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    "source_key": "britannica_1926",
    "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926)",
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    "chunk_id": "1926:infantry:d51b4422ab08",
    "title": "INFANTRY",
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    "verified_text": "to appreciate the lessons learned from the experience of infantry in the world war in relation to the past as well as io the future, it is necessary to emphasise one particular aspect of infantry evolution—the gradual decrease in size of the unit which one man can command. it is desirable also to visualise what ‘command ” really implies. a corporal is said to “command ” the squad of recruits which he is training on a barrack square; he does it by shouting words of command to them. marshal foch also “‘ commanded ” the allied armies in western europe in 1918; he did it, however, without raising his voice above its usual pitch. between the marshal and the corporal were a host of inter- mediate commanders of every sort, kind and description, but we are concerned here mainly with infantry commanders and especially with those in the junior ranks. for theirs is the hard- est task in a battle, and it is upon them that success depends. ‘ the wisest plans, the most thorough preparations, the most brilliant guidance avail nothing unless the fight is won by the fighters—by the platoons.” the minds of superior officers there- fore are devoted—especially in peacetime—to hard thinking on the problem of what they can possibly do or invent to make junior infantry commanders superior to the adversaries whom they may meet in action. a general’s command implies much forethought as well as some experience in its holder, and thus his ‘“ command ” again has a different meaning. he is a trainer, and it is with respect to this aspect of “command” that we are chiefly concerned. units and weapons if we turn to the past for a moment, we find that the greeks invented and trained their phalanx and the romans their legion, and with these two systems the infantry arm dominated the known world for several centuries. each of these formations was trained by precise drill, executed almost daily by junior com- manders. moreover this drill was in each case suited to the age and the esprit de corps of the period. in battle the voice of the infantry superior could be heard and was instantly obeyed, both in the phalanx and the legion. then ensued the dark ages and comparative chaos dominated by feudal horse soldiers until archery made infantry again supreme. precise drill was at the infantry root of the success of the archers and fire orders were strictly en- forced. if we take crecy (1346) as an example, we find that edward iii. initiated fire orders himself, though he left the command of the front-line to his son, the youthful prince of wales, in charge of the archers. a careful survey of the ground at crecy from the commanding position of its windmill, in which king edward was posted, enables one to see how it was possible for him to issue fire orders to the archers pested below him. they were only a few hundred yards from him, but he could see better than they could when the crowd of french cavaliers would offer the best target to the british longbowmen. these bowmen had under several reigns been disciplined and drilled with precision in the use of their weapons, and that is why they defeated the gallant but undisciplined mob of horsemen who attacked them without method at crecy. it is also obvious that the diminutive size of the battle-field enabled the commander-in-chief, posted behind his reserve, to initiate fire orders and see their effect—in fact he performed duties which now appertain to platoan commanders. moreover, the size of the whole battle-field corresponded with a sector allotted to one battalion or at most to two in tg18. thus the process of devolution of the physical command oc- -cupied some five centuries, chiefly because it took all that time to alter infantry armament from bows to lewis guns; partly also because each generation of professional soldiers clung with punc- tilious tenacity to the unsuitable drill of a previous age. similar tenacity is visible to-day but changes are in the air. frederick the great (1740) attained parade-ground precision even during the shock of encounter, and won his battles by means of remorse- less drill, stepping to music and machine-like fire tactics with in- accurate muskets. such is the force of tradition that in 1914 german companies in flanders illustrated frederick’s tactics with the aid of song to inspire their parademarsch within close range of british infantry. but their opponents’ rifles were ac- curate in 1914 and the death roll was enormous. frederick, however, did not teach one system on the barrack square and then practise a totally different one on active service; but that is what the british infantry did before the south african war (1899), and what some officers would like it to do again. their line of reasoning is that, as every war alters tactical formations, it is not of much avail to learn any tactics which may perhaps be discarded in the next war. british infantry in 1913.—in oct. 1913, the british infantry underwent a drastic change, in spite of much opposition. the old “‘ eight company ” battalion was altered, and the system was adopted of dividing battalions into four companies, each 200 strong. this change gave a peace strength of about 100 men per company available for training and the organisation of a battal- ion at the beginning of the war was as follows:—headquarters, machine-gun section (two guns), four companies. a company consisted of its headquarters and four platoons; a platoon of four sections. a section was commanded by a non-commissioned officer and was a normal fire unit. four battalions, from various regiments, were grouped into a brigade. in the british army the regiment, is a unit. of'sentiment and the spring from which esprit de corps arises. it is based on a fixed regimental depet which is the common link of battalions scattered over the british em- pire. the four-company battalion marked a stepping-stone in the history of the british infantry, because the platoon became the “‘ tactical ” unit instead of the company. as a logical con- sequence the fire unit (section) decreased in size and became the command of a junior n.c.o.—a corporal or lance-corporal. at first this change seemed incomprehensible to the lay mind, because it was contrary to the idea that in modern war the im- provement of communications tends to centralisation and con- trol by the higher authorities. but the extent of the modern battle-field and the increase and improvement of mechanical weapons tend to isolate and break up infantry units more and more. a further consequence of the change was that british infantry organisation became based on a four-unit system from the brigade to the platoon. this uniform distribution of units in multiples of four proved to be handier than the french or the 467 german distribution in multiples of three. by the end of 1918 the four-unit system was pronounced to be the best, whether for tactics, administration, reliefs or daily routine—but especially for tactical handling in the field. one reason for this is that * odd ” numbers destroy the even distribution of duties. other armtes, 1914.