LEAD

the principal lead producing countries in the world are now the united states, spain, germany, aus- tralia, mexico. other important producers are india, canada, italy and poland. russia and china possess deposits of ore which, adequately worked, would yield a very large output, but at pres- ent their production is quite small. the united states has wide- ly distributed deposits, and an output of at least four times that of any other country. the magnitude of her reserves, moreover, ensure her retaining this eminence for many years. the home market, however, consumes practically the whole of her produc- tion, the export being almost negligible. spain ranks second to the united states as a producer of ore, and, with australia, is the largest exporter in the world. the principal german lead mines are in upper silesia, which, before the war, produced about half the ore smelted in the country, the balance being imported. other deposits occur in saxony, nassau, westphalia and the black forest. in australia, the largest part of the output comes from broken hill, new south wales. before the war 50% of the production was shipped for smelting else- where, germany being the principal buyer. since the war, how- ever, australia has done her own smelting at port pirie (s.a.) and cockle creek (n.s.w.). mexico has large quantities of lead ores, but disturbed conditions and inadequate communica- tions militate against production in proportion to the country’s resources. she has, nevertheless, a large output. the principal mines are situated in the northern and central states. the follow- ing table gives the production of lead ore of the countries men- tioned in the years 1921, 1922 and 1923:— | country 1921 1922 1923 ; long tons long tons long tons * united states 370,081 426,458 487,135: spain . 133,677 117,484 125,465 germany 36,500 39,400 27,500 australia 83,878 151,929 171,857. mexico 59,540 108 681 153,217; india . 47,300 56,400 68,900, | canada 29,768 41,655 49,658 | italy . 14,796 15,083 21,153 | poland 580 7,106 15,000 russia # 1,500 2,000 2,000 china! 2,000 2,500 2,000 1 approximate. bistiograpiy.—r. d. divine, “ separation of lead, zinc and antimony ores,” trans. amer. inst. min. eng., vol. 49 (1914); l. c. ball, ‘' the etheridge mineral field,’’ geol. surv. queensiand, no. 245 (1915); j. m. callow, ‘‘ notes on flotation,”’ zrans. amer. inst. 676 min, eng., vol. 54 (1916); w. l. uglow, “' lead and zinc deposits in ontario and in eastern canada,” ann. rept. ontario bur, mines, vol. 25 (1916); w. versfeld, ‘‘ the base metal resources of the union of s. africa,” rept. s. afr. dept. mines and industries (pre- toria, 1919}; s. c. bullock, ‘‘ lead and zinc mining in the united kingdom,” min. journ., vol. 132 (1921). special reports in the mineral resources of great britain: g. v. wilson, ‘‘lead, zinc, copper and nickel ore of scotland,” jfem. geol. surv., vol. 17 (1921); b. smith, ‘ lead and zinc ores in the carboniferous rocks of north wales,’’ afen:. geel. surv., vol. ig (1921); h. dewey, ““ lead, silver-lead and zinc ores of cornwall, devon and somerset,” mem. geol. surv., vol. 21 (1921). | (n. m. pe.) leader, benjamin williams (1831-1923), british painter (see 16.320), died at burrow’s cross near guildford, surrey, march 22 1923. leaf, walter (1852— }, british banker and scholar, was born at norwood, london, nov. 26 1852. educated at harrow and trinity college, cambridge, he graduated as senior classic in 1874, and in 1875 was made a fellow and in 1920 honorary fcllow of his college. in 1877 he entered the firm of leaf, sons and co., becoming in 1888 chairman of leaf and co. ltd. later he became chairman of the westminster bank. leaf was one of the founders of the international chamber of commerce, of which he was elected president in 1925. in 1918-9 he was chair- man of the committee of the london clearing banks, and from 1919 to 1921, president of the institute of bankers. his scholastic attainments were recognised in his presidency of the hellenic society and the classical association. among his classical works are the iliad (1886-8, 1900-2), with english notes and introduction; companion to the iliad (1892); troy, a study in homeric geography (1912); homer and history (1915); little poems from the greek (1922); and strabo on the troad (1923). in 1882 he collaborated with andrew lang and e. myers in a translation into english prose of homer’s {/iad. league of nations.—the covenant of the league of nations, incorporated in the treaty of versailles and the other treaties of peace in 1919, was perhaps the most remarkable of all the direct results of the world war. for the text of this doc- ument see covenant. (see also europe; security). i. origins and foundation the league of nations may be regarded as a necessary result of the development of human society in political organisations. it is not an abnormal achievement of human idealism—a great leap in advance beyond the achievements of the present age, outstripping the practical needs and requirements of the world. on the contrary, it is a practical method for achieving practical ends which are of importance to every citizen of every country. the demand for an international organisation to prevent war has often been made in the last four centuries. fundamentally, this demand is that the relations of states shall be subjected to something analogous to the system of law and order to which men have subjected themselves within the smaller units in which they live. it is one example of the truth of the maxim of the roman lawyers—wbi societas ibi lex. but the purpose and the content of the rules for the conduct of their relations—the /ex— necessarily depend on the nature of the units of the society and on the nature of their relations. when grotius wrote his famous work on the law of nations, he was writing of a society of states whose intercourse was dis- turbed by the continual outbreak of war. indeed, europe had been convulsed by the thirty years’ war for a whole generation prior to the publication of his work. thus it was natural and indeed inevitable that the rules which grotius produced for the guidance of the society of states, as he knew it, amounted to little more than a code of laws for the better conduct of war. he did, indeed, sketch the outlines of a law for the pacific relations of states, and, in the following century and a half, his successors developed to some extent what he had begun. but only after the napoleonic wars was the first serious attempt made to establish an organised system of conducting international afiairs with a view to the avoidance of war. to alexander of russia’s scheme of a holy alliance we need only briefly allude. though admirable in intention, it was leader—league of nations rejected as ‘‘sublime nonsense and mysticism” by castle- reagh, and it eventually degenerated into a mere prop of despot- ism supported by the empires of central europe and [i'rance. but the work of castlereagh himself is worthy of closer atten- tion. he tried to substitute for the chaotic political methods of the past a system of diplomacy by conference, confining his efforts, however, to the great powers, though he desired to make their attitude to the smaller powers one of “‘ influence rather than authority.” he provided his “ conference of ambassa- dors”? with an organised plan of work and with a secretariat, and he supplemented it by occasional conferences of the prin- cipal statesmen of the concert. his conference of ambassadors continued to sit in one form or another for almost six years, and he held four or five of his conferences of principal statesmen. the european conceri.—later in the 1oth century, castle- reagh’s work bore fruit in the european concert, which proved on many occasions to be an effective instrument for the joint settlement of balkan problems and for the maintenance of european peace. but at the time, and for the purpose for which he had created it, castlereagh’s system of diplomacy by con- ference almost completely failed. it did so because it never had in it the seeds of life. its members differed fundamentally on all the greater issues of international politics—while some of them were independent and autocratic sovereigns, subject to no con- trol, and without the pressure behind them of a general demo- cratic will for peace. it could truly be said that international society was not ready for such schemes. since the napoleonic wars, however, forces have been at work which have changed the economic condition of the world, knit- ting its many parts together, and making possible a permanent international political organisation. the first of these forces is the revolution in communications in the course of the last cen- tury, which has brought the most remote parts of the world nearer to each other than neighbouring towns were 100 years ago. the second of the forces—a result of the first—is the re- markable raising of the standards of civilisation through the co-operation of mankind in ever larger groups and in enterprises conceived and conducted on an ever greater scale. to-day, much of the world’s commerce is international, and it has be- come evident that the interests of any one civilised country are indissolubly bound up with those of every other country, so much so that no sensible statesman will ever again base his policy on the principle that his country will gain by another country’s loss. nor is this community of interests between peoples confined to their material well-being. it extends to every sort of scien- tific, political and moral activity in which men co-operate for the progress of their race. on the other hand, revolution in communications, rapidly destroying the factors of space and time, has rendered possible a development of warfare which has changed its whole character and rendered it universal and destructive in a sense never hitherto imagined. indeed, it js not too much to assert that another world war would almost cer- tainly throw mankind back into the dark ages. for these, among other reasons, some sort of international organisation for the conduct of the relations of states was, in 1919, essential, if the human race was not to abandon the hopes and the ideals for which it had striven during centuries of progress. essential conditions of a league with the reasons for the failure of the earlier scheme of a century before, and with the nature of modern national states in our minds, we can perhaps now proceed to lay down the essentials of a league of nations. it may be taken as commonly accepted that the purposes and objects of a league are the following: first, the maintenance of peace; second, and as a corollary to the first, the solution of international disputes by methods of law, if and when the necessary law exists; when it does not, their solution by political methods, by public debate, by impartial investigation and by conciliation on the basis of the accepted canons of right and justice; third, the promotion of international co-operation league of nations wherever necessary or useful, between states and between the citizens of different states. the promotion of such co-operation will imply the development of rules and the general acceptance of common machinery and common practice in ever wider spheres of international activity. further, a first principle which must be borne continually in mind is that the fundamental basis of all law, and the primary condition of all political organisation, is the consent of those who are to obey it. and an important and relevant corollary of this proposition is that the force, even the united force, of the greater or more powerful members of a society cannot in the long run coerce the will, or replace the consent, of the others. it is useless, therefore, to plan any organism which depends on the co-operation of the powerful states, but which will not also receive the willing acceptance and co-operation of the great body of other states. an examination of the results of these limiting conditions, and of the lessons to be drawn from historical experience, and of the accepted objects which it is desirable that a league should achieve, will indicate the minimum of rules and of machinery which is essential. membership.—in the first place, then, there must be rules laying down the conditions of membership of the league. as the members of the league, in order to carry out the objects which they agree upon, must give reciprocal undertakings, they must have some guarantee that those with whom they associate themselves are willing and able to carry out what they promise. next, it is essential that all the members should enter into agree- ments to meet in conference from time to time. third, it will in practice be necessary that there should be some smaller organ than the full conference of all the members, which in the current business of the league, and when executive action is required, can act for and represent the whole. it is evident that the com- position of such an executive organ will—in a society in which members are so unequal in size, population and power—involve most difficult problems of representation such as those that arose in 1926. secretariat.—a further consequence of any attempt to organ- ise international affairs through regular conferences of all the members of the league, and through a smaller executive organ, is the necessity for a secretariat which shall be charged with the duty of preparing the work of the organs of the league, which shall act as a central exchange for information among members and shall organise the central and technical services. the secre- tariat would also have to keep the records of the league, super- vise the execution of the league’s decisions, and in general act as an organising agency for the promotion of international co- operation. it is, perhaps, theoretically possible that these duties should be fulfilled by means of national secretariats attached to the representatives who compose the full conference or the executive organ of the league; but there are great practical advantages in an international secretariat whose members are individually independent of national governments. the above represents the minimum machinery that is essential to the effective working of any league. we must next consider the minimum mutual obligations which the members of the league must assume if it is to prove an effective instrument for the maintenance of peace. peaceful settlement of disputes.