures of julio jurenito (1922) is a grim and significant satire of the capitalist world, but whose later novels are typical best sellers adapted to the tastes of the soviet reading public. drama.—the russian drama has been in a state of stagnation ever since the death of chekhov and cuts a poor figure by the side of contemporary poetry or even of fiction. the plays of gorky (the lower depihs, 1903, eng. trans. 1910), and of andreyev, written in imitation of the method of chekhov, miss precisely all the inner “ musical ” logic that justifies the non- dramatic construction of chekhov. the “ modernistic ” dramas of andreyev (the life of man, 1907, etc., eng. trans. 1915), are crude rhetoric in black and red. more satisfying is the sym- bolic melodrama, he whe gets slapped (1916, eng. trans. 1922), which was later turned with great advantage into a film. the genuine symbolists failed to produce a theatre of their own, and with the exception of the beautiful dramas of blok, which are lyrical rather than dramatic, gave nothing to the stage. for the russian theatre the period was one of rapid develop- ment and of remarkable achievement. but the drama did not keep pace with it. of the reforming producers who revolu- tionised the russian stage, nicholas evreinov (b. 1879) is also a playwright. his theatre is subordinated to his semi-religious idea of transforming life into art by the aid of the theatre. his work has points in common with that of pirandello. the realistic tradition has been definitely abandoned by dramatists and the dominant form of play in soviet russta is a kind of conven- tional puppet play of ideas, where the characters, stripped of all reality and humanity, are made to symbolise abstractions. such are the crude and mediocre plays of lunacharsky. on a much higher artistic level are the plays of the regretted leo lunts (1901-24) who endeavoured to create a pure and simpli- fied tragedy of pure action that would be once again suited to the expression of genuine heroical feeling. the futurists made attempts to create a high standard, boldly aristophanesque propaganda drama. the only successful attempt is a mystery bouffe (1919) by mayakovsky, a vigorous and effectively crude play of bolshevik satire. there exist english translations in book form of works by gorky, andreyev, bunin, artsybashev, kuprin, shmelev, ropshin (savinkov), merezhkovsky, shestov, z. hippius, sologub, blok, remizov, aldanov, pilnyak, evrei- nov and lunacharsky. bibliography.—w. l. phelps, essays on russian novelists (1911); harold williams, russia of the russians (1914); paul selver, afodern russian poetry, an anthology, russian and english text (1917); a. yarmolinsky and b. deutsch, modern russian poetry (1921); m. olgin, a guide to russian literature, 1820-1917 (1921); leo trotsky, tr. rose strunsky, literature and revolution (1925); prince d. s. mirsky, afodern russian literature (the world's manuals, oxford university press, 1925); the same, russian literature 1875-1925 (1926); articles in the slavonic review. (d.s. m1.) russo-polish campaign.—this campaign, of 1920, which resulted in the defeat and rout of the soviet army when it was within sight of the polish capital, is full of dramatic incident. organisation of command, staff and administration was lacking on both sides, but above all it was the want of a proper system of supply which accounted for the sudden collapse of troops engaged in a victorious advance. the thinly populated territory lying between the niemen in the north and the dniester in the south was incapable of supporting large bodies of troops, and as both sides attempted to live on the country during their advances the failure of their operations followed quickly each success. cause of the war.—during the course of 1919 and early 1920, the soviet govt. had succeeded in clearing their territory of the white russian detachments under kolchak, denikin and yuden- 439 ich. they were thus at liberty to examine the situation on their frontiers. with such a mixture of races living side by side in the disputed regions no delimitation of frontier would have suited all parties, and in the absence of authority to enforce a decision, trouble quickly arose between the soviet and the newly formed polish state. poland was determined to maintain her new lib- erty and had called up fresh levies to support the various legions which had been repatriated from the fronts upon which they had been fighting in the world war. the soviet began to concentrate their troops towards the west. inflammatory speeches in mos- cow and a fierce propaganda amongst the polish working people brought polish public opinion to a fever heat. from seven divi- sions in jan. the soviet had, by march, increased the number of their troops facing the poles to 20 divisions, with three cavalry divisions. poland decided that she could not wait quietly for the inevitable soviet attack by which she would certainly be destroyed, and that she must act at once. polish offensive.—strategically, the territory in dispute may be divided into two separate areas: white russia in the north and volhynia and podolia in the south. the marshes of the pri- pet divide one area from the other. acting in collusion with petlura, the hetman of the ukraine, who had promised to raise his country against the soviet, the poles advanced in april as far as kiev. by the beginning of may the polish-soviet front ran from dvinsk in the north along the course of the dnieper to kiev and thence to the dniester near kamenets. no sooner were the poles established in kiev than the soviet northern army began to advance. ‘the poles were able to transfer troops from the south and counter-attacked the soviet forces which had already penetrated as far west as lida and baranoicze. by the end of may the line held at the beginning of the month had been restored. operations had been most ably carried out by the polish minister of war, gen. sosnkowski, but there were indi- cations that the soviet were transferring more and more troops to the west and that a renewal of their attacks might be expected. at the beginning of june, in the southern area there appeared a new soviet cavalry leader, budenny, who completely altered the situation. budenny had been a non-commissioned officer in the old russian army and soon proved himself a man of action. within a month he had driven back the poles a distance of 200 m. until their line in the south ran just east of pitsk and rewne (rovno) to the junction of the dniester and siret (sereth) (sce eastern european front: map). russian success.—fyighting in the northern area continued intermittently during the month of june, preventing the poles from transferring troops to the hard-pressed south. despite the operations in the south it was clear that the main soviet attack was coming in the north. on july 4 the blow fell. the whole polish line gave way. wilno (vilna) and minsk were lost in the first week. grodno fell on july 20 and bialystok on july 25. by the end of july the soviet advance guards had reached the bug. in 25 days the poles had lost 300 m. of territory. the main cause of the collapse was their failure to constitute reserves. in their desire to protect their new territory they had been led into a linear defence where they were strong nowhere. their forces were insufficient to defend a line nearly 800 m. in length. disposition of troops.—the polish situation was now critical. on the bug their men fought with desperation and the soviet advance was checked. no time was to be lost, however, or the soviet would carry out fresh concentrations. with the help of the french military mission, under gen. weygand, a plan for a great counter-attack was evolved on aug. 6. the situation of the opposing sides on that date was as follows:— soviet: (1) northern group. four armies—iv., xv., iii. and avi.—on the bug from rozan to brest-litovsk, with a cavalry corps on the extreme north skirting the east prussian frontier and aiming to outilank the polish left. (2) southern group. two armies—nii. and xiv. with bu- denny’s cavalry, along a line from kowel through brody to tarnupol. the men of the soviet army were unfed and worn out with a month’s marching. only the thought of the rich booty to be obtained in warsaw maintained them in the ranks. 