NEGRO

the negro population of the united states as enumerated in 1920 was 10,463,131, an increase of 635,308, or 6-5% over rgro. ‘the rate of increase was less than in any preceding decade and less than three-fifths of that between 1900 and ro1o0, the smallest up to that time. as in the white population the rate of increase between rg1o and 1920 was less than in any preceding decade, it might be thought that the fall in the increase among negroes conformed to the trend of population change. but this would be an error. the rate of increase of negroes in 1900-10 was about -5 and in 1910-20 about -4 of that of the whites. that this deviation in the rates of increase had been maintained for a long period appears from the following figures:— increase . ratio of negro amount in per cent of in- 1 y period thousands per cent crease to white (100) negro | white | negro | white 1800-20 770 3,560 | 76:8 82-7 93 1820-40 1,102 6,32 62-2 80°5 77 1840-60 1,508 12,727 54°6 89:7 6! 1860-80 2,139 16,481 48-2 61-2 79 1880-1900] 2,253 23,289 34°2 vo 64 | 1900-20 1,629 | 28,012 18-4 41-9 44 increase.—the numerical increase of negroes was larger in the later periods, rising to a maximum in the last 20 years of the toth century. the rate of increase, on the contrary, diminished steadily. at each period the rate of negro increase was less than that of the white. apparently the immediate result of the civil war and emancipation was to raise the relative rate of negro increase between 1860 an«d 1880 from -6 to nearly -8 of that of the whites. but since 1880 the rate of negro increase has fallen rapidly, and negroes, who in 1800 were 18-9% of the country’s population, in 1920 were only 99%. if each race should increase through the present century as it did 1031 between ro900 and 1920, the population of the country in 2000 a.d. would be over 400,000,000, of which about 20,000,000, or one-twentieth, would be negro. the rate of increase of each race is likely to fall, but the difference in favour of the white race is not likely to giminish: areas.—'the region in which the increase of negroes since 1900 has been greatest is shown by the following facts. the five states with the greatest amount of negro increase between rgoo and roro were all southern states. the increase in them was nearly one-half (49°53) of that of the whole country. the five states which occupied a similar position between 1910 and 1920 were pennsylvania, ohio, illinois, north carolina and new york, four of them northern states, and the increase in them was nearly three-fifths (58°5) of the whole. these four northern states are highly urbanised. the facts suggest a migration to industrial centres. the conjecture may be tested by computing the percentage of increase of urban population both negro and white. from 1000 to 1910 the whites in cities having 2,500 inhabitants or more increased 39-:1°%5 and the negroes 34-2%; from roto to 1920 the percentage of increase decreased for each race, but among the whites it fell by 10-5°, to 28-6%, and among negroes it [cll by 1-6%6 to 32-6%, so that between igro and 1920 negroes in cities increased at a higher rate than the whites. atigration—the large amount of negro migration to northern cities between 1910 and 1920 and the comparatively slight migration in 1900-10 appear from the following table:— | negro pop- increase of negroes city ulation in 1900 1900-10 1910-20 chicago. 30,150 13,953 65,355 new york . 60,666 41.043 60,758 philadelphia 62,616 21,846 49,770 detroit 4,111 1,630 35,097 cleveland 5,988 2,460 26,003 st. louis 35,516 8,444 25,894 total 199,047 79,376 262,877 the preceding figures are for the cities in which the negro population increased by 25,000 or more between 1910 and 1920. all lie outside of the southern states. the negro population of these six cities increased between 1900 and rgr1o by 39%, and between 1910 and 1920 by 95%. as the increase of negroes in all northern states between roto and 1920 was 444,635, nearly three-fifths (59° ) of that increase was in these six cities. births and deaths.—the remarkable fall in the rate of negro in- crease and the rapid distribution of negroes to other parts of the country than the south, especially to certain northern cities, are the striking changes revealed by the fourteenth census. how is the fall in the rate of increase to be explained? has it any connection with the growth of interstate migration? these questions are elucidated by turning from the census figures of living population to the registra- tion figures of births and deaths. the following table shows the registered births and deaths of negrocs in each of 30 states arranged in the order of i increasing proportion of deaths to births:— states with a natural increase of negroes — perioct n n deaths state covered by ie d aaa to 100 registration moe eatns | births north carolina . 1917-22 143,307 | 77,758 54 mississippi . 1921-2 44,940 | 24,574 55 south carolina . i9i9-22 95,110 | 53,372 56 virginia 1917-22 119,435 | 77:775 65 new jersey 1921-2 6,779 4,771 70 maryland i916~—22 45,871 | 40,245 87 massachusctts iq 5-22 8,846 7,870 89 wisconsin iq1 7-22 657 597 gi new york . iq 5-22 34,502 | 32,126 93 delaware i921 2 1,248 1,200 96 michigan i9i 5-22 7,603 7,453 98 connecticut i9i 5-22 3,890 3,868 99 new hampshire 1915-22 86 85 99 total 512,334 | 331,694 65 1032 period deaths state covered by errs fete to 100 registration nave eatns | births illinois 1922 3,704 3,786 102 pennsylvania iqi5~—22 48,207 106 ohio. 1917-22 23,940 110 rhode island 1915-9 and 1921-2 1,684 iii california i9iq-22 3,054| ii4 indiana 1q17-22 10,377 119 nebraska . ‘ 1920-2 685 122 kansas e - 15 1917-22 ; utah . : : 1917-22 kentucky . ; 1917-22 vermont ‘ iqi§~22 oregon iqiq~—22 minnesota . i915~22 washington 1917-22 montana 1922 wyoming 1922 maine 1915-22 total ier maa i14 if negro deaths had exceeded births in the 17 states of the last table between 1910 and 1920, and if there had been no immigration of negroes to this group of states, the number of resident negroes would have been less in 1920 than in gro. in fact, it increased from 852,120 to 1,113,940, or 30-7 %. the total immigration to these states for the decade was probably not less than 300,000, there are seven southern states for which we have births and deaths reported, and all but kentucky had an excess of births over deaths. the negro population of these states increased between 1910 and 1920 about 1%. on the basis of the figures for 1919 and 1920 there was a natural increase of about 35,600 annually, or 356,000 for the decade. as the decennial increase of negroes was about 40,000, these states must have lost by emigration more than 00,000. the bureau of the census has supplied figures of negro births and deaths between 1915 and 1923 in the urban and rural districts. they are as follows:— ; deaths to births deaths ramtirths urban . 266,380 269,631 102 rural . 517,945 309,243 60 these show that during these eight years in the cities of the united states for which the facts are known there were 3,251 more negro deaths than births, but that in the country districts there were 208,702 more births than deaths. the figures of each class are given separately below for north and south. ; deaths to births deaths ioe bathe northern urban 155,972 151,118 97 northern rural . 335245 40,294 i21 northern total . 189,217 191,412 iol southern urban 110,408 118,513 107 southern rural . _ 484,700 268,949 «55 southern total 595,108 387,462 68 conclusion.—these figures show that the rural districts of the north are least suitable for negro increase, that the urban dis- tricts of the south are almost as unfavourable, that the cities of the north show a slight excess of negro births, and that the great reservoir for negro increase is the rural districts of the south. the cause for the low rate of increase between rg1o and 1920 is found in the migration from the country districts of the south both to the north and to southern cities, and to their exposure to conditions climatic or economic which raised the death-rate and lowered the birth-rate. urban conditions in the south as well as in the north bear far more lightly upon the whites, who thrive and multiply in american cities. in this regard urban negroes in the united states are in a position like that of european and american whites living in cities a century or more ago, when citics were parasites upon the adjacent country districts, at whose expense alone they could maintain their population. — bibliography.