LIVERPOOL, UNIVERSITY OF

new chairs have been founded in classical archaeology, geography, commerce, civic design, social science, applied mathematics, organic chem- istry, industrial chemistry (fats and oils), bacteriology, geology, oceanography, entomology, parasitology, tropical diseases of africa, dental surgery, veterinary anatomy, care of animals (causation and prevention of disease), international law, engi- liverpool, university of necring, electrical machinery, applied mechanics, civil engineer- ing, metallurgy and naval architecture. new fellowships have been created for modern history, english literature, celtic, chemistry, anatomy, orthopaedic surgery, engineering. a num- ber of scholarships have been instituted, 1n architecture, travel- ling, research (offered in the faculties of arts, science and engineering in rotation), chemistry, marine biology, medical subjects, engineering and law. new buildings were erected for arts building extension, students’ union and gilmour hall, engineering building exten- sion, school of tropical medicine, chemistry school extension, department of geology, hall of residence for women extension, dental school extension, athletic pavilion, laboratory for research in tropical diseases (sierra leone). residential buildings have been altered and equipped for accommodating the departments of education, geography, school veterinary surgery, metallurgy, school of social science, hostels for men, institute of archaeology. new departments have been instituted in civic design and town planning, poetry, music, art of the theatre, medieval history, analysis of observations, geology, cytology, pharmacology, radi- ology and electrology, orthopaedic surgery, parasitology, chemi- cal physiology, public health chemistry and refrigeration. new degrees have been ordered for commerce, architecture, hygiene, orthopaedic surgery, veterinary science and philosophy, while diplomas have been instituted in radiology and electrology, tropical hygiene, archaeology, geography and social studies. in 191g a tidal institute was established by the university in association with local shipowners. in connection with the depart- ment of oceanography, founded in 1919, a sea fisheries laboratory is maintained at port erin. extensive researches are carried on in the local sea fisheries in regard to diseases of fish and kindred subjects. extramural work.—the university extension board extended its influence to the isle of man, to crewe in the south and to blackpool and carlisle in the north, at 23 centres, in co-opera- tion with local committees and organising bodies. chnstmas lectures for boys and girls have been inaugurated. a scholarship open to extramural students provides the holder with the means of proceeding to a degree course in the university. free public lectures have become a feature in university life at liverpool. courses of lectures and single lectures are given almost nightly, in the winter, in many subjects taught in the university. industrial relations—for some years advisory boards have been established in commerce and in science and engineering subjects, including representatives of commercial and industrial firms. the university has adopted special regulations for the proper conduct of what is termed ‘ outside work.” facilities are offered by a large number of firms permitting students to visit works and examine processes, etc. much is done in finding suitable posts for graduates on leaving the university. numbers of students —the following table shows the increase of students in 1924-5 as compared with the entries for 1g1o—-11:-— 1924-5 part full part full | time i ; ee rt ere mr— oo oos the university in wartime—during the war the resources of the university (particularly of the science, engineering and medical departments) were devoted to national service, and accommodation in the university buildings was found for many government departments. research work was undertaken for the government in chemistry (dyeing, edible oils, high explo- sives, etc.), insect pests, mathematics (admiralty work and guns), optical instruments, engineering and medical science (particularly in tropical diseases, bacteriology, pathology, ortho- paedic surgery and dentistry). the engineering staff organised classes for the manufacture of shells, and the staff and students made over 1,500 gauges. the inspection of high explosives for the liverpool area was centred in the chemical laboratories, and over 250,000 tons of high explosives were passed there. mem- llandaff—locarno, pact of bers of the university who served in the war (staff, students and servants) numbered 1,673 of whom 197 were killed in action or died on service, and five gained the victoria cross (one with bar). llandaff, henry matthews, rst viscount (1826-1913), british politician, died in london april 3 1913. lloyd of dolobran, george ambrose lloyd, ist baron (1879- ), british administrator, was born on sept. 19 1879, the son of sampson samuel lloyd of dolobran, mont- gomeryshire, and was educated at eton and cambridge. he became a close student of politics and travelled widely in burma, india, little tibet, the himalayas, egypt, morocco and asia minor. in 1905 he was appointed attache to the british em- bassy at constantinople, and in 1908 acted as special commis- sioner for the british govt. to inquire into and report upon the future of british trade in turkey, mesopotamia and the persian gulf. during the world war he saw service in egypt, gallipoli, russia, mesopotamia and with the sheriff of mecca’s forces in the hejiz, gaining the d.s.o. in 1917. he was conservative m.p. for west staffordshire from 1910 until 1918, when he was appointed governor of bombay, a post which he held until 1923. he was created g.c.i.e. in 1918 and g.c.s.i. in 1924 when he was again returned to parliament as m.p. for eastbourne. in may 1925 he was appointed high commissioner for egypt, and in oct. was raised to the peerage. locarno, pact of.