440 poles: (1) northern group. four detachments—roja force, 1. army, iv. army, sikorski’s force—facing the soviet northern group from brest-litovsk to the east prussian frontier at chorzele. this group was formed of units which had been re- treating for over a month, strengthened by reinforcements thrown in hastily as they came up. much material had been lost and the men were tired and hungry. the situation presented a picture of great disorder, but the approach to the line of the vis- tula was beginning to simplify the supply of food and munitions. (2) southern group. three armies—yvi., iii. and iv.—facing the soviet southern group. here the situation of the poles was much better. pressure from the enemy had been by no means so severe as in the north and many of the divisions still retained their original fighting valuc. polish plan of attack—the polish plan was to withdraw all but a minimum of force from the southern area and to attack the soviet northern group with the greatest possible strength. the operation bears a close resemblance to ludendorff’s ma- noeuvre at tannenberg. in many respects the situation was similar. the russians were advancing in two main groups di- vided by the pripet marshes instead of the masurian lakes. here the soviet southern group was advancing slowly like rennen- kampf’s army in r914. the situation would become critical as soon as the two soviet groups converged upon the polish army. no time was to be lost. would the commander of the soviet armies in the south allow himself to be deceived in the same man- ner as rennenkampf? on august 6 orders for the following fresh groupings were issued from polish headquarters. (1) three armies—ii., i. and v.—under gen. joseph haller, were to withdraw slowly to the line of the vistula from deblin to modlin with the v. army pushed well forward on the left to prevent any ent eb re of the polish left between warsaw and the east prussian rontier, (2) two armies, iii, and iv.—were to concentrate behind the wieprz between chetm and deblin, ready to strike due north. the advance of these two armies to commence on aug. 16. (3) one army, vi.—would withdraw as necessity arose in the direc- tion of lemberg, tempting the soviet southern group away from the critical point in the north. by aug. r2 all the armies, with the exception of the two on each flank, had reached their assigned positions without incident. in the south the iit. had found the xii. soviet army advancing and had been forced to throw out a detachment on its right flank to cover its concentration. it had been delayed in consequence. in the north, the v. had been driven back by overwhelming strength and had been unable to prevent the enemy outflanking movement. enthusiasm in the polish army had risen surprisingly in the days since the momentous decision to attack had been taken. the chief of the polish state, marshal pilsudski, had himself taken command of the hi. and iv. armies. with the help of weygand and his staff the service of supply had been restored. new bodies of reinforcements were moved forward from the depets in western poland and the depleted units began to raise their heads again. national optimism returned. the enemy in the south made no determined move and appeared to have no inkling of what was afoot. every hour that he delayed meant more chance of success for the polish plan. polish advance.—gen. sikorski’s v. army in the north was the first to move. the soviet movement round his left had as- sumed alarming proportions and had to be stopped. on aug. t4 he pressed forward from his defensive position at modlin and at once encountered the soviet xv. army advancing to the attack. sikorski persisted in his attacks all through aug. 15 and 16, his men fighting with determination. not even the appear- ance of elements of the soviet iv. army in his left rear turned him from his purpose. throwing out covering detachments to watch his rear he attacked again on aug. 17. his determination reaped its reward, for the enemy gave way in front of him, their retreat rapidly developing into a rout. in the south pilsudski’s armies made good progress. the blow against the left of the soviet xvi. army came as a complete surprise and they offered little resistance. during aug. 16 and rustless steel 17 the poles covered over 50 miles. by aug. 18 the iie. soviet army, which lay between the xy. destroyed by sikorski, and the xvi. broken by pilsudski, turned also in hopeless confusion. on the extreme soviet right their iv. army, containing some of the most famous communist regiments, together with the cavalry corps, had reached the vistula between torun and ptock in their great turning movement. they were preparing to roll up the polish left when sikorski suddenly advanced. had they advanced resolutely even then, all might have been well, but. they hesitated and were lost. their half-hearted attacks against sikorski’s left had little effect. it was not till aug. 20 that the order for a general retreat reached them. on aug. 22 at miawa, and aug. 23 at chorzcle, they were successful in cutting them- selves a passage, but on aug. 24 at kovno they ran up against pilsudski’s iv. army blocking the way. almost without making an etfort to attack they passed ignominiously over the east prussian border to internment. the pace of the polish pursuit was remarkable. from aug. 16 to aug. 25 the advanced units of the ii. army had covered 200 m. as the crow flies. the iv. army averaged 25 m. a day in their advance. the service of supply was left far behind. the troops existed as they could upon the exhausted country. lucki- ly the soviet resistance was so completely broken that there was no further fear of counter-attack and the polish units had ample time in which to reorganise. conclusion.—the results of the battle of warsaw, as it has been named, are only exceeded by those of tannenberg. the poles captured 70,000 prisoners, 200 guns and 1,000 machine- guns. from 50,000 to 100,000 soviet troops passed over into east prussia. ‘the victory of the poles was due to the adoption of a determined offensive based upon a sound plan. the raising of the morale of the beaten troops by the polish authorities, roused to enthusiasm themselves by the inspiring presence of gen. weygand, is little short of miraculous. the crisis of the battle was undoubtedly aug. 15-16, when sikorski’s v. army cleared its front. if it was pilsudski’s force which completed the soviet defeat, it was undoubtedly the magnificent fighting of sikorski and his men which made victory possible. brstiocrariy.—h. fenner, die rote armee, 1920 (1920); s. szpotsanski, la pologne nouvelle et pilsudski (1920); m. pernot, l'epreuve de la pologne (1921). gw ie) rustless steel.—rusting under usual atmospheric con- ditions is a universally recognised characteristic of iron. it is everywhere accepted, like the law of gravity, as an unquestion- able fact. those who use iron or steel in exposed places always take into account that it must be protected from rust or be ulti- mately replaced. the rusting of iron has been studied by chem- ists for many generations. in the journals of chemical and phvs- ical societies, and in books, the subject has been discussed at great length in relation to a variety of explanatory theories. experimental test.—a useful idea which seems to lead ta the root of the matter can be acquired by an interesting and very simple experiment. on placing a few bright iron nails in a test tube filled with water the iron 1s observed, in the course of a few days, to be covered with rust. some particles of rust may be observed on the inside of the tube above the nails. these particles may have risen from below or fallen from above the position in which they are found. if they have fallen from above it should be possible, by inter- posing a diaphragm, to collect them and keep them separate from such rust as may form on the bright iron at the bottom of the tubc. a suitable diaphragm can be made from cotton wool or a piece of lightly rolled blotting paper. having added two or three bright iron nails, filled up the tube with recently boiled water and adjusted the diaphragm at different heights in several tubes otherwise similarly prepared, the tubes are kept in a quiet place away from direct sun- light. during the first few days nothing appears to happen. after two or three weeks the nails are still bright, but a faint band of rust may be noticed on or in the white diaphragm. as weeks and months go by the band of tron rust in the diaphragm grows more distinct and broader. ne it scems certain that the iron visible in the diaphragm, as rust, could be found inches