PLANT PHYSIOLOGY

this branch of botany has made such great advances and it touches physics and chemis- try so closely that it has almost become a separate subject. progress has been made over such a wide field that only a few important developments are referred to. photoperiodism.—it is a familiar fact that, at least in tem- perate climates, many plants flower at certain periods of the year only. there are so-called spring flowers, autumn flowers and plants which flower in the summer. this marked seasonal effect must be due to some varying external condition or set of condi- tions. it has often been supposed that temperature plays a large part in the development of flowers, and a certain degree of warmth is essential for growth, yet altering the temperature alone will not markedly alter a plant’s flowering period. asters and chrysanthemums cannot be made to flower in summer by lower- ing the temperature nor irises in winter by putting them in a greenhouse. apart from temperature there is one regular cyc- lical change associated with the march of the seasons and that is the change in the length of the day and night, the day in the latitude of london varying from 163 hours in june to a little under eight hours in december. it has been shown by garner and allard (1) that in the case of many plants it is the length of the day which is the decisive factor in fixing the season of flowering. the discovery was made in the united states, where the behaviour of a valuable variety of tobacco known as maryland mammoth was being studied. it had been found impossible to obtain seeds from this variety since it went on growing steadily through the season, sometimes reaching a height of 12 ft., being eventually cut down by frost before it had formed flowers. one autumn a specimen was transplanted to a greenhouse, where it promptly flowered and set seed. this was at first thought to be an effect of temperature, but further investigation showed that it was im- possible to cause the plants to flower in the summer. it was soon found that the dominating factor was length of day; if growth conditions were favourable it would flower in the short days of late autumn or winter but not in the long days of summer. by artificially shortening the day to 12 hours by placing the mary- land mammoth plants in the dark during some of the dayligh’ hours, flowering could be brought about at any time of the year following up this discovery of the behaviour of the variety ot tobacco, garner and allard investigated at washington the behaviour of a large number of plants. these were grown in pots which were borne upon light trucks running on tram-lines so that the pots could be run in and out of sheds and thus be illuminated for various fractions of the daylight period. many plants, such as the tobacco variety mentioned above, soya beans, asters, chrysanthemums, poinsettia, were found to be “short day ” plants, and would only flower when the period of daylight was reduced to 12 hours or less. if the time of illumination is suit- plant physiology ably adjusted the plants will flower and fruit when they are quite diminutive, while other individuals exposed to full daylight grow to a large size without any trace of flower production. other plants such as grasses have been shown to be “ long day ” plants which require a long daily period of illumination for the initia- tion of flowering (2). phototropism.—in the physiological field of irritability of plants the question which has perhaps been most discussed of recent years has been that of the nature of the response of plant organs to light from one side. it is known that many stems when exposed to unilateral light grow toward the light. the earlicst view was that this reaction was a response to the greater intensity of illumination on the near side as compared with that on the far side. when, however, it was found that many transparent organs such as root hairs and fungal hyphae would respond to light, the view that the plant organ was sensitive to the direction of the incident light came to the front. blaauw (3) was the first to put forward against this view a simple theory of the photo- tropic response. ile showed that simple unicellular structures like the sporangiophore of phycomyces and the hypotocotyl of helianthus exhibited a very definite ‘ light-growth reaction ” when illuminated all round, the rate of growth being increased in phycomyces and reduced in helianthus. light, apart from direction, has thus an acceleration effect in the one case and an inhibiting effect in the other. the turning of the hypotocotyl of the sunflower toward the light is explained by the relatively greater retardation of growth on the side turned toward the light. it would seem that the sporangiophore of phycomyces should turn away from the light, but it was shown that this glass- like cylindrical structure acts as a lens, the light being focussed on the further side which is thus the more intensely illuminated of the two. later, it was shown by buder (4) that if the sporangiophore is placed in hquid paraffin and exposed to unilateral light the focussing effect is no longer produced, and the nearer side is the more highly illuminated, with the result that the organ now grows away from the light. asa result of his work blaauw put forward the view that phototropism is simply a growth response to the different intensities of illumination of the two sides of the plant organ. the light probably acts in some photochemical way and this affects the cell processes. buder’s (5) experiment, in which one half of the coleoptile of the oat was illuminated by a pencil of light coming directly from above, and also that in which the hollow colcoptile was illuminated on one side by a pencil of rays coming from the inside outwards, speak strongly in favour of the theory that the response of orthotropous organs is to differences of light intensity and not to light direction. conduction of the phototropic and the geatropic stimulus — interesting results have recently been obtained by studies on the conduction of the phototropic and geotropic stimulus. if the apex only of the coleoptile of oat be illuminated, the stimulus is conducted to the lower part which becomes curved. it was first shown by boyson-jensen, and later more fully by paal and by stark, that if the tip is cut off and stuck on again by means of a thin film of gelatine, illumination of the tip while the lower part is kept darkened will still bring about curvature. the conduction takes place through the layer of gelatine, and it will also pass through a thin sheet of cane covered with gelatine; but if a thin sheet of mica or of metal be used there is no transmission of the stimulus. this indicates that the agent responsible for the conduction is some diffusible material and not an electric current. it has also been shown by snow (6) that a similar phenomenon is to be observed in connection with the geotropic stimulus. he finds that if the primary roots of the broad bean (vicia foba) are decapitated and the tips are stuck on again with a film of gelatine the roots become again capable of curving under the action of gravity. the conduction in this case also appears to be due to the diffusion of some soluble substance. the diffusion from the tip of a substance important in growth reactions is not confined to organs which are phototropically and geotropically stimulated. if the tip of a coleoptile kept vertical is removed the rate of growth of the coleoptile is slowed down but the replace- 157 ment of the tip increases again the rate. a growth promoting substance seems thus to be continually passing downwards from the apex. permeabilitvy—there have been many investigations dealing with the permeability of the plant cell but the nature of the plasma membrane, which largely controls the entry of sub- stances, and the forces which lead to the accumulation of sub- stances in the cell are still very obscure. the whole subject has been reviewed by stiles {7}. a clearer picture, however, has now been obtained of the water relations of the cell. the plant cell usually exhibits an osmotic pressure which ranges from about 11 to 40 atmospheres and may reach over 150 atmospheres. in addition to this outwardly directed osmotic pressure (tp) there is in turgid or partially turgid cells an inwardly directed pressure, the wall pressure (t). in a fully turgid cell, i.e., one which is fully imbibed with water, the wall pressure is equal to the osmotic pressure, 7.e., p=t. in a partially turgid cell the wall pressure is less than the osmotic pressure: the difference (p—t) between these two pressures is the suction pressure (s). uf the cell is lying in water this suction pressure is a measure of the pressure forcing water into the cell. the ‘“ water absorbing power ” of a cell, as it used to be called, is thus determined not by the osmotic pressure of the cell but by its suction pressure. whether one cell will absorb water from another depends not on their relative osmotic pressures but on their relative suction pressures; a slizhtly turgid cell with a low osmotic pressure can take water from a fully turgid cell of much higher osmotic pressure. when the cell is plasmolysed the suction pressure is at its highest, and is equal to the osmotic pressure of the cell sap; when the cell is fully turgid the suction pressure is zero. respiration.—the work of neuberg and his collaborators (8) has placed our knowledge of the chemistry of the related process of alcoholic fermentation on a firm basis. the probability is very great that pyruvic acid is an intermediate product in the conver- sion of a hexose sugar into alcohol and carbon dioxide. normal respiration follows rather different lines; in essentials it is the exact opposite to photosynthesis (carbon assimilation). in that process sugar is built up from water and carbon dioxide with the aid of the energy of light. in respiration, sugar is oxidised to carbon dioxide and water with the liberation of heat. it may be represented thus:— ch 2oc+602.=6h.o +6c0.4674,800 calories. other sub- stances may be oxidised in the process of respiration but sugar appears to be commonly used. ‘there are various theories as to the mechanism of respiration, one being that oxidation is due toa peroxide and an enzyme (peroxidase). such oxidising enzymes, although they will oxidise a number of aromatic substances present in the plant, will not act on the materials such as sugars which are used in respiration. of late years the view of wieland has been very much to the fore. in this view the process of physiological oxidation is really a process of combination with water, followed later (probably under the action of an enzyme) by a process of dehydrogenation in which hydrogen is split off, the material being finally reduced to carbon dioxide. the hy- drogen formed, which is in an active state, combines with the oxygen in the air to form water. wieland has shown that, in the absence of oxygen, respiratory material such as glucose can produce carbon dioxide at ordinary temperatures when in the presence of water and some catalyst (such as palladium black) provided that some “ acceptor,” as it is called, of hydrogen is available. methylene blue or hydroquinone can act as such an acceptor. in the view of warburg (9) the process of respiration is essentially a surface reaction. it has been shown that if blood corpuscles be reduced to an emulsion by freezing and thawing, respiration will go on, but it is confined to the solid portions of the emulsion, i.e., to the cell fragments. the same applies to broken- up egg cells. warburg has shown that various substances, such as oxalic acid, amino acids (leucin and cystine) and even sugars, when adsorbed on the surface of animal charcoal, are oxidised with considerable rapidity. as a result of these oxidations the same substances are produced as arise when these materials are respired in the living organism. 158 this view of oxidation at a surface receives support from the fact that narcotics not only retard the process of respiration but also the oxidation of substances by animal charcoal. further- more, the narcotics are the more effective the greater their degree of adsorption by the charcoal; by their active adsorption they displace the material from the surface. it is found that hydrogen cyanide (hcn) has a far greater eflect in solution than can be explained by its adsorption. warburg is thus led to the view that iron plays a very important part in the process, the oxida- tion only occurring on those parts of the surface (of the charcoal ot the cell} in which iron is present. the hydrogen cyanide is peculiarly active because it alters the iron chemically so that it is no longer active as a catalyst. in nathansohn’s (ro) view the physiological oxidations characteristic of respiration are essentially electro-chemical. small membrane potentials in the cells may lead to the electrolytic dissociation of water, the nascent hydrogen being removed by the same “‘ acceptor ” and the active oxygen bringing about the oxidation of respiratory materials. brpliogrrapny.—(1) w. w. garner and hi. a. allard, jour. agricultural res., vol. 18 (1920); and vol. 23 (1923); (2) m.a. i. ‘tincker, annals of botany, vol. 39 (1925); (3) a. i]. blaauw, afed,. vw. d. landbouwhkoogeschool, vol. 15 (1918); (4) j. buder, ber. d. dent, bot. ges., vol. 36 (1918); (5) j. buder, zdid., vol. 38 (1920); (6) r. snow, annals of botany, vol. 38 (1924); (7) l.. w. stiles, permeabil- ity (1924); (8) c. neuberg, ergebnisse der physiologie, vol. 21 (1923); (9) o. warburg, biochem. zeitschrift, vol. 113 (1921) and wirkung der struktur anf chemische vorgdnge (jena 1923); (10) a. nathan- sohn, zeitschrift fiir elektrochemie, vol. 28 (1921). see also sir j. c. bose, researches on irritabiitiy of planis (1913); h. w. howard, an experimental study of ihe rest period in plants (1915); c. f. cross et a/., cellulose: an outline of the chemistry of the structural flements of plants (1916); contributions to plant phystol- ogy, johns hopkins university (1917); b. e. livingston, a quarter century of growth in plant physiology (1917); sir j. c. bose, life movements in plants, 3 vol. (1918-23); the physiology of the ascent of sap (1923); the physiology of photosynthesis (1924); a. j. eames and l. h. macdaniels, an introduction to plant anatomy (1925). (v2. hb) plata, rio de la, or river pate (see 21.786), the great estuary on the east side of south america, between the re- publics of argentina and uruguay, into which flow the rivers parana and uruguay with their tributaries. during the 20 years ending in 1926 many of the ports, cities and towns located on the plata-parana-paraguay river system have made marked prog- ress. mllions of dollars have been spent in extending and im- proving shipping facilities by montevideo, la plata, buenos aires, rosario—all of them ports of call for ocean-going steam- ships. many of the smaller ports like santa fe, paran4, corrien- tes, posados and asuncien, have also improved their facilities, and have increased their exports of grain, hides, meat, quebracho wood and extract, mate and lumber. a decided impetus has been given to river shipments by the development in the lumber and cattle and meat canning industries, following on the purchase by north american interests, in 1915-6, of nearly 2,000,000 ac. of land, several hundred miles north of asuncien, paraguay. communications. —the completion, in 1916, of a 37 m. railway around the falls of guayra, on the alto paran4 river, opened a new river and rail gateway to the heart of brazil, the principal outward shipments being yerba-mate and dried beef. a new ho- tel at iguazu river falls and a motor-car service from puerto aguirre to the falls, rom. distant, provide modern accommoda- tion, and, aided by better steamboat service on the alto paran4 have brought more tourists to the cataracts. the rondon, the roosevelt (1913-4) and other expeditions of recent years; the colonisation schemes of european and american companies in paraguay and bolivia; the completion of a brazilian railway from sao paulo nearly to the paraguay; petroleum investigations in eastern bolivia; larger areas planted with cotton in argentina and paraguay have combined to arouse wider interest in the vast region watered by the plata river system. on the uruguay river the cities of mercedes, paysande and salta have new water sys- tems, improved streets and extended sanitation. a packing plant at fray bentos has increased operations there. the argentine navigation co., the lloyd brazileiro and local steamboat lines plata, rio de la—plebiscite operate la plata services to corumbi, brazil, 1,800 m. from the atlantic. deep-draft vessels ascend as far as rosario, 200 m. above buenos aires. throughout the plata region the gradual introduction of modern agricultural implements has increased output, and, consequently, river traffic. brnitocraruy—w. j. tlolland, to the river plate and back (1913); cg. ross, argentine and uruguay (1916); :\. boerger, sieben la plata-jahre (1921); review of the river plate (buenos aires, weekly). acr) platt, charles adams (1s861- ), american architect and sculptor, was born in new york city oct. 16 1861. his educa- tion in art was acquired in the national academy of design, new york city, after which he went to paris in 1882 and studied under boulanger and lefebvre, returning to the united states in 1887. his intention had been to become a painter and etcher, but the outcome of a visit to italy was a book, jfudian gardens (892), which showed that he had been captivated by the architectural spirit of the italian renaissance. as a conse- quence he turned to architecture, in which his work showed the marked influence of italian form. he designed a large num- ber of private houses and gardens in addition to public build- ings, among the latter being the maxwell memorial library, rockville, conn. (1917); the freer gallery of art, washington, d.c. (1918); the library, connecticut college for women, new london (1922); the agricultural building, university of illinois, urbana, ill. (1923); and the lowell memorial fountain, new york city. see afonograph of the werk of charles a. platt, with an introduction by royal cortissoz (1913). player piano: see musical instruments. playfair, nigel (1874— ), british actor and theatrical manager, was born in london july 1 1874. educated at harrow and at university college, oxford, it was at oxford that he gained his first theatrical experience with the oxford university dramatic society and other amateur acting societies. for some time he practised as a barrister, and it was not until july 30 1902 that he made his first appearance as a professional actor at the garrick theatre, london, in ‘‘ a pair of knickerbockers.” he afterwards played many other parts, but was chicfly asso- ciated with the lyric theatre, hammersmith, london, the management of which he assumed in 1919. among his most famous productions at this theatre were john drinkwater’s abraham lincoln (1919) and the revival of gay’s beggar’s opera (1920) which ran for over three years. he published a number of volumes, including the story of the lyric theatre, hammer- smith (1925), and contributed verses to london periodicals. plebiscite (sce 21.834), politically a method of ascer- taining the general desire of the inhabitants of a given terri- tory or area. asa means of setiling the destination of populations and territories the method of the plebiscite is comparatively new. it was first used in the french revolution to defend the wholesale annexations of territory made by the conquering french re- public, and subsequently by napoleon i. it was revived by napoleon iit. and applied (successfully for him) in the case of nice and savoy, and (successfully for victor kmmanuel) in the duchies of north italy during the years 1859-60. these cases were comparatively simple, for the area in each instance was historic and defined and the question was—did such area want to remain as it was or become absorbed in a larger unit? the peace conference of 1919 decreed plebiscites without much discrimination, in cases where it seemed desirable to soften the blow to a defeated enemy or to get over a difficult diplomatic crisis. they were not gencrally conceded as a matter of prin- ciple, but resorted to as an expedicnt. plebiscites after the war.