—in the german, french and u.s. armies the regiment consisted of three battalions, and was a tactical as well as an administrative unit. in germany it was commanded by a colonel with a lieutenant-colonel as his second-in-command. the battalion, commanded by a major, was divided into four companies, each commanded by a captain. the company was divided into three sections (ziige) each under a subaltern who had as his understudy or second-in-command, either a sergeant- major, a “‘ vice-sergeant-major”’ or a ‘‘ sword-knot ensign ”’ (aspirant-officer). on mobilisation for war one additional officer was allotted to each company. prior to mobilisation every in- fantry regiment and jiiger battalion was provided with a ma- chine-gun company of six guns, plus one spare. the french company was organised into four sections, com- manded in war by three subalterns and one adjutant (superior company sergeant-major). the sections were grouped in pairs to constitute pelotons (platoons) under the senior of the two sec- tion leaders. in peace there were only two subalterns on the establishment for the four sections. machine-gun sections were alotted to battalions as in the british army. in the united states the company was composed of three officers and 150 rifles, divided into two sections, each of three squads. in the world war, however, the u.s. infantry regiment was remodelled on the continental model, having also a regimental machine-gun company, a headquarters company and a supply company. thus before the war the infantry battalion was in almost every country about 1,000 rilles strong allotted to four companies each commanded by a mounted officer. but the british battalion was the weakest in fighting strength, because its first line transport and other services were deducted from its 1,000 riiles, whereas the regimental systems of continental infantry provide these services from a separate establishment. the subalterns were dismounted officers whose commands varied as follows: british 50 men, german 80 men, french 50 men, united states 7s men. but in the british infantry a large proportion of the 50 men borne on the strength of the platoons were absent on other duties. for instance, they were signallers or machine-gunners, or bandsmen or transport drivers or pioneers—they were in fact everything except fighting infantrymen, and they should never have been on the rolls of the fighting platoons. the british treasury, however, ordained otherwise and thus made training and fighting difficult for every platoon commander. changes during 1914-8.—during the progress of the war the basic organisation of the infantry of the belligerent powers was not materially altered. the changes were chieily in the direction of additional weapons and a multiplication of kit, which reduced the infantry soldicr to a beast of burden laden under a weight which destroyed his mobility. in 1915 the british infantry, as compared with the german, suffered from a paucity of machine- guns, and was slow to increase its machine-gun strength. at first an increase was made (up to four per battalion), and when manufacturers raised their output these were formed into ma- chine-gun companies. they were gradually divorced from the infantry and formed into a machine-gun corps, firstly as brigade machine-gun companies and finally as divisional battalions. by the time this had been accomplished the lighter lewis gun had made its appearance and had been allotted to infantry units. the first issue (not long before the battle of loos 1915) was only four guns per battalion, but by the end of nov. 1915, when brigade machine gun companies had been formed, the establish- ment of lewis guns was increased. : the tendency at first was to use this weapon like a heavy machine gun, but when its characteristics were better understood it took its place as a company weapon in 1916, and as a platoon weapon in feb. 1917. by march 1918, 36 per battalion became available. we then find the platoon composed of four sections, , two of which were armed with one lewis gun cach. the allot- 468 ment of an automatic weapon on such a scale marked an im- portant step in the tactics of infantry. one of these new weapons, handled by only two men, could deliver a stream of bullets equal in number to, and more accurately aimed than, what could formerly be projected by 25 soldiers with rifles. obviously the number of men required in the forefront of the battle couid be reduced without affecting the volume of fire. this meant fewer casualties and bigger reserves and the maximum number of soldicrs in every section was reduced to one leader and six men, making a total for all ranks of a platoon only 31 actually taken into action. the germans were faced with the man-power problem before any of the other belligerents, and they also appreciated the value of the light machine-gun. in march 1917 they issued three to every company, and afterwards raised this allotment to six by giving two guns to each platoon. finally, each german battalion consisted of a heavy machine-gun company of 12 guns and three infantry companies armed with six light machine guns cach, without counting the special machine-gun companies allotted to divisions for every battle. this tremendous increase in automatic weapons had an inevitable effect on infantry formations. the costly attacks on narrow frontages were abandoned. the suc- cessive lines or waves of men gave place to open formations. the four sections of a platoon were gradually separated from one another and compelled to manoeuvre and fight under their own leaders. when platoons were too weak to man four sections they fought with only two, one of which was armed with a lewis gun. the frontages allotted to the leading platoons were increased and in some of the great battles of 1918 we find platoons attack- ing on frontages of 200 and even 300 yd. with very small effec- tives. fire-power was at last understood. special weapons.