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    "source_key": "britannica_1926",
    "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926)",
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    "chunk_id": "1926:marine engineering:b592cb627b32",
    "title": "MARINE ENGINEERING",
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    "verified_text": "at the present time there are three distinct types of marine engines, and these may be grouped as follows: (1) steam-engines with coal-fired boilers; (2) steam-engines with oil-fired boilers; (3) internal-combustion en- gines, such as the diesel or semi-diesel type. of course, groups (1) and (2) may be reciprocating steam-engines, turbines (geared or otherwise) or combined turbine and reciprocating. the three types are described below. reciprocating marine steam-engines.—to-day, all marine reciprocating steam-engines are stage expansion engines, that is, the steam expands in stages from the highest pressure cylinder, through the intermediate stages, and finally exhausts into the condenser. modern stage-expansion engines may be grouped as marine engineering follows: compound.—in this type there are two cylinders, the high pressure and the low pressure. steam performs its function in the high pressure cylinder; from there it passes into the low pressure cylinder, completes its work on this’ cylinder and finally exhausts to the condenser. triple expanstoi.—in this engine, as its name implies, steam exerts its power in three stages before exhausting to the condenser. quadruple expansion.—in this type the steam is used four times before exhausting to the condenser, two intermediate cylinders being fitted. no marked improvements have taken place in this type of prime mover, except as regards engine refinements, the general design remaining the same. the advent of the marine steam turbine and the marine internal-combustion engine certainly has led many shipbuilders to install one or the other of these types; but it is interesting to note that in some recent large steamers, notably the peninsular and oriental ‘‘ naldera ” and “ narkunda,” the carefully balanced triple-expansion engine has been installed. experiments are being carricd out to utilise steam at a much higher pressure than formerly, and excellent results are expected. combined reciprocating engines and steam turbines —an excellent example of this arrangement is the white star “‘ olym- pic.” the arrangement has proved an economical one, and is as follows: each wing propeller shaft is driven by a reciprocating engine, the low pressure cylinder of which exhausts into a par- sons low-pressure turbine driving the centre shaft; 21 double- ended cylindrical boilers supply the necessary steam. marine steam turbines.—(see turbines, steam.) theadvan- tages of this prime mover which has led to its adoption during the past few years are as follows:— (a) fewer working parts, as no slide valves, piston and connecting rods are required. (b) the steam is supplied direct from the boilers with no inter- vening loss. (c) considerably less danger of breakdown. (d) engines placed well down in vessel (a big asset in warships). (e) less expenditure of lubricating oil. (f) no cylinder lubrication is necessary, and clean feed water is returned to the boilers. (g) absence of vibration, a big factor in warships and passenger steamers. (k) smaller attendance required than in the case of reciprocating engines. (4) superior governing, good parallel running and even turning movement. (k) priming, which would fracture the cylinder covers of a steam reciprocating engine, has no material effect on a turbine. (i) overloading (forcing the engines) can be indulged in within reasonable limits. (m) more economical except at the lowest speeds. the large-sized turbines are more economical in steam per horsepower developed than the best triple or quadruple expan- sion engine, as the turbine is able to take full advantage of the whole of the expansive energy of the steam. the two types in general use are the parson combined impulse and reaction tur- bine, and the brown curtis impulse turbine. there are, natu- rally, many modifications of these types. geared turbines—these turbines are coming into favour more and more. the chief trouble with the marine turbine arose with the propeller. it is necessary that a turbine for maximum efficiency should run at a high rate of revolution, whilst for maximum propeller efficiency, much lower rates of revolution are necessary. the solution for this was by the introduction of some form of gearing between the turbine and the propeller. several forms of reduction gearing are being experimented with, such as the electrical, hydraulic and mechanical. mechanical gearing appears at present to show advantages over the other forms—an efficiency of over 98°%% being obtained in the case of single reduction, and over 97% with double reduction. there is practically no limit to the ratio of reduction. double reduction gearing finds favour for the follawing reasons: (a) the type per- mits larger ratio between revolutions of turbines and propellers without excessive size of gear wheels—higher revolution of tur- bines permits, for the same power, smaller turbines, and increase in the number of turbines for the same power further reduces 797 the size of each unit; (b) high revolutions or greater blade speed are possible, resulting in a nearer approach to the point where the blade speed in relation to steam speed gives maximum econo- my; (c) a small turbine permits of a pivot thrust block being used, as the dummy can be omitted, and all unbalanced load taken by the block; (d) small turbines have small rotors and can thus be made of a much more robust construction; (e) variations in temperature for any single turbine are kept moderate, and these turbines are therefore suitable for use with superheated steam; (f} the parts being smaller, the turbines can be more easily overhauled, repaired or renewed. america favours the electric drive for her navy and mercantile marine. marine internal combustion engtnes—one of the principal reasons which has led to the adoption of the internal combustion engine for marine propulsion is the thermal efficiency of this prime mover. compared with a steam engine (reciprocating), and coal-fired boilers, we find: diesel 40°%% to 45% thermal effi- ciency, according to size; steam engine 20% to 25%. as regards running, the fuel bill is about half that for an oil-fired boiler ship fitted with geared turbines; very great saving of space occu- pied by the machinery; reduction of personnel. against these advantages we have the greater initial cost; complication of paris; a greater number of spare parts have to be carried; it is probable that the repair and upkeep bill will exceed that for steam units. before a big reduction can be made in initial and upkeep costs, all parts must be standardised; and the engines should be built in combinations of various numbers of cylinders for various powers and revolutions. for a given power the diesel compares unfavourably as regards weight with the steam turbines and oil-fired boiler combination, and the head-room is greatly limited (this, especially from a naval point of view, is a marked disadvantage). the possibilities of this prime mover are endless; but up to the present the diesel has not been installed in the largest ocean-going liners or cross- channel mail packets. there is no doubt, however, when a speed of, say, 25 knots can be reached, combined with a reliable and simple design of engine, we shall see the mammoth type of in- ternal combustion ship breaking the atlantic records. the largest ship up to the present with diesel engines installed has a length of 600 ft. and a breadth of 72 ft.; and another diesel- engined vessel of 20,000 tons is under construction. the present types work on the two-stroke or on the four-stroke principle; but many competent authorities affirm that the marine oil engine of the future will be a double acting two-stroke with port scaveng- ing—this design giving an engine of low initial cost and simple construction. the solid (or mechanical) injection of the fuel is likely to be generally adopted in preference to the air injection system, owing to the reduction in first cost that is obtained by its use. experiments are now being carried out with geared diesel engines, and these will be watched with interest. marine boilers —it is only within the last few years, com- paratively, that the water-tube boiler has been seriously con- sidered as a rival to the cylindrical, or water-tank, boiler. the experience gained after many years with the cylindrical marine boiler proved it to be undoubtedly a good, safe, easily under- stood generator and also comparatively easy to clean. this type may be said to be the principal boiler of the mercantile marine. for naval purposes, of course, there can be no question as to which type is suitable; but even with such highly trained engine-room ratings as the british navy possesses the advent of the water-tube boiler was not looked upon at all with favour. al- though water-tube boilers are being fitted in increasing numbers in the mercantile marine, their many advantages do not appear to be recognised to the extent they should be, this being due in part to the high initial cost and also to the fact that the fuel consumption ts inferior to that of the cylindrical type. however, the outstanding features of the water-tube boiler (7.e., they are much lighter and give greater horsepower for the same space) should further recommend them. the modern trend is toward much higher working pressures, higher temperatures and the more efficient burning of the fuel and generation of the steam in the boiler. there is no reason why pressures of 700 lb. or 800 lb. 798 per sq. in. should not be reached. superheating of the steam, air preheating, increase in boiler feed water temperature and careful analysis of the funnel gases are all receiving due attention, as are also the best means to adopt to ensure the cleanliness of the internal surfaces and tubes, and thus prevent or retard cor- rosion. zinc slab protection is, to a certain extent, being super- seded by electrolytic protection. in this system electrolytic con- ductivity is produced in the boiler water by a current of elec- tricity from a source outside the boiler to metallic anodes insu- lated from the boiler shell, the current being regulated at will. oil burning in marine boilers—within the last few years oil fuel burning has made rapid strides, and but for the question of cost would be much more generally adopted. as an example of saving in boiler-room staff, after the cunarder “ aquitania ” was converted to burn oil, her firemen were reduced to 42 as against 320 when coal-burning. the advantages of oil fuel are: superior evaporative power per weight of fuel carried, giving increased radius of action—1 lb. of oil with a heat value of 19,000 b.t.u. will evaporate 15 lb. of water to and at 212° f-,, and 1 lb. of coal with a heat value of 14,500 b.t.u. will evap- orate ro lb. of water to and at 212°f.; ease of shipping into bunkers and putting into fires; less stokehold staff and bunker space required; absence of coal dust and ashes; no necessity to open furnace doors with consequent loss; proper regulation of combustion; capability of forcing the boiler. against those ad- vantages we have: uncertainty of obtaining supplies; complica- tions of piping and machinery; possible leakage; special appli- ances are required for burning; liquid and solid impurities found in the oil; widespread contamination of water-ways. liquid fuel is atomised by one of three methods—steam, com- pressed air, pressure. the last method is generally adopted in modern marine practice due to the reliability and freedom from breakdown of pressure systems. the system as now adopted is very simple; oil is drawn from the bunkers and strained, which removes all solid impurities. the oil is delivered from the fuel pumps under pressure, an air vessel assisting in maintaining a steady supply. next, the oil passes through cold filters and thence to the heaters. the heating process may form particles of carbon in the oil, which are removed by passing it through filters fitted on the delivery side of the heater. from these filters, called hot filters, the oil passes under pressure to the distribution boxes on the boiler front, and from there through the burners (where it is atomised) to the furnaces. marine auxiliaries.—the great increase in the number of auxiliary engines now fitted in modern steamships necessitates as much attention as do the main propelling machinery. as regards design, the majority of auxiliaries follow accepted prac- tice; but the following units call for special consideration. condensers.—the modern method is to insure high vacuum combined with reliability, and that the weight of the apparatus shall be as low as possible consistent with the work the con- denser is called upon to.perform. separate air pumps are in- stalled, one pumping out the feed water, and the other main- taining a high vacuum by pumping air from a cooler part of the condenser. tube failure—through corrosion—is a frequent source of trouble, and the many experiments now being carried out with tube metal mixtures have not eliminated this. electrolytic protection has been adopted with good results. metallic packing for the tubes, in place of the ordinary tape packing, has recently been introduced, and the results are ex- cellent. in connection with modern condensers a system has been devised known as the “closed feed system.”’ by this method the condensate is removed from the condenser and discharged to the boiler without exposure to the atmosphere; thus preventing air mixing with the feed water and causing boiler corrosion. another method now coming into favour is the removal of the air in the feed water by mechanical de-aeration; and this method seems to possess advantages over the removal of the air by chemical means. the michell thrust block.—this block possesses marked ad- vantages over the older form of multiblock. the device consists of one collar on the shaft, the thrust being taken by a series of marines pads capable of a slight rocking movement. the pads maintain a continuous flow of oil between the metal surfaces, which are thus kept apart by as many oil wedges as there are pads to pro- duce them. this block is essential to the satisfactory working of gears now fitted in many modern ships. bibliography.—f. j. drover, marine engineering practice (1924); rk. sennett and sir h. j. oram, the marine steam engine (1924). (fr. j. d.) marines (see 17.719). great britain.—marine forces in some instances constituted the whole or the main part of forces told off for coastal descents, e.g., the british expedition to ostend in 19r4and the zeebrugge enterprise of 1918. in others they under- took emergency land operations for which no other military force was available, e.g., in the case of the royal marine bde. at antwerp, 1914; or again, as in the case of the u.s. marine bde. in france, 1917-8; and the british 63rd (r.n.) div., which in- cluded marine units, in the composition of a land army in con- tinuous operations. in several instances the marines proper formed a soldier nucleus for formations of which the principal part was made up of sailors, as the british r.n. div. and even more so the german marine corps. france used improvised battalions and brigades of sailors (fusiliers marins) in the same way, and a brigade of these under rear-adml. ronarc’h won undying glory by its defence of dixmude during the first battles of ypres and the yser. the german marine corps was composed originally as a division partly of marines and partly of sailors, who were numeri- cally far in excess of naval requirements. it took part in the siege of antwerp and the advance through flanders. when stabilisation came the division was raised to the strength of a corps, and the corps commander (adml. schroder) was made responsible for the yser front, for coast defence between nieu- port and the dutch frontier, and for purely naval operations based on the belgian coast, having both submarines, surface craft and aircraft under his command for the purpose. finally, the german corps formed a third mobile division which was sent to any point on the western front where reinforcements were needed. the royal marines, 1914-8.