—in connection with the peace con- ference of rotg 17 plebiscites were proposed, and of these only eight were actually held. of these the turkish plebisct(e in transcaucasia was a farce. those of allenstein marienwerder (y.v.) retroceded territory disputed between the germans and poles to the former. that of oedenburg returned part of west hungary from austria to hungary (see burgenland). that of klagenfurt (see austria) returned the whole klagenfurt basin (which was claimed by the yugoslavs) to austria. none of plekhanov—plumer these five was of great importance, but the remaining three did decide questions which could not have been equally settled by other means. two plebiscites were held in luxembourg. the first, a political one held after the deposition of the grand duch- ess, elected her younger sister in her place by a great majority. the second, an economic plebiscite, decided by a large majority for an economic union not with luxembourg’s neighbour belgium, but with france. but these, though held under the influence of were not actually directed by the principal allies. solid and permanent results, tke those obtained in luxem- bourg, were likewise reached in schleswig (q¢.v.).. bismarck had given a promise in 1866:to take a plebiscite in the northern or danish area of this territory which he had not carried out. the peace conference of 1919 put into practice this project by a pleb- iscite which was a model of fairness. the net result was to cede the southern or flensburg zone to germany and the north- ern area to denmark, a division satisfactory on every ground and giving indications of permanence. the plebiscite in upper silesia (see silesia) was the most gravely contested of all such popular votes. intimidation by polish volunteers under korfanty and the hardly disguised polish sympathy of general la rond, the french president of the plebiscite commission, caused much difficulty. finally, after the vote had been taken, arrangements for partitioning the ter- ritory between poland and germany were sharply contested be- tween great britain and france. it was finally settled in oct. 1921 by an appeal to the league, which laid down a frontier con- sidered by independent critics as unduly favourable to polish claims. the net result of the peace conference was to discredit rather than to advance the method of decision by plebiscite. much clearly depends on the method of taking a plebiscite or the pre- vious condition of the country, and on the size of the electoral areas in which the vote is taken. and it is plain that these diffi- culties were not successfully surmounted in most of the plebiscites taken at the bidding of the peace conference at paris in 19109. braciocrapity.—h. w. v. temperley, ed., a ihistory of the peace conference of paris (1920); references in ‘subject index to vol. 6, 703; plebiscites in historical section of f oreign office peace [lan«dlbooks; sarah wambaugh, a afonograph on plebiscites, carnegie endow- ment for international peace (1920). he we va 1.) plekhanov, georgy valentinovich (1857-1018), russian socialist, was born nov. 26 1857 in the province of tambov, of an old noble family. his father wished him to enter the army, but while a student he joined the narodnist (populist) revolutionary movement. at the age of 20 he led the first great popular demonstration at st. petersburg (leningrad) in the ka- zansky square (dec. 18 1876). when the majority section of | the narodnists adopted terrorist methods in 1879, plekhanov seceded, and later with deutsch, axelrod and vera sassulich, created the marxian russian social democrat party (1884). he spent 40 years in exile, chtelly at geneva and later at san remo. he was associated with jules guesde, liebknecht and clara zetkin (who translated his book on tchernichevsky), was russian delegate to the socialist international congresses held in paris (1889) and in copenhagen (1910). he was the recognised leader and philosophic exponent of russian marxism, his most famous book being the matcrialistic conception of his- jory, and wrote also a remarkable booklet directed against anarchism. up to the split between the bolsheviks, or left wing, led by lenin, and the mensheviks, or right wing, led by martov, in 1907 he was the leader of the social democrat party. at first neutral in his attitude, desirous of re-establishing unity, he be- came a strong opponent of lenin’s “ anarcho-syndicalism ”’ and of his conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat. in the world war plekhanov advocated resistance of german mili- tarism and attacked lenin’s extreme anti-war tactics. when the russian revolution came, he returned to russia in spite of illness and was triumphantly received at petrograd (lenin- grad) (march 31 1917), and was invited to join kerensky’s gov- ernment. he refused, but supported kerensky against the 159 bolsheviks in the bitter press campaign which followed, and was brutally handled by riotous red guards during the bolshevik revolution (nov. 1917). he died in finland may 30 1918. the soviet govt. has erected several statues to his memory and published an official edition of his works. plener, ernst, ierinerr von (1841-1923), austrian poli- ticlan, was born on oct. 18 1841 at cheb in bohemia, the son of the austrian statesman ignaz von plener (1810-1908). he began his diplomatic career in 1865, and served in the laris and london embassies until 1873. in the latter year he was elected by the chamber of commerce of his native place to the chamber of deputies of the reichsrat, where he was soon reckoned among the most conspicuous members of the con- stitutional party. in the taaife period (1870-93) he was one of the leaders, and from 1888 the acknowledged head of the ger- man-liberals in their struggles against the slav-conservative majority in the chamber. consequently he represented ger- manism on the nationalities question, but was not averse to concessions cgmpatible with the maintenance throughout the whole monarchy of the position due to the german austrians. he sought to compromise the quarrel between germans and czechs, and the so-called ‘‘ points ” of 1890, a summary of the bases for a german-czech understanding, were essentially his work. in the windischgraetz coalition ministry (1893-5), plener took over the portfolio of finance. soon after his retire- ment from the finance ministry, plener was appointed president of the supreme audit department (obderster rechnuingshof). he became a member of the upper house in 1900, and died may 1 1923 in vienna. plener wrote a series of economic and political works, among others die ta fabriksgeseisgebung (1871); englische baugenos- senschaften (1873). his speeches were published by his friends in 1911, he ane published erinnerungen, 3 vol. (1911-21). pliek§ans, jan (1863- _+), latvian poet and dramatist, was born sept. 12 1865 at tadenava in the district of illukst, courland. he adopted the pen name of jozsef rajnis. he was educated at the riga gymnasium, and from 1884 to 1888 studied jaw at st. petersburg (leningrad). he later practised as a bar- rister at mitau, courland. from 1891 to 1895 he edited in rigaa democratic latvian paper, dienas lapa (daily paper). he was arrested by the russian govt. on political grounds and deported first to pskov and then to viatka returning thence in 1903. he may be considered the chief exponent of democracy in latvian poctry. he invented a special form of sonnet, shorter than the ordinary sonnet and well constructed. as a dramatist he achieved distinction, not only as a translator of shakespeare, goethe and schiller, but also by his own tragedies written in the lettish language. his principal historical tragedies are uguus un nakts (fire and night), pat vejini (blow breeze) and daugava (the deina). the sons of jacob has been translated into english, and was produced may 22 1925, at the new scala theatre, london, by the international theatre society. for several years he was director of the latvian national theatre, and in 1920 became a member of the latvian sacima (parliament). plough: see tractor. plumer, herbert charles onslow plumer, rst baron (1857- ), british soldier, was born march 13 1857, and entered the army in 1876. ile served on the red sea littoral in 1884, and in 1896 commanded a mounted regiment in the mat- abele campaign. before the outbreak of the south african war in 1899 he raised the rhodesian field force, which he com- manded during the early months of the contest. he was promoted major-general on the conclusion of hostilities. in may rors sir herbert plumer was selected to lead the it. army on the western front. his army was not very actively engaged during the remainder of 1915, nor yet in 1916, but on june 7 1917 plumer gained a signal victory at messines. (see ypres, tuirp battle or.) in nov. he was selected to take charge of the british troops that were being sent to the basin of the po after the italian defeat at caperetto. he command- ed them until march but he was then summoned back to 160 flanders to resume the leadership of the ii. army just before the great german offensive started. when the general advance of the allies began in august, his army took a prominent part in the operations by which belgian flanders was recovered from the invaders. for his services in the war he was raised to the peerage as baron plumer of messines and of bilton, was pro- moted field marshal, and received a grant of £30,000. he sub- sequently commanded the british forces on the rhine fora short time. from 1919 to 1925 he was governor of malta and in 1925 became high commissioncr for palestine. plunkett, sir horace curzon (1854- ), irish poli- tician (see 21.857), after his retirement in 1907 from the vice- presidency of the irish agricultural department took no prom- inent part in politics till the crucial year, 1914. in the spring of that year he made abortive suggestions for an agreed settlement of the irish question; and then in july, just before the outbreak of the world war, he announced his conversion to home rule and appealed to ulster to give home rule a chance. in 1917, a year after the dublin rebellion, he took the lead in a further attempt at a solution of the problem. when mr. lloyd george set up a comprehensive convention of irishmen to consider the matter, there was great difficulty in finding a suitable chairman; but the first meeting unanimously chose sir horace for the post. he was himself sanguine, and worked at his task with singular devotion; but the absence of sinn fein from the gathering, the impossibility of reconciling the views of the ulstermen and those of the southern unionists, and the occurrence of a number of tragic events in ireland, prevented the adoption of any report with colourable unanimity. in 1920-1 he was a prominent ad- vocate of ‘‘ dominion home rule,” and saw it adopted in the irish treaty. he served as a senator of the irish free state in 1922-3. (see ireland: agriculture.) plymouth, england (see 21.861), which has included devon- port and stonehouse since 1914, had a population in 1921 of 200, 857 and an area of 5,711 ac. in the borough. morice town, to the north of devonport and stoke, is a rapidly growing district. plymouth has returned three members to parliament, from the drake, devonport and sutton divisions, since 1918. lady astor, the first woman to sit in the ilouse of commons, was returned in to19. by the municipal reorganisation of 1914 the town was divided into 14 wards, and has now a mayor, 20 aldermen and 60 councillors. the municipal museum and art gallery were finished in 1g10, and a free library has been opened in tavistock road. the church of st. gabriel, compton gifford, was built and made into a parish in 1910, and that of st. boniface, st. budeaux, was built in 1913, and made a parish in 1916. a parish was formed from that of sutton-on-plym in 1911. a memorial to men of the royal marine light infantry was unveiled on the hoe in 19234, a naval memorial in 1924, and one to capt. scott and his com- rades in 1925. milbay pier in the harbour has been extended to give further accommodation for mail steamers. pneumonia: see respiratory system, diseases of tile. pneumothorax.—the lungs are elastic organs kept in a condition of extension by their attachment to the walls of the bony thorax. this attachment is not direct, but is effected through the intervention of a smooth-walled empty sac, the pleura, which on the one hand covers the lung, and on the other forms a lining to the thoracic wall. the surfaces of this sac are held in contact by the weight of the atmosphere, and glide over one another during movements of respiration. if gas or air gain entry, whether from without or within, the lung is released from its condition of extension, and on account of its elasticity tends to collapse and empty itself of air. this is the condition known as pneumothorax, and according to the means of its production is spoken of as spontaneous or artificial. spontaneous pneumothorax.—this is generally due to the rupture of an air-containing lung into the pleural sac, commonly caused by softening of a tuberculous nodule. according to the size and nature of the rupture the pneumothorax is formed gradually, with slow development of symptoms or suddenly with immediate and urgent distress. a rapid and complete col- lapse of one lung, accompanied, as commonly happens, by en- plunkett—poincark, jules henri croachment of the chest contents on the other lung, is a condi- tion that leads to severe breathlessness. where, however, the collapsed organ was extensively diseased its loss may be less urgently felt and occasionally its collapse may be actually bene- ficial, it was largely the benefit arising from certain of these cases that directed attention to the idea of inducing collapse artificially. in most cases of spontaneous pneumothorax the pleura becomes inflamed, and fluid, whether thin or purulent, transforms the condition into a hydro- or pyro-pneumothorax. artificial pneumothorax.—otherwise known as pneumothorax treatment, or as collapse-therapy, artificial pneumothorax was first urged on theoretical grounds in 1821 by an irishman, james carson of liverpool. his views were supported by clini- cal observations on spontaneous pneumothorax (houghton, 1832; stokes, 1837), but not till so years later did potain (1884) put air into a spontaneous pneumothorax, and cayley (188s) treat a case of haemoptysis by this method. the treatment on its modern lines may be said to originate with forlanini, who reported his first cases in 1894-5. the aim of this treatment is the collapse of a diseased lung, where disease does not respond to other measures, and where the other lung is sufficiently sound. its main field has been pul- monary tuberculosis, but it has also been used in jung abscess and bronchiectasis, in the diagnosis of obscure lung conditions, especially tumours, and to assist the surgeon in certain chest operations. the gases used are commonly ait, nitrogen or oxy- gen, according to the requirements of the case. the gas is delivered from a “ gas bottle” connected with a “ pressure bottle ” containing fluid, and enters the chest through a special needle attached to a water manometer to control the pressure. it is introduced in small quantities at first and col- lapse brought about slowly. as it collapses the lung squeezes out the diseased secretions it contains, and these are brought up as sputum. in a favourable case the sputum then ceases, the temperature becomes normal and the patient regains his lost health. gas is given every few weeks, and treatment is carried on till disease is judged to be healed. the lung is then allowed to expand and does so to a varying extent. the main impedi- ment to pneumothorax treatment is the occurrence, in a large proportion of cases, of adhesions between the surfaces of the pleura. the miain source of failure during its course is the de- velopment of fresh disease in the functioning lung. the success of pneumothorax treatment in severe tuberculous discase has been very notable, at least 50% being improved, arrested or cured. see medical research council, special na no. 67, aye on artificial pneuntothorax (stationery office, 1922 (co ixiy*) poelzig, hans (1869- ), german a rede was “ in berlin april 30 1869. he studied architecture at the technical high school in berlin from 1888 to 1893, in 1900 he was appointed a lecturer in the breslau academy of arts, of which he was sub- sequently director from 1903 to 1916. he was architect to the city of dresden from 1916 to 1920 and also professor at the technical high school there. in 1920 he started an advanced studio for applied arts at the academy of arts in berlin. he became professor of the architectural section of the technische hochschule in berlin in 1924. poelzig was also a member of the academies of arts at dresden and berlin and president of the deutscher werkbund. among his buildings may be mentioned the dam in the klingenberg valley; the centenary exhibition in berlin (gardens and buildings); the reconstruction of the schauspielhaus, berlin; the water tower at posen; the “ cap- itol ” cinema, berlin; the reick gas works, dresden; and the alterations in the breslau concert hall. poincare, jules henri (1854-1912), french physicist, was born at nancy april 29 1854. he studied at the ecole poly- technique, devoting himself to scientific mining, and took his degree in 1879. he was lecturer at caen and then was trans- ferred to the university of paris in 1881, lecturing first on physical mechanics, then on mathematical physics, and ulti- mately on astronomical mechanics. in 1887 he became a mem- ber of the academie des sciences. among the discoveries made poincark, by him is that of the ‘‘ fuchsian functions,” an order of functions more general than those of the ellipse, which he applied to the non-euclidian geometry founded by lobatchevski, and that of the theory concerning the rings of saturn, by which they are sup- posed to be formed of a multitude of small and solid satellites. he also worked on the electro-magnetic theory of light and on electric oscillations. poincare died in paris july 17 1912. his works include cours de physique mathematique, 10 vol. (1889 etc.); lecons de la mecanique celeste (1903 etc.); theorie de maxwell ct les oscillations heriztennes (1907); la theorie du po- tentiel newtonien (1899); science et hypothese (1903); la valeur de la science (1904); science et methode (1908). poincare, raymond (1860- \, french statesman (sce 21.892). in march 1906 m. poincare became minister of finance in the sarrien govt., but he gave up his portfolio to m. caillaux in oct. of the same year, when m. sarrien was succeeded by m. clemenceau as prime minister. during the next five years, though he still continued to exercise a powerful influence in the senate, m. poincare devoted himself mainly to his legal career. in 1909 he was elected a member of the french academy. in jan. 1912, m. caillaux, who had been prime minister since the beginning of the previous year, resigned, whereupon m. poin- care formed a government in which he himself held the portfolio of foreign affairs. his most notable colleagues were m. millerand, m. briand and m. delcasse, ministers of war, justice and marine respectively. m. poincare’s cabinet constituted an entente nationale, and his first aim was to pursue a more definite foreign policy. in home affairs the problem which presented the greatest difficulties was that of electoral reform. m. poincare induced the chamber to pass a proportional representation bill. but above all diplo- matic affairs claimed his constant attention; for during the nego- tiations with germany which took place in consequence of the dispatch of a gun-boat by that country to agadir, certain inci- dents had occurred during the caillaux administration which had produced a feeling of disquictude in regard to foreign policy. m. poincare therefore sought io re-establish a continuity of policy; and though he maintained courteous relations with ger- many his main endeavour was to prove that france would remain faithful to both friends and allies. the ratification by the senate of the franco-german treaty of nov. 4 1911 was followed by france’s definite establishment in morocco and on march 30 1912 m. poincare obtained the signature of the sultan mulai-hafid to a treaty recognising the french protectorate. on nov. 27 he further concluded a treaty with spain which settled the boun- daries of france and spain in morocco. almost immediately after the establishment of the poincare govt., an incident had occurred, which temporarily obscured the friendly relations between france and italy. the italians, who at that moment were at war with the turks, seized two french mail-steamers, the ‘‘ carthage’ and the “ manouba,” which were on their way to tunis, on jan. 16 and 18 ror2. but m. poincare, by his calmness and resolution, succeeded in re- establishing amicable relations between the two countries. by the end of oct. italian sovereignty in libya was recog- nised, and by a mutual declaration of the two governments, full liberty of action was granted to france in morocco and to italy in libya. when in the autumn of 1912 the balkan war broke out, m. poincare made every effort possible to prevent the conflagration from spreading. nevertheless the succession of european crises combined with the ever-increasing menace from germany and austria-hungary, rendered it necessary to take precautions; and with this object in view, m. poincare exer- cised constant watchfulness over army organisation. he induced parliament to vote a programme of naval construction; and through the strengthening of franco-british relations it became possible to concentrate the whole of the french fleet in the med- iterranean while great britain disposed her naval forces in the north. at the beginning of jan. 1913, m. poincare made known his intention of standing as a candidate for the presidency of the re- public in the place of m. fallieres. a rival candidate appeared in raymond 161 the person of m. pams, the minister of agriculture, who was supported by the radicals and socialists. the contest between the two was spirited, but on jan. 17 the national assembly elected m. poincare president of the republic by 483 votes, as against 206 votes for m. pams. m. poincare on being elected resigned the premiership, and was replaced by m. briand. on feb. 18, the date when m. falli¢res’ term of office expired, the new president took up his residence at the elysee. two days later he addressed a message to parliament, reminding them among other things that “ the will of one power alone was not enough to maintain peace,” and “any nation that wished to give proof of its pacifist attitude must be ready at all times to meet and repulse any military attack which might be