above the nails only if iron from the nails had dissolved in the water and diffused upwards. it secms equally likely that the band of iron rust becomes visible in the diaphragm hecause the oxygen of the atmosphere in contact with the upper surface of the water has dissolved there and diffused downwards. in an open tube the reaction between the dissolved oxygen and the dissolved iron rustless steel forms rust which falls onto the bright nails. ina tube correctly fitted with a suitable diaphragm the two diffusing substances meet anc react within or above the diaphragm and the solid product is held there, leaving the nails bright and smooth but slowly losing weight as the years go by. one of the characteristics of pure iron is that rusting leaves it with a smooth surface. on the other hand rusted steel has generally a pitted surface. also mild steel rusts more quickly than good wrought iron. the reason for this is worth mentioning. if polished and etched, the surface of pure iron is seen, through a microscope, to consist of a conglomeration of grains, each white like its neighbours; the grains are irregular in shape but may be visualised as so many silver coins lying on the banker’s counter. when similarly polished and etched, a piece of mild steel is seen to consist of dissimilar grains; some are white in appearance and others black. these may be visual- ised as a mixture of silver and copper coins lying side by side on the banker's counter. | on placing a clean half-crown on either side of the tip of the tongue there is no perceptible taste. on placing silver coins on each side of the tongue and nipping the free ends of the coins together whilst the tongue is between them there is no perceptible taste. on going through the same performance with copper coins similar results are obtained. if, however, the experiment be repeated with one silver and one copper coin, which singly are tasteless, it will be found that when in contact, with the tongue between them, the penny on the upper side of the tongue has a sharp metallic taste. the copper coin excites the sensation of taste (like an ordinary steel knife) because it is being dissolved and it dissolves more rapidly in contact with the silver in conformity with the general law that when dissim- ilar metals are in contact, in the presence of an electrolyte, one of them is apt to be selectively dissolved or corroded. : cause of rust—from these experimental observations the rusting of iron appears to depend on the fact that iron is soluble in water. the rusting of steel at a greater rate than iron appears to depend on its solubility in water plus a degree of selective solu- bility due to the dissimilar nature of its constituent grains. if, therefore, iron is to become rustless under ordinary atmospheric conditions it must first be made insoluble in water. and further, in order to guard against selective corrosion, its composite grains should be made as similar as possible. use of chromium.—the simplest and cheapest forms of rust- less steels, but not the first in chronological order, are ordinary mild steels containing chromium. the resistance of the steel to rusting depends on the amount of chromium it contains. the addition of 10% of chromium to pure iron would suppress its solubility in water, and as the resulting pure chromium-iron would consist of similar crystals it might be regarded in itself as a satisfactory rust-resisting metal. but such pure chromium irons cannot be produced commercially. the commercial rustless steels always contain carbon which even in small amounts causes the formation of dissimilar crystals. between 1912-4, a series of steels containing between 9 and 16% of chromium was investi- gated by brearley (see u.s.a. patent 1197256/16), who con- cluded that with the stipulated amounts of chromium and not more than -70% of carbon, rustless steel articles could be pro- duced providing they were submitted to suitable hardening operations with the object of suppressing differences in grain constitution due to the carbon in the steel. irom this series of rustless steels developed by brearley the familiar ‘ stainless ” cutlery is made. the resistance of chromium steels to rusting is increased by adding chromium and decreased by adding carbon, small amounts of carbon are always unavoidably present but definite amounts are also added with the object of producing required degrees of hardness, resistance to wear or ability to cut. the useful extent to which chromium alone can be added to iron is limited because ultimately such comparatively pure chromium irons are brittle and on that account are not in great demand for industrial purposes. steels containing more than 9% chromium were made as early as 1892. their rust-resisting properties were not realised because at that time the resistance of steel to general corrosion was esti- mated by its measure: resistance to solubility in dilute sulphuric acid. since the solubility of high chromium steels in dilute sul- phuric acid is greater than that of ordinary steel, the quest for non-rusting steels, depending on conventional tests, was directed away from and not towards the undoubted merits of chromium. 441 nickel steels.—prior to 1912 the least corrodible steels in gen- eral use were nickel steels. the more nickel they contained the less they were supposed to corrode. steels containing 25% nickel were held in high regard, as they were notably resistant to dilute sulphuric acid, an active corrosive agent in industrial towns or under special conditions as in chemical works or mines. the addition of nickel to steels which already contain enough chromium to make them resistant to ordinary atmospheric cor- rosion produces useful results: (1) conferring a certain degree of resistance to the corroding effect of cold sulphuric acids, whether in the liquid or vapour form, (2) making those higher chromium alloys tough which, without the nickel, would be brittle, and (3) making it comparatively easy to secure homogeneous grain con- stituents with or without the necessity of submitting the alloy to special forms of heat treatment. materials of this class were investigated by strauss in germany 1912-4 (english patents, 13414/13 and 13415/r3). strauss appears to regard the presence of nickel as an indispensable constituent of rustless steels, and krupps, with whom he is associated, have devoted most atten- tion to a steel containing about 20% chromium and 6% nickel. steels of this composition are austenitic or can readily be made austenitic by quenching from temperatures of about 1,000° cen- tizrade. such steel cannot be hardened by the usual heat-treat- ment processes. hey are hardened by cold-working, as are all metals and alloys (see metallurgy). faraday’s work—the commercially more important rustless steels owe their properties to the presence of 1o to 20° chromium with or without the addition of nickel in amounts generally less than 10°%. but attempts to preserve brightened and polished surfaces were made 100 years ago when both nickel and chromium were rare metals, michael faraday, amongst others, studied the subject in 1822. he produced an alloy which “ after lying many months had not a spot on its surface.”” this alloy was a combina- tion of stecl with a considerable proportion of platinum. faraday appears to have made 3° nickel and 5% chromium steels but produced nothing which resisted tarnishing except rare metal alloys which are much too costly for industrial use. marsh’s work.—le scalding at high temperatures be regarded as a form of corrosion, then the work of marsh must be noticed. looking for some substitute for platinum wire or strip to wind resistance coils, marsh found what he required in an alloy of nickel and chromium. this material, alloyed with more or less iron, is familiar as the coiled filament of heated metal in office and bedroom radiators. its value for that purpose, apart from its electrical properties, is that it does not scale when it becomes red hot. marsh’s nichrome alloy having satisfied all the require- ments of a good radiator, neither marsh nor anyone else appears to have connected its resistance to scaling at red heat with its possible value as a rustless alloy. raynes’ cobalt chromium alloys.—after marsh, the american haynes, who is reputed to have made the first motor-car in america, was busy with cobalt-chromium alloys. from his ob- servations and experiments arose the well-known cutting tool material called “ stellite ” and a similar material in a malleable form from which haynes made pocket-knife blades. development.