—it is evidently essential that every member must agree that it will not go to war with any other member without previously submitting the dispute to peaceful methods of settlement. further, and as a corollary to this first undertaking, there must be a second one providing for common action against members who break this fundamental agreement. what the nature of this common action must be is a matter for discussion; but it must at the least provide for united and energetic moral pressure by the whole body of the league against the recalcitrant member. it may well be argued that in the world as it is to-day this united moral pressure should be supported in whatever way may be possible by united material pressure as well. what in any case is essential is to find some means of bringing home to every citizen of a member which 677 breaks its league agreements the universal disapprobation of the other members. thirdly, it is practically, if not theoretically, necessary to lay down in advance, some method, or methods, for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. great clasticity may be left as to the nature of these methods, and as to the choice of method which the parties to a dispute may adopt. but the agreements of the league should include plans for settlement by conciliation, or arbitration or judicial verdict; and these plans should be based on the essential principles by which alone moral pressure can be brought to bear on individuals or on governments—that is to say, on strictly impartial inquiry into the merits of disputes, and on full publicity for the con- tentions of the parties and for the proceedings by which settle- ment is attempted. it is further essential that the agreements of the league should include the automatic abrogation by members of all treaties or undertakings which are not consistent with their obligations as members of the league. no general organisation, such as a league of nations, can operate or inspire confidence in its mem- bers if the undertakings to which they agree by their member- ship are overborne or superseded by other inconsistent agree- ments which they may enter into with individual states. the organisation and the undertakings indicated seem to constitute the minimum that can serve as the basis of any effec- tive international organisation for the prevention of war. be- yond this minimum, there are other things not absolutely essen- tial but highly desirable. for example, judicial verdict implies a court of international law. it is true that such a court might be set up ad hoc for any dispute in which it is required, but it is far better that a permanent court should be established as part of the machinery of the league. such a court, indeed, appears to be a necessity if we are to achieve the development of inter- national law as an increasingly important factor in the relations between states. again, it is highly desirable, though it is not theoretically essential, that the agreements of the league should provide that any dispute, or any circumstances affecting the peace of the world, should be a matter of general concern to every member, so that any member may be within its right in demanding the consideration of any such matter by the organs of the league. interdependence of states had so far advanced during the course of the 19th century that this principle received some slight and tentative recognition in the conventions for the peaceful settlement of international disputes drawn up by the conferences at the hague. but the principle needs full recogni- tion and application if countries are to be prevented from drifting into armed conflicts which in these times will certainly involve the interests of their neighbours. and lastly, it is desirable, though again not essential, that the league should be given the necessary powers to enable it to act as the co-ordinating agency for the international activities of its members in all the multifarious spheres hitherto governed by international bureaux, by general treaties and by other forms of official and unofficial co-operation. the essential provisions of the covenant impartial consideration of the covenant will show that it embodies every one of the features which have been enumerated as the essentials of an effective league. it may further be said that where it goes beyond the essentials it does so in a way which was intended to make, and does make, for greater completeness and efficiency. membership.—article 1 of the covenant consists of the rules of membership. it stipulates that the original members of the league shall be the signatories to the covenant and such other states named in the annex thereto as shall accede to it without reservation; and that any fully self-governing state, dominion or colony may be- come a member if its admission | is agreed to by two-thirds of the mem- bers and provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations and shall accept the regulations of the league in regard to its military forces. these rules constitute a statement of the principles concerning membership that are essential if the members of the league are to have con- fidence that their mutual undertakings will be carried out. 678 representation._with regard to agreements to meet tn conference, articles 2, 3 and 4 of the covenant stipulate for the creation of an assembly consisting of three representatives of each member of the league, and for a smaller council consisting of representatives of four great powers and of four smaller ones. the covenant does not lay down the intervals at which these bodies shall meet: it merely stipulates that the assembly shall mect at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require; and that the council shall meet in the same way, and at least once a year. it leaves these questions to be dealt with in whatever rules of procedure the council and the assembly might respectively consider it wise to adopt. the question of representation of the members at the assembly was one which naturally involved serious difficulties. it was solved by according to every member an equal right to send three represent- atives. the question of representation on the council was still more difficult. a definite preponderance of influence in international affairs had been accorded prior to the world war, to the great powers of the world. it was inevitable, and right, that the great powers who are members of the league should be given permanent representation on its principal executive organ. the representation of the smaller powers --an exceedingly difficult matter—was dealt with by providing that the four non-permanent members of the council kail be selected by the assembly from time to time in its discretion. articles 6 and 7 provide for the necessary secretariat, and for the nomination of a secretary-general, who shall make all the appoint- ments to the staff with the approval of the council. these articles also provide that every position in the secretariat shall be open to women. so much for the institutional organisation of the league as it was established by the covenant. disputes.—with regard to the agreements not to resort to war, which are included above, among the essentials, the covenant em- bodies almost everything that any responsible authority had in 1919 advocated as practicable. by article 12 the members agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead toa rup- ture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the council, and they agree that they will in no case resort to arms until three months after an award has been made by the arbitrators or a report has been made by the council. article 12 thus not only embodies an agreement not to go to war without previous recourse to peaceful methods of settlement for disputes, but also lays down two alternative procedures by which, through the agency of the league, settlement can be effected. the first is ambiguously referred to as “ arbitration,” but it is evident from articles 13 and 14 (the latter of which provides for the establishment of a permanent court) that the use of the word “ arbitration ” is a loose one, and that what is really intended is recourse to legal decision. these two arti- cles, indeed, leave great elasticity, but their purpose was to secure the establishment of a permanent court of international law to which the parties should in the normal course take disputes of a legal nature. there is, moreover, at the end of article 14, a clause designed to increase the value of the permanent court. this clause provides that the court may give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the council or by the assembly. thus, if a litigant should bring to the league a dispute in which it believes the law to be on its side, it will be able to demand, even if the other party does not agree, that the council shall secure on the juridical questions at issue an advisory opinion from the court; and the court, in rendering this opinion, will give the council the elements for a decision which would have all the force of a legal verdict. thus the covenant included provisions which went far towarcls securing that all iuternational disputes of a genuinely legal nature shall be deter- mined by legal methods. with regard to the other alternative method provided for the settlement of disputes, which members agree to by article 12, that is to say, inquiry by the council, article 15 lays down in considerable detail the procedure which is to be adopted. it provides that any party to a dispute can oblige the league to take cognizance of it by giving notice to the secretary-general. the parties undertake to communicate to the secretary-general as promptly as possible state- ments of their case, with all the relevant facts and papers. the council is then given discretion to endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and it is provided that if its efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such an account of the dispute and of the settlement arrived at as the council may deem proper. lf the council fails to settle the dispute, it is to make a report setting forth the merits of the dispute and the recommendations which the council thinks would be suitable for a settlement, and this report is to be published. a report may be made either unanimously or by a majority vote, and any individual member of the league which is represented on the council hasa right to make its own public state- ment concerning the dispute. there is a further provision in article 15 to the effect that if such a report is agreed to by the council unanimously, with the exception of the representatives of one or more of the parties to the clispute, the members of the league—including the parties—agree that they will not go to-war with any party to the dispute who complies with the provisions of the report. this is a most important additional limitation of the right of members to resort to arms, article 15 also league of nations allows an appeal from the council to the assembly, provided it is made within 14 days after the submission of the dispute to the council. if a dispute is so referred to the assembly, the assembly is to deal with the matter in the same way as the council, and if its report is agreed to by all the members of the league represented on the council, and by a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, it has the same force as a unanimous report agreed to by the council, 7.e., the members of the league must not go to war with any of the parties to the dispute which accept it. these articles, then, provide two, or rather three, methods by which disputes can be settled by peaceful means through the agency of the league. the first provides for legal verdicts by the permanent court, when such verdicts are possible and useful; the second for arbitration by some special tribunal agreed to by the parties to a dispute; and the third, for settlement by the political agency of the council or the assembly, in accordance with procedure based on the principles of full publicity and strict impartiality. the authors of the covenant believed that publicity would of itself ensure impartiality; that it was not conceivable that a council, acting as the representative of the whole body of the league and in circumstances of utmost pub- licity, should conduct its inquiries into a dispute in any way not consistent with the strictest fairness to all the parties concerned. sancttons.— articles 12 to 15 also make provision for the next essential of a league—united pressure by all the members against any of their number which disregards its undertakings. in pro- viding for a public report by the council on the merits of a dis- pute and for the publication of its recommendations as to a settlement, the covenant lays down a method which, in prac- tice, must exert the strongest moral pressure on any state which in defiance of article 12 ts disposed to go to war. but the covenant goes beyond this, and provides tn article 16 that, if any member of the league in contravention of its agreements resorts to arms, such a member is tpso facto “‘ deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the league,” and the other members are obliged to prevent all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the na- tionals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state. it was difficult in the disturbed condition of the world after the war to realise just what would be the effect of such a complete economic and financial boycott in times of normal peace. but it is not too much to say that no civilised state would, in 1914, have ventured to declare war had it been threatened by such a universal boycott asis stipulated by article 16 of the covenant. it is sometimes held that in providing for such a universal boycott, the covenant goes beyond the essentials of a league. it is sometimes even held that it goes beyond what is practicable and wise. but it must be remembered that article 16 only comes into force if a state insists on going to war without waiting for any attempt at peaceful settlement, or where an agreed tribunal or a unanimous council have given a decision which has been accepted by the other party. in other cases ultimate resort to war is envisaged under the covenant as legitimate, and the obligations of article 16 would not come into force. indeed against a genuinely recalcitrant member of the league, the covenant goes even further. article 16 lays down that in addi- tion to the blockade which is an automatic obligation of all the members of the league, the council shall consider and shall recommend to the several governments concerned, what military, naval or air forces members of the league shall severally con- tribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenant. in other words, while leaving again the greatest possible elas- ticity, the covenant foreshadows united military action, if it is necessary, against a covenant-breaking state. to turn to another matter, the covenant provides by article 20 for the abrogation of treaties, obligations and understandings which are inconsistent with its own terms, and thus meets in yet another particular, the essentials of a league. further provisions of the covenant how far, and in what respects, does the covenant go beyond these essentials? league of nations guarantees.—first, there are the much-discussed provisions of article 10. this article has been very generally misunder- stood. its effect is to guarantee the members of the league against external aggression which would impair their territorial integrity or political independence; but this guarantee is only to be enforced as the council acting unanimously shall agree. in practice the protection against sudden and unjust attacks provided by articles 12-16 will probably be much more useful, and, if executed, all that is required. article 10 is really only a rather clumsy assertion that territorial or political changes shall not be made by aggressive war. such changes, if required, must be made under article 19, which enables the assembly to recon- sider treaties which have become obsolete or dangerous to peace. armaments.—second, it may perhaps be said that, by the provisions of article 8 on the subject of armaments, the cove- nant introduces something which is extraneous to an agreement to preserve the peace. but the history of the 20th century has demonstrated that if you prepare for war you will have war; that increase of armaments in one country provokes increase of armaments in other countries, and that if rivalry in preparation for war continues, within a certain time war will break out. the authors of the covenant believed that unless rivalry in arma- ments could be prevented, any league of nations, however it be constituted, would fail. they therefore thought an agreement not to engage in unlimited competition in armaments absolutely necessary to the peace of the world. the covenant deals with the matter in a way which is pre-eminently practical and sane. it recognises that the maintenance of peace requires the reduc- tion of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and directs the council to formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration of the several members of the league. in other words, the members agree to co-operate in working out a general international plan embodying scales in accordance with which their armaments shall be limited or reduced. further, the members agree that they will, through the league, endeavour to take measures for abolishing the evil effects of the private manufacture of armaments and material of war, and they agree to exchange full information as to their armaments, their preparations for war and the condition of their industries which may be adapted to warlike purposes. lastly, by article 23 they agree that, subject to conventions to be arranged, the international traffic in arms, admittedly one of the minor contributing causes of war, shall be placed under the league’s supervision. these are only general principles. in themselves they would be of small value. but it was hoped by the authors of the cove- nant that the action of the permanent machinery of the league would in time enable its members to give effect to the purpose of article 8; and that thus great strides would be made towards the disarmament which everyone desires. in this respect, as in others, the authors of the covenant were careful not to travel too fast; they laid foundations on which those who were to wield authority in the league could later build. secret treattes.