—tin addition to the lewis gun, rifle-grenade and hand-grenade, the stokes light mortar proved to be a useful infantry weapon. although it did not form an integral part of battalions, the brigade light-mortar batteries drew their personnel from the infantry and the mortars were allotted to battalions during operations. the light mortar was the nearest approach to an infantry gun in the british army and, though not an ideal weapon, rendered great help in reducing encmy machine guns and strong points. the german mortars in the summer of 1918 were distributed as follows: each regiment had a regimental minenwerfer ’? company, organised in three sections, cach with three light minenwerfer, and in addition two or three medium minenwerfer. the important part played by these weapons in battle tended to prove that infantry, when scientifically armed and on ground that affords cover for movement, can act inde- pendently of other arms, and is capable of fighting its own local battle cither with or without artillery support and tanks. to fulfil this rele, however, it needs to be more highly and scien- tifically trained than before the world war. the importance of training the commanders of companies, platoons and sections cannot be over-emphasised, and it was the shortage of these trained officers and non-commissioned officers which caused so much deterioration after the battle of ypres in 1917. it was also the cause of avoidable casualties in every subsequent battle. post-war organisation. the british infantry battalion is now organised in a battalion headquarter wing, and four com- panies. the wing includes a machine-gun platoon. each com- pany consists of company headquarters and four platoons, each platoon of headquarters and four sections, two of which are armed with one lewis gun each. the platoon is the largest unit composed of men whose sole duty is to fight, and the war established it as the “ tactical unit ” of infantry. the section is the fire unit and consists of a leader and six men, a number which experience has proved is the largest that can be directly controlled in action by one commander. thus the british subaltern officer’s command in battle became 28 fighting men, as compared with 50 in 1914—but the lewis guns, rifle-grenade and hand-grenade increased the fire-power of the platoon out of all proportion to the number of its men. the french battalion comprises a headquarters group, three ordinary companics, a machine-gun company and a section of infantry accompanying weapons (mortar or infantry gun). the company at war strength 1s composed of a headquarters section and four combat sections, and the section of three groups. the fighting group consists of a team of riflemen and a team of automatic riflemen, the team in cither case comprising a corporal and five men. in peace or when the strength is lowered by casualties, the number of sections in the company, or groups in the section may be reduced, but the actual groups are maintained at full strength. the french nowadays place all their reliance upon the light automatic rather than on the rifle, and their new organisation is the outcome. although their group is far stronger than the brit- ish section, to which it corresponds, the side of all its ten men cen- tres round the service and introduction of the one fusil-mitrailleur, and the rifle team inevitably loses much of the value of its greater mobility. on the other hand, the british organisation, though possessing greater freedom and power of manoeuvre, means that the platoon commander has the difficult rele of combining four sections of which two are radically dissimilar in arms and in action to the other two. the german battalion, also, consists of three companies and a machine-gun company. <a company is organised in three sections; each section (zug) is divided into four or five groups (gruppe) of eight men each—two light machine groups and either two or three rifle groups. the role or infantry the question is sometimes put, ‘ what is the use of infantry? is it not butchery to expose men on foot to the mechanical hor- rors of the battle-field of to-day?” limitations of mfachines—man on foot is still more uni- versally mobile than any machine. the morc destructive weapons become the more does man scck impregnable shelter in which he can escape the missiles of death-dealing machines. an enemy may conceal himself in a hiding place which is inaccessible to any machine; but where man has entered there also man can follow to seck him out, and until the assailant possesses a me- chanical octopus he must himself go in to dislodge his adversary. the appliances manufactured by inventive genius only help to break down the barriers’ to this final act of combat. a great artillery bombardment will drive the enemy to ground, but even where concentration of shell-fire is achieved, it cannot dislodge him. heissaferin his dug-out thanin flight. the tank is tangi- ble, it is true, and therefore less petrifying, but man can avoid it or hide from it more easily than from infantry. moreover it is less agile, more cumbersome, more limited in its modes of action than the foot-soldier. there are types of obstacles which it can- not yet surmount, ground which will not bear its weight, or which is too rough or steep to cross. cavalry like infantry is a human arm, but it affords too easy a target, is too quickly stopped by rifle or machine-gun fire and is less mobile on rugged and broken ground. its superior speed is insufficient compensa- tion for these drawbacks except against broken and flying in- fantry. thus we see that infantry is still essential in battle, that its power is based on human rather than on material factors, and that its tactics spring from moral elements of which once is fear. destruction of enemy morale-—to wear down the enemy's nerve control is the rele of the commander, of the artillery, of bombing aeroplanes. when opposing armies are in close contact the infantry shares in the process by raids and false attacks. in the battle the part of the infantry is to snap, not wear down, the encmy’s control over his fear. the fracture is efiected by the enemy’s realisation that he is powerless to ward off his assailant’s blow. to accomplish this we must pass a sufficient though not necessarily a larger proportion of men through the curtain of his fire to a point so close to him that they can assault or offer the threat of an assault which he realises he is powerless to prevent. the key to this assault is fire at short range to pave a way for the onslaught. hence formations which avoid loss by taking advantage of cover and conserve the will to close with the enemy are necessary. surprise, the simpler, more cer- tain and less costly method, is effected by assault from an unexpected direction against an unguarded spot. the key to infantry success is therefore movement or in military language infantry manocuvre. fear above all is caused by uncertainty and appre- hension of the unknown which breaks down the will to resist and gives to the assault in flank or rear its supreme value. thus at close quarters mere numbers are not the deciding factor, and assaults are better launched by platoons than by battalions. strengthening one’s own morale-—what are the factors which enable the average man to fight down fear? first undoubtedly comes confidence—confidence in his superiority to the enemy, based on his own skill in handling his weapons; faith in his leader’s skill and judgment combined with devotion to him as a man; trust in and