—among recent works are those of booker t. washington, the story of the negro (1909); william archer, through afro-america, an english reading of the race problem (1910); j. m. negro literature—nepal states with a natural decrease of negroes | mecklin, democracy and race friction (1914); t. j. woofner, negro migration (1920); h. j. seligman, the negro faces america (1920); and k. j. scott, negro migration during the war (1920). important u.s. govt. publications include the following: bureau of the census, negro population 1790-1918 (1918); u.s. labour dept., negro economics div., negro afigration in 1916-7 (1919); report of the hearing before the judiciary committee house of representatives, respecting legislation to create a negro industrial commission and a commission on the racial question (1924); and report of the hearing before a senate sub-committee of the judiciary, respecting the racial question (1924). (w. f. w.) negro literature: see american literature; french african literature. nenot, paul henri (1853- ), french architect, was born in paris, and when only 13 years old was placed in the studio of m. lequeux as architectural pupil, coming there under the influence of j. l. pascal. thence, when 15, he went to the ecole des beaux-arts. after serving in the franco-prussian war of 1870, in which he gained the military medal, he continued his course at the ecole des beaux-arts, and in 1877 gained the grand prix de rome. while holding this prize in rome, he competed for the victor-emmanucl monument in that city, receiving for his design the premium of 50,000 fr., the work itself being en- trusted to an italian. on his return to france he entered for the great competition for the rebuilding of the sorbonne, in which he was successful, and commenced in 1885 a work that was to occupy him for the next 17 years. the building forms a paral- lelogram of over goo ft. in length by 325 ft. in width, and its plan is brilliantly conceived, taking as its dictating condition the retention of richelieu’s chapel of the sorbonne. nenot relied steadfastly on the assistance of the sculptor and the painter, and the grand amphitheatre gave him the opportunity he absolutely insisted on of employing for its decoration puvis de chavannes, whose mural painting of the ‘ sacred grove’’ is his master- piece. the hall itself, used as a salle des conferences, is an admi- rable example of the d-plan carried by a series of alcove recesses to an ultimate development. his other buildings, mostly in paris, include the institut oceanographique, the offices of the compagnie generale and those of the compagnie nationale des wagons-lits. he received many distinctions, becoming a member of the institut in 1895, and being later elected president of the societe des artistes frangais. he was awarded the gold medal of the royal institute of british architects in 1917. nepal (sce 19.378).—the relations between the british govt. and nepal were for more than a century regulated by the treaty of segowlie of 1815, which, among other pro- visions authorised the appointment of a british resident at katmandu. on dec. 21 1923 a fresh treaty of friendship was signed between the two countries, confirming the old treaty and making certain fresh provisions, the most important of which (at any rate from the nepalese point of view) is the recognition by the british govt. of the complete independence of nepal. the old quinquennial mission to peking has fallen into desuetude. slavery, which was an institution in the country from the lime of the gurkha conquest, has now been abolished by the nepal govt. and all slaves have been manumitted with the general consent of the slave owners and of the population © of the country generally. this liberal measure was due to the initiative of the maharajah, sir chandra shamsher jang. services in the world war—during the world war, sir chandra shamsher jang gave signal proofs of his loyally and friendship to the british empire. immediately after the out- break of the war he placed the whole resources of his country at the disposal of the allies. from march rors to the end of the war a force of some 10,000 men of the nepalese army served in india and on the indian frontier. the normal number of gurkha battalions (20) in the indian army was doubled, and it is estimated that over 200,000 nepalese subjects left nepal to serve with the indian army during the course of the war. the nepalese govt. contributed sums amounting in all to 13,500,000 rupees (nearly £1,000,000) for various war funds, etc. (exclusive of the maharajah’s numerous subscriptions to nernst—netherlands military hospitals and charitable funds in connection with the war), cardamums to the value of 130,c00 rupees; tea to the value of some 32,000 rupees; over 8,000 hill blankets, and other articles of clothing; various gifts of timber, including 200,000 broad-gauge sleepers for the indian railways, and 31 vickers- maxim machine-guns—a magnificent contribution from a small and poor country. many decorations were bestowed upon the troops who served with the indian army, and upon the various members of his highness’ family who organised and commanded them. during the short afghan war in 1019, the maharajah dispatched a force of 2,000 men of the nepalese army, which assisted the indian govt. in guarding the northwest frontier stations. route tuto nepal.—the only portion of nepal (with the excep- tion of some portions of the tarai country which lies at the foot of the hills), ever visited by europeans is the valley of kat- mandu, and even this can only be entered by special permission of the nepal government. the road to katmandu starts from raxaul, a small junction on the bengal north western railway situated close to the fronticr, due south of the capital, in the district of champaran in northern behar. hence to katmandu is a distance of 75 m., the first 50 of which lie across the alluvial plain of the tarai and through a sal forest to the foot of the hills, whence the road follows the beds of rivers and across low ridges till the small hamlet of bhimpedi is reached. up to this point the road is practicable (at jeast during the cold weather) for wheeled traftic, and it is indeed possible to drive a motor- car over it, and it is gradually being improved and rendered fit for wheeled traffic all through the year. from bhimpedi there is only a mountain track, which crosses two bridges (elevation about 8,o00 ft.), and reaches the valley of katmandu some seven miles from the city, whence a fair carriage road is avail- able. a ropeway has been constructed from near bhimpedi to the katmandu valley, and will be operated by electricity from the power station in the valley, which also supplies electric light to the city. (sce ixpra.) (w. f. o’c.) nernst, walter (1864- ), german physicist, was born on june 25 1864 at bricsen, west prussia. he studied at the universities of ziirich, berlin, graz and wiirzburg and became an assistant at the university of leipzig, subsequently going in this capacity to gettingen, where he later became a professor. in roos he was appointed ordinary professor of physics in the university of berlin. he became known through a technical invention in the sphere of electric lighting, which falls within his gettingen period. in the glow-lamps named after him, the filaments are made of the rare earths, arsenate of zirconium, thorium, magnesium and others, which, in the cold state, do not conduct electricity (second-class conductors) but do so if heated to a temperature of 600-700° centigrade. in comparison with the car- bon filament lampsthat were generally used at thetimethese nernst lamps offered the advantage of a considerably lower consumption of current, but the complication of the heating device soon re- duced their popularity, especially as it was about this time that auer succeeded in producing glow-lamp wires out of osmium, which after further devclopment led to the metal filament lamps of to-day. nernst is further known for the statement of the so- called third law of thermodynamics. in 1920 he received the nobel prize for physics. he is the editor of the jahrbuch der elcktrochemic, the zeit- schrift fiir angewandte chemie, and the zeitschrift fiir elektro- chemie. lis experimental and theoretical applications of thermodynamics to chemistry appeared in english (1907). netherlands (koninkrijk der nederlanden) (sce hot- land, 13.557), a kingdom of western europe. the land area is 12,618 sq. m. and the population (dec. 31 1924), 7,298,043. i, political history although she did not take part in it, the world war was the greatest event in holland’s history between roto and 1925. neutrality the fact itself of her having succeeded in main- taining her neutrality seems little