—by providing in article 18 for the publication of all treaties, the covenant again goes beyond essentials. yet no reasonable man can doubt that, under the diplomatic system which prevailed before 1914, secret treaties of alliance, directly by their mere existence and indirectly through the mistrust which they created, were one of the serious causes of international conflict. mf andates.—article 22 of the covenant introduces a new prin- ciple into international affairs which is certainly extraneous to the central purpose of a league. the mandates system which it creates is a great experiment in the government by advanced peoples of backward territories and races. the main principles are simple. the article is based on the proposition that back- ward peoples and territories are not for the future to be exploited for the exclusive benefit of those who govern them; that, on the contrary, their interests and well-being constitute a sacred trust of civilisation and that the way in which they are ruled is a matter of interest to the world at large. the article therefore 679 javs down that in the government of such territories the interests and progress of the inhabitants must be the guiding purpose of the administration. the methods by which their interests are to be protected and their development secured vary, of course, in every case with the nature of the territory and the character of the people concerned. but in every case the fundamental principles are the same; and to secure the observance of them the covenant imposes on the mandatories a duty to make annual reports for submission to a permanent mandates commission; which is, in turn, to report to the council. here again the cov- enant relies on publicity and public opinion as a guarantee that article 22 will be faithfully carried into effect. inicrnational co-operation.—with regard to international co- operation, the covenant in articles 23 and 24 goes a great deal fur- ther than might be considered essential. it provides in general terms for the establishment of a labour organisation (which in fact has been elaborated separately by another agreement); for the equitable treatment of commerce; for the development of free- dom of transit; for league supervision of the traffic in arms; for league action in matters of public health and for the general supervision by the league of all official, and also, if necessary or useful, of unoflicial, international offices established for inter- national purposes of general interest. the general effect of these provisions is to make the league what it is clearly desirable that it should be—a central organism through which international activities of every sort can be co-ordinated and, when useful, assisted by the council and the secretariat. there can be no doubt that the result of this must be to prevent waste of effort and promote efficiency in the conduct of international business of every kind. amendments.—in the last place the covenant, by article 20, provides a method by which it can itself be amended; and this, it may be held, is not an essential of a league. it is true that the covenant might have been regarded as an ordinary international treaty, valid, as most treaties are now made, for a certain fixed period, at the end of which it might have been renewed or changed by the ordinary methods. but it was precisely because the authors of the covenant did not regard it as an ordinary inter- national treaty that they provided a special means for amend- ment; and there can be no doubt that, morally, article 26 is of great significance, and that practically it may prove to be of great constitutional value. it still leaves it difficult to secure amendment of the terms of the covenant. it can only be done if all the members of the council and the majority of the mem- bers of the assembly are agreed. but the fact that amendment is definitely envisaged is in itself important. generally, it may be said that when the covenant goes be- yond the essential features which are necessary to any effective league to preserve peace, it does so with one of two objects in view. either it is with the purpose of giving real life to the machinery which it establishes: of bringing the international forces actually at work into effective co-operation, in order that members of the league may be brought closer together, and the league itself be strengthened and have the vitality that comes from continuous and varied work; or else it is with the purpose of removing those deep-seated causes which public opinion has recognised as having led to war. it is not by chance that the covenant contains more or less claborate provisions concerning armaments, the traffic in arms, annexation by conquest, the avoidance of unfair economic competition, imperial rivalry in the exploitation of backward countries, secret treaties and alli- ances. it is because these things have led to war in the past that the covenant secks to deal with them in a practical and effective way, to the end that war may be rendered less probable in the future. it has already been said that the authors of the covenant confined themselves to laying down the essentials of the organisa- tion which they considered the league required and the general rather than the detailed obligations to which they thought that members of the league must agree. elasticity is one of the chief “notes” of the whole machinery of the league. the council and the assembly are free to develop their own methods and 680 systems as they choose, to appoint committees and commissions at their discretion, and to draw up codes of procedure which they can themselves change; they are thus able to give to the general principles of the covenant the free development which experience may dictate. it is in pursuit of this same elasticity that in several cases the council is charged to carry into execution plans which the authors of the covenant felt to be essential, but which they were not themselves, for lack of time and for lack of expert technical advice, able immediately to prepare. much valuable work has been done under these provisions. preparation and enforcement the covenant was prepared by a special commission of the peace conference of paris, consisting of ten representatives of the great powers and nine representatives of the smaller allied states. this commission, appointed on jan. 20 i919, was a body of remarkable authority. presided over by president wil- son, its members included colonel house, general smuts (later prime minister of south africa), lord robert (viscount) cecil, m. leon bourgeois (former prime minister of france), m. veniselos (prime minister of greece), m. pessoa (ater president of brazil), m. vesnitch (later prime minister of yugoslavia), m. scialoja (later foreign minister of italy), m. hymans (foreign minister of belgium) and others. the first draft prepared by the commission, based on proposals put forward jointly by the british and american delegations, was laid before the peace conference at a public meeting on feb. 14; it was thereafter amended in the light of criticisms made by the conference, by the press and by the neutral powers at a special meeting held for the purpose of hearing their views; and the final draft was adopted by the plenary conference at another public meeting on april 28. it was, on the insistence of presi- dent wilson, inserted as part i. of the peace treaties made with germany, austria, hungary and bulgaria. by this device the allied powers were prevented from making peace with their enemies without being members of the league. with the entry into force of the treaty of versailles on jan. 10 1920, the league of nations came legally into existence. prior to this date, preliminary organisation of its work had been carried on by the secretary-general under the authority of a committee of the powers. when all the allied powers had ratified the peace treaties (except the u.s.a., hejaz and ecua- dor, who failed to do so) the members of the league numbered 29. to these were added during the course of 1920 the neutral powers, 13 in all, who in accordance with article i. of the cove- nant acceded toit without reservation. by successive admissions of ex-enemy and other states, the number of members had by 1925 risen to 56. see also covenant; disarmament: sanctions and guaran-~ tees; treaties; versailles, treaty of, etc. bibliography.—leon bourgeois, le pacte de rorg et la societe des nations (1919); g. scelle, le pacte des nations et sa liatson avec le traite de paix (1919); w. schuecking and h. wehberg, die satzung des velkerbundes, kommentiert (1921); r. s. baker, woodrow wilson and world seitlement, 3 vol. (1923); hi. foley, weodrow wilson's case for the league of nations, compiled with his approval (1923); p, munch, les origines et l’oeuvre de la soctete des nations, 2 vol. (copenhagen, 1923-4). (cuok cy) il. the work of the first six years in order to understand what has determined the character, scope and varying efficacy of the league during the first six years of its existence, it is necessary to bear in mind both the general conditions under which, and the organisation through which, it has been working. it is only by realising these condi- tions that we shall understand why some of the main interna- tional problems have becn dealt with by the league and some outside it; and why its success in those which it has undertaken has varied from case to case. the first of the determining political conditions is that the process of settling the terms of peace, of resolving the imme- diate problems left by the world war, was only begun and not league of nations ended by the treaties of peace signed in 1919. for years after- wards peace was still being negotiated in every capital in europe. one of the treaties, indeed, the treaty of sevres, was never rati- fied. renewed war between greece and turkey, rather the continuation, after an interval, of one section of the world war than the outbreak of a new one, was to precede the new treaty of lausanne of 1923. but even those treaties which were duly ratified left unsettled questions of the first political importance, in the forefront ‘‘ reparation ”’ and in the second rank a host of secondary, but still difficult and important, problems. but the task of completing and executing the terms of settle- ment between recent combatants is very different from that of permanently preserving the peace of the world. the covenant (qg.v.), designed to create a permanent instrument, is naturally drafted as if the immediate war problems had been settled by the treaties of peace and as if, peace and normal conditions hav- ing been established, it was the task of the league to maintain them. the questions left unsettled directly concerned the late belligerents, not the world as a whole. their settlement was essentially a corollary of the treaties and a part of the same work. it was natural, therefore, that they should be dealt with, not by the new world organisation, the league, but by confer- ences of the allies or of the late belligerents similar in compost- tion and in character to those which had negotiated the treaties. limiting factoers——in the second place, the scope of the league’s work has been limited by the fact that, while in essence a world organisation, it has not yet received the adhesion of all countries, and in particular three of the seven principal coun- trices of the world have during the whole period now under review been outside its membership. these conditions derive additional importance from the fun- damental character of the league as an organisation. the league is not a super-state with either the right or the authority to impose its will on the sovereign states which compose it. it is essentially an organ for securing agreement between them, and its power of action is at any time limited by the extent of possi- ble agreement. except in a few special cases, of which the most important is that members undertake not to go to war to enforce a claim rejected by all the members on the council except the disputants themselves, signature of the covenant does not in- volve an obligation on any state to accept a decision of the league without its own consent. for the great bulk of its work, therefore, the league requires unanimity. it can persuade, it can elicit a collective world opinion, both private and official, which it may use to aid its persuasion, but, except before the imminent threat of war, it cannot compel; and even in this case unanimity of the non- disputant members of the council is required. it follows, there- fore, that the power of the league varies with the policies and characters of the countries which compose it and of their rela- tions between each other. how far this is from involving impo- tence, how great is the difference between the policy a country would pursue if left alone from that which it can be induced to follow under the persuasion of collective opinion, the following account will show. but however wide the range within which such persuasion can be effective, there is at any given moment a limit beyond which a country cannot be moved. and beyond such limits the league is, for the great bulk of its work, impo- tent. in dealing with its various problems the league has to deal with exactly the same forces and differences of policy and interest as if they were handled by other methods of negotiation; and the organs of the league, the assembly, and the council comprise, indeed consist of, representatives of interested gov- ernments themselves. it follows that any serious divergencies of policy between members of the league, and especially its more important mem- bers, will be likely to enfecble the league for its general work. and it is obvious that the obstinate differences on reparation and other questions touching germany and on near eastern affairs, affecting as they did for some years the general relations of some of the principal countries on the council, necessarily limited the league’s general power and progress. league of nations these limiting factors have diminished in importance as the years have passed. little by little, the specifically war problems have found a settlement, the transitional instruments of nego- tiation, supreme councils or allied conferences or the conference of ambassadors (see san remo; spa; paris; london; cannes; genoa; lausanne; and locarno; also ambassadors, con- ference of; supreme council) have ended or retired to a secondary place; and the pernianent organisation has come into the foreground. the number of member states has risen from the 42 of the first assembly to 55, in 1925, and the improvement in international relations which, while largely developed at geneva, found its expression at locarno, has immensely added to the strength of the league to deal with such future troubles as may occur. organisation of the league the principal organs of the league are the assembly, meeting usually once a year and representing all states; the council, meeting usually every third month and consisting of four per- manent members (great britain, france, italy and japan—to which germany will doubtless shortly be added)—and six non- permanent members elected by the assembly; the permanent secretariat; a whole series of special organisations and com- mittees (for finance and economics, transit, health, armaments, mandates, intellectual co-operation, opium, traffic in women, etc.); and, working independently of the council and assembly, the permanent court of international justice, and the inter- national labour office. the respective spheres of competence