made against it.” this allusion to the danger of war showed that the new presi- dent was fully alive to its possibility; and that this fear was well grounded events were soon to justify. seeing that the menace from without continued to increase, m. poincare felt that while adhering strictly to the limits imposed upon his powers by the french constitution, his first duty must be to back up all those who were endeavouring to strengthen the defensive organisation of the country. never once did he exceed his functions in this respect, and the men to whom he entrusted the government were always those who had the support of parhament. always apprehensive, and with reason, of the terrible events which he saw were looming ahead, m. poincare endeavoured to cement the friendships and strengthen the alliances of france. at a later stage, his adversaries abroad as well as those at home criticised him severely for this policy; yet it is hardly reasonable because @ man is sufficiently far-seeing to apprehend a storm and make preparations for it, to accuse him of wishing to hasten it. he claimed that he did his utmost to avert war holding that the way to prevent the conflict was for those powers against whom the menace was directed to present a powerful and united front, and thus make it seem imprudent to attempt any act of aggression. he also felt that if in spite of everything france was attacked, it was essential for her to be able to make a suc- cessful resistance. this belief he consistently adhered to, both in deed and word, as well as in his writings; and though it im- pelled him to be constantly on his guard, he never departed from a strictly pacifist attitude. in july 1914 m. poincare went to russia on a visit which had been planned for some time past. he was on his way home, hav- ing arranged to visit the three scandinavian capitals, when the news of the austrian ultimatum to serbia reached him. after a short stay in stockholm he returned hastily to paris; and in a letter to king george v. he pleaded for a clear declaration that the entente cordiale, if necessary, would prove its strength on the battlefield, pointing out that such a statement would have a restraining effect on the policy of vienna and berlin. throughout the war he continued to perform his duty with the same energy and discretion as before; though sometimes he visited the front, he never placed any obstacle whatever in the way either of the government or of the army. in nov. 1917 he gave proof of his vision and disregard of self by placing in power m. clemen- ceau, who, though undoubtedly the man of the moment, was one with whom he had little sympathy. during the critical months of 1918, m. poincare revealed an inflexible resolution and a supreme confidence in the ultimate victory. after the armistice, parliament by a resolution testified to the services he had rendered to his country. during the peace negotiations divergence of views again be- came apparent between m. poincare and m. clemenceau. on more than one occasion the president found it necessary to write to the prime minister pointing out the errors which, from his point of view, were being committed. his counsels, however, were not followed, and at the beginning of 1920, after having completed seven years as president, he left the elvsce and was shortly after re-elected senator for the department of the meuse. in jan. 1922, the briand cabinet having resigned, m. poincare once more became prime minister and minister for foreign affairs. he made it his chief aim to insist on the fulfilment by germany of her obligations in regard to reparations. during 162 the first year of his new government he failed to arrive at any agreement on this subject with the british cabinet, whose views differed so widely from his own. the inter-allied conference in london in aug. and dec. 1922 produced no result. a further conference took place in paris on jan. 2 and 5 1923. but m. poincare rejected the proposals drawn up by mr. bonar law, and all that was done was to put on record, in friendly terms, the complete disagreement of the two governments. at this moment, the reparations commission, with britain dissenting, having declared that germany had failed to fulfil her obligations in regard to the delivery of coal and coke, m. poincare, in agreement with belgium, undertook the occupation of the ruhr. at first this measure involved merely a method of control, but gradually, owing to the passive resistance of the germans, it became necessary to exploit the railways and to some extent also the mines by means of franco-british supervision. by the autumn’ the passive resistance had ceased, and m. poin- care awaited the german proposals which never came. he then accepted the american suggestion that a group of experts should be given the task of finding the solution of the reparation prob- lem; this resulted in the adoption of the dawes plan. but m. poincare had made up his mind not to withdraw from the ruhr until he was satisfied that this plan was being carried out. during the first three months of 1924 m. poincare had to face a financial crisis due to the state of the exchange. not without difficulty he induced parliament to vote new taxes and succeeded in saving the situation. but from now onwards he had to with- stand strenuous opposition from the parties of the left consisting of the radicals and socialists. the policy of these groups met with a marked success at the general elections of may 11 1924 and resulted in a majority for the left which now formed a coali- tion under the name of the cartel des gauches. immediately the results were announced, m. poincare stated that he would retire on the day when the new chamber was to assemble, which took place on june 1 1924. thenceforward he took his place in the senate, intervening only rarcly in political debates. in addition to various articles on legal, political and literary sub- jects, poincare undertook the publication of an important work in 10 volumes, entitled: au service dela france; neuf annees de souvenirs, the plan of which is to describe the sequence of events from ro11 to 1920 and the rele which he himsclf played in them. two of these volumes appeared in 1926 under the titles of le lendemain d’ agadir and les balkans en feu." see h. girard, raymond poincare (1913); e. charton, l’ angleterre et m. poincare (1923); s. huddleston, poincare (1924). (p.b.) poison gas: sce chemical warfare. poisoning: see food poisoning. poland (sce 21.902), an independent republic of central europe (rzeczpospolita potska) and a member of the league of nations. its area is 149,805 sq. m., and the population (1925) 28,596,000. i. political history poland after the partitions —the congress of vienna (1815) set the seal on the three partitions of poland. the smouldering discontent of the poles broke out in revolution in 1830, 1846 and 1863; but the bloody repression of the last revolt closed the period of active rebellion. from this date until 1914 the poles of prussia, galicia and congress (russian) poland developed along widely different lines so that from a practical standpoint the differences between them became almost as important as the ideal unity of their memory and dreams. the poles in prussia —each acquired some characteristics of the empire with which its lot was cast. the prussian govt. especially under bismarck, had attacked the polish problem with its usual efficiency. in the ’thirties the administration in prussian poland had become purely german; the polish officials 1in june, 1926 when the fall of the briand government created great confusion in france, poincare declined to join briand in a re- constructed cabinet. however, after the brief administration of herriot, he became head of a coalition government, undertaking himself the onerous dutics of minister of finance. poison gas—poland assisting this process by quitting the state service. in 1872 the “ kulturkampf” began; the polish language was gradually eliminated from school and pulpit. in 1886 a commission began to buy up polish estates and settle german peasants on them. in 1894 the “ ostmark ” organisation was founded, with the aim of ensuring german cultural and mercantile predominance in the east. in 1902 the so-called “‘ wrzesnia ” case aroused a painful scandal when it was admitted in the german reichstag that polish children had been beaten for refusing to say the lord’s prayer in german (see posen, 22.170). in 1908 a com- pulsory appropriation bill was passed, and the use of polish at public meetings forbidden. the resistance of the poles was stub- born, but in view of the strength of germany, not mainly polit- ical. the leaders looked to russian poland for assistance; but their strength at home lay in the network of co-operatives and peasants’ associations, led by the catholic priests, who put up a solid resistance in the economic field. the result of the prussian occupation was to create a sturdy class of peasants and small bourgeoisie, disciplined and economically and culturally ad- vanced, whose political programme was essentially defensive. the poles in austria —in austria, on the other hand, the poles were almost a dominant nationality. the numerical strength of the parliamentary “ polenklub,” which always united against all outsiders, was such that no austrian govt. could be formed without it. in 1867 the poles of galicia were granted a special minister for galicia (galizischer landsmann- minister) as the price of their consent to the “‘ ausgleich ” with hungary. the governor, or statthalter, of galicia was invari- ably a rich polish aristocrat; and these two officials were able to defy any centralising efforts of the vienna bureaucracy and establish a de facto independent polish state within austria, with a purely polish administration, which extended over non- polish east galicia. galicia, unlike prussian or congress po- land, thus retained an active interest in politics, and the nobles developed into a large administrative class; but while preserving the tradition of the “ szlachta ” they paid little attention to material development; and galicia remained economically back- ward in every respect. even the development of the galician oil-fields, when it came, was due almost entirely to jewish houses, who made enormous fortunes out of it. de jure auton- omy within the monarchy for galicia was constantly urged by the german nationalists of austria; but would have been most unwelcome to the poles, politically, because it would have vastly weakened their position against the ruthenes of east galicia (sce gaticta, east) who were almost as numerous as them- selves; financially even more, because it would have meant the end of the very heavy annual subsidies which this province received from the imperial i:xchequer. the poles in russia.—nor was the desire for a free and united poland so unresting in warsaw as is generally supposed. all self-government in congress poland was suppressed in 1863; all education was russified in 1869, justice in 1873. on the other hand, the abolition in 1851 of the customs frontier between russia and poland had laid the foundation for an extraordinary industrial expansion in this district. russian poland became the chief industrial region for all russia. its vast market in agricultural russia was protected against western competition by high tariils; the russian govt. touk every possible measure (such as the introduction of specially favourable railway tariffs) to assist this expansion. the polcs of russia refused on principle to enter the russian state service. this could only be welcome to russia; and its result was that the poles busied themselves with productive occupations—industry, trade and agriculture, and the upper and middle classes achieved a well-being far superior to anything enjoyed by their cousins in galicia. a second and important result of this expansion was the growth in congress poland of a large and radical proletariat which dis- sociated itself from its polish exploiters and made common cause with the russian social democratic movement. the divisions between the upper and lower classes in poland were accentuated by the agrarian policy of the russian govt. in poland. the emancipation of the peasants was effected by yuck nee x tei sromoz “sg odyata. ga | sea lares ygder 5 mthyjnice : _pomor zz ag buds ode i a ydposzcp ys “g7! warta a se nae ow *s ak cme = poser ae * limoctawer| el | (poznaits em finiveno beh “(re na dn dig ihe , a in pighgttar viarszonare la a ee wardcin ceczyca sw! os b le s210 ot, ——— <n owicz | vey hy ote! a 3 . are ro mena =f . krotosrid. pam. . rijec ay s ; astron phi else : pfozienice id ie 4 ont ep fs 1 ‘e* a a ae za wrerdye * pelcin hg besonic . > my 7 | lsi crac ae = mr ee = a. ay: =_—. ""wowy sacen ih £00, i hi hag ge an en english miles 50 4100 kilometres | ea as, te eee es | ra 50 109 provincial ils ease lpia nonegne ain railwa ys y e ra oswieciany le e aml ln 9, 42. . ’ a ow hoe \ aare ag ae” biel: a / cm k= rest lifoys she? = “fit “hos, ae am | wal shue tee, svestree yy wrodz: meres . i “e, * book 7 ee - a przemysh) pe lein dylie mis er gins \e + 3 a pe brzezany ge gy a imeaticn the ukases of 1861. each peasant, whatever his tenure had been, and the mass of the landless proletariat, became freeholders. the landlords received compensation in the form of russian treasury bonds. village affairs were placed in the hands of the peasants’ communes, which quickly fell undcr the influ- ence of russian bureaucracy. nevertheless, contrary to the hopes of the russian govt., these communes served as centres for the spread of education and for the revival of the idca of polish nationality. the russian revolution of 1905 was a turning point in polish history. the measures of repression which followed it aroused the deep hatred of a large section of poles among whom the most prominent was pitsudski, leader of the “right” or pa- triotic wing of the socialist party, who was obliged to nee to galicia and now began to organise active resistance to russia from that base. yet the revolution was followed by the grant of a russian constitution, and the liberals in the duma were not averse to the idea of granting poland a large measure of autonomy within russia. the polish and the russian bour- geoisie found a bond of union, even as had the polish and russian proletariat. moreover, the brighter prospects in russia con- trasted strongly with the renewed severity of the regime which biilow introduced in prussia. and in east galicia and the ukraine alike the ukrainian (ruthenian) nationalist movement ——much more prominent in austria since the grant of general suffrage in 1907—was exceedingly unwelcome to both the poles and the russians. russia, defeated in the far east, had again begun, after an interval of nearly 30 years, to propagate pan-slav ideas and to work actively among the slavs of europe. the neo-slav move- i 04 ment, unlike most earlier forms of pan-slavism, was prepared to drop the racial and religious feud with the poles. the idea of uniting all poles with autonomy within the russian empire was widely preached; its realisation seemed near at hand. it became the programme of the national democratic (all-polish) party, founded in congress poland in 1897 under roman dmowski, which gained a considerable following, even in austria. the slav congresses of 1908 and rgro really did much —thanks largely to the efforts of the young czech leader, dr. kramaf, to reconcile the polish and russian nations. this reconciliation, was not, indeed, more than partial. it was rudely shaken in 1912, when russia separated the govt. of cholm from the rest of the kingdom of poland. poles in gencral, nevertheless, now looked on [prussia as their chief encmy and the sympathies of the poles of galicia had become divided. poland during the world war.—the outbreak of war in aug. 1914 thus found the poles of germany, austria and russia to a great extent estranged from one another, their sympathies divided, and a united national policy lacking. lpilsudski, the “ activist,” crossed the frontier from galicia with a few hundreds of his armed band and engaged the russian empire in battle as forerunner of the army of an independent and united poland. but the polish national committee, formed in cracow on aug. 16, aimed at uniting galicia and congress poland as a third party in the dual monarchy and required the polish legion to take the oath to the emperor. in warsaw another polish com- mittee under dmowski denied the right of the cracow com- mittee to speak in the name of the polish nation; protested loyalty to the tsar; and attempted to form a polish legion on the side of russia. meanwhile the grand duke nikolai niko- laievich issued a proclamation (aug. 14) in which he promised to unite the three parts of poland in an autonomous state with the russian empire. when the russian army occupied a great part of galicia the russophil party in galicia (the national democrats) openly adhered to this programme. the “ austrian solution ” retired into the background. in the summer of rors, however, the central powers con- quered all congress poland. after the fall of warsaw on aug. 5 1915, governments were set up on behalf of germany at warsaw, and austria-hungary at lublin. it was now the russian solu- tion that was platonic. but fresh difficulties confronted the austrian solution. the polish socialist party (p.s.p.) under pilsudski declared that no recruiting should take place for polish legions until an autonomous polish govt. had been formed to conduct it. the p.s.p., the peasants’ party and the national democrats united on this programme. meanwhile tisza, the hungarian minister president, had vetoed the austrian trialist scheme, which was also opposed by germany. vienna, again, rejected the plans put forward by germany, of annexing con- gress poland to germany, or of forming an independent polish buffer state in economic military and political alliance with the central powers. formation of a polish state—in aug. 1916, however, aiter the defeat of the austro-hungarian troops at luck, the german supreme command acquired complete control of policy on the eastern front. ludendorff believed it possible to gain a large polish army if his ideas were adopted. germany and <austria- ywungary issued a proclamation on nov. 5 1916, holding out a prospect of the restoration of an independent congress poland as a hereditary constitutional monarchy closely attached to the central powers. francis joseph promised galicia increased autonomy within austria-hungary. the discussion of details was shelved; the military governments at warsaw and lublin continued to administer the country. the german governor, general von beseler, arranged for the election of a diet with fairly extensive powers in local administration, education and justice. meanwhile, by decree dated nov. 26 1916, a provisional council of state was appointed, which was solemnly opened on jan. 14 1917; but the national democrats were excluded from it, the minister of political affairs was allowed to hold relations with the central powers only, and the decisions of the diet poland could be overruled by von bescler. pilsudski, who had long been in conflict with the german supreme command on the degree of independence which the polish troops should enjoy, resigned his command, entered the dict and began to work out the plans for a national polish army. he refused, however, to raise it for german use; and actually the german plan of raising a polish army failed completely. in march ror7 the russian dynasty fell. on march 30 the new russian govt. recognised poland’s right to self-determina- tion and promised poland its support in the creation of a new polish state. these events altered the attitude of the allies towards poland, particularly as they were now reinforced by the entry of the united states into the war. the answer of the entente powers to the peace proposals of the central powers issued on jan. 10 1917 had already declared their adhesion to the tsar’s manifesto to his armies (dec. 25 1916) which had spoken of “ the formation of a free poland in all parts into which it is at present divided.” paderewski was working tirelessly in america. in nov. 1916 a great polish national department in chicago had united all the organisations of the 4,000,000 poles in america; and under paderewski’s influence, president wilson on jan. 22 1917 alluded to a “united, independent and autonomous poland.” the danger threatening poland from russia vanished with the breakdown of brusilov’s offensive (july 10917). the central powers were now the only enemy. the poles of galicia were discontented with austria’s failure to introduce the promised self-government; the left was stimulated by the example of russia, and when the austrian reichsrat met in may 10917, its polish members demanded ‘‘an independent united poland with an ontlet to the sea,” and declared that the polish case was one for “ international consideration.’”’ the council of state in warsaw demanded wider powers on may 1, but the chiefs of the provisional governments in their answers of may 15 and june 8 did not give immediate effect to these demands. after a conflict, some members of the council accepted the german demands to make a recruiting appeal, and take an oath of loyalty to the german and austro-hungarian armies and to their allics, for the present war, swearing by their “‘ father- land, the kingdom of poland and the future king of poland.” pitsudski resigned from the dict with his adherents, and set about turning his secret milita:y organisation against germany. polish legions were formed in france under general haller and in russia under general dowbor-musuicki. polish volunteers from america were tratned in canada. on july 22 polish dis- content was increased by the arrest of pitsudski. on aug. 25 the diet, now discredited with the people, resigned. on sept. 12 germany and austria-hungary introduced a new project of a regency of three, a cabinet and premier and council of state, chosen by the regency, and enjoying limited powers, the german and austrian military governments retaining the right of veto. the regency was appointed on oct. 15; it consisted of the archbishop of warsaw, dr. kakowski, prince lubomirski and josef ritter von ostrowski, a large landowner. the first minister president, jan v. kucharzewski, was appointed on nov. 26 and formed his first ministry on dec. 7. the final collapse of the russian army in the autumn was the signal for the central powers to work out fresh combinations, according to which the future of poland was determined in the most various ways. but although germany was still strong, austria had now lost all real authority over the poles of galicia, who were in a position to dictate terms as they pleased. the proposals of the russian delegates who arrived at brest-litovsk in dec. 1917 amounted to a recognition of poland's independence; and the thirteenth of president wilson’s fourteen points (jan. 8 1918) declared that a polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably polish popula- tions “‘ with an outlet to the sea and an international guarantee of its independence and integrity. the polish national com- mittee, founded at lausanne in aug. 1917 and since established in paris, was gaining increasing influence in the councils of the allies, largely through dpaderewski, who represented it in poland washington. between sept. 20 and dec. 1 1917 france, great britain, italy and the united states had recognised it as the official representative of the polish people. polish delegates were not admitted to the deliberations at brest-litovsk. by treaty (march 3) russia renounced all claims over poland; but the treaty signed feb. 9 1918 between the central powers and the ukraine allotted the ukraine the disputed province of cheitm, while austria-hungary further pledged herself in a secret clause to form east galicia and the bukovina into a separate crownland. these clauses became known; polish opinion was infuriated beyond measure; the polish cabinet resigned; the polish club in the austrian reichsrat went over to the opposition; the remnant of pitsudski’s legions still fight- ing for the central powers mutinied. some were interned, some fought their way to the coast and joined haller’s legions in france. in april the polish delegates to the congress of rome declared their aim to be “ reunion into one independent state of all the polish lands, including those which the central em- pires are refusing to restore to poland and those which they are bestowing as largesse on their vassals.”’ the elections for the council of state in poland were held in the same month; and it was opened in warsaw on june 22. little interest was taken in the elections, and general feeling in poland tended to ignore this body in favour of the national committee in paris. after the breakdown of the german offensive in july 1918, a last effort was made. the poles were offered their choice between rival schemes of a poland attached to austria in the “‘ mitteleuropa ” plan, or a state formed according to german wishes, though under an austrian archduke. but the poles were now strong enough to ignore all suggestions from this quarter, especially as the prime ministers of great britain, france and italy had declared in favour of an independent and united poland at versailles on june 3 1918, and wilson insisted on the fourteen points as a basis for peace. 7 the declaration of independence--on oct. 6 the polish regency council and minister president published a manifesto to the polish nation declaring its intention of dissolving the council of state, forming a representative national government and summoning a diet for a “ free and united poland.” on oct. 15 the polish representatives of the reichsrat declared themselves to be “ subjects and citizens of a free and re-united polish state.”” on the same day the council of regency in warsaw summoned the galician poles to warsaw to take part in forming the new polish government. a cabinet, consisting for the most part of russophil national democrats, was hur- riedly formed on oct. 22. on oct. 28 a commission of austrian poles met in cracow to wind up relations with austria. assum- ing its authority to extend throughout galicia, it appointed its next meeting for nov. 2 in lemberg, where a ruthenian govt. had already formed, thus early coming into collision with its neighbours (see gaticia: east). on nov. 3 the cabinet pro- claimed the polish republic, and declared its intention of form- ing a government with the left. in fact, owing to the hostility of the left, the cabinet resigned on nov. 4, and a provisional cabinet of officials carried on. on nov. ro pitsudski, who had been released from imprisonment on oct. 7, arrived in warsaw. the german troops of occupation were disarmed and expelled, and the poles assumed the executive power in warsaw on nov. 11. the council of regency declared on nov. 12 that it appointed pitsudski to the supreme command of all polish troops; while pilsudski proclaimed himself head of the national government. on the 18th he notified all belligerent and neutral states of the formation of an independent state of poland. post-war position.—of all the new or resurrected states of europe, poland was in many respects in the most diflicult posi- tion. the territory of congress poland and galicia had been devastated in the war. most of the factories were closed for lack of raw material, where they had not been actually dis- mantled. the fields of the peasants had been laid waste, their live stock slaughtered, their farms burnt. many districts were actually famine-stricken, others swept by epidemics. com- munications were disorganised, rolling stock in a deplorable 165 state. marks, roubles and kronen circulated freely, but their value was low and uncertain, and public and private finances were chaotic. owing to the past policy of the prussian and russian poles, a national bureaucracy only existed in galicia. at one time there were only six officials in the ministry of finance. thirty thousand german troops were still in the country. on the east, bolshevik russia was in a highly un- settled state. the ideas prevalent in russia had unsettled the peasants, who pressed for a redistribution of land from the large estates, and the workmen, who were suffering under unemployment, were in a state of unrest. the century of foreign rule had been an ill training for constructive political thought, and political parties were as numerous as they were, in the main, futile. but above all, the problem of poland’s frontiers assumed an immediate and lasting importance. only in the carpathians could poland be said to possess a natural frontier. over the vast and formless eastern plains, nation merged into nation, and there were vast areas where the very language of the in- habitants was only a doubtful dialect. in others, enclaves of polish and non-polish territory were inextricably mixed. in others, and these among the richest, the land-owning nobility was polish, the peasants ukrainian or white russian. poland’s historical frontiers had at one time extended, over large non- polish populations, from the baltic to the black sea. at the time of the partitions of poland, they had embraced nearly twice as much territory as was ethnographically polish. the poles themselves had learned to think in wide spaces, with more force than restraint. with powerful neighbours to east and west, each far more numerous than themselves and each at the moment highly unpopular with the victors in the war, the poles little needed the encouragement which they received to make enormous territorial claims. much of their history for the next four years was to consist in disputes with their neigh- bours involving the young state in excessive expenditure and entailing grievous neglect of internal problems. pilsudski, the old revolutionary, had begun by appointing a cabinet of the left, composed mainly of galician socialists and peasants’ representatives. this was formed on nov. 18 after the social leader, daszynski, had attempted unsuccessfully to form a ministry four days previously. the programme of m. moraczewski, the premicr, was “ consolidation and social con- struction.” but his rule was short. the propertied classes refused him their support, and his attempt to float an internal loan met with little response. the friends of the entente and the national democrats resented the galician rule; and when m. paderewski, the second man in poland enjoying almost unlimited prestige, arrived in the country in dec., he composed his differences with pilsudski and became premier on jan. 17. prussian poland had come under complete control of its polish inhabitants by jan. 9. west galicia was incorporated; east galicia was occupied by polish troops, which had entered lemberg on nov. 22. it was possible to hold elections for a constituent assembly on jan. 26 1919. the constituent seym met on feb. 10. out of the 337 deputies, only 32 were socialists. the national democrats numbered 107. the majority of the house consisted of peasants, politically extremely ignorant, sympathising with the left against the landowners, with the right against socialism. the seym passed a vote of confidence in paderewski’s cabinet, and confirmed pitsudski in his position as head of the state without, however, exactly defining his position. pilsudski and paderewski were chiefly interested in foreign affairs. on dec. 13 1918 poland had broken off diplomatic relations with russia, on dec. 15 with germany. on jan. 4 1919 all polish parties had issued a message that poland was one with the entente through community of ideas and historical tradition. paderewski proceeded to paris to urge poland’s claims; pilsudski raised an army to defend them. general hlaller’s troops, returning from france, formed the nucleus of this force. the unemployed were glad to join it and on march 7 six classes were called up. already poland had an army of 166 600,000, which was soon increased to 800,000. on april 2 a state of siege was proclaimed in congress poland, and on may 8 an offensive opened in east galicia against the soviet russian and ukrainian forces. the treaty of versatiles and the frontier problems.—on june 28 ro1g the polish delegation signed the treaty of versailles, under which poland agreed to accept an agreement with the principal allied and associated powers for the protection of national minorities in poland, and for the protection of freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations. this minorities treaty was signed on june 28 1919 between poland and the principal allied and associated powers. under the treaty of versailles, poland received the larger part of posen and part of west prussia. a plebiscite was to deter- mine the settlement of masuria and upper silesia. danzig was to be a free city under the protection of the league of nations. this city was to be included within the polish customs frontiers and its foreign relations and the protection of its citizens abroad were to be entrusted to poland, who also received other eco- nomic rights in this territory. the actual details were to be settled later by a treaty between poland and the free city. art. 87 of the treaty assigned to the allied and associated powers the duty of fixing poland’s eastern frontier. a provi- sional boundary was laid down between poland and russia, roughly corresponding to the course of the vistula. as a sig- natory to the treaty of versailles, poland was an original mem- ber of the league of nations. the treaty was not popular in poland but the seym ratified it on july 30-31 by 285 votes to 41. during the next three years, however, poland was almost exclusively occupied on questions arising directly or indirectly out of it, which it will be convenient to take in order. the industrial district of teschen (g.v.), with important coal mines, was claimed by both poles and czechoslovaks. each nation attempted to assume practical control and there was some fighting. a plebiscite commission arrived in the district on jan. 30 1920, but on july 28 1920 the supreme council fixed a line of demarcation through this district, cutting the town in two, and through the neighbouring districts of zips and orava. in east and west prussia (see allenstein-marienwerder) the plebiscites were held on july 11 1920. the bulk of the dis- tricts were allotted to germany on the basis of the vote. upper silesia was the scene of grave troubles (see silesia, upper). art. 88 of the treaty of versailles provided that the inhabitants of this area, except in its purely german portions, should vote by plebiscite for adherence to germany or poland. allied troops occupied the districts in the meantime, and a com- mission consisting of a french, a british and an italian represent- ative took charge. the plebiscite was fixed for march 20 1921. the poles put great pressure on the inhabitants. at the polls, 717,422 votes were cast for germany, 483,514 for poland. the towns and industrial districts voted german. in consequence of a rumour that only two districts were to be assigned to poland, korfanty, a prominent pole, occupied southeastern upper silesia with an armed force, recruited and equipped from poland, and defied the allied powers. a commission of the council of the league of nations on oct. 20 1921 awarded the southeastern districts, including 75% of the aggregate material wealth of the disputed territory, to poland. a convention signed at geneva between poland and germany may 15 1922 provided guarantees for the continuity of the economic life of the country and the protection of minorities during a transitional period of 15 years. danzig (g.v.) was proclaimed an independent free city on nov. 15 1920. a treaty between danzig and poland was signed at paris oct. 27 1920 and a supplementary convention at warsaw oct. 24 1921. poland’s rights in the territory of the free city are exclusively economic and ensure her free access to the sea. the convention regulating the administration of the harbour and waterways was signed on may 23 1923. hostilities against the ukraine and russia.—the disturbances on poland’s eastern frontier were on a larger scale. polish troops, on occupying lemberg in nov. 1918, had expelled the east poland galician govt., which took refuge in vienna. general petliura, who formed a government in the ukraine in the same month, proclaimed the union of the republics of ukraine and west ukraine (east galicia). the east galician troops placed them- selves under his command. throughout roto fighting continued between the polish and ukrainian troops, the former remaining in de facto possession of the disputed territory. at the same time, poland was engaged in a somewhat serious war with soviet russia the german troops of occupation had evacuated the white russian and little russian territory in chelm and volhynia in such a way that the bolshevik troops were able to occupy it before the poles, to whom the inhabitants appealed for aid, could come up. in this year soviet russia was engaged in war with most of her neighbours and with various expeditions, such as those of kolchak or denikin. the policy of the allies was extremely uncertain; but in any case it was hostile to soviet russia, and there was talk of forming a ‘‘ sanitary cordon ”’ round that country. the polish forces, as the largest and most successful of those opposed to russia, enjoyed considerable support in western europe. all the allies desired a strong poland; but british statesmen considered that this aim would be best achieved if poland’s frontiers were not excessively extended. in the autumn, russia suggested an armistice which was declined. the allied and associated powers on may 8 definitely assigned west galicia to poland, and on june 21 allowed her to establish a government in east galicia, which district was, however, to determine its own fate in the future and to preserve its autonomy. on nov. 20 the peace conference reached a decision that east galicia was to receive autonomy for 25 years under a polish protectorate, after which period the league of nations would decide its future. the “ curzon line’”’ of dec. 8 attempted to define poland’s eastern frontier. it drew a line roughly following the ethno- graphical frontier and thus running some way further west than the actual line then occupied by polish troops. the dis- trict of vilna (wilno), which the poles had occupied in april 191g, was assigned to lithuania. in the spring of 1920 efforts were made to secure peace with russia; but as poland advanced claims on historical grounds to large non-polish areas, these came to nothing. on april 25, having settled differences with petliura in the ukraine by a treaty dated april 22, poland opened a strong offensive. on may 8 the polish troops entered kiev. the soviet army, how- ever, having defeated kolchak and denikin, concentrated against poland and opened a counter-offensive. by july the polish forces were in a serious position. poland appealed to the allies for mediation; and the allies suggested that poland should retire to the curzon line and that representatives of poland, russia, finland, lithuania and latvia should meet in london to arrive at a gencral peace settlement of eastern europe. russia refused this offer, but agreed to negotiate directly with toland. on july 22 poland asked russia for an armistice; the soviet govt. replied, fixing the opening of nego- tiations. russia was procrastinating, apparently believing that the military situation would become more advantageous to herself with delay. the allics, however, had been perturbed by the russian advance, and a french mission under gen. weygand had arrived in warsaw to assist the polish general staff. the in- vasion had also awakened poland to the need of a supreme effort. the government issued an appeal to the country, which responded to it nobly. on aug. 14 pitsudski opened a counter- offensive, and drove the russians back in confusion. on aug. 17 the polish army retook nowo-minsk and on aug. 19 brest-. litovsk. poland, backed by the allies, was now able to reject the terms which the russian delegates at minsk suggested, which included the formation of a civic militia of the polish workmen, 200,000 strong. the conference was moved to riga, where the preliminary treaty of peace was signed on oct. 12. the final treaty was signed at riga on march 18 rg2z and rati- fied by the seym on april 17. poland the contracting parties acknowledged each other’s independence, and abandoned all claims to territories situated on the other side of the new frontier; russia also declared her desinteressement as regards the territory disputed between poland and lithuania. both parties mutually agreed to recognise the political sovereignty of the other and to refrain from propaganda or from harbouring organisations directed against the other party. they mutually renounced claims to war reparations, while russia undertook to restore all art collec- tions, libraries, historical documents, etc., removed after 1772, all industrial installation evacuated between aug. 1 1914 and oct. i i915, and to pay 30,000,000 roubles in gold as poland’s share in the assets of the former russian empire. a number of mixed com- missions were set up to carry out the terms of this treaty; but, in general, disputes were more common than agreements among them. as regards industrial property, poland agreed (aug. 25 1914) to accept a large sum as settlement. poland’s eastern frontier now ran southeast from the border of latvia to dzina (disna), then south, just east of dokszyce (dok- shitsi). it passes some 18 m. west of minsk and, further south, some 70 m. east of pinsk; then running almost due south and then slightly southwest to ostreg; for some 25 m. it continues southwest, thence almost due south till reaching the river zbrucz which it follows till its junction with the dniester, which separates poland from rumania. simultaneously, poland was embroiled with lithuania on the question of vilna (g.v.). this town and district had been oc- cupied by poland on april 19 1919 but were assigned to lithu- ania by the curzon line, and russia recognised lithuania’s claims to them by a treaty dated july 12 1920. during their advance, polish troops came into conflict with the lithuanians. an armistice convention of oct. 7 laid down a line of demarca- tion, which was to come into force on oct. ro. on oct. 9, how- ever, the polish general zeligowski took possession of the dis- puted districts by a coup de main. the polish govt. disowned the general but made no serious effort to recall him, after pro- longed negotiations, the conference of ambassadors assigned wilno and district to poland on march 14 1923. the lithuanian govt. refused to accept this decision as final. on march 14 1923 the allied powers through the conference of ambassadors recognised poland’s de facto northern, eastern and southeastern frontiers, the united states subsequently notifying the polish govt. of their acknowledgment of this fact. this decision repealed previous provisions for the future of east galicia, which thus became an integral part of poland. relations with the little entente, france and rumania and the baltic states—-surrounded by so many enemies, poland could not stand alone. the most important d/oc in central europe formed after the war was that of the little entente (qg.v.). although poland had many interests in common with the members of this alliance, she was unable to join it. she had no quarrel with hungary; indeed, policy, tradition and a simi- larity of social structure made her sympathetic towards that -state. the long drawn out disputes with czechoslovakia on the teschen, zips and javorzina frontier questions prevented a close alliance with that power, which also refused to enter any alliance directed against russia. furthermore, czechoslovakia had received a mandate over carpathian russia and hoped to estab- lish a direct frontier with russia. so long as the fate of east galicia remained in abeyance czechoslovak and polish interests were bound to conilict. on nov. 6 1921 a czecho-polish political convention was indeed signed at prague. the two parties mutually guaranteed, as far as they were able, the territories in their possession and agreed to act in concert for the application of the treaties which they had signed in common ‘ when occasion arose.’' czechoslovakia “ disinterested herself '? in eastern galicia, poland undertook ‘‘ analogous obliga- tions " towards czechoslovakia. note was taken of czechoslovakia’s conventions with rumania and yugoslavia, poland’s with france and rumania; reference was made to a commercial convention, and provision made for arbitration of differences. feeling, however, was too unfriendly for the ratification of the treaty, although a com- mercia! agreement was signed (sept. 20 1921). poland took part from time to time, as observer, in the periodical conferences of the little entente. poland's relations with czechoslovakia only be- came really cordial in 1925. of much greater importance were poland’s agreements with france and rumania, referred to above. from the first, france had designated poland as the ally which should take over 167 russia’s rele on germany’s eastern frontier. the note with which clemenceau transmitted to m. paderewski the polish minorities treaty reminded him that poland would “ to a large extent depend for the secure possession ” of her territories on the western powers. the french mission helped to save poland during the russian advance of 1920. france gave poland her support in the silesian and east galician questions, thus helping her to acquire most valuable coal and oil fields and in- dustrial regions, france assisted poland to organise and equip her army, lent her instructors and staff officers and made her generous loans for the purchase of war material. on feb. 19 1921 pitsudski signed a franco-polish treaty in paris for the ‘““ maintenance of the treaties ... the peace of europe, the security of their territories and their common political and military interests.”