short of a miracle. holland’s situation has always been a perilous one, not only because she is 1033 surrounded on all sides by the nations whose wars convulse europe, but because important waterways, on which her neighbours’ trade depends, flow out into the sea across her territory. in the years before the war, when it was already casting its shadows ahead, more than one acute controversy between the two opposing groups of european powers had centred round the position of holland. first, belgium had been used in an attempt to make holland give up her attitude of de- tachment. the dutch-belgian rapprochement, which was so much talked about in those years, did not proceed from the dutch-speaking flemings, but from francophile circles. it never went very far, anc it was forgotten in the outcry raised over the proposal to fortify the mouth of the schelde which was sub- mitted by the dutch govt. to the chamber in 1g1o. the contention, however, that holland was obliged, or even that it had the right, to allow entente forces to use the dutch part of that river in case of a german threat to antwerp was quite un- tenable. the entente governments tacitly recognised the cor- rectness of holland’s behaviour, and in 1911 and 1912 official visits of president fallicres to the hague and of queen wil- helmina to brussels and paris made it plain to the world that there was no ill-will between holland and the entente. probably, indeed, a desire to allow germany no possible pre- text for an attempt to occupy the dutch ports in case of an anglo- german conflict had as much to do with the decision to fortify the mouths of the rivers as any idea that the fortifications might ever actually be used against great britain. while english and french newspapers were protesting against this scheme, holland was also remodelling her system of land defence to excellent efiect. the german general staff were so much impressed with these reforms that they thought it necessary to rearrange their plan of operations for the event of a war with france. from von xfoltke’s memoirs it appears that at the time of his predecessor, von schlieffen, the german staff intended to violate dutch as well as belgian territory, trusting that when they rushed their armies westward through the dutch province of limburg (which juts out to the south, covering part oi the eastern frontier of belgium), the dutch army would remain inactive behind the “water line,” the inundated area, which protects only the western part of the country, the most densely populated part, including the provinces of north and south holland, in which all the largest and economically and politically most important towns are situated. von moltke, realising that the dutch army was made mobile and would be used to strike, even if only the outlying province of limburg were violated, decided to respect dutch neutrality, although the detour necessitated would delay the german advance from crefeldl by some precious days, holland’s attitude, then, in those crucial years was strictly and impartially neutral. the sympathics of the public could less easily be controlled. the memorics of the boer war had already lost much of their bitterness, largely owing to the grant of self- government to the late boer republics and the consequent appeasement in south africa itself. the economic prosperity of the country was to a certain extent bound up with the tremend- ous development of the german hinterland since 1870, but the dutch people felt oppressed by the militarist temper and the blatant imperialism which appeared to possess their powerful eastern neighbour. on the outbreak of war in 1914, it was the violation of belgian neutrality and the subsequent acts of repres- sion in the occupied territory which made the deepest impression and determined the attitude of dutch public opinion. only when the pressure of the british blockade began to be severely felt could the small group of german sympathisers command some attention, without, even then, ever swaying public opinion. the government at once proclaimed, and rigidly maintained to the end, strict neutrality. inevitably there were times when each group of belligerents felt holland’s neutrality, however impartially administered, as a burden. the british navy was able to see to it that holland did not provide germany with the food and other materials she wanted from overseas, but the en- forcement of the blockade gave rise to a good deal of friction. moreover, holland’s neutrality undoubtedly had the effect of 1034 covering germany’s right flank. on the other hand, the closure of the schelde, once antwerp had fallen, was all to the advantage of great britain, as germany was thus prevented from using antwerp as a submarine base. disputes about particular points were practically continuous, but the sincerity and reality of dutch neutrality were recognised on both sides, and neither attempted to use violence against holland. the efficiency of holland’s defence forces contributed to this. the army, 450,000 strong, had been mobilised without a hitch in the last days of july 1914, and was kept on a war footing, at a great cost financially and morally, till 1918. it had to cope with no serious incidents. some thousands of belgian and british troops were interned after the fall of antwerp. german and british aeroplanes sometimes strayed on to dutch territory. the naval forces occasionally had to intern a submarine or a destroyer, and to them fell the dangerous work of mine-sweeping along the dutch coast. the government carried out its inter- national obligations as a neutral with consistent firmness and moderation. mr. loudon, the minister for foreign affairs, had from the first adhered rigidly to international law, and he strove honestly to see that all the government’s actions in the carrying out of the decree of neutrality were guided by its precepts. the blockade.—unfortunately, frequent cases arose in which the vague principles of international law could be variously inter- preted. great britain, for instance, protested when holland excluded armed merchantmen from her harbours, contending that the article in holland’s original proclamation of neutrality to which mr. loudon appealed had been drawn up at a time when germany’s resort to unrestricted submarine warfare could not be foreseen; and it was in reply to those utterly illegal methods that britain had started arming her merchantmen. in this case holland maintained her attitude. the sand and gravel dispute, which dragged on throughout 1917 and 1918, was more acrimonious, and at one time endangered holland’s neutrality. the entente govts. protested against holland allowing the germans to use her waterways for the transport of sand and gravel to belgium for use in the construction of a new kind of ferroconcrete dugouts. both belligerents put the severest pres- sure on holland, great britain penalising her for concessions to germany, germany threatening her for concessions to britain. mr. loudon at last consented to ration this traflic on the footing of pre-war statistics; but in the spring of 1918, when germany was making her final offensive, ludendorff wanted this arrange- ment to be used as a pretext to overrun holland and make a dash for the dutch ports. an ultimatum was actually presented, and only the determined intervention of representatives of the c.vil power in germany prevented ludendorii from having his way. the most real difficulties, however, were economic; and these bezan to be of the most tragic importance to the dutch people in 1915. for holland international commerce is not a luxury but a necessity. it directly supports an important part of the com- munity, dutch industries are dependent on it for most of their raw materials and their coal, while four-iifths of the grain supply comes from abroad. seaborne trade was gradually extinguished as the war went on. the germans began by laying mines in front of the english ports. the british retaliated by laying a minefield in the north sea. in order to make their blockade of germany elfective they exercised an ever more stringent control over imports into the adjacent states, regardless of the pro- visions of the declaration of london.! they prescribed to neutral traflic a route along the south coast of england, so as to be able to examine cargoes at leisure. the germans then prescribed the route round the north of scotland, and declared the channel area an area of war. in march rors the entente powers did away with all distinctions between legitimate and contraband trade, and prohibited the import into holland of all goods, whatever their