of the assembly and the council are not exactly defined in the covenant. each may deal with any matter within the league’s competence or affecting the peace of the world. in practice, the size, composition and times of meeting of the two bodies determine their functions. the assembly affords an opportunity for an annual review, by the responsible representatives of the governments of the world, of the international situation. it largely creates the atmosphere and determines the general lines of policy for the ensuing year, and it is a convenient instrument for the concluding stages in the negotiations of conventions and general agreements of world interest. the council, on the other hand, has become the league’s executive organ. it deals with the host of special questions that arise for settlement throughout the year, and directs the multifarious permanent tasks of the league and the special organisations through which they are carricd on. these special organisations are in some respects the most interesting feature of the league as an administrative machine. they consist for the most part of permanent committees, com- posed of specialists and experts drawn either from the depart- ments of the national governments or from private institutions. these experts work normally in their own countries, and they have the special knowledge of national forces and conditions, and possess the national influence, which no purely international officials can retain. but they meet periodically as members of a regular organisation. by this system, which follows closely the principles of the inter-allied central organisation built up in the later years of the world war, the league obtains an execu- tive instrument more expert, more effective and more economi- cal than could possibly be obtained by the unaided service of its own whole-time officers. it binds together the national adminis- trations of the world and forms them into an instrument of international work. more than this, it permeates with its own spirit those who in their own countries are carrying on national work which reacts on the interests of other countries. in these six years some thousands of such persons, no small proportion of those who throughout the world are forming and executing the policy which determines international relations, have learnt, in regular co-operation with those of corresponding position in other countries, the international point of view. it is thus a system which, apart from its direct utility, effects a peace- ful penetration of the league point of view into national systems. in this elaborate and elastic system the permanent secretariat is the uniting element—the “ coupling.” its importance results 681 from the immense range and variety of the organs which it serves, and from the fact that these organs consist of councils, commissions or committees meeting periodically, not in perma- nent session, and consisting of persons whose main work is else- where, in their respective countries. pouitticaal disputes it is the task of the league to prevent political disputes causing war. it is most successful where it has been able, by patient work in improving international relations, to remove the causes of disputes before they arise. in this wider sense most of the work of the league has a political aspect. in its mandates and minorities work, for example, the league is continually trying to establish conditions which will diminish the risks of future conflict; and in such a piece of international co-operation as the reconstruction of hungary, the existence of political dif- ferences constituted one of the main obstacles to success, and their settlements one of its main rewards. the definite political disputes threatening to disturb international relations and, in some cases, the peace of the world, which have been submitted to the league of nations are treated in this work under the individual headings, but something must be said here to illus- trate the methods by which the league discharges its primary responsibility of preserving the peace. aaland islands.—the first of these disputes was between sweden and finland in 1920 over the aaland islands (¢.v.).. neither country appealed to the league, but as the danger of conflict tncreased, great britain brought the matter to the council under article 11 of the covenant. both countries were invited to become members of the council for the purpose, sweden as a member state under the specific provision of article 4,and finland, not then a member, by special resolution in accordance with the general spirit of article 17. sweden urged the strong and persistent desire of the islanders them- selves for union with sweden, and her representative declared that “af finland . . . failed to withdraw her troops a conflict was likely to arise.” finland claimed that her legal sovereignty was indispu- table and that the council was not competent because the matter was one which by international law was solely within the domestic jurisdiction of finland. the council, with the concurrence of both parties, appointed a commission of three international jurists to give an advisory opinion on this point (the court of justice not yet being established), and on the basis of its report declared itself competent. it then sent a committee of inquiry, consisting of a belgian, a swiss and an american, to investigate on the spot and propose a settlement. in conformity with the report of the committee and after hearing the views of the islanders, as well as the finns and swedes, the council, in june 1921, decided that finland’s claims to sovereignty over the islands must be recognised but that the claim of sweden and the islanders should be met by detailed guarantees ensuring neutralisation and a large measure of autonomy. this decision was followed by a conference of 10 powers in oct. to frame a convention providing for the neutralisation and demilitarisation of the whole archipelago. the convention was duly ratified and came into force in april 1922. no trouble has since arisen, and the settlement appears to be accepted as final and conctusive. vilna (wiine).—the next .dispute marked a failure in league action. the treaty of versailles left the eastern frontier of poland to be fixed later by the principal allied powers. no definite frontier was fixed, but a provisional line was drawn which left vilna (¢.v.) in the territory of lithuania, a newly created state. a dispute arose between poland and lithuania over this line, and hostilities became imminent. the council, in sept. 1920, sent a military commission which prevented hostilities and provisionally arranged the disposi- tion of the respective forces. but gencral zeligowski, a senior polish officer, crossed the line and entered vilna with a considerable force. the polish government repudiated his action, but refused to send troops against him. the league’s military commission arrested hostilities by establishing three neutral zones between the opposing forces, and the council proceeded to deal with the territorial dispute. they first attempted a referendum and arranged to send a small international police force to maintain order during the plebiscite. but the inflammation of public opinion made it very unlikely that a fair expression of opinion could be maintained, and this plan failed. the council next attempted conciliation by direct negotiations between the two governments under the presidency of m. hymans, the belgian member of the council. a proposal made by m. hymans himself that the vilna territory should be an autonomous canton within the lithuanian state was not accepted, and the effort at direct negotiation thus failed. the council then made a formal “recommendation ” in accordance with article 15; they adopted m. hymans’ report unanimously and with the assent of the full as- sembly which discussed the proposal in sept. 1922, called upon both countries to accept it. they refused, and the league did not enforce 682 the recommendation. finally, early in 1923, the conference of ambassadors, acting on behalf of the principal allies under article 87 of the treaty of versailles, definitely fixed the eastern frontier of poland in such a way as to include the district of vilna within it. the fait accompli prevailed. the league had succeeded in averting hostilities which would otherwise have been inevitable, but it had failed to secure the adoption of its own solution on the substance of the dispute. upper sulesia.—the next dispute was equally difficult, and again resulted from the incompleteness of the terms of peace signed in 1919. the treaty of versailles provided that a frontier was to be drawn in german upper silesia (g.v.), dividing the district between germany and poland in accordance with the “ wishes of the in- habitants "’ as indicated by a plebiscite and taking account of “‘ geographical and economic conditions ’—two conflicting criteria which pointed to very different conclusions. the plebiscite was held in march 1921, but neither the plebiscite commission, nor a com- mittee of experts, nor the governments composing the ‘‘ supreme council ” could agree as to the line to be drawn. a polish insurrec- tion broke out, and production in the rich mining and industrial area of the “ triangle ’’ was stopped. there was the greatest tension not only between poland and germany but between the allics— france proposing a line based on the plebiscite, giving the bulk of the disputed area to poland, and great britain proposing a line more in accordance with economic considerations, giving the bulk of it to germany. repeated and prolonged attempts to effect an agreement failed. there was rioting and, indeed, for some days, fighting be- tween organised volunteers. work was stopped and there was danger of a serious rupture between the allics. hlaving failed to reach agreement through their normal organ, the supreme council, the allies, in aug., asked the league to propose a frontier in accord- ance with the treaty, binding themselves to accept any agree recommendation. the council met in special session on aug. 29 and referred the problem for preliminary cxamination to a committee consisting of the representatives of belgium, brazil, china and spain —states which had taken no part in the previous discussions. this committee came to the conclusion that the only practicable solution was to be found in drawing such a frontier as would attribute to each country a number of inhabitants proportionate to the votes recorded in its favour, while arranging special guarantees against the dislocation of the economic life of the district for a period long enough to enable it to be adjusted to the new frontier. that is, instead of trying to determine a frontier on a compromise between the con- flicting plebiscite and economic considerations, they proposed to take the plebiscite as the basis of the first and to meet the second by an appropriate economic convention. this solution was adopted by the council, and by the allied powers, who traced the frontier accord- ingly. a germano-polish convention, ensuring the continuity of the economic life of upper silesia for a period of 15 years, was sub- sequently drawn up in agreement by the two powers negotiating under the presidency of a swiss statesman appointed by the league. this settlement was severely criticised both in germany and great britain. it must, however, be remembered that the league had no authority to fix an ideal fronticr line, but only to apply the treaty provisions. the whole case is an illustration of the difhculty already mentioned of the league, designed as an impartial instru- ment for the preservation of peace, being used to complete the terms of a peace settlement between recent combatants, but at last agrec- ment was reached, a cause of dissension between the allies was removed, work was resumed and rioting ceased. albania,—a further risk of hostilities occurred in 1921 through a delay in the definitive settlement of a frontier. albania (9.v.) was admitted as a member of the league in 1920, but the frontier ques- tion was still under consideration by the conference of ambassadors, in april 1921 albania called the attention of the league to en- croachments on her territory by serbia and greece. lhe council, unwilling to complicate the task of the conference of ambassadors by separate intervention, asked the conference to hasten their de- cision and called on the three countries to abstain from any hostile action. the question being still unsettled in sept., however, the league appointed a committee of three impartial persons from luxembourg, norway and finland to report on the situation. before its arrival in nov., however, yugoslav troops entered the mirdita district of northern albania. ‘there was heavy fighting, "and the defeat of albania was almost complete. the british govt. at once demanded the summoning of a special meeting of the council under article 11 to consider the situation and if necessary to agree upon measures under the ‘ sanctions ” article, no. 16, of the covenant. at the meeting of the council on nov. 18, the serb- croat-slovene state agreed to evacuate its troops and to respect the frontier which had now been definitely fixed by the conference of ambassadors. the league commission of inquiry personally accompanied the departing troops, and on dec. 10 were able to report that the evacuation had been successfully completed without untoward incidents. a serious threat of conflict had again been averted and has not since recurred. memel.—yvhe memel problem is another instance of a peace treaty question handed over to the league because the allies, acting through their normal machinery, had been unable to settle it. there was a strong reason for invoking the services of the league in this leaguie of nations case because it involved extremely complex technical questions of transit and port facilities, with which the league’s technical organi- sation was particularly fitted to deal. lithuania, having suffered from a fait accompli, pending the definite fixing of a frontier at wilno, successfully tried a coup of her own at memel tn jan. 1923. the conference of ambassadors fixed the frontier in a way which left memel in lithuania on condition of a large measure of autonomy to the german population and guarantees for the development of the port as an international outlet. but they failed to frame a con- vention acceptable to lithuania to give effect to this condition. active conflict being threatened, the conference in sept. asked the league to deal with the matter. the council appointed an im- partial commission, which made a thorough investigation of the local conditions, and in march 1924 presented a complete draft conven- tion to the council. this convention (for the terms of which see nmiemel) was accepted by both parties and endorsed by the allied governiments. the corfu dispute-—a much more important dispute, affecting a_ principal power, was brought before the league in the autumn of 1923. an italian general and his staff, who were engaged as repre- sentatives of the conference of ambassadors in fixing the frontier between albania and greece, were murdered on creek soil, by per- sons unknown, on aug, 27 1923. the italian govt. demanded repara- tion and apologies of the greek govt., who accepted some of the- conditions and refused others. the italian naval authorities there- upon occupied the island of corfu, loss of life occurring in the operation (see corfu). greece appealed to the league, but also stated her willingness to accept any decision of the conference of ambassadors. ‘the position of the conference, as a body whose | decision both parties agreed to accept and as itself directly interested, made the formal competence of the council doubtful. the council therefore confined itself to discussing detailed suggestions for a settlement and forwarding them to the conference of ambassadors. the conference adopted most of these suggestions, but with an im- portant modification on the question of reparation. with regard to this it dispatched an allied committee of inquiry and, on receipt of its report, which it withheld from publication, it awarded italy the full amount of reparation which she had demanded. corfu was then evacuated. the immediate question thus settled, the council re- ferred to a committee of jurists the question of legal principle which the case had raised with regard to the compctence of the council, the right of coercive action and the responsibility of a state for political crimes committed on its territory. unanimous replies were received to these questions and were transmitted by the council to the assembly; and the legal position was thus more clearly estab- lished as regards similar incidents in the future. the case was an extremcly intricate one, and there has been much difference of opinion as to the action of the league. the league facilitated a quick settlement, the early evacuation of corfu and the avoidance of hostilities; and the actual proposals which it made as to the details of scttlement are not open to adverse criticism. but it did not secure the adoption of all these proposals. the action of the conference of ambassadors, in giving its award, while withholding the report on which it purported to base it, would have been im- possible if the league had been in full control of the case. the fac- tors which made effective league action difficult were partly the special and dual position of the conference of ambassadors in the question and partly, it must be recognised, the fact that one of the parties involved wasa great power and that the general relations of the powers were at the moment complicated by other questions of policy. the degree and limits of the league's action accurately re- flect the extent to which it was possible to make a collective world opinion effective under the conditions created at the moment by the relations between the governments, and especially the great powers on the council. that this collective opinion had an important in- fluence on the settlement is indisputable, and the expression of this opinion, made possible by the meeting of the assembly, was indeed a revelation to all who witnessed it of what is bound to be henceforth a new force of the first importance in the political life of the world. mosul.