INDIA

the fifth regular census of the indian empire (march 1921) gave a total population of 318,942,480, of whom 247,003,293 dwell in british india, and 71,939,187, in the indian states. the corresponding figures of area were 1,805,332 sq. m., of which 1,094,300 lie in british territory, and 711,032 in the indian states. with an area rather more than half that of the united states, the country has a population about three times as large. but the increase in population, 1.2% during the decade 1911-21, was the lowest in any similar period since the decennial census was instituted:—the result of a wide- spread failure of the crops through drought in 1918, and an epidemic of influenza which is estimated to have carried off anything up to 10,000,000 victims. political divisions.—british india consists of (@) nine major or ‘ governor’s ” provinces, viz.: assam, bengal, bihar and orissa, bombay, burma, central provinces and berar, madras, punjab and united provinces of agra and oudh; (b) two minor provinces, viz.: baluchistan and the north-west frontier province; and (c) certain smaller administrative areas, viz.: ajmer-merwara, andamans and nicobars, coorg and delhi. the present article deals exclusively with british india, except where the contrary is stated. the indian states are governed by ruling princes and chiefs, and are in political relation with the british government through the medium of political officers specially attached to the larger units or groups. the rulers of 119 states have a salute of guns, which forms a rough measure of their relative importance, as it varies from 21 guns to 9; the remaining 442 states and estates have no salute. many of the smaller cstates are divided up among several sharers. the more prominent individual states are hyderabad, mysore, baroda, kashmir and gwalior; and apart from these units the main territorial groups of states are rajputana, central india, the western india states, the punjab states and the madras states. burma con- tains a number of shan states, which technically form part of - british india, though they are administered through their hereditary chiefs. | religions, etc—a classification by religions would divide every 1,000 of the people into 686 hindus, 217 moslems, 37 buddhists, 31 animists, 15 christians, ro sikhs and. 4 jews, parsees and followers of other faiths. the census recorded 22,600,000 as literate, in the sense of being able to write a letter in their own vernacular tongue; and 2,500,000 were returned as able to read and write english. seventy-one per cent of the people are supported by agriculture, 1% only by organised industry, another 9% by the simple hand industries, 7°% by trade and transport, 14°4 by the professions and liberal arts, and 13% by the administration and protection of the country. i. general history lord hardinge as viceroy.—in the spring of 1910 the ap- pointment of lord kitchener to succeed lord minto as viceroy seemed probable. fate reserved lord kitchener for other tasks, and the choice fell on sir charles hardinge, permanent under-secretary for foreign affairs and formerly ambassador at st. petersburg, who was raised to the peerage as lord hardinge of penshurst. his long viceroyalty (nov. 1910-march 1916) was strenuous and eventful. the earlier years were marked by the visit of king george v. and queen mary to india, the selection of delhi as the site of the future capital of the indian empire, the revision of the ‘ partition”? of bengal and the nefarious attemps of anarchists to compass the deaths of the viceroy and his wife on the occasion of their state entry into delhi. the closing years saw india in the throes of the world war. lord hardinge, like his predecessor, had an hereditary con- nection with india, as his grandfather, the rst viscount hardinge, was governor-general (1844-8) in the stirring times of the first sikh war. the goodwill of indians towards the new viceroy deepened as they saw his genuine liking for their country; his zeal to obtain redress of the grievances of indians residing in other parts of the empire; and his endeavours to associate 426 their political leaders with the work of government under the reformed councils scheme. his diplomatic and foreign office experience and knowledge of the politics and conditions of the east enabled him to handle dexterously and effectively the external affairs of india and to enter into the difficulties and apprehensions of indian mahommedans. he cordially pur- sued the policy of friendship and co-operation with the ruling chiefs of native states that lord minto had inaugurated. when the world war came in 1914, the popularity of his administra- tion and the personal influence and friendship which he had acquired with the ruling princes had much to do with the mag- nificent response of india to the call of the empire. the morley-minto reforms.—the scheme of administrative reform which had been worked out between lord minto and lord morley, then secretary of state for india, was in full operation when the new viceroy arrived. the main object of the india councils act, ro09, had been to enlarge the legis- lative councils and make them more fully representative, intro- duce the elective principle, give greater powers of discussion and of obtaining information from the executive. in each council the nominated members comprised: (z) a substantial d/oc of officials, the d/oc in the imperial legislative council being large enough to secure, together with the members of the executive council, an absolute majority; (2) non-oflicials nomi- nated to represent classes or interests which would otherwise be unrepresented or inadequately represented. in all the councils, with the exception of that of bengal, the nominated members exceeded in number the elected members. the number of the latter in any province was too few to admit of any system of territorial constituencies and direct voting. special constituencies therefore were formed, such as univer- sities, chambers of commerce, groups of municipalities and district boards, and also for mahommedans as a separate class or community. the councils were empowered to discuss and move resolutions on the annual budget and in like manner to raise discussions by resolution on matters of general public interest. but they did not vote the budget, and resolutions operated only as recommendations which were not binding on the government. the councils had no direct control over the executive, though they could inform and influence it; lord morley had emphatically said that india was not ripe for parliamentary institutions and that he would be no party to creating them. the act increased the number of members of the executive councils of madras and bombay from two to a maxi- mum of four, thereby providing a seat for an indian or two indian members; it also authorised the creation of an executive council in any province having a lieutenant-governor. the policy of associating indians with the executive government thus affirmed as regards to provinces, was given effect to in the gov- ernment of india by the appointment first of mr. s. p. (afterwards lord) sinha, and then of sir ali imam as law member of the governor-general’s executive council. working of the reforms.—lord minto had predicted that the conciliatory measures embodied in and associated with these changes would clear the political atmosphere. he prophesied rightly. on jan. § 1911, a deputation from the indian national congress presented an address to the new viceroy expressing deep and heartfelt loyalty to the crown and appreciation of the reforms which ‘‘ had done much to bring about a better under- standing between the govt. and the people.” as the enlarged legislative councils settled down to their work, even the ad- vanced party found in the new powers a healthy outlet for their energies. as consultative and critical bodies the reformed councils exercised a real and growing influence and were an educative force. they formed, directed and developed public opinion in political matters. they acted as a restraint upon the autocratic tendencies of the executive and made it more re- sponsive to popular demands, and they strengthened its hands when it had to sustain indian interests against the interests of great britain or of the self-governing dominions. the king’s visit.—the royal visit in the winter of 1911 was a complete success. the presence of the king-emperor and his india consort in india touched the imagination of the people. the delhi ceremonies drew vast crowds eager to see and salute the sovereign. when a visit to calcutta followed, the welcome given by the populace of that city was even more enthusiastic and unrestrained. on dec. 12 1911, in a great arena outside delhi specially prepared for the occasion, the king held a coro- nation durbar at which he received in person the homage of the grcat officers of state and the ruling princes and chiefs of the indian empire. largesse and “ boons ” of various kinds were granted, and an announcement made of great political moment. the seat of the govt. of india was to be transferred from cal- cutta to delhi; eastern bengal was reunited to bengal and the enlarged province given a governor in council; bihar, orissa and chota nagpur, tracts which are loosely connected with bengal proper were made a lieutenant-governorship in council; and assam was reformed into a chief commissionership. the secret had been well kept, and the surprise was complete. the scheme, though open to obvious objections was ingenious and cleverly balanced. a reasoned exposition of its object is con- tained in a despatch, dated aug. 25 1911, from the govt. of india to the secretary of state, submitting the proposed changes for the home govt’s approval in advance of the king’s visit. time alone will test the wisdom of these changes, autocrati- cally conceived and dramatically carried out. the building of the new capital was thrown back by the world war, and the cost, which was originally estimated at £4,000,000, will greatly exceed that amount. new delhi, it is urged by opponents of the scheme, will be merely cold-weather headquarters of an official hierarchy, an imposing mass of buildings untenanted for cli- matic reasons during eight months of the year; while the govt. of india, rotating between it and simla, will live perpetually in a bureaucratic atmosphere. on the other hand the drawbacks of calcutta were many, and constitutional changes have emphasised the desirability of removing the supreme govt. from immediate contact with the internal administration of bengal. the presi- dential government of reunited bengal is an undoubted success, the bitterness of feeling engendered by the “ partition ”’ has dis- appeared, and the interest of the mahommedan population of the eastern districts receives a just measure of attention from the local government. the province of bihar and orissa is the weak feature of the scheme. the artificial union of two blocks of territory, geographically apart and without linguistic or racial affinities, can never be a convenient administrative unit. | lord hardinge’s internal administration —the beginning of a sustained advance in popular education was made at the delhi coronation durbar, at which a recurring grant of solakhs (£333,- 000} to local govts. for the purpose was announced. this was followed in succeeding years by larger grants. from 1911-5 non- recurring grants amounting to {3,250,000 and recurring grants of £826,000 were made to the provinces. the total annual expend- iture on education rose during the period by nearly £3,000,000 and the number of boys and girls at school or college by 1,500,000. this expansion was numerically greatest in the primary schools. a wide educational policy was laid down, embracing the univer- sities and secondary and technical schools and colleges. re- search and post-graduate instruction were promoted in the universities. a well-equipped medical college was established at lucknow, raising the number of medical colleges in india to five, schools of tropical medicine were founded in calcutta and bombay, and an institute of science at bangalore. non-recurring imperial grants for public health service, amounting to {2,700- ooo, and recurring grants of £368,000 were made, rendering prac- ticable theexecution of sanitary measures which a few years be- fore seemed beyond the limits of financial possibility. the appointment of a royal commission under the presidency of lord islington, to inquire into and report on the public services of india with a view to increasing the proportion of indians in the higher offices was warmly approved. another popular measure was the establishment of a legislative council in the central provinces. indians in the dominions and the celomes-—serious dis- content was provoked by the position of indentured labour in india the colonies to which it was permitted, and by the treatment of indian residents in south africa and canada. the first trouble arose over the refusal of the natal govt. to accept indian immigrants as permanent citizens of the union after the expiration of their indentures. as no redress was obtained the govt. of india in ro1zzr prohibited for the future indentured emigration to natal. in the following year the grievances of the indian domiciled in the union against the union govt. came toa head. the indian settlers resorted to “‘ passive resistance. ” the situation was aggravated by strikes and riots among indian labourers in natal. intense feeling was aroused in india by reports of the treatment of passive resisters by the magistrates and the rough handling of strikers and rioters by the police. in a speech delivered in madras (nov. 24 1913), lord hardinge expressed evident sympathy with the passive resisters in their struggle against “‘ invidious and unjust laws,” and pressed for an inquiry in south africa by a strong and independent com- mittee on which indian interests should be fully represented. the union govt. resented the viceroy’s language, but the calculated indiscretion served its purpose. a commission of inquiry was appointed, and a solution was at length reached and embodied by the union govt. in its indian relief act, 1or4. this closed the passive resistance struggle. in the action they took lord hardinge’s govt. had the warm approval of the educated classes. with regard to canada the grievances of indians were less easy of setthement, and lord hardinge could only advise a policy of reciprocity, which could be made _ effective without direct retaliation and would not raise questions of the personal status of indians in canada. revolutionary crime.—a new and sinister feature in indian life had forced its way to the surface soon after lord minto arrived in the country. the wide-spread unrest, which he found among the educated classes, and endeavoured to appease by political reforms, had its echo among other classes which were permeated by economic discontent and with whom crude notions of self-rule and political freedom easily “‘ yoked them- selves,’ as lord morley put it, “to deep invisible roots of alien race, creed and inviolable caste.’ secret societies, com- posed chicfly of young men belonging to respectable families, sprang up in many districts of bengal, having for their object the deliverance of india from the foreign yoke. this they sought to compass by assassination and terrorism. the art of bomb-making was imported from europe. revolutionary liter- ature and the use of pistols and explosives were sedulously studied, and a series of anarchical crimes occurred from 1907-9. a group of measures were passed for dealing with seditious meet- ings, publications and associations, and for establishing special procedure and special tribunals for the trial of anarchical crime. quiet was apparently restored; but in bengal trouble broke out again towards the close of 1912; and by the end of 1913 the ordi- nary forces of law and order in that province had been definitely beaten. on dec. 23 1912, as the viceroy was making his first state entry into delhi, a bomb was thrown and exploded in the howdah of the elephant on which he and lady wardinge were riding, severely wounding him and killing an attendant. the assailants were never brought to justice, but there is little doubt that they were connected with the anarchical movement in bengal which had extended to the punjab. in1914 and 19rg rev- olution activities became more daring, with the assistance of german agents in america and the dutch east indies; but the vigorous use of the special powers provided by the defence of india act broke up the movement for the time being and restored order. the organisation of the revolutionary societies, their inter-connection and propaganda methods, their success in corrupting the educated youth of the country, are minutely described in the report of the sedition committee (1918) over which mr. justice rowlatt presided. tue war period india’s effori—on the outbreak of the world war in aug. 1914, the response made by india to the needs of the empire was signal testimony of her pride in the british connection. the 427 political leaders instinctively suspended their controversies with the government, and gave her their support. the martial classes eagerly responded to the callto arms. from the rulers of native states lavish offers of help poured in. they were recounted in the viceroy’s telegram to the secretary of state, dated sept. 7 1914, which was read in both houses of parliament and circulated throughout the empire. as a wonderful demonstration of loyalty and generosity, its effect on popular feeling was immense. with this confidence and enthusiasm were mingled some alarm and bewilderment. trade came to a standstill. there were runs on the banks, encashment of currency notes and hoarding of coin. in the remoter districts rumours of the collapse of the british raz disturbed the countryside. the mahommedan peas- antry in parts of the punjab raided and burned the houses of hindus and moneylenders, and military force was required to restore order. in bengal the revolutionary societies redoubled their criminal activities. in san francisco and vancouver an indian revolution was openly preached to the sikhs settled there, and numbers of them were incited lo return to the punjab to take part in a general rising. their designs were detected, but for some months the punjab was disturbed by murders, dacoities and robberies, and the reckless use of arms and explosives. india as a whole however was so calm that the govt. was able to denude itself freely of its military resources to meet the demands of the home govt. for troops and war material. most of the british troops, the flower of the indian army, the best of the artillery, and large quantities of ammunition were despatched to france and other theatres of war. in sept. 1914 a force of 70,000 men was sent to france. by the end of 1915 india’s contribution amounted to nearly 80,000 british and 210,000 indian officers and men. at one time the original british garrison was reduced to only 15,000 men. these were gradually supplemented by territorial and garrison troops from home, but throughout the war the british element in the army in india was far below the defensive needs of the country. the entrance of turkey into the war placed indian mahom- medans in a difficult position; but they loyally rallied to the side of the crown. against a few prominent agitators only was it necessary to take action. the premier mahommedan prince, the nizam of ityderabad, and the begum of bhopal, in addresses to their co-religionists, effectively stated the british case, and exposed the falsity of the pretexts by which enver bey and his associates sought to justify the entrance of turkey into the war. these addresses and a declaration by the govt. of india as to its attitude towards islam in general and the holy places in par- ticular served greatly to maintain tranquillity. retirement of lord hardinge—in nov. 1915 lord hardinge completed his fifth year as viceroy, but at the request of the home govt. remained in office until the following april. in a farewell speech to his legislative council he expressed his wish to see “* the early realisation of the just and legitimate aspirations of india, ” but he besought his hearers not to be led astray by impracticable ideals, but to look facts squarely in the face and to realise that in the dominions self-government had been the slow product of steady and patient evolution. lord chelmsford’s administration.