comradeship with his fellows—the assurance that he will be backed up, that his efforts will not be in vain. secondly, esprit de corps—which is allied to confidence. thirdly, discipline—the power of association to overrule instinct. lastly. action to minimise reflection on the dangers to be faced. ‘the training of infantry confidence is born of training—the training of each individual, the training of the leader, the training of the unit. these successive trainings forge the infantry weapon and make it fit to act its part on the battle-ficld. moreover these various trainings of human beings symbolise the truth that man is still the master of the machine. but no greater error is current to- day than that infantry is the most easily trained arm. none needs more care, more skill if it is adequately to play its part. for it is the least mechanical and by far the most human arm in existence. yet expericnce of the world war indicates that of all the arms and services, infantry, the backbone, was the least trained. this defect was due not so much to the reason that less care, less research and thought were devoted to it—though these factors counted—but to the reason that it is the most difficult arm to train, because it possesses so few concrete ele- ments. it is concerned with tactics and ground. elements of training —to train infantry is to exercise an art, whereas to train gunners is to apply a science; the one requires an artist, the other a calculator. the man in the ranks of the artillery. the tank corps, the air service, is often a me- chanic—executing aconerete task ina definite manner. initiative is the province of the oiflicer, but even he in the subordinate ranks of other arms is concerned with producing a material effect. the infantryman’s use of matcrial—his weapons—is only a means to an end not an end in itself. he himself survives the scientific developments of countless wars because his human value remains unchanged. even in the employment of his weapons he is guided by variable factors and conditions. but the use of his variety of weapons is only complementary to the use he makes of tactics and ground before he gets to grips with his enemy. _ the varicty of elements with which he has to deal has led as a rule to each different unit being trained—too often mis- trained—according to the whims and prejudices of its temporary commander, who is apt to confine himself to such parts of the subject as he himself knows best. hence a tendency towards over-emphasis of such matters as drill, musketry, bayonet fighting, which can be easily mastered by the intellect of the average officer. hence also the neglect of tactical training, which demands thought and is difficult to learn and teach be- cause it deals with moral and variable factors and requires a modicum of imagination. minor tactics and fire tactics.—the tactics of infantry must be based on human nature and not on mechanics or geometrical perfection. yet it is almost incredible how in the past showy evolutions deduced from the parade-ground have persisted on the battle-field. it is a truism to say that a revolution has been wrought in infantry tactics by the inventions which mechanical science has brought to bear on war. but it is no less true that the consequences of this revolution take years to understand. this lesson may be summarised in the phrase—* the power of manoeuvre.” it needs a complete reorientation of military thought and fresh views before we begin to extract right methods from the melting pot of war. yet that infantry which soonest learns its lesson will be supreme. 469 a mastery of elementary tactics is essential if infantry is to attain its goal in battle. it must be permeated by the best doctrine which the last war can teach, and its junior command- ers must no longer be subjected to the whims or prejudices of whoevet happens to be in temporary command. moreover the doctrine should be adopted by authority and be expressed in language so simple and by metaphors and illustration so clear, that it can be as readily grasped by subalterns and corporals as by general officers. 11s manual of instructions should be as intelligible to the australian bushman as it is to the staff college graduate. development of leadership—in 1806-15 the british were capable of a sustained effort in the theory of tactics as originated by sir john moore, and there is reason to believe that british infantry could to-day be trained to as high a pitch of comparative excellence—but not without a definite doctrine of minor tactics and some evidence of leadership to inspire its wholesale adop- tion. this quality of leadership in peace-time needs the special ingredients of spirit, intelligence and human sympathy, together with sufficient character and determination to carry conviction to the mass. just as sir john french inspired a new doctrine of peace training at aldershot after the south african war, so now could a leader develop the experiences of the last war and reduce fire tactics to simple exeretses for platoon and company com- maniders. such a doctrine would probably be based on the little group of men following a corporal whom it knows because he has trained it. in the hurly-burly of modern war these httle groups retain cohesion because men will follow a leader whom they see close to them, whose voice they can hear and whose presence is familiar. these groups (named sections), trained by higher leaders whom they trust, will forget themselves and accept any risks in battle if they are convinced by habit that their effort will not be-in vain, that their successes will be immediately supported. a fire unit which forms part of a trained team will sink itself unhesitatingly if it knows that the rest of the team will not leave it in the lurch or allow it to bear the brunt alone; that, when it has spent itself to make an opening, others will rclieve it of the burden. but can we reasonably expect generals who were trained in pre-war tactics to take the lead and compel their subordinates to alter their methods of training? tactics and manoeuvre for decades the infantrics of all countries attempted to pro- duce tactics adequate to the new weapons at their disposal by multiplying the lines which were successfully used by their fore- runners in the days of the musket—with its short-range and slow rate of fire—and the case shot and solic shot of the artillery. they moved shoulder to shoulder with intervals. the idea of manoeuvre was absent. even down to the closing stages of the world war the action of infantry units in battle—as distinct from a skirmish or an affair of outposts—was confined to frontal attacks. manoeuvre was the weapon of the higher commanders only. a division or a brigade moved as a body; hence it was its commander alone who had the power of striking an enemy force at two or more different angles concurrently. we have already seen how slowly the idea of decentralised fire orders developed. it was the same with decentralised manoeuvre. in any large action each of the infantry units was allotted only a fraction of the frontage of the force of which it formed a part. this narrow sector was hedged in on either side by neighbouring units of a corresponding size. how then was it possible for attack or defence on the part of infantry units to be aught but straight to their front? how can they manoeuvre if they have no space to move in? and how can they be expected to move to a flank if they possess no intervals and no flanks? the continuous line.