PUNISHMENT

punishment is the deliberate infliction of suffering on a wrongdoer. originating in the prim- punishment itive lust for reprisal for an injury suffered, it has been rational- ised into a well-nigh universal conviction that it is the best if not the only means of bringing the sinner to repentance. the new psychology, which sees deeper roots than naughti- ness or wickedness in childish wilfulness and adult criminality, is doing something to undermine this faith in the universal efficacy of punishment. wrongdoing must be corrected, but the correctional treatment must be based on a diagnosis of the individual. if the misconduct is due to invincible ignorance or to a neurotic constitution or to a morbid emotional state, the infliction of punishment may only aggravate the underlying cause of the objectionable behaviour. perhaps in any case there 1s a wiser alternative to punishment. | in the treatment of the criminal, as in that of the child, the concept of punitive justice still dominates action and feeling. to the common mind justice is punishment. this sentiment gains powerful support from a modern school of philosophic thought which maintains that it is only by the punishment of the offender that human society can maintain its moral integrity, a view which finds its most dramatic expression in the words of the late mr. justice fitzjames stephen in his history of the criminal law in england, to the effect that it is morally right to hate the criminal and that exemplary punishments are necessary to express and confirm that hatred. | the popular attitude is further reinforced by an undying faith in the deterrent effects of hard legal penalties. in the united states, at least, beccaria’s maxim, that it is not the severity but the swiftness and certainty of punishment that gives it its deterrent effect, falls on deaf ears. we seek by severity to compensate for the discreditable delays and un- certainties of our criminal justice. it is in england, perhaps, more nearly than in any other country, that beccaria’s prin- ciple is being reasonably applied. the great humanitarian tradition which was born of beccaria’s epoch-making pamphlet and forwarded by the heroic labours of romilly, bentham and howard, has, in england, achieved the . all but complete abolition of the death penalty and a general mitigation of prison sentences. but, while the same generous sentiment has, since the coming of william penn, never failed to command distinguished support in america, it has apparently been far less effective in america than in england. here the county jail of john howard still survives, and in many american states such crimes as rape, arson, robbery and burglary, as well as murder, are still punishable by death. consonant with these survivals is the extent to which the infliction of punish- ments is left to the arbitrary and capricious discretion of the judges, who frequently impose sentences of incredible severity on offenders convicted of the more serious offences. sentences of 10, 20, 30 and even 60 years are not infrequently imposed on offenders who in england would rarely receive more than the statutory term of five years. but in the united states, as in the england of romilly and bentham, humanitarianism has its illogical but effective revenge. as in that older day when, in the mother country, the multi- tudinous death penalty hung in the balance, there is at present in the united states the scandalous spectacle of prosecuting officers compromising with the offender, of witnesses disappearing between indictment and trial, of juries refusing to convict, of appellate courts resorting to tricky technicalities to reverse a judgment of conviction and of governors exercising the pardon- ing power like spendthrifts. “thus,” as romilly says, “ the law defeats its own ends and becomes the abettor of its own violation.” punishments must be brought into conformity with the conscience of the people. bretiograruy.—r. saleilles, the individualisation of punish- ment (boston, 1911); h. oppenheimer, the rationale of punish- ment (london, 1913); george ives, htstory of penal methods (lon- don, 1914); f. fi. wines, punishment and reformation, rev. ed. (new york, 1919); mary gordon, penal discipline (london, 1922); c, philipson, three criminal law reformers (beccaria, bentham, romilly) (london, 1923); e. h. sutherland, criminology (phila- delphia, 1924). (g. w. k.*) punjab, university of the—pyle