nature, which could be suspected of being destined for transmission to germany. all goods imported into holland had to be consigned to an unofficial body (the netherlands oversea trust), which possessed the confidence of the /ifente authorities and undertook that they should go no further. tphis declaration has never been ratified. netherlands the allies gradually assumed control of the entire economic life of holland, allowing her the bare necessities of life, with- holding anything that could be used to replace goods sent to germany. even holland's trade with her own colonies was subject to this control. as holland depends on germany for certain indispensable articles, ¢.g., coal, she was driven to export food which she really could not do without, in order to obtain them in exchange. meanwhile in r9or5 dutch vessels had begun to fall victims to german u-boats. after the unrestricted sub- marine war had been proclaimed early in 1917, practically all overseas traffic ceased. food scarcity became almost as serious in holland as in germany itself, certainly more serious than in england. bread was severely rationed. meat was very scarce, as the lack of imported fodder had necessitated the slaughtering of stock. factories began to close down in 1917 for lack of raw materials and coal. in the last stages of the war holland's industrial life was at a complete standstill. holland greeted the armistice with relief; but the peace had many disappointments in store for her, and mr. van karnebeck, who had become minister for foreign affairs when a new govern- ment was formed shortly before, was not to have a much easier task than his predecessor, one big surprise was the discovery that belgium proposed to advance at the peace conference certain claims involving dutch sovereignty. in the first months of the war, when the germans advanced through belgium, a stream of belgian — refugees, which swelled to a flood when the invaders reached ant- werp, had sought safety on dutch soil, where they were hos- pitably received. at one time their number exceeded 1,000,000, and their support, the provision of food and shelter, was an exceedingly heavy charge. ifundreds of thousands went back to their country when things had settled down under the occupation. hundreds of thousands remained till the end of the war, and the way in which they were cared for by a nation which was itself soon to suffer very heavy privations is one of the redeeming fea- tures of the history of the war. but all this kindness and generosity seemed to have been forgotten, and holland found herself decidedly unpopular in some of the allied countries. the firm refusal of the dutch govt. in 1920 to surrender the ex-emperor william, who had taken refuge there in nov. 1918, gave rise to excited denunciations of holland’s alleged ten- derness for the hohenzollerns. holland's attitude in the war was widely represented in the most unfriendly light. the question of the scielde on this matter belgium declared that holland's claim to sovereignty over the schelde mouth, and her action in closing it against the allied forces, had made the defence of antwerp impossible, while her possession of the province of limburg had hindered the defence of belgium's eastern frontier, which ought to have been basecdlon the river maas. it has been argued above that holland’s action in the war had really benefited the allied cause, but the opposite contention was made by the belgian “ comile de politique nationale,” which advocated annexation of the disputed regions. it claimed that belgium should be given sovereignty over dutch flanders, on the left bank of the schelde, and over dutch limburg, on the ground that the treaties of 1839, guarantecing the neutrality of belgium, having lapsed, these lterrilorics were necessary for her protection and develop- ment. with the same object in view, exaggerated complaints of an economic nature were made against the dutch regime on antwerp’s waterway to the sea. the relations between the comite and the belgian govt. were intimate, and belgium initiated a cdliscussion of these questions at the peace conference in paris, claiming they arose out of the discussion of the treaties of 1839. holland claimed that this revision should not in any case prejudice dutch interests, and that any discussion of claims involving dutch sovereignty was inadmissible, as holland had not been a party in the war and had honourably fulfilled her obligations as a neutral. mr. van karnebcek consented, how- ever, to go to paris to explain this point of view to the supreme council, who heard al. hymans on may 20 and mr. van netherlands karnebeck on june 3 r919. the powers created an international commission to dea] with the question, asking them to submit * proposals which involve neither transfer of territory nor inter- national servitudes.”” tvhe question was eventually referred to direct negotiations' between the two countrics. these negotiations on new arrangements for the regime on the schelde, on the ghent terneuzen canal, etc., were, however, catricd on in a somewhat unfavourable atmosphere. dutch public opinion was greatly irritated. the populations of lim- burg and dutch flanders protested their loyalty to the dutch fatherland. meanwhile the annexationist agitation in belgium went on, and was still supported by the government, as was proved when a secret circular, emanating from the belgian lor- eign office to “ belgian agents ’ in dutch limburg, was dis- closed by flemings friendly to holland. yet the dutch govt. was prepared to go far to meet belgian wishes. alihough not admitting that the regime of 1839 had been harmful to belgian interests, and maintaining that she had always ad- ministered it in a fair and friendly spirit, holland declared her readincss to make important economic concessions, which she looked on as the price to be paid for good political relations. early in 1920 a treaty in which several dutch concessions were laid down was ready for signature, when a new dispute arose, about the sovereignty of the wiclingen channel, which connects the schelde estuary with the open sea. although that channel runs along the belgian coast within the three-mile limit, holland had exercised sovereign rights over it since mediaeval limes, ard the two delegations at the beginning of the negotiations had agreed to leave the wiclingen ques‘ion on one side. when agreement had been reached on other matters it was arranged that each side was to present its case with regard to the disputed point in order to safeguard its claims for the future, but without any intention of arriving at a solution for the time being. yet when the dutch note embodying the case of holland with respect to sovercignty over the wielingen was handed in, the belgian govt. regarded it as a new and unacceptable claim, and used it as a pretext to break off the negotiations; or such was the view taken in holland, where it was believed that m. hymans at the last moment shrank from facing annexationist criticism with a treaty containing nothing but economic con- cessions. when conditions everywhere grew more stable, and the annexationist programme of the comrle de politique nationale looked less capable of realisation, m. wymans, who had again become belgian minister of foreign affairs alter a period out of office, approached mr. van karnebeek, and the treaty of 1920, was, without holland having changed her attitude towards the wielingen question, signed at the hague on april 3 1925.7 iis ratification by holland was, however, delayed by the pro- longed political crisis; and meanwhile it was subjected to hvely criticism. in 1919 and 1920 holland had been willing to make economic concessions to avoid a threat to her sovereign rights; and mr. van karnebeek’s conduct of the dclicate negotiations had been generally admired. when in 1925, however, the treaty was at last published in its entirety, the danger which loomed so large five years before secmed altogether negligible, and the proposed concessions were scrutisised entirely on their merits. the result was widespread dissatisfaction with the one- sided character of the treaty. criticism centred round two main points. firsily, there are the provisions for a new dutch-belgian regime on the schelde. the prosperity of antwerp during the last years appears the best reply to the suggestion that dutch control of the lower course of the river threatened antwerp with ruin. yet public opinion in holland admits that the machinery provided by the 1839 treaty for carrying into practice the mixed commission’s recommendations is cumbrous. it is greatly disturbed, however, at the provision in the new treaty by which holland’s obligations 1see h. w. v. temperley, fistory of the peace conference in paris, vol. ii., pp. 192 seg. (london, 1920). 