-—thus it came to pass that in spite of the fire effect produced by scattered boers sitting on distant kopjes in south africa (1899), and in spite of japanese losses in assaults at port arthur and elsewhere in manchuria (1904), european tacticians failed to shake off certain notions about continuous lines and storming masses. they appreciated the 470 importance of putting what they called “ weight’ into the decisive attack, but failed to realise that the weight or force- fulness of an attack no longer increases in proportion to the number of infantrymen thrown into it. in south africa wide and premature extensions were adopted to minimise losses on the flat veldt, but such extensions did not lead to any idea of manoeuvre. on the contrary, the unmanageable thin lines one behind the other were incapable of intelligent manoeuvre—as was discovered in peace training after the south african war. even then the idea of manoeuvre to a flank by a small body was not grasped, or at any rate was not taught as a definite doctrine. skirmishing lines in extended order made rushes and utilised ground; they fired in small bodies and opened at long ranges; at the decisive points they were gradually thickened up into a crowd. these crowds surged forward at a given signal and assaulted to their front. but the infantry soldier was so near his neighbour in these sham battles that he had scarcely sufficient space to load and fire his rifle without hitting one of his friends; the units became so mixed together in the process of thickening up that neither the corporal nor the subaltern could exercise control over his own men or any unit; often he could not find them during the decisive stage of the battle. fortunately the ‘“ cease fire ’’ sounded and reorganisation took place; butin 1914-8 there was no “cease fire”? and no umpires and the warring infantries were slow to learn. this was no doubt inevitable, and is a sufficient reason to try now to gather the lessons of 1918, and it may not be out of place to suggest that the tactical experiences of 1918 have not been embodied in the tactical handling of units in 1926. group formations.—official manuals seem always to lag behind the age, and in fact human nature conquercd the line formation before its breaking up was officially sanctioned. tradition held fast to her pre-war habit, but the need for a control which could not be obtained with the extended line helped to breach the ramparts of orthodoxy. the group attained its final and complete recognition after its success against the german “ pill-box ” defence in the dreary wastes of the ypres salient in the autumn of 1917. also the germans in their 1918 offensive deliberately trained their infantry in similar groups with orders to penetrate everywhere by infiltration. british dispersion, enforced by new weapons and human _ nature, rendered penetration possible by attacking infantry groups— termed “sections ” in the british army—between the posts or machine-gun “nests” of the defenders. by exploiting every initial penetration the commander on the spot attacked in front and flank simultaneously such posts of the enemy as opposed him in his own sector. this newly acquired power of manocuvre restored to infantry the master-key of victory, and retains for it still the important rele which the old stereotyped tactics were rapidly losing. but it took three years of war and un- precedented losses to drive home a lesson which peace training may probably obliterate. the infantry attack.—the outstanding lesson gained from the new-won possession of infantry units—the power of ma- noeuvre—is that tactics can be based on the fundamental prin- ciples which govern the action of other independent bodies which manocuvre. the platoon is no longer fixed in a segment of the machine of battle but is an independent moving part fighting its own small action. its forward sections should press on unceasingly in order to find and penetrate any weak spots in the defence and to advance to the objectives assigned to them. if the forward body of a platoon is checked by an enemy post, it fixes it firmly by fire so that the enemy’s attention is absorbed “ by a menacing hand at his throat ” whilst the manoeuvre body (termed the platoon reserve) works round his flank to deliver a surprise blow. ‘this act of fixing can be achieved by a combination of fire with move- ment. there must be the threat of the forward spring in order to fix the enemy’s attention. fire alone, from the hastily chosen halting places of an attacker, cannot be relied on to absorb the whole attention of a defender behind selected cover. unless each forward infantry section is imbued with a determination to infantry press forward, the posts of the defence may be able to bring cross-fire on groups which have penetrated the position. but there is still a further means by which the enemy can be fixed. artificial smoke screen.—the world war added a useful weapon to the infantry—armament-smoke. this new element gives the user the conditions of day but imposes on his adver- sary the conditions of night. mist or fog has often been a decisive but accidental factor in battle, but with the introduction of artificial fog which can be projected at the will of the user, the enemy’s view is impeded whilst his own movements take place in daylight. in attack, the forward sections may fix the enemy posts more effectively by firing smoke to windward of them than by rifles or lewis guns. thus smoke helps small local assaults. decisive manocuvre—the manoeuvre body of an infantry company follows close behind its forward platoons and remains under the hand of the captain. if and when the whole of a for- ward platoon is held up by the fire of an enemy centre of resist- ance, the captain uses his manoeuvre body to turn a flank. to achicve this he might have to quit his allotted sector and follow in the wake of a more successful unit on his flank. passing through the gap he turns and assaults an exposed flank of the centre of resistance. such a blow has the moral effect—coming as a surprise and threatening the line of retreat—which is the key to victory. but if the defenders of the post turn to meet this flanking attack, the forward body should rush in and assault them from the front. such combinations are simple if peace training is staged on the basic principle of “ fixing and ma- noeuvre,”’ as the key formula of fire tactics. this combination of fixing and manocuvre is the bed-rock principle of every street fight. watch a couple of small boys tackling a bigger one. what happens? one of the small boys rushes straight at the big boy, and when his attention is fixed the other runs in from behind and delivers a blow. the first small boy puts all his energy into this effort, for he knows in- stinctively that if he fails the opponent will beat them each separately. but if the big boy attacks one of the small ones, the other in like manner rushes in from behind. thus fixing and decisive manocuvre should become a formula engraved on the mind of every infantry corporal and subaltern, and he should also be trained to act upon it instinctively. it has won general acceptance since the end of the war and concerns above all the tactics of the platoon, which is the smallest unit which can fix and manocuvre without waiting for orders from a superior. defence.