—just before the outbreak of the world war the total strength (all ranks) of the british corps of royal marines was 18,000. during the war, however, the strength of the corps increased steadily, until at the end its numbers had been more than trebled, due to the formation of new units within corps. in 1914 the r.n. div. was formed; vari- ous divisional units of royal marines were raised for service with it, such as engineers (transferred to the royal engineers in 1917), medical units and transport. the r.m. submarine miners (1917), the r.m. labour corps, the home service labour corps (1917) and the r. m. engineers (1918) were raised. special units were also provided separately and compositely by the r.m. artillery and the r.m.l.i. at various times. in all naval actions, and in naval patrol duties, the royal marine personnel took a part. in the early days of the war per- sonnel of the corps served with the armoured cars operating from dunkirk. four battalions of the brigade took part in the defence of antwerp. details from two r.m.l.i. battalions were involved in the landing at kum kale and sedd-el-bahr (march 4 1915), and marine artillery siege guns were used at dunkirk. the corps sent a battery to egypt in ror6 for coast defence duties. detach- ments served also in cameroon, in the persian gulf and with adml. troubridge in serbia, and formed the nucleus of the heavy batteries which were raised for service with gen. botha in south- west africa and with gen. smuts in east africa. the corps furnished gun crews for armed merchantmen and garrisons for naval bases as at scapa, cromarty and st. helena, and for the coast defences at the north foreland, in the west indies and elsewhere. (x) united states —the united states marine corps is a separate military organisation under the administration of the navy dept., and as such it forms a part of the naval establishment of the country. it was founded on nov. 10 1775 when a resolution of the first continental congress authorised the raising oi two marinescu—marketing battalions of marines to assist the continental navy in the de- fence of the colonies. in organisation, training and duties this force was modelled after the british marines of that date. from then to the present the marines have continued to serve as an inte- gral part of the u.s. navy, although under the authority of con- gressional cnactment portions of the corps have been temporarily detached for service on shore with the u.s. army. the laws provide that marines may be assigned to the follow- ing duties: to garrison the different navy yards and naval stations within and beyond the continental limits of the united states; to furnish detachments to serve aboard the battleships and cruis- ers of the fleet where they form one of the gun divisions of the ship, perform military guard duties and act as a landing force from the fleet or squadrons as required; to act as expeditionary landing forces for service with the fleet to capture and defend such positions as may be required as temporary naval bases for the fleet; to furnish the first line of the mobile defences of naval stations and bases beyond the continental limits; and, when special conditions make it advisable, lo be temporarily trans- ferred for service with the army. the marines have taken a conspicuous part in every war in which the united states has been engaged and have also seen much foreign service in the peace-time occupation of foreign countries for the protection of american citizens and property during revolutions and unsettled conditions, in furtherance of the diplomatic policies of the united states. before the spanish-american war in 1808 the marine corps consisted of 75 officers and 2,000 enlisted men, but was increased thereafter, and at the entrance of the united states into the world war in 1917 it consisted of 511 officers and 13,124 en- listed men, and during that war a total of 31,824 marines were sent overseas for service with the a.e.f. the fourth brigade of marines formed a part of the second division of the a.e.f., where they served in many campaigns and battles with conspicu- ous gallantry and gained many citations and decorations. the peace-time operations of organisations of the marine corps have included expeditions to china, cuba, nicaragua, mexico and panama, for the protection of american interests, and the recent occupations of santo domingo and haiti to insure the peace and stability of these countries under treaty obligations between them and the united states. the mission of the marine corps under the stated naval policy of the united states is: “ to sup- port the fleet, or any part thereof, in the accomplishment of its mission.” the emblem of the corps is a hemisphere with the map of the americas thereon, superimposed upon a foul anchor and surmounted by an eagle with spread wings. the motto of the corps is “ semper fidelis.” (d. w.*) marinescu, george (1864- ), rumanian neurologist, was born at bucharest feb. 23 1864. he was educated at the faculty of medicine of bucharest and then went to paris where he worked under dr. charcot at the sulpetriere, carrying out valuable researches on the histopathology of the nervous system. a year later he went to frankfort and worked with professor weigert. he then continued his research work on nervous dis- eases in berlin and brussels. in the latter town he published his work on the treatment of epilepsy for which he obtained a prize from the academie royale de belgique. in 1900 he was appointed professor of neurology at the university of bucharest. in the autumn of 1916 professor marinescu went to london where the medical research committee made him a whole-time grant. at the l. c. c. maudsley hospital, denmark hill, in collaboration with lt.-col. f. w. mott, f.r.s., he applied himself to an important series of researches upon the microscopic structure of nerve cells and their changes in different phases of activity or damage. he also took an important part in the investigation of the nervous system in some cases of encephalitis lethargica. marinetti, filippo tomaso (1878- ), italian writer, was born at alexandria dec. 22 1878, and studied in paris, graduating at the sorbonne; in 1899 he also graduated in law at the university of genoa. he was the founder of the futurist movement, publishing the original futurist manifesto in the paris figaro on feb. 20 1909. for a time he edited the international 799 review poesia, but his most characteristic work was majarka le futuriste, published in french in 1910. he also wrote for the stage le roi bombance (1905), a satirical tragedy, and other plays, and published a volume on the futurist theatre, teatro sintetico futuristo (1916). in 1914 he wrote an extraordinary vol- ume entitled zang-tumb-iuuum on the balkan war, and particu- larly on the siege of adrianople. other futurist essays are noz futuristi (197), manifesti del futurismo (4 vol., 1920), demo- crazia futurista. on the outbreak of the world war he was strongly in favour of italian intervention, as he showed by his volume guerra sola igtene del mondo (1915). otte amict 1n mia bomba deals with war experiences; while in fulurismo e fascismo (1922) he expresses his support of the fascist movement. mari- netti’s futurism, though violent, exaggerated and sometimes ridiculous, is a quite genuine reaction against the excesses of the academic and hidebound tradition in literature and art. markby, sir william (18209-1914), anglo-indian jurist (sce 17.730), died at headington hill, near oxford, oct. 15 1914. marketing.—marketing is essentially buying and selling. the central fact is the sale, but to secure sales the goods must often be assembled from the places where they were produced, graded when qualities differ, sorted when there are different varieties, moved to market and in many cases thence to the place of consumption. i. in the united states methods of marketing —the simplest form of marketing and the most primitive is the sale by the producer directly to the consumer, in the aggregate, sales made in this way even at present run into immense volume, although but a small part of the total of business. modern business, the development of large cities, an increasing di- vision of labour in industry, all tend to reduce this form of market- ing. there is still a considerable amount of marketing of produce, particularly butter and eggs, direct from farmers to consumers, by parcel post and by direct sale. again, certain specialities, comph- cated machines and machines requiring much attention and service after the first sale, usually are sold direct by manufacturers to consumers through the medium of speciality salesmen. the sales- man is the representative of the producer in the marketing transac- tion. again, if a retailing house docs so large a business that it can advantageously engage in manufacturing some of the lines of goods it sells, it may combine production with distribution. most products of common use, such as foods, clothing, footwear, house furnishings, lumber, fuel and so on, are marketed through middlemen. the manufacturer of men’s clothing or of shoes usually sells his product to retailers scattered over the country, who in turn sell to consumers. manufactured food products, dry goods, drugs, hardware and house furnishings are generally sold first to whole- salers, who in turn sell to retailers. farmers’ produce, fruits, vegetables, butter and eggs, are com- monly marketed through local buyers, then to wholesalers or whole- sale distributors, then to retailers and lastly to consumers. variations in afethod.—variations are introduced into marketing in many ways. the actual sale may be consummated through per- sonal salesmanship either in the scller’s place of business or in the buyer’s. if the seller carries a line of goods he must have a store or shop, but even this may not keep him to one location, the old-time pedlar carried his store on his back. more recently grocery stores, meat shops, book and periodical shops and even dry goods and house furnishings have been put on whecls, on automobile trucks and sales routes laid out to be covered periodically, making sales direct to housewives and consumers. again, the sales may be effected through retail institutions by mail. in the united states a gigantic business has been built up by a few large mail order houses which are really stores or shops selling retail to consumers. some wholesale concerns selling only to retail dealers have developed enormous businesses founded on the mail order method of selling. in addition to these there is an unknown but certainly large amount of business transacted by ordinary retail and wholesale stores by mail, supplementing personal selling. wholesale marketing in the case of highly perishable goods, such as fruits, where no time may be lost in effecting sales in order that they may reach the consumer before spoiling, the auction system is used. wholesale buyers and salesmen come together at a designated place at a set time and clear their transactions. the auction is a much more widely used mechanism of trade in england and in continental europe, where large quantities of nearly all kinds of goods are thus sold, than it is in america, where the system is declining. in addition to its use in the marketing of perishable 800 goods it occurs, to a limited extent, particularly in lines of known standards or qualities, which are bought and sold in wholesale quantities at certain dates each year, as carpets, rugs, wool, furs and fruits. it is also a common method of marketing second- hand goods, works of art, antiques and even real estate. variation in marketing occurs through variation in ownership of the goods to be marketed. to illustrate: producers or local buyers usually sell outright to wholesalers all goods marketed through the wholesaler-retailer channel of distribution; but in highly perishable goods, such as fruits, dressed poultry, live poultry, etc., and also in cases where the value of the goods runs very high in proportion to the value of the service rendered by the wholesale middleman—as, for example, finished textiles, real estate, commercial paper and stocks and bonds—the wholesaler (or dealer who takes his place) frequently, if not usually, merely sells or buys as the agent of the owner and secures a commission or brokerage instead of a profit for his services. this arrangement in the case of perishable goods relieves the wholesale dealer of the risk from joss, and, in the case of costly goods, of the burden of financing the goods. such wholesalers are known variously as commission dealers and brokers. function of speculation—while goods are being gathered to- gether in wholesale quantities and made ready for distribution to the retail trade other factors in marketing frequently enter in, fac- tors of a speculative nature. standardised goods that are not readily perishable, such as grain, cotton, wool, silk, provisions, coffee, sugar and so on, are likely to be bought purely for specula- tive purposes. thus a lot of grain or cotton may be bought and sold several times before being moved to consumption. it is but another step for these speculators to make their ventures in hope of gain.on what they think future prices will be. hence “ selling futures’? is a common occurrence on the great exchanges that deal in the commodities named. under this system grain may be bought and sold long before it has been harvested or grown, or even before it is planted. (see grain trade.) a flour-miller may quite legitimately ensure his future supply of grain at a certain price by buying “ futures.” but a great deal of opposition has been aroused at various times by speculation in the necessities of life. it has been charged that dealing in futures enables powerful speculators to combine un- justly to secure success for their ventures, in some cases tending to hold prices down and in others tending to hold prices up. asa result both producers and consumers are suspicious of such traders. the consensus of opinion among those who have studied the course of speculation on exchanges seems, however, to be that if manipulation of prices and monopoly can be kept out of the market, and if the laws of supply and demand are allowed to operate freely, the effect of speculation, particularly of dealing in futures, has a healthful balancing effect on the market. under such conditions purchase and sale of commodities for future delivery tend to discount and equilibrate all conditions of supply and demand, so that changes of price are made much more grad- ually than they would be if buying and selling of such commodities were confined solely to the stock offered each day. dealing in futures is an essential function of marketing, but it needs careful regulation to prevent unfair practices. | methods of marketing —if producers are many and small, and are located far apart, it is almost certain that their products will have to be assembled by a local buyer of some kind; whereas if the producers are able to turn out large quantities they may be able to deal with wholesalers direct. if consumers use small quantities or small lots of any product at one time it is almost certain that they must purchase from retailers. but a large consumer would be able to buy more advantageously direct from the producer. some articles cannot be sold more than once or twice in a lifetime to a customer. if it also happens that such articles re- quire much demonstration and explanation, then the producer is almost forced to sell direct to the consumer or have his sales made by special representatives or agents. subscriptions to high-priced periodicals, adding machines, life insurance and real estate are illustrations of goods that need such specialised attention. marketing time is a very important element in the marketing of perish- able goods. there must be no delay, and little time can be given to the sale of any particular unit. an illustration of a perishable article is the daily paper, the weekly or monthly magazine. timeliness is the essence of their value. this makes necessary a highly specialised marketing organisation to carry papers or magazines over the country and, in the case of magazines, to place them on sale everywhere at the same time. such specialised handling calls for expense not incurred in goods not perishable. a low-priced article with a small margin of gross profit to the seller cannot be sold in the same way as an article that offers a wide margin. in the former case the margin above costs of production could not permit the article to be sold direct or to be advertised and sold by itself by the mail-order method. it must take its way to the consumer through the channels of trade followed by thousands of similar articles. competition—the competition in the sales field of any article might readily determine the channel of distribution that is taken. certain manufacturers of soaps, perfumes and toilet goods have found it so difficult to place their products advanta- geously in drug stores and similar retail outlets because of the number of competing lines that they have found it advisable to sell, especially in country districts or small towns, direct to consumers by means of agents and canvassers working on a commission basis. a motor-car tire maker found it so difficult to break into the market through automobile dealers and garages that he sold his product to a mail-order house. a new product must as a rule be sold through specialised mar- keting systems which may be abandoned after the public has begun to know the article. the costs ofr marketing table i. contains figures compiled from actual records by the harvard bureau of business research, harvard university. table i. the retailing of shoes: a comparison of costs net sales 100 per cent lowest | highest | usual o/ 0/ of rae) /o 70 independent shoe stores: low priced shoes 13°3 32°33 20°5 high priced shoes 23°43 32°85 28-8 chain shoe stores 9°85 57°60 24-6 department store: shoe departments it is clear that the statistics do not prove that in the case of shoes either chain stores or department stores can be conducted at less expense than independent stores. it is true that the lowest figure for chain stores is considerably lower than any other, but the chain stores also show the highest costs. the average costs of selling in chain stores scem to run a little higher than in independent low- priced shoe stores and in department stores. table ii., showing cost of markcting,! is compiled and adapted from reports of the harvard bureau of business research, north- western university bureau of business research, several national trades associations and personal studies. costs of selling through mail-order houses are not officially known. they are supposed to range from 18 to 30% of sales. but the knowl- edge of a general figure of this kind for a large mail-order house with many departments would be of little value even if correct. costs of selling vary from department to department in mail-order houses just as in department stores. to be of value in a comparison of selling expenses, the figures should show the cost of selling shoes, for example, by mail. all things considered, the general costs of running a large mail-order house are probably somewhat lower than those for a large department store handling similar classes of goods, the mail-order establishment need not be in a shopping district, so that the rent or investment represented by its size is comparatively small; the employees who fill orders do so more rapidly and for less pay than those who sell in a store; advertising is usually confined to the less expensive publications, and in the case of the largest houses the customers are much more numerous, running into mil- lions. costs in the shoe department of a mail-order house should run lower than in a department store or speciality shop because in the mail-order house there is no time and labour lost in fitting shoes. eae a, cr ee ne eae 1 costs of retailing in other lines of merchandise, so far as the figures are available, show about the same relationships. the example presented may be taken as typical. marketing table ii. marketing costs percentage on sales wholesale retail low- | high- | ,- low- | high- est = usual est est usual | %| % | %| %| % | % automotive equipment . 