—the development of rustless steels appears to follow closely the lines on which ordinary stecls have developed. the rustless chromium steels were first used for table cutlery and aero-engine exhaust valves. when the valves were required to offer great resistance to scaling, silicon was added with good effect. when valves were required to be as hard at red heat as ordinary structural steel is at ordinary temperatures, 12 to 30% of nickel was added with good effect. to resist other specific con- ditions, other metals such as molybdenum, tungsten, manganese and copper have been added. in this way chromium irons are becoming the base of a series of rustless, scaleless and non-corrod- ing alloys, whose possibilities are not likely to be completely explored for many years. special difficulties—the development of rustless steel is hampered by two difficulties. the first relates to its adaptability to existing manufacturing processes. this difficulty starts with the actual making of the steel and is met in every hot-working 442 and cold-working process. apart from its rustlessness the most diverse and often antagonistic properties are required. the second difficulty relates to the smelting of the ore. the ferro- chromium alloy can be produced cheaply by smelting chrome- iron ore in the blast furnace but it contains unfortunately some 8 or 10% of carbon. this alloy is useless for making rustless steel because it contains too much carbon. for soft varieties of rustless steel the steel maker requires ferro-chromium alloys containing practically no carbon. to take the carbon out of the blast furnace ferro-chromium, costing about £20 per ton, involves an additional cost of {100 per ton. this is the price of ignorance; and it is still not known how to adapt cheap smelting operations to chromium ore without contaminating the product with car- bon. even if suitable chromium alloys were obtainable for noth- ing, rustless steels would still be more expensive than ordinary steels on account of steel manufacturing defects, which it is costly to avoid or remove. chromium plating.—closely bound up with the future of rust- less steel is the possible development of chromium plating, which is arrested by unforeseen difficulties. those interested in the production of chromium-plated articles assumed the possibility of covering mild steel with a coating which should exhibit ze plus ultra resistance to corrosion. the process appears to have failed for the same reason that nickel-plating fails when applied to steel articles exposed to weather conditions, since it is porous, and against a strong light is seen to be perforated. the same is true of chromium plating when peeled off, so that sooner or later moisture would find its way through the perforations and rust the unplated steel surface. until this trifling defect has been overcome visions of chromium-plated steel castings and plated goods made from pressed mild steel, which would last for ever, are just visions. the unquestioned acceptance of rusting as a characteristic of ordinary steel has concealed the various causes which promote rusting. since the introduction of rustless steels individual causes of general corrosion have been more sharply separated and defined. the most notable causes of corrosion, apart from direct solubility, are due to distortion and contact. effects of distortion and contact.—a piece of rustless steel used for stainless knives and containing, say 13% chromium, will re- main bright if exposed in a country garden providing it has been suitably heat-treated. if, however, a piece of the same material be machined in a lathe the machined surface and the turnings themselves will rust, because they are distorted and probably to some extent because adjacent parts of them are distorted un- equally. the more smoothly and less violently the surface is machined the less it is likely to rust. if ultimately the surface be smoothly ground and polished it will not rust. the polished surface does not offer easy lodgment for casual dirt but otherwise polishing in itself does not appear to exert a great restraint to rusting. a piece of the same 13% chromium steel, for example, in the form of cold-drawn wire which has simply been highly pol- ished after cold drawing rusts with surprising readiness. the corrosive effects of distortion can generally be avoided or eliminated. in many cases the direct effects are negligible, but the secondary effects of roughly machined surfaces may be serious. foreign substances which readily adhere to rough surfaces pro- duce contact corrosion. almost any wet substance will cause corrosion of the lower chromium rustless steels, to start at the point of contact. a piece of string, glass, wood, paper or even the contact in still water of two pieces of the same low grade rustless steel promotes corrosion. in running water, contact corrosion is less noticeable and may even be entirely absent. when the substance in contact with rustless steel is some other metal of a more electro-negative character the attack 1s greater and occurs more quickly. the effects of contact corrosion are also quickened and greater when the contact surfaces are wetted by sea water instead of ordinary water. contact corrosion of the simpler kinds can be avoided by using higher-chromium rustless steels with or without the addition of nickel. for a few instances —notably in machines pumping hot sea water—the problems are difficult to deal with because the effects appear to contradict general rules and tendencies. this may be taken as a sure indi- rutherford sir ernest—rykov cation that the subject of contact corrosion, a most extended and energetic destroyer, has not been completely explored. (see also iron and steel.) bibliography.—sir r. a. hadfield, ‘f on the alloys of iron and chromium,” jour. iron and steel inst., vol. 2 (1892), with a good bibliography of early work; f. g. bell, ‘‘ stainless steel,” iron and coal trades review (aug. 10 1923); j. h. g. monypenny, ‘ stainless steel, with particular reference to the milder varieties,” 7 vans. amer. inst. mining and met. engineers (feb. 1924); w. h. hatfield, “ stainless and similar corrosion resisting steels in the chemicat and allied industries,” the industrial chemist (march 1925); ““ chromium-nickel rustless steels,” the metallurgtst, supplement to the engineer (oct. 30 1925); j. h. g. monypenny, stazuiless iron and steel (1926). h. bre.) rutherford, sir ernest (1871- ), british physicist, was born at nelson, new zealand, aug. 30 1871 and studied at the university of new zealand, where he took the b.sc. degree in 1894. after a period of research at the cavendish laboratory, cambridge, he became in 1898 macdonald professor of physics in mcgill university, montreal; in 1907, langworthy professor of physics at manchester university; and in 1919 cavendish professor of experimental physics in the university of cambridge, accepting, in addition, in 1920, the professorship of physics at the royal institution, london. ina brilliant series of researches he established the existence and nature of radio-active trans- formations, the electrical structure of matter, and the nuclear nature of the atom. he was elected f.r.s. in 1903, and was knighted in 1914. many british and foreign degrees and honours were bestowed upon him, including the rumford medal of the royal society, 1905, the barnard medal 1910, the bressa prize 1908, the copley medal 1922, and the franklin medal 1924. he was awarded the nobel prize for chemistry in 1908, and the o.m. in 1925 and was president of the british association in 1923, and of the royal society in 1925. his works include radzo-activity (1904), radioactive transforma- tions (1906); radioactive substances and their radiations (1912), and numerous papers in the transactions of the royal society, the philosophical magazine, etc. rutherford, mark (c. 1830-1913), british author (see 23.940), died at groombridge, sussex, march 14 1913. ryan, john denis (1864- ), american capitalist, was born at hancock, mich., oct. 10 1864. in 1889 he went to den- ver, where he was employed as a salesman of lubricating oils. in tgo1 he secured an interest in a bank at butte. in 1904 he was made manager of the amalgamated copper co. in montana, becoming president in 1908. he had been elected president of the anaconda copper mining co. in 1905, and after the