—attacking infantry, owing to its open formation, can offer immediate resistance to hostile counter-attack. it halts and cach unit consolidates its own ground forthwith, with its defensive posts distributed in depth and disposed to give each other support by fire. the rele of the forward bodies is to break up the cnemy’s organised attack. if the attacker makes a gap or effects a lodgment into the position of any forward bodies, the reserves counter-attack to throw him out. should the attack break through the forward positions on a broad front, the reserves take him in flank by fire. just as manoeuvre is superior to frontal attacks, so is defence-fire which enfilades from a flank the more damaging to the attackers’ morale. in this as in all cases the training and determination of the better infantry wins the day, but the great advantage possessed by the defence—almost its only advantage—is that its action can be thought out beforehand. its reserves can be placed on a flank in readiness for action, and can be practised on the actual ground to counter-attack from favourable positions with aux- iliary arms to help them. picture of an infaniry battle—who is there with expcricnce of big attacks embracing miles of country in france that has not seen the most resolute infantry suddenly assailed by a burst of surprise-fire from the flank or rear? its self-forgetting deter- mination grows uncertain; it ceases to move and looks furtively for cover. if the surprise-fire continues from invisible shooters, the men become irresolute and nervous. the will to advance is gone. if the threat of a counter-assault from a flank should immediately follow they look to their rear and break or dribble away. unless their own commander coming on from behind infant welfare—infectious fevers can throw in an opportune reserve to counter the counter-attack and restore the local situation, the attack is stopped. that is how, so often in france, one german machine-gun nest—just one little group inspired by the will to resist, nourished in the principle of surprise—would hold up the attack of a company and sometimes of a whole battalion. it is thus we learn to visualise the infantry unit—battalion, company or platoon—in the battle of to-day. it possesses the power of offensive movement and yet is protected by its open formations. its articulation into interdependent moving bodies capable of manocuvre is the main infantry feature developed by the world war. the illimitable extension of fronts, brought about by the vast numbers which nations in arms put into the field, forced the military leaders to seek and discover a solution to the dcadlock—and they found it at last by granting the power of manoeuvre to infantry units down to the platoon. this revo- lutionary idea began to emerge in the flanders attacks of 1917 but was still only in its chrysalis stage when the war terminated in 1918. it still lacks a clear, simple working formula which can be practised by lance corporals in their daily exercises. future development a question naturally arises as to the probable direction which the development of infantry will take under conditions caused by new inventions, particularly mechanical ones. in what way must we improve and reform our infantry methods in order to lighten the infantryman’s burden in view of the probability that he may have to wear a gas mask in every future attack? the question may be considered under two heads: firstly, means to increase mobility; secondly, tactical doctrine. mobility —almost every mechanical advance means a step towards greater mobility. every arm and branch of the service is becoming more mobile—or else decaying—under the influence of the petrol era. in the transport of an army the horse has already given way to the road motor, and this in turn promises to yield to a cross-country tractor with caterpillar tracks. the heavy artillery is already motor-drawn, and the lighter field artillery will follow suit. mobility is the foundation stone of the value of infantry. its unique position has always rested upon the fact that it is more xxiversally mobile than other arms. but on the normal field of battle, if it is to maintain its unrivalled position as the “ handyman ” of war, its mobility must keep pace in proportion with that of the other arms. to give it increased mobility two problems must be solved. firstly, means must be devised for bringing infantry to the scene of its action more quickly and with less fatigue than by the use of its legs. in the second place, infantry equipment must be lightened. the soldier must not again be treated as a beast of burden— other means than piling loads on his back must be devised. equipment—lif infantry is to possess an adequate agility its weapons and ammunition must be lightened to an appre- clable extent or they must be carried for him. in fact the infantryman of the future must be regarded as an athlete. every article which he does not need in the combat itself must be discarded or carried for him on accompanying transport. wanted: a battle drill—a further development in tactical methods which has been mooted is a controllable system of movement on the battle-ficld. at present armies retain drill movements for the parade-ground and throw them aside when they go on active service. as human nature in battle retains only that which has become instinctive habit it is scarcely sur- prising that in moments of crisis one has scen men advancing, against the deadly fire of machine-guns, in close-packed bodies. but if drill were brought up to date on the lines of open order and the group, it is probable that moments and even hours of priceless value would be saved. but even during the actual attack, there might well be occasions when an ingrained method of control could be used to quicken the manoeuvre of deployed units and direct them to take advantage of local situations. voice control would be out of the question, but if signals were few and simple, visual control might be used, particularly if a clearer means of signalling were devised. 