—lord chelmsford, the new viceroy, assumed office on april 4 1916. previously governor of queensland and of new south wales, at the time of his appointment he had been serving as an officer with a territorial battalion in india; and he was cast at once into one of the most difficult periods of british-indian history, momentous alike in the number and magnitude of the problems demanding solution and in the gravity of the issues they have raised. in the very first year of his administration the political peace en- joyed by his predecessor came to an end. in the early part of the year mrs. besant succeeded in getting her scheme of home rule considered by leading members of the national congress and the moslem league. she continued to advocate it with great energy among students and school-boys in madras, established a home rule league, celebrated a “‘ home rule ” day, and de- claimed in her paper new india against the government. mr. b. g. tilak, who up to 1914 had been serving a sentence of six years’ 428 imprisonment for sedition, was equally active in bombay. in oct. 1916, a group of elected indian members of the imperial legislative council submitted a memorandum on proposed re- forms to the govt. of india. they described the morley-minto reforms as having created legislative councils which were mere advisory bodies without any effective control; they propounded a scheme which, while retaining irremovable executives respon- sible to parliament and the secretary of state, would have sub- jected them in legislation, finance and administration, to the orders of a legislative body in which elected members would be predominant. at meetings held in lucknow in dec. 1916 the national con- gress and the moslem league agreed upon a scheme of reforms as the irreducible minimum with which the national party would be content. the moslem league, originally founded for the pro- tection of moslem interests against hindu ascendancy, had fallen under the influence of the ‘“‘ young ’”? mahommedans, who made home rule their objective and joined forces with the congress on the condition that in certain provinces in which the mahom- medans were in a minority they were guaranteed a proportion of seats in the future legislative councils in excess of the number they could hope otherwise to win. effect was given to this com- pact, henceforth known as the “ lucknow compact,” in the congress-league scheme. following the lucknow conferences an energetic ilome rule campaign was opened in all provinces. the stir in the nationalist camp was quickened by the knowledge that the views of lord chelmsford’s govt. on political reforms had for some time past been before the home authorities. a preliminary and informal examination of the changes possible and prudent had been made by lord hardinge. lord chelmsford immediately on assuming office took up the inquiry from the point where his predecessor had left it. at the close of 1916 his government submitted to the secretary of state a considered scheme of reforms, and asked for an authoritative declaration of policy. was the goal for the indian peoples to be responsible government? if so, by what stages and steps should it be reached? the questions raised were large and delicate. the cabinet was preoccupied by the war. in july 1917 the secretary of state mr. (sir) austen chamberlain, resigned on the report of the mesopotamian commission. declaration of aug. 20 1917.—it fell to his successor, mr. e. s. montagu, to announce on aug. 20 1917, in the house of com- mons, the indian policy of the government. the policy of h.m. govt. is that of increasing the association of indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the pro- gressive realisation of responsible government in india as an integral part of the british empire .... progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. the british govt. and the govt, of india, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advance- ment of the indian peoples, must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co- operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed on their sense of responsibility. in the course of the winter mr. montagu visited india, and a joint report, dated april 22 1918, by himself and the viceroy was drawn up before he left. war conference of 1918.—the montagu-chelmsford report was nearing completion when attention was recalled to the press- ing realities of the war. in the near east, german troops had penetrated the caucasus and turks were invading persia. with the collapse of russia, the opening up of a road to afghanistan and thence to india seemed possible. in a telegram (april 2 1918), the prime minister made an appeal to the govt. and people of india to redouble their efforts and prevent german tyranny from “ spreading to the east and engulfing the world.” lord chelmsford’s reponse was to convene a war conference at delhi, to which many ruling princes and representatives of all provinces of every shade of opinion were invited. the con- ference heartily and loyally responded to the appeal, and agreed upon a programme of measures of no small value. in the five months preceding the armistice 200,000 men were recruited, and india had the war gone on this number would have been greatly in- creased. in the spring of 1917 the legislative council had ac- cepted the govt’s. proposal to make a free gift of £100,000,000 to the home govt. towards the expenses of the war. this was in addition to the obligation the indian govt. had undertaken of bearing the normal charges of all troops on the indian estab- lishment sent overseas. the part borne by india in the war and the sacrifices made by her people for the common cause are rep- resented by an addition of over 230 crores of rupees ({£153,000,- ooo) to her debt, the sending overseas of 800,000 combatants and 400,000 non-combatants, and the furnishing of foodstuffs and other supplies at the cost of much privation among the poorer classes. if the agriculturists as a body and some other sections of the community made money out of the war, the urban classes and the multitude of persons on small salaries and fixed incomes suffered greatly from the dearness and scarcity of food and clothing. inpia after the war recepiion of montagu-chelmsford report——the armistice in nov. 1918 was the signal for general rejoicings but ushered in a season of political strife and agitation unfavourable for the peace- ful introduction of the new constitution. the montagu-chelms- ford report had been published in the previous july. in the sept. session of the legislative council the report was referred for consideration to a committee of the non-official members, and was approved by them, with certain qualifications. the moderate party held a special conference in nov. at bombay, and accepted the general principle of the montagu-chelmsford " scheme, while urging that it should be enlarged in certain ways. on the other hand the national congress, which had now become the organ of the extreme national party, wholly con- demned the scheme at its dec. meeting, demanded full pro- vincial autonomy at once, and asserted india’s right to self- determination. unhappily another controversy now arose, which was fated to overshadow and prejudice the constitu- tional question by the passions which it kindled and the bitterness which it imported into the relations of the people and the government. the rowlatt bill—the report of the sedition committee over which mr. justice rowlatt presided had discussed the | outbreaks of seditious crime, particularly from 1907, and had provided impressive evidence of the existence of a revolutionary and anarchical conspiracy in bengal and elsewhere and the inef- fectiveness of the ordinary criminal law to deal with it. the committee proposed to strengthen in certain minor respects the existing law, and to endow fhe governor-general in council with emergency powers, to be used only in specified areas, and only after a notification declaring the existence of a state of affairs in those areas which demanded emergency measures. those measures included: (a) the trial of seditious crime by three judges of the highest status, without juries or assessors who were liable to be affected by public discussion or deliberate terrorism; and (6) the investing of a provincial government with powers of internment’ similar to those conferred under the defence of india act, but modified by checks in the shape of local investigating and visiting committees. in jan. 1919 the publication of the draft bills embodying the committee’s proposals was followed by a violent campaign by the nationalist press and nationalist politicians. they were represented as an attack upon the popu- lar liberties, an attempt to invent crimes, a monstrous engine of tyranny and oppression, the forerunner of a policy of reaction and an unmerited slur upon the loyalty and law-abidingness of the indian people. a whirlwind of excitement swept through the cities of upper india, a strange medley of ignorance and alarm, of political unrest and domestic discontents, of conscious exag- geration and mendacity. while the bills were before the legislative assembly, mr. m. k. gandhi, a well-known social and religious reformer, revered in the bombay presidency as an ascetic and holy man, initiated a passive resistance movement. satyagraha, as he termed it, meant insistence on truth and a reliance on soul force. on the india rowlatt bills receiving the viceroy’s assent, mr. gandhi an- nounced a day of general mourning and cessation of business. on march 30 a kartal, or closure of shops, took place at delhi, the mob came into collision with the police, and deaths occurred. a wave of excitement passed over the punjab. violent disturb- ances broke out in lahore, amritsar and other centres when news came that mr. gandhi had been forbidden to enter the province and had been sent back to bombay under arrest. be- tween april ro and 15 mobs were in possession of these and other towns in the central punjab. disorder assumed the char- acter of open rebellion, definitely anti-government and anti- british, communications were cut, and the civil authority was only maintained by military force. martial law was proclaimed in amritsar on april 14, was extended subsequently to other dis- tricts and was not finally withdrawn from every part of the prov- ince until june, although order was gencrally restored by the end of april. but the situation remained critical owing to the afghan war, and it was thought prudent to run no risks. in bombay the news of mr. gandhi’s arrest at delhi was the occasion of an immediate outbreak of disurder in ahmadabad, the capital of guzerat, and in neighbouring towns. the military had to be called in, but not before numerous acts of incendiarism and violence and some loss of life had occurred. the disturbances terminated on the arrival of mr. gandhi, who expressed great sorrow at the excesses of his followers and was allowed to address an enormous meeting at which he upbraided the people for their violence. | amritsar.—on april 13 ‘‘ the tragedy of amritsar ”’ occurred. in that city banks and other buildings had been pillaged and burnt and europeans murdered. the civil officers, finding them- selves powerless to cope with the mobs in possession of the city, called upon the military to restore order. brigadier-gencral dycr, the officer commanding, deemed it necessary in the course of his operations to disperse forcibly an unlawful assembly held in the falianwala bagh. nearly 400 persons were killed by the fire of his troops, and probably thrice that number wounded. his ac- tion aroused intense indignation among indians of all shades of political opinion, and became the subject of most bitter contro- versy, which was in no wise allayed by the appointment towards the end of the year of the hunter committee to inquire into the the disturbances which had arisen in consequence of the row- latt legislation. general dyer’s action was condemned by this committee, and it was decided by the authorities that he should receive no furtheremploymentinindia. after a warm debate in the house of commons (july 8 1920), this action was approved by 230 votes to 129, but the house of lords, on july 20, by 120 votes to 86, passed a motion “deploring”’ the treatment of gen- eral dyer as “ unjust ” and as “establishing a precedent dan- gerous to the preservation of order in the face of rebellion.” the morning post, taking this view, raised a considerable sum as a testimonial to the censured officer. in june 1924, the case came into the law courts in london. sir michael o’ dwyer, who was lieutenant-governor of bengal at the date of the amritsar affair brought an action against sir sankaran nair, formerly member of the viceroy’s council, whose book gandhi and anarchy had attributed to him a responsibility for the shooting. sir michael o’ dwyer won the action, receiving £500 damages, and the judge, mr. justice mccardie, expressed the view “ that the time and the method of general dyer’s punishment, if he were wrong, were most unfortunate.” the afghan war, tor9g.—relations with afghanistan had been uniformly good ever since the amir habibullah’s visit to lord minto in 1908. he had been received in state at agra on jan. 9 of that year, and afterwards went to some of the principal cities in india and made a prolonged stay in calcutta. the amir was delighted with his reception, and let it be known that his friend- ship with the british govt. had been immensely strength- ened. during the world war he was staunch; but on feb. 20 tg1g, he was murdered, and his son amanullah ascended the throne. the succession was disliked by powerful factions in the state; and in his difficulties the new amir lent an eager ear to the dis- 429 torted reports of the disturbed state of the punjab and of the nature of the rowlatt acts which found their way to afghanistan. he concluded that an invasion of india might prove a solution of his domestic differences, appealing as it would to the religious fanaticism of his mahommedan subjects, deeply stirred by the humiliation and defeat of turkey and by the british conquest of mesopotamia. ilis plan was to incite the independent tribes to rise and to follow up their raiding parties with his afghan regular forces. but the frontier tribes were slow to move. ag- gressive movements of his troops in the khyber were countered by the rapid mobilisation of the army in india early in may, the occupation of the afghan advanced base at dacca and the bomb- ing by aeroplanes of kabul and jalalabad. by the middle of may the afghans asked for a cessation of hostilities, and in june the amir accepted an armistice. in july his representatives at- tended a conference at rawalpindi and on aug. 8 a treaty of peace was signed, under which the amir lost his subsidy and the privilege of importing arms through india. a separate letter officially recognised the freedom of afghanistan from foreign control. doubts have been expressed as to the wisdom of this concession. but control over the foreign policy of afghanistan has always been nominal rather than real, and the withdrawal of the subsidy in itself implied the rescission of the reciprocal obligation. waziristan expedition —the rawalpindi treaty did not end the troubles on the frontier. the independent tribes of wazirs and mahsuds, who occupy a large block of country south of the khyber line between afghanistan and the british districts to the east, had risen in may at the instigation of the afghans and raided the adjoining british districts. the indian govt. deter- mined to undertake the permanent pacification of the country, a serious undertaking, as the tribes could place some 30,000 well- armed men in the field. a strong force was assembled on the fron- ticr in oct. and an ultimatum given to the tribes. the wazirs in the tochi valley were soon subdued, but the mahsuds fought with dogged obstinacy and great skill. there were two consid- erable encounters (on dec. 21 1919 and jan. 14 1920) with heavy british casualties. in the end the mahsuds accepted the terms imposed upon them, and the military operations closed on may 7 1920. the nen-co-operation amfovement.—in dec. to1g the mon- tagu-chelmsford scheme of constitutional reform became law by the passing of the govt. of india (amendment) act. the king’s proclamation of dec. 23 dwelt in eloquent and arresting language on the political advancement conferred upon the indian peoples, authorised the viceroy to extend the royal clemency to political offenders in the fullest measure compatible with the public safety, and announced that the prince of wales would visit india to inaugurate the new constitutions. the effect of these gracious words was unfortunately marred by the excite- ment which attended the inquiry of lord hunter’s committee then in progress into the punjab disturbances of the preceding april. the national congress met at amritsar, and passed reso- lutions denouncing the government’s action in the punjab, demanding the recall of lord chelmsford and condemning the reform scheme as disappointing and unsatisfactory. this hos- tility towards the administration and rejection of the reforms by the extreme section of the nationalists developed in the ensuing months into a definite ‘‘ non-co-operation ”’ movement organised by mr. gandhi. the publication in 1920 of the report of the committee pre- sided over by lord hunter, and of the correspondence between the govt. of india and the secretary of state regarding its find- ings, and the subsequent debates in parliament renewed the bitterness and indignation which the amritsar proceedings had aroused in india. about the same time the terms of the sevres treaty became known to indian mahommedans and added flame to the “ khilifat ” agitation, which the pro-turk section of that community had been vigorously fomenting. in aug. mr. gandhi proclaimed in a letter to the viceroy his adoption of non- co-operation as a remedy against a government for which he retained “‘ neither respect nor affection ” on account of its “ un- 430 scrupulous, immoral and unjust” action in the matter of the caliphate and its failure to punish adequately the officials re- sponsible for “‘ the wanton cruelty and inhumanity ” with which the disorders in the punjab were suppressed. in jan. 1921 the duke of connaught visited india in place of the prince of wales, and inaugurated the new constitutions. the speeches delivered by him in opening the legislative assembly, the council of state and the chamber of princes at delhi and the legislative councils of madras, bengal and bombay made a deep impression. his earnest appeal, as an old friend of india, to all parties, british and indian, “ to bury along with the dead past the mistakes and misunderstandings of the past,” struck a note which found response in the proceedings of the new legis- latures and in the indian press. on april 2 rg2t lord chelmsford made over the office of viceroy to his successor lord reading. no viccroy had been more tried by circumstances beyond his control, and no viceroy had shown more steadfast courage, patience or devotion to the highest ideals of his great office. the era will be a landmark in the history of modern india. it saw india started on the road to self-government and admitted on equal terms to a partnership in the british empire. (t. w. ho.) tne new constitution during lord chelmsford’s viceroyalty an important change had taken place in the political machinery. the morley-minto reform had introduced the electoral principle into the indian legislatures, and given them a wider sphere of influence over the executive government. but in effect they remained advisory bodies, and the absence of any administrative responsibility whetted their critical faculty without giving them any corre- sponding practice in the actual work of government. ‘the executive authorities, imperial and provincial, remained gov- ernments of officials, responsible to the secretary of state, and through him to the british parliament, and not amenable in any direct sense to popular control in india. from this arrangement to the announcement of aug. 29 1917 was a wide step, involving organic change and not taken before time. the enthusiasm which had welcomed the morley-minto reform had long evaporated, and the demand by the indian leaders for administrative power was insistent. the montagu- chelmsford report conceded the justice of the demand, and pro- posed that responsible government, in the sense of government by ministers primarily responsible to an elected assembly, should be conferred on india by progressive stages. it recognised that india was not yet ready for full responsible government, that an electorate had to be created and that its representatives must at first be inexperienced. its authors proposed therefore to con- fine the first stage of advance to the major provinces, and in these provinces to set up a dual form of government, generally known as *‘ diarchy.” this device, accepted only after all possible alter- natives had been found impracticable, was a division of the pro- vincial field of government into two sections, one of which would be transferred to the control of ministers chosen by the gov- ernor from the elected members of his legislative council. in july to19 a bill embodying this scheme, with certain modi- fications, was introduced into the house of commons, read a second time and referred to a joint select committee of both houses presided over by lord selborne. the committee, after an elaborate investigation and hearing nearly 70 witnesses, ac- cepted the main principles of the scheme, and dealt at length with the political and administrative problems involved in the bill. their report (h.c. 203) is a most valuable constitutional docu- ment, indispensable to a study of the new regime. the bill passed both houses substantially as amended by the committee, and received the royal assent on dec. 23 1919. it takes the form of amendments of the government of india act, and has been so drafted as to admit of its being textually incorporated into the principal act. as is usual with statutes relating to india, it left a great deal of the new constitution to be worked out by rules drafted and applied by the government to mcet the needs of each particular case. india demarcation of spheres.