? the two governments undertook to consult each other “in all matters of foreign policy which concerned both states so far as these questions affect the settlement of international relations in the spirit of the treaties and in accord- ance with the covenant of the league of nations ’’; to con- clude a commercial treaty and to take concerted measures “ for the defence of their territories and the protection of their legitimate interests” in cases of an unprovoked attack upon either or both.! the polish govt. ratified this political treaty on may 30 1922. it was not stated whether any further unpublished military con- vention had been concluded. poland signed a commercial agree- ment with france (feb. 6 1922) with a bilateral convention dealing with the property and rights of private individuals and an agree- ment concerning the exploitation of oilin poland. anew conven- tion was signed in paris on dec. 9 1924 on a very wide basis, which again included clauses relating to the french capital in- vested in polish oil. other agreements with france deal with the polish immigrant workmen in france (sept. 3 1919 and oct. 14 1920) and consular and general matters (april 17 1924, dec. 30 1925, feb. 20 1926). in view of the common danger threatening both states from russia, poland concluded a defensive alliance with rumania on march 3 1921 (text printed in vol. 7 of the league of nations treaty series). the treaty provided for mutual assistance in the case of an unprovoked attack on either party on their eastern frontier (defined in the case of poland as those laid down in the preliminary treaty of riga of oct. 12 1920); common diplomatic action in regard to the two parties’ eastern neigh- bours; and for a military convention to be concluded for the same duration as the treaty, z.e., five years from the date of signature, with the right of denunciation at six months’ notice after two years. a definite alliance between poland and the baltic states proved impracticable as, quite apart from the antagonism between poland and lithuania, the smaller states could not contemplate anything but a defensive attitude towards russia, and feared to be entangled in an aggressive policy. in july 1921, however, representatives of poland, finland, latvia and estonia met at helsingfors and deter- mined to hold periodical conferences to exchange opinions on mat- ters of policy and discuss the possibility of joint action. such cor- ferences were held at riga (aug.-sept. i921), revel (dec. 1921), warsaw (march 1922), genoa (april 1922), revel (sept. 1922), helsingfors (march 1923), riga (july 1923), revel (oct. 1923), warsaw (feb. 1924) and helsingfors (jan. 1925). the majority of these dealt only with minor financial and economic problems. at the warsaw conference of march 1922, however, a political agrec- ment was suggested defining the outlines of a rapprochement be- tween the states concerned on the basis of ‘ benevolent neutrality towards any of the signatory states which might be attached with- out provocation,’”’ and a previous understanding in respect of treaties and agreements entered into. these suggestions could not be rati- fied owing to the opposition of the finnish diet. a conference was held in the same month at riga, attended also by representatives of russia, where the establishment of neutral zones as a preliminary to disarmament broke down, as did the disarmament conference in moscow of dec. 1922. at the second helsingfors conference (jan. 1925) a multilateral arbitration treaty was signed between poland and the baltic states. poland concluded a commercial treaty with finland (nov. 1923), a consular convention with latvia (jan. 3 1924) and with estonia (glan. 11 1924). _! the text of this treaty is printed in vol. 18 of the league of na- tions treaty serics. 168 the minorities ouestions.—the events and treaties shortly mentioned above delimited and to some extent guaranteed poland’s frontiers, although their security left much to be wished in view of the agitation conducted by her neighbours, especially soviet russia. it left her, however, with national minorities amounting to 9,000,000 out of a total population of some 27,000,000 (according to the polish handbook, 1925, 3,883,000 ruthenians, 2,123,000 jews, 1,057,000 white ruthe- nians, 1,036,000 germans, 72,000 lithuanians and 210,000 russians, czechs, tatars, etc.), sufficient, under the system of proportional representation and scrutin de liste, to give the bloc of national minorities 89 deputies in the first regular seym of 444 deputies. the polish-minorities treaty of june 28 1919 secured to all in- habitants of poland full protection of life and hiberty; it secured that all bona fide inhabitants of the districts allotted to poland be ad- mitted to polish nationality and citizenship in the fullest sense (except in the case of recent german colonists); guaranteed the minorities the right to use their own language, to maintain their own institutions, to receive primary instruction in their own language, and where the proportion was considerable to receive ‘an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of public funds.’’ the jews are included among the “ racial, religious or linguistic minorities ’'; yiddish is recognised as a language, and the jews are granted special protection as regards education and the keeping of the sabbath, but are not recognised as ‘‘ a separate political community within the polish state.”’ the guarantee for the execution of this treaty was entrusted to the league of nations. the most difficult minorities questions, after the jews, proved to be those of the ukrainians. east galicia was not incorporated within poland for a considerable period, during which, however, poland treated it as an integral part of the polish state. complaints were numerous, and only grew less after the fate of the district had been decided because they were now unlikely to be heard. on sept. 26 1922 the seym passed a general law on provincial self-government which established local bodies (dietines) for dealing with purely local affairs. this law granted a small measure of autonomy to east galicia, but not enough to prevent complaints; more particularly as the break-up of large estates under the land reform acts was utilised to settle polish peasants in the non-polish districts. serious disputes arose, not only with the ukrainians, but also with the german minorities. in 1924 a more conciliatory spirit began to prevail. on july 10 of that year a bill was passed providing tor the use of ukrainian, white russian and lithuanian in government offices, law courts and schools in districts where the majority of the population speaks one of those languages. the provisions were not extended to the yiddish language. m. thugut, the vice-premier tn 1924, however, made persevering efforts to reconcile the minorities. in the summer of 1924 the government concluded a kind of pact with the jewish leaders by which the government promised to pro- mote in every way the religious and educational interests of the jewish community, while the jewish leaders pledged themselves to respect the integrity of poland and to give loyal support to the poiish national government. nevertheless, the racial and especially the religious enthusiasms of the polish people were such that considerable friction persisted between them and the minorities, the latter were strong enough to form a serious danger to the polish state in times of unrest, par- ticularly along poland’s eastern frontier, where such unrest was actively fomented by the soviet government. this was perhaps the principal reason why relations between poland and russia continued unsatisfactory, consisting, indeed, mainly of a continuous scrics of “incidents '"’ accompanied by mutual insults and threats of an appeal to arms. internal conditions, 1919-24.—for the first years of its exist- ence the history of poland was dominated by its foreign polit- ical situation. large parts of its area were the theatre of wars; its army absorbed a considerable proportion of its man-power; and military expenses were the main item in its budget. nor was this purely due to aggressive or imperialistic tendencies. poland’s long and defenceless frontier necessitated the upkeep of a large army, more particusarly when her chief neighbour was so unrestful a one as soviet russia. taxation was insuffi- cient to meet these expenscs, and polish national resources— forests, oil-fields, etc-——were heavily mortgaged to foreign capitalists, generally french, in consequence. the first period of poland’s independent existence bore the marks of its origin, which had been to some extent revolutionary, and during that period much advanced legislation was passed. whereas the population up to 1918 had enjoyed little political liberty, the franchise system promulgated on nov. 30 1918 for poland the elections to the constituent seym allowed the often untu- tored wishes of almost the entire adult population of poland to find expression. the constituent seym was therefore mainly composed of peasants (who form 65% of the population of poland), while the workmen were also strongly represented. these groups, however, and especially those of the peasants, suffered from a grievous lack of unity. the agrarian ouestion.—not only were there antagonisms between the representatives from the three portions of the republic, but their economic status and development were very different. in the west and the east of the country there were numerous large estates; but in the former districts the peasants were well organised and educated, while in the latter they were illiterate and backward. in galicia there were numerous small estates, especially in the west; in congress poland the land reform commenced in 1905 had established a considerable num- ber of small estates, but the reform was still far from comple- tion. in both galicia and russian poland there was a large landless proletariat, and in galicia especially there were a great many dwarf holdings which were inadequate to support the families cultivating them. the natural desire of the peasants for a reform was increased by the example of events in russia, and the first agitation contemplated a redistribution of a very radical nature; more especially as large parts of poland were practically famine areas, and were only partially saved from the most widespread distress by the administration of relief (mainly granted by the american food mission) on a large scale. the land reform bill was introduced in the seym on july 10 1919, and was passed by a single vote in a house of about 360. it proposed the nationalisation of forests ani limited the amount of land to be held by an individual in poland to from 148 to 248 ac., although in the non-polish lands a higher limit of 988 ac. was fixed. the land thus available was to be used for increasing ‘‘ dwarf holdings " to economic small holdings and settling the landless in new small hold- ings. the reform, however, was not carried through as originally intended. it was impossible in any case to put through expropria- tion on a large scale, for financial reasons. the bill became a con- venient asset in the political bargainings of the over-numerous parties of the seym. it at last became law at the end of 1925. jt now pro- vided for the distribution of about 50,000 ac. a year to a period of 10 years, the maximum which an owner could retain was 148 ac. in the industrial centres, 740 ac. in the border provinces and 435 ac. in other areas. the benefit of the reform was largely enjoyed by the large and medium farmers, who thus came to form a conservative class. in general, however, owing to a series of remarkably good har- vests, the agitation for reform largely diced away. the labour qouestion.—the workmen in poland were less fortunate. the industrial boom which almost all europe enjoyed after the war missed poland, where so many of the industrial areas had been ravaged and industry disorganised beyond the possibility of speedy repair. the closing of the russian frontier, moreover, cut off congress poland’s accustomed and almost sole market. in galicia, prussian poland and congress poland, the labour legislation in existence in 1918 was extremely various, while in the last-named area it was very backward. no trade unions, in the modern sense of the word, existed in this, the chief industrial district of poland; they had been prohibited by the russian govt., and the prohibition had been strictly en- forced. the socialist movement in these districts had therefore been of a radical and secret character, while the high proportion of jews in polish industry, as employers and workers alike, per- haps accentuated these traits, and certainly diminished the sympathy felt for the movement outside its own ranks. the period during which socialism was able actively to influence polish legislation was short, but while it lasted some important measures were passed. labour inspection was introduced on jan. 3 1919, the organisation of the labour inspection bureaux being slowly extended until the whole country was covered in 1923. the duties of labour inspectors include that of arbitration. working hours were regulated by the statute of dec. 8 1919, by an amendment to this statute of feb. 14 1922 and by various other statutes. the working day, with certain exceptions, is limited to eight hours and the work- ing week to 46 hours. the decrce of feb. 8 191g introduced the free- dom of coalition and defined the status of trade unions, which after that date grew rapidly in numbers and importance, at a later period, poland took a very important part in the work of the international labour organisation, being among the states to ratify most readily the draft conventions prepared by that office. poland nevertheless, the position of the workmen in the republic was not happy. they were a minority, and their interests con- flicted too often with those of the majority. during the period of the russo-polish hostilities in 191g—20 their sympathies were often deeply estranged from their country. the communist element was large, and was actively encouraged by russian agents, whose activities—carried on in defiance of the provisions of the treaty of riga—caused much ill feeling between poland and russia. fear of bolshevism caused the middle class and peasant parties to adopt an excessive severity towards any socialist organisations. labour troubles were frequent, and often very grave. they abated when conditions grew more settled and communications improved. one relic of the early socialist influence was the over-staffing of industry and of public services, introduced as a palliative against unemployment; this over-staffing helped to burden the state exchequer and prolong the financial crisis. administration and finance —-a capable civil service might have carried the country through without grave difficulties until conditions had settled down. unfortunately, the only trained bureaucracy was that of galicia, and this was not only numeri- cally insufficient to meet the needs of the whole country, but had inherited by no means ideal traditions. the requisite stails for the ministries were hastily improvised, but as a rule made up in quantity what they lacked in quality. they necessarily acquired experience slowly, and the first years of their adminis- tration were inefficient and expensive. local government had, indeed, existed before the war, but varied widely in the different parts of poland. in prussian poland the rural commune had usually consisted of no more than 350 persons; in galicia of about 1,000; and in russia of some 7,000. district self-govern- ment did not exist in russian poland before the war. a large apparatus had thus to be improvised, and what was already in existence had to be made uniform. the efforts to introduce a uniform system of administration, as well as a uniform code of justice, largely occupied the first years of poland's independence, and had not been wholly completed by 1925. these difficult tasks had meanwhile to be accomplished under the worst possi- ble financial conditions. in 1919 the financial situation was chaotic. from rgz2r on, polish agriculture began to recover, and the peasants, the majority of the population, achieved a cer- tain prosperity. the recovery of industry was slower; that of public finance slower still. until m. grabski undertook his reforms in dec. 1923 the whole of polish life was really domi- nated by the steady and sometimes extremely rapid fall of the mark, with the familiar accompaniments of inflation; the im- poverishment of the middle classes and officials, antagonism between town and country, wage disputes in industry, and uncertainty as to the future. parliamentary history —these difliculties were partly a cause, partly an effect, of an extraordinary political instability. starting life as a country divided both politically and geographi- cally, poland achieved a great number of political parties. the constituent seym had 13 political parties, as well as two inde- pendent members, and it was difficult to ensure a stable govern- ment, especially as the constitution gave parliament a pre- ponderating influence in the government of the country. m. paderewski resigned in nov. ro19, following the decision of the powers to grant east galicia autonomy. a new cabinet of the right and the conservative peasants was formed on dec. 13 1919 under m. skulski. its most important member was m. grabski, the minister of finance, who succeeded m. bilinski, a high financial authority from the old austro-hungarian serv- ice. grabski, a national democrat, aroused intense indignation in galicia by fixing the value of the krone, for exchange pur- poses, at some 20% below its market value. in may 1920 the cabinet proposed to requisition the next harvest. witos, the galician peasant leader, caused a crisis by his opposition. as witos himself was unable to form a cabinet, grabski formed a non-party conservative govt., with prince sapieha as minister of foreign affairs. at the height of the russian offensive in july grabski resigned and witos became premier, introducing 169 daszynski, the socialist leader, as vice-premier for the purpose of negotiations with russia. in july 1921 the socialists and national democrats left the government, which carried on asa government of the left centre. on march 17 the constitution was adopted (see below). in aug. witos was violently aticeed by the right in con- nection with the upper silesian dispute, and resigned. a non- party cabinet under m. ponikowski was formed on sept. 27. the most remarkable member was m. skirmunt, minister of foreign affairs, who had been appointed to that post shortly before, on the resignation of prince sapieha. the minister of finance, m. michalski, introduced a capital levy which stabilised the currency for a while. on march 3 1922 ponikowski resigned owing to difficulties in the vilna dispute. on march 27 he formed a second cabinet, but resigned on june 2 owing to a difference of opinion with pitsudski, who considered that the attitude of the polish delegation at the conference of genoa had been too con- ciliatory towards russia. the fall of ponikowski, whose admin- istration, unhampered by party conflict, had been a marked advance on those preceding it, both in foreign and financial policy, was the signal for an outbreak of party strife between right and left. after a prolonged crisis, during which pilsudski came into hot conflict with the right, who had selected kor- fanty, of silesian fame, as their leader, a non-party cabinet under nowak was formed on july 27. the electoral law was passed on july 28, and the general elections fixed for nov. 5 for the seym and nov. 12 for the senate. the elections to the seym returned 163 members of the right, six of the centre, 190 of the left (41 socialists, the remainder mostly small peasants), 83 of the national minorities and two communists. in the senate the right had 52 deputies out of 1114, the national minorities 21; the other parties were small. the first business of the two houses was to elect a president. marshal pitsudski refused to stand. the parties of the left, supported by the national minorities and the witos peasant party, put forward and secured the election of m. naturowicz, a friend of m. pitsudski, who had acted as minister of foreign affairs in several cabinets. the defeated candidate of the right was count zamoyski. polish nationalism was infuriated by the election of a president through the votes of the national minorities, including the jews; and on dec. 16 a fanatic (appar- ently of unsound mind) assassinated the new president. this act sobered public opinion. the new president was m. wojeie- chowski, an old member of the polish socialist party and later a leader in the co-operative movement. gen. sikorski became premier. financial collapse and reforms.