16 26 23°5 15 2 2: clothing. i2 18 16 20 30 24 drugs . ; 12 20 t5 a 33 28 dry goods . ii l7 i4 15 30 23 electrical sup- plies . 10 20 14 20 31 26 groceries. : 5 15 9 9 22 14 hardware . 13 21 18 ii 32 2 jewelry = 7 15 20 18 24 40 2 shoes 12 26 15 13 a4 2 furniture. ; 20 35 25 general merchan- , dise . a” 34 io 30 16 department scores: ou a 18 32 28 chain stores (shoes) .. 10 57 24 chain stores (5 and toc) . sad os 26 chain stores (groceries). ad 7 16 chain stores (drugs) . . 28 this saving is counterbalanced somewhat by the number of shocs which are probably returned. the lower costs of selling in the mail- order house, however, are offset in part at least by the costs of trans- portation and other expenses incidental to ordering by mail. economies in the chain of distribution.—a part of the com- petitive battle for trade among these various types of institutions consists in the utilisation of large buying power. large chain store systems, mail-order houses and large department stores frequently purchase their goods direct from producers and secure the prices usually given wholesale purchasers. in some cases a part of these differences may be used in cutting the prices to consumers, but it would be a mistake to assume that the con- sumer gets all the benefit from purchases made at lower prices, or that this entire difference ts gained for the dealers. concerns that go direct to the producers, and thereby eliminate the whole- salers, as a rule incur practically all the usual expenses of whole- saling, such as interest on the investment in the larger stock of | goods, storage risks, buying expense in dealing with numerous producers instead of a few wholesalers, extra record-keeping and, with chain stores, reshipments to their various stores throughout the country. the only real saving which buying direct from producers in- sures is the eliminated profit of the wholesaler, with a possible reduction of the expense for salesmen whom wholesalers must employ. competition in buying has forced the joint creation by small concerns of buying organisations which, united, represent as large a buying power as the chain or department stores. co-operation in buying certain classes of goods has strong ad- vantages both for dealers and consumers. buying in group at one time may secure advantages, not only in price but also in transportation and handling, sufficient to cover the added ex- penses incurred in buying in quantity. since 1920 there has been a rapid development in group buying by independent retailers of all kinds. the competition of chain-store systems wielding enormous buying-power advantages has forced independent dealers, both large and small, to associate for the purchase of many items, and in some cases for the joint ownership of full- sized wholesale houses. comparing the various methods of retailing as exemplified in the ordinary independent stores, the department stores and the mail-order house, from such facts as are available, it does not seem possible to assert positively that any one method presents decided general economic advantages over the rest. each pre- sents advantages in point of service, but the difference in service appears to be fully compensated in expense—that is, the public pays for what it gets and in proportion to what it gets. sol so far as the public is concerned, it seems safe to say that there are large classes who prefer and who will always continue to prefer to trade in those retail establishments offering them the highest developments of service, the department stores and the independent speciality shops. other large classes prefer and will probably always prefer to buy in stores offering less service and proportionally lower prices. undoubtedly there are many who find their greatest satisfaction in purchasing in the stores of the self-service kind, where they may look about and pick up on their own initiative whatever they may wish to buy. institutions are built to serve people in the way that they want to be served. ‘there is room, therefore, in the retail trade for many types of stores. speciality shops, department stores, chain stores and mail-order houses will all continue to exist as long as there are numbers of people who want the services each institution offers. it seems impossible to believe that any one type will monopolise the retail business or crowd out all the others. avoidable waste-—the following statements outline briefly a few of the details of distribution which it seems certain must receive attention in order to secure more economical distribution. no doubt many more could be added. poor roads greatly in- crease the costs of bringing the farmers’ crops and produce to market, costs that must be added to the price that consumers eventually pay. inadequate railway transportation is another element that makes a considerable addition to the costs. car shortages at crop-moving time, cars unsuited to the products to be hauled, excessive delays in forwarding, at terminals, on the way and at transfer points, are common sources of expense. delay in transportation as a factor of expense in distribution has not been given the attention that it deserves. poor location of terminals makes a great deal of expensive cartage necessary. congestion of traffic in city thoroughfares is a growing cause of increased costs in distributing goods. inadequate, inefhcient, poor- ly located storage facilities cause huge losses. inadequate, unau- thoritative and inaccurate collection and dissemination of market information such as is needed by producers, distributors and consumers is responsible for great wastes. through lack of such information business in many lines now passes constantly from glut to famine and back again. poor packing of merchandise, inefficient loading, rough handling and uneconomical methods of handling are causes of waste and therefore of higher costs of distribution. to refer more specifically to the activities of marketing through wholesalers and retailers, there is a startling loss of the wholesale salesman’s time in finding customers, in making appointments, in fruitless interviews. the time of both salesmen and buyers is lost. probably less than a sixth of a salesman’s time, averaging salesmen of all classes, is actually employed in selling or even in displaying and describing merchandise. anything that can be done to improve this deplorable economic condition will increase efficiency and decrease costs. no one can even begin to estimate the losses resulting from poorly trained salespeople who fail to sell and who waste the time of their purchasers through lack of knowledge of their goods, their customers’ wants and their busi- ness, or through lack of ability to use their knowledge properly. owing to lack of incentive most employees give but a fraction of their ability to their work. a dvertising.—advertising 1s or should be an invaluable aid to marketing. in thelist of expenses of distribution it occupies a prom- inent place. there is certainly room for improvement in its admin- istration. much study has been given in some organisations to such problems as the proper selection of mediums and the right use of the space taken. no doubt much greater progress can and will be made in the future in these directions, but the greatest loss in advertising seems to be in the lack of faith of the public in the advertising. if people gave more credence to advertising, much less of it would be needed to secure the same result. the remedy, of course, lies in the direction of raising the standards and shutting out the dishonest advertiser. (see advertising.) duplication.— duplication in delivery organisations. by retail stores is a source of economic waste. there are many who think that there are too many retail stores. would goods be sold for 802 less if there were fewer? probably not, because a large part of the competitive losses now occurring are borne by the dealers them- selves in unpaid services. it may be argued that if their number were reduced the rentals for the locations that would be elimi- nated could be saved. this cannot be definitely checked by such experience as has been recorded in any public way. concen- tration of retailing seems invariably to result in increasing rents. in fact, rents tend to increase faster than sales, so that the fewer the stores the higher the share of the landlord. more studies are needed to determine the exact effects of restriction of the number of stores on costs of distribution. there is further the fact that the store plant is unused for a large part of the time. store hours are by custom and legislation steadily growing shorter. this means that the capital invested in stock and plant has fewer hours in which to produce. dishonesty.—finally, there is undoubtedly an enormous loss due to unfairness and dishonesty, a loss that 1s now carried in large part if not whelly as an expense of distribution, being added to the price paid by the consumer. failure to return containers lent by distributors seems a small item, but in such a business as milk distribution in large cities the loss to milk distributors due to non-return of empty bottles is enormous. uncollectable debts and the cost of collecting delayed payments are important items in the expenses of distribution. disregard of contracts in such matters, as refusal of goods after placing orders, failure to deliver goods after orders are placed, abuse of the privilege to return goods, claims for adjustment and many other similar items make up large losses. unfair competition, efforts made not to increase legitimate business but to impede or even to destroy compet- itors, commercial bribery, “‘ graft ’’ and the exercise of monopoly, all burden distribution expense far too much. a source of con- siderable loss is theft by employees, burglars and shoplifters. some retail establishments count upon a fixed percentage on their sales representing losses due to this cause, a percentage that is added to the gross expenses which form part of the selling prices. many of the losses of the distributive business, including theft, breakage, fire and so on, are covered by insurance, the . cost of which is carried as an expense against the distributing process. anything that can be done to reduce these losses will by that much reduce expenses of distribution and prices of goods. education in marketing the leaks and wastes enumerated aboveare certainly responsi- ble for at least a quarter of the present costs of marketing. they may be responsible for a third or even more. here, then, is a great field for reducing costs by improving present methods. the first general step towards suchimprovement is education. a begin- ning has been made. before 1860 the apprenticeship system was general in england and to some extent in america, in retail, wholesale and importing houses. the apprenticeship system gradually decreased about the middle of the roth century, and for years after no systematic training was provided for young people other than the haphazard effect of their experience. the first training of modern salesmen in america seems to have been by the subscription book houses that flourished during the *seventies and ’eighties. their canvassers or book agents were thoroughly drilled or schooled in the art of selling or in securing orders. during the ’nineties sales managers in speciality manu- facturing concerns, notably the national cash register co., of dayton, o., began training their men in special schools held at the factory. training salespeople for retail stores seems to have begun in the ’nineties in such subjects as arithmetic, spelling and writing and, in 1905, in sales methods, under the auspices of the women's educational and industrial union in boston. educational] serv- ice to salespeople and other workers is now commonly found in the better classes of both wholesale and retail stores. a beginning has been made also in education in distribution and marketing in american colleges and public schools. several colleges offer courses in marketing, selling, sales management and advertising. many high schools give similar but more elementary courses. the main drawback to a rapid development of public education marketing in marketing seems to be a shortage of teachers who can conduct such courses rather than lack of public interest. such an organi- sation as the united states chamber of commerce in its relation to distribution is largely a clearing-house for information and educational ideas for its members. one of the notable things in the progress made in educational work for marketing is the growing conception of the relation of the sciences of psy- chology and sociology when practically applied to the prob- lems of marketing. bibplrography.