—if{ its provisions were taken in logical sequence, the first feature of the new constitution would be its demarcation of the duties of the ‘‘ central ”’ or imperial govt. from those of the provincial governments. the former retains certain powers of supervision and control over the provincial administrations; but its direct functions are now specifically listed, and the departments which are under the provincial govts. are similarly enumerated. these governments derive their revenue from the departments under their own con- trol, z.e., land revenue, stamps, excise, forest, etc. the imperial govt. takes the yield of its own central departments—railways, post and telegraphs, customs, income tax, salt, opium, etc. at present, however, these do not balance its budget, which carries the whole cost of the defence of india; and consequently it has to levy subsidies from the provinces, though it is pledged to fore- go them when the development of its own resources shall permit. as with the administrative and financial powers, so also are the law-making powers of the central and the provincial authorities carefully delimited. the provincial sphere —feach of the major provinces is now placed under a governor. ‘the whole of the provincial depart- ments are divided in each province into two groups, the “ re- served ” and the “‘ transferred.”’ the former (at present law and order, justice, police, the land, etc.) are administered by the governor and his executive council (of whom at least one mem- ber is an indian); the latter (education, public health, excise, etc.) are administered by the governor and two or more ministers, who are chosen by him from among the leaders of the provincial legislature. these two bodies work independently, each in its own field; and their responsibilitics are clearly distinguished. the governor is the link of union, and has full discretion to bring them together for joint consultation. on matters of common interest. the executive council in its control of reserved sub- jects, is responsible through the govt. of india and the secretary of state to the british parliament; the ministers in their control of transferred subjects are responsible to the legislative council on the spot. this, in the briefest terms, is the system which has been named or nicknamed ‘‘ diarchy.” its purpose is to provide a field of actual duty in which indian leaders can be trained by actual practice in the art of government. on the one hand, they will have the assistance of the governor, and opportunities of consulting their official colleagues in the executive council. on the other hand, the field entrusted to them will be carefully defined, so that their work can be seen and judged by the elec- torate, and so also that any consequences of their inexperience may not affect the sphere of administration which remains in the hands of the executive council. the legislative council in each province has a large elected majority, with an element (under 30%) of officials and nominated members. the elections are direct and the constituencies main- ly territorial. a property qualification, differing in different provinces, determines the franchise. the vote has been given to about 5,000,000 of the adult male population in the whole of india, female suffrage being left to the local option of the provin- cial councils. for whatever legislation and supply they require, both halves of the government are dependent on the legislature thus constituted. in the “ transferred ” sphere, ministers must secure the support of the legislature. if they fail, their policy fails; and the ordinary course is for them to resign or be dismissed by the governor, so that they may be replaced by ministers who can carry the legislative council with them. in the “ reserved ” sphere, it is the task of the governor and his official colleagues to reconcile the legislature to their policy. but if they fail, their responsibility for right policy to the british parliament is in no wise diminished; certain safeguards are accordingly provided against the event of the council refusing a jaw or supply for which it has been asked by them. the govern- or has an exceptional power to pass such a law by his own decree, if he certifies that it 1s essential for the discharge of his responsi- bility; but a measure enacted in this way has to be reserved for his majesty’s pleasure. similarly the government may re- store a grant for expenditure which has been refused or reduced india by the council if the governor certifies in the same sense; and in case of emergency he may authorise any expenditure which “may be in his opinion necessary for the safety or tranquillity of the province or for the carrying on of any department.” f'i- nally, should the legislature take action in any department which the governor regards as dangerous, he has wide powers to stop a bill, or to refuse assent to it, or to return it for reconsideration, or to reserve it for the consideration of the governor-general. extensive safeguards thus exist against the possible misuse of its power by the provincial legislature. the imperial sphere—in the central government there is no diarchy. the governor-general and his executive council (of whom there are now in practice not less than three indian members) still remain in sole and undivided responsibility to parliament for the supreme govt. of india. the central legisla- ture, however, has been radically altered by the 1919 act. the lower house, or legislative assembly, has 144 members, 103 of whom are elected direct by constituencies similar to those which elect to the provincial legislatures but larger in area and with a higher property qualification. in the upper house, or council of state, are 60 members, of whom 33 are elected on a still more restricted franchise. in neither chamber therefore is there an assured majority for the government, to secure the laws, the taxation measures or the expenditure grants which it requires for the administration of the country. the underlying conception of this unusual situation is that it should throw the government more upon the support of the elected representa- tives of the people and weaken its reliance on the direction of the secretary of state. it was anticipated that, where the executive govt. and its legislature are in accord on policy, there would be a convention of non-interference by the secretary of state, subject of course always to the overriding power of the british parlia- ment. it was not, however, unforeseen that the central govt. may not always be able to carry the legislature with it, and ma- chinery was provided for avoiding a deadlock in such an event. in legislative business a difference between the two chambers may be referred to a joint sitting. if in either chamber a bill is proposed or amended so as to affect “ the safety or tranquillity of british india or any part thereof,” the governor-general may stop it. he may also, as under the previous constitution, veto a bill, or refer it for his majesty’s pleasure. should he recommend a bill which either chamber accepts and the other rejects, he may treat it as enacted; or if both chambers reject it, he may make it into an act on his own responsibility. in both cases, however, the governor-general must first have certified that the “‘ passage of the bill is essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of british india or any part thereof,” and the measure must subse- quently be laid before both houses of parliament; effect may not be given to it, unless in a state of emergency, until ilis maj- esty’s assent has been received. in financial business the supply grants have to be voted by the legislative assembly; but if a grant which the governor-general declares to be essential to the discharge of his responsibilities is refused or reduced, he may restore it. expenditure on defence and in the political and ec- clesiastical departments, charges prescribed by law, loan charges and certain salaries and pensions need not be voted; and the governor-general has power to sanction vital expenditure in cases of emergency. further development.—the above ts an outline of the complex scheme that comprises the first stage in what the preamble of the 1919 act describes as “ the gradual development of self-govern- ing institutions.”’ as “ the time,”’ to quote the act again, “ and the manner of advance can be determined only by parliament,” it is provided that, ro years after the passing of the act, a par- liamentary commission will go to india, to inquire into the work- ing of the reforms, and to report on the desirability of establish- ing the principle of responsible government, or of extending, modifying or restricting the degree of responsible government already existing. in other words, the retention or otherwise of the electoral system and diarchy will be examined on the evi- dence of the work actually achieved; and it will be decided, if diarchy is retained, whether further departments should be 431 transferred from the official half of each provincial government to the control of ministers. it has been necessary to recite the main features of the new constitution because of the influence they exercised on the political history of lord reading’s vice- royalty. lord reading’s vicerovalty 1921-6 arriving in april 1921, the earl of reading brought to the office of governor-general a prestige not exceeded by that of any of his forerunners. having served as law officer of the crown, cabinet minister, lord chief justice of england and british high commissioner in the united states, he enjoyed an eminence both as a lawyer and as a statesman which made his selection a particular compliment to india. the task which con- fronted him required all his courage and all his experience. though the actual machinery of the new constitution had begun its work with relative smoothness, the country was seething with an excitement for which the political changes were merely a pre- text. a moderate section of indian leaders commanded the coun- cils and furnished ministers to the provincial governments. but they owed their position to the boycott of the whole scheme by the extremist politicians, whether hindus or moslems, who had taken no part in the elections of the previous winter, and now held no place in the councils or the ministries. the real battle of india’s future was being fought outside the domain of constitutional government. hindu extremism.—yhe more advanced nationalist party were gaining strength and audacity under the magnetic leader- ship of mr. gandhi, who had been appointed virtual dictator of their forces at the national congress of christmas 1920. he was sweeping the country with his cry of non-violent non-co-opera- tion. the yoke of foreign dominion was to be thrown off and the curse of western commercialism eradicated. india would then be worthy of complete hlome rule, and a date (at first sept. 30 1921, but subsequently extended on several occasions) was actually prophesied for the disappearance of the british government. in his campaign mr. gandhi was aided by bands of ‘ national volunteers,” pledged to deliberate lawlessness, and carrying the spirit of unrest from the towns into the rural areas. outrage after outrage showed the inability of the masses to dis- tinguish between non-co-operation and anarchy. the tide of disaffection was rapidly rising, and the jails could no longer contain the volunteers who courted a tolerable martyrdom. the condition of the country had not been worse since 1858. mahommedan extremism.—moslem feeling also had been growling in acerbity for several years. long persuaded that it might rely on the special consideration of the british govt., it had been rudely shocked by the reversal of the partition of ben- gal in rori, for the severance of eastern bengal into a separate province had been regarded as a measure for the protection of the large and impoverished moslem community in that area. genuine distress was felt at the misfortunes of turkey in tripoli (rori—2) and the balkans (1912-3); and among the younger men a movement of active sympathy with the “ young turk ” party made considerable headway. when the sherif of mecca revolted against his turkish overlords it was not only the young indian moslems who condemned his action, or resented the part which they were convinced that great britain had played in fomenting it. though there was very little active disloyalty during the war, and although the cooler heads among the indian mahommedans disapproved the action of constantinople tn siding against great britain in the world war, an under-current of religious solidarity was stimulated by economic discontent and a lively sense of the waning of the power of islam. the treaty of sevres was attacked as a device of england to humiliate her former friend and ally; and a movement of pro- test was headed by two brothers, mahomed ali and shaukat ali, whose liberty had been restrained for seditious agitation during the war. their followers were known as the khilafat party from their claim that the temporalities of the sultan, as khalifa of islam, should be restored. with them there was no pretence of non-violence; they attempted to seduce the mahommedan 432 troops, played on religious fanaticism and talked of proclaiming an indian republic. seeing in them a useful adjunct to his own campaign, mr. ghandhi took the khilafat movement under his wing. it was in a struggle against this combination of forces that the first three years of lord reading’s govt. were mainly spent. the moplah rising.—in aug. 1921 the most serious of many unpardonable deeds of violence broke out. the malabar coun- try in madras is occupied by 2,000,000 hindus and about 1,000,- ooo moplahs, an ignorant mahommedan peasantry of mixed arab and indian descent with an evil reputation for outbreaks of fanaticism. among the latter the khilifat excitement spread like wildfire; and during july and aug. 1921 meetings were helc and arms collected to prepare for the coming of an islamic mil- lennium and the overthrow of british rule. when the magis- trate of calicut attempted to make some arrests, he was met by armed force, and rebellion immediately broke out. railway and telegraph lines were cut, roads blocked, government offices burned and a moplah king proclaimed. the few europeans who failed to escape from the district were brutally murdered, and then the moplahs turned upon their inoffensive hindu neighbours. they burned villages, sacked temples, outraged women, massacred and attempted wholesale the forcible conver- sion of the hindus to islam. the extraordinary difficulties of the country made the task of suppression particularly difficult; and the troops which were locally available had to be reinforced at the beginning of oct. by four battalions, a pack battery and a section of armoured cars. a drive was then made through the affected area, and the rebellion gradually collapsed. it is estimated that during the campaign the moplahs lost 3,000 1n killed alone. the whole tragedy was a definite fruit of the extremists’ chal- lenge to law and order. it was also the first shattering blow to the hindu-moslem unity which the extremists had hoped to establish for their own purposes; mr. gandhi and his lieutenants professed to belittle the outbreak, but it soon became apparent how gravely the moplah atrocities rankled in the minds of the ordinary hindus. meanwhile the ali brothers had got to the end of their tether. in oct. 1921 they were arrested, tried at karachi and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. but the khilafat agitation was not now to be checked, and it soon gained fresh momentum. visit of the prince of wales—on nov. 17 1921 ti.r.h. the prince of wales landed at bombay for the visit to india which had been postponed in the preceding year. efforts, partly suc- cessful, but frequently defeated by the prince’s arresting popu- larity, were made to boycott the public ceremonials arranged in his honour; yet the tour was courageously carried through. he rapidly traversed british india, carried through a heavy tale of ceremonies and interviews, visited several of the leading indian states, as well as nepal, inspected the northwest frontier, attend- ed the kadir cup (pig-sticking meet) near meerut, and finally left for england from karachi in march. the just comment on results of the tour is a quotation from the viceroy’s telegram to the prince on his departure: ‘‘ you leave india having won india’s heart, for the road to the heart of the people lies through knowledge and sympathy. from the day you landed in india you set yourself to gain the one; providence has endowed you with the other.” decline of non-co-operation—the year 1921 marked the apogee of the extremist movement, and among moderate men of all classes it was felt that the govt. of india was approach- ing the limits of permissible patience. mr. gandhi was pre- paring a scheme of mass civil disobedience, both aggressive and defensive, and was on the eve of launching it, when on i’eb. 4 1922 another hideous outrage occurred. at the chauri chaura village, in the east of the united provinces, 21 policemen and village watchmen were set upon by a mob of “ volunteers ”’ and excited peasants and battered to death or burned alive. mr. gandhi at once suspended his orders for civil disobedience, issued a new “ constructive programme ” which threw his followers into confusion, but he was at last arrested on march 101922. put on india trial at ahmadabad on three charges of spreading disaffection and instigating the overthrow of the government, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six years’ simple imprisonment. ilis trial produced no popular excitement. it was overshadowed by the resignation by mr. e. s. montagu of his office as secre- tary of state, as a sequel to his having published, without cabi- net approval, a dispatch from lord reading’s govt., in which hlis majesty’s govt. was urged, in deference to mahommedan sentiment in india, to revise the treaty of sevres. the cause of non-co-operation now began to waver. the vol- unteer movement was collapsing from’ want of funds. mr. gan- dhi’s repeated prophecies of the millennium had been falsified. the nationalist schools which had been started to rival the gov- ernment institutions had been failures, and masses of students saw their careers imperilled. nor was the boycott of the bar maintaining its popularity among the lawyers who abounded in mr. gandhi’s camp. the unity of hindu and mahommedan action was severely shaken by the numerous outbreaks of racial violence. above all, good harvests were steadying the masses, and economic discontent was being allayed. by the end of 1922 a strong section of the nationalist party wished to reverse the policy of holding aloof from the councils. the akali riots—the unsettlement, however, which the nationalists had engendered, was no longer theirs to curb, and took little heed of political manoeuvres. it had now penetrated the slow-moving punjab, and the doctrine of non-violent ob- struction to authority was bearing strange fruit on unlikely soil. lor some years there had been a reforming movement among the sikhs, directed at recovering a number of scattered temples of their religion from hereditary incumbents (mahants) and em- ploying their revenues for the spiritual service of the people gen- erally. the puritan reforming section (akalis) had got into the habit of taking the jaw into their own hands, and ejecting by violence the mahants of whom they disapproved. the latter appealed to the courts, or engaged armed retainers to defend their property. in either case it was necessary for the govern- ment to intervene; and it suited the employers of the akali bands, adherents of the non-co-operation movement, to distort this intervention into hostility against the sikh religion. all attempts by the government to bring the akali fervour into orderly channels were frustrated, and in 1922 the akalis estab- lished such a reign of terror that military assistance had to be supplied to the police. then came the episode of the guru-ka-bagh, one of the most extraordinary stories of recent indian history. at asmall temple 10 miles from amritsar the police had prevented some akalis from trespassing and cutting trees; whereupon from all over the punjab bands of sikhs assembled to assert their right over the land. the method they employed was bewildering in its depar- ture from the usual martial spirit of the sikh. a band of akali volunteers started every morning from amritsar, under a vow to employ no violence but to reach the temple or to return sense- less. the police who were deputed to protect the property were obliged to use their batons (in india, their jathis or iron-shod bamboo staves) sufliciently to stun the volunteers, who were then carried trimuphantly back to amritsar in the ambulance cars which their sympathisers had in readiness. this demonstration went on day after day, until the whole sikh community was in a ferment and its traditional loyalty to the government was all but destroyed. in 1923 the animosity of the sikhs was turned against the administration of the nabha state, the maharaja of which had abdicated rather than face an inquiry ordered by the govt. of india. regrettable incidents occurred; but the futility of the whole business at last began to dawn upon the sikh mind, and by the end of 1924 common sense was rcasserting itself. it was not only in the punjab that 1924 and 1925 were difficult years. moslem fecling was very bitter about great britain’s treatment of turkey. susceptibilities were set on edge by the greck invasion of asia minor, and subsequently elated by the victorics of mustafa kemal. either emotion had a tendency to bring the moslems into conflict with their hindu neighbours, india and racial tension again became acute in the latter half of 1922. the following two years were thus marked by an almost continu- ous succession of sporadic disturbances in northern india. second phase of lord reading's viceroyalty—at the end of 1923 came the second general election. a strong section of the congress party, adopting the label of swaraj (home rule), broke away from mr. gandhi’s programme of boycott and put up a mass of candidates for the councils. the liberal or moderate party, which had predominated in the first triennium of the new legislatures, were attacked as having supported the government in bolstering up an unpopular constitution. they had also lost cohesion and discipline, and a new party, describing itself as independent, but standing on no common platform, made serious inroads on their position. for the swarajists the election was a substantial victory. they secured nearly half the elected seats in the central assembly; and in at least two of the provinces they commanded the provincial councils. their discipline was good, and they had entered the legislatures with the avowed object of “ uniform, continuous and consistent obstruction with a view to make government through the assembly and the councils impossible.”’ it was only in the central provinces, however, that they proceeded at once to extremes, rejecting the budget pro- vision for the salary of ministers, and ultimately compelling the government to resume the “ transferred ” subjects and suspend the operations of diarchy. in the central legislature, which first met after the elections on jan. 31 1924, they concentrated on de- manding that the grant of full responsible government should be expedited. when this was not endorsed by the government, they retaliated, in coalition with a sufficient number of members of the other parties, by rejecting the finance bill for the year, with the result that the viceroy had to use his emergency powers and certify the necessary expenditure of the administration. the episode, however, and the subsequent conduct of the nation- alist coalition during the remainder of the session, established them in the rele of a constitutional opposition, thus marking a new stage in the political development of the country, so that the second phase of lord reading’s viceroyalty may be taken as dating from jan. of ro24. the last prop of non-co-operation was knocked away when, in a special summer session of the legislature, the swaraj party voted with the government on a tariff measure; and mr. gandhi, who had now returned to politics, threatened to lead his followers out of the national congress into a campaign of social reform and hindu-mosiem unity. of the latter the prospects were gloomy, for the tale of racial conilicts and bloodshed was ever length- ening. the culminating outbreak occurred at kohat in sept. 1924, and ended in the whole of the hindu population fleeing from the town. a unity conference, hurriedly got together at delhi, though attended by representative members of all the indian communities, ended in little but good resolutions. equally ineffective was an attempted coalition of all the political parties in the councils; but mr. gandhi was won back to the congress camp, and the opening of 1925 found the swaraj party temporari- ly in a position of considerably improved strength. in bengal, pivoting their policy on opposition to an ordinance which the government published against a recrudescence of revolutionary crime, they refused for a second time to vote salaries for minis- ters, with the only result that the governor in executive council resumed control of the transferred departments and diarchy for a time was at an end. but in the central assembly the policy of wrecking took second place to a growing divergence between the new independent party and the swarajists. the muddiman inguiry.—in the autumn of 1924 an important inquiry into the working of the new constitution was held by a committee under the presidency of sir alexander muddiman. its appointment was in response to the demand by the national- ist politicians for the early abolition of diarchy in favour of some form of provincial autonomy. its business was to advise on any defects in the working of the 1g1tg scheme and on any amend- ments compatible with the general purpose and structure of the scheme. the report (published as cmd. 2,360 of 1925) was a twofold one. a minority of the members found that the new 433 system had broken down, that transitional measures were inap- propriate, and that steps should at once be taken to establish a permanent constitution. the majority on the other hand re- corded their opinion that, though the experiment had worked too short a time to justify a final verdict, they were not convinced that it had failed. they recommended several minor improve- ments in the machinery and procedure; but they concluded that, “except by some form of dualism, it was not possible to afford an equally valuable training towards responsible government in india and still te safeguard those conditions upon which govern- ment depends.” the swaraj claim that responsible govern- ment should be expedited was by implication rejected. while the controversy which followed the publication of the muddiman report was running t1s course, lord reading accepted an invitation from the secretary of state for india (now the earl of birkenhead) to visit england for the purpose of personal dis- cussion in the summer of 1925; the goverror of bengal, lord lytton, officiating as viceroy in his absence. this was the first exercise of a new act enabling viceroys and provincial governors to obtain leave during their term of office. 11 was obviously de- sirable to announce a line of policy in answer to the protestations of the nationalists that the 10-year period of experiment should be curtailed, and that the british parliament ought not to im- pose its judgment as to the fitness of india for self-government. on july 10 accordingly lord birkenhead made a careful state- ment in the house of lords, reviewed the working of the reform act of 1919, and emphasised the lack of co-operation and the actual hostility displayed by a section of the indian leaders. he expressed his willingness to consider any practical scheme of advance on which indians could agree, and he did not close the door to an antedating of the statutory inquiry due in 1920, if indian leaders gave evidence of a sincere and genuine desire to work the present machinery. on aug. 20 a corresponding speech was made by lord reading in opening the autumn session of the indian legislature, coupled with a plea for a closer co-operation. this did not avail to dissuade the assembly from rejecting the advice of the muddiman commission; but when, in the same month, the chamber had for the first time to elect its own presi- dent, its choice fell on mr. v. j. patel, who accepted the oflice and solemnly dissociated himself from all parties, although he had been formerly one of the most advanced non-co-operationists in the swaraj camp. regrouping of partics was the keynote of the caucus meetir gs at christmas 1925. the die-hard swarajists flung an ultimatum at the government, with threats of civil disobedience, obstruc- tion and the refusal of office; and over this the corgress split. a new wing of the party, representative mainly of western ir dia, broke off and declared for a policy of “‘ responsive co-operation.” at a separate conference the liberals prepared a separate plat- form; so did the independents; and a powerful gatherirg of moslems at aligarh assented to a defirite anti-hindu propa- ganda. the united front which political india had seemed to present in 1921 was seriously disintegrated by 1926; but the proc- esses of schism and reunion are never at an end. administrative progress —although political excitement dur- ing lord reading’s viceroyalty seriously hampered the daily routine of administration and often went near to paralysing the legislatures, yet the administrative system was too firmly rooted to be rendered fruitless. in the provinces the output of legisla- tion was abundant; and in the central assembly measures of much importance were painfully hammered out, notably in the removal of racial privilege, in establishing a protective fiscal system, and in meeting problems of organised labour which were for the first time emerging in india. the rural community, it is true, were left the cinderella, as well as the catspaw, of political advance; but lord reading sufficiently appreciated their domi- nant importance to procure, on the eve of his departure, the ap- pointment of a royal commission to go into the whole question of agriculture. fortunately there had been steady advance in agricultural prosperity. a short monsoon in 1920 necessitated considerable famine-relicf operations in the succeeding year; but thenceforward a series of remarkably good harvests lowered 434 prices and restored the contentment of the masses. the epoch of economic distress in 1920-1 had affected the manufacturing classes even more than the patient agriculturists. labour trou- ble came to the front as never before, 1921 witnessing no fewer than 400 strikes of varying magnitude, and legislative measures of a new type began to appear on the statute book. social organisation.—an amended factory act in 1922 pre- scribed a 6o0-hours week and raised the minimum age of child workers from nine to 12. a mines act in 1923 dealt with the employment of women and children below ground, restricted the hours of adult labour to 60 above ground and 54 below, and enacted a weekly day of rest. the first workmen’s compensa- tion act came into force in 1924, and measures were undertaken for the regulation of trade unions and the settlement of industrial disputes. many of these steps were taken in ratification of the conventions adopted by the international labour conference held at washington in 1919. they were described by the dircc- tor of the geneva labour office as “ the first tangible results in the east of the ideals inspiring part xiii. of the treaty of peace.” the same official formally thanked the govt. of india for ‘‘ the conspicuous example of social and labour progress which it is showing to the world.” besides these legislative measures, a quieter process was at work in the steady improvement of the depressing housing conditions in the large labour centres, such as calcutta, bombay and cawnpore. the city improvement schemes there and elsewhere have produced remarkable results, which, even from a purely material point of view, should prove remunerative; for nothing has prejudiced the efliciency of indian labour more than the periodical flights of the labourer back to the healthier conditions of his native village. in the social organisation of india the post-war record is one of considerable change. the non-brahmans of madras struck against brahman domination, and seized power in the new pro- vincial legislature. the lowest strata of outcasts or “ untouch- ables ’? have shown signs of organising for their own protection and betterment, and mr. gandhi led a vigorous, if not a wholly popular mission for their uplift. some flutterings of a feminist movement were perceptible. an accomplished indian lady, the ‘poetess, mrs. sarojini naidu, occupied the chair of the national congress of 1925. numerous ladies of the classes which formerly prided themselves on their seclusion are now to be met on political and other platforms, and some little progress is being made to- wards the recognition of the re-marriage of hindu widows. so- cial progress, however, lags far behind political aspirations. recrudescence of political crime.—allusion has already been made to the inroads on the tranquillity of the country which en- sued on extremist agitation. they unfortunately provided cover . for a revival in bengal of revolutionary crime on the familiar lines:—dacoities, looting, assassination and the intimidation of witnesses. conspiwacies multiplied in 1923; and early in 1924 an inoffensive englishman was shot in the streets of calcutta in mistake for a police official; the bengal provincial conference in the following july passing a resolution laudatory of the “ noble self-sacrifice ’? of the murderer. in oct. 1924 came a special ordi- nance for dealing, by exceptional procedure of arrest and trial, with anarchical offences in the province; and among the earliest suspects against whom it was enforced were two members of the bengal legislative council, and the chief executive officer of the calcutta municipal corporation. by the extremists some capital was made of this departure from the ordinary and not too effective methods of the criminal jaw; but the restoration of order which followed the ordinance was its justification. the indian civil service—not least among the anxieties of the time was the effect of political change on the public services which constitute the main structure of indian administration. it was not only that members of the indian civil and other serv- ices found their position substantially altering, as they became transformed from the originators of policy into the subordinate executants of a quasi-parliamentary system. this was inevitable, but it was accompanied by virulent attacks from indian politi- cians, who impugned the good faith of the services and made no secret of their desire to replace englishmen by their own coun- india trymen; and it was accentuated by the domestic anxiety which resulted from the growing cost of living, of passages to england and the like. many valuable public servants retired prematurely, and the english universities soon stopped the supply of recruits of the type that had previously been available. in 1923 a toyal commission was appointed to inquire into the whole problem; it was composed of four englishmen and four indians with lord lee of fareham as chairman. in may 1924 it presented a report ! remarkable for its unanimity. it recom- mended a jarge increasein the recruitment of indians for the services, and the entrusting entirely to local governments of recruitment for the ‘ transferred ” services. on the other hand, it advised several alleviations of the financial position of euro- peans in the services, the adequate protection of the services in the execution of their duties, and the establishment of a public service commission on the lines familiar in several of the domin- ions. these proposals were attacked in the assembly, but the govt. of india showed their intention of acceptirg the report and its implications, and certain declaraticus by the home govt. made it clear that they were determined to maintain the policy of keeping a strong and competent european element in the leading services. recruitment almost immediately im- proved, though certain of the services, particularly the civil medical appointments, cannot -pretend to offer their former attractions to englishmen. indians abroad.