2 in spite of the signature of the convention, ncither side aban- doned the original contention with regard to the wieclingen channel, the belgians basing their claim on the three-mile limit, the dutch on ancient rights of possession. 1035 with respect to the works for keeping the river in a navigable state are defined afresh. it is feared that holland may have to spend millions in technically unsound attempts to keep the elusive schelde channel in the same place. a clause exempting vessels bound for antwerp, during their transit of the dutch part of the schelde, from any examination or delay upon any ground whatever arouses criticism as an infringement of holland’s sovereign rights. the provision, by which pilots’ fees from the open sea to antwerp are expressly limited to the amount payable from the open sca to rotterdam, although the first distance is three times the latter, while nothing is said to prevent the antwerp fees from being fixed at a lower level, 1s thought to favour belgium unduly. the second point criticised is that containing holland’s consent to the construction over her territory of canals from ant- werp to moerdyk and from antwerp to ruhrort. these canals are obviously intended to deflect part of the rhine trade frem its natural course down the river to antwerp; a plan which is naturally deeply resented in rotterdam, it 1s argued further that the treaty would not eliminate all matters for dispute between the two countries; but that it contains the germs of endless new quarrels. furthermore, the flemings, who play an increasingly important part in belgian political life, are friendly towards holland and will, it is hoped, understand her refusal to be bound by arrangements made during the ascendancy of the comite de politique nationale, although at the same time the interests of antwerp, the flemish metropolis, are very par- ticularly involved. certain points were discussed afresh between the two governments, and at least interpretative concessions on the part of belgium were expected. domestic history since 1910.—in 1907, for the second time in the century, a cabinet was formed out of the coalition of the parties of the right, that is, of the two protestant parties, the anti-revolutionaries and the christian ilistoricals, and the roman catholic party. this coaliion, which may at first sight appear an unnatural one, sprang from the fact that catholics and orthodox protestants were equally opposed to the rulirg ‘liberalism, and in particular to the educational system de- veloped by the liberals. orly the state’s own schools, which were strictly “ neutral ” as regards religion, reccived grants of public money. the orthodox protestants and the catholics both complained that as taxpayers they had to help in supporting schools to which conscience forbade them to send their children, while as parents they had also to maintain their own private denominational schools. this situation at length, and in spite of the traditional enmity between the two creeds, led to a coali- tion of the calvinist partics and the roman catholic party. in roro dr. abraham rkuyper formed the first coalition gov- ernment. ijtlimself a calvinist, chicf of the anti-revolutionary party, he succeeded in finding “ one root of faith ” from which both catholics and protestants sprang, and divided the dutch nation into “ christians ” and “ paganists.” but the political situation in 1907, when the second coalition govt. was formed, did not permit dr. kuyper’s strong personality to be included, and when in 1909 the general election led to further disaster for the liberals he nevertheless remained discarded. mr. ijecmskerk was the leading member of this government, which was somewhat too moderate in its religious policy for the more fanatical kuyperians, whose zeal for social reform was gratified by the grandiose scheme for state disability and old age insurance on which the minister of labour, m. talma, worked strenuously. the scheme, however, had not yet been carried into effect when the defeat of the coalition at the polls in 1913 hung it up indefinitely. the parties of the left proved unable, in 1913, to assume the responsibilities of government. the once powerful liberal party was now broken up into several sections, of which one was really anti-clerical conservative, while another was radical. moreover, the socialist party, which made a big advance in 1913, now claimed a large proportion of the forces of the left, and there was little sympathy between it and the so-called old liberals. an attempt was made, nevertheless, to form a coalition of the 1036 netherlands. left, under dr. bos, the radical leader, on a programme that | in, the new quarters of many a dutch town afford fine examples included universal suffrage. the old liberals agreed to this | programme, but the socialists, although their leader, mr. p. j. troelstra, was in favour of accepting, refused to co-operate. in this difficulty an extra-parliamentary cabinet was formed by mr. cort van der linden. in conformity with the verdict of the electors it bore a decidedly “‘ left ’’ character, but it at- tempted to find final solutions for both the questions which had long paralysed dutch political life. mr. cort. van der linden and his colleagues proposed to bring about a revision of the constitution (for which purpose a two-thirds majority of the chamber is required) by an agreement of all parties. in it the clerical groups would find the solution of the school problem and the liberals, radicals and socialists the final extension of the suffrage. although faced with the problems arising out of the world war, the government persevered with this task, and indeed the quickened sense of national solidarity helped it rather than otherwise. in 1o17 its programme was carried out. universal suffrage and proportional representation were introduced; at the same time, the principle of absolute equality with regard to the public exchequer of “ public,’’ undenominational or a religious education and “ private ”’ denominational education, was con- ceded in full and written in the constitution. the first elections held under the new suffrage law (june 1918) resulted in further disaster for the liberal groups. the cort van der linden administration resigned and another calvinist- catholic cabinet was formed. the premier, mr. ruys de beer- enbrouck, was a catholic, a thing without precedent in dutch history. this government’s mandate was confirmed by the elections of 1921, when the coalition parties increased their number of seats to 60 out of the 100 which constitute the second chamber. at the elections of 1925 thev lost some ground, but still retained the majority, and when mr. ruys retired, mr. colyn, leader of the calvinist anti-revolutionary party, formed another coalition cabinet. in nov. 1925 internal disagrce- ments compelled that government to resign. each of these elections since proportional representation came into force meant a further stage in the disintegration of the liberal parties, of which only the radical group held its own. the socialists, on the contrary, made a big advance in 1018, and although they suffered a setback in 1921 they more than retrieved their for- tunes in 1925. they then numbered 24 members and were the second largest party in the chamber after the catholics with 32. the 1921 election was the first at which women’s suffrage was in full working order. six out of the roo seats were occupied by women in the chamber of 1925. the years of coalition govt. through which holland passed after the armistice can be divided into two very distinct periods. the years 1919 and 1920 were feverish ones, when a fallacious sense of prosperity stimulated enterprise in business and politics alike. it is not perhaps unfair to connect the zeal for social reform which characterised those days with a certain nervousness which remained after the ‘‘ november days ” of 1918. mr. troelstra, the socialist leader, his imagination fired by the spectacle of the german revolution, toyed with the idea of imitating it among his own people. the attempt was a ludicrous failure. the government took strong measures and the people rallied to them, and after an excited week quiet was restored on nov. 21 1918. the socialist party, which had been fac from unanimous about this adventurous policy, re-entered the path of constitutionalism, and mr. troelstra, who resigned the leadership in 1925 owing to