—a. b. adams, ‘‘ marketing perishable farm products,” columbia_university studies, vol. 72, no 3 (1916); “re- ducing the cost of food distribution,” annals of the amer, acad. of pol. and soc. science (nov. 1913); g. arias, princtptt dt economia commerciale (1917); hf. el. brace, the value of organised speculation (1913); p. t. cherington, the elements of marketing (1920); f. e. clark, principles of marketing (1925); clerget, manuel d’ economie commerciale (1909); m. f. copeland, principles of merchandising (1924); p. s. converse, on marketing (rev. ed., 1925); w. w. cum- berland, co-operative afarketing (1917); c. s. duncan, afarketing: its problems and methods (1920) and wholesale marketing of food (1920); e. p. harris, co-operation the hope of the consumer (1918); j. hirsch, der moderne handel (rev. ed., 1925); a. marshall, in- dustry and trade (1920); e. g. nourse, the chicago produce market (1918); p. h. nystrom, the economics of retatling (1920); and r. a. ramsey, constructive merchandising (1925). w. sammons, keeping up with rising costs (1915) and how to run a wholesale business at a profit (1918); a. sonnichsen, consumers’ co-operation (1919); l. d. h. weld, the marketing of farm preducts (1915); white and hayward, marketing practice (1924); reports of committees at the nattonal distribution conference of the chamber of commerce of the 'nited states (1925). ch etlon) ii, in great britain excepting the larger wholesale markets in england, situated in liverpool, mincing lane, e.c., and elsewhere, which handle cotton, wheat and certain other imported products, it may be asserted that much variety, extremely haphazard methods and a considerable degree of inefficiency in organisation are the characteristics of the marketing process throughout the greater part of england, scotland and wales. for this unsatisfactory condition many reasons may be given, not the least important of which is the continued existence of market rights in the hands of private individuals or joint stock companies or their assignees enjoyed under royal charter, act of parliament, or surviving manoria) rights. scarcely less important causes are the reluctance of the smaller british producers to form societies for co-operation in the sale of their output and the comparative ease with which, hitherto, a growing home market has absorbed an output which, especially in the case of certain perishable products, has increased less rapidly than the demand. again, improvements in methods have not been necessary in the absence, until recently, of effective competition from abroad in respect of most of the less important commodities ordinarily handled in the provincial markets; while the inability of many existing markets to cope with an increase in the volume of business—an inability especially marked in some of the larger towns and arising mainly from the difficulty of reconciling numerous and conflicting vested tnterests—has rendered difficult any large-scale recasting of the marketing process throughout the country. location and organisation of the principal english wholesale food markets: fruit and vegetables ——the smaller centres of popula- tion have traditional and established market places originally set apart for the sale of produce direct from the growers to the consumers. in the larger industrial towns these markets have grown in importance (but not in physical dimensions) with the growth of the towns themselves. some have become retail markets whose continued existence it is not always easy to justify on economic grounds; but others have become wholesale markets, especially in areas where local production is insufficient or erratic and foreign imports are needed to ensure supplies, or again where transport facilities and favourable geographical situation have permitted the extension of their spheres of influence and caused them to become distributing centres for large areas. many of these are well organised and are sensitive to price movements in other markets, since, however, they draw a large proportion of marketing their supplies direct from the producer, and these supplies are liable to fluctuation, they require an additional and a more re- liable source from which to supplement the local output and from which special lines and imported supplies may be obtained to balance demand. this source they find in the central markets at important ports, and especially in the covent garden market in london, which has become a national distributing centre for fruit and vegetables. privately owned by the covent garden estates company, ltd., this market handles not only produce raised within carting dis- tance of london, which is required for london consumption, but also main crop produce in general demand, part of which is regularly recodsigned to other distributing centres, and certain produce in limited demand or supply, such as glass-house produce which commands a high price and most of which is reconsigned to other markets. much of this reconsignment business is eco- nomically indefensible; but it cannot be replaced entirely by direct consignment to provincial markets until the latter become more developed and price movements in them much less liable to be influenced by small alterations in supply and demand. meat and fish—wholesale meat markets are generally owned and managed by local authorities, and exist only in those centres of population (not more than 20 in number) where the magnitude of possible trade justifies their establishment and where retailers are assured of adequate supply with wide range of quality and prices. in smaller towns the place of the municipally owned market is taken by wholesale butchers who purchase live stock, slaughter it and sell the meat to retail dealers; and in the city of sheffield, where no meat market proper exists, the wholesalers sell at the slaughter-houses which they rent from the local] author- ity. by far the largest and most important of wholesale meat markets proper is the london central market at smithfield which in a single year handles between 400,000 and 500,000 tons, including 40% of the total imports of meat into the whole country. unlike covent garden, it undertakes practically no reconsignment of produce to other wholesale markets; but its prices for both home and imported meat (although not officially issued under the imprimatur of the city of london corporation, which is its owner and manager) are largely used as a basis for wholesale dealings in other parts of great britain. in the foreign meat trade a network of depets has been estab- lished by certain large distributing firms in all the principal cities andtownsinthecountry. tothemsupplies of chilled or frozen meat are despatched from the ports of entry. they, therefore, serve as small markets from which retailers can secure supplies with ease and promptness. the prices charged are fixed with reference to smithfield and are, therefore, fairly uniform throughout great britain; but local circumstances occasionally demand departure from strict uniformity. fish is handled at hull, grimsby, fleetwood, aberdeen and other ports, usually by dutch auction, and is distributed by the wholesale purchasers to their stalls and to representatives in certain provincial fish markets (birmingham, glasgow, liverpool, manchester and others) and also to the very important billings- gate market in london. cereals — wheat is usually sold by sample in the local corn- market nearest the producer’s home. certain of these small markets, however, attract a considerable quantity of grain from areas outside their immediate neighbourhood, and some of the largest dominate large tracts of country, frequently serving as depots for the receipt of both home-produced and imported wheat and for its export to other consuming centres. the purchasers at these local markets include millers among their number; but sale outright to merchants and sale by merchants or agents on commission are not uncommon, the latter being, perhaps, the usual plan in scotland. producers’ co-operative societies may also be employed, which may sell direct to millers, or more frequently to merchants whom the larger milling-firms find it more convenient to employ in their purchasing of home-grown wheat in bulk. barley when sold for malting and distilling is usually sold in the larger market-towns by merchants acting on a commission 803 basis on behalf of the farmer. oats are largely consumed on the farms of the growers, but direct sale by the producer to oatmeal] millers is common. merchants, however, frequently buy out- right for sale to large consumers such as collieries and railway companies. after wheat is milled it is usually sold direct to bakers, con- fectioners or other users, generally through travellers employed by the milling companies. occasionally factors or wholesale dealers intervene, who purchase from millers for re-sale on their own account to small bakers in the more sparsely populated districts. distribution by this method is uncommon, however, in the case of home-milled flour; although imported flour is nearly always handled by wholesale dealers of this kind. at the next stage, that of baking, a few firms in several of the more important centres of population confine themselves to a purely wholesale trade. a fair number attempt to combine partial retail distribution with wholesale manufacture and usually possess retail shops where the bread is sold over the counter direct to the consumer or from which door to door delivery by van may be undertaken. the majority of baking firms, however, confine themselves strictly to retail trade, selling, in addition to bread, various forms of confectionery, such as cakes, sweets and bis- cults, which may be either proprietary articles or manufactured by the bakers themselves; but certain difficulties, occasioned especially in the north of england by housewives buying bread at irregular intervals only, encourage distributors to cease manufacture themselves and to rely on wholesale baking firms entirely for the supplies which they need. poultry and eggs.—owing to the fact that british producers of poultry and eggs have no export trade to foreign markets, there is no obligation on them to conform to standardised methods in the dis- posal of their products. there is consequently great variety in the marketing of these commodities and the plan adopted by an individ- ual producer depends partly on the scale upon which he is operating and partly on his situation relative to his market or his customers. sale may take place (2) by private treaty in the producing area; (6) by auction in the producing area; (c) directly to distant dis- tributors; (d) through commission salesmen in distant wholesale markets; (¢) through co-operative societies. to the first of these classes may be assigned sales at local weekly markets of eggs and dressed poultry to local customers, sales by parcel post or rail direct to the consumer, sales from door to door often in conjunction with milk and vegetables, sale to local distributors in the nearest market town and sales at the farm. this latter plan is common throughout england and wales, intermediaries known as higglers (also as cad- gers and hagylers) going round in districts where the farms are scat- tered and distant from the larger consuming centres. the higgler calls at the farm with a vehicle once or twice a week, buys all the eggs and poultry available and pays cash without much regard to classification or to quality. ile then resells privately or in open market to wholesale and retail distributors; but he may occasionally send consignments to wholesale markets for sale on commission. the system of selling by local auction has been greatly extended in recent years. the stirling live-stock mart 1s a good example, and the kings lynn market also is one that has lately made marked progress in this comparatively new development. for sale on commission the smithfield and leadenhall markets in london are utilised as well as the various wholesale markets in the provinces. costs of distribution the costs of distribution vary considerably with the nature of the commodity handled, the method adopted and the degree of efficiency in the market organisation available to the producer, in the case of cereals the fees paid by the farmers in the local corn-exchange are very small. sixpence per day, one guinea per year, one penny on each occasion the market is entered, threepence per person entrance fee for sale by sample, are a few examples taken at random of the rentals and fees in actual operation at the present time. cartage to the market or railway station is also the farmers’ expense. this ts reckoned at is. to 2s. 6d. per quarter of grain up to a distance of 8 to 10 miles. merchants selling wheat on commission for growers are paid gd. to is. per quarter or 2d. or 3d. per hundredweight. these figures are slightly higher in the cases of barley and oats. a rent ranging from 2 guineas to over 8 guineas per annum is charged to merchants who operate in the local exchanges and who require stands, desks or space on the market floor. | fruit and vegetables.—-for fruit and vegetables the costs incurred in the complete marketing process are proportionally greater than in the case of cereals. considerable expense arises in the preparation of produce for the market. dressing potatoes for example costs 4s. to 5s. per ton. cartage to railway station is estimated in lincoln- shire on the average to amount to 3s. to 4s. perton. railway charges are moderate and, on the whole, reasonable. in the distributive 804 market itself porterage charges and market tolls are an additional burden and then there are the payments to the commission salesman for his services. , it is the practice of the commission salesman to supply the recep- tacles or containers needed by the producer and generally to act on the latter's behalf once the produce is despatched from the farm. when a sale has been effected the salesman remits to the grower the anfount realised less the charges for use of containers, for transport, porterage, market dues and also a commission on the selling price for service rendered. the latter is nominally about 73°, but actually in cases investigated by the linlithgow committee an average of to or 12% was found. in its further passage towards the consumer the produce may find its way direct to the retailer from the commission salesman, or it may be sold to a commission buyer acting for a distant wholesaler, who in turn resells to the local retailers from whom the consumer buys. these agents who buy on commission may act merely on behalf of principals who cannot attend the market in person, or may them- selves buy on their own credit and assume full responsibility for the produce and for bad debts, charging up goods at cost price, adding porterage-out and a flat-rate charge to cover labelling, consigning and the clearing of emptics. in the former case they receive a flat- rate per package, handled (2d. in covent garden). in the latter they charge 23 to 7} on the cost price. it is calculated that the wholesalers on whose behalf they act make a net profit of about 2° on their sales to retailers, and that the latter obtain a net profit of over 6% on the cost of the goods or a little under 4° on turnover. the diversity, however, of retail serv- ices demanded by the consuming public and the wide range of costs entailed cannot but make for uncconomic distribution of these products; it would not be correct to state that the middiemen actually engaged in the marketing process make profits that are unduly large. | amfeat.—in the meat trade the following estimates taken from the linlithgow report exhibit well the costs incurred and prices paid and received in the passage of beef from the english farmer to con- sumers in larger industrial centres. s. d farmer receives for one animal from dealer at local market. , cs 3b ooo. 6 farrier’s expenses (tolls, etc.) . . oo 9 3 farmer's net receipts . a , . 30 10 9 dealer receives from wholesale butcher . e210 “0 dealer’s expenses (rail, tolls, feeding, etc.) . es tes 2g dealer’s net profit ae re ye be. 6 wholesale butcher receives from retailer __. » bo <a 29 wholesale butcher receives for hide and offals . 3 ito 6 gross receipts of wholesale butcher... 25. ie 5 expenses of wholesale butcher (slaughtering) igs <2 wholesale butcher’s gross profit a es ee retailer’s receipts from consumers . - ««36.. [oy to retailer’s payment to wholesale butcher ~ ofr bae. ® retailer’s gross profit . 2 w& ce s « o g the weight of meat sold in this instance was 690 pounds. the net rice paid by consumer being £36 9s. rod. and the receipt from offals being £3 los. 6d. the difference between the net price received by the farmer and the total made by meat and offals is, therefore, the difference between £40 0s. 4d. and £30 ios. 9d., 7.¢., £9 9s. 7d. the corresponding differences for wiltshire bacon and for pork were £3 14s. 7d. and £1 16s. 6d. for weights of 1.40 and 148 ib. respectively. the same committee also collected figures showing the receipts from the sale of a forequarter of frozen beef weighing 187 ib. and costing £2 14s. 63d. or 34d. per pound. in this case £5 6s. 13d. was realised, giving a gross profit of 48-6% on sales. in another case new zealand lamb costing {1 17s. 4d. was retailed at f2 8s. od., leaving a gross profit of 22-2% on sales. when it is remembered that the expenses of the retailer in the case of frozen meat are sub- stantially less than in the case of home-killed meat, owing to the absence of slaughtering and dressing costs, the very remuncrative character of trade in forcign meat is readily perceived. again, com- petition appears to be less active in the retail meat trade generally than it was before 1914, and this notw.thstanding an imercase in the number of establishments since that date. it would seem to be the case that butchers, having been encouraged to purchase collectively during the war period, still combine to keep down prices both of stock and meat; and further that retailers to a considerable extent azrce on the prices consumers are required to pay and on the whole refrain from underselling one another in open competition. in the distribution of bacon retailers usually purchase supplics of home-cured bacon direct from the factory; but in some cases they may buy from wholesale provision merchants. the margin obtained by the wholesaler is about 23%. this is ample for the services he renders. the retailer’s gross profit is more difficult to ascertain; for this trade is mainly undertaken by grocers who rarely separate it off from other departments of their business, it appears, however, that the profit on english bacon is from 10 to 14 %o of the sale price. marketing poultry and f-.ggs.