—the indian relief act of t914 in the union of south africa and the outbreak of the war in the same year pushed into the background for a time the indignation felt in india about the treatment of its nationals in certain of the domin- ionsand crown colonies. but the grievance soon acquired increased impetus withtheargument that indiantroops were considered good enough to fight by the side of forces from parts of the empire which refused civic rights to indians in peace time. raised in a definite form at the imperial conferences of 1917 and 1918, the issue led to a “‘ reciprocity agreement.” ‘trouble revived, how- ever, in various forms in natal and the transvaal, in east af- rica and in fiji; and the imperial conference of 1921 was again called into consultation. it passed a resolution to the effect that british indians domiciled in another part of the empire should be given recognition of their right to citizenship. south africa, however, where it is estimated that 160,000 indians are settled, declined to be a party to this declaration, and has uniformly urged its own responsibility for regulating the status of its in- habitants in its own interests. in natal (where the most of the indians are domiciled) and the transvaal the tendency, in spite of theoretical concessions, has been to discourage indian settlers by imposing definite civic disabilities; and the union govt’s. support of the ‘‘ class areas bill’ has alarmed the indian set- tlers, who believe that it will be used as a weapon for the com- pulsory segregation of asiatics in urban areas. bitter though the feeling became in south africa, it reached an even more acute point in kenya, where at one time there seemed an imminent prospect of open hostilities between the british and the indian settlers. there the indians had four grievances: the closure of the highlands of the colony to them, compulsory segregation, inadequacy of their franchise and repre- sentation and threats to stop immigration. from an inquiry held by the colonial office m 1923, a policy was announced by h.m. govt. which, though conciliatory on most of the points at issue, failed to allay the sympathctic agitation in india; and the whole question was again brought before the imperial confer- ence in the same year. four of the dominions and the colonial office itself accepted the principle of consultation with the govt. of india on the status of indians in the dominions and colonics; south africa stood alone in refusing to hold out any hopes of the extension of the political rights of the indian residents. from the informal discussions that ensued, a more accommodating temper developed. in kenya the former scttle- ment was modified by the labour govt. in 1924, and tension was relaxed by the local indians accepting certain nominations for the jegislature. in south africa the patient labours of a depu- east india (civil services in india), cmd. 2128 of 1924. india tation from india paved the way for the appointment of a con- ference to which the union govt. assented in april 1926. for those who do not know india, there is difficulty in appre- ciating how seriously these grievances react on the political situa- tion there. they are universally interpreted as betokening racial arrogance, an intention to humiliate indians as such, and the rejection in practice of that impcrial citizenship which inclia is being offered in theory. they provide extremists with a handle for stimulating popular indignation against the british govt. and they complicate its task. on the other hand, little allowance is often made in india for the considerations which are of vital moment to a european community imbedded in a vastly larger indigenous population. the north-\w est frontier —on the conclusion of the war which the new amir forced on india in roto, there came clear evidence of a revival of russia’s old thrust towards india. it was with a view to fomenting revolutionary trouble in india that bolshevik tentacles were pushed into persia and afghanistan; and when in 1921 a russo-afghan treaty was concluded, one of its chicf fea- tures was the establishment of russian consulates so near the indian border as kandahar and jalalibad. the amir was not averse from playing off one of his neighbours against the other; and after inviting a mission from india to come to kabul and negotiate an anglo-afghan treaty, he kept it dangling through- out 1921 before coming to final terms in nov. of that year. the conditions included the complete independence of aighan- istan, and the opening of legations at london and kabul. with the accrediting of an afghan minister to the court of st. james, a period of greater cordiality was inaugurated, though scrious tension arose in 1923 over the afghan attitude towards certain frontier outrages, and in 1925 a russo-afghan trade conven- tion indicated the continued flirtation of the amir with his sovict neighbours. he has also secured a treaty of alliance and mutual defence with the new turkish govt. of angora. meanwhile he has embarked on a programme of domestic reform and progress, which offers some promise of opening his country to european influences. relations with the frontier tribes improved after the cam- paigns of 1919 and 1920; but in 1923 a gang of outlaws in afghan territory were guilty of slaying two british officers near landi kotal, of shooting the wife and abducting the daughter (after- wards gallantly rescued) of an officer in kohat cantonment, and of murdering another officer and his wife at parachinar. apart from the necessary punitive measures, the govt. of india initi- ated a permanent policy of controlling the mahsud country, one of the chicf storm-centres on the border. dropping the plan of military occupation, they adopted a scheme of penetration of roads suitable for motor transport, guarded by local irregulars, and commanded by two strong posts at razmak and manzai. of even higher importance was the extension by five years of labour in the most forbidding country, of the khyber railway from jamrud to landi khana; the first train through the khyber pass being run on nov. 2 1925. a new treaty was signed with nepal in dec. 1923. it contains provisions for mutual informa- tion of any trouble with adjoining states, and others for regulat- ing the transport of arms and merchandise. the traditions of friendship with this allied state have bcen strengthened. retirement of lord reading.—at the end of march 1926 lord reading laid down the office which he had filled with courage and distinction during a period of special difficulty. by the excr- cise of extreme patience, he had allowed the vehemence of tg21 to exhaust itself without deriving fresh food from any untoward step of the government and he had guided the inevitable reaction into constitutional channels. he had taken measures for the financial health of india, and particularly for economy in its military administration. he had been diligent in removing grievances within india and vigilant for her interests abroad. on retirement he received the high honour of promotion to mar- quess: and he was succeeded by lord irwin of kirby moordale, a grandson of the sir charles wood who, as secretary of state for india, had laid down the lines of the existing educational system m 1854. 439 il. education the dominant factor of the educational system continues to be, as from the east india company’s days, the insistent demand of the midtdle-classes for secondary and university education as a means of livelihood. this has been supplied by the state to the limits of its means on very cheap terms, to the comparative neg- lect of the agricultural and labouring classes who, while not actively hostile to the schoolmaster, were well content to do with- out him. the effects of this neglect, the failure of secondary education to mect the needs of the country’s industrial develop- ment and the largely unsatisfactory character of such education for any purpose combined to make educational reform the most urgent, as well as one of the thorniest, of current administrative problems. the lines laid down by lord hardinge’s govt. were vigorously pursucd by his successors. university education —the calcutta university commission reported in t91g. presided over by sir michael sadler, it consisted of seven members, of whom four came direct from england and two were indians. the report condemned in emphatic and impressive language the whole system of secondary and univer- sity education, as it existed in bengal, and, subject to qualifica- tions, in other parts of india. it was based on an external examining university and a multitude of afhhated colleges scattered throughout the country. it was content to leave the ordinary student to believe that the passing of examinations is the only thing of value in a university training. the affiliated colleges were, as a rule, poorly staffed and equipped; the teaching mechanical; and the conditions for the students pitiable. the secondary schools feeding the colleges were even worse; and boys entered the university so ill-prepared that the first two years were spent in what was really school and not college work. the commission advised radical reforms. the universitics should be centralised, unitary, residential, teaching bodies with a government of theirown. tuition of a preparatory and nota university type should be removed to a new grade of inter- mediate colleges, where the curriculum would be of a varied kind and would lead up to appropriate examinations not under uni- versity control though qualifying for entrance to a university, and having an independent value as a certificate of general edu- cation. students would thus enter the universities at a later age and at a stage represented by the old “ intermediate ” examina- tion, thus relieving the universities of a part of their unwieldy host of undergraduates. these recommendations were generally welcomed, and most of the former universities (including the fun- du university at benares, which owed much to the energy of mrs. besant) have been re-constituting themselves accordingly, while new universitics of the teaching and residential type are being built up at dacca, aligarh (moslem), lucknow, rangoon, patna, nagpur and delhi; yet another being under contemplation at agra to relieve the external work at allahabad. the multiply- ing of universities, however, may go too far; there is already some danger of the lowering of standards, in competition for under- graduates; and it is hoped that an inter-university board for all india will be strong enough to maintain standards and insist on modern methods of instruction. the latest returns were materially affected by the boycott of governmental institutions under mr. gandhi’s stimulus; but they showed the number of students at universities and colleges to be in the neighbourhood of 60,000, of whom more than two-thirds were hindus, and not so many as 3° women. secondary education.—the establishment of ‘“‘ intermediate ” institutions advised in the sadler report, and the equally essen- tial improvement of the mass of high schools, have not pro- gressed so rapidly as university reform, mainly owing to the shortage of funds. boards for secondary and intermediate edu- cation, however, have been sect up in several provinces and improvements are being slowly effected. the attendance at sec- ondary schools of a non-technical type in 1922 was 1,240,000, fe- males being in the ratio of rather over 10°94. the “ national ” schools, with their cult of the spinning-wheel, which mr. gandhi startcd at the height of his non-co-operation movement, have 436 now largely disappeared, the best of them having been rescued by applying for official recognition. technical and commercial schools were equally handicapped by narrow means, and the 1922 attendance at them was only some 21,000. primary educatton.—the pace of development here has re- cently been seriously retarded by financial difficulties; in 1909 the number of children at primary schools was 4,420,000; in 1918 it was 6,000,000; by 1922 it had risen only to 6,310,000. and yet it is from them that all true improvement must start, as well as all hope of creating an intelligent electorate. the diffi- culties are many: the traditions which confine education to certain castes, communal troubles, bad communications, the dearth of competent teachers, but above all the poverty of the rural parent, who cannot spare his sons from the ranks of the bread-winners and has no belicf whatever in educating his daugh- ters. to these permanent obstacles must be attributed the fact that, according to the census of 1921, only 122 in every thousand men, and 18 in every thousand women, in the country can read and write. scarcely 3% of the population are enrolled in the primary schools, and the total numbers under instruction of all sorts are 9,300,000 out of the 247,000,000 inhabitants of british india. in face of these figures it is not surprising that the legisla- tures have frequently turned to the remedy of compulsion. acts asserting the compulsion principle have been passed in several provinces, but the translation of principle into practice is still incomplete. meanwhile the decentralisation of primary educa- tion offers a prospect of greater elasticity, especially in adapting the school curriculum to rural needs. iil. defence indian frontiers.—the defence of india is a three-fold prob- lem—the protection of its land frontiers, the maintenance of internal order and the guarding of its seaboard. it is natural to think of the frontier problem mainly in terms of the turbulent northwest border, where the military strength has so long been obliged to concentrate. not only is the attitude of the tribes incalculable, but afghanistan, though the present treaty relations with it are excellent, has too often developed a spirit of unprovoked aggression in the past; and the ancient menace of a russian invasion through afghan territory has, after long abeyance, revived in the new form of bolshevik activity directed against the stability of government generally and british gov- ernment in particular. ‘‘ the road to london,” declared lenin in 1920, ‘‘ is through kabul and india.” but grave though these preoccupations are, other frontiers must not be forgotten. on the northeast, nepal is a state of con- siderable military importance which furnishes, from its gurkha peasantry, some of the best material in the indian army. fortu- nately it has a long tradition of friendship with india and many common interests. behind it however and marching with india on its flanks lies tibet, harmless enough in normal times, but always liable to chinese influence. china herself adjoins burma for over 1,000 m., and occasional lawlessness affords some indication of what might follow the development of an unfriendly spirit at peking or even in the province of yunnan. further south, a fringe of french indo-china and then 600 m. of siam comolete the indian border. nevertheless, the northwest frontier remains at present the focus of interest. its military risks are enhanced by the extraor- dinary physical difficulties of the country, by the almost unpar- alleled fierceness of its climate, by the fact that the sturdy mountaineers are now well-armed, andalso by the oscillation of the british govt. in the past between a policy of standing on an arti- ficial borderline against the pathan tribes and a forward policy of advancing the british sphere of influence, or even of control, towards the frontier of afghanistan proper. the kitchener reorganisation.—it was thus on the defence of the northwest frontier that lord kitchener riveted his attention when, in the course of his long tenure of the post of commander- in-chief, he set himself to the task of reconstituting the army in india. though able men before him had done much to make it an efficient instrument of war, lord kitchener brought to bear india upon the problem new ideas and methods. the organisation of the indian army which he inherited dated from the mutiny. it failed, he considered, to distinguish sufficiently between the re- quirements of internal security and those of offensive warfare. it did not earmark troops for these two distinct purposes and train and equip them accordingly, but left the selection and mobilisation of an active army in the event of war to the last moment. lord kitchener aimed, therefore, at creating out of the forces at his disposal (some 230,000 men in all), a field army capable of being immediately mobilised, of the strength which he considered would be required to defend india against a rus- sian advance through afghanistan, until help could be obtained from england. he proposed to mark off this army from the troops allotted for internal defence, to distribute it conveniently by divisions (each division comprising some 13,500 combatants of all arms), in homogeneous military areas, and to train it in war formations under the generals who would command in the field. iie broke up the four army commands which he found existing, and replaced them by nine divisional commands. in each divisional command he proposed to place a self-contained division of the field army, together with the necessary comple- ment of garrison troops that would be left behind for internal defence in the event of mobilisation. when fully mobilised his field army would comprise some 120,000 combatant troops, or more than half the total strength of the army in india. adequate transport and supplies were to be provided and every arrange- ment made to enable each division of the field army, thoroughly trained and fully equipped, to pass rapidly to a state of war, when required, without confusion and dislocation. it was a large scheme, involving many subsidiary reforms, such as enlarged staffs, extensive re-grouping of troops and build- ing of barracks, better training and equipment, increased pay and allowances for the soldier. it had only been partially put into execution when the war broke out; financial difficulties had intervened, and the fear of russian aggression had been allayed by the anglo-russian agreement of 1907. in the meantime much greater progress had been made in the united kingdom in the organisation, training and equipment of the british army. the expeditionary forces dispatched from india were found in the earlier stages of the war to be inferior in these respects to the british troops. then came the serious complaints of the efliciency of the higher military command in the mesopotamian campaign, leading to the inquiry set up by act of parliament, and the grave indictment of the indian military system as regards both administration and organisation, contained in the report of lord george hamilton’s commission (cmd. 8610 of 1917). the sys- tem was described as cumbrous, slow-moving and over-centralised in the last degree. almost immediately ensued the afghan war of ro19, followed by the waziristan campaign, with renewed complaints against indian army administration. the esher committee report—lit was thus decided to set up a committee, with lord esher as chairman, to inquire into the organisation and administration of the army in india. in the judgment of this committee, which reported in 1920, the existing military system was defective in many respects. their recom- mendations involved considerable modifications of the kitchener scheme. to one of them prompt effect was given; the nine divi- sional commands created by lord kitchener were replaced by smaller territorial units, and these were grouped into four army commands, the commanders of which would take over much of the responsibility which had hitherto been centralised in the commander-in-chief and army headquarters. the more im- portant proposals of the committee regarding the functions of the military forces in india in any scheme of empire defence, the authority to be exercised over them by the british war office, and the position and duties of the commander-in-chief were hotly contested by the indian nationalists, who saw in them a design of subordinating the indian army to the necessi- ties of the empire and of encroaching on the independence of india. indian army—the army in india is composed of british regular troops, which form part of the british army transferred india for a period of service to the indian establishment, and of the indtan army. the latter consists of indian troops raised by the indian govt. and commanded by indian officers holding the viceroy’s commission and by british officers holding the king’s commission. ‘the numerical proportion in which the two component parts of the army should stand to each other was fixed in the first instance in 1858, and further considered in 1893, when the ratio of one british soldier to 2-5 indian soldiers was definitely