—the conference of lausanne in 1923 found that its most difficult question in the settlement of the terms of peace with turkey was the frontier line between turkey and the british ‘‘ mandate ” territory of ‘iraq. agreement having failed, the treaty provided that turkey and great britain should attempt to reach agreement by friendly negotiations, and that, if these did not succeed within nine months, the question should be referred to the council of the league. the negotiations failed, and in aug. 1924 the question was accordingly brought before the council, who ap- pointed a commission of three (a swede, a hungarian anda belgian) to investigate on the spot. the commission worked for eight months and then presented a report in which, after reviewing exhaustively all the factors of the case, they recommended unanimously that the best solution would be for the disputed district, including the town of mosul, to be included in ‘iraq if the british mandate could be continued for 25 years, but that, if this were impossible, it would be better to assign it to turkey. when the council had this report before them in sept. 1925, they were faced with the contention of turkey that the council's task under the treaty of iausanne was one of mediation, not arbitration, and that no decision could be binding unless turkey herself had assented to it. the council asked league of nations an advisory opinion of the permanent court of international justice, who replied that the treaty had given arbitral powers and that the consent of the two parties was not required, though unanimity of the other members was necessary. with this opinion, the council in dec. decided, by a unanimous vote of all members other than the disputants, that the territory should be assigned to ‘iraq, subject to the prolongation of the brjtish mandate and the assurance of full protection for the kurdish population. the turks refused to accept the court's opinion that an arbitral decision was binding, and withdrew from the council at which the above decision was taken. the british govt. undertook to ask for authority to accept the prolongation of the mandate for 25 years or until such earlier date as ‘iraq could be accepted as a member of the league, and announced their intention to attempt the renewal of negotiations with turkey. during this difficult period the council took various measures to assist in the maintenance of the status guo without hostilities and to investigate complaints as to turkish deportations of christians and violations of the frontier. the mission of gen. laidoner on behalf of the league for this latter purpose is of special interest as being the first of its kind. (for the gencral scttlement see mosul.) the greco-bulgar incident.—on oct. 19 1925 shots were ex- changed between two greek and bulgarian sentries occupying fron- tier posts separated by 4o yards on the frontiers northeast of salonika. on oct. 22 greek troops, under orders from athens, entered bulgarian territory through the struma valley and penetrated about 8 km. on afront of about 32 kilometres. bulgaria telegraphed an appeal to geneva asking the secretary general to convene a special meeting of the council under the powers conferred on him by article it of the covenant. this appeal arrived on friday morning, oct. 23. the secretary general at once decided to convene the council, and after telephonic conversation with m. briand, the president for the time being, fixed it at the most quickly accessible place, paris, and at the earliest date physically possible for members requiring to come from stockholm, london and rome, monday, oct. 26. at the same time it was arranged that a telegram should be sent to both governments in m. briand's name, as president, calling on both sides to abstain from all hostilities. this telegram was also dispatched the same friday morning. preparations had been made for a greek attack on the bulgarian town of petrich with a force of 1,000 men and three batteries at 6 a.m. on saturday, oct. 24; and the bulgarian commander had orders to resist. briand’s telegram, arriving in the two capitals on friday, was immediately effective. orders arrived from athens just in time to stop the greek attack on petrich. on monday, the 26th, the council mct tn paris. the situation of immediate danger, viz., the presence of greck troops in bulgarian territory, was at once dealt with. evacuation was demanded within a time-limit of 60 hours, and an assurance that the necessary orders had been given was asked within a time-limit of 24 hours. the same day orders were telegraphed to british, french and htalian military attaches to proceed from belgrade and athens to supervise the evacuation. the attaches received their instructions on tuesday, proceeded immediately by special trains, and arrived on the scene of action about 2 p.m. on wednesday, oct. 28. there followed one of the most dramatic and significant scenes in history. the attaches at once summoned the two commanders and gave them detailed in- structions in the name of the league of nations as to the evacuation, prescribing the times at which the evacuating troops should move and the interval which was to elapse before bulgarian troops might enter the abandoned territory. within about 11 hours of the officers’ arrival, and eight hours before the expiration of the time limit, the last greek soldier left bulgarian soil. the council proceeded ta deal with the question of reparation and of safeguards against the recurrence of similar incidents. they appointed a commission, under the chairmanship of sir horace rumbold, and including french and italian generals and dutch and swedish civilian members, the commisston reported to the council at geneva at its meeting in the first weck in december. its findings (see bulgaria) were approved by the council and accepted by the two governments. the incident was closed and future security in the balkans substantially increased. the league in this case acted with promptitude and efficacy. the spirit expressed and developed at the recent locarno conference, the relative weakness of the countries directly concerned and the fact that this was the kind of problem with which the league was de- signed to deal, and was not complicated by the difficulties of incom- sante defined treaty provisions, all doubtless contributed to this result. these eight cases have been chosen as best illustrating the character of the political problems with which the league was faced during the years 1920-5, and its method of working. other disputes were brought before the league: between hungary and rumania about the expropriation of certain hungarian nationals in transylvania; between hungary and austria about the bur- genland; between hungary and czechoslovakia about a frontier delimitation; between finland and russia about eastern 683 karelia; a frontier dispute (jaworzina) between poland and czechoslovakia, and a dispute between france and great britain with regard to the nationality of persons born of british parents but resident at tunis. tuo comments—in reviewing the league’s action in these political disputes as a whole, two comments at once suggest themselves:— 1. the extent of the league’s power to act effectively necessarily varies with the general international relations of the governments in and outside the league. after locarno the council deals promptly and decisively with the greco-bulgar trouble. with the vilna incident, which occurred when the relations between the principal powers were diificult and complicated by many divergencies of policy in other questions, the action is slow, indecisive and unsuccessful. 2. the league, whose normal task is to preserve peace on the basis of treaties fully concluded, is placed in a difficult position when it is asked to complete the work of settling terms of peace. in the upper silesia, memel, vilna and ‘iraq cases this was a complicating factor. in such cases the treaties are cither incomplete or ambiguous; they may be complicated by obifer dicta in the course of the negotia- tions: the league is held responsible by public opinion not only for a decision within the limits of its mandate but for the character of the mandate which it has had no power to vary; and by the very fact that it is continuing the work of making terms imposed by a victor its impartiality ts compromised. disarmament and security the reduction of armaments is the first of the specific tasks imposed by the covenant. there is none on which the league has achieved so little direct and tangible result, for armaments remain, in the world as a whole, at a level not very substantially lower than in 1913, and no reduction is directly traceable to league action. but the indirect results have been of great importance. for it at once appeared that reduction of arma- ments required an increased sense of security; and the search for methods of obtaining this led to the growth of a belief in all- inclusive arbitration, the most notable and fruitful political development since the covenant. the first action of the league was to appoint a ‘‘ temporary mixed commission ”’ to prepare the way for armament reduction. this commission, consisting partly of politicians (though not representing their governments), partly of military and other technical experts, and partly of persons representing special classes of public interest (e.g., working-class opinion), finally elaborated a draft treaty of mutual assistance. the basic prin- ciple was a combination of a general and special guarantees. within the cadre of a general treaty, groups of states would enter into detailed arrangements to support each other if at- tacked, and as a condition of being entitled to this support they would agree to proportional disarmament. the proposal was criticised on the ground that the detailed plans for reciprocal military support contemplated would be unlikely in fact to lead to reduced armaments and, above all, that the authorised group- ing of friendly states against prospective enemies was in conflict with the essential spirit of the league. at the 1924 assembly, when it was clear that these objections would be fatal to the draft treaty, the whole problem was reviewed on another basis. in a month the “‘ geneva protocol ” was elaborated and unani- mously agreed for recommendation to the governments (see security). this second scheme also failed to win acceptance, the new conservative govt. of great britain taking the lead in its rejec- tion as the previous labour govt. had led the opposition to the earlier treaty. great britain was not prepared to accept the unlimited obligation of arbitration in her own disputes, or the responsibility of assisting the enforcement of such arbitration over an unrestricted range of other countries who might accept the obligation. apart from the objection of substance made to certain of the principles of these two schemes, it may be suggested that their rejection was in part due to the methods and procedure by which they were framed, which differed from the ordinary practice and traditions of the league. the temporary mixed commission included in one body diverse elements (statesmen, experts, etc.) who, under the ordinary league system, are separated into 684 clearly differentiated committees, each with its own compe- tence and defined rele. in fact, serious misunderstandings some- times arose as to the extent to which a statesman connected with a government, but not on this matter representing it, might be taken to be reflecting its policy or a policy it might be induced to accept. moreover, the commission for a technical body, which it was in principle, perhaps worked too long without the effective direction of a political authority like the council. the geneva protocol, on the other hand, was dealt with too rapidly by the political body, the assembly, the work of experts having to proceed simultaneously with the political discussions and .not having preceded them, as is the normal league method. the consequence was that the assembly was acting more as an advisory body recommending a scheme than a political authority of fully accredited representatives. for so important a project the work of political preparation had been inadequate. when all is said, however, it is difficult to regret even the haste of the 1924 assembly, for the demonstration which it gave of the genuine desire of a large part of europe for all-inclusive arbitration, and the impetus it gave to the movement towards arbitration throughout the world, have been perhaps the most important factors in political history since 1919. _ certainly the preparation of these two schemes was essential to the locarno agreements of 1925. by “ preparation ”’ of course is not meant merely the technical elaboration of the proposals. in international agreements, that fs always the least part of the work. it is the preparation of the public opinion of the world, of the minds of ministers and their advisers, which is the im- portant thing. the preparation, in this wider sense, at geneva was the indispensable basis of the locarno treaties. these trea- ties provide for all-inclusive arbitration, on very much the protocol principle, but over a restricted though wide range of countries; and for mutual guarantees and support somewhat simi- lar to those of the original treaty of mutual assistance. it is, how- ever, of their essence that the main vital guarantee is ‘‘ bilateral ” and not based upon a grouping of powers presumed to be friendly against others presumed to be unfriendly. trafic in. arms.