—locarno is a fact of european signifi- cance. if, therefore, we wish to treat of the particular outlook of one nation or another it cannot be in relation to the great objectives shared by all, towards which the policy of locarno was directed, the german people, indeed, have expressed their opinion of the actual documents in which the results of locarno are enshrined, in less unanimous terms than other nations, but it may be said that in the overwhelming majority they are as convinced as any nation of the desirability of those great aims. it was not altogether easy to make it clear to german public opinion that the problem of security was fundamental to any practical approach to these ends. the man in the street, seeing the harbours empty, the barracks deserted, the armament indus- tries destroyed and the richest areas of his country overrun by foreign troops, found it hard to understand that it was not his own security but that of his armed neighbours, old and new, that stood in need of a guarantee. the difficulties would, there- fore, have been excessive had not great britain stepped in at germany’s suggestion and declared herself ready to throw the whole weight of her power into the scale in the defence of ger- many’s western frontier, no less than eastern frontiers of france and belgium. it is too much to say that great britain’s intervention, beneficent as it was, amounted to a solution in itself. the path which it opened was still encumbered by many obstacles. the sincerity of the german proposal was not everywhere realised with the same clear-sightedness shown by the british statesmen. germany was credited with designing to secure a british guar- antee on the rhine to enable her to effect a forcible rectification of certain frontiers in the east which were not in harmony with racial justice and sound economics. it was feared, moreover, that a separate pact between the great powers interested in the rhine would overshadow a pact concluded within the framework of the league of nations and undermine the prestige of the league itself. it was by no means easy to remove the first source of anxiety, despite germany’s sincere wish to develop her relations in the east along peaceful lines, since france, as poland’s military ally, could not be seriously regarded as an impartial guarantor of german-polish relations. the second ground of apprehension would, it seemed, vanish when germany entered the league of nations. she was, however, compelled to demand that she should enter as a completely equal partner. it was therefore necessary that consideration of the inequalities of armament be secured beforehand. an unusual measure of goodwill on the part of all concerned was needed to overcome these and other difficulties. happily the hour of locarno was favourable and the statesmen assembled 723 there actually incorporated this goodwill in a high degree. per- sonal contact strengthened in each that determination to conquer the spirit of mistrust, which in such circumstances is the sole warrant of success. accordingly, there was little delay in draw- ing up the documents which were signed in london on dec. r. from the german point of view their immediate significance is clear and simple:— 1. they set europe free from the nightmare of warlike complica- tions in one of the danger-points of the continent. 2. they substitute a system of objective legal procedure and amicable arrangement for high-handed militarism and the one- sided interpretation of treaties. 3. they pave the way for germany’s co-operation in the league of nations, by ensuring that she shall not be involved against her will in conflicts for which she is unfitted by her geographical position and her military situation, even if it had no other than this immediate significance, the pact of locarno would be one of the most important documents of 20th century history. but it was recognised with a rare unanimity and, further, was emphatically laid down in the protocol of locarno that its full import entailed further con- sequences. everything in fact in this complex of treaties has a bearing upon the future. the legal disputes, often of a very subtle order, which in recent years have stirred passions to a frenzy, will in future be referred to the calm atmosphere of international courts of equity, so that our generation may acquire a clear outlook, enabling it to co-operate in mutual confidence in the political, economic and cultural reconstruction of europe. there is hardly any aspect of this infinitely complicated problem which will not sooner or later be made to feel the beneficial influence of this clarifying process. the particular problem, however, which will be most immediately and decisively affected is undoubtedly that of universal disarmament. germany’s practical interest in this issue is less than that of other countries. for the chief financial relief will be enjoyed by those countries which disarm, while the diminution of the military burden will benefit the powers competing with them in armaments. for germany, on the other hand, the effect is primarily a moral one in three ways. firstly, because disarmament will mean the beginning of the long-delayed fulfilment of a solemn promise, confidence in which brought the german people to lay down its arms; a promise which was solemnly reaffirmed to it in versailles. secondly, because in the words of the distinguished statesman who represented belgium at locarno it is impossible “ to keep a rich and powerful people disarmed by duress and in a one- sided way for an indefinite period, while its former enemies in europe remain armed to the teeth.” thirdly, because this is the best way of convincing the german people that the pledges which germany has offered of her own free will, and under the guarantees of great britain and italy, for the security of her western neighbours, are appreciated at their full value by the latter. how could the german people be asked to believe in the security pact if the signatory powers most immediately concerned continue to base their security exclusively upon heavy artillery, tanks and aerial bombs? regarded in this light, it becomes intelligible why public opinion in germany more than anywhere else looks so eagerly for the realisation of what in locarno was so justly styled the ‘ logical outcome.”’ every recognition is due to the fact that the responsible statesmen on their return to the turmoil of their capitals from the calm and reflective atmosphere of locarno have honourably striven without waste of time to bring about the realisation of a part of that ‘ logical outcome.” it must alike be recognised that before the full programme can be realised, time is necessary to prepare public opinion in each country. the document of locarno is no prescription, merely needing the physician’s signature, to allay the fever of mistrust. but in the last resort the prescription of locarno will have to prove its efficacy by one fact alone: that no state shall ever again hold it necessary or even compatible with the treaty to seek for the guarantees of its security by accumulating the machinery of violence on the territory of its neighbour. when 724 that hour strikes, even those sections of german opinion, which are still skeptical of europe’s miraculous healing from the spirit of destructiveness, will no longer be able to stand aside. then will the whole german people engage its ambition in being out- distanced by none in peaceful co-operation for the welfare of europe. (see security.) (g. sr.) lockjaw: sce tetanus. lockouts: see strikes and lockouts. lockroy, edouard (1838-1013), french politician (see 16.854), died nov. 22 1013. lockwood, wilton (1861-10914), american painter (see 16.855), died at brookline, mass., march 20 1914. in 1912 he was elected a member of the national academy of design. lockyer, sir joseph norman (1836-10920), british astronomer (see 16.855), died at sidmouth, devonshire, aug. 16 1920. in rg12 he became president of the british science guild. locomotive: sce railways. loczy, lajos de locz (1849-1920), hungarian geologist, was born at pressburg (bratislava) nov. 2 1849. he studied at the zurich polytechnic, obtaining his engineer’s diploma in 1874, and from 1877-80 travelled through india and china as geolo- gist to the expedition of count bela szechenvi. in 1886 he be- came professor of geology at the university of budapest, and in 1908 director of the hungarian geological institute. he com- pleted geological researches in china, in hungary and, during the world war, in serbia. his principal work, the scientific results of the expedition of count bela ssechenyi to eastern asia (1890), compriscs the first scientific description of the mountains which connect the kuen lun chains with the north- east indian chains behind the red basin of szechwan. his re- searches concerning the steppe-formations of the gobi and the northern iiwang ho territory are also of great importance. his other important work, the resiults of the scientific research of the balaton, forms a great monograph of the hungarian lake, in which the formations of the balaton region are explained. his posthumous works are: the new geological afap of (pre-w ar) hungary, and geology of west-serbia, which revolutionised the geological knowledge of serbia. he died at balatonaracs may 13 1920. loder, bernard cornelius johannes (1840- ), dutch jurist. from 1873 to 1908 loder practised as a lawyer in rotterdam and from 1908 to 1921 was a judge of the high court of justice of the netherlands. in 1905, 1909, 1910 and 1922 he represented the netherlands at the diplomatic sea conferences at brussels. he presided at the conference of the scandinavian kingdoms, switzerland and holland, held in 1920. the perma- nent court of international justice at the hague appointed him its first president in 1922 and he retained this position until early in 1925. lodge, henry cabot (1850-10924), american statesman and author (see 16.860), in view of his continuous service in the senate since 1893 was recognised during the closing years of the roosevelt administration and under taft as one of the republican leaders. this position he maintained at the time of the republican-progressive split which led to the election of woodrow wilson in 1912; his personal friendship with roose- velt remained unbroken, but he held true to his long-established principles of party regularity. he was well equipped for leacer- ship in opposition, for his talents were critical rather than con- structive and he possessed the qualifications of a great parlia- mentary debater. his prime interest lay in foreign affairs and it was as a member of the senate foreign relations committee and later as opponent of president wilson that he exercised his chief interest. this opposition was originally in no way per- sonal, as has been frequently suggested. in r914 lodge supported wilson’s demand for the repeal of the panama tolls exemption on the ground that the president had a right to expect such assistance as would enable him to conduct foreign affairs effectively; “ the great responsibility,” said lodge “‘ of initiating and shaping our foreign policy must rest with the executive and cannot rest anywhere else.’’ he jost confidence in wilson, however, as a result