ill-health, never regained his old prestige. yet the affair probably helped to create the spirit in which the government tackled social problems. mr. talma’s insurance scheme, of which the cort van der linden cabinet had carried out only a small part, was taken up again, and in dec. 1919 a comprehensive disability insurance act was passed. large sums of money were voted in aid of building societies and building schemes of municipal bodies. not only were housing conditions greatly improved, but as architecture has again be- come a living art in holland, and the best architects were called of modern building, and have been studied and admired by the experts of other countries. a piece of legislation with which holland was in advance of all other countries was an act restrict- ing the hours of labour to 45 a week. but the fictitious prosperity was succeeded by a severe de- pression. shipping and shipbuilding particularly felt the effects, and no place suffered more from the occupation of the ruhr area and from the preference grantecdl by france to her own and belgian commerce than the great port of rotterdam. when international conditions improved in 1924, economic conditions in holland soon felt the effect. yet unemployment remained still a drain on dutch resources. the one really bright spot in the picture was the prosperity of the east indian “cultures.” meanwhile, the stress of the times occasioned a radical change in the government’s policy. economy came to be the cry. the building subsidies were cut down. in order to enable dutch industry to compete with the countries with debased currencies, dispensations from the act restricting the hours of labour were freely granted. on yet another point a revulsion of feeling mani- fested itself against legislation passed almost without opposition a few years previously. the new cabinet of the right had to carry into practice the general provision of financial equality for denominational education which their predecessors had writ- ten into the constitution. it was now felt that the multiplication of small state-subsidised schools, which resulted from dr. de visser’s (the minister of education 1918-25) measures, over- burdened the taxpayer. during the years 1922-4 dutch politics centred round the financial situation. in the early summer of 1923 the government strengthened itself with a new minister of finance, mr. colyn, who two years later was to succeed mr. ruys in the premiership. mr. col¥n, a strong personality, was expected to carry out a programme of ruthless economy. all salaries paid by the state were indeed cut down by one-fifth, a measure which naturally occasioned a good deal of discontent. socialist and radical critics complained that economies in other directions were neglected, while at the same time, by the raising of the general import tariff from 5 to 8°, ad valorem, the introduction of a tax on bicycles (which are more numerous in proportion to popula- tion in holland than in any other country), and the raising of the duty on tobacco, the burden of taxation borne by the mass of the community was not inconsiderably increased. the object of mr. colin's policy, at all events, was reached: in the course of 1925 the budget was balanced. an improvement in the yield of direct taxation, as a consequence of the economic revival, contributed towards this event. in spite of this success, mr. colin’s govt. soon was unable to carry on. it was freely predicted at the time that the elimination of the education grievance would soon bring about the dissolution of the coalition, and that thus the way would become clear for a more natural grouping of partics on economic and political lines. in oct. 1923 it was thought that the knell of the coalition had been sounded when 1o catholics joined the parties of the left and the bill for the strengthening of the naval defences of the dutch east indies, which the government, in spite of their zeal for economy, and in spite of the effect which the washington treaties mizht be supposed to have on the situation in the pacific, co.usidered indispensable, was rejected in the second chamber by 50 to 49 votes (oct. 26 1923). after a crisis of several months, however, the coalition was patched up and the elections of june-july r925 were fought on the old lines. mr. coljn formed a new government in july. the new crisis was occasioned by a question of far less intrinsic importance, but more serious as @ sign of the progressing disintegration of the coalition. in spite of the prolonged comradeship in office, one at least of the two protestant parties, the christian historical party, never ceased to look upon the roman catholics without a cer- tnin watchful suspicion. of late years, owing to their excellent organisation and also to their constant participation in the government of the country as a consequence of the coalition, netherlands the growth of catholic influence and self-confidence, which started in the 19th century, had been accelerated, inducing a certain uneasiness and irritability in protestant circles, which the christian historical party, for all its loyalty to the coalition, could not ignore. in those circumstances a motion, introduced by an independent christian historical member of the chamber, to abolish diplomatic representation at the vatican, which had been introduced during the war by the cort van der linden govt., assumed an importance quite out of proportion to its in- trinsic merits. the whole christian iistorical party voted for it, and the motion was carried. the liberals, radicals and social- ists, while caring little for the question itself, had voted for the motion in order to show up the unreality of the coalition. the catholic ministers in mr. colin’s cabinet resigned on nov. 11 1925, and the next day the premier offered the resignations of himself and all his other colleagues. co-operation between the christian historicals and the roman catholics had now become exceedingly diflicult, but the hopes of those who wanted to see the coalition give way to a new grouping of parties were disappointed. radicals and socialists have long aspired to an alliance with the catholics, among whom democratic tendencies are strongly, although by no means exclusively, represented. an attempt (nov. 24-dec. 1 192s) on the part of the radical leader, mr. marchant, to form a democratic ministry, however, met with a unanimous refusal from the catholics, in spite of mr. marchant’s offer to rescind the vote against the vatican legation. the result was that dutch parliamentary politics appeared to have reached an absolute deadlock. after a crisis of unprecedented duration, jonkheer de geer, therefore, on march 3 1926 formed a non-parliamentary cabinet with a programme of all-round economy, including reductions in the army and navy and productive state works for the unemployed. he announced his intention of resigning as soon as a parliamentary majority had been formed. brsrtiograpny.—j. w. robertson-scott, war time and peace in holland (1914); oorlogstijd (1916); a. a. ul struycken, nederland, belgie en europa (1919); c. j. f. bosmans and m. visser, reper- toire des traites et des engagements internationaux concernant les pays- bas (the hague, 1921); n. g. japikse, die stellung hollands im weltkrieg (1921); h. arselin, la [ollande dans te monde (1921); a. j. barnouw, jzolland under queen wilhelmina (1923); g. w. t. omond, belgium and luxemburg, nations of to-day (1923); g. hi. bousquet, l’evolution sociale aux pays-bas, 1914-22 (1923); p. geyl, de groot- nederlandsche gedachte (ilaarlem, 1925); leon nemry, les pays-bas apres la guerre (1925); g. n. clark, ‘ the great neth- erlands idea,” edinburgh review (april 1926). (p. g.*) ii. economic and financial development although holland remained neutral during the world war, the war itself and the subsequent years left their impress upon its economic and financial development. some of these influences were of a temporary nature, suchas the effects of the crisis of 1920-1 upon dutch economy. the permanent changes chictly regarded public finance. in the economic sphere the war accelerated the expansion of national industries and the process of banking concentration. the foreign capital holdings of the people were affected by the loss of russian securities, represent- ing an estimated value of £100,000,000, and by the realisation of a considerable number of american securitics. against these losses, there was a large increase in the extent and value of the dutch capital invested in the dutch indies, and further a large increase in internal investment within the country. population.