—apart from these efforts to deal with the fundamental problem involved in the reduction of armaments the league has worked at the two subsidiary and connected questions of the traffic in arms and their private manufacture. a draft convention to regulate traffic in arms was drawn up at a conference of 44 states, including the united states, germany and turkey, in geneva in june 1925. the object of this con- vention is to establish a general system of supervision and pub- licity over the international trade in arms and munitions, and a special system for certain land areas and maritime zones. gov- ernments alone are to have the right to export or import arms exclusively designed for war, and a licensing system is provided for. in general, it may be said that the convention does not give any effective authority to control traffic by international action, but is likely to provide the publicity which is the first condition of either national or international restriction when that proves practicable. this international aspect of private manufacture of arms, is still (1926) under preliminary study. the saar, danzic, mandates, minorities in certain areas of the world the league, normally an instru- ment through which sovereign states settle their differences or co-operate in matters of international concern, has itself direct and special responsibilities for government and administration. in the saar it has the full responsibility of a sovereign state, ex- ercised through a permanent commission appointed by and re- sponsible to the council. the small free city of danzig is under its special protection, and a resident high commissioner of the league acts as arbitrator on disputes between the free city and poland. over the large area of the mandated territories separat- ed from the german and turkish empires by the terms of peace, it is responsible for seeing that the mandatory powers govern and administer in accordance with the mandate and the pro- visions of the covenant. andina number of states it has duties with regard to the protection of minority populations. league of nations the saar bastn.—the saar basin (g.v.) is a mining district, with a predominant german population of some 700,00c, which the treaty of versailles transferred from germany to the trusteeship of the league for 15 years, after which its future fate is to be decided by a plebiscite. the treaty prescribes the form of government, through a governing commission, subject to the council of the league only, the inhabitants having no rights of representative government outside purely local administration, though the commission are re- quired to consider the views of elected representatives before chang- ing the laws or imposing new taxes. the treaty also transferred the property in the mines to france in compensation for the destruction of the mines in northern france. the saar govt. is thus, by treaty provision, not by league de- cision, purely autocratic and unrepresentative. with an overhang- ing plebiscite and situated between france and germany, it was inevitable that its inhabitants should have developed an extremely sensitive political consciousness and that the district should have been a mirror reflecting the controversies of its two great neigh- bours. there has in fact been considerable political friction and tension, varying directly with the changing political relations of france and germany. the council and the commission have been criticised for some of the appointments on the commission, for the introduction of the french franc as the sole legal tender, for questions affecting education, for — certain administrative decrees designed to prevent disturbances dur- ing a strike in 1923, for the presence of french troops for the main- tenance of order which the treaty contemplated would be undertaken by local gendarmerie, and in general for an undue regard for french interests. the inquiry made by the league in july 1923 showed that some of the charges were not without foundation. the commission has now developed an elected advisory council, designed to give as full representation to the wishes of the inhabitants as is possible under the autocratic regime imposed by the treaty; the administra- tive measures complained of tn 1923 were changed with the termina- tion of the strike; french troops were gradually replaced by local gendarmerie, and the political tension generally relaxed with the improved relations of france and germany. the main grievances, substantial though they had often been, have in reality been complaints against the provisions of the treaty, against conditions which those provisions made practically inevitable. entrusted with the execution of terms imposed by the victor, the league is at once compelled by those terms to action which bears the mark of its origin, and at the same time is criticised by the stand- ards properly applicable to an international authority which is not only impartial but unfettered. danzig.—the free city of danzig, a small wedge between east prussia and the polish corridor, is important as the chief outlet to the sea for polish trade. to act asa kind of court of first instance for the disputes bound to arise out of the intricate and nicely balanced rovisions of the danzig constitution (see danzig) it was provided be the treaty of versailles that the league should appoint a resident high commissioner, a further appeal lying to the council. there has been great tension and mutual! suspicion throughout practically the whole six years between danzig and poland, such as sometimes almost to make negotiations between the two impossible. under these conditions the council has had to devote much time at nearly every mecting to disputes of which the one about poland’s right to have post-boxes under her own control within danzig is typical and the best known. the economic life of the city has on the whole been satisfactory, the vessels entering the port and the exports rising considerably above the pre-war level. the demoralisation of the german mark caused great difficulties, however, and capital was urgently needed to adjust her port and other facilities to the new conditions. the league gave an expression of its special in- terest in the city by assisting her to introduce successfully a stable currency of her own and later to raise a municipal loan for develop- ment purposes. mandates.—the german colonies and the arab provinces of the turkish empire, ceded as a result of the world war, were not trans- ferred to other states in full sovereignty. their administration was entrusted to different mandatory powers under the general super- vision of the league. for the terms on which the mandates were given and the general supervision exercised by the league through the permanent mandates commission, see mandates. it is difficult to measure the extent to which this system of super- vision does in fact modify colonial administration. no indication can of course be found by searching the league records for instances of censure and repentance. that is not the way in which the in- fluence of a collective opinion operates, or can operate, without dis- ruptive results on the conduct of great powers. that does not mean, however, that this influence is not profoundly effective. mandatory powers and their administrators are keenly sensitive to the candid and informed criticism which is always forthcoming in the commis- sion’s meetings, even if it finds little reflection in the public resolu- tions: and the desire to avoid risk of exposure to it is a factor in daily colonial administration comparable with the influence exercised by parliament on whitehall by the right to ask questions of the responsible minister. muinorities.—vhe work of the league in the protection of minor- ities (g.v.) is one of the most important, and perhaps the most delicate league of nations of all its current duties. nine states are under treaty obligation, and five others have by declarations accepted a similar engagement, to observe in their administration certain principles designed to secure to racial and religious minorities within their territories pro- tection of life and liberty, the free exercise of religious rights and the free use of their native tongue, with opportunities of education in it where it is the native tongue of a considerable proportion of the population. the minorities number in all some 30,000,000, and are so situated that no possible treaty provisions or frontiers could have given them rights of sovereign self-government without creating innumerable states or enclaves. they are free citizens of the states to which they belong, and the only ultimately satisfactory solution is that they should become indistinguishably incorporated in the general political life of the country. in the meantime the racial, religious and traditional feelings of enmity between them and those who form the majority of the population subject them to the dangers of differential majority government and administration. the difficulties so caused constitute perhaps the greater part of the political troubles and political dangers of europe. it isa problem of peculiar delicacy, for the minorities constitute a kind of state with- in the state, and interference with or even open criticism of the government on which the daily conditions of their life depend may always do more harm than good. for this reason complaints are only considered officially by the council if they are put on the agenda by a member of the council, who satisfies himself that they are sufficiently serious and well founded to justify this action; and the council itself deals directly with these questions, not entrusting them beforehand to any technical committee. the league’s in- fluence is exercised for the most part in the form of private repre- sentations and conversations which gain their authority from the fact that the sanction of a public discussion at the council always remains as a possibility in the background. economic and financial reconstruction the reconstruction work of the league shows, better than anything else, that the league is not confined to a limited range of special tasks, but is an instrument which the governments of the world can use for any form of international co-operation they wish to undertake. the covenant imposes scarcely any specific economic or financial duties. it implies the preparation of economic sanctions; it contains the obligation to secure and maintain freedom of communications and transit and (in a vague and ambiguous phrase) equitable treatment for the commerce of all member states; but there is nothing which directly con- templates such tasks as that of the financial restoration of a country. the league’s work in this sphere began with the brussels financial conference held under its auspices in sept. 1920. ex- perts from 39 countries, named by the governments but not representing their policy, met to consider the methods by which stable finances and currencies could be restored. they drew up a series of unanimous resolutions which, elaborated as they were by the later genoa conference of 1922, have since served as a useful guide and support to countries attempting to restore their finances. more important, however, than the establishment of this general body of doctrine was the league's practical work in itself restoring the finances of two countries, austria and hun- gary, whose problem was beyond their own unaided resources. austria.—lit is interesting to observe the mechanism of the league in dealing with the extraordinarily complex political and financial problem of the republic of austria (g.v.), a sub-committee of the council handled the political aspects of the question. the financial committee worked out a technical scheme of reconstruction; the economic committee considered what immediate economic measures would be useful; a legal committee worked side by side and prepared the formal instruments to embody the technical recommendations; and behind all the assembly provided the motive force of the col- lective good will of the world towards an effort to save a member state from destruction. the composition of the financial committee, on which the heaviest burden fell, deserves special attention. it consisted of experts, partly drawn from national treasury depart- ments and partly from private finance. they sat as experts and not as representatives of governments, and were thus able to recom- mend proposals involving government action, without waiting for the assent of the governments. at the same time, their position enabled them to estimate with special knowledge how far it was possible to induce the several governments to go. the principles of the scheme proved of such importance in the future history of european recovery, and were so novel and untried at the time, that it is well to summarise them brietly. the immediate trouble with austria was that her currency was rapidly falling to zero. this was due primarily to the fact that the revenue was in- sufficient for the public expenditure, and the government, having 685 no other resources, was mecting the deficit by printing notes. the scheme therefore provided that the inflationary issue of notes should cease and, to assure this, that the right of note issue should be trans- ferred from the government to an independent bank of issue, working on commercial principles. this of course did not solve the problem. inflation resulted from the unbalanced budget. austria was, therefore, required to undertake internal reforms which would bring the budget into equilibrium. as this would take some years, and it was essential to stop inflation at once, it was proposed to raise an external loan of some £27,000,000 which would be available to meet deficits during this period. as security for this loan austria's assets, primarily her customs and tobacco receipts, were assigned and placed under control. at the time, however, there was an obvious danger that austria herself would fall to pieces, in which case her customs and tobacco receipts might also disappear. they were, therefore, an insufficient basis on which to issue a loan, this difficul- ty was met by securing government guarantees of the loan, in different proportions, from great britain, france, italy, czechoslo- vakia, sweden, holland, belgium and denmark, two other countries, spain and switzerland, associating themselves with the loan in a somewhat different form. in addition, a political protocol was signed assuring austria’s political and economic independence. lastly, there was to be a commissioner-general responsible to the council in general control of the whole scheme, controlling the assigned revenues, holding the proceeds of the loan, and supervising the reform of the austrian budget. the scheme was therefore essentially one of financial reconstruc- tion, it did not directly undertake the economic restoration of the country. its contribution to economic development was to afford the indispensable basis of a sound currency. this work is now practically completed. the currency was at once stabilised in 1922 and has remained absolutely stable ever since, the only currency in europe remaining stable throughout the period. taxation receipts covered ordinary expenditure during 1924-5 and a large part of the reconstruction loan has been available for increasing the capital resources of the country by productive in- vestment. the control of the budget ceased on dec. 31 1925, and it is anticipated that the office of the commissioner-general will be terminated before the end of june 1926. hungary.—the results in austria led, a year later, to a request for similar aid from ifungary, whose currency and finances reached the same position as austria's, though more slowly. here the roblem was technically easier, as hungary had a solid agricultural baais for her economic life and was more than self-sufficient in the primary necessities of food. but it was politically more difficult, for her neighbours, particularly czechoslovakia, serbia and rumania, speculated anxiously as to the attitude of a restored and strength- ened elungary, and their relations with her were embittered by many unscttled disputes. the league could not act except at the unan- imous wish of all the interested countries, who included hungary's neighbours, and it looked as if this would prove an insuperable ob- stacle. under the iniluence of the league, however, these disputes were settled—with an incidental advantage to the political situation of central europe extending far beyond the immediate results of the reconstruction scheme, the scheme was identical in its main principles with the austrian, but the loan was less than half the amount, it was issued without government guarantees and provision was made for a moderate reparation payment under technical conditions which afforded a valuable precedent for the german problem. the ilungarian crown was at once stabilised in relation to sterling and with sterling has now gone on to gold. the budget recovered its balance after the first few months. control began on may 1 1925. the first subse- quent financial year (july 1 1924 to june 30 1925} showed a surplus of 63,000,000 gold crowns and there was a further surplus in the first six months of the following financial year. the great bulk of the loan, therefore, not being required for its primary purpose of meeting budget deficits, will be devoted to productive investment. it is anticipated that the control will end with a declaration by the council that the financial stability of hlungary is assured at about the same time as the austrian, 7.e., in june 1926. german reparation.