adopted and has since been adhered to as the permanent basis. the proportion is struck on the regular forces, including the imperial service troops maintained by indian states. no account is taken, on the one hand, of the auxili- ary force, recruited from the european and anglo-incian community, or, on the other hand, of the reserves of the indian army, the indian territorial force, the armed police, or the armies of the indian states. the british troops are necessarily the most costly part of the organisation; both on this account and from a sense of national pride, indian critics of military expenditure constantly press for a reduction in the british element. in the course of a <le- bate in the central assembly in march 1921, the then commander- in-chicf, lord rawlinson, stated the case for not altering the proportion of british to indian soldiers while the existing requirements of internal and external defence remained. other measures of great importance however have been taken to meet the aspirations of indian nationalism for an indian share in the country’s defence. since the war, king’s commissioiis have been made available for indian gentlemen who qualify as cadets at the royal military college, sandhurst, where 10 vacancies are reserved for them annually. in order to secure suitable candidates for sandhurst, a military college has been established at dehra dun, with a six-years’ course of preparatory education. the question of providing a sandhurst training wholly in india was subsequently referred to a special committee, on which two of the nationalist leaders consented to serve. for the effective employment of young indian officers hold- ing the king’s commission, it has been arranged to officer eight units of the indian army entirely by indians, gradually as their rank' and length of service may justify, with the object of thus constituting the nucleus of a national indian army in the future. another momentous step was the enrolment of an indian terri- torial force in ro21. it consists of 20 provincial battalions, about 12,000 strong, liable for general military service; and there are in addition a number of university training corps. alongside of these the old volunteer force continues under another name. it is now the auxiliary force, confined to european british subjects, and hable only for local service in emergencies. in 1914 when the war broke out, the regular forces in india comprised 75,575 british soldiers, including 2,689 commissioned officers; 159,861 indian army troops, including 2,771 brit- ish commissioned officers and 341 british warrant and non- commissioned officers; and 21,069 imperial service troops. the reserves of the indian army numbered 36,000 odd, and the volunteer force consisted of some 38,000 europeans and anglo- indians. during the war the indian army was greatly enlarged, as demands were made upon it by the home government for service abroad. in the last year of the war the govt. of india undertook to raise an additional 500,000 combatant recruits, and no doubt the full number would have been secured had the armistice not intervened. demobilisation began early in 1919, but was interrupted by the afghan war and the subsequent campaign against the tribes in waziristan. on jan. 1 1926 the indian troops serving in the country mustered 154,668 men, or approximately the pre-war strength; the british troops were only 60,359 men, or some 20,000 below pre- war strength. the defence charges in india before the war were about £20,000,000 a year; after all the economies advised by the inchcape committee, they are in the neighbourhood of £37,500,000, which represents an annual charge, for the pro- tection of their country, of 3s. per head of the population of british india. 437 naval defence —the third branch of india’s defence, the pro- tection of her vast seaboard, has hitherto been left to the british navy, with minor assistance from the royal indian marine. without that powerful aid, india’s weakness would be disastrous. “ her sea-borne trade, ” writes professor rushbrook williams, “is rich; the proportion of her wealth collected into centres within practicable distance of her coastline very great. good harbours are few; and from the naval point of view, with cer- tain exceptions, not easily defensible. it seems, therefore, no exaggeration to state that adequate naval protection will in future constitute a postulate of her national existence. should her surrounding seas fall under the dominance of her foes, she can never be secure along the road to prosperity.’ at present india makes an annual payment of {100,000 towards the navy, and maintains the royal indian marine. nationalist sentiment has combined with a recognition of india’s helpless- ness at sea to claim the institution of an indian navy and the creation of a class of indian naval officers; there is also a demand for an indian mercantile marine assisted by the state. in the spring of 1926 the government announced its intention of setting up a royal indian navy, at a cost of 63 lakhs (£420,000) a year. with its headquarters at bombay, it will be composed at first of 4 sloops, 2 patrol craft vessels, 4 trawlers, 2 service ships and 1 depot ship. it is to be a sea-going force, whose function in peace time will be the training of personnel for war service in the indian ocean and persian gulf, port defence, survey work and marine transport. (mer.) lv... phe indian sextles the relations now subsisting between the indian states and the british govt. are the outcome of an evolutionary process which still continues (see 14.407 seg.). the mutiny, the passing of the east india co. and the grant. of sumads of adoption to the rulers in 1862 obliterated the peril of annexation, breached the barriers of isolation and inaugurated for the states a new era of union under the crown. queen victoria’s proclamation of 1858 announced to the ‘ native princes of india” that all treaties and engagements made with them would be scrupulously ob- served and that their rights, dignity and honour would be respected. the british govt., while emerging as paramount power, thus guaranteed to the ruling princes and chiefs the measure of sovercignty which they severally possess in their internal affairs. as regards the nature and extent of this sover- cignty, the following extract from a minute by sir henry maine may be quoted: “* there may be found in india every shade and varicty of sovereignty, but there is only one independent sovereign, the british government. . . . the mode or degree in which sovereignty is distributed between the british govt. and any native state is always a question of fact which has to be separately decided in each case, and to which no general rules apply.” two important principles have, however, been laid down by statute, namely, first, that the indian states “ have no connections, engagements or communications with foreign powers,” and second, that the british govt. has the right to protect and govern subjects of the states when resident or found abroad. for international purposes, therefore, state territory is in the same position as british territory, and state subjects as british subjects. status of the princes——the assumption of the govt. by the crown in 1858 called the princes to greater responsibilities as well as to higher honours. lord curzon speaking at gwalior in 1899 claimed the rulers of the states as his colleagues and partners in the administration of the country. their new pre- rogatives involved obligations not envisaged when the treaties were framed, but proceeding naturally from the solidarity of the states with british india. many forces were at work tending to draw the relationships between the princes and the crown into conformity with a single type, and also to increase the govt. of india’s interest in the administration of the states. the result was over-rigidity of treatment and the formulation of rules which seemed to the princes to transcend the provisions of treaties. lord minto, perceiving an atmosphere of discon- 438 tent, took the occasion to make a declaration of policy, during a visit to the maharaja of udaipur in nov. 1909. he interpreted the proclamations of queen victoria and king edward as inculcating a more sympathetic, and therefore a more elastic policy, and he laid stress on the fact that the foundation stone of the whole system must be the recognition of -identity of interests between the imperial govt. and durbars and the minimum of interference with the latter in their own afiairs. lord minto had already taken the princes into his confidence by consulting them officially on the question of the growth of sedi- tion in india. his declaration and the spirit in which it was acted upon gave great satisfaction to the ruling princes. lord hardinge, pursuing the same policy, in 1913 and 1914 invited some of the princes to meet him in conference at delhi to discuss a scheme for founding a central college at delhi at which students from the various chiefs’ colleges might complete their education and take a degree. h.h. the maharaja of bikaner delivered a notable speech at the 1914 gathering when, speaking on behalf of his brother princes, he said:— we trust, and we are confident that your excellency will before long convene similar meetings to deal with other subjects in which we and the states represented are no less closely concerned than this one of the college, and on which our deliberations will not only be of the greatest advantage to ourselves, our states and our people, but also, we hope, of some value to the imperial government. lord hardinge in 1914 created a new post of political secre- tary to the govt. of india, in order that closer attention might be devoted to relations with the states. the past fifteen years had proved an era of striking progress and development, and the rulers themselves, encouraged to play more important parts in the drama of indian affairs, were becoming daily more ad- vanced in their own administration, so that new methods of political treatment were required. in aug. r914, on the outbreak of the war, the princes vied with each other in the offer of loyal service. in a telegram which stirred england the viceroy reported that the rulers of the states in india, numbering nearly 700, had with one accord rallied to the defence of the empire and offered their personal services and the resources of their states., from among the many princes who had volunteered for active service lord hardinge selected seven rulers, including the veteran sir pertab singh (regent of jodhpur), who would not be denied his right to serve the king emperor in spite of his 70 years. his nephew, the maharaja, who was but 16 years old, went with him. con- tingents of all arms were accepted from 12 states, besides a camel corps from bikaner. a hospital ship was given by various states at the instance of the maharaja of gwalior, and as the war progressed there were many fresh evidences of the spirit of loyalty animating the princes and their peoples. the support afforded by the durbars in the matter of raising recruits was of particular value. minorities and successions—in 1916 lord chelmsford, in spite of war preoccupations, decided to invite the princes to another conference. in his opening speech he laid stress on the magnificent assistance rendered by the states. the most im- portant of the subjects discussed at the conference related to the form of administration to be adopted in a state during a minority. in tg909 lord minto had become aware that several of the rulers felt strongly that they had a right to be made acquainted with the considerations which guided government in minority administrations. ile therefore ascertained the opinion of the leading durbars, and prepared a statement of the general policy of government in the matter. in 1915 attention was again drawn to the matter in consequence of representations made by certain of the rulers that in some cases in the past the rights and privileges of states guaranteed by treaty or otherwise had been unwittingly infringed during the minority period by the exercise of the prerogative of the paramount power. lord hardinge thereupon convened a committee consisting of three rulers of states and three political officers to consider the question. their recommendations were fully debated in the conference of 1916, with the result that a resolution was india published in aug. 1917 laying down the principles for the con- duct of minority administrations. in it the govt. of india asserted their rele as trustees and custodians of the rights, interests and traditions of a state during a minority, but admitted that the special conditions of each state required special treatment, and promised to attach due weight to requests by individual ruling princes or chiefs regarding any principles which they might wish to be adopted in the case of their own states or families, while reserving to themselves freedom of action in dealing with such requests. seventeen general prin- ciples were laid down for observance during minority adminis- trations. the resolution was received with much satisfaction by the princes, and the general opinion was that the pronounce- ment of government was an event hardly second in constitu- tional importance to the sanuds of adoption granted by lord © canning. the next conference, held in 1917, saw the decision of another very important question, viz.: the form of recognition by gov- crnment of successions in the states. lord chelmsford an- nounced that in the case of the succession of a direct natural heir recognition on the part of a paramount power was purely formal, and that the obligation on the part of the new ruler to obtain it in no way impaired his inherent right to succeed. he also an- nounced the relaxation of the requirement that rulers of states before paying visits to places in british india should obtain the previous concurrence of the local government concerned. the requirement had proved irksome in practice, and under the new arrangement the obligation was limited merely to visits to hill stations and other places where special local conditions might render concurrence of the local authorities necessary. the chamber of princes.—his highness the maharaja of bikaner, who earlier in the year had been one of the indian representatives at the imperial conference and a member of the imperial war cabinet, took the lcad in this conference. in his final address to the viceroy he expressed the hope of the princes that before the british govt. came to any decision on the sub- ject of political reforms to be introduced in british india the ruling princes would also be consulted. he stated:— we feel that we too must kecp a definite goal in front of us, and whilst it is essential that our rights and privileges and our position as allies and friends guaranteed to us by solemn treatics and engage- ments with the british govt. remain unaltered, our states cannot afford to lag behind in the general advance which india's associa- tion with great britain alone has rendered possible. it is for these reasons that we are now all the more anxious to see the early estab- lishment of a constitutional chamber which may safeguard the interests and rights of ourselves and of our states. lord chelmsford replied that any scheme which they might put forward would receive most careful and sympathetic con- sideration from the govt. of india. a draft scheme was accord- ingly prepared by a committee, and was discussed informally by the viceroy and certain of the princes in the presence of mr. montagu in feb. 1918 during his visit to india. in dec. 1919 the king issued a royal proclamation signifying his assent to the establishment of a chamber of princes, which was even- tually inaugurated by the duke of connaught in feb. 1921. from the proclamation then read, we quote the following :— in my former proclamation i repeated the assurance, given on many occasions by my royal predecessors and myself, of my deter- mination ever to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignitics of the princes of india. the princes may rest assured that this pledge remains inviolate and inviolable. i now authorise my viceroy to publish the terms of the constitution of the new chamber. my viceroy will take its counsel frecly in matters relating to the territorics of the indian states generally, and in matters that affect those territories jointly with british india, or with the rest of my ¥mpire. [t will have no concern with the internal affairs of individ- ual states or their rulers or with the relations of individual states to my government, while the existing rights of the states and their freedom of action will be in no way prejudiced or impaired. his royal ilighness also conveyed to the princes a special message of thanks from his majesty in public acknowledgment of their splendid record of achievement during the war. he alluded to the fact that i{.h. of bikaner had taken part in the peace conference and had signed the treaty of versailles, while india h.h. the maharaja of nawanagar had attended the league of nations assembly at geneva. h.h. the maharaja of bikaner was appointed to be the first chancellor of the chamber (naren- dra mandal), and was re-elected to the office each year until 1926 when he was succeeded by h.h. the maharaja of patiala. with the growth of new conditions and the unification of india under the british power, a body of usage affecting the treaty position of the states had insensibly come into being, and the durbars were therefore anxious that for the future they might have a voice in the formulation of political practice. a committee of princes, known first as the codification com- mittee and afterwards constituted as the standing committee of the chamber, accordingly met at regular intervals and achieved useful work with the advice and assistance of officers from the secretariat and administrative departments of the govt. of india in revising the summaries of political practice under various heads such as mining concessions, railways, tele- graphs and telephones, mints and currency, opium, extradi- tion, etc. the results were reported at successive meetings of the chamber of princes. the salute states in the punjab province were taken into direct relations with the government of india m nov. 1921, through the appointment of an agent to the governor-general. a similar arrangement was made in 1923 for the five states in the madras presidency, and in 1924 for the bombay states of kathiawar, together with cutch and palanpur. a new first- class political appointment was created for the last-mentioned group, and the bombay political dept. was amalgamated with that of the govt. of india. in rozr the gwalior state was separated from the central india agency and was brought into direct contact with the central government through a single intermediary officer, while in rajputana the states of bikaner, sirohi and jhalawar were at different times placed in direct relations with the agent to the governor-general instead of through a subordinate political agent. at the meeting of the chamber in the autumn of 1921, lord reading announced that for the future, except at installations and investitures, where local custom would continue to be followed, the king had been pleased to dispense with the presentation of nazars at ceremonial visits or receptions, either to himself or to the members of his family or to any of his officers to whom it had hitherto been customary to present them. in 1918 and rg2t the king conferred many honours and distinctions upon ruling princes and chiefs and others in recognition of the services rendered by the indian states during the war. the style of “ his exalted highness ’’ was conferred upon the nizam of hyderabad, and the title of “ faithful ally of the british govt.’’ was formally confirmed to him. the prince of wales, during his indian tour, in the winter of 1921-2, visited many of the states and was received with loyal enthusiasm and splendid hospitality. at the imperial conferences of 1921 