—the war had little effect on the growth of the popula- tion, which increases by approximately 100,000 per annum, a rela- tively high figure as compared with other countries, the result of a persistently favourable birth-rate (24-1 per 1,000 in 1925) and an extremely satisfactory death-rate {9-6 per 1,000 in 1925). it was only in the influenza year 1918 that the death-rate increased to 17-2 per 1,000. the population was 5,945,115 in 1910; 6,865,314 in 1920; and approximately 7,400,000 in 1925. agriculture. —a sound adaptation of the various branches of agrt- culture and cattle-breeding to the nature of the soil, the advantages of cultivation by the individual owners and an increasingly marked preponderance of small holdings, favourable market facilities and technical skill stimulated by co-operation and state encouragement —all have contributed to the development of agriculture. 1037 the home production was only 154,000,000 kg. of wheat or about 21-8 °5 of the total consumption (708,000,000 kg.); on the other hand 32-5 °oof the total output from dairy-farming wasavailable for export. a‘ter the war the export trade recovered quickly. exports of butter, which had ceased entirely during the last years of the war, attained their pre-war figure in 1924 ({5,800,000) ; cheese exports actually in- creased threefulld (46,200,000); whilst meat exports during the same year amounted to £6,300,000 or 30% more than in i9t3. indusiry. -a number of new industries are increasing in impor- tance, for example, the chemical and electric lamp industry. the first blast furnace was started at velzen near the north sea coast. the coal mining industry, whose beginnings date from the end of last century, now satisfies two-thirds of the requirements of the country. the output of coal rose from 300,000 tons in 1900 to 1,000,000 tons in 1910 and 6,800,000 tons in 1925. an approximate idea of the in- dustrial position in 1923 can be derived from the statistics of production. yield of the various branches of industry in ilolland foodstuffs 25,000,000 textile industry 20,800,000 metal industry 19,600,000 luxury articles 8,300,000 clothing and boots 5,{00,000 wood industry §, 200,000 chemical industry 5,700,000 miscellaneous 18,500,000 £108,300,000 the value of the total agricultural output in this year was {87,- 900,000. the unemployment figures showing the percentage of workers un- employed among trade unionists give an idea of the general economic situation in recent years. whilst in 1913 the highest figure was 8-8 (dec.), the summer average 4-1 and the winter average 8-0, the corresponding figures for 1924 were respectively 19-7 (jan.), 5:8 and 10-5. generally speaking the highest level was reached in 1923. since then the figure has fallen, but was still unsatisfactorily high in dec. 1925—13°8. trade and shipping.—trade statistics were reorganised and im- proved in 1917. asa result, however, no comparison of figures of values is possible while even figures of quantities before 1917 can only be used with great reserve. i9qi3 1925 | kg. kg, ' i mports 21,302,000 | 25,500,000 | exports 5,848,000 | 12,336,000 the direction of dutch trade has changed considerably :— - . dutc ger- eng- | united] bel- reanee | ee inany la nod states glum : i nites tt u3 co ww r in we ww = “ci bd | = n nl cc] oo on on nn on cn an on | | lal o— = bol | = ‘this -qul-31 11-29-01 tt oo) et 5251-5 "2(25°9 39 3-811 -o} jo] 1 -ol_ 4-7 zi (the figures represent percentages of the total) the system of virtual free trade—duties of 5°), being levied on a number of “ finished articles ’’w—remained practically unchanged during the war and even during the subsequent period of currency disorder in several states of europe; only in the case of the shoe and cizar industries special temporary prohibitive measures were intro- duced with a view to restricting dumped imports. the tariff was increased to 8°9 on july 1 1925, and the list of dutiable commodities was somewhat extended, principally on revenue grounds. in 1925 47 °% of the total exports of £146,200,000 consisted of foodstuffs and 35°7°% of manufactured goods. the total imports in that year amounted to £204,200,000, the importance and development of shipping can be gauged from the following figures for ocean-going shipping in the port of rotterdam:— loaded ships, net tonnage registered: i1g00 loaded ships, net tonnage registered: i9l0 loaded ships, net tonnage registered: 1913 loaded ships, net tonnage registered: 1925 5,452,000 8,898,000 11,638,000 13,903,000 the amount of dutch high-seas shipping in 1925 was 1,319,534 net tons registered, so that {tolland took the seventh place in the high-seas shipping of the world, being only surpassed by norway in the tonnage per head of population. in 1913 the tonnage amounted to 687,635, and [folland then also stood seventh on the list. 1038 the monetary system and banking—the following figures show the extent of banking transactions:— iqi3 1924 £ 12,600,000 |f 37,700,000 |£ 82,400,000 32,200,000 | 133,300,000 83,200,090 15,600,000 75,900,000 47,900,000 1920 capital and reserves other assets ‘’ debtors " throughout this period the dutch guilder (florin), thanks largely to the policy followed by the netherlands bank, maintained its position as one of the highest-valued currencies of europe. the gold standard was officially re-introduced on april 28 1925 when the pro- hibition on the export of gold was cancelled. on the same day similar steps were taken by great britain and by the netherlands east indies. the amount of bank notes in circulation at the end of 1925 was £72,900,000, as against {25,900,000 at the outbreak of the war. the gold reserve increased during the same period from £13,000,000 to £37,000,000. in addition to the bank note circulation the “giro” systems of transfer through the intermediary of the netherlands bank and of the post office are becoming increasingly important. but the cheque and clearing system of the large banks has not developed much in holland. state finances.—before the war the state finances were satis- factory. the total of ‘‘ ordinary ”’ expenditure had increased from £12,400,000 in 1900 to £16,400,000 in 1910 and £18,300,000 in 1913. the increase is evidence of the tendency in holland, as elsewhere, towards increased state activities: but it should be remembered that the general rise in prices during the period 1900-13 amounted to 16%, and the increase in population to 19%, the position of the dutch public debt was very satisfactory be- fore the war. in 1840, after the end of the war with belgium, it amounted to approximately £117,000,000. by jan. 1 1914 it hail fallen to £95,700,000, although large public works (railway con- struction) had been undertaken in the interval. the war and sub- sequent years made very high calls upon the state funds. mobilisa- tion cost £101,400,000; the supply of the population with material necessities during the war—the system of distribution involved sub- sidies from the public funds—cost {£47,100,000; and the housing subsidies which were charged against the extraordinary budget cost £54,700,000. the ordinary expenditure also increased considerably as a result of increased state activities and rising prices: the highest figure reached was £52,700,000 in 1924. the deficit for the period of crisis, which terminated in 1924 as far as the state finances are con- cerned —after deduction of such exceptional taxation as the tax on war profits —was £183,509,000. of thisamount £175,000,000 have been funded. although the sinking fund continued to operate in the in- terval, the debt rose to a record figure on jan. © 1925 with £244,100,- 000, falling to £239,300,000 on jan. § 1926. the ordinary expendi- ture for both 1925 and 1926, which can again be regarded as normal years, amounted in round figures to {50,090,000 and is wholly being met out of the revenue. 36-2 % of the total expenditure was met out of of the proceeds of direct taxation in 1925 as compared with 23-7 “% in 1913. the above-mentioned increase of expenditure is reflected in the position of the treasury. whilst before the war it was very rare for more than £4,000,000 to be required for treasury needs, the floating debt amounted on jan. i 1922 to not jess than £71,500,000 (consisting chiefly of treasury bills). against this amount there stood £40,000,000 of claims, composed for the most part of advances made to the colonies. it was only owing to the exceptionally liquid state of the money market that the state was able to raise such sums. the floating debt was reduced by jan. i 1926 to £25,500,000, owing to various funding operations undertaken in successive years; but against this figure there are claims of the state amounting to £24,100,000, mostly against foreign countries. the burden of taxation —viz.: of all taxes, including those of the provinces and communes—increased from £3 5s. per head in 1913 to netherlands bank yearly average index num- bers whole- sale prices exports £ million of domes- tic pro- imports £ million for home consump- domestic credits £ million notes in circulation £ million neuvilly, treaty of £13 4s. in 1921 (including tax on war profits), but had been reduced by 1924 to £7 12s. per head of the population. bis_lrograpuy.