—though the league had no direct respon- sibility for handling the german reparation problem, the experience gained in the austrian and ifungarian schemes certainly contributed to its solution. the most important principles of the dawes scheme had been anticipated, and for the most part tried in practice, in these earlier schemes. it is sufficient to mention the stabilisation of the currency, the foundation of an independent bank of issue, the pro- visions for the maintenance of budget equilibrium (with the impor- tant difference that no general budget control was necessary in (sermany), the fixation of reparation payments not for all time but for a considerable period, the principles of the control of the as- signed revenues and the “ transfer ’’ system. greek refugee settlement.—reconstruction work of a somewhat different kind has been undertaken by the league in the settlement of greek refugees (see refugees) who to the number of nearly 1,500,000 or more than a fifth of the population of greece, fled back to greece as a result of the greco-turkish war, a task evidently beyond the unaided resources of greece. with the aid of the league a loan of £10,000,000 was raised and employed to settle the refugees 686 in productive employment, mainly upon the land. the work, directed by a refugee settlement commission, consisted of an amer- ican chairman and a british vice-chairman, selected by the league, and two greek members, chosen with the council’s approval by the greek government. the bulk of the refugees were housed, allotted land, and started on their new carcers with a small initial capital and the necessary equipment, among other work carried on under the direction of the financial committee have been the introduction of a new and stable currency, later followed by a municipal loan, for danzig; financial advice to estonia and albania; and a study, which is still continuing, of the problem of double taxation, trade and commerce.—meantime the economic committee has been working patiently at the task of securing more ‘‘ equitable treatment ” for commerce in the spirit of article 23 of the covenant, and in removing impediments to international trade. the most important achievement in this sphere was the conclusion in oct. 1923, of a convention for the simplification of customs formalities. in addition, a convention has been arranged which has removed some of the obstacles to commercial arbitration. the committee have also considered the equitable treatment of foreigners (the recommenda- tion of a code of principles to guide governments in their treatment of foreign enterprises established in their territorics) and the suppres- sion of fraudulent trade marks. they have embarked upon an attempt to secure the abolition of prohibitions of exports and imports. a communications and transit committee, with numerous sub- committees, includes experts in land, sea and air transport, and is responsible to a periodical conference. the first important confer- ence was held at barcelona in 1921, when two conventions were ap- roved laying down the gencral principles that transport originating in one state and crossing a second into a third, or transport making use of through international waterways (see inland water trans- port), should enjoy complete liberty of transit with equal treatment for all fags and freedom from customs duties and vexatious dues. a second conference held at geneva in nov. 1923 dealt with in- ternational railway traffic, equality for shipping in maritime ports, the transmission of electric power across a third state and the development of hydraulic basins situated between two or more states, the maritime forts convention, drawn up at this conference, provides for equal treatment of all states in port dues and regula- tions, while the railway convention codifies existing railway practice as regards international traffic and aims at simplifying frontier formalities for passenger and goods traffic. all the conventions con- cluded at these conferences provide for machinery of compulsory arbitration similar to those contained in the clauses of the peace treaties of 1919 relating to communications and transport. in such cases the transit committee of the league acts as a mediatory body before a case goes for compulsory settlement to the international court of justice. the transit organisation has been instrumental in effecting considerable improvements in the passport system (par- ticularly in the abolition of visas in many cases) and it has arranged a further passport conference to continue this work in 1926. among other questions studied are the reform of the calendar, commercial aerial law, wireless regulations, international motor drivers’ licences, etc. miscellaneous questions the league is also an instrument of positive co-operation in work of general benefit to the world. the short space here allotted to this must not be taken as an adequate measure of its relative importance in the general achievements of the league. for its health work the league has the assistance of 2 technical health committee, composed, like the financial, economic and transit committees, of experts. this health organisation has had the active co-operation of the united states, germany and russia, as well as the member states, and its activities have ex- tended throughout europe and the eastern mediterranean, tropical africa and the far east. public health.—lits first important work was to assist poland by means of an epidemic commission with the best western experience to prevent the spread of typhus through poland to europe. for this purpose it was necessary to attack the prob- lem in russia itself, and the commission went to russia, estab- lished effective co-operation and opened offices in moscow and kharkov. this was followed by a european conference at warsaw in may 1922, attended by soviet russia, the ukraine, turkey, germany and 24 other states. a draft convention was drawn up and has since become the basis of bi-lateral agrce- ments between the nations adjoining poland and russia. public health courses were arranged for health officers at moscow, kharkov and warsaw. the epidemic commission next gave assistance to the greek health authorities in dealing with the dangers of epidemic resulting from the sudden immigration of league of nations masses of greek refugees in and after the greco-turkish war. apart from such emergency assistance, much has been done to secure an interchange of knowledge and experience between the public health organisations of the world, to promote their co- operation and to study the characteristics of special epidemic or endemic diseases and the methods of combating them. various missions have visited the eastern mediterranean, the far east, greece and albania, the balkan states, russia and italy, pales- tine and syria and persia. scientific work is also being done with a view to the standardisation of sera and of certain drugs for the treatment of diphtheria, tetanus and dysentery. an interesting experiment, which has been made possible on a large scale by the generosity of the rockefeller foundation, is the interchange of selected officers of health administrations. officers of one country visit those of another, study their methods, participate for some weeks or months in practical work and then meet at geneva to compare results. lastly, the health organisation maintains an epidemiological intelligence service, publishing at regular intervals detailed information of the move- ment of epidemic disease throughout the world. drug trafic.—of what may be called the social questions handled by the league the control of noxious drugs, and par- ticularly opium, has been the most difficult and important. the league took as its starting point the opium convention of ror2, which had been signed by most countries in the world. an advisory committee was appointed to prepare a plan to make the application of this convention more effective in practice. they took as their aim the restriction of the traffic to medicinal and scientific requirements, and started an investigation to dis- cover the extent of these requirements. finally, the u.s. govt. sent a delegation to participate in the work of this com- mittee, and in any conference which might follow, and to attend the 1924 assembly which reviewed the progress of the previous year and a half. two plenipotentiary conferences fol- lowed in the winter of 1924-5. the first of these dealt with the question of the gradual suppression of opium smoking in the far east with a view for its ultimate abolition. at this an agreement was reached under which the signatory states undertook (a) to strengthen the measures already pro- vided for in the convention of 1912 and (8) to suppress entirely the consumption of prepared opium in their respective terri- tories within 15 years from the date at which the poppy-growing countries should succeed in preventing the clandestine exporta- tion of raw opium from constituting a serious obstacle to the restriction of consumption in the former territories. the second conference drew up 4 convention for the more effective restric- tion of the production or manufacture of narcotics and of the international trade in them. the latter is to be controlled in particular by a system of export authorisations and import certificates. a permanent central board is to be established which is to recetve periodical estimates from the contracting parties of the quantities of narcotics they need and ask for ex- planations if they are such as to suggest a danger of illicit traffic. a further protocol engages the signatory states to take measures which shall completely prevent, within five years, the smuggling of opium out of their territories from constituting a serious obstacle to the suppression of the use of prepared opium in other countries. the american delegation had brought a complete programme of their own, which they failed to get adopted. the chief dif- ference was that they wanted a more definite undertaking than the other countries thought practicable for the restriction of the growth of the raw product and for the cessation within a term of years of the prepared opium. they ultimately withdrew from the conference, as did china. white slave traffic-—certain work has also been done by the league in connection with the traffic in women and the protec- tion of children. a convention was drawn up by the 1921 assem- bly strengthening in certain respects the provisions of two pre- war conventions dealing with traffic and has been signed by 33 states. the problem is also being studied by one of the two committees of the commission for the protection and welfare of league of nations children and young people, which includes representatives of voluntary organisations and makes annual recommendations to the assembly. the study of child welfare is undertaken by the child welfare committee of this commission. apart from this general work the league took direct practical measures in 1921 to rescue, and where possible restore to their own people, women captured and removed from their homes during the military operations in the near east, houses of refuge being established at constantinople and aleppo. lastly, in 1923, the league arranged a conference at which a convention was drawn up to assist in the suppression of the international traffic in obscene publications. humanitarian work.—two important pieces of humanitarian work have been undertaken by the league through dr. nansen. in 1920 large numbers of war prisoners were still in russia and adjacent countries awaiting the means of repatriation. with the aid of certain charitable societies dr. nansen organised a fleet of steamers under league charter in the baltic and black seas and 427,386 prisoners of 26 different nationalities were re- patriated at the astonishingly low cost of less than £1 a head. dr. nansen also undertook somewhat similar work for the scttle- ment of large numbers of russian refugees. their movements were assisted by the invention of a special system of identity certificates, as a substitute for passports, and considerable prog- ress has been made in finding them employment. two other picces of humanitarian work may be mentioned in conclusion, a convention drawn up at the 1925 assembly for the suppression of slavery (q¢.v.) and restriction of forced labour, and the scheme prepared by senator ciraolo and now being worked out in collaboration with red cross organisations, for the pro- vision of insurance against national calamities such as earth- quakes. among other tasks, the most novel departure has perhaps been the work of the committee on intellectual co- operation (g.v.) which has till recently been presided over by m. bergson and has included among its members prof. einstein, madame curie and prof. gilbert murray. under article 24 of the covenant some international bureaux established by convention must be, and others may be, brought under the league. four such organisations have now been affiliated, viz.: relief bureau (for the repatriation of distressed persons), a hydrographic bureau (to secure co-ordination in hydrographic work), an office for the control of liquor traffic in africa and a committee for air navigation. the league issues a handbook giving information about some 360 international organisations and a quarterly bulletin giving some account of their work, summary of workk in these six years (1919-25), therefore, the league has averted hostilities in some half-dozen cases and probably prevented at least minor wars in several of them. it has made a substantial contribution to europe’s recovery by the guidance and influence of the brussels financial conference; by the direct reconstruc- tion of austria and hungary; by the model so afforded for the solution of the german problem and the self-restoration achieved in other countries; and by a-serics of transit and customs for- malities conventions and other measures designed to remove the impediments to international trade. it has repatriated some hundreds of thousands of refugees and established nearly 1,000,000 in productive employment in greece. it has exercised a varying but increasing influence over the government of some 30,000,000 of minority populations entrusted to its guidance. it has supervised the mandatory administration of the former colonial empire of germany and turkey. it has directly gov- erned the district of the saar and has assisted in the government of danzig. it has worked at a number of social problems, the regulation of opium and other drugs, and the protection of women and children. apart from these tangible and visible results, it has pene- trated and modified the policies of national governments through the regular contact, and co-operation in international work, of foreign ministers, quarterly and annually at meetings of the 687 council and assembly, and of their advisers and technical assist- ants both at these meetings and at a series of technical con- ferences and discussions. beginning with disarmament but extending to security, it has prepared the way for the great extension of comprehensive arbitration embodied in the locarno agreements and doubtless destined to extend beyond them. on the other hand, the league remained long impotent before the protracted conflicts which reflected the