and 1923 respectively t.h. the maharao of cutch and the maharaja of alwar were included among the representatives of india, and at the meetings of the league of nations from ro2r onwards t.h. the maharao of cutch, the maharaja of navanagar (twice), the maharaja of bikaner and the maharaja of patiala. soon after the war, certain problems in connection with the organisation, training and maintenance of the imperial service troops were taken up by the govt. of india in consultation with the ruling princes and chiefs concerned. his highness the maharaja of alwar, after pointing out that the greater states had, during the war, not only placed their units of imperial service troops at the disposal of government but had depleted their man power to keep these units up to full strength, advocated a complete policy of trust in the states and asked that the policy might be applied in such a manner as to eliminate all distinctions between imperial service units and the local forces or armed police of the states. after prolonged consideration, a compre- hensive scheme was prepared for the reorganisation of the state forces, embracing not only the first line troops but also the irregular troops and the state police. the armament and equip- ment of the first line troops was to be improved, the irregular 439 troops were to be armed and organised-in such a way as to transform them into an efficient reserve, while the police were to be given suitable weapons to enable them to cope with dacoits. more than thirty states joined in the scheme. to facilitate the training of military officers, certain vacancies at the prince of wales’ military school at dehra diin were offered to boys nominated from indian states. in view of the contemplated repeal of the press laws of british india, a resolution passed in the chamber of princes in 1921 asking that some special means of protection might be given to the indian states in place of the relevant provisions of the press act. lord reading’s govt. considered that they were obliged in honour to agree to such protection, but the legislative assembly vigorously opposed a bill which was brought 1n under the title of indian states (protection against disaffection) bill. it became necessary for the governor-general to exercise the extraordinary powers allotted to him by the govt. of india act, and to certify that the bill was essential for the interests of british india. the bill was passed by the council of state and eventually became law. in 1908 the govt. of india recommended to the secretary of state that the necessary legislation should be undertaken in order to enable subjects of indian states, while retaining their primary allegiance to their states of origin, to become eligible for certain services in india, admission to which was under the existing law confined to british subjects. the required provi- sion was eventually made in section 96a of the govt. of india act. a new indian state-—before lord minto left india, he announced at benares that the govt. of india, with the sanction of the secretary of state, had decided to grant to the maharaja of benares and his successors a permanent status amongst the rulers of india, by constituting part of the family domains as a state. this remarkable step, which involved the transfer of some 300,000 persons from british to indian rule, was taken in view of the unique position of the benares house, representa- tives of which had played important parts in relation, first to the court of delhi, and afterwards to the british government. the change was effected by means of an instrument of transfer, the provisions of which ensured to the residents of the territories the rights and privileges which they had enjoyed under the british administration. in rgr1g9, in view of the success of the measure, the town of ramnagar, adjacent to benares city, was also handed over to the maharaja for use as his capital. in 1913 the instrument of transfer in virtue of which the province of mysore had been transferred in 1881 to the present ruling family of the mysore state was superseded by a treaty, the wording being altered in certain respects to meet the wishes of the present ruler. the change was announced during lord hardinge’s visit to the state in the same year. . constitutional development—while the paramount power has parted with none of its prerogatives, the evolutionary process has gradually led to a certain breaking down of the isolation of the states among themselves, the strengthening of their position and the advancement of the dignity of the princes. they not only gained, in the chamber, means for expression of their col- lective needs and opportunity for influencing the development of political doctrine, but they were admitted, as joint representa- tives of india, to the innermost councils of the empire through the appointment of a member of their order to successive imperial conferences and meetings of the league of nations. thus the integral connection of the states with the british empire has been further emphasised, and the possibility that constitutional changes in british india may react on the states has been more effectively recognised. in a few advanced states, legislative bodies have been constituted analogous to those in british india, mysore being a prominent example, while in others the rulers have devised means for the people to voice their grievances and aspirations more easily through consultative councils. the movement is unhurried, as the trme and manner of change, if change there is to be, rests with each individual ruler. but it cannot be denied that the processes at work in british 440 india must impair the vitality of the conservative traditions which have their stronghold in the states, and for this reason, the princes must be keenly interested in the development of constitutional reforms beyond their borders. while it is an accepted axiom that the independence of the states in matters of internal administration carries with it the counter- obligation of non-interference in british indian domestic affairs, any fundamental change in the system of government in british india may be claimed to fall within the category of matters of imperial or common concern, in regard to which the princes may reasonably expect to be heard. (r. hp.) v. economic history general survey.—the economic history of india during the seventeen years 1909-25 falls naturally into three chronological divisions: pre-war, war and post-war. the first period was one of rapid progress. after the famine year of 1908 the monsoons were satisfactory, and the harvests good. the general conditions of world trade favoured indian commerce and indian prosperity. exchange was steady, budgets showed surpluses. as a debtor country india profited by the general rise of prices, needing to export smaller quantities of goods to meet interest charges. as also the prices of food- stufis and raw materials were rising faster than those of manu- factured goods, the exchange of indian exports for imports was carried on with greater profit to india. in these five years the money values of indian sea-borne trade increased by 40%; the gross earnings of the railways and of the post office by one-third. characteristically, the increased purchasing power was used to absorb gold and silver to the amount of £127,000,000. but also some notable new industrial enterprises were launched, and a stronger spirit of enterprise was displayed both in commerce and industry. the outbreak of the world war produced a temporary panic, quickly allayed. the interruption of foreign trade threw india largely upon her own resources. efforts were made for the pro- duction of manufactured articles, particularly war requisites, not previously attempted, and various industries which work up native raw materials for the home market expanded consider- ably. a strong stimulus was given to the old demand that the state should take a leading part in the development of indian resources, both by means of a protective tariff, and by helping private enterprise in the raising of capital, by research and by developments of the educational system; and a great change took place in the attitude of the government to these questions. the transition from the war period to international peace was marked by the “ famine ” of 1918, followed by another monsoon failure in 1920; by the visitation of influenza, which in 1918 and 1919 probably killed not fewer than 10,000,000 people, by much political agitation and the recasting of the constitution. a post-war boom of trade in r919 and 1920 was followed by a severe slump in 1921 and 1922; exchange tluctuated violently, the sterling value of the rupee first rising to a record height, and then falling in 4 most embarrassing manner. five years in succession showed budget deficits, amounting in the total to over 100 crores.. but in 1922 a steady recovery began, well maintained till the end of 1925. the monsoons, during the five years 1921 to 1925, were on the whole good, and, given good monsoons, indian commerce is solidly based on an imperative world need for indian staple products. there was a “‘ return to normalcy, ” but not-to the pre-war normal. the war cataclysm has left among its permanent effects important economic and political changes including a reversal of fiscal policy from free trade to protection. agriculture and irrigation since the census of 1921 showed that 70% of the total popula- tion of the dominion-were supported by agriculture and pastoral industry, not indian agriculture only, but all indian economic prosperity is necessarily a gamble in rain. during the period under review only two serious monsoon failures occurred, those 1 lakh = 100,000 rupees; crore = 10,000,000 rupees. india of 1918 and 1920. that of 1918 was one of the worst on record; over all india the estimated out-turn both of rice and of wheat was in 1918-9 25% below the previous quinquennial average. this was much worse than in the great famine of 1899, but there was no corresponding distress; the maximum numbers on relief never went beyond 600,000, as compared with 5,000,000. this was partly because the harvest of 1917 had been a record one, so that the famine year was helped by an unusually large carry- over; but it also indicated that government efforts to promote agricultural prosperity had achieved a large measure of success. the great shortage in the total amount of grain available in the country necessitated exceptional measures, in addition to the well-tried methods of dealing with unemployment and desti- tution. export of grain was prohibited; the surplus of burma was secured by india, and 200,000 tons of wheat were imported from australia. the failure of the later rains in 1920 produced famine conditions in certain districts in the early part of 1921, and the number on relief went up to 400,000; and it was not till after the country had recovered from that shortage that export of grain could again be freely permitted. at the biennial meeting in pusa, in dec. 1919, of the board of agriculture, a conference of imperial and provincial departments of agriculture, the problem of famine policy was once more re-examined in the light of the experience of 1918; and a new programme was drawn up of measures calculated to minimise the loss of grain, fodder and cattle during years of deficient rainfall; including plans for improving the storage of grain, the growing of better fodder crops, evolution of improved varieties of drought-resisting cereals and emergency means of irrigation. special attention was given to the great loss of cattle, though this had been mitigated in the bombay deccan, one of the worst areas, by the success of the bombay agrt- cultural department in turning prickly pear into valuable fodder by burning off the prickles in the flame of the blacksmith’s forge. meanwhile among the intelligentsia of the towns there arose a foolish and short-sighted demand for the prohibition of export of foodstuffs even in normal years, a demand which, if successful, would multiply and intensify famines by removing the commercial incentive to agriculturists to produce a surplus. the departments of agriculture had been reorganised early in the twentieth century, and, with still very inadequate per- sonnel and funds, they have achieved important results in a great variety of directions. one important branch of their work consists of the introduction of improved varieties of plants. this involves, firstly, research in order to obtain from abroad, or evolve locally, the variety which will prove its superiority under indian conditions; secondly, growing the improved variety in sufficient quantities to furnish the ryots with seed; thirdly, con- vincing ryots by means of demonstration farms, and otherwise, of the advantage offered; and, fourthly, in many cases, watching over the subsequent fate of the new variety to prevent it from being swamped by inter-mixture with others. the area sown in 1923-4 with improved varieties popularised in this way ex- ceeded 5,000,000 ac., including over 2,000,000 ac. under wheat and rice, and even more under cotton. the work on wheat accomplished by the imperial research institute at pusa is famous; very valuable work has also been done on sugar at coimbatore. the work of provincial departments is too varied to be even summarised here; as examples, taking one province (madras) only as representative, mention may be made of the agricultural college at coimbatore; the introduction and pop- ularisation of cambodia cotton, which gives upwards of 200 lb. of superior lint per acre, as compared with the ordinary indian crop of 80 lb. of short staple cotton; the vigorous propaganda of single paddy transplantation and the growing of green manure, which has been of immense value to rice cultivators; the selling on a large scale at cost price of fish manure; the fight against insect pests of cotton and other crops by the madras pest act; and its system of popular education in agricultural science by means of simply expressed tracts in the vernaculars. a forward step was taken along the lines of linking together the efforts of all the agricultural departments by the establish- india ment in 1920 of the indian cotton committee, which is financed by a small cess on each bale of cotton produced. this has been followed by measures for the control of cotton gins and the transport of cotton in order to prevent adulteration of superior growths, and the inter-mixture of seeds of improved with unimproved varieties. it is perhaps significant that there is now more indian cotton to be found on the liverpool market than before the war, and the difference in the price it realises as compared with american has almost disappeared. the total crop of indian cotton has now reached 6,000,000 bales of 400 lb. each, as compared with a pre-war quinquennial average of 4,000,000 bales. <a great deal of the extra cotton grown goes to the japanese and chinese mills. it is intended to apply the same principles of inter-provincial co-operation to the still more difficult problem of cattle improvement. the tamil proverb, “the calf of the good cow dies,” gives a scarcely exaggerated idea of indian backwardness in the science of cattle-breeding. an extension of the irrigated area is the most effective of all measures of famine prevention. the area annually irrigated by government works has now reached some 28,000,000 ac., which is not much less than the total cultivated area of great britain. the area irrigated by wells and other privately owned sources is about 21,000,000 acres. the two greatest irrigation schemes the world has ever known are being carried out in the indus basin, the sutlej valley scheme and the lloyd (sukkur) barrage. the way for the former was prepared by the triple canal proj- ect, sanctioned in r905 and completed in 1917. the surplus waters of the jhelum are held up by a head weir, and carried southwards by a canal to the chenab, part being used to water a large area between these rivers, but most being poured into the chenab above the intake of the old chenab canal. the demand on chenab water being thus reduced, some 20 m. higher up a new head weir on that river has been constructed, which waters a great area between the chenab and ravi, and, crossing the ravi river, passes on to water the northwestern half of the lower bari doab, which is land lying between the ravi and sut- lej. altogether over 1,700,000 ac. are annually irrigated by the canals; and the execution of the project makes it possible to utilise the sutlej river, not only to complete the irrigation of the bari doab, but also to irrigate a great area on the southeastern side of the sutlej. by the sutlej valley scheme four head weirs are being con- structed on that river, three above and four below its junction with the chenab; 2,075,000 ac. will receive a perennial supply of water; 3,033,000 ac. a controlled supply from the beginning of april to the middle of october. the new canals will super- sede a number of “ inundation canals,” which give a somewhat uncertain supply from may to sept.; and also will bring into cultivation 3,750,000 ac. of desert waste. an interesting feature of the work is that mechanical excavators are being used because of shortage of labour. at sukkur, where the combined five rivers of the punjab enter scinde through a narrow gorge, the lloyd barrage is being built, 4,725 ft. long between the faces of the regulators on either side, which will control the flow of water into seven great canals. when fully developed the area annually irrigated will approach 6,000,000 ac., considerably more than the whole cultivated area of egypt. as a necessary corollary the port of karachi, of which the trade has already nearly quintupled since 1897, will be further developed by harbour works at a cost of £2,000,000. nowhere in india outside the indus basin is there scope for works of equal magnitude, but a great scheme is being carried out for the irrigation of oudh, by canal fed from the sarda river. this project has been under contemplation for 50 years, but has been in abeyance because of the opposition of the oudh land- owners (taluqdars). they have now altered their views as a result of the experience of 1918, and the increasing cost, due to rising wages, of well irrigation. the area to be irrigated is estimated at 1,700,000 acres. in madras even older schemes first planned by sir a. t. cotton, the great pioneer of scientific canal irrigation in india, have been revived, for great storage reservoirs in the cauvery, bhavani, tangabhadra and kistna 441 rivers; and the cauvery scheme has been sanctioned. all over india smaller works are being planned, debated and put into execution. (see irrigation.) co-operation.