471 let anyone with experience of war ask himself if there were not moments in his recollection when he might, had his men been drilled in such a system, have saved precious minutes, an opportunity which never returned, by the use of a signal instead of the slow method of sending a message by runner. the old close order was under control, but modern fire made it impos- sible. with extended order the battle degencrated into the chaotic movements of an uncontrolled mob. an ingrained sys- tem of battle drill, in which intervals and distances were pur- posely exaggerated, would enable sub-units to be manoeuvred, to be opened or closed in ‘ concertina ’’ fashion according to the ground and local circumstances. such a system might go far to combine the flexibility of the old with the invulnerability of the modern formation. it seems improbable that in the juture we shall see the exten- sive and elaborate field fortifications of 1914-8. the new mobility brought in by the tank, the caterpillar tractor and the aeroplane, would appear to prevent the stagnation which pro- duced labyrinthine entrenchments in the world war. (see macuine guns; srratecy; tactics; war.) (i, max.) infant welfare: see maternity and infant welfare. infectious fevers.—in this article the various infectious fevers are dealt with. chicken-pox, or varicella (see 6.130).—several writers have maintained within recent years that a close relationship exists between herpes zoster (shingles) and chicken-pox, and that the virus of the two diseases is identical, on the grounds that: (1) chicken-pox in one individual may follow herpes zoster in an- other within the ordinary incubation period for the former, 7.e., within 21 days. (2) in such cases no other source of infection may be discoverable. (3) much less frequently herpes zoster may be apparently contracted from a case of chicken-pox. (4) herpes and chicken-pox may sometimes coexist in the same individual. the problem, however, cannot be solved until the causal agent of chicken-pox has been discovered. diphtheria (sce 8.290).—the principal cause of the spread of this disease is now generally admitted to be the human carrier, whether sick or healthy. in the great majority of cases the dis- ease is disseminated by the diphtheria bacillus being expelled from the mouth or nostrils by coughing, sneezing, spitting, kissing or speaking. apart from tonsillectomy, which is not always practicable, there is no certain method of ridding the carrier of bacilli. on this account a remarkable change has taken place in the methods of prevention of diphtheria. in 1913 bela schick of vienna devised a test whereby immunity or susceptibility to diphtheria can be determined. the test is performed by in- jecting intracutaneously a minute dose of diphtheria toxin. if the subject is immune, no reaction occurs, whereas suscepti- bility is shown by the appearance of a small red swelling at the site of injection within 24-48 hours. those found to be suscepti- ble are given three subcutancous injections of a mixture of toxin and antitoxin, which was first introduced by von behring in 1913, but not used on an extensive scale until some years later by park and zingher in the united states. after the lapse of some weeks or months immunity as determined by the schick — test is established and lasts for some years, if not throughout life, whereas the immunity afforded by injection of diphtheria antitoxin is not likely to last longer than three or four weeks. the experience of the years from 1910 to 1925 has confirmed the earlier observations as to the value of the antitoxin treat- ment of diphtheria. death and severe paralysis are practically unknown when the patient receives an adequate dose within the first 24 hours, but become increasingly frequent with each 24 hours’ delay. the intramuscular method is the best mode of ad- ministration, as it is quite as simple as the subcutaneous and ensures more rapid absorption of the antitoxin. measles (see 17.947).—caronia of rome has isolated (1923) a minute diplococcus, which he regards as the specific cause of measles, from the blood, bone-marrow, naso-pharynx and cere- brospinal fluid of children during the prodromal and eruptive periods. injection of healthy children with attenuated cultures of this organism produced immunity to measles, but inoculation 472 of large and repeated doses gave rise to a typical though mild form of the disorder. further confirmation of caronia's investi- gations is required before his organism can be accepted as the cause of measles. subcutaneous injection of the serum of con- valescents within the first six days after exposure to infection is a preventive method first employed by nicolle and conseil in 1918 and subsequently carried out on a large scale by degkwitz in germany and other clinicians on the continent and in the united states. in nearly all cases this.method either prevents an attack of measles altogether or renders it very mild. in the ab- sence of convalescent serum, which is often difficult to obtain, the whole blood or serum of adults, especially the parents, who have had measles, can be used. scarlet fever (see 24.303).—the recent work of g.f. and g.ii. dick indicates that scarlet fever ts a local infection of the throat caused by a particular type of streptococcus haemolyticus, which is capable of producing a soluble toxin, absorption of which gives rise to the general manifestations of the disease. these observers successfully inoculated volunteers by swabbing their tonsils and pharynx with a culture of the organism. subsequently they de- vised the ‘‘ dick test,’”? which determines the susceptibility or immunity of an individual to scarlet fever, and is performed by injecting into the skin a filtrate of the culture which produced the disease. if the person is immune no reaction occurs, while sus- ceptibility is shown by the appearance of a red area within 12-24 hours. desquamation, which was formerly considered as the chief agent in the dissemination of the disease, is now generally regarded as harmless, unless the scales have been contaminated by dis- charges from the nose and ears. the duration of infectivity is now held to be much shorter than formerly. it is probable that most cases cease to be infectious in the course of the fourth week, unless they are complicated by discharges from the nose or ears. specific immunisation against scarlet fever is still in the experi- mental stage, but very promising results have been obtained by subcutancous injection of susceptible persons with a small amount of the toxic filtrate of the variety of sirepftococcus hae- molyticus which causes scarlet fever. further observations are required to determine the duration of the immunity acquired by this method. passive immunity can be acquired more rapidly by injection of a special scarlet fever antitoxin, but is probably ess permanent. the method employed by the late dr. robert milne, consist- ing in inunction of the skin with olive oil and application of 1-20 carbolic oil to the throat, has proved to be valueless, as it does not prevent the spread of infection or the occurrence of compli- cations and return cases. f:ncouraging results have been ob- tained from the use of an antitoxic scrum prepared by tnjection of horses with gradually increasing doses of sterile scarlet fever toxin. it has been found that if the serum was given early the course of the disease was shortened, and the incidence of com- plications and sequelae greatly diminished. typhoid and paratyphoid fevers (see 27.503).