—official publications: jaarcijfers van het konin- krijk der nederlanden, centraal bureau voor de statistiek (the hague, yearly); afeandschrift van het centraul bureau voor de statistiek; department of overseas trade, report on the economic, financtal and industrial conditions of the netherlands (london, yearly); department of commerce, miscellaneous series no. 91, b. i’. moore, economic aspects of the commerce and industry of the netherlands, 1912-1918 (washington, 1919). see also j. c. a. ever- wijn, die beschrijving van ilandel en nijverhetd (the hague, 1913); m. w. f. treub, oorlogstijd (haarlem, 1917); de economische toekomst van nederland (waarlem, 1917); vragen van desen tijd (ifaarlem, 1919); g. vissering, international economic and financial problems (1920); de problemen van geldwesen en wisselkoersen op de finantteele conferentie te brussel, september-october, 1920 (the hague, 1920); g. il. bousquet, l'evolution sociale aux pays-bas, 1orgz-22 (1923); m. j. van der flier, war finances in the nether- lands up to tor8 (oxford, 1923); l. nemry, les pays-bas apres la guerre (brussels, 1924); g. angaulvant, les indes neerlandatses, leur role dans l’ economie internationale (the hague, 1926). (sw v3-bs) neuilly, treaty of.—the bulgarian treaty was signed at neuilly on nov. 27 roro, and came into force on aug. 9 1920. in the main it is the sameas the austrian treaty. but there were important differences in the military and naval clauses, and also in regard to reparation and finance. | as regards the territorial clauses, the only serious changes were to the west and south. the serb-croat-slovene kingdom obtained several strategic ratifications. the two most important are that the strumitsa salient in the extreme south-west has been flattened out, the western half being ceded to the serbs; also, and more important, in the nish-pirot area the town of tsaribrod has been taken from bulgaria and a line drawn whereby an advance on nish would be rendered more difficult. the frontier, however, confers no offensive advantage on the serbs, and ts thus a sensible one. a loss more serious in another sense is that to greece of the district of western thrace, lying between xanthi and the maritsa river. this was ceded to greece on her obtaining eastern thrace and adrianople. bul- garia, for ethnic reasons, received a slight extension of territory west of adrianople. the expulsion of greeks from adrianople and east thrace by the turks has, however, not caused the allies to change their minds about western thrace, which remains annexed to greece and is denicd to bulgaria. but, though these losses are humiliating to the pride of the bulgars, it cannot be said that they seriously injure their strength or prosperity. dedeagach, which she lost to greece with the whole of western thrace, is really unsuitable as a port and also at a great distance from sofia. with the view of giving bulgaria access to the aegean, veniselos offered, during the negotiations, to build a railway connecting the fine greek harbour of kavalla with the salonika- constantinople railway, which now runs to sofia up the struma valley, though with a break of gauge. this offer, though doubt- less quite sincere, has never been acted upon, though in article 48 the principal allies undertake to ensure the economic outlets of bulgaria to the aegean sea. bulgaria had always asserted claims to that part of mace- donia now in serbian hands, and also to eastern and western thrace. in the former area her ethnic pretensions are better founded than in the latter. but serbian macedonia is in the hands of a formidably armed and militarily strong nation. greek macedonia and thrace are now populated by hundreds of thousands of greek refugees from asia, and contain over 80° of a purely greek population. it would seem, therefore, that both districts are irrecoverably lost to bulgaria, and that her strength must rest purely on her own resources. in popula- tion, she has only lost some 300,000 persons, of whom some are not bulgars. part iv. the military, naval and air clauses have some special points. bulgaria is allowed 20,000 regulars, 10,000 gendarmes and 3,000 frontier guards, or 33,000 in all. this number is insufficient to maintain order in a turbulent balkan state, and the subsequent serious disturbances in bulgaria are due directly to this fact. it 1s increased by the difficulty of applying the voluntary long-service system of 12 consecutive years to a nation of peasants. in an agricul- neuromuscular system tural country it is practically impossible to get men to leave their farms for 12 years, and the army is always likely to be dangerously below strength, and the less regular formations dangerously above it. the naval clauses do not differ from those of the g:erman or austrian treaty. all bulgaria’s navy has now been destroyed, and she is left with four torpedo-boats, of which three are damaged, and six motor-boats, of which four are damaged. part v. (prisoners of war and graves) and part vi, (penalties) are the same as in the austrian treaty (sce st. germain, treaty of). part vit, (reparation), this contains the most novel and inter- esting feature of the treaty, and is, in fact, the only serious attempt to get reparation on to a business basis. it contained three features of great interest. (a) contrary to the practice in the german, austrian and ifun- garian treaties, there was no attempt made to seize or distribute the bulgarian commercial fleet on the “ ton-for-ton ” or “ class-for- class ”’ principle. : . (b) it fixed the amount to be paid at the lump sum of £90,000,000. (c) it created a reparation commission consisting of i*rench, british and italian representatives, with power to reduce this amount by a simple majority vote (not by unanimity as is the system- atic rule), on the suggestion of the inter-allied commission. _ the general scope and powers of the reparation commission are drawn in such a manner as to control the finances of the country sufficiently to obtain reparation, without offensive interference. in the end, the reparation commission, after examining the question on the spot, has practically remitted three-quarters of the total of £90,000,000. the annual sum now required to mect the charges on the 550,000,000 gold francs of the debt is well within the capacity of the new bulgarian state, and is being punctually paid. none of the remaining clauses of the bulgarian treaty have any special features of interest or importance. conclusion.—viewing the bulgarian treaty as a whole, it is the fairest and most practical of all the treaties imposed on the enemy powers. there has been little diminution of territory or population, and no vindictiveness shown. bulgaria was protected by the principal allies, first from occupation of her territory by serbs or greeks, next from the seizure and distribution of her commercial fleet, and finally from the financial anxicties and confusion consequent upon an unfixed lability, and from the difficulties of a too-powerful and too-obtrusive reparation commission. the reason is that the principal allies, while not strong enough to withstand the public demand for severity in the german, austrian and hungarian treaties, were strong enough to resist the serb, greek and rumanian claims in the bulgarian treaty. the result is that bulgaria is more relatively prosperous than any other ex-cnemy state, and has been able to pay her habilities without making the league her receiver and manager, like austria and ilungary, or adopting a disguised form of this liquidation like germany under the dawes scheme. bulgaria has shown herself more willing to accept new condi- tions, and it is not impossible that she may enter ultimately into some form of alliance with the serb-croat-slovene kingdom. (see bulgaria; peace conference; reparation, etc.) brsiiography.—h. w. v. temperley, ed., 7istory of peace con- ference, vol. 4 and 5 (1921); text of treaty, parliamentary papers, treaty serics, 1920, no. 5, cmd. 522. cts av. va. ey)