—poland’s position in the early part of 1923 was still very unsettled. general uneasiness was felt as to how far the french occupation of the ruhr, with its possible complications, might afiect her position. the visit of marshal foch to warsaw in the summer aroused a fear that poland might be committing herself to secret military alliance; the french loan of 400,000,000 francs for purchase of material of war in france was regarded with suspicion as pointing in the same direction. the polish mark was affected by the collapse of the german currency, falling in sympathy with it. m. grabski was unable to put through the reforms which he desired, and the other ministers of finance proved quite unequal to the situation. relations with russia remained unsatisfactory, being especially troubled by the soviet’s persecution of catholic priests. in the spring witos secured a promise from the right of more speedy execution of the land reform, and he became premier on may 27 in alliance with the national democrats. the left and the national minorities showed considerable discontent, which was shared by pitsudski, who had now been succeeded as chief of the general staff by gen. haller. interest centered in the financial question; the mark sank in the autumn to nearly 1,000,000 to the pound sterling. there was serious industrial unrest in july and again in oct.; but fortunately the harvests were again excellent. on oct. 27 the government took in two strong personalities from the right, m. korfanty and 170 m. dmowski; but the finances were not reformed, the peasant parties were discontented, and the government resigned on dec. 11. on dec. 19 a non-party government was formed under m. grabski, poland’s most able finance minister. the political parties agreed to subordinate all other problems to those of financial reconstruction. m. grabski, who had received valuable advice from a british financial mission under mr. hilton young, asked for emergency powers, which were granted him on jan. 3 1924. he was now able in an astonishingly short time to stabilise the currency and balance the budget and the financial problem occupied the chief attention of the country throughout 1924. the consolidation of the polish debt to america (nov. 14 1924) and to great britain (dec. 10 1924) marked a political as well as a financial advance. a commercial treaty with great britain had already been concluded (nov. 26 1923) and one with the united states was concluded provisionally on feb. 10 1925. among other agreements concluded by poland may be mentioned a commercial treaty (may 12 1922), a special commercial agreement (jan. 21 1923) and an emigration convention (may 1924) with italy; a convention regarding option and nationality with germany (aug. 30 1924). the polish concordat.—an agreement of great interest was the concordat reached with the holy see on feb. 10 1925. it should be remembered that pope pius xi. before his ascension of the holy see, had been papal nuncio in poland. the concordat differs materially from any other similar arrangement. the catholic church is granted an absolute freedom of execution of her authority and jurisdiction in poland; the assistance and support of the state being assured her in this respect. the states’ interests in connection with nomina- tions for the higher ecclesiastical posts are adequately protected. in religious education, the competencies of church and state are exactly defined. the division of poland into ecclesiastical provinces is carried out in such a way that no portion of polish territory re- mains subject to the jurisdiction of a bishop residing outside the borders of the state. in this connection must be mentioned the establishment of an autocephalic orthodox church in poland, which received the blessing of the synod and of the oecumenical patriarch- ate in constantinople on nov. 11 1924. the political importance of the religious question in poland can hardly be over-estimated. re- ligious differences have always been far more important than racial in dividing poles and russians, poles and ruthenes, poles and jews, and even poles and germans. it was largely owing to the religious bond with clerical circles in vienna that the lot of galician poles in austria was happy. to some extent catholic poland to-day has entered into the succession of the efoly roman empire and the ame interest is one of her chief supports in her struggle with ussia. the problem of security —meanwhile the question of security, in all its forms of guarantee of security, arbitration and limita- tion of armaments was beginning to succeed that of reparations as the chicf european problem, and poland, whose interest in the latter question had been secondary, found herself one of the parties most directly concerned in the deliberations of the powers and of the league of nations. simultaneously, her posi- tion with regard to the league changed. the 2oth session of the council of the league (june 17 1924) was the first at which there was no polish question on the agenda of the meeting; hitherto poland had only too regularly occupied the attention of the representatives of the powers as plaintiff or defendant in wearisome frontier disputes. count skrzynski, who became poland’s foreign minister for the second time in aug. 1924, took an active part in the work of the fifth assembly of the league (sept. 1924). the polish delegation maintained that the performance of a mutual guar- antee pact,which would facilitate the application of articles 10 and 16 of the covenant, could alone secure disarmament in accordance with article 16; and spared no effort to co-ordinate the opposing views and to assist in the drafting of the geneva protocol. the protocol, which embodied all three aspects of the problem of security, was in complete agreement with the polish thesis. the rejection of the geneva protocol by great britain in 1925 alarmed polish opinion. the original german proposals made to france in the spring of 1925 treated the problems of ger- many’s western and eastern frontiers separately. in poland it was feared that a system of regional pacts by which germany guaranteed her western frontier alone might endanger the integ- poland tity of poland’s western frontier. poland contended that the question of security in western europe was inseparably con- nected with that of the stability of frontiers in the east, and that the conclusion of agreements guaranteeing germany’s western frontiers could not in any case create a state of uncer- tainty in respect of her eastern frontiers, as both were estab- lished by the treaty of versailles and any new agreements would have to be in strict accordance with the peace treaties and with the existing alliances. in march the seym passed a resolution protesting against any tampering with poland’s frontiers. the slav minorities did not join this protest, although expressing themselves in favour of poland’s present western frontier. they were clearly living in hopes that the question of east galicia would be reopened at some future date. poland’s relations with germany were further troubled, firstly by the breakdown of negotiations for a commercial treaty, followed by a tariff war, secondly by a failure of the arrangements to receive the german natives of poland who had not opted for polish nationality, whom the polish govt. called upon to leave poland on or before july 31 1925. the question of danzig, moreover, was a perennial cause of friction. its economic importance for poland, its racial and historical bonds with germany, were never forgotten by either party. these considerations, as well as the continued friction with russia, were a prime factor in drawing poland and czechoslovakia closer together. on may 6 1924 a polish-czechoslovak con- ference in cracow had finally regulated the jaworzna dispute; and on april 23 1925 the two countries signed a treaty of arbi- tration, a commercial treaty and an agreement which settled certain outstanding points of dispute. although poland still remained outside the little entente, the position of the slav bloc along germany’s eastern frontier was greatly strengthened, and it was obvious that in future the countries composing this bloc would act in greater accord than previously. the locarno pact (see security) signed on dec. 1 1925 brought forward a fresh solution to the problem of poland’s security. poland and germany signed an arbitration treaty which included in its preamble the recognition of the inviola- bility of the existing treaties, the recognition of the integrity of each contracting party’s rights, and the elimination of war as a means of settlement of disputes and conflicts. in a separate treaty of guarantee between france and poland, france is referred to as the guarantor of the polish-german arbitration agreement. france undertook in the case of an unprovoked attack by germany against poland to abandon no means of assistance at her disposal and within the limits of the covenant and of the political agreements with poland.* polish opinion was not easily reconciled to the idea of the locarno pact. the arrangements were accepted, but there was some feeling that poland was being abandoned by france which even brought about a temporary rapprochement with soviet russia. m. chicherin, the russian commissar for foreign affairs, visited warsaw sept. 26-30 1925, but the visit did not, apparently, result in any concrete revision of the policy of either country. at the same time, poland was unfortunate in losing 1a project for disarmament submitted to the conference of poland and the baltic states held in moscow on nov. 30 1922 had already been rejected by these states on the ground that the plan, if adopted would secure russia a military predominance without providing adequate political or moral guarantees to the other contracting parties. on this occasion the absence of russia from the conference created a great difficulty, as the acceptance of the decisions of the confer- ence by russia's neighbours would place them at an obvious dis- advantage towards russia who remained free from any international obligations. the polish delegation accordingly brought forward a clause, which was adopted, exempting the countries referred to from the duty of registering and publishing figures concerning their traffic in arms until russia had signified her access to the convention, a further protocol brought forward by the polish delegatiof, con- demning chemical and bacteriological warfare, was also adopted by the conference. at a conference held at riga (july 9-11 1923) the four baltic states (not including russia) agreed to support dis- armament proposals at genoa if accompanied by a general treaty of neutral guarantee. poland m. grabski, who resigned on nov. 13 in consequence of a dis- agreement with the bank of poland. the zloty fell to an alarm- ing degree, and it seemed clear that poland’s financial troubles were, after all, not over. on nov. 20 m. skrzynski formed a new coalition cabinet, but was obliged to admit that the finan- cial and economic state of the country was serious, the treasury was almost empty, the shortage of private capital was very great, and unemployment was increasing rapidly. the year 1926 opened amid considerable friction between the right and the left. the coalition government maintained itself throughout the winter, but the steady fall of the zloty aroused great dissatisfaction, and controversy arose as to who should bear the brunt of the retrenchments which were obviously indispensable. the socialists demanded a large programme of public works to relieve unemployment, and a rise in salaries for the lower branches of the civil service, while refusing to admit a reduction in the number of railway employees. they proposed to make their economies on the army budget. the right desired a reduction of civilian expenditure, while maintaining the army at full strength. this dispute affected the whole life of the country. the left rallied round marshal pilsudski who wasstill a popular hero in his retirement, and he opened a series of dev- astating criticisms on the army, its conduct and its influence on national policy. there was a fresh frontier “ affair’? with lithuania in march, which followed closely on a more serious incident in which germany was concerned, a large german espionage organisation in poland being discovered. public opinion in poland grew more excited and alarmed than ever. on march 2 the seym ratified the locarno treaties, but there was a strong feeling that the security which they afforded poland was inadequate. this feeling found expression when the league of nations met later in the month to elect germany a permanent member of the council and put the locarno pact into operation. the polish delegates insisted on poland’s right to a permanent seat on the council. they afterwards withdrew their claim, but other countries made similar demands, and the admission of germany had to be postponed. there were signs after this that poland was working to form an eastern european bloc in conjunction with the little entente and possibly italy. the treaty with rumania was renewed on march 26 in the altered form of a guarantee pact, each party guaranteeing the political independence and territorial integrity of the other and pledging itself to immediate aid and assistance in case of unprovoked aggression.' on april 14 count skrzynski, on a visit to prague, signed an arbitration treaty with czecho- slovakia, the details of which were kept secret, but which was stated by dr. benesh to be ‘‘ much more than an arbitration treaty ... an expressive symbol of definite politics,” while count skrzynski declared that “‘ here in central europe a slav bloc has been created.” secondly, a treaty of ratification was signed, which cleared away certain outstanding points of dis- agreement. from prague count skrzynski proceeded to vienna, where a new treaty of arbitration was signed(april 15 1926) between poland and austria. marshal pitsudski’s coup d’efati—meanwhile, however, in- ternal dissensions had become acute while the news of the con- clusion of the second russo-german treaty (see germany) increased the general nervousness. gen. szepticki, chief of the army inspectorate at cracow, whom marshal piisudski had been attacking with particular vehemence, resigned his post, pub- lishing his reasons for doing so. the adherents and opponents of pilsudski now formed two definite, opposing camps in the army. the quarrel between the marshal and the parties of the right was of no new date. it was largely owing to fear of pil- sudski’s possible excessive influence that the polish constitu- tion had been framed to allow the legislature an excessive power by comparison with the executive. pitsudski had since been gradually edged out of power, and was now in retirement 1rumania forms the centre of polish interests in the balkans, partly because of their common frontier with potential importance of rumanian ports as an outlet for polish trade. 171 pending his appointment as inspector-general and commander- in-chief in time of war. the right, however, desired to frame the bill containing this appointment in such a way as to bring the army under the direct control of parliament, while pitsudski insisted on independence from the ministry of war. at the same time the discussions on the budget commenced. the minister of finance proved unable to reconcile the opposing claims of the right and the left. the socialist ministers of the cabinet resigned; on april 21 count skrzynski himself resigned in consequence. at the request of the president, skrzynski re- sumed power with arump cabinet of the right to pass the monthly budget. three fruitless weeks were passed in the endeavour to form a reasonable parliamentary majority, till on may ir m. witos, the peasant leader, succeeded in forming a ministry. this solution evoked considerable dissatisfaction. both sides were weary of the futile parliamentary struggle, and it was rumoured that m. witos proposed te cut the knot by estab- lishing a dictatorship of the right, supported by the polish nationalist circles and fascist organisations. above all, witos proposed to pass through the disputed army bill, for which count skrzynski had been unwilling to assume responsibility. on may 12 pitsudski, whose following was growing from day to day, suddenly attacked warsaw at the head of the troops which espoused his cause. ‘the government prepared to resist, proclaimed pitsudski a rebel, and summoned its own adherents in the army to warsaw. throughout may 13 and rq there was heavy fighting in the streets of warsaw, in which at least 200 persons appear to have lost their lives. on may 14 the social democratic party proclaimed the genera] strike in war- saw and certain other polish towns. the government’s troops were unable to come up, and by may 15 pilsudski won a definite victory. the government and the president of the republic resigned, and m. rataj, marshal of the seym, became acting head of the state, in accordance with the terms of the polish constitution. a non-party cabinet was formed, pending the election of a new president. the troops which had supported m. witos returned to their garrison, and by may 17 most of the country was quiet. the new government proclaimed “the moral regeneration of the nation” as against “individual and party seclionalism.’’ dpitsudski was elected president but at the be- ginning of june 1926 refused the office in favour of his nomince, professor ignacz mosiecki. he remained, however, the dictator of the country. (j. gra.) constitution poland is a republic. the legislative power is vested in a diet (seym) and a senate, which are summoned, adjourned and dissolved, but not without their own consent, by the president. the dict is composed of paid members elected for five years, upon a system of proportional representation. suffrage is uni- versal, all who enjoy full civic rights and who are over 21 being qualified to vote, but, since voting is personal, soldiers on active service are excluded. citizens over 25 are eligible for election to the diet; members of the civil service cannot be elected for the district in which they hold office. the minimum age for voting in senatorial clections is 30, whilst no one under 40 is cligible for election. bills go to the senate after being passed by the diet and if no objection is raised within 30 days the bill becomes law. amend- ments suggested by the senate are considered and voted on by the diet, which can override them by a majority of eleven- twentieths. the budget is fixed each year for the following year; taxes and customs dutics can be established only by law and a supreme court of control superintends the management of state finance. the executive power is exercised by the president and a council of ministers who are responsible for his official actions. he 1s elected for seven years by the national assembly, that is, the diet and senate acting together. laws are to be signed by him and by the president of the council and the minister concerned. the president has the supreme power in the army, except in time of war, when the minister for war is responsible for all military affairs. the president can declare war and make peace only with the consent of the diet. he has the right of pardon. 