merging of the amalgamated interests in the anaconda in 1910 he continued as president of the latter until 1918. he developed large water powers in montana and in 1913 electrified the railway between butte and anaconda (100 m.), the success of which led to a wide expansion of railway electrification. during 1917-8 ryan was on the executive of the american red cross. he was appointed in april 1918, head of the aircraft board of the committee of national defence, and in aug. was appointed second assistant- secretary of war and director of air service of the u. s. army, which position he resigned in november. in rgro he was elected chairman of the board of directors of the anaconda copper min- ing company. ryder, albert pinkham (1847~1917), american painter (see 23.949), died at elmhurst, l. i., march 28 1917. rykov, alexei ivanovich (188:1-— ), russian politi- cian, was born in saratov, the son of a peasant. saratov was a place of banishment for revolutionaries, and rykov came under their influence. when he went to kazan he was already taking part in social democratic organisations. he was im- prisoned and sent back to saratov to remain under police super- vision. continuing his revelutionary work, he was rearrested, but escaped abroad before his trial. he visited lenin at geneva and returned 1o russia as a propagandist in various industrial districts. in 1904 he was in moscow, and in 1905 attended a congress of the communist party which elected him a member of the party’s central committee. on returning from the congress he was arrested in st. petersburg (leningrad). he was rykov freed by the revolution of 1905, was a representative of the bolsheviks in the st. petersburg workmen’s soviet and escaped from the capital when the soviet was arrested. he took part in the dec. revolt and the fighting on the barricades in moscow, escaped to odessa after the failure of that revolt, but presently was again working in moscow, where he was arrested but once more succeeded in escaping. in 1907 he was arrested and banished to samara, but went abroad to visit lenin. he was arrested on returning and exiled to the province of archangel for three years. he escaped shortly before the end of his term of exile and went to paris. he 443 returned to russia to organise a congress, was arrested in 1or1 and remained in prison till 1913, when in oct. he was sentenced to exile to the narym district for four years. in 1914 he escaped, went to samara, was recaptured and sent back to the narym district, where he remained until the march revolution of 1917, after which he worked in the moscow organisation of the bolsheviks. he took an active part in the nov. revolu- tion, was for some time president of the supreme economic council, and, alter the death of lenin, became president of the council of people’s commissars. he was still occupying this position in 1926. 444 aar (sarre) territory: (sce saar, 23.053), an indus- trial and mining district situated on the franco-german frontier, north of lorraine and near the iron ore deposits of briey. its area is 741 sq. m., its population 770,000. the 31 coal mines employ 72,000 men; the 5 iron and steel plants and subsidiary industries a further 32,000, the larger part of this most important district is prussian, the smaller bavarian. from nov. 1918 to jan. 1920 it was occupied by french troops and administered by a french general. admintstration under the league of nations.—by section iv. of the treaty of versailles (jan. 10 1920) germany ceded to france the full and absolute possession of the coal-mines in the saar basin as compensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in the north of france and as part payment towards the total reparation due from germany for the damage caused by the war. the district containing the mines was formed into the saar territory, of which the frontiers were roughly defined in the treaty and afterwards to be exactly traced by a commis- sion. this territory, which is not a state, possesses no sovereign rights and has no permanent existence; it is administered by the league of nations, acting as trustee, for the period 1920-35. during this period all powers of government formerly pos- sessed by the german empire, prussia and bavaria are ceded by germany to the league of nations and exercised by a governing commission of five, to be nominated by and respon- sible individually and collectively to the league of nations. one of these five persons must always be a frenchman, a second always a saar inhabitant of german nationality; the remaining three members belonging to three countries other than france or germany. the five are appointed for one year by the council of the league of nations, which designates one of them as president. each member may be reappointed or revoked by the same authority. in view of the dominant french interests, m. rault, the french member, has held the presidency of the commission from 1920 up to march 31 1926. a consultative council, consisting of 30 members, elected every three years by popular vote of the inhabitants, usually from the local political parties, has been established in an advisory capacity without power of initiative. all new laws and modifications of old ones are submitted to it before being promulgated by the governing commission. a commission of 9 is nominated by the governing commission and tenders its advice on all problems submitted to it by the commission. the power of the commission is not sovercign. france owns the mines! and the territory is subjected to the french customs regime. , france,! under the treaty terms had also the right to use french money in all matters connected with the exploita- tion of the mines. in fact, the french franc became the only legal currency after june 1 1923. in many other respects, how- ever, the status quo under german rule at the time of the armis- tice is maintained. the inhabitants retain their local assemblies, religious liberties, schools, language and nationality. the governing commission administers the following departments: public works, railways, ports, telegraphs, agriculture, social insurance, forests, public instruction, trade and commerce, foreign relations, finance, public welfare and decides all ques- tions arising from the interpretation of the treaty stipu- lations which concern the government of the territory. in 1935 a plebiscite will be held, on the result of which the league of nations will decide whether the territory or certain portions of it shall continue to be governed autonomously under the league, be united with france or again be governed by germany. after 1935 the coal mines may under certain conditions be re- purchased by germany. 1 the mines now belong to the french state and are under the direct control of the french minister of public works in paris through an administrative head in saarbriicken. saar therritory—sachau work of the commission.—the work of the governing com- mission has been exceedingly diflicult, and was not accomplished without friction, especially during its opening stages. ‘the first acute problem to arise was that of the status of the local officials. it was decided that they should retain their position as german — officials, but pledge fidelity to the new government. certain disagreements led, however, in july 1920 to an eight days’ strike of all officials, which threatened to spread to the coal-mines. it was suppressed by the french military, by courts martial and expulsions. that again raised the question whether the presence of a french garrison was desirable in a plebiscite territory. in fact, the french garrison was subsequently reduced and a local gendarmerie raised. the establishment of a court of appeal of mainly neutral composition in june 1920 went some way to quieting apprehensions; another step in this direction was the appointment in sept. 1922 of a swiss commissioner to inquire into and provide for the preservation of the records necessary for drawing up the voting test to be used in the plebiscite of 1935. in the spring of 1923, when tension between france! and germany was high owing to the occupation of the ruhr, 75,000 miners struck from feb. 5 to may 15. asecond grave political crisis now arose, especially after the governing commission had increased the french garrison and promulgated certain repressive measures (decree of march 7). ‘this decree was severely criticised, both in the meeting of the league of nations on april 23 and in the