of the president's | lockjaw—lodge, henry cabot handling of the mexican problem in 1914, and thereafter became one of his principal critics. he regarded him as a man of words with no capacity for well-considered action: ‘i wonder if the future historian will find him out,” he wrote in his diarv. this distrust increased after the outbreak of the world war. lodge’s intense nationalism, which in the past had given him the reputa- tion of being an anglophobe, led him to protest strongly against the failure to protect american lives and property, whether destroyed by mexican revolutionaries or by german submarines. he successfully opposed the shipping bill in jan. 191s, osten- sibly on the ground that it would lead to foreign complications, chiefly, however, because he feared it would result in the pur- chase of the german ships in american harbours, an act which he regarded as unneutral and unfriendly to the entente. he desired the united states to enter the war against germany after the sinking of the ‘ lusitania,” and warmly objected to every suggestion of placing an embargo upon the export of american munitions, which he looked upon as a pro-german manoeuvre. he steadily opposed wilson’s caribbean policy; in feb. 1914 he refused to support the treaty negotiated with colombia providing for the payment of $25,000,000 and express- ing regret for incidents connected with the united states recog- nition of the independence of panama and the acquisition of the canal zone; in jan. 1916 he offered a resolution calling for armed intervention in mexico. he advocated enthusiastically a larger army and navy. | | | with the entrance of the united states into the war, lodge called for non-partisan support of the president in all policies that might increase the war effort of the united states and its assistance to the entente allies, and he helped to carry through many of the administration’s war measures, although he op- posed one of the most important designed to organise war- making agencies, the overman act, on the ground that it gave unlimited power to the executive. wilson’s peace policies lodge neither understood nor approved. in r91r5 and 1916 he had himself advocated a league of nations and the principle of compulsory arbitration, but he later confessed that he changed his mind and saw in wilson’s proposals more danger than advantage. in aug. 1918 lodge was elected republican floor leader of the senate, and as a result of the autumn elections which gave control to the republicans he became chairman of the senate foreign relations committee. at the moment of the opening of the peace conference he was thus titular and actual leader of the opposition to wilsonian peace policies, a post for which he was fitted by his convictions as well as his ability. , on dec. 21 1918 senator lodge inaugurated what developed into a successful campaign against the wilson peace plan by a speech in the senate in which he insisted upon the need of sepa- rating the league from the treaty. under his guidance and that of senator knox, both men of long experience in matters of foreign policy, the senatorial opposition to wilson developed rapidly; it was not broken by wilson's conference with the committee on feb. 26 1919. “‘ the president,” recorded lodge, “answered questions for two hours about the draft of the con- stitution of the league of nations, and told us nothing.” on march 4, lodge with 38 republican senators issued a declara- tion expressing disapproval of the covenant in its existing form and its inclusion in the treaty of peace. thus when wilson finally returned from paris in july r919 he found a well-organ- ised opposition to the covenant, which capitalised the increas- ing protest against the president’s alleged autocracy of method and the dissatisfaction with various aspects of the versailles. treaty, together with the discontent inevitably arising from after-war conditions and directed against the party in power. . lodge did not hope to defeat the treaty by a straight vote of disapproval; the popular demand for peace was too compelling. hfe did hope to attach a number of amendments or reservations which would attract the support of the die-hard enemies of wilson and the covenant, and which would protect the “ in- terests and safety of the united states.”’ this policy he carried through successfully, aided by the president’s illness and his lodge, sir oliver joseph—£ refusal to consider any compromise. on sept. 10 1919 lodge presented the report of the committee to the senate, which finally adopted 15 reservations to the treaty. when, on nov. 19, the treaty with these reservations was voted upon, 42 demo- crats, of whom nearly all approved the covenant and treaty but objected to the reservations, voted against it. it was accordingly defeated, 39-55. a motion for ratification without reservations was lost, 38-53. i:fiorts to secure a compromise followed but proved unsuccessful. wilson refused to accept the lodge reservations, and lodge was able to hold his group firm in refusing to pass the treaty without reservations. his tactical success was unquestionable when on mar. 19 1920 the treaty, which had been reintroduced, failed to secure the necessary two- thirds vote of the senate by seven votes, for it was lost through the votes of democratic senators who voted against it at the wish of the president. senator lodge himself was doubtless sincere in his willingness that the treaty should pass, with his reservations attached, but he later expressed relicf that it had failed; writing only a month before his death he seemed con- vinced that “ the league cannot do anything to stop wars.” as the successful leader of the opposition to wilson, lodge’s prestige was increased and his influence