172 for purposes of administration poland is to be divided into palat- inates, districts and urban and rural communes, these forming the units of local government. economic autonomy is established by means of chambers of agriculture, commerce, industry, etc., which will together form the supreme economic chamber of the republic, the competence of which required further legislation. the control over the whole administration is vested in administrative courts headed by the supreme administrative tribunal. judges are nom- inated by the president, whilst justices of the peace are popularly elected. judges can be removed from office only in certain legal cases and following a judicial decision. a united code for justice, both civil and criminal, had not been fully completed in 1924, and the russian, german and austrian codes, together with certain polish regulations, were still in force in various parts of the country. all citizens are equal in the eyes of the law, protection of life, liberty and property being assured to all inhabitants. state protection is given to labour and insurance for unemployment, illness and accident is guaranteed. roman catholicism is the recognised religion of the country but others are allowed provided they are in accordance with the law. land must be cultivated from the point of view of public utility. the law is to decide to what extent citizens and independent associa- tions may cultivate the land and exploit its mineral wealth, and in what cases the state may repurchase property to improve the value of its production. (c. a. m.) bipliography.—dr. j. grzymala-grabowiecki of the polish foreign office kindly supplied a detailed and valuable account of poland's foreign relations since 1919, large portions of which are in- corporated in the above article. literature on modern poland is extremely scanty. the following may be quoted: prof. w. a. phillips, poland (home university library, n. d.); l. bernhard, die polenfrage (leipzig, 1910); j. moraczewski, zarys sprawy polskie] w obecnej wojnie (lausanne, 1915); j. rosner, w krytycenej chwili (vienna, 1916); w. feldman, geschichte der polttischen ideen in polen (munich, 1917): | daszynski, cetery lata wojny (cracow, 1918); o. czernin, im weiltkriege (berlin, 1919); constitution de la republique de pologne du 17 mars 1921 (warsaw, 1921); afemozire sur le traite de riga (paris, 1921); b. winiarski, les institutions polt- tiques en polagne au x1xe stecle (paris, 1921); a. skrzynski, poland and peuce (london, 1923); the polish handbook, 1925 (london, 1925). il. defence man-power.—military service is obligatory for all male sub- jects of the polish state between the ages of 21 and 50. on gen- eral mobilisation men of 19 and 20 are also liable. the terms of service are: in the active army, two years from 21 to 23; in the reserve, 17 years from 24 to 4o; and for the levee en masse, 10 years from 41 to 50. officers and other ranks on the reserve are called out from time to time for refresher training. there is no training for the levee en masse. the annual class is calculated to produce an average of 160,000 conscripts, of whom about 110,000 are fit for general service. the total mobilisable man-power may be summarised as follows: permanent cadre, 50,000; two serving contingents, 220,000; reserves (men up to 40 years of age and men of 19 and 20 who are liable to be called up), 2,155,000; jevee en masse (10 classes at an average of 80,000 each), 800,000; making a total of 3,225,- coo. from this total must be deducted all men who would be retained in civilian life on those works that are regarded as of national importance. army organisalion.—in peace time the army is organised into the following units: 30 divisions of infantry, of three regiments each; 4 divisions of cavalry, of three brigades of two regiments each; 5 independent cavalry brigades of three regiments each (one brigade has four regiments); 30 regiments of field artillery; 10 regiments of heavy field artillery; ro divisions of horse artil- lery; 2 regiments of mountain artillery; 1 regiment of super- heavy artillery; 1 regiment and 10 independent batteries of anti-aircraft artillery; 4 companies of foot artillery; 1 tank regi- ment; 10 engineer regiments and 6 aviation regiments. there is the normal complement of army and divisional troops. the total establishment of the army is about 270,000 all ranks. in war it is estimated that poland could mobilise and equip an army of about 1,000,000 men. of these some 40% would be required for lines of communication troops and services, leaving a field army of 480,000 all ranks. recruiting organisation—voland is divided into recruiting areas which are subdivided into recruiting districts. the civil authorities of each recruiting district keep a register, and sum- mon each class annually to appear before a recruiting commission poland which is a mixed civil and military board. those passed fit for general service are posted to units but remain on leave until actually ordered to join, usually in oct. of each year. in each recruiting area a revision commission is set up to deal with appeals against the decision of the recruiting commission in cases where grounds for appeal are shown to exist. exemptions from service are granted in certain cases, e.g., on religious and compassionate grounds, etc. administration.—the country is divided into 10 administra- tive districts, each under a general officer commanding, who is responsible for the administration and mobilisation arrange- ments of his district. the ro districts are grouped into five army inspectorates. army inspectors are responsible under the min- ister of war for the training and efficiency of the troops in their inspectorates. the headquarters of districts are as follows: war- saw, lublin, grodno, be6dz, cracow, lwow (lemberg), poznan, toruh, brzes¢ and przemysl. the headquarters of inspectorates are as follows: (1) wilno (vilna), no. 3 and 9 districts; (2) warsaw, no. 1 and so districts; (3) toruf, nos. 7 and 8 dis- tricts; (4) cracow, no. 4 and 5 districts and (5) lwew, no. 2 and 6 districts. the higher command.—the president of the republic, as head of the executive, is the supreme chief of the army. he grants commissions, makes appointments to commands from divisional commanders upwards, awards promotion and con- firms retirements. for other matters he delegates his authority to the minister of war. the great war council is an advisory council on important military questions. it consists of the mem- bers of the cabinet and the highest military authorities. it is summoned as required, and is presided over by the president of the republic. the small war council sits permanently. it consists of the minister of war, the army inspectors, the inspec- tors of artillery and cavalry, the chiefs and sub-chiefs of the general aclministrative staffs and other members co-opted for special business. it is the executive organ for the preparation of military operations; its decisions on these matters are obliga- tory on the minister of war. the minister of war is the governing authority in all matters connected with the army, including training, armament, supply, recruiting, etc. considerable powers are delegated to army inspectors and general officers commanding military districts, who thus act as the executive medium through which is carried out the policy laid down by the minister of war. the ministry is divided into three branches: general staff, administrative branch and army control branch (finance). a draft bill for the appointment of an inspector-general was under consider- ation in 1921. it is intended that this office shall carry the power of practically complete control over military affairs while remaining nominally responsible to the minister of war. in time of war the inspector-general would become commander- in-chief. the general staff is organised in five bureaux: organi- sation, intelligence, instruction, communication, personnel. drmament.—the armament of the army is not yet homo- geneous, though a scheme for introducing similarity of weapons is being carried out gradually. as regards rifles, the french lebel, austrian mannlicher and german mauser are in use. the latter is being adopted as the universal pattern and its manufacture has been started locally. the light machine-guns are the french chauchat, german bergmann and the lewis gun. these types are to be replaced by a browning automatic rifle firing mauser ammunition. the manufacture of this gun is to be undertaken in poland. heavy machine-guns in use are the maxim, hotchkiss and schwarzlos. the hotchkiss firing mauser ammunition is to be generally adopted and manufactured locally. the field-gun is the french 75 mm.; the field howitzer, the 100 mm. skoda. the horse- artillery gun is a 3-inch russian field-gun, but it is proposed to reline this weapon to take the same ammunition as the 75 mm. gun. the mountain gun is the french 67 millimeter. the heavy field artillery is armed with a 105 mm. gun and the 155 mm. schneider howitzer. the heaviest field artillery has a 120 mm. gun. | poland the cavalry is armed with sword and carbine, while the front rank of line troops carries a lance. the carbine is to be stand- ardised to take mauser ammunition. frontier guard.—a somewhat novel body has been created in poland called the corps of frontier guards. the corps is organised on a military footing and consists mainly of volunteers from the regular army, the establishments being completed by conscripts when necessary. its strength is about 25,000 all ranks, organised in 6 brigades subdivided into battalions and squadrons. the headquarters are at warsaw, and the units distributed along the whole length of the lithuanian, latvian and soviet frontiers. its duties are the protection of the country from armed raids and banditry, the prevention of smuggling and the closing of the frontier to unauthorised individuals, propa- ganda, etc. navy.—the navy also comes under the orders of the minister of war. a special department exists in the ministry supervised by an admiral with a staff of some 30 officers. the total estab- lishment is 2,350 all ranks, of whom 570 are on a long seryice engagement. the sea-going fleet consists of a division of six torpedo boats; a training division of two gunboats and four mine-laying trawlers; a hydroplane division, and the naval port of gdynia, including the land defences. a programme of naval expansion is under consideration, and will probably be put in hand as soon as the financial situation permits. the river fleet consists of the vistula flotilla and the pinsk flotilla; there are in all four monitors, six river gunboats, 25 motor boats and some other small craft. air force.—the polish air force is part of the army, and is under the ministry of war, a special department being con- cerned solely with aviation. the strength of the air force is about 700 officers and n.c.q. pilots. the full establishment, which will not be reached before 1928, allows for 12 regiments of aviation with a total of 580 machines. at present six regi- ments only have been formed. in time of war the regimental organisation is abolished and divisions of aeroplanes are allotted to formations as required. discipline and morale.—discipline in the army is, generally speaking, good, relations between officers and men being on a satisfactory basis. the tendency of senior officers to dabble in politics and criticise each other in the press is an adverse factor which should be eradicated in time. as regards morale, the strong points are the intense patriotism of the poles and the increasing efiorts of officers to study the men’s welfare and provide recreation. on the other hand the army contains a considerable non-polish element and barracks are often bad. on the whole the weak points are being attended to and morale is being steadily raised. the lower ranks work hard and apply themselves to learning. tactical effictency.—since 1919 the army has had a large french military mission as instructors, with the result that there now exists a considerable number of well trained staff and regimental officers. the polish army compares well with any but the highest western standards. the general obstacle to progress is the lack of money. until the economic situation improves, the army must continue to suffer from shortage of material, curtailed programmes of training and inferior barrack accommodation. (a. p. w.) iii. economic and financial history population and resources.—the area of polish territory after the final determination of the frontiers is 149,895 sq. m., with a population numbered at 27,192,674 on sept. 30 r921, and estimated at 28,896,000 on jan. 1 1925. sixty-five per cent of the population live on the land, and the wonderful soil, the vigour of the peasantry and the proximity of big industrial markets offer the certainty of prosperity on the condition of good man- agement. but the economic organisation of this territory by a political unit was kept in suspense after 1918 until some definite basis could be created both for external and internal relations. in foreign affairs the essential preliminary of defined frontiers was not obtained until the defeat of the bolshevik armies in aug. 173 1920 had been crowned by the peace of riga (march 1921), and not put beyond question until polish upper silesia was taken over in july 1922. | at home a constitution and administration had to be created in the midst of the war with the bolsheviks and the damages of the world war repaired. practically, poland started her career nearly three years after her neighbours, handicapped by a scar- city of able men, a mediocre administration and the inherited hostility of her people to all governments. agriculture, forestry and related indusiries.—the devastation and dislocation of the war delayed the recovery of agricultural production until 1922-3. in 1919 considerable quantities of cereals were imported. even in 1920 the crops (except potatoes) averaged only about 30% of a good pre-war year. the industry and thrift of the polish farmer brought about a progressive improvement by 1021-2. imports of fertilisers, implements and machinery rapidly increased, the worst ravages of the war were repaired, and co-operative marketing made considerable progress. both area under cultivation and yield per acre show a marked advance. the excellent harvest of 1923 enabled poland to export cereals, out of crops which are given as:— eh dee eens area in production in metric tons hectares 4,644,768 1,017,365 1,199,457 2,515,076 2,279,219 108,729 5,962,000 . 1,354,000 1,656,000 . 3,522,000 . 26,494,000 . 2,081,000 . rye wheat barley oats potatoes beet the most immediately advantageous crop has been sugar beet, exports rising from 40,000 tons of sugar in 1921-2 to 190,000 tons in 1924-5. this industry is highly organised, both in labour (the men work in the fields in the summer and in the factories in winter), in supplying and in marketing. at an early date it established connections in london and obtained credits, exporting sugar and importing fertilisers and machinery. it has steadily consolidated its reputation and increased its operations. in 1919 some damage had been done to the forests by foreign governments, machinery was lacking and in many areas the methods of exploitation were primitive. the chief difficulty was inadequate transport. the forests were nationalised in 1919. about one-third are worked by the state and the rest are state-controlled. exports are chiefly and_ increasingly boards, sleepers and other half-finished articles. mining and metallurgy—petroleum mining in galicia had been encouraged by the germans during the war, but the difficulties of production have increased as it is now necessary in many cases to sink wells to low levels. petrol production is under government control, intended to ensure cheap oil for the population, but disadvantageous to the mines. the govern- ment’s practice of paying for oil many months after it was piped caused serious financial and labour difficulties during the infla- tion period. lack of capital for exploiting the deeper mines and restrictions on export have been additional causes of difficulty. production remains round about half the pre-war level. exports of petroleum products are growing at the expense of home consumption. other industries of importance, depending on minerals, are cement, glass and salt (government-owned). efforts are being made to develop the construction of locomotives, aeroplanes and machines of all kinds, largely by customs protection aimed at increasing poland’s metallurgical development for both economic and military motives. these efforts have met with but moderate success. the coal-mines of dombrowa, cracow and teschen were favoured from the beginning by the polish govt., which facili- tated the renovation of damaged plant and purchase of new equipment. the mines had an abundant supply of inexpensive labour, and thus made rapid progress. it is claimed that their output had passed the pre-war level by the end of 1922. the upper silesian area, added in that year, surpasses the rest in 174 area and quality. poland now ranks after germany and great britain as the third coal-producing country of europe. lignite is of little importance. the ruhr occupation increased the german demand for polish coal in 1923, but in 1924 the “ sta- bilisation crisis”? and the world-wide shrinkage in the demand for coal began to restrict production, which by the middle of 1925 had fallen to about 75% of the pre-waz figures. fudusiry.— apart from the industries already mentioned, and the important textile manufactures, the industries are not large and work chiefly for the home market. there is a general shortage of both working and fixed capital, due to a century of poverty and foreign exploitation, to the financial troubles of the last few years, and to the inability of poland to attract foreign capital in large amounts. labour, more particularly clerical labour, is not of very high quality. the bulk of the clerks still count on the whacus. the reserve of skilled artisans capable of producing highly finished articles is small. as the industries produce little for export they are dependent on the home market, where the standard of living of the bulk of the population is low and the demand liable to fluctuation according to the harvests. the textile industries are distinguished from other polish manufactures by their size, and by the vigour and ability of their leadership. in rorg the mills found themselves despoiled of the great bulk of their machinery, equipment and raw ma- terials, in debt for pre-war supplies, and deprived of the russian market which had taken 75° of their output before 1914. making arrangements for their pre-war debts, they were able to obtain certain credits for the purchase of machinery and cotton. wool came from the british govt., financed out of relief credits. the remaining machinery was reassembled, and manufacture was thus able to make an early start. it found a great demand in the home matket, depleted by eight years of war, and made rapid progress. russia, officially closed, took fair quantities surreptitiously. other foreign markets, notably rumania, pre- sented themselves. by 1921 production of cotton stood at 60% of the pre-war figure, and by the end of 1922 the pre-war figure was passed. in the home market ledz sold at prices generally above the level of prices abroad (partly to provide insurance against depreciation of currency). from an early date the textile industry had direct access to the state bank for its credits, and individual firms were thus able to protect them- selves to some extent against fluctuations of the exchanges. in the last stages of inflation in 1923 considerable depression set in, and this was intensified by the financial reform of 1924. foreign credits revived the cotton and woollen industries in the autumn of that year, but the acute credit crisis of 1925 brought the in- dustries into difficulties. communications.