british house of commons in may. the british govt. declared itself in favour of “fan impartial inquiry conducted by the machinery of the league into the question of the general administration of the saar territory.”” on jan. 1 1923 the franc was substituted for the mark as the legal currency. a public inquiry was conducted by the council of the league on july 6. the council found it unnecessary to discuss the pro- visional decree of march 7, as this had already been withdrawn (june 18). it “ appreciated the economic considerations ” which had led to the change of currency; and declared it desirable that ‘‘ the support of a foreign garrison should be withdrawn so soon as the development of the local gendarmerie permits.” it expressed its “ great appreciation of the administrative work achieved by the governing commission.” the present regime in the saar territory is inevitably and ipso facto unpopular among the local population. causes of friction have, however, now been eliminated as far as humanly possible. economically, on the other hand, the saar territory enjoys considerable advantages. it has no army to support, no repara- tions to pay, no foreign debt and no war debt. it has always been able to balance its budget out of normal current revenue and the per capita taxation on the inhabitants has been low. unemployment has rarely exceeded 1-5% of the total working population. exports in 1924 amounted to 1,123,441,499 francs, imports to 874,642,000 francs. in 1913 the annual production of coal was 13,000,000 tons, the coal reserves about 16,000,000 ,000. coal production sank in feb. 1920 to 743,000 tons but rose by oct. 1923 to 1,223,000 tons. it is thus over the pre-war average. the monthly average production of pigiron (115,000 tons) and steel (120,000 tons) is also above pre-war figures. since jan. 10 1925, under the treaty terms, a customs barrier has been imposed between germany and the saar, which thereby becomes incorporated within the french customs regime. this has necessitated finding and developing new markets throughout the world. future prosperity will be influenced by the terms of an ultimate trade agreement between france and germany. biptiocraphy.—j. kollmann, die grossindustrie des saargebiets (berlin, 1911); treaty of versailles, part ii], section iv, annex. chapter i (1920); league of nations oficial journal (1920-5); a. allot, le bassin de la sarre (1924); a. ruppertsberg, geschichte des saargebiets (berlin, 1924). (g. ws.) sachau, carl eduard (1845- ), german scholar, was born july 20 1845 at neumiinster in holstein. in 1869 he was safeguarding of industry appointed professor of semitic languages at the university of ‘vienna, and in 1876 professor of oriental languages at berlin, where he became director of the school of oriental languages. in 1879-80 he travelled extensively in syria and mesopotamia, and in 1897-8 in babylonia and assyria, for the purposes of study. sachau was a member of the academics of sciences of berlin, vienna, london, leningrad and helsingfors. his chief works are: gdwdltki's almurrab (1867); syriaca inedita (1870); syrisch-remisches rechishbuch aus dem 5. jahrhundert (1890); reise in syrien und mesopotamien (1883); neuarabische volkslieder aus afesopotamien (1889); katalog persischer llandschrifiten (1889); muhammedanisches ferbrecht von zanstbar und ost-afrika (1894); am iuphrat und tigris (1900); syrische rechisbticher (1907-14); vom asiatischen reich der ttirket (1915). for a complete bibliog- raphy of the works of sachau, see s. weil, die festschrift 2u ehren ed. sachaus, 1915. safeguarding of industry.—this is a term which has come into use to designate a policy, entered upon by great britain after the world war, of tariff protection to particular industries under certain definitely prescribed conditions. the idea took shape at the economic conference of the allies in paris in 1916. the first of the resolutions concerning permanent meas- ures, as distinct from war and reconstruction measures, was as follows:— the allies decide to take the necessary steps to render themselves independent of the enemy countries in so far as regards the raw materials and manufactured articles essential to the normal develop- ment of their economic activities. the signatories—including, of course, great britain—re- tained complete freedom as to the nature of the measures to be adopted, and expressly added that, in deciding upon them, they would “ have regard to the principles which govern their economic policy.” ) the balfour committce—the further consideration of the mat- ter was at once referred by mr. asquith, the prime minister, to the committee on commercial and industrial policy after the war, presided over by lord balfour of burleigh. in an interim report in march 1917 it drew a distinction between the great staple industries of the country and those producing “ certain special commodities essential to national safety as being abso- lutely indispensable to important british industries, which were supplied before the war entirely or mainly from present enemy sources or from sources under present enemy control.” the re- port also set forth the position with respect to synthetic dyes, spelter, tungsten, magnetos, optical and chemical glass, hosiery needles, thorium nitrate, gauges and drugs, as pivotal or “ key ”’ industries. | the committee presented its final report on dec. 3 1917, def- initely recommending that “‘some governmental action should be taken to promote and safeguard the development in the united kingdom of industries of a special or pivotal character ’’; and also expressing the opinion that “ the producers of this country are entitled to require from the government that they should be protected in their home market against dumping.”” dumping was defined as “ the sale of goods at prices lower than those at which the goods are currently offered in the country of manufacture.” no action was taken on these recommendations until aug. 1921, when the coalition govt. secured the passage of the safe- guarding of industries act, 1921. this dealt, in part i., with the safeguarding of key industries, and in part ii. with the preven- tion of dumping, authorising, in each case, a duty of one-third of the value. key industries were specified in a schedule to the act; the board of trade was authorised to issue lists in accordance therewith; and complaints as to improper inclusion in, or exclusion from, the lists were to be considered by a referee appointed by the lord chancellor. the duration of this part of the act was for five years. the enact- ment as to dumping in part ii. was restricted to goods other than articles of food or drink; and dumping was defined by implication as sale “‘ at prices below the cost of production,” which was itself defined as ‘' 95° of the wholesale price at the works.’”” but under part ii. were now included conditions beyond those contemplated in 1917. the depreciation of the exchanges of continental countries, especially of germany, had been accompanied by a “ lag between the internal and external value of their currencies, which, so long as 445 it continued, gave their exports an advantage in forcign markets, thus exposing the home manufactures of those markets to an excep- tional but, it might be, ruinous competition, ; accordingly the act added to the goods with respect to which action could be taken those sold ‘at prices which, by reason of depreciation in the value in relation to sterling of the currency of the country in which the goods are manufactured (not being a country within his majesty’s dominions) are below the prices at which similar goods can be profitably manufactured in the united king- dom.” on complaint being made to the board of trade, the board must satisfy itself that the value of the currency of the country in question had fallen by at least one-third in relation to sterling. whether it was alleged that the imports were being ‘‘ dumped ”’ in the usual sense, or sold cheaply on account of the rate of exchange, the board was required to satisfy itself that there was a prima facie case for maintaining that such imports were seriously affecting employment. it might then refer the complaint to a special com- mittee, sclected from a permanent panel mainly of persons of com- mercial or industrial experience, which was directed to report as to whether the conditions were satisfied; into the effect which the im- position of a duty would exert on any other industry using the goods as matcrials; and also as to whether the threatened industry in the ace kingdom was being carried on with reasonable economy and emciency, if aes report was satisfactory, the board of trade was given power, but not required, to make an order applying the act, so long as it was not at variance with any engagement with any forcign state. the draft of the order must, however, be approved by the hfouse of commons before it became operative. such an order, un- less renewed, would not be valid for more than three years, and if made on the ground of depreciation of currency for more than three years after the passing of the act. four classes of goods safeguwarded.