in the succeeding ad- ministration was for a time great. he served as permanent chairman of the republican national convention in 1920, and as one of the four u.s. delegates at the washington conference on the limitation of armaments in to21. thereafter his in- fluence waned to some extent, especially after he opposed harding’s proposal for joining the world court. ie was re- elected to the senate in 1922 by a narrow margin; under cool- idge, although icader of the senate, he did not work in close co-operation with the president. he died at nahant, mass., on nov. 9 1024 at the age of 74. senator lodge was one of the great congressional figures of the last decade of the 19th and the first two decades of the 20th centuries. reputed cold and distant in matiner, a “ boston brahmin,” he enjoyed the prestige indicated by his popular appellation, the “ scholar in politics,” and heli the respect of }its colleagues on both sides of the senate, who admired his ability as a debater, his tactical skill upon the floor, and the knowledge and experience which he brought to prolonged and assiduous labour in committee. an historical writer of high reputation and productivity, fate denied him the opportunity to become re- sponsible for great legislative measures and forced him at the apex of his career into the rele of critic. (c. sey.) lodge, sir oliver joseph (1851-— }, british scientist, (see 16.860). after 1910 sir oliver lodge became increasingly prominent as a leader of psychical research and a strong believer in the possibility of communicating with the deal, and he dis- tinguished himsclf more than any scientist of his time in the serious endeavour to reconcile science and religion. among his publications dealing with this subject are the survival of afan (1909); reason and belief, 3rd ed. (1911); the war and after (1915); raymond, or life and death (1916), a memoir of his son killed in the world war, with an account of communications believed to have been received from him since; chrisiopher: a study in human personality (rot8). early in 1920 he made an extensive lecturing tour of the united states, having just pre- viously retired from his postasprincipalof birmingham university; and a few years jater he published a series of popular scientific books of which the best known are the making of man (1924), ether and reality (1925), relativity (1925), and vulks about wireless (1925). in toro he received the albert medal of the royal society of arts for his pioneer work in wireless telegraphy. he was president of the british association in 1913-4, and of the radio society of great britain in r925, and had been an i.r.s. since 1902. lodz, poland (sce 16.862), the most important centre of cotton and woollen manufacture in the country before the world war, has been deprived of its former outlet in the russian empire, but cotton spinning and weaving remains its most important industry. ©6dz had a population of 451,813 in 1921, of whom 60% were poles and some 180,000 jews. an exchange has been odz-cracow, battles of 425 established, and a school of social and economic studies was opened in 1925. werk on the drainage system and gas-werks was to have begun in 1924. e6dz became the seat of a roman catholic bishop in 1920. eodz-cracow, battles of.—the repulse at the end of oct. 1to14 of their first offensive in poland (see visrula-san) placed the germans in a perilous position on the eastern front. the austrian armies were again in retreat, and were rapidly becoming demoralised; the germans themselves, on the northern part of the eastern front, were greatly outnumbered and could expect no considerable reinforcement till the ypres battle in- the west had been decided. the evident intention of the russian commander-in-chief, the grand duke nicholas, was to advance on the great industrial region of silesia. in their retreat from warsaw and poland the germans had done their best by elabo- rate destruction of communications to impose as slow a rate as possible on this advance; but their numbers were insufficient to stem the oncoming tide of russia's hordes by a direct defence. invasion of german territory might be slow, but it seemed in- evitable. ludendor ff's plan.—the german high command solved their portion of the problem by placing hindenburg, commander of the ix. army, in charge of all german forces on the eastern front (vu. and lx. armies and woyrsch's detachment) and instructing him to do his best without immediate reinforcement. hindenburg kept ludendorlf as his chicf of staff, and the latter at once proposcd a characteristically bold solution. this was to withdraw the in. army from central and southern poland and, taking advantaze of the excellent railway system, to trans- fer it north to a base between posen and torun (thorn), from which to strike a blow at the grand duke’s communications as he advanced southwest on silesia. the plan was an audacious one. in the first place it left the direct route to the enemy's objective, the province of silesia, barred only by the unreliable austrians and by weak german elements. luclendorif trusted to the destroyed communications and to the customary russian sluzzishness of manoeuvre for time sufficient to carry out the contemplated counterstroke. secondly, east prussia, again threatened by invasion, would be further denuded of defenders, for ludendorff proposed to call on the viii. army to furnish a quota to his striking force. lastly, the manocuvre involved thrusting a body of between five and six corps within reach of russian forces twice that size, and the greater the success of the blow, the deeper the penetralion into the russian rear, the heav- ier would be the weight of the enemy masses concentrated on it. but the result of the battle of