—the great dimi- nution in the incidence of these diseases in recent years in many countries has been due partly to immunisation in the army and navy during 1914-19 of a large proportion of a particularly sus- ceptible age-group and partly to the careful supervision of the water and milk supplies, which has reduced the disease to such an extent that the health authorities are able to devote more attention to the prevention of contact and carrier cases. nu- merous statistics have been published in various countries show- ing the efficacy of antityphoid and antiparatyphoid vaccination. among the most striking are those given by russell. during the two years in which the united states took part in the world war there were 1,065 cases of typhoid or paratvphoid or one among 3,756 men, with 156 deaths or one death among 25,641 men, as compared with one case for every seven men and one death among every 71 men in the spanish-american war of 1898. the duration of immunity following inoculation varies from two to four years or longer, but under certain circumstances, such as ingestion of massive doses of typhoid bacilli and impair- ment of resistance, which are specially liable to occur among sol- diers on active service, the immunity is lost in a much shorter infectious fevers time. the serum treatment of typhoid and paratyphoid fevers is still in the experimental stage, the great decrease in these dis- eases having prevented a trial of it on a large scale in recent years. vaccine treatment unlike vaccine prophylaxis has not become generalised, and the results obtained are inconstant. some observers, indeed, regard the vaccine treatment of typhoid as an example of non-specific proteintherapy, as the same results have been obtained by injection of b. coli and staphylococci. diet.—the modern tendency is to feed rather than to starve the typhoid patient, who is now no longer condemncd to an ex- clusively milk diet for several weeks, but may be allowed other readily digestible articles of diet from an early stage. a more liberal diet enables the patient to offer a better resistance to the disease, to be less liable to complications and to make a more rapid recovery. | treaiment of carriers.—after the carrier state has lasted six months without being affected by drug treatment such as hex- amethylene tetramine for urinary carriers, and chloroform, men- thol and lacto-bacillin for intestinal carriers, operations such as removal of the gall-bladder (cholecystectomy) in the cases of intestinal carriers, or of the kidney (nephrectomy) in the case of urinary carriers must be considered. paratyphoid fevers—these are acute infectious diseases due to the action of bacilli, of which three varieties have been de- scribed, viz., bucillus paratvphosus a, bacillus paratyphosus b, and bacillus paratyphosus c. though on the whole less severe except in war time, they closely resemble typhoid fever in their clinical appearance and course, and can only be distin- guished therefrom by bacteriological examination. another point of difference is that while typhoid fever is an exclusively human disease, paratyphoid fevers may infect both man and animals, e.g., dogs, cows, rabbits and pigs, and be transmitted from man to animals and vice versa. ty phus (see 27.508).—as the result of their cindy of the epidem- ics which occurred in tunis from 1906 to 1909 |} nicolle and his collaborators have shown that typhus is transmitted by the bite or faeces of infected lice, and not by other insects such as bugs, fleas or mosquitoes, or by discharges from the mucous mem- branes as in other infectious diseases. recent research indicates that the minute intracellular organism known as atckelisia prowazeki is the cause of typhus, this conclusion being based on experiments showing that the virus of typhus and xickelista prowazeki are inseparable in infected lice, as well as on the pres- ence of bodies indistinguishable from aricketisia prowazeki in typhus lesions in man, where they have been found with great regularity in the blood-vessels of the various tissues. the weil-felix reaction, which was described by weil and velix of prague in 1915, occupics as important a position in the diagnosis of typhus as the widal reaction in that of typhoid fever, or the wassermann reaction in that of syphilis. it con- sists in the agglutination by the patient’s serum in a dilution above 100 of a proteus-like organism named x 19 isolated from the urine of a typhus case. the reaction appears tow ard the end of the first week, rises rapidly to its maximum betwecn the 11th and 13th days, and gradually falls in convalescence, but may re- main positive for months and thereby enable a retrospective diagnosis of typhus to be made. the prophylaxis of typhus con- sists in the complete delousing of patients and contacts, as well as in the disinfection of clothing, which is best carried out by steam. the serum and vaccine treatment of typhus is still in the experi- mental stage. whooping cough (sce 28.616).—1t is now generally recognised that the micro-organism in the form of a cocco-bacillus, de- scribed by bordet and gengou in 1906, is the causal agent of whooping cough. it is found in a practically pure culture in the catarrhal stage and first week of the paroxysmal stage, and then rapidly diminishes in number, being outgrown by numerous other organisms, especially bacillus influenzae and the pneumo- coccus. in the great majority of cases, therefore, the disease ceases to be contagious long before the characteristic whooping has ceased. recent writers have drawn attention to the fact that whooping cough is not so rare in adults as it is commonly sup- inflation—inifluenza posed to be, but that it may assume at this period atypical forms which are responsible for a spread of the disease. a vaccine pre- pared from the bordet-gengou bacillus usually in association with other micro-organisms has been used on a large scale in the prevention and treatment of whooping cough, but clinicians are by no means unanimous as to its value. among the numer- ous drugs recommended for the treatment of the disease ether administered by intramuscular injection has recently enjoyed a considerable vogue on the ground that it reduces the number and severity of the paroxysms. (deo) inflation: see currency.",
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