—most of the applications received were adversely reported upon; but four having been adjudged to fulfill all the conditions, formed the subjects of a draft order laid before the louse of commons in june 1922, and approved by resolution of the house at the end of july. in each instance the complaint had been made on the ground of depreci- ated exchanges. the order applied to four descriptions of goods manufactured in germany: fabric gloves and glove fabric, do- mestic glassware, illuminating glassware and domestic hollow- ware. the case of fabric gloves had previously been referred back to the committee that it might consider the assertion that the lancashire cotton trade would be injured by the effect which the duty would have on the export of yarn from england, and it had reported, repeating its former recommendation. in the case of glassware, though the report of the committee had included imports from czechoslovakia, that country had been so success- ful in stabilising its currency before the order was actually pre- pared, that the president of the board of trade, in the exercise of his discretion under the act, determined to limit the imposition of duties to imports from germany. in oct. 1922 a further order was made with respect to gas mantles from germany, the com- plainants having satisfied a committee that the conditions of the act were in fact satisfied. the time required by so elaborate a procedure and the limited duration of the promised safeguarding prevented any further action being taken before the fall of the first baldwin administra- tion at the end of 1923. asto the effect of the orders it is difficult to form any confident opinion, in view of the continuance, out- side the particular trades under the act, of the severe general depression of trade. but there seems reason to believe that in the case of domestic hollow-ware some improvement was dis- cernible, and that in the other cases the trades were enabled to keep alive, and were saved from the still greater decline they would otherwise have experienced. zl change in procedure.—on the formation of tne second bald- win administration a new procedure was adopted. the general conditions on which safeguarding dutics would be granted were announced on feb. 3 1925, ina white paper (cmd. 2327, 1925), together with the intention of the government, when a frima facie case had been made out and reported on favourably by a special committee, and the imposition of a duty had been con- curred in by the board of trade and the treasury, to proceed by the ordinary methods of financial legislation, with all their customary safeguards. to the conditions imposed by the earlier act were now added (1) that the applicant industry should be “of substantial importance, on account of the volume of 446 employment or the nature of the goods,” and (2) that the com- peting imports should be “ abnormal.” the term “ dumping ”’ dis- appeared; and it was now made necessary to prove that the com- petition came “‘ largely from countries where the conditions are so different . .. as to render it unfair.” ‘ unfairness ” was limited to one or more of the following causes :— (a) depreciation of currency, operating so as to create an ex- port bounty. (6) subsidies, bounties and other artificial advantages. (c) inferior conditions of employment of labour. the special committee in each case might “ call attention to any special circumstances by reason of which the industry in the united kingdom was placed at a serious relative disadvantage.” finally, the committee was called upon, in the event of the claim to a duty being made out, to express its opinion as to the rate of duty which ‘‘ would be reasonably sufficient to counteract the unfair competition.” the operation of the previous act had been restricted by exist- ing treaty obligations, and a commercial treaty had recently been made with germany extending to that country most favoured nation rights. the government therefore now determined that any safeguarding duties imposed under the new act should be general in their application and not limited to imports from par- ticular countries. four further applications granted.—out of more than a score of applications in the course of the next few months, four suc- ceeded in satisfying the conditions of the act. the first of these reports, that on lace and embroidery, was in time to be given effect to in the finance act 1925, which imposed an import duty of one-third of the value. the other three were given effect to in the safeguarding of industries (customs duties) act 1925, which, after long debates, became law on dec. 22. this im- posed for five years a duty of one-third of the value on imports of certain classes of cutlery and on both leather and fabric gloves, and also a specific duty on incandescent mantles. the lace, cutlery and glove trades were deemed important by reason of the volume of employment they provided. the gas mantle industry was considered important in view of its character. during the war it had been discovered that there was vital need in every branch of gunnery of the rare metals thorium and cerium for the manufacture of searchlights, and it was held that the only chance of maintaining the production of these metals was to give those engaged in their extraction the one commercial market furnished by the gas mantle trade. the report of the committee appointed by the board of trade upon :— (a) the effect of part i. of the safeguarding of industries act 1921, on the development of the industries manufacturing the goods covered by the schedule to that act. (b) the question of the desirability or otherwise of an extension of part i. of the act after its expiry on aug. 19 1926. (c) the question of the desirability of inclusion within the ambit of the schedule of any articles or substances not now covered. was published on april 22 1926 (cmd. 2631 of 1926). the com- mittee recommended the continuation, and in certain cases, the increase or extension of rates of duty, and the continuation of the safeguarding duties for a minimum of five years, and prefer- ably ten years. bibliography.— final report of the committee on commercial and industrial policy after the wer (cd. 9035, 1918); and official reports of parliamentary debates (hansard's), especially those in the house of commons (aug. 11 ig21, july 31 1922; and dec. 9 1925). (wa. a.) safety first.—the origin of the safety movement or, as it is more popularly called, the safety first movement, is often disputed. the united states first developed the idea on an organised national basis, but the principles were in practice much earlier in great britain and elsewhere. in the middle of the roth century an association was formed in manchester to prevent the disasters due to boiler explosions; early in the 20th century cer- tain undertakings, notably lever bros., cadbury bros. and the great western railway co., were developing the principle safety first of educating their employees in the necessity of being on their guard against the risks of modern machinery and high speed transport. the slogan “ safety first ’ was certainly used on a large scale in america first of all. its origin lies in an old railway rule “ the safety of the public shall be the first consideration of the staff.”” the slogan caught on, and, though often misinterpreted as implying that all other considerations are of secondary im- portance, no better substitute has yet been evolved. it is the motto for a movement which aims at educating the community in the common sense principles necessary to cope with the ever- increasing and inevitable risks inseparable from modern condi- tions. the majority of all accidents should not, and need not, occur. campaign tn great britain.