tannenberg had been to persuade hindenburg and ludendorff that disparity in numbers could be larecly discounted with the russians as foes. disposition of the russian forces —on the russian side, the first fortnight of nov. 1914 saw the high-water mark of that onward sweep towards germany of russia’s exhaustless masses, on which the allies had built such high hopes. there were at this time eight russian armies deployed. the x. army, which had replaced the defeated i. army on the eastern frontier of east prussia, had begun to move forward. the i. and ii. armies, to the northwest and west of warsaw, protected the flank of the main advance by the v., iv. and lx. armies; on the south, the ihl. and viii. armies covered the left flank by pressure on the austrian main forces in the direction of cracow. but prog- ress was slow, hampered by difficultics of supply; and already the russians were beginning to feel that shortage of muni- tions and of trained drafts which was to lead to their disasters of r9t5. their armies were strung out in lnear formation and no central reserves were available. the point of attack chosen by ludendorff for the ix. army under mackensen, which now comprised 55 corps and two cav- alry divisions, was the junction between the i. and ii. russian armies. the vistula and warta rivers, to cast and west, would protect the flanks of the german advance. to prevent any trans- fer of russian forces from north of the vistula, a detachment, mainly of fortress troops, was to advance on mlawa, while another pushed up the right bank of the river towards ptock. chefmza 7 bydgoszez (bromberg) corps 2vesing slereslau) corps eee | 2nd < g army .sieradz® ek oy ; “sy a e 4 gwe fae iy , ~ wa mig, lly es i hh. nibotag, us, pile de wi atte %, > > ae 4x” kreuzburg th the russian i. army was spread over a wide front with three corps north of the vistula between miawa and ptock and two corps south of the river—the v. siberian at witoctawek and the ii. corps (lately transferred from the ii. army) between kutno and zeczyca. the ii. army was on the warta, west of ledz, directed on kalisz. the v. army was on the left of the ii. and was approaching the upper warta. first battle of lede—mackensen began his advance on nov. tz. on the rath the isolated siberian v. corps at wioclawek was overwhelmed and driven back on plock. two days later the ii. corps acting as a link between the i. and ii. armies about kutno, and the xxiii., the right corps of the ii. army, were defeated by greatly superior numbers and driven south. scheide- mann, commander of the russian if. army, now tried to wheel his corps from their line on the warta to a position northeast of ledz, the chief manufacturing town of poland. but the ger- man movements were too sure and rapid for the ponderous rus- sian counter-march. the columns of the ii. army were attacked in turn as they came up and were thrown back on ledz. meanwhile the two defeated corps of the i. army, now joined by the siberian vi. corps from north of the vistula, were forced back towards warsaw and away from ledz. into the gap be- tween the two russian armies mackensen thrust three divisions, fortress troops ”“pabjanic ie lodz-cracow, battles of div... — — division r._. — — reserve ~--— — siberian . forc s ordered to cut off ngermans south of t60az je ara kierniewice a ; ae s ree ee zf lap sas ro piv. ail op"; vo my, wy tyes pitica 8- battle or lodz 1914 english miles rf) 10 20 40 kilometres cc 10 20 30 main ralweays ————————s russians 10% nov em germans 10% no => » 0%, wh , 2%, o> j f- noworodomsk the two of the xxv. res. corps and the 3rd guard div. and his two cavalry divisions, with instructions to pass round the right flank of the ii. army and encircle ledz from the south. a corps formed from the breslau garrison, which had now come up from the west, was to turn the left wing of the russian it. army, pinned in front by the attacks of the german xi., xvii. and xx. corps. ludendorffi was aiming at a second tannen- berg, in which schetdemann’s army was to fill the same rdele as had the unfortunate samsonov’s. the i. res. corps meanwhile was by persistent attack to prevent the i. army from inter- vening. by nov. 18 the position of the russian it. army seemed well- nigh desperate. it was being driven into a narrow semi-circle round ledzz with both flanks turned, and was becoming exhausted and dispirited. but help from the v. army was now close at hand. plehve, its commander, on receiving orders to turn back to the assistance of the ii. army, acted promptly and with reso- lution. he attempted to rail one division north to skierniewice but only one regiment got through before mackensen’s cavalry cut the line. the rest of the division came into action on nov. 19, south of ledz against the turning movement of the german xxy. res. corps. the whole of the remainder of the v. army marched north on the 18th, the gap it left on the lodz-cracow, battles of iv. army’s right being filled with cavalry. that same night the siberian i. corps relieved the pressure on scheidemann’s left by a successful attack on the german xi. corps. next day the xix. corps routed the breslau troops. this restored the situa- tion on the west side of ledz; but to the east and south of the town schaffer’s xxv. res. corpsand 3rd guard div. were still advancing. by the evening of nov. 20 they had completely turned the right of the russian ii. army and were attacking ledz from the south. during nov. 21 ludendorff persisted in a last effort to accom- plish the destruction of the russian ii. army, but the attacks definitely failed. by the 22nd the tables had been turned, and schaffer’s force was itself completely surrounded. while part of plehve’s army, after rescuing the left of the ii. army, turned