—in the selling of poultry and eggs at the local market, apart from the cost of conveyiag the produce to the place of sale, the vendor usually has to pay market tolls and, in the case of sales by auction, the auctioneer’s fee, the average tolls charged (by the local authorities who usually own the markets) are }d. to 2d. for poultry and from 4d. per score to 6d. per 100 for eggs. auction charges generally range from 5 to 73% of the price realised and, consequently, are higher than those for selling livestock. this, no doubt, is because of the smaller value of the individual lots put up for sale. the higgler's profit in the districts where he flourishes is from id. to 2d. per doz. on eggs. this is not excessive; but his serv- ice, nevertheless, is not economical. the dealer’s business is more speculative, owing to the rapid fluctuations in prices from day to day and from market to market. ilis average profit of from 2d. to 4d. per doz. on eggs is, therefore, reasonable, especially as he provides boxes and pays transport charges. commission salesmen’s charge is 5 °% of the selling price, and wholesale dealers purchasing an their own account aim at a gross profit on eggs of about 2d. per doz. and of 2d. to 3d. per ib. on dead poultry. probably it is in the retail section that profit margins in this trade are greatest and most open to question, 14°. on eggs and 20 to 30%, on poultry being the averages for the whole country. producers complain that the difference between the prices they receive for poultry and those paid by the public has increased dis- proportionately in recent years. the gross margin formerly to cover profits and expenses of all intermediaries was roughly is. per bird. the current margin is about 6d. per lb., which is approximately is. 6d. to 2s, 6d. per bird. co-operative marketing the organisation of producers on a co-operative basis for the disposal of their produce and for the carrying out the processes involved in marketing is not a new development in great britain; but the progress made is insignificant compared with what has taken place elsewhere. figures in the returns furnished to the chief registrar of friendly societies for the year ending march 31 1924, referring to societies operating only in england and wales, establish the fact that roughly about 33° of the total value of agricultural produce marketed in england and wales was handled by co-operative marketing societies or co-operative socicties with marketing branches. the following table which is taken from no. 1, of the economic series published in 1925 by the ministry of agriculture and fisheries (great britain) sets out in detail the position for the 12 months beginning april 1 1923. the following table shows the number and turnover of agricul- tural marketing societics and certain other societies handling agri- cultural produce as part of their general trading during the period 1923-4. the table excludes turnovers in grain, hay, potatoes, etc., of general trading societies. number commodity handled of turnover? societies £ dairy produce . ; . ; 63 1,447,627 eggs and poultry —. : 43 349,262 fruit and vegetables > : : 18 301,932 livestock! . . ; ; 9 375,128 auction marts (livestock) ; 18 1,081,953 slaughterhouses : | ii 415,270 bacon factories . . , , _ 6 694,8263 woo ce kk wks 13 200,0004 | total . ; | 181 : 4,565,998 ‘this entry covers socicties selling livestock on behalf of members otherwise than through an auction mart owned or rented by the socicty. 2turnover in respect of produce handled, and not necessarily total turnover of society. 31924 figures. 4j<stimated value. these 181 societies are widely distributed without any union or centralising agency which might secure joint action or otherwise look after common interests. attempts, however, have been made from time to time to fedecrate them or to institute an advisory body to assist them to sell advantageously. the most recent project of this kind was the establishment in 1918 of the agricultural wholesale society with the object of buying and selling for such societies everything that is best bought or sold on wholesale lines. the capital of this new wholesale body, however, proved tnadequate; and in consequence of a period of acute trade depression with insuffi- cient resources and credit to enable it to surmount its difficulties it markham—marne, first battle of the went into liquidation in 1924. during its bricf existence it seems to have done more bulk purchasing of agricultural implements and seeds than large scale marketing of produce; although it did set up a department to market eggs and established a meat section to help the co-operative slaughterhouses in their sales in smithfield market. its downfall involved the agricultural organisation society in such difficulties that the latter body also succumbed a short time after. present development.—the present trend is in the direction of the several groups of societies forming their own trading feder- ations on a commodity basis and thus falling into line with the general course of development towards larger scale marketing and trade. onesuch central trading body is the english farmers’ bacon agency. another, the british egg producers, which took over the business of an earlier body of the same kind, has hardly met with the success it deserves; but a regional trading federation in south wales, called the south wales mutual dairies, which is a selling agency for four large dairy societies in carmarthen- shire and pembrokeshire, has had better fortune. there is also a rather undefined union of fruit and vegetable marketing co- operative societies of the counties of worcester, gloucester, warwick and those adjoining, which is growing into a trading federation; but, on the whole, the association of co-operative marketing societies for joint action in the conduct of the sale of their produce is only very slightly developed in great britain. since 1900 many efforts have been made to establish trading relations between these agricultural producers’ co-operative or- ganisations and the industrial co-operative movement. the 1,300 retail consumers’ societies of the latter are said, approxi- mately, to feed one-third of the whole consuming population of great britain and are, therefore, in a position to offer an assured outlet for the produce of british farms, while some progress has been made in bringing the two organisations into closer re- lations it is obvious that the natural clash of interests between producers and consumers must always make price-fixing dificult. if this awkward point could be settled satisfactorily, much might be done to eliminate the control now exercised by the many middlemen in the marketing of agricultural produce. (see co- operation, agricultural.) the foop council the general dissatisfaction with retail prices during the years succeeding the period of war-time government control resulted in the appointment in 1922 of a departmental committee (the linlithgow committee) of the ministry of agriculture and fisheries to inquire into the mcthods and costs of selling and distributing agricultural, horticultural and dairy produce in great britain and to consider how the disparity between the price received by the producer and that paid by the consumer could be diminished. this was followed by a royal commission on food prices in 1924 with terms of reference not very different. asa result of the first (and only) report of the latter body a food council was sent up to study current and future problems of wheat and meat supplies and to issue periodical reports. this council is not endowed with any statutory powers. it seeks to work by focusing public opinion on whatever it judges to be un- reasonable prices or unduly high profits; but it shirks definite price-fixing and thus avoids many problems that presented themselves during the period of government control and to which no satisfactory solution ever was given. bibliography.—ministry of food, first, second, third, fourth, fifth and final reports of the departmental committee on the whole- sale food markets of london (1920-1); london county council, london wholesale food markets (1921); j. g. smith, organised prod- uce markets (1922); ministry of agriculture and fisheries, zxierim and final reports of the departmental committee on distribution and prices of agricultural produce (1924); agricultural tribunal of in- vestigation, final report (1924); first report of the royal commis- ston on food prices with minutes of evidence and appendices (1925): ministry of agriculture and fisheries, economic series, no. 1, 2, 3, etc. (1925). j. g. su) markham, sir clements robert (1830-1016), british geographer (see 17.734), died in london jan. 30 1916. the principal work of his later years was connected with the two antarctic expeditions under capt. r. f. scott. an important 805 history of arctic and antarctic exploration by markham was completed posthumously by dr. f. h. h. guillemard and published in 1921 under the title of the lands of silence. a life, written by his cousin, adml. sir a. h. markham, was published in 1917. | marne, first battle of the, the series of actions fought in sept. 1914, when the french and british armies turned at bay between paris and verdun and defeated the germans, driving them back to the aisne. the germans had hoped to bring france to her knees in six weeks, but when four weeks had expired france and england were still keeping their opponent at arms’ length. the germans were indeed slightly ahead of their time table, but they had in- sufficient troops to carry out their grandiose plan. antwerp and. maubeuge had necessitated a subtraction of strength and the invasion of east prussia had ied to the dispatch of two corps from the german right wing in france. further, the rapid ad- vance had led to considerable wastage and the comparative breakdown of wireless was hampering the invaders. i. the opening operations advance on paris.—the original plan had implied that if the french formed a great defensive flank resting on paris, the capital was to be turned by forces pushed west and south of it ; reserve divi- sions were to be dropped for the investment; and the five field armies, pivoting on thionville, were to make a stupendous left wheel and toforce the allies against the swiss frontier. by aug. 28 this plan had begun to show signs of weakness. the german right wing was not strong enough and was too widely spread out. the it. army was in comparative isolation and found itself committed to an advance against the great fortress of paris. this army was roughly handled by the french at the battle of guise on aug. 29 and its commander, von biilow, thereupon sent out urgent appeals to the i. and ili. armics on his right and left respectively to close in to his aid. these cries for help altered the whole course of the war. the commander of the i. army was glad to switch off from the elusive british army and decided to turn inwards. the hand of german supreme headquarters was now forced. they approved the scheme, although it meant giving up the advance on paris. the new objective of the right wing was to be the flank of the french main forces opposite the ii. army. envelopment was still held in view, but the net was to start its scoop east of paris instead of west of it. opposed to this wavering was the consistent policy of joffre. an orderly retirement until he could gain the respite afforded by some topo- graphical obstacle was his dominating thought. here he pro- posed to reform and reorganise and then to assume the offensive at the earliest possible moment. the limits of the withdrawal were laid down as the territory immediately south of the rivers seine, aube and ornain. <a retirement so far would mean the isolation of paris, but joffre clearly realised that the fate of paris would be decided in a battle fought, not under its walls, but in the open field. defence of paris —paris was not undefended. it had, indeed, been proposed to declare it a ville ouverte, but the patriotism of its inhabitants decreed otherwise. the military governor was general gallieni, who had under him four and a half divisions of terriforials, some cavalry and ficld artillery, as well as 5,000 fusiliers marins. on sept. 1 the newly formed vi. army, some 60,000 strong, was placed under his command, and in addition he received sordet’s cav. corps, two reserve divisions and a par- ticularly fine reinforcement in the shape of the 45th div. from north africa. gallieni had therefore a respectable mobile force at his disposal, as well as garrison troops. his first duty was the defence of the capital against which, so far as he knew, the german right wing was steadily advancing. the task was a difficult one, for the apathy and neglect of successive french governments had been reflected in the unreadiness of the fortress. by herculean efforts much was done in the limited timeat his disposal, but gallieni took a grave view of the situation. then suddenly the whole situation changed. up to the morning of sept. 3 it seemed certain that the german right wing was advancing 806 @ a4 vc sar? sur: antife [senlisf7 ze faa f on paris with the senlis-paris road as the axis of movement; by the afternoon information, transmitted by aeroplanes and cavalry patrols, clearly showed that the german i. army had switched off from paris and was heading south-east towards the junction of the right of the british and the left of the french v. army. the situation in which gallienit now found himself was one which demanded exceptional powers of decision. on the one hand there was the german i. army making a flank march across the north-east of paris, ‘* trailing its coat ’? under the very eyes of the garrison, and providing a temptation almost 1tmpossible to resist. on the other hand there was the fact that joffre had declared that he did not wish to undertake an offensive until he had got his army behind the upper scine and aube. at 9 a.m. on the 4th gallieni, anticipating the sanction of the commander- in-chief, directed the commander of the vi. army to hold his troops in readiness for an advance against von kluck’s exposed right flank. next he communicated with joffre and sir john french. all three were equally desirous of assuming the offen- sive at the earliest possible moment and any divergence of opinion was only on matters of detail. joffre’s offensive.—little reflection was necessary to convince jofire that a chance not often met with in war was now vouch- safed him. he determined to assume the offensive from where he stood and shortly before midnight he issued his orders stating that advantage was to be taken of the situation of the german i. army to concentrate against it the efforts of the allied armics of the extreme left. all preparations were to be carried out on sept. 5 and the attack was to be made on the 6th. dis position of the forces.—at this moment the position of the allied armies in france resembled a ribbon attached at its ends to paris and verdun and sagging slightly by its own weight in the centre. at paris was the french vi. army and other avail- able troops. next came the british army. then in succession the french v., [x., iv., and il. armies, the right of the latter joining up with the mobile forces of verdun. the initial orders included the vi., british, v. and tx. armies only. the first was to cross the ourcq and make for chateau thierry. the british were to be ready to attack in the direction of montmirail. the vy. army was, generally speaking its right protected by the ix. army. during sept. 5 supple- mentary orders were issued to the iv. and iii. armies, the gen- eral trend of which was that they were to attack inwards and thus to bring about a double envelopment of the german armics. facing the allies were the five german armics to which had been entrusted the great turning movement pivoting on thionville, , to attack from south to north,’ marne, first battle of the battle of the 1914 position at commencement of battle english miles r) 20 40 kilometres main roilwa main roads french amie — british army erman armes a end villon i tourbee 4, ? | 3 ! 