incompleteness of the conclusion of peace in 1919 both in diplomacy, as in the reparation question, and in actual hostilities, as between greece and turkey. in some of the disputes which it has handled, it has been indecisive or ineffective; in others, the nature of its action has apparently been determined as much by the relative strength of the disputants as by considerations of ideal justice. it has made no material progress in securing disarmament. its work in removing the fundamental causes of war, and in partic- ular those which spring from economic policy, has only begun. whether these results will be regarded as disappointing or as satisfactory will doubtless depend mainly on the standard by which they are judged. by comparison with the pre-war posi- tion and methods of negotiation there can be no doubt that they represent a very great achievement. no better illustration can perhaps be found than in two references to lord grey’s book, twenty-five years (1926). of the london conference of ambassa- dors of 1913, for example, he says in effect that it lasted eight months, discussed minor questions and settled nothing, but was well worth while because it gave the world a sense of confidence to think that there was some method of international contact during a period of tension. in contrast with this, even the assembly of 1925, the least spectacular of recent years, in three weeks dealt with a mass of useful work, of real if secondary importance, and the assurance of a regular method of international contact is now not tempo- rary but permanent. still more significant is the account which viscount grey gives of the conference of the balkan powers when they met, as it happened in london, after the first balkan con- flict of 1912. he believed that the policy they were discussing would mean both the resumption of war and a disastrous result, as indeed it did. but neither great britain nor any other great power was directly concerned. if his opinion were asked in un- official conversations he gave it, informally, tentatively—and in fact without effect. neither he nor anyone else felt able to inter- vene in a matter directly affecting only the negotiating states. the second disastrous war followed. in contrast with this the settlement of the recent greco-bulgar dispute of 1925 illustrates the recognition of the new principle that a war is the concern of the whole world. if, however, our standard of judgment for the results of the six years is not the pre-war position but the ultimate ideals of the league, it is no less clear that the league’s work is only in its infancy. the league is not yet universal in its composition. its ability to deal with a first-class dispute between first-class powers has fortunately not yet been tested. there is as yet no complete assurance that such a dispute would find the league united and effective. nor has more than a beginning been made in removing the causes from which such disputes may arise. ‘this, the ultimate object of the league, must in the nature of the case be a progressive, and indeed a permanent task. it means a complete, if gradual, revolution in the traditional and historic attitude of the nations of the world to each other and a trans- formation of many of their policies. in this work the league may lead, but it can never advance far beyond, the public opinion of the world. the scope is illimitable and the task unending. brsliograpuyy.—the main authorities are the league’s own pub- fications, which give complete information as to all its activities. tn the first place the official journal contains the minutes of the council with the documents presented to it; while the records of assembly meetings are issued in special supplements. <all treaties registered under article 18 of the covenant are published in the treaty series. all reports of specially appointed league commis- sions are at once published, as are also the periodical reports of permanent officers and authorities carrying on league work (such 688 as the commissioners general in austria and hungary, the greek refugee settlement commission, the saar governing commission, etc.). as these official records are very voluminous the league also publishes (a) an abbreviated monthiy summary, giving a regular account of league activities and (0) a serics of special pamphlets as to special tasks (health work; reconstruction of austria; mandates, etc.) and a gencral summary “ a survey.” in addition, the league issues technical publications on various subjects of world interest. of these the most important are the conomic publications (including a monthly bulletin of statistics, which gives a synopsis of all main statistics indicative of economic development throughout the world, and annual publications on currency, public finance, trade and commerce), a military year book and a monthly epidemiological report. these publications are issued in english and french through league agents (in england messrs. constable). books on the league work are numerous, especially with regard to special subjects (the saar, opium, etc.) and the general principles and conception of the league. of those which summarise the general work of the league the following may be mentioned: publications by the league of nations union (1920, etc.); organisers of the league of nations, the league of nations starts (1920); w. schiicking und h. wehberg, die saizung des velkerbundes. kommentiert (1921); l.v. a. bourgeois, l’oeuvre dela societe des nations 1920-1923 (1923); p. munch, les origines et l’oeuvre de la societe des nations (1923); r. williams, the league of nations to-day (1923); h. g. alexander, the revival of europe (1924); m. fanshawe, reconstruction, a full summary to 1925, well documented (1925). league of nations information section, pamphlets on the league of nations, its cove- nant and its various activities; p.-j. n. baker, the geneva protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes (1925); sir g. g. butler, a /landbook to the league of nations, brought down to the end of the sth assembly, with an explanation of the protocol... with an introduction by the right hon. viscount cecil of chelwood, 2nd ed. (1925). the publications of the world peace foundation include a number on the work of the league. among these are handbook on the league of nations, 1920-24, and the yearbook of the league of nations (1925). (a. sr.) learned societies.—incorporated by royal charter in 1902 ‘“‘ for the promotion of historical, philosophical and philological studies,” the british academy has since rgro proved itself a potent force in the branches of learning which come within the scope of its activities. the proceedings of the british academy, of which ro vol. have been published, comprise ‘‘ communications,’’ together with special annual lectures endowed by private benefactors, or by public subscription. other publications are supplemental papers (1911, etc.) and the annual schweich lectures on biblical archaeology, inaugurated in 1908. | the fund—an anonymous endowment of {10,000—has also enabled the academy to help forward the work of excava- tion in bible lands. the series of social and economic records under the direction of the late sir paul vinogradoff, was started in 1908, with the support of a government grant; five vol. have now been published. a renewed grant in aid of the acad- emy’s work has furthered the continuation of this series. the publication, by the clarendon press, of the facsimiled o/d testa- ment of the codex sinaiticus (1911-22) was made possible by an anonymous gift. national commemorations.—since, in 1908, it organised the commemoration of the tercentenary of milton’s birth, the acad- emy has become the recognised co-ordinating body for the organ- isation of similar national commemorations, aided in this by the foundation of the annual master mind lecture (one of a number of endowments, under the will of the late henriette hertz). the academy’s activities in furthering the shakespeare tercen- tenary in 1916 were stimulated by the establishment, in rort, of the annual shakespeare lecture (endowed by the late mrs. frida mond). the annual raleigh lectures on history (iounded by sir charles wakefield, in 1919) the tercentenary of the death of sir walter ralcigh, were inaugurated by lord bryce, pres- ident of the academy, with a survey of world history. among other endowments may be mentioned the warton lecture on english poetry; the philosophical lecture; the italian lecture; the lecture on aspects of art; the lecture on english philology and literary history; the cromer prize for greek essay; the biennial prize for english studies. the academy administers also the rose mary crawshay prize fund for english literature, an annual prize of £100 awarded to a woman of any nationality for work on english literature. learned societies educational work.—the academy has provided a platform for dealing with educational needs. thus, the school of oriental studies, now an integral part of the university of london, was largely the outcome of a scheme submitted to the academy in 1904 by the late professor rhys davids. the organisation of im- perial studies, now recognised in london and in other british universitics, was directly due to proposals made by sir sidney low, in a paper read before the academy in 1912. the english place-name society, founded in 1921, to carry out the survey of english place-names, was inaugurated under the auspices of the british academy in 1923, as the result of a statement submitted by professor a. mawer, now director of the society. the mem- bership of the society, drawn from all parts of the country, al- ready numbers some 7oo. the foundation of the british school of archaeology in jerusalem in to1g was brought about by the academy, in conjunction with the palestine exploration fund. students are now being trained at the school to fill posts created by the formation of a government department of antiquities. the compilation of a register of the archaeological sites of pales- tine has been takenin hand. the government museum of antiq- uities has been organised. the exploration of various sites in palestine and, not least, the excavation of two palaeolithic caves in galilee, and the discovery of the ‘‘ galilee ’’ skull, are among the early achievements of the school, under the directorship of professor j. garstang. the establishment of the british school at jerusalem, in which the late professor leonard king was pri- marily concerned as initiating the idea, must take an important place among the more recent efforts of the academy. in all this archaeological work the palestine exploration fund has been foremost and active, and among its recent excavations are those on the hill of ophel at jerusalem, the results of which confirm the view as to the site of the city of david. meanwhile remark- able discoveries have been made in the near east (see arch- aeology: western asta). among the enterprises promoted by the academy is the ency- clopaedia of islam (1908, etc.)—-perhaps the most important proj- ect of the international associations of academies (which lapsed at the outbreak of the world war). the scheme was launched at the meeting of the association held in london, 1904. the ency- clopaedia is issued in english, french and german. sir thomas arnold, nominated by the academy, acts as english editor. the government of india, through the academy, contributes towards the publication of the english issue. international relations.—internationally, the academy is closely associated with the newly established union academique internationale, in which body it represents great britain. the principal proposals of the union in which the academy is con- cerned are the following: (a) corpus vasorum (1922, etc.); (8) catalogue of alchemical mss(1926, etc.); (c) dictionary of medtae- val latin; (d) forma imperit romani; and (e) supplements to the corpora inscriptionum graecarum et latinarum. other learned societtes —the leading departmental societies, the society of antiquaries, the royal historical society, the royal society of literature, the early english text society, the selden and other societies have all continued, developed and renewed their activities, during the period under consideration. among newer developments may be mentioned the remarkable progress of the less eclectic institutions, such as the english, classical, historical, geographical and modern languages associ- ations, and the important part played by them in securing due recognition for humanistic studies, in the scheme of national education. the value of classical study is increasingly recog- nised and there is due appreciation of the danger likely to accrue were it submerged by newer studies. the organisation of co- operative research in studies appertaining to modern languages and literatures was advanced by the foundation, in 1916, of the modern humanities research association. many agencies have promoted the recognition of english and its paramount position among modern studies—notably the english association, and, in more specialised work, such societies as the early text society, the malone and the s.p.e. (society of pure english), of which dr. robert bridges, is the founder and leading spirit. leather the shakespeare association (incorporating the shakespeare day committee), founded in close connection with the shake- speare tercentenary, 1916, has started asurvey of shakespeare in the various countries of the world, and has published a number of papers. the bibliographical society, founded in 1892, has since 1910, mainly owing to the activities of professor a. w. pol- lard, issued a number of important publications on english bibhography. in 1920 the socicty took over the library, founded by the late sir john macalister in 1888, and incorporated its transactions with it, as a bibliographical quarterly. (i. g.) societies in the u.s.a. a feature in the united states during the period 1910-26 has been a marked tendency towards decentralisation and specialism in constantly narrower groups or subjects. the number of soci- cties has increased, with a corresponding increase in the number of individuals engaged in research work, but the professed scope of the large majority of these organisations is local, particularly in the fields of history, ethnology and geology. all the older societies continued to function, with little or no change in organ- isation or objective. the smithsonian institution maintained its pre-eminency, particularly in the fields of american ethnol- ogy and astrophysics. the american oriental society, founded in 1842 for the promotion of oriental studies and the encourage- ment of research in eastern languages and literature, continued to publish a journal which has appeared without a break since 1843, and extended its activities by including in its field of research the historical study of religion in its widest scope. the national geographic society, with possibly a larger mem- bership (700,000) than any other society in the united states, was very active both in organising and financing explorations and in publication. of recent formations the carnegie institution of washington, )d.c., is the most important. it was endowed in 1902 by the late andrew carnegie with a sum of $22,300,000 to encourage in the broadest and most liberal manner investigation, research and dis- covery and the application of knowledge to the improvement of mankind. organised in departments, including those of experi- mental evolution, embryology, botanical research, marine biol- ogy, meridian astrometry, eugenics and nutrition, it is working encrgetically along its selected lines of investigation. in addition to other work in terrestrial magnetism, researches are prosecuted in atmospheric electricity, magnetism in general and other allied topics. the institution has physical laboratories at national rock creek park, d.c., a nutrition laboratory at boston, mass., where studies of the metabolism of normal individuals and of diabetics and other researches connected with metabolism are conducted, and a desert laboratory for botanical research at tucson, arizona. in addition it maintains the mount wilson observatory at pasadena, california.