to attack schaffer’s group south of ledz, rennenkampf, the com- mander of the i. army, had been ordered to despatch forces from lowicz and skierniewice to gain touch with the ii. army and close the german line of retreat to the north. the lowicz force, which consisted of 34 divisions, started on nov. 20 and by the evening of the 22nd, in spite of three changes of command and indifferent staff work, had captured strykew and brzcziny, and had apparently sealed the gap between the russian i. and ii. armies. the russians actually ordered up 18 trains to remove the anticipated harvest of prisoners. the skierniewice column of a division and a regiment accomplished nothing. escape of schaffer’s force —in the evening of the 22nd, schaf- fer, heavily engaged with part of plehve’s army, south of ledzz, received a wireless order from mackensen to cut his way out by brzeziny. during the night of nov. 22, in intense cold, he suc- ceeded in slipping from the grasp of the enemy opposing him and concentrating his weary divisions to make their bid for release. unknown to him, the russians had already opened a breach. the centre columns of the sowicz force had marched on to ledz, leaving the left column, the siberian 6th div., isolated west of koluszki on the warsaw-ledz railway. this division fought gallantly during nov. 23 and repulsed all efforts of the xxv. res. corps to escape. further west, however, the 3rd guard div. moving through the galkewek forests, found the gap in the russian net and captured brzeziny in the early hours of nov. 24. encouraged by this success, the xxv. corps renewed its efforts against the hapless siberian 6th div., whose appeals for help were disregarded by other russian formations within easy reach of the battlefield. finally, the division, with both flanks turned and overborne by weight of numbers, broke and left the way open for the xxv. res. corps to rejoin the 3rd guard div. at brzeziny. schaffer’s line of retreat was now clear, and on the 25th his whole force, moving by strykew, re- joined mackensen. he brought with him several thousands of prisoners and a number of captured guns. liffect of the battle—ludendorfi’s bold stroke had stopped the grand duke’s intended invasion of silesia as effectively as sir john moore, by a similar move, had halted napoleon’s incursion into spain a little more than too years before. never again during the war were the russians in a position to threaten ger- man territory. the campaign shows well the value of mobility as a strategical weapon. on oct. 26 the ix. army was engaged opposite warsaw during hindenburg’s first offensive. during the next fortnight it retired 120 m. destroying the communica- tions as it went; reorganised and repaired its losses; was trans- ferred by railway across the enemy front; and deployed in com- plete fighting trim for its new offensive on nov. 11. this shows german organisation and efficiency at its highest. the quality of german leadership was also well-displayed, and was in strong contrast with the irresolution and inertia shown by some of the russian commanders. schaffer’s exploit was a masterly one; within a few hours of receiving his orders to retire, he had succeeded in breaking off action and setting his columns in motion to seek a way to safety, which his determination and the fine fighting spirit of his troops was to win. compare this with the inaction of many of the russian commanders, particularly the failure of the numerous bodies within reach to come to the rescue of the siberian 6th 727 div. on nov. 23. ludendorff had owed much to rennenkampf’s passivity for his victory at tannenberg; here again rennen- kampf’s inefficiency and lack of the will to victory saved him from the loss of schaffer’s force which his rashness and obstinacy had exposed. yet rennenkampf had been accounted a dashing leader of men before the war. the grand duke himself, ruzski (the commander of the northwest front), and plehve, who hid an iron will in a weak and wizened frame, all acted promptly and with determination to take advantage of the opportunity. second battle of ledz: dec. 1-15.—at the end of nov. hindenburg received reinforcements of four corps from the west, released by the termination of the first battle of ypres. he now advanced again and captured lede on dec. 6 and eowicz on dec. 15. the russians fell back to the bzura-rawka river line in front of warsaw, which they were to hold until aug. rors. meantime an attack by the austrian ii. army towards piotrkew in the first week of dec. had been repulsed. batiles round cracow: nov. 15-dec. 25.—while the fighting round ledz was taking place in the north, fierce battles were being waged in southeast poland and western galicia between the austrian main armies and the russian left wing. these battles were indecisive in their results and have less interest, strategically and tactically, than the battles round ledz. after the fighting on the san and round deblin (iwangerod) in the latter part of oct. the austrian i. and iv. armies fell back gradually on cracow, followed up slowly by the russian iv. and ix. armies. the austrian ii. army (two corps), was railed north to fill the gap on the left of woyrsch’s force caused by the withdrawal of the german ix. army for hindenburg’s counterstroke in north poland. the front of the ii. army was taken over by the iii. army, which now held the line of the carpathians as far east as the uzsok pass. the eastern carpa- thians down to the bukowina were guarded by pflanzer-bal- tin’s group. to defend western galicia between the fortress of cracow and the carpathians, a group consisting of the xi. corps and some cavalry was formed and took up station on the line of the middle dunajec. the austrian plan was to meet