4 . , < averdun fothion es {8 miles l ae aol numbered i. to v. from right to left. the french, british and german armics thus enumerated were those immediately con- cerned in the operations now known as the battle of the marne. further to the southeast, between the fortress of toul and the swiss frontier, the german vi. and vii. armies had been heavily engaged with the french i. and ii. armies since the middle of august. during the evening of sept. 4 a new directive was issued to the german forces. by it the i. and ii. armies on the right were now to face west towards paris. on the ieft the iv. and v. armies, by a determined advance south-east, were to open a passage across the moselle, in which region a lesser sedan might yet take place. the iii. army in the centre was to push south ready to assist either wing as required. thus von moltke was forced to abandon the hopes founded on the great massive wheel of five armies pivoting on thionville and instead was compelled hurried y to assign to his armies three divergent axes of march towards the west, south and south-east. in the new scheme it was von kluck’s task to remain between the oise and marne. instead of doing so he continued pushing on over the latter river. as the french vi. army had been ordered to cross the ourcq and to advance towards chateau thierry a collision between it and the flank guard of the german i. army was now but a matter of hours. almost exactly at noon on sept. 5 a battalion of the french vi. army came under heavy shell fire from the german flank guard. some very heavy fighting ensued and by evening the french had made good a little ground, although at the expense of heavy casualties. it. the actual battle the battle proper may be considered as starting on sept. 6. the french vi. army moved out to the attack with both of its flanks protected by cavalry. by then von kluck had begun to comply with orders by withdrawing his troops across the marne. the bulk of the day’s fighting took place opposite the right wing of the french vi. army and especially against the extreme right. it was soon evident to gen. maunoury, the french commander, that the german flank guard was being sub- stantially reinforced. von kluck could, however, only reinforce his right flank at the expense of his front, and, in consequence, opposite the british there was a noticeable slackening in the ad- vance of the german [. army. put briefly, the relative situation of that army had changed. what had been its right flank— consisting of the iv. res. corps and a cavalry division—was, by successive reinforcements, to become the front; while the original front, by a corresponding diminution, was transformed marne, first battle of the into the left flank, and the army as a whole was to face west instead of south. the hesitation observable in the german advance was soon followed by an unmistakable retrograde movement. the british lost no time in seizing the heights on the grand morin south of coulommiers, from which german heavy guns had during the morning brought an effective fire to bear. save for some fighting early in the morning about rozoy—an action brought on by the germans to cover their retreat—the british were not heavily engaged, though a few prisoners and machine-guns were taken. to the right of the british, the french v. army, after a check early in the day, had made a substantial advance, the ger- man j. army was now in the position of having to fight desper- ately to hold off the converging attack of the french v1., the british, and the french v. armics. the fighting on the ourcq on sept. 7 was hard and bitter. even at the risk of weakening himself elsewhere, even of causing a gap between himself and the il. army, von kluck had to bring every available man to the fight. the effect of his action was that a gap, soon to yawn into a gulf of 30 m., was opened between the german i. and if. armies. into this gap the british and the left of the french v. army were steadily pushing. in other words, von kluck found himself committed to an isolated action with his left and rear exposed. unless he could hold off the brit- ish and the french v. army sufficiently long to enable him to dispose of the french vi. army he was defeated. but for his task he had neither the time nor the men. after a day of hard fighting the french vi. army had made some further progress, and its front ran generally from cham- bray through barcy and marcilly to the high ground west of etavigny. the british were now opposed merely by german cavalry reinforced by jiiger battalions and were enabled to push their line to la haute maison-aulnoy-chailly and jouy sur morin. the french v. army likewise made good progress, reaching the line la ferte gaucher-trefois. further to the right the fighting had been severe, the left of foch’s ix. army being heavily attacked and forced to call on the v. army for help. a somewhat disquieting feature of the day was the apparent intention of the germans to make another effort to turn the paris-verdun line at nancy and at troyon, where a successful thrust would very seriously discount the irench efforts on the ourcq. worse still, maubeuge fell on sept. 7, and the invaders not only gained another rail line of communication but had now another corps available for operations in the field. against these drawbacks, however, could be set the fact that the gap between the german [. and ii. armies had considerably wid- ened, and into it, the british army and the left of the french v. army were now advancing with speed. sept. 8 was remarkable for the violence of the german attacks along the ourcq. maunoury’s plan was to attack with his right centre and left, while the vii. corps in the centre was ordered to hold its line at all costs. that corps was heavily attacked carly in the afternoon, and such was the severity of the fighting that a week later the streets of etrepilly and trocy were still blocked with the bodies of the slain. to the north the french outflanking movement was brought to a standstill, while even the superb gallantry of the zouaves of the 45th div. on the right centre failed to make any considerable impression on the enemy. dur- ing the afternoon gallieni visited the commander of the vi. army at his headquarters at st. soupplets and pointed out that the greater the resistance offered by the germans on the ourcq the less opposition would the british meet with in their advance. nevertheless, maunoury considered it advisable to make ar- rangements for a possible withdrawal on the following day. meanwhile the british army was discounting the efforts which von kluck was making on the ourcq. sir john french decided that the best method of assisting the french vi. army implied the speedy passage of the petit morin and marne rivers, for after passing the latter the british army would be facing northwest and thus almost directly threat- ening the line of retreat of the german i. army. orders were accordingly issued for a general attack along the line of the petit 807 morin, to begin early on sept. 8. at first the march was undis- turbed, but on reaching the petit morin it was soon realised that the german cavalry would not yield without a struggle, especially as the steep valley covered with small but thick woods distinctly favoured the defence. some severe fighting ensued, but by evening the british had made good the petit morin and were on the line la nouec-viels maisons, where they joined up with the ii. cav. corps of the trench vy. army, the left corps of which extended to the southern outskirts of montmirail. sept. 9 was to witness von kluck’s last effort on the oureq. the french vi. army, although it had been reinforced, was at the end of its strength and its left was pushed back. a superb effort, however, restored the day and then it was clear that von kluck had shot his bolt. during the day the british crossed the marne and on its right the french v. army seized chateau yhicrry. thus on the extreme west of the great battle things had gone well for the allies, and it is now time to turn to the doings in the centre of the field. german supreme headquarters had ordered the i. and ii. armies to form front facing paris, the former between oise and marne and the latter between marne and seine, chateau thierry to be the point of junction of the two armies. this order had at first been disregarded by von kluck, who had persisted in his passage over the marne and in maintaining his position in front of the it. army. von biilow, however, endeavoured to comply with the orders of his superiors, and did make an eflort to wheel his army to the right with the object of taking up the line cha- teau thierry (exclusive)—marigny-le-grand. the net result of compliance with orders by one army commander and disregard of them by the other was that the right corps of the hl. army was squeezed out of the line by the left corps of the i. army. in other words, the two armies were acting upon different plans; overlapping had arisen; and the confusion inevitable in such cir- cumstances began to be revealed upon the evening of sept. 5. this factor alone was bound to hamper the ii. army, and von bilow’s task was not lightened by the subsequent conduct of his neighbour. when von kluck renounced his plunge south- east he did it with such thoroughness as to lead to the transfer of practically his whole strength to the ourcq. on sept. 7 he demanded back the iii. and ix. corps which he had lent von bilow but the day before. the withdrawal of these units to the ourcq exposed von biilow’s right flank; a great gap was thus opened between the il. and i. armies and von kluck, who had, on sept. 5, inconvenienced von biilow by his undue proximity, was now seriously embarrassing that commander by his aloofness. ill. the german retreat retreat of von biilow.—generally speaking, the task of the tx. army under foch for sept. 6 was to support the advance of the v. army with its left flank while maintaining a watching attitude along the rest of its front. foch, however, found himself quite unable to carry out even the moderate programme he had drawn up. von bilow was endeavouring to wheel into position between | marne and seine, and on his left the iii. army’s orders were to push due south. as a result the french were attacked with con- siderable vigour all along the line for, although his right was be- coming compromised, von biilow was able on the 7th to push on with his centre and left, the latter flank working in conjunc- tion with the german iii. army. but owing to the determined resistance of the french ix. army under foch and to the assist- ance afforded him by the french v. army on his left, the germans made no great impression other than to deny the french ix. army the possibility of making progress north and west. on the following day, sept. 8, the germans renewed the attack and a serious position developed for the right of the french lx. army, which was forced to give ground. foch refused, however, to be perturbed inasmuch as the news which came in of the course of the fighting east and west of him was reassuring. on the oth a sudden german attack told on the french left. foch’s reply was to move his reserve from his shattered left to join in a counter attack from his right, realising as he did that the danger of the german thrust was more apparent than real. 808 reports as to the forcing of the line of the marne by british troops during sept. 9 forced von bilow to the conclusion that retreat was inevitable for von kluck, and that his own ij. army must fall back at once, if it were to avoid envelopment on its right flank. with the object of gaining time to get his long trains safely back over the marne, the offensive by his left and centre was carried out with vigour during the morning, the french right being driven back to salon; but early in the afternoon the german if. army and the right of the iii. army were in full retreat, strong rear guards being left facing the french. verdun.—the fighting described up to the present, i.e., that between the ourcg and f¢ere-champenoise, must not be allowed to overshadow the operations of the french armies between vitry-le- francois and verdun. for nowhere on the whole front was the tenacity of the french iil. and 1v. armies surpassed. it was towards the east that the germans hoped to retrieve their failure elsewhere. here they hoped to cut off verdun from either side and to bring about a kind of minor sedan in which the french i., ii., itt. and iv. armies might be herded together and de- stroyed. the german vi. and vii. armies were to advance east- wards across the moselle; the iv., with its right passing through vitry-le-francois, was to bear down across champagne, while the german crown prince with his v. army was to proceed round the entrenched camp of verdun. fortunately for the french the crown prince based his advance upon a misconcep- tion. he assumed that verdun would be left to its fate, whereas sarrail commanding the french iii. army kept his right at- tached to it throughout and, further, on his own responsibility, ordered the fortress commander to use his troops to make an attack on the crown prince’s communications. german retreat.—the attacks of the germans brought the french into a serious position, especially the iv. army of langle de cary. in fact, at one time there was a serious chance that its right might be rolled up. however, reinforcements from the extreme french right, that is to say the i. and 11. armies in the vosges, restored the situation. then, on sept. 8, the li. army was called upon to deal with a new peril. fort troyon was in serious difficulties and thus a very patent danger to the rear of the iii. army was suddenly revealed. the garrison, however, put up a stout resistance and the place was relieved by a french cavalry division from toul on sept. 10. the germans renewed their attacks on the following day but they were without signifi- cance. from verdun to paris five german armies were in re- treat. the great battle of the marne had been fought and won, it was not for several years after the battle that the world learnt how and why it was broken off by the germans. the truth ‘'s that by sept. 8 von moltke had completely lost his grip of the pattle. in these circumstances a liaison ofiicer, lt. col. hentsch, was directed to visit the v.,1v.,itl., if. and i. armies in turn and to bring back a clear idea of the situation. further, he was empowered to issue such orders as would close the gap between the i. and ii. armies should he find that retreat had sct in upon the right wing. the critical point of his tour was his visit to the ii. army where he spent the night of sept. 8-9. von bulow was considerably disconcerted about the passage of the british over the marne; he came to the conclusion that the retreat of the i. army was inevitable, and that therefore his own li. army must fall back if his right were not to be enveloped. hentsch agreed and proceeded next day to the i. army, where he interviewed von kluck’s chicf of staff. although the latter considered that the i. army could held its own there was now no option but to order its retirement. thus by the late afternoon of the oth the whole right and right centre of the german army was falling back. supreme headquarters, in ignorance of the fact, were preparing for a continuance of the offensive but had to bow to the inevitable. during the roth orders were issued [or the retreat of the five armies behind the aisne and vesle. by the 16th the german front was thus traced out—the neigh- bourhood of noyon, the plateaux south of vic-sur-aisne and soissons, the tableland of laon, the heights north and west of reims north of ville-sur-tourbe, varennes, and thence to the meuse near forges wood, north of verdun. marne, second battle of thle conclusious.— thus tamely petered out the grandiose german plan, and thus ended the great and decisive battle of the marne. tactically indecd it was somewhat of a disappointment te the allies. no part of the german host was annihilated or even im- mobilised for any length of time. the number of trophies and prisoners was inconsiderable. the germans broke off the fight in their own time. no great pursuit, as had succeeded jena, took place, and the germans were able to retire, if not unscathed at any rate in fair order. from the strategic and moral aspects, however, the battle was of immense importance. it marked for the allies the definite turn in the tide of defeat, while for the ger- mans it marked, no less, the collapse of the plan with which they had entered on the war and on which the great general stafi had been prepared to hazard the fate of the fatherland. that plan had aimed at securing a rapid decision in france with the bulk of the german armies, and the subsequent and immediate prosecution of a second campaign against the more slowly mobilising strength of russia. but by sept. ro 1914 the ger- mans had definitely acknowledged defeat in france. it is signifi- cant that the battle of the marne has been called by the germans themselves der wendepunkt (the turning point) of the war. binliocrapiy.—a,. corbett-smith, the afarne and after (1917); f, e. whitton, the a\\farne campaign (1917); k. von biillow, alen bericht aur marneschlacht (1919); a. von kluck, der marsch auf paris und die marne-schlacht (2914) (1920). see also wortp war: bibliography. (f. e. w.*) marne, second battle of the.—the second battle of the marne developed between july 15 and aug. 4 1918. begin- ning with the german offensive of july 15, which was broken on the champagne front between that date and july 18, it was concluded by the victorious counter-offensive of the french armies of july 18-aug. 4, extending from the marne to the aisne. this was the prelude to the general offensive of the allied armies and their uninterrupted march to the victory of nov. 11. a typical “ defensive-offensive ” battle, it demonstrated at once the will of the french high command to impose its preconceived plan upon the enemy, and the rare faculty possessed by the french soldier of passing direct from parry to riposte with an energy and vigour that recent ordeals seemed only to have strengthened. (sce also german offensive.) i. introduction two months earlier, gen. foch, commander-in-chief of the allicd armics, had decided to take the initiative at the first possible moment,! and, true to the principle that ‘ to make war is to attack,” was determined to give the enemy no further respite once he had gripped him. the opportunity he sought was given him by a mistake on the part of the german supreme command, which, having crowded its forces into the pocket of chateau-thierry, was now to fird the position made worse by the resounuing check to the otfensive in champagne. german plans.