—the beginning of the british national campaign was in london in 1916. at an important con- ference it was decided to form the london safety first council to deal with london’s street dangers, and this body has been in active existence ever since. composed of representatives from the various london local authorities, transport and business undertakings, together with experts on traffic matters, it has waged a continuous educative campaign in the london area, particularly in the schoals. nearly 200,000 school children par- ticipate annually in its essay competition; over 15,000 motor drivers enter annually for its “ freedom from accidents”? com- petition. over 1,000,000 posters and warnings have been dis- played in schools and elsewhere, whilst the chief transport under- takings have supplemented the campaign by additional efforts. it is claimed that, owing to these activities, there are fewer children killed on the london streets than was the case previous- ly; that the rate of increase in london’s accidents is less than in the provinces; and that the standard of both drivers’ and pedes- trians’ watchfulness is higher in the metropolis than elsewhere. safety work in indusiry.—in 1918 attention was directed to the value of accident prevention work in industry, and the british industrial safety first association was formed to deal with this side of the problem. its gravity is best indicated by the fact that 200,000 more persons were compensated for industrial accidents in the five years following the war than were wounded in the previous five years of war. members of this association, who took up organised accident prevention work, found that they were able very materially to reduce the number of their accidents, in some cases by as much as 70 to 80%. these results were achieved by co-operation between employer and employed, and by impressing the necessary common-sense precautions by means of posters and allied measures for interesting and educating the workers. a national campaign.—the growth of motor traffic, and so the toll of street accidents, which rose from 36,000 in 1918 to well over 100,000 in 1925, directed attention to the need of a general national campaign. in 1924 the british industrial safety first association and the london safety first council were merged in a national safety first association, and in that year and in 1925, with the support of the great motoring and other organisations, a national campaign was inaugurated. with the co-operation of many local authorities, education committees and chief constables, safety instruction was given in schools; the public were instructed through the medium of the press, of posters and of the association’s journal, safety first, and arrange- . ments were made whereby a pamphlet on safe motoring was issued with every motor driving licence. in eight of the chief provincial centres, branches of the association were formed for the purpose of initiating work on the lines successfully carried out by the london safety first council. other countries —corresponding accident prevention bodies exist, or are in process of formation, in practically all countries. the oldest and most influential is the national safety council of america, with a very large membership and field of activity. other bodies are the canadian national safety league, the industrial accident prevention association of canada, the association des industriels (accident prevention) of france, the association des industriels (accident prevention) of belgium, sage—st. germain, treaty of the associazione degli industriali (accident prevention) of italy and the national insurance institute, trieste. the inter- national labour office at geneva has a special department dealing with accident prevention. (see industrial welfare.) (j. a. a. p.) sage, margaret olivia slocum (1828-1918), american philanthropist, was born at syracuse, n.y., sept. 8 1828. after graduating in 1847 from the troy (n.y.) female seminary, afterwards known as the emma willard school, she taught in various schools until 1869, when she became the second wife of russell sage (see 23.1002). she proved herself a shrewd business woman and for several years before his death had full control of his affairs. she had long been interested in charities, and he left to her without restriction his entire fortune, over $64,000,000, doubtless foreseeing its probable final distribution to charity. in 1907 the russell sage foundation was incorporated for the ‘improvement of social and living conditions of the united states of america,” and to it she gave $10,000,000. in 1912 mrs. sage bought marsh i., off the louisiana coast, containing about 79,000 ac., later turned over to the state as a permanent refuge for birds. she died in new york city nov. 4 1918. her will provided that after bequests to relatives and friends amounting to about $12,000,000, the residue, some $36,000,000, should be divided into 52 parts and variously distributed to many colleges, museums, hospitals, charitable institutions, bible societies and missions. to most of these she had made gifts during her lifetime. the largest portion, seven parts, was left to the russell sage foundation. it was estimated that during her life she had made public gifts of some $40,000,000. said halim, prince (1863-1921), turkish statesman, the son of halim pasha and the grandson of mohammed ali, the founder of the present egyptian dynasty, was born in cairo and was educated in turkey, completing his studies in geneva. exiled because of his sympathy with the young turkish move- ment, he affiliated himself to the committee of union and prog- ress in paris. after the revolution of july 1908 he returned to constantinople and was nominated senator. at various times from 1908 to 1918 he was president of the council of state, min- ister for foreign affairs and general secretary to the union and progress party. on june 17 1913 he became grand vizier, in which capacity he endeavoured to settle the questions of ar- menian reforms, mosul oil, and the participation of english, french and russian capital in the baghdad railway. he also endeavoured to establish close relations with greece. prince said halim favoured a turco-german alliance, but sought to keep turkey neutral in the world war. on her entry into the war he tendered his resignation, which was refused, and he re- mained in office until feb. 1917. after the armistice of moudros, oct. 31 1918, prince said halim was imprisoned by the british in malta. released in 1921, he was assassinated in rome on dec. 6 r921. one of the last representatives of old turkish grands seigneurs, prince said halim was a connoisseur of oriental as well as occidental fine arts. he founded the evkaf for muslim arts in constantinople, and the school for turkish decorative writing and miniature. said pasha, mehmed (1838-1914), turkish statesman, was born at erzerum, the son of ali namik effendi, formerly charge d’affaires at tehran. in 1876 he became first secretary to the sultan abdul hamid ii. and afterwards senator. after the russo-turkish peace in 1878, he became minister of justice, and showed energy and initiative in carrying through important legal reforms. in 1879 he was appointed grand vizier, a post which he held nine times in all. in 1881 he established the ad- ministration of the public debt, and the tobacco monopoly. in 1885, owing to his having advocated armed intervention to re- store the sfui#s quo in bulgaria, he was replaced by kiamil pasha. at the time of the armenian massacres he was again in power, but was dismissed in 1895, and was forced to take refuge at the british embassy. during the revolt of the young turks in 1908 he was called on by abdul hamid to form a cabinet, but was unsuccessful in his attempts to defend the old regime. after the revolution he was for some time president of the 447 senate, and in ro1r succeeded hakki pasha as grand vizier. in 1913 he again became president of the senate, and died in constantinople march 1 1914. said pasha was a remarkable speaker; and, combining as he did the culture of both east and west, may be considered as one of the most experienced and far- secing turkish ministers of the roth century. his afemoirs in three volumes are a justification of his policy; and an account of his legal reforms will be found in the blue book, turkey (1881, no. 8). st. aldwyn, michael edward hicks-beach, rst eart (1837-1916), british statesman (sce 23.1013), was created an earl in 1915. he died in london april 30 1916.