the expected attack towards silesia of the russian v., iv. and ix. armies with woyrsch’s army and the i. army, while the it. army from the north and the iv. army from the south wheeled against the enemy’s flanks. the russian advance was slower and more cautious than had been expected; their v. army had to turn about on nov. 17 to rescue the ii. army at ledz; while the iv. and ix. armies on approaching cracow halted for the iii. army in galicia to come forward and invest the fortress. on nov. 17, therefore, as soon as the austrian ii. army had completed its detrainment and come up into line, the austrian armies north of the vistula took the offensive. a week of attack and counter-attack followed with little advantage to either side. radko-dimitriev’s iti. army had meanwhile come up to the dunajec; he passed one corps over to the north of the vistula to enable the ix. army to parry the thrust at its left flank of the austrian iv. army; with the remainder he drove back the austrian xi. corps to a defended position east of cracow. final encounters of 1914.—conrad, the austrian chief of the general staff, now planned a new combination. he passed part of the iv. army over by rail to the left wing of the austrian iti. army near limanowa for a counter-stroke at radko-dimi- triev’s left. this was made on dec. 3, and the fighting soon be- came general along the whole front between the vistula and the carpathians. brusilov’s viii. army, facing the austrian iii. army along the carpathians, sent a corps by nowy sacz to the assistance of radko-dimitriev, but was thereafter itself heavily attacked. on dec. 15, after the loss of ledz and =owicz in the north, the grand duke issued orders for a general withdrawal in south poland and galicia to winter lines. the v.,iv.and ix. armies fell back to the nida line, and the iii. army to the duna- jec. brusilov’s viii. army, however, on the extreme left, coun- ter-attacked the austrian iii. army between dec. 18 and 25 and drove it back to its former position in the carpathians (battle of jasto). this brought to an end the campaigns of 1914. 720 the russian “ steam-roller,” which the allies in the west had so confidently expected to see smashing over its foes with irresistible, if deliberate, momentum, had come to a standstill for want of fuel. the grand duke’s decision in the middle of dec. to break off battle and retire was occasioned mainly by the shortage of munitions and the impossibility of keeping the ranks filled with trained drafts to replace the heavy wastage due principally to that very lack of a sufficiency of shells and other material of war. but the russians had most loyally done their best under great disadvantages to live up to the expecta- tions which their allies had formed of them. it was the machine, antiquated and behind the age, that fell short of the stern re- quirements of modern war. brni1ograppuy.—cc. von wulffen, schlacht bet lody, rord (1918); sir a. w.f. knox, with the russian army, 1974-7 (1921); e. luden- dorff, my war afemories (1922); j. daniloff, russland wm weltkriege, tor4{-§ (1925). (see also worrld war: bibliograpity; and article eastern front with map.) ta paw) loeb, jacques (1859-1924), american physiologist, was born in alsace, france, april 7 1859. graduating at ascanisches gymnasium, berlin, he studied medicine in munich and stras- bourg (m.d., 1884). he was assistant in physiology at the universities of wurtzburg (1886-8) and strasbourg (1888-90), working also at the naples biological station from 1889-91. he went to the united states in 1891 and taught biology at bryn mawr for a year. he became assistant professor of physiology and experimental biology at the university of chicago in 1892, being appointed associate professor in 1895 and professor in 1900. in 1902 he became professor of physiology at the univer- sity of california. from roro to the date of his death he was head of the division of general physiology at the rockefeller institute for medical research. he died at hamilton, bermuda, feb. 11 1924. dr. loeb’s work was chiefly directed to a pursuit of the real distinction between living and dead matter, the thesis upon which he worked being that all living things are chemical machines and that their workings are open to the same mechan- istic explanation as are those of any machines made of inert matter. among his published works are the heliotropism of animals and {ts identity with the heliotropism of plants (18090); physiological morphology in 2 vol. (1891-2); comparative phys- iology of the brain and comparative psychology (1900); studies in general physiology (1906); the dynamics of living matter (1906); the mechanistic conception of life (1912); artificial parthenogenesis and fertilisation (1913); the organism as a whole (1916); forced movements: tropisms and animal conduct {1918). loeb, james (1867- ), american banker and _philan- thropist, was born in new york city aug. 6 1867. on his gradu- ation from harvard college in 1888, he became a member of the firm of kuhn, loeb & co., bankers, new york city, retiring from business in 1901. in roos5 he founded and endowed the institute of musical art in new york city. he devoted much of his time to classical archaeology. he was the founder of the loeb classical library of latin and greek authors, works which give text and translation on adjacent pages. the first volume appeared in 1912. he was instrumental in founding the deutsche forschungsanstalt fiir psychiatric, an institution in munich for the systematic study of the causes of mental diseases. he trans- lated from the french: p. decharme’s evripides and the spirit of his dramas (1906), m. croiset’s aristophanes and the political parties at athens (1909) and p. l. legrand’s daes (1917).