—the allies had had information at the be- ginning of july of two german plans of offensive: one on the french front in champagne, the other on the british front from arras to ypres. it remained to be seen which would be launched first, for the enemy had not the necessary reserves and material for the execution of the two simultaneously on such extended fronts. it soon became known that the attack in champagne would precede that in flanders and would take place ahout july 9 or 10. as it turned out, the check to the first offensive was to prevent the enemy from executing the second. the enemy’s plan was known in detail: he was to attack on either side of reims, the principal effort beirg entrusted to the i. and wii. german armies, moving on chalons, while the vii. army crossed the marne in the direction of dormans and rejoined the main attack in the region of epernay. foch’s preparations —meanwhile foch was preparing the severe riposte that he was about to inflict on the enemy. to meet the essential requirements of the expected defensive battle in champagne and, at the same time, to make provision for the counter-offensive which petain was preparing in the soissonnals, 1 order no. 3 of foch, may 20. marne, second battle of the um beauvais zt ye pret: a yee as = ry a = rods ee y 2. x a foes ms en. \"= pee ‘f e f a 4 a7 zi <2 p vhs, \"begs 3 . : ss aes rs nes a ats \" kia wee a, 7 : ? “.a sr hs a bomeutteovalais scar todttre ‘ nena oren z, = $s | et steyn ence villers-cotteretsy<\"e-y 4 vo villers m re | ee oe alaid2? e omt cemapitrepill may en malia k eo ‘pi tlyo ta provias,l2 mile he brought together between the oise and the argonne a reserve mass of 38 infantry divisions (29 french, four british and five american) and six french cavalry divisions. these strong re- serves were to be augmented at an early date by the arrival of new american divisions, just in time for the critical moment when the adversary could only with difficulty maintain his forces. thus, in the middle of july, the point was reached at which the balance between the forces became re-established and was about to turn in the allies’ favour. this was the moment chosen by foch for taking the offensive. composition of french army.—before defining the part plaved by the french armies in the second battle of the marne, it may be as well to state that they comprised, at that time, 103 divisions, divided into three groups of armies under the command of gen. petain, whose headquarters were at provins. tabee i. reserve group gen. fayolle, at noailles commander head- area quarters i. army . | gen, debeney conty amiens region. it, army gen. humbert clermont | st. just-en- chaussee | region. x. army gen. mangin versigny | villers-cotterets region. centre group gen, maistre, at sesanne vi. army . | gen. degoutte trilport | chateau-thierry region. v. army gen. berthelot montmort pee and the south. iv. army . | gen. gouraud st; east of reims. nemmie ix. army . | gen. de mitry between vi. and | v. armies. eastern group gen. de castelnau, at mirecourt viil. army | gen. gerard flavigny vii. army | gen.de boissoudy| lure degoutte with his vi. army was later placed under the orders of fayolle, in the reserve group of armies. de mitry’s ix. army was brought in during the course of the battle. these forces held 600 km.—this being about two-thirds of the total allied front. | barbstion 809g battle of the marne i918 english miles 10 kilometres 0 10 20 1 main railways main roads gu? he ’ ag ; a, er brie sty. massiges'o # es, ys de -ke un : risin ag — wy cie :% i pa ie stl: ~ sur: marne: se, sas id vali \\ arne ‘s $7 e memmie ere- champenorse ee ee ppd ! je-francots ce a an = . bea's general organisation of the offensive-—the gencral-in-chief had, on july 12, stated the mission of the two groups of armies to be: ‘to reduce the pocket of chateau-thierry by means of two lateral thrusts towards the plateau situated north of fere- en-tardenois . . . . ” so as to bring about the junction in this region of the two groups of armies, the tactical limits for which were clearly marked by the line chateau-thierry (for the re- serve group), fere-en-tardenois (for the centre group). he had, as early as july 8, settled the means that would be at their dis- posal, defined the action they were to take, and ordered the prep- aration. but the centre group of armies, against whom the imminent attack would be directed, had still first to break this attack and in due course re-establish the continuity and security of its front; after which it would immediately proceed to the counter-offen- sive with all the means at its disposal, and gen. petain exhorted “the command of every echelon to set themselves resolutely to act on the principle of simple, audacious and rapid methods of attack.”’ i]. the german offensive in champagne, from july 1 onward the french iv., v. and vi. armies were on the alert and ready to receive the assault. the iv. army (gouraud), to the east of reims, occupying a highly organised front, was to make a completely successful test of the new method of disposition in depth, ordered by gen. petain. it had finally been decided to leave nothing along the line of outposts (con- stituted by the monts de champagne) but “ islands ”’ of resist- ance, which would be required to sacrifice themselves for the purpose of dissipating the enemy attack and keeping it under the well-controlled fire of the main position established in the ear. the moral preparation was on a level with the organisation of the defensive, and general gouraud was able to address his men in such terms as these: “the bombardment will be terrible. you will stand it without flinching. the attack will be formidable, delivered in clouds of dust, smoke and gas... . but you will break it and it will be a great day. ...” it was not possible to prescribe a rigorous application of the principle of defence in depth (as in the case of the iv. army) for the v. and wi. armies, as their defensive organisation was recent; it was to be feared that in their case the manoeuvre would develop under less favourable conditions. on the 14th, at 8 p.m., a coup de main by the lv. french corps brought in 27 prisoners, who, on being questioned, revealed the fact that the german attack was to be launched that night, the artillery preparation being timed for 12:10 a.m. but before it s10 began, the french counter-preparation and counter-battery fire opened on the whole of the enemy front. the enemy, though stupefied by the number of our batteries, carried on according to programme, and, between 4:15 and 5:30 a.m., the german infan- try advanced to the attack on a go km. front, from chateau- thierry to massiges (leaving out the reims salient). to the east of reims, thanks to the steps taken by gouraud, the attack suffered a complete reverse. the enemy infantry was broken up by french artillery fire and decimated by the machine-guns distributed along the outpost line before even reaching the main line of resistance, which, in spite of repeated assaults, they failed to break at a single point. to the west of reims the situation was less favourable. german success at dormans.—in front of the v. army (berthe- lot) the encmy made some progress between the marne and the ardre in the direction of epernay,.and the french centre (v. french corps and ii. italian) was thrown back on the second position along the line pourcy-belval-reuil-sur-marne. lastly, the right of the vi. army (degoutte) was not able to stop the enemy from crossing the marne on either side of dormans, between jaulgonne and verneuil. the vii. german army thus established a bridgehead south of the river, in front of the ¥. army’s left and the vi. army’s right; it also regained touch with the i. german army on the slopes of the montagne de reims. on this side the situation was therefore serious, and petain cle- cided to check the adversary’s advance by reducing first of all the pocket which had just been formed. to this end he engaged, on the 16th, practically the whole of the allied reserves intended for the defensive battle. the french command was now confronted with a serious prob- lem. it was still three days to the counter-offensive, which the reserve group of armies had orders to carry out on july 18. the question was, whether to continue the preparations for this coun- ter-offensive and risk losing the montagne de reims or to suspend preparations in order to parry the immediate blow. foch decided to maintain his plan of offensive intact, and gave orders to pro- ceed with the preparation. the general staff of the british xxii. corps and the sist and 62nd divisions were already on the move; these divisions were to appear on the field of battle of the centre group from the roth onward. following them on july 17th the british 15th and 34th divisions were to march for the neighbour- hood of pont sainte-maxence and of chantilly-senlis respectively at foch’s disposal. german attack checked.—the german attack had degenerated into local actions, disconnected and therefore useless, from july 16 onward. by vigorous counter-attacks the french had even recaptured some of the enemy’s points d’appui, while our artillery and aircraft, by bombarding the marne crossings, made it more and more precarious for him to obtain supplies. the only progress in the attack—to the southwest of reims between the vesle and the marne, on july 16—remained fruitless, for it had cost the enemy too dear for him to repeat such sacrifices. after two days of useless efforts, therefore, the german com- mand stopped the costly “ friedensturm ” operation, on which they had based their supreme hope, and on july 17 their army was on the defensive. the third grand offensive, which the enemy had carried out with even more powerful means than the two preceding ones (44 divisions on a front of 80 km.), had failed completely. on july 18 was to be launched the french counter- offensive, in which british and american divisions were to par- ticipate. fortune had changed sides. the operations of the centre group of armies for the clearance of the south bank of the marne, the recapture of chateau-thierry and the disengaging of the paris-avricourt railway line, formed part of the general offensive action prescribed for the two groups of armies on july 12 and initiated by the reserve group on the 18th, under con- ditions which will be dealt with later. ill. counter-offensive of the french the french counter-offensive comprises two phases: (1) the first extends from july 18-28, and includes the victorious bat- tles of fayolle’s main group of armies in the soissonnais and on marne, second battle of the the ourcq, and the closing stage of the defensive battle of cham- pagne and reims during the same period, in which the centre group under gen. maistre re-established its front and passed to the attack. this first phase, again, comprised three successive ma- noeuvres: the breaking of the enemy positions by the reserve group of armics on july 18 anc1 19; the re-occupation of chateau- thierry and the south bank of the marne by the centre group of armics, in combination with the right of the reserve group, on july 20 and 21; and the co-ordination by the general-in-chicf of the main effort of the two groups of armies on both banks of the oureq in the general direction of arcy-sainte-restitue and fere-en-tardenois on july 23 and 24. (2) the second phase, sometimes called the battle of tardenois, extends from july 29 to aug. 4, and includes the recapture of sois3ons and the push towards the vesle. french preparations for atlack—we have seen that, acting upon petain’s instructions of july 12, fayolle prepared a counter- offensive for the 18th, which aimed at reducing the pocket of chateau-thierry. these preparations were continued with the utmost secrecy while the centre group of armies (gen. maistre) were checking the last enemy offensive (july 15 and 16) and (from the 17th) arranging a counter-attack. in this connection it is interesting to take stock of the means which maistre was to have at his disposal for passing direct from parry to riposte and those which fayolle, for his part, was assembling in silence in the region of vilhers-cotterets on the right ilank of the enemy’s marne salient. the counter-offensive of the centre group was entrusted to two armies, the v. and the ix., the latter having been put into the front between the v. and vi. armies. the v. army (berthe- lot), which had been so heavily attacked at reims, had eight divisions in first line (including the italian 3rd div.), and one infantry and two cavalry divisions in second line. three of its divisions, among them the italian 8th div., had been withdrawn for reconstruction. at the same time the british 51st and 62nd divs. were now being held in reserve in the vertus-avize zone. the [x. army (de mitry) had five divisions, including the amer- ican 3rd div. in first line, one division in second line, and two reserve divisions, including the american 28th division. two other divisions were in course of reconstruction. on the 17th the mission of the two armies was confirmed: they were to regain all the ground lost between reims and the marne and to clear the south bank of the river at the same time as the reserve group of armies launched its attack. the reserve group operated with the x. and vi. armies. the x. army, under gen. mangin (battle headquarters at bonneuil-en-valois), who was responsible for the main attack, had ro divisions in front line, including the american 1st and 2nd divs., placed on the flanks of the moroc- can div. in the centre of the army, and six divisions in second line and the if. cavalry corps, making a total of 16 infantry divi- sions and three cavalry divisions. in the rear of the army the british 15th and 34th divs. were in reserve to the east of pont sainte-maxence and senlis. in addition, the army was given a large number of tanks and strong artillery reinforcements. the task which mangin set before his troops was “ to break through the enemy front between the aisne and the ourcq and push straight on in the direction of fere-en-tardenois in liaison with the offensive of the vi. army.” on his right the vi. army, commanded by degoutte, whose own right was engaged in the defensive battle, had only seven divisions in front line—among them the american 4th and 26th divs. (american i. corps at la ferte under jouarre)— and one division in second line. the battle headquarters was at may-en-multien. degoutte was to attack with his own resources only, reinforced, however, by tanks. his orders were that “the main attack would take place between the ourcq and the rd d’alland with the object of reaching the line neuilly- saint-front—rounded hill of breuil—and eventually of develop- ing the attack in the direction of coincy in liaison with the x. army towards breny-armentieres.’’ he had further at his dis- posal the british oth brigade of the air division, which was to ‘‘ support his attacks.” marne, second battle of the secrecy of concentration.