—from her own resources poland could do little to equip her railways, as the repairing shops in the russian provinces were almost completely destroyed. her greatest deficiency —rolling stock—was largely made good by considerable allocations from germany and austria. a large quantity still had to be purchased abroad; repairing works had to be constructed, shunting stations in- stalled. works for manufacturing locomotives and railway coaches were created, and the immense damage in the eastern districts to bridges, stations, warehouses, etc., has been made good in large measure. the former russian lines have been adapted to the nar- rower gauge. the greatest technical problem was the adaptation to the new directions of trade. from being strategic lines and channels of exploitation leading to st. petersburg, vienna and the german centres, the systems had now to provide abundant communication with danzig and (later) upper silesia. equally scrious were the difficulties of administration—first in replacing the german em- ployees in the former german areas, and then the more enduring difhculty of training a personnel. the superabundance of untrained hands introduced, under socialist influence, the cight-hour day, the special passes for government employees augmented at the same time the working difficultics and the deficit. but great and rapid progress was made. the american railway mission gave valuable advice, and enabled poland to avoid many of the mistakes made by other european countries. by the end of 1923 the technical condi- tion of the railways would compare most favourably with that of almost any european system, but the charges, in consequence of depreciation of the mark, were too low, and the deficit on the railways was one of the chief causes of the deficit in the budget. early in 1924 the railways were made autonomous. a gold loan, guaranteed poland on the receipts of the galician railways, provided them with some working capital. fares and rates were increased, and economies on the administration finally enabled the railways to show a surplus even in 1924, which has been maintained. the long and numerous waterways are the natural means of trans- port for much of polish traffic, but repairs to the banks, dredging and other work is sorely needed. capital and organisation have been lacking, however, and little has been done. labour and social questions—social questions in poland cannot be measured by the standards applied in countries further west. the differences in the standards of life and in the habits of the people (e.g., in the part played by religion) makes statis- lics peculiarly hard to interpret. this is notably the case for figures of industrial unemployment. most of the 30% of the population who are not employed in or about agriculture still retain family connections with the land and are accustomed to return there in any time of stress. in consequence there is an unusual “elasticity of supply ” in polish industrial labour. since the war this situation is seriously complicated by the great increase of the population. poland is now deprived of her two great debouches—the united states, which absorbed 100,000 workers yearly; and german agriculture, which took as many as 1,000,000 persons in the season. the population has been in- creased by expulsions from russia, whilst the rate of annual growth is perhaps the highest in europe. under socialist influence, room has been found for much un- skilled labour in the railways and other government services, thereby hampering the efficiency of these young administrations and increasing the deficit in the state budget. trade union policy has maintained the extremcly large number of public holidays, extended the practice of the eight-hour day, and in- creased the number of men on the pay-roll of industry. the ability of polish industry to compete with foreign, and especially german, industry has been very much restricted, and polish finances have suffered. other factors depress the standard of comfort, notably the housing shortage, which with poland’s expanding population is perhaps more intense than anywhere in europe. the repair of about 60° of the war damage has done something to relieve the agricultural areas (until 1921 hundreds of thousands of people lived in holes in the ground), but in the towns no family may by law retain for its own use more rooms than its own number plus one. as a political force communism is spent, killed by polish patriotism and the bolshevik war. but socialism of the marxian type is important both in politics and in trade unionism. in the latter if has combined with economic forces to restrict ouiput and promote unrest and strikes, which have been very frequent. in 1925, however, in many industries, notably in upper silesia, under the stress of “stabilisation”? and german compctition, the hours and efficiency of labour have been increased. a num- ber of statutes for the protection of the workers against accident, illness, old age and unemployment have been passed. in this, as in some other fields, there is a difference between polish law and polish practice. trade in poland is conspicuous for the large proportion of middlemen, some of whom fulfil no economic purpose. of them a large number are jews, who form 10% of the populace of poland and 30% in warsaw. they arouse much popular prej- udice, and are one of many causes which give to economic and social affairs a more emotional and less calculable quality than is common further west. foreign trade relations —the political framework of po- land’s foreign trade has been but recently shaped and is not yet complete. though commercial agreements with czechoslovakia and rumania were made in 1921, and with austria, yugoslavia, switzerland, france, italy and japan in 1922, this list excludes both poland’s chief customer and her largest neighbour, and the agreements themselves were of a primitive kind. during the period of inflation, prohibitions both of export and import were common, but with the stabilisation of the currency and some years of experience the way was open for the introduction of a new customs tariff which was instituted in 1924. in it the needs of the national finances, which had hitherto been almost poland completely neglected, also obtained some recognition, although in a country so predominantly agricultural as poland the cus- toms duties must be one of the foundations of the national revenue. poland suffers from exceptional difficulties in the administration of her customs revenue, due to the length of her frontiers and their lack of natural protection. danzig is now included in the polish customs tariff and organisation. the attempts to make a commercial agreement with germany led in 1925 to profound disagreement, the reimposition of the system of prohibitions and an overturning of poland’s trade balance. too much reliance cannot be placed on statistics of foreign trade, especially during the inflation period. the years 1920-1 were disastrous ones. devastation, disorganisation and the bolshevik war reduced exports to perhaps 10°% of the value of imports, which included large amounts of american grain financed by the allies out of relief credits. by 1922 the worst was over. by june of that year, excluding trade with russia and through danzig, exports were estimated at 50°% of imports, and in 1923 that exports of commodities probably equalled imports in value, while the total foreign trade increased by a fair amount. in addition, considerable sums were received annually in remittances from poles in america and small amounts from poles working in the devastated regions of france, the total probably averaging about $32,000,000 per annum, or 12° of the total imports. political changes have not greatly affected the main currents of poland’s foreign trade. estimates of percentages difler, but about half of both exports and imports are german, and im- portant amounts (e.g., of american cotton) come through germany. the bulk of the remainder is with poland’s neigh- bours, notably rumania and austria. great britain takes about 7°% of both imports and exports. the part played by russia is much less than pre-war. nor has the nature of the trade undergone much change. the exports are chicily (a) cereals, dairy produce, timber, sugar and flax; (b) coal, iron, steel, petrol and chemicals from the mining areas; and (c) textiles. the imports are (a) fertilisers and agricultural ma- chinery and equipment; (2) machinery and raw materials for the industrial areas; and (c) fish, cocoa, fats and other foodstuffs not produced at home. thus by the end of 1923 poland was settling down to a some- what badly organised foreign trade with a value of about £50,000,000 a year, vulnerable especially on the german side. the reform of 1924 administered a serious shock to foreign trade. exports were rapidly surpassed in value by imports, though their total value did not diminish. but the bad harvest of 1924-5, the coal crisis and difficulties with germany gravely aggravated the situation. some recovery, however, appears in the autumn figures, and much was expected from the good harvest of 1925-6. banking and credit.—at an early date the polish banks (which had not been very strong before the war) locked up their resources in industry to a very great extent. weakened alike by this immobi- lisation, by the continual decrease in the gold value of deposits result- ing from inflation and by their lack of co-operation, they failed to exercise on the government’s financial policy the influence which they should have brought to bear. such an influence was all the more necessary because of the frequent changes in the ministry of finance. the shaping of policy thus fell to far too great an extent into the hands of the state loan bank, the officials and the politicians. by 1924 the state loan bank had taken to itself the bulk of the business of discounting bills which would under normal conditions be transacted by commercial banks. with the stabilisation of the currency the banks resumed some- thing of their true importance. some of the weaker banks disap- peared. some government banks were amalgamated. in gencral, deposits increased continuously and with them discounts and ad- vances. but interest and charges were heavy; the much-needed re- forms of administration and co-operation made slow progress, and the banking system was not fully able to meet the strain of 1925. in that year it became increasingly difficult to collect inland bills, nor had the banks enough foreign resources to face the exchange difficulties without shrinking. currency and exchange.—much agricultural business was done by various forms of barter. considerable quantities (for poland) of foreign currencies were in use, especially dollar bills, which the polish 175 emigrant had familiarised in the remotest villages, but no satis- factory estimates of the amount are available. figures of the issue of notes are as follows:— | equivalent per circulation in ; equivalent in date millions of thousands | head of popula- marks of dollars tion in dollars dee. 31 1918 | 1,024 113,812 4°38 dec. 31 1919 5,316 48,275 i-45 dec. 31 1920 49,361 83,664 3:11 dec. 31 1921 229,538 78,542 2-87 dec. 31 1922 | 793,437 44,575 1-60 ac, : 7 19,666 0-69 : | 61,697 2:13 these mark notes were issued by the polska krajowy kasa poscyczkowa, or p.k.ix.p. (the state loan bank), a government in- stitution, whose dominant position in commercial banking was the special feature of polish inflation. for its facilities it charged 7% per annum till 1923, although money generally commanded as much as 60° per annum. its exchange regulations, though imperfectly administered, probably delayed the flight from the mark. this bank was subsequently merged in the national bank. public finance.—the rise in the tide of inflation overtook the polish treasury before it had learned to swim. before poland had even equipped herself with a constitution the mark had fallen to 800 to the dollar. no budget ever received the final approval of parliament until the end of 1923, and a parlia- mentary system of national finance had still (1926) to be con- structed. the excessive instability of poland’s early cabinets was a chief cause (after the war with the bolsheviks) of her financial troubles. another potent cause was the defective administra- tion of the public services already mentioned. the direct finan- cial losses from this cause were considerable. the chief item in the expenditure was the army, which in 1921-2-3 required about one-half of the estimated or about the whole of the actual receipts from taxation, viz.: about 400,000,000 to 450,000,000 gold francs per annum (or about 12s. 6d. per head of population), this is not a large sum for a country with poland's lang, undefended land frontiers, on the morrow of invasion by russia, and was not the true cause of the fall of the mark. a budget overbalanced by such an item is too small a budget, and in fact polish taxation yielded far too little. the responsibility for this must be divided between the constantly changing governments, the weak administration and the citizens’ century-old tradition of evading taxation. in the autumn of 1921 am. michalski succeeded in arresting the downward course of the mark and balancing the public accounts for a period of several months. his chief resource for this purpose was the danina or extraordinary capital levy, and, skilfully employ- ing the proceeds of this levy to maintain the exchanges steady, he was able to collect a large proportion of his taxes without their being frittered away by currency depreciation. from the danina alone he collected 90 °%% of its estimated yield. the next event of importance in the succession of finance min- isters was the ministry of m. grabski, who became prime minister and minister of finance in dec. 1923. the financial reform of 1924-5.—grabski has claims to rank with rasin as one of the great financial statesmen of the con- tinent since the war. the weakness which has lately overtaken the ztoty should not obscure the great importance and high quality of his reforms, the credit for which must go in the main to grabski himself and his immediate assistants. grabski’s strategy may be summarised as: no foreign control, no parliamentary interference, the immediate “ pegging ” of the exchange, the introduction of a new currency on a gold exchange standard, and (concurrently if possible but, if not, then later) the balancing of the budget and, finally, the obtain- ing of certain resources abroad on the credit of the reforms thus executed. from the outset grabski concentrated on the ex- change problem, and within three weeks of receiving his full powers from parliament he had completely arrested the decline of the mark. he achieved this result by arresting the printing press and declaring his readiness to sell exchange freely, risking the whole gold reserve of the treasury, which amounted to only $2,500,000. this respite allowed progress to be made with the institution of the national bank, and especially with the national budget. 176 the budget problems had been a little simplified at the end of the previous administration by the “ valorisation ” of the taxes on jan. 1 1924 and by the institution of monthly estimates and accounts. the immediate necessity was more cash, and grabski, like michalski, had to take money where he could find it. the immediate balancing of the 1924 budget was secured essentially from two sources—by the anticipation of certain taxes, and by the reimposition of a danina. this property tax, intended to produce 1,000 million gold fr. by three equal annual instalments, served its chief purpose by producing some 200 million fr. in 1924 and over 94 million fr. in the first four months. the other leading feature of the budget reform was the turning of the railways into a practically autonomous institution. some gold loans were floated on the home market with moderate success. a loan of 400,000,000 lire was obtained from italian sources on the security of the tobacco monopoly. i3y these means, before the summer of 1924, the budget was ren- dered independent of the'printing press and the major part of poland's immediate problem was solved. but the new budget stood at the high figure of over 1,600 million ztoty, and even so would have failed to balance by 160,000,000 but for extraordinary revenue such as the italian loan. this figure is too high for poland's resources, just as the revenue of 1922-3, estimated at about 420,000,000 zloty for each, was too low for her needs. the figure of 1,000 million sug- gested by commander hilton young appears to be about the true figure. the expenditure of the ministry of war increased with the increased budget, and economies in the civil administration were not carried out as vigorously as was necessary. meantime, the bank polski, the national bank of poland, was created by charter as a limited liability company, with a capital of 100,000,000 ztoty. it has the sole right of issue of bank-notes until dec. 31 1944. the main features of the charter resemble those adopted in austria. notably, the government credit is limited to 50,000,- 000 zloty. when circumstances permit, the currency is to be placed on a full gold standard, but for the present is restricted to a gol ex- change standard. the gold value otf the currency is not fixed in the charter or by other law. the whole capital was subscribed by the public, but she government appoints the president and approves the directors. the first balance sheet of the bank, of may 10 1924, showed (in round millions of ztoty) bank notes 1n circulation iii, current accounts, etc. 230; against gold 70, foreign balances 207, bills 118 and other assets 46. this strong position resulted from the utilisation of all available reserves and the restriction of the circulation below the country’s needs. but for some 12 months the bank was able to sell dollars freely at 5-185 zloty per dollar and still maintain a cover of between 50 and 70° against a minimum of 30% required by the charter. at the end of 1924 poland funded her chief external debts, viz., to u.s.a., great britain and for relief credits. the total amount of poland's foreign debts at the end of 1925 was about £70,000,000. the first annual instalment on these debts was punctually paid at the end of 1925. the economic consequences of stabilisation began to appear in the summer and autumn of 1924, and are still working them- selves out. they were greatly accentuated by two extraneous events—the very disappointing harvest of 1924, which in itself was enough to turn the foreign trade balance against poland, and the worldwide coal crisis. by the irony of circumstances upper silesia, whose detachment from germany was much criticised in some british circles, has thus become a lability which has now to be borne by poland instead of germany. these two events destroyed the foreign trade surplus, which was one of the foundation stones of the reform. the other foundation stone, the balanced budget with its consequent great burden of taxation, has pressed increasingly heavily on the economic life of poland. the gross budget for 1925 was no less than 2,176,000,0c0 zloty, and the net figure 1,658,000,000. great restriction of trade after the stabilisation was to be expected, and austria’s experience showed that it might be pro- longed, but in poland things go to greater extremes than clse- where. the centre of the difficulties, as of the reform, has been the national bank. its resolute maintenance of free transactions in exchange threw the burden of defending monetary stability upon its credit policy. the official rate of discount at the end of the inflation period was 48% per annum, and in practice 60% was usually payable. the bank polski fixed its discount rate at 12%, which was reduced to 10% in nov. 1924, and required banks not to charge more than double the official bank rate, polar exploration but the demand for credits grew without ceasing. those given by the union of banks rose from 83,000,000 zloty in april 1924 to 376,000,000 at the end of march 1925, and during the same time credits granted direct to industry by the bank polski increased by 221,000,000. credit was nevertheless ex- tremely scarce, and the repayment of loans increasingly difficult to secure. ‘the real rates paid in private trade often consider- ably exceeded 2° a month. when the stimulus of inflation was removed the traditional habits of the polish people showed them- selves in these long credits. the resulting slow pace of circula- tion of money makes a correspondingly larger note-issue essen- tial. in 1925 the bank polski rigorously curtailed credit and reduced its note issue from 551 to 369,000,000; but during the same period the treasury issue of notes and small coins (purely fiduciary) rose to over 400,000,000, or more than the total note issue of the bank polski, at the end of 1925. prices had increased by practically 20% between june and dec. 1924, and production fell off very seriously. early in 1925 more stability was achieved, but the evil results of the bad harvest then began to appear. poland was compelled to import foodstuffs for some £13,000,000, and the exchanges began to be in danger. the expiry on june 15 1925 of a coal agreement with germany, under which poland had been able to export some 500,000 tons a month, brought relations with germany to a crisis, and tore the zloty away from its gold anchorage. through the autumn the exchanges sagged lower, some of the greatest banks came into serious difficulties, and certain of them had to be granted a moratorium by the government. discontent increased and grabski resigned early in nov. 1925. a new cabi- net under count skrzynski was formed, with m. zdziechowski as finance minister, which endeavoured to effect considerable economies in the budget and to secure loans abroad. the initial successes of grabski’s reform have not properly been consolidated. their permanence required them to be fol- lowed by the application of principles adopted in other kuropean countries whose finances have been overhauled. even more than those countries poland requires a moderate increase of her working capital. her pre-war history, the war and post-war inflation have prevented her from accumulating this fund from her own resources. but it would have been easicr to attract it from abroad if improvements in her banking and public admin- istration had been carried out more vigorously. a further effort at financial consolidation, if necessary with foreign help, is required if poland is to achieve that economic strength which is indispensable to her prosperity as an independent state. bibliography.— little material is available. on economic condi- tions, see reports of british and other commercial attaches; files of economist; l’europe nouvelle. on finance see e. hilton young, report on financial conditions in poland (1924); g. zdziechowski, the finances of poland in 1924 and 1925 (1925); bulletin of polish mintstry of finance, and publications of the league of nations, financial section, the whole ground is covered in the polish hand- book, ed. f. b. czarnowski (1925). the best statistical information is in the publications of the league of nations. f. hf. nur.)