—the operations of the reserve group of armies had been prepared with infinite precautions for main- taining secrecy—the essential factor in a surprise. the reinforc- ing divisions were only brought up to the front during the last two days, their movements being carried out by night, between july 14 and 16, the mounted elements marching and the un- mounted carried by motor transport. no more rapid and com- plicated concentration had ever been carried out. petain had issued an order on the 17th stating the conditions of the coun- ter-offensive for the following day, which concluded with these words: “ the general-in-chief expects that the ardour and energy displayed by all will make july 18 a glorious day.” a violent storm which burst noisily during the night of the t7th-18th intensified the darkness and made movements in the woods very difficult; but it was favourable to secrecy and bv 4 a.m. on the 18th the x. and vi. armies were in position and ready to move without any sign of uneasiness being shown bv the enemy. at the same hour the centre group of armics was preparing to counter-attack. at 4:35, without a single preliminary round, the whole of the french artillery opened fire from the aisne to the marne, and 16 front line divisions dashed forward with the tanks, while all the air squadrons went up. in the x. army the infan- try and tanks advanced without an artillery preparation behind a rolling barrage, turning the enemy’s strong defensive positions and quickly gaining a footing on the plateau northeast of the forest of villers-cotterets. in the vi. army,on the contrarv, the attacking divisions continued their artillery preparation against the enemy’s defensive position for 13 hours, and only attacked at 6:05. the surprise was complete, and, along the whole front, the enemy lost practically all his advanced units and batteries. his resistance was only effective in two localities on the broken ground from louatre to the buisson de hautwison, at which point the xi. army corps, having no tanks, progressed only with difficulty and to the west of neuilly-saint-front, where the ii. corps came under oblique fire from the heights of chouy. mangin received information of the first results achieved towards 8 o’clock, and exploited them without delay by the judicious use of his reserves. (general robillot’s cav. corps had experienced extreme difficulty in debouching from the forest of villers- cotterets, which was encumbered with troops and baggage, and could as yet operate only with dismounted squadrons—the hour of the cavalry had not struck! on the first day the enemy lost 12,000 prisoners and 250 guns. the battle raged through the night of july 18-19 and through- out the day of july r9. the two french armies substantially attained their objectives, even in the difficult region of loudtre- chouy-neuilly-saint-front, where the xi. and ii. corps com- bined their attacks to subdue the enemy resistance. the artil- lery and air force were both definitely superior to those of the enemy. the artillery pushed its batteries forward and the bomb- ing machines attacked the marne crossings and the enemy con- centrations at oulchy-le-chateau and fere-en-tardenois. the central group reinforced—while fayolle’s group of armies had, by means of heavy pressure and exploitation of the surprise, penetrated deeply into the enemy’s positions, the centre group was preparing to clear the south bank of the marne. but its units were exhausted by the resistance they had to put up against the german attacks of july 15-18, and in order to reinforce them with fresh troops the british xxii. corps (srst and 62nd divs.) was brought in to relieve the italian corps. petain took care to insist that it was not a question of a simple relief. “ it will be carried out on the move—that is to say, it will take the form of a surprise attack, carried out with the co-operation of the french units on either side.” foch defined the character that the battle was expected to take as follows: “ the battle, when engaged, will be conducted with the utmost energy and without waste of time, in order to exploit the advantage gained by surprise.’”’ nevertheless it was not until the 2oth that the centre group was able to push forward. on that day its ix. army reached the south bank of the marne, evacuated by the enemy during the night, while in the sri v. army the british xxii. corps was heavily engaged in the courton wood, where it took several hundred prisoners. the fighting continued to be very severe throughout july 21 and 22. on the two wings of the ['rench disposition the enemy offered a stubborn resistance to the attacks of the x. and v. armies which pressed on their flanks. it was evident that he wished to gain time for evacuating the material and troops that he had risked towards the marne. at last, however, on july 21, at 7 a.m., the 39th div. of the xxx viii. corps, attached to the vi. army since that morning, reoccupied chateau-thierry. the american 3rd div. crossed the marne in its turn, to the east of the town, and entered the barbillon wood. in the vi. army the american i. corps and the french vil. and j1. corps advanced on the plateau of etrepilly and latilly, and on the 22nd, at noon, the vi. army re-established its communications by way of chiteau-thierry. on the same evening elements be- longing to the v. army gained a footing north of the marne, at port 4 binson and two battalions of the ix. army crossed the river at passy-sur- marne. capture of butte chalmont—from the 22nd onward the two groups of armies exercised continuous pressure upon the enemy, the air division co-operating in mass in the pursuit. but the whole interest of the battle was focussed, on july 25, on the heights dominating the ourcq valley from the north—orme du grand rozoy and butte chalmont. once these heights were captured, the x. army would be able to push on the arcy-sainte-restitue and the vi. army to move on fere-en-tardenois, skirting the wooded region on the north side, in conformity with the plan of the french high command. on july 25 the two divisions of the french xj. corps took by assault oulchy-la-ville and oulchy-le- chateau and gained a footing on the west slopes of butte chal- mont, thus depriving the enemy of all hope of re-establishing himsclf on the ourcq. the two armies! lost no time in follow- ing up their success, as soon as they had concentrated all their available means and relieved those units which had been most severely tried. the vi. army was indeed able to shorten its front and rearrange its disposition accordingly. a fresh division, the american 42nd, was also added to it. advance checked at fere-en-tardenois.—the attacks went for- ward on the 27th. “‘ forward! . . . however tired the troops! ”’ telegraphed fayolle, and progress continued to be made on july 27 and 28 as follows: the vi. army reached the ourcq and gained a foothold in fere-en-tardenois; the v. army reoccupied its positions of july 15, and the divisional cavalry pushed its patrols beyond the infantry’s advanced guards. but from the 28th, at noon, the vi. and vy. armies met with a stubborn resist- ance and a barrage that was solidly established from fere-en- tardenois to ville-en-tardenois. the ii. corps was unable to debouch from fere. the american i. corps, which had ad- vanced as far as sergy, was violently counter-attacked there by a guards division. the village was taken and retaken four times and finally held by the american 42nd div., though only at the cost of heavy losses. the advanced guards of the v. army could debouch neither on villers-agron nor on ville-en-tardenois. in the centre, there- fore, the situation remained practically unchanged on july 29 and 30. qn the two wings there was fierce fighting on the 28th, on the west towards buzancy, where the british 15th div. gained a footing in the village and was driven out again, but succeeded in holding the park of the chateau; and on the east, where the enemy made repeated counter-attacks and the allies had to fight costly engagements in order to hold their recent gains. only the right of the x. army made definite progress. on the 28th the xi. corps took butte chalmont, and on the 2oth the xxx. and ni. corps with the british 34th div. occupied grand rozoy; but the divisions in line had reached the limit of their powers after several days of incessant fighting. first phase of french offensive complete—the enemy had made heavy sacrifices to gain solid support for his flanks and cover his line of retreat towards the vesle. the resistance that 1the ix. army had been withdrawn from the front since the 25th. the iil. army corps had joined the v. army. 812 he offered everywhere made it clear that he was not to be under- estimated but was capable of violent reactions, and it now became necessary to hasten his retreat by a direct action against the plateaux of the tardenois. the first phase of the french counter- offensive was now at an end: the marne valley and the paris- avricourt railway line had been completely cleared. this was the first of the ‘‘ clearance ”’ offensives laid down in the orders of july 24, which had been issued by foch to the commanders-in- chief of the allied armies. the second phase was now to begin, and fayolle’s appeal to the endurance of the troops was indeed timely, in view of the severe battles that lay before them with- out hope of respite before the winter. the days of july 30 and 31 mark a pause in the progress of the french armies, which on july 29 received fresh instructions from petain for the combination of their attacks. the vi. army, reinforced by the it. corps and charged with the main action, was to “ push vigorously, and without stopping, in the gencral direction of fismes and bazoches with its whole front, its left to establish itself in the region of saponay so as to facilitate the debouching of the right wing of the x. army towards cramaille.” the x. army was to make every effort, by successive actions starting from its right (the south), to reach the line bois d’arcy, upper course of the crise, and then by way of the arcy- sainte-restitue plateau to work in the general direction =f braine. ‘the v. army was to support the right wing of the vi. army, making its effort in the direction of romigny-lagery- crugny, along the heights on the south bank of the ardre.’’ it was to be kept in mind that the enemy, with his wings reinforced, might launch counter-attacks between the oise and the aisne or on the reims salient. considering the nature of the coming operations, it was not expected that the two cavalry corps would be used, and the commander-in-chief therefore with- drew them and moved them to the neighbourhood of vitry-le- francois and beauvais in readiness for the two franco-american and franco-british offensives that were being prepared. redistribution of troops.—reliefs were effected within the armies. the vi. army put considerable american forces into line: the 42nd and 32nd in the first line, the 4th and 28th in second line, while the 26th and 3rd were being reconstituted in the marne valley. in the x. army, mangin, convinced that he could obtain a de- cisive success in carrying the heights north-east of the grand rozoy, rested his troops on july 30 and 31 in view of this new effort. the v. army withdrew the british xxii. corps and replaced them by two french divisions. the vi. army resumed its attacks on the 31st. the american g2nd div. maintained its hold of seringes-et-nesles in spite of enemy counter-attacks, and the american 28th, 32nd and 4th divs. entered cierges and the meuniere wood. in this way the enemy’s attention was drawn to the centre on the evening of the 31st, while the next morning (aug. 1), at 4:45, the right of the x. army attacked in its turn and, after severe fighting, occupied the whole crest that extends from l’orme du grand rozoy to saponay in- clusive. on the same day the vi. army, though it succeeded in capturing the meuniere wood, failed before saponay on ac- count of the extreme fatigue of its attack divisions. its artil- lery gained a definite superiority of fire, however, and the air force reported numerous outbreaks of fire and explosions in the enemy's rear. nevertheless an obstinate resistance was main- tained throughout the night by the encmy. german retirement to the vesle.—at dawn on aug. 2 the three french armies found themselves facing a void. the enemy had fallen back on the vesle, where he intended to establish himself firmly, the forward movement of the allied divisions was pre- ceded by advanced guards, which soon regained contact, and by evening the troops had reached the plateaux of ambief, mareuil-en-dole, dravegny and lhery, reoccupying soissons at 7 p.m. on the ard, the left of the x. army reached the aisne. its right, together with the vi. and v. armies, arrived in the immediate vicinity of the vesle. contact was estab- lished everywhere. all along the front the enemy artillery and machine-guns became very active. on aug. 4 and 5 the marne, second battle of thr allied troops lined the banks of the vesle, the american 3 2nd div. entered fismes and the advanced guards were even able to push some units north of the river at several points. but the enemy reacted vigorously, and in view of this well-organised re- sistance ]’och had to consider whether to carry on operations beyond the vesle or to remain on the south side for the time being. it was obvious that a passage could only be forced by a set bat- tle in great strength. at the moment, other allied offensives were on the point of being launched in picardy and santerre in accordance with the plan made by foch on july 24 in the midst of the battle of the marne. it was desirable to reserve any avail- able allied troops to insure the success of this plan, which was of so varied a character that the enemy, surprised by the points against which attacks were directed, would not have time to parry them. it was for this reason that the order was given not to undertake any strong action north of the vesle, but yet to keep the enemy under the impression that such an action was in preparation, particularly on the date chosen for the franco- british offensive, which would thus have more chance of a sur- prise. iv. results of the battle the second battle of the marne was now over. after three weeks of bitter, vehement and uninterrupted fighting, in which the french armies exerted themselves at times up to the limit of human endurance, the following results had been achieved— of great importance materially and of incalculable moral value: ‘the capture of 30,000 prisoners, over 500 guns, 200 trench mor- tars and 3,000 machine-guns; the shortening of the front by 45 km.; the restoration of the paris-chalons railway line and the removal of the threat against paris. but above all, the enemy morale was shaken while that of the allies was strengthened. finally, the initiative of operations had passed to the side of the allies, and, in addition, their numerical superiority was assured from that time onward by the arrival of the american forces and their inclusion in the battle, for the battle that was just finished marked the actual entry ex bloc of american divisions in the offen- sive battle. | it was not, could not be, a surprise to any frenchman—and still less to the enemy, who had had four years’ experience of the british arniics—to see the four british divisions which were fizhting among the french divisions cover themselves with glory; but it was questionable whether the enemy had foreseen that the young american divisions, going into the attack with their organisation only just completed and their training still unfinished, would be able to make good both the one and the other by their energy, dash and courage, and by the fine con- fidence and disdain of danger which is to be looked for in so great a nation. it was in the height of this struggle that foch, relying presuma- bly on the results already achieved, forestalled events to some extent in order to hasten them, and, calling together the com- manders-in-chief of the allied armies, issued to them his famous orders of july 24, of which it may be said that they covered the rest of the campaign and contained the germ of victory. among the so-called “ clearance ”’ offensives that he designed in order to get possession of a base of departure for a general offensive, the one developed between the marne and the aisne had already done what he required of it. in fact, the action of the troops responded to the idea of the chief with a rapidity which, so to say, emphasised the excellence of his plan and justified all hopes. the battle whose scene was in the theatre of the marne for the second time in less than four years thus marked a turn of the tide in favour of the allies, and, by associating british, american and italian forces with the glorious success of the french armies, formed an auspicious prelude to the general offensive. see victory, advance to. bibliography.—r. hoff, la bataille decisive 18 juillet—r11 novembre, 1918 (1919); e. j. requin, la course de l'’ amerique, ete. (1919); a. woolcott, chdeteau thierry (1919); f. b. maurice, the last four months (1919); r. recouly, la bataille de foch (1920); j. j. pershing, final report of gen. j. j. pershing (1920); m. l. v. marrakesh—marriage laws h. corda, la bataille de zor8 (1921) and la guerre mondiale (1922); b. e. palat, la grande guerre sur te front occidental (1925); see also the times (london), documentary history of the war (1917, etc.); and the times (london), diary and index of the war, 1914-8 (1921). ce. re) 4 * marrakesh, or morocco (see 17.753), the southern capi- ~ tal and largest town of morocco, had a population of 139,874 in 1921, 1,956 being europeans. a european town outside the oid city, at the foot of the hills of geliz and near the military camp, was founded in 1913, and has wide roads planted with trees; it is joined to old morocco by the fine avenue de la koutoubia. there is also a new quarter, with shops and a public garden, in the city itself, and an hotel was opencd in 1924. french and franco-arab schools have been started. the sub-division of morocco is under a french military governor, who is in charge of the municipal services, and it has a french court, with right of appeal to the court of first instance at casablanca. ‘there are good roads to mazagan, mogador, safi and casablanca, where the trade of the city is handled; and one to fez was in course of construction in 1925. there is connection by narrow-gauge railway with casablanca and the rest of morocco, and a stand- ard-gauge line to casablanca was under construction in 1926.",
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