—the policy of active encouragement of rural credit banks on the raiffeisen plan, as the most effective means of remedying the chronic indebtedness of cultivators and im- proving the business side of agriculture, was adopted, after long discussion, by the act of 1904. registrars of co-operative societies were appointed for the different provinces, to draft model rules, register, inspect and audit the accounts of co- operative banks, and also to carry on propaganda and education in co-operative principles. in 1912 an amending act was passed, as the result of eight years’ experience; and also to extend the official encouragement to co-operation in other fields. the number of registered societies increased from 5,432 in 1911 to 61,106 in 1924; the membership from 308,000 to 2,314,000; the capital employed from rs. 227 lakhs to rs. 4,053 lakhs! (about £30,000,000). the great majority of the societies are village banks; but there are 522 ‘‘ central banks ”’ situated in towns, which gather in deposits, supply funds to the rural banks in their neighbourhood, and act as links between them. there are also ‘ apex ” banks, for the provinces of madras, bombay, bengal, bihar and orissa, burma, the central provinces, assam and mysore. encouraging progress is being made by societies for purchase and sale; sales to members aggregating rs. 113 lakhs in 1924 and purchases from members rs. g3 lakhs. there were 442 cattle insurance societies, with 6,693 members, asmali but very hopeful beginning; and there is a promising move- ment in urban areas to use the principle of co-operation in house building and milk supply. manufacturing industries on the basis of the number of people who are employed hand-loom weaving is still by far the greatest of indian non- agricultural industries. the census of 1921 found very nearly 2,000,000 hand-looms at work, and the actual number was probably considerably greater. the indian industrial com- mission (1916-8) discovered that the consumption of mill-spun yarn by hand-loom weavers increased by about 30% in the two decades before the war, which would more than compensate for the diminution in the output of hand-spun yarn. ‘the war itself helped the weaver, indian mills not being able to make up adequately the deficiency of imported cloth; so also did the very high prices of mill-woven cloth after the armistice. but from 1922 onwards weavers’ difficulties have greatly increased. the development of mill manufacture in china has deprived the japanese mills of part of their chinese market, and caused them to make greater efforts to dispose of their output in india. in the fierce and very equal competition which so ensues between indian and japanese mills, it 1s the hand-loom weavers who suffer most. in some districts after a struggle to live on less than subsistence earnings, they have been compelled to abandon their hereditary calling; in others, where the level of skill and enterprise 1s higher, they have given up cotton weaving for silk, or textures with gold or silver thread interwoven, which are called in india “‘ lace work. ”? the industry as a whole shows a surprising degree of vitality, fly-shuttles, which increase a weav- er’s output from 20 to 100%, have been adopted widely, and so also have simple machines for winding and warping, owned and used co-operatively. out of some 1,400,000 workers in factories of all sorts, about one-quarter are employed in cotton-mills, and some 80,000 in cotton gins and presses. this industry has had very consider- able vicissitudes, but taking bad years with good, it has been prosperous and progressive. the total indian consumption of mill-woven cloth is much the same now as in the years imme- diately preceding the war, in spite of the very great increase of price. but whereas before the war indian mills supplied just under 30% of this production, their share has risen (1924-5) to 52%; while the share of the united kingdom has fallen from 68-5% to 42-5, japan now getting 4% of the market. on the 1 lakh = 100,000 rupees; crore = 10,000,000 rupees. 442 other hand indian mills have lost in china their chief foreign market. the supremacy of bengal in jute is more firmly estab- lished than ever; nearly two-thirds of the jute grown is con- sumed by the bengal mills, as compared with less than half before the war; so that bengal now produces about twice as great a bulk of jute manufactured goods, mainly in the form of gunny bags, hessian cloth and cordage, as all the rest of the world. such industries as leather tanning, paper manufacture, brewing, woollen manufacture, which are of considerable though minor importance, were greatly stimulated by war conditions, and maintain part of the advance so won. the two most notable new enterprises launched in the five years immediately preceding the outbreak of war were projects of the jate mr. j. n. tata, which were brought to fruition by his sons and their partners after his death in 1904. the tata iron and steel company was successfully launched in 1907 with indian capital; it began operations in 1908 and produced iron first in 1911. when the world war broke out it was in a position to be of great service both in mesopotamia and in other war theatres; and, since the military requirements were for steel, the com- pany converted into steel as much as possible of the iron it produced, though the sale of iron in the open market would have been much more profitable. dividends of 20% on the ordinary and 290% on the deferred shares were paid in 1917 and 1918; again in 1920 and 1921 ordinary shareholders got 16% and deferred shareholders 200°; but since 1922 no dividends have been paid except preference shares; and the heavy fall in the price of steel caused by intense international competition com- pelled the company to seek governmental aid. various other attempts have been made in india to produce steel on modern lines; and in the boom period after the armistice a number of schemes for exploiting the extraordinarily rich and abundant ore deposits of orissa for this purpose were floated; the chief result of which was to increase the potential output of the bengal iron company. the tata iron and steel company is the only one actually producing steel. equally notable was the tata project of utilising the heavy rainfall on the western ghats to supply bombay with electric power. in order that power should be available throughout the year it was necessary to create great storage reservoirs on the deccan tableland. the first completed was at lonavla, whence there is a fall of 1,725 ft. to the power-house at khopoli. the works were formally opened on feb. 81915. the andhra valley project with its artificial lake further to the north, was initiated in 1916 and completed in 1922, and supplies 100,000 horse- power. it is being followed by the nila-mula scheme to the south of lonavla, expected to supply 150,000 h.p., and pre- liminary work is being done’on the koyna valley project, still further to the south, to yield 350,000 horsepower. the original purpose of these schemes was to make the bombay mills inde- pendent of coal; but as the amount of power available has in- creased, it is becoming possible also to revolutionise the methods of transit and consequently the conditions of housing of bombay. by the electrification of the railways in the immediate neigh- bourhood of bombay it is hoped that third-class fares may be reduced to a rate of 11 m. for one anna (approximately one penny). this will make effective the work of the bombay improvement trust, which is charged with the duty of reclaim- ing the islands to the north of bombay and converting them into residential and industrial areas, thus making it possible for the most prosperous, but also the most terribly congested, city in india to expand to healthy dimensions. the close of the world war was marked by a great outburst of speculation. the aggregate authorised capital of new joint stock companies floated in the year 1919-20 alone was rs. 281 crores, whereas the paid-up capital of all registered companies in existence in 1914 was only 75 crores. subsequent liquidations were heavy. the most important of the new projects which failed to realise expectations was the tata industrial bank, the shares of which were being bought eagerly in the early part of 1920 at a high premium. its object was to finance new industries on much the same lines as those followed by the “ d banks” india in germany; but after a short run it was amalgamated with the bombay central bank, which does ordinary banking business, the capital being considerably written down. banking.—on the other hand an important step towards the organisation of a more complete and effective banking system for india was taken in 1920 by the amalgamation of the presi- dency banks of bengal, bombay and madras into the imperial bank of india. the imperial bank was authorised to establish a branch in london, which had not been allowed the presidency banks, and its london branch takes over from the bank of england the business which the latter had previously done for the govt. of india. the imperial bank has also been re- quired to open too new local branches to supplement the 70 branches of its three constituents. a great deal more remains to be done to knit together the various sorts of banks operating in india into a sound and efficient system. there was a heavy mor- tality among indian joint stock banks in 1913-7. the causes of this weakness still in large measure remain, and it must be regarded as a factor retarding the progress of india towards a complete financial autonomy. the government and industry since 1910 there has been a change of policy in relation to in- dustry. in that year the principle of /aissez-faire was asserted by lord morley’s despatch refusing assent to the plans of the madras govt. for the encouragement of new industries, and incidentally sentencing the madras department of industries to temporary impotence. this department had been built up step by step since dec. 1897 by the initiative and under the con- trol of sir (then mr.) alfred chatterton. at a total net cost of £33,000 a prosperous manufacture of aluminium hollow-ware had been established, the use of oil engines for pumping water for irrigation popularised, well-boring carried on extensively, the use of the fly-shuttle, automatic dobbies and subsidiary machines introduced among hand-loom weavers, and other important work accomplished. a similar policy had been initiated in the united provinces by sir john hewett; and there also it was dropped in consequence of lord morley’s adverse judgment in the case of madras. the outbreak of war brought a change in the attitude of the india office, and in may 1916 the indian industrial commission was appointed to report on possible means of direct governmental encouragement of industry not incompatible with the existing fiscal system. its positive recom- mendations were numerous and varied. departments of in- dustry were in consequence re-created in madras and the united provinces, established also in the other provinces, and, under the reformed constitution, put in the charge of indian ministers. tari fs. —the reservation excluding the existing fiscal system from review was only temporary. the reform of the consti- tution was speedily followed by the appointment in oct. 1921 of the indian fiscal commission, which reported in favour of “rapid industrialisation by means of discriminating protec- tion.” in accordance with that recommendation an indian tariff board was appointed in july 1923, to report on the indus- tries referred to it which had applied for protection. the first and most important of these was steel, and the tariff board recommended that bounties should be paid on the production of heavy steel rails and fish plates on a descending scale begin- ning at rs. 32 per ton, and that specific duties roughly equivalent to 30% ad valorem (e.g., rs. 40 per ton on steel rods) should be levied on other forms of british or other imported steel. this assistance not being sufficient to enable the tata iron and steel company to manufacture steel at a profit, an additional bounty of rs. 20 per ton on 70% of the monthly ingot production was voted for the period from oct. 1 1924 to sept. 30 1925; and it was subsequently decided that this bounty should be continued at the diminished rate of rs. 12 per ton'till march 31 1927. in 1925 also an old controversy was concluded by the resolve of the government to abolish the excise duty of 35 % ad valorem on cotton cloth woven in indian mills. hence the daty of 11% on imported cloth becomes undisguisedly protective. india labour organisations.—the post-war period has seen a re- markable increase of class consciousness among indian urban workers. trade unionism on british lines made its first appear- ance during the war in madras, the pioneer society, the madras labour union, being a fairly solid organisation of the cotton- mill operatives, which quickly found imitators among the alu- minium workers, the employees of the oil companies and others. the great rise of prices and the industrial boom of 191g furnished the most favourable possible conditions for a rapid advance of trade unionism; increased wages were necessary, employers were most anxious to avoid stoppages, but they were not in all cases ready to grant increases in proportion to the rise of prices except under pressure, for fear the rise in price might be only temporary. | bombay was the chief storm centre. the cotton operatives in particular showed unsuspected staying power, and not only se- cured advances during the boom which meant an increase in real as well as nominal wages, but also, in 1925, won a more re- markable victory in resisting successfully a reduction of wages during the slump. indian trade unions are still largely dependent on the help of outsiders as organisers, and the success of particu- lar unions mainly depends on the single-mindedness with which these voluntary associates work for the material benefit of the members. there can be little doubt that in the future trade unionism will prove a permanent and growing element in indian industrial hfe. labour legislation —india was represented at the interna- tional labour conference at washington, which was followed by an ‘ all india industrial welfare congress ” held in bom- bay in april 1922. important labour legislation was enacted in the same year. the factories act of 1922, which came into force on july 1, raised the age of admission for children from 9 to 12, for full time work from 14 to 15, prohibited night work for wom- en, and enacted for all workers a maximum day’s work of 11 hours and a maximum week of 60 hours. the mines act forbade the employment of children and young persons below ground, while still permitting that of women, and limited the week’s work to 60 hours above ground and 54 hours below. the work- men’s compensation act of the same year was a very carefully drafted measure providing, on conditions designed to minimise litigation, for compensation for death or accident for 3,000,000 in- dustrial workers. the contention that long hours of labour are more tolerable and justifiable under indian than under european conditions springs from interested motives, and is not based upon actual fact. railways.—in 1907 the route mileage of indian railways open to traffic reached 30,000 m., of which over 15,000 m. was standard (5’6”) gauge, and most of the remainder metre gauge. on march 31 1925 the mileage was 38,269 m., of which 18,781 m. were standard gauge. at that date 1,200 m. were under construction and 1,084 m. in addition had been sanctioned. a great deal of unfavourable criti- cism has been levelled against the railway policy—or, rather, policies —of the indian govt., with special justification on the counts of lack of enterprise, vacillation and undue complexity. but the broad fact remains that nearly 40,000 m. have been constructed with a capital liability of £500,000,000, which convey passengers at an average rate very little over one farthing (3°74 pics) per mile, and goods at an average rate of one half-penny (6 pies) per ton per mile, moreover, they make profits which are sufficient to meet all in- terest charges and also to make substantial contributions to the revenue of the country. important changes are now taking place in railway administration. the relations between the railway department and the general ad- ministration are being altered to give the railways more financial responsibility and independence; on the termination of the leases of the east indian railway and the great indian peninsula railway (e. i. r. and g. i. p.), together comprising nearly 5,000 m., the working of these two lines was taken over by the state; and the system of departmental management is being superseded by divi- sional organisation, which was tried successfully first on the great indian peninsula railway. foreign trade.—in the years immediately preceding the war indian foreign trade made rapid progress. very high freights and great difficulty in securing cargo space during the war nccessarily reduced the volume of sea-borne traffic very greatly; but the impera- tive need of belligerent countries for many sorts of indian produce caused prices to rise so much that the money value of the goods carried was not greatly altered. the exports of private merchandise 443 from india were valued at rs. 249 crores in 1913-4 and at rs. 253 crores in 1918-9; imports at rs. 183 crores and rs. 169 crores re- spectively. in 1924-5 the value of the exports went up to rs. 398 crores and of imports to rs, 243 crores. these figures disguise rather than reveal the essential facts with regard to the changes in indian foreign trade. there has been a considerable reduction in the volume of imports, most marked in cotton goods and other textiles; but from this decline, in spite of protective duties, iron and steel have been exempt, the increase in indian production being no greater than the increase in indian demand; and there has been a very great increase in the imports of machinery and mill work. other imports which have greatly increased are mineral oil and motor-cars. the volume of exports is now at least at as high a level as before the war; but the character has considerably altered. less grain is being exported and more tea; much less raw jute and a great deal more manufactured; the export of raw cotton has increased, and so has that of cloth, par- sta coloured piece-goods, but the export of yarn has greatly eclined. india has in fact become much more self-sufficing with regard to manufactures, and less disposed to export food and raw materials except where, as in the case of cotton, high prices and increased pro- duction make export specially profitable. the causes of this change are partly to be found in higher freights and higher import duties; partly also in the changed condition of world trade as a whole, re- garded as an interchange of manufactures for foodstuffs and raw materials, in consequence of which the indian peasantry get only a small increase of price for most of the things they sell, but have to pay a great deal more for what they buy. but it is also partly due to indian progress in manufacturing equipment and industrial organi- sation. (g. sl.) summary statistics 1913-4 1923-4 area under cultivation . (million ac.) 219-2 222°5 area under forest (million ac.) 82-6 86-0 vield of rice (million tons) 28-8 28-2 yield of wheat (million tons) 8-4 9-7 yield of tea (million ib.) 307-2 375°4 yield of cotton (million bales, 6-0 400 lb. each) 5:9 yield of jute (million bales, 8-4 400 ib. each) 8-9 yield of raw sugar (million tons) 2°3 a°2 yield of rubber (million jb.) : 14:5 output of coal! (million tons) 16-2 19-7 output of gold! (oz.) 596,000 422,000 output of petroleum (million gal.) 278 294 persons employed! 261,000 333,000? looms . 96,688 137,238? cotton; spindles 6,620,000 7,245,000? output of yarn! . (million ib.) 683 617 output of woven goods')(million ib.) 260 402 (thousand doz.) 895 759 persons employed . 216,000 321,000? jute looms ; : 36,050 47,528? ute’ spindles 744,289 1,003,179? mill consumption . (million bales) 4:5 47 route anya 34,656 38,039 -— train mileage 156,276 158,94 railways passengers carried |(mnlfions) : 458 ae goods carried . (million tons) 82-6 98:2 deposits in banks (crores of rupees) 96 196 post office: no. of items car- ried : ; (millions) 1,050 1,209 value of total imports? . (millions) £165 £207 value of total exports® . (millions) £177 £255 imports (net)of cotton pce.gds.|(million yd.) 3,110 1,329 imports (nct) ofironand steel |(million tons 1-0 8 | imports (net) of silk (million yd.) 35-5 16:2 | exports (net) of cotton yarn |(million ib.) 154 be exports (net) of rice (million tons) 2:4 2:2 exports (net) of wheat . (million tons) 1-2 -6 exports (net) of jute bags (millions) 369 4l4 exports (net) of jute cloth (million yd.) 1,061 1,349 exports (net) of tea (million ib.) 293 339 no. of scholars eee 5,828,1904 8,315,188 education female 952,5314 1,001,466 expenditure on education .||no comparable £12,560,000 taxation per head . : information 4-i rupees land revenue per head . : | available i-4 rupees exchange on london 163d. 174d. 1 these figures include the indiin states. 2 these figures are for 1922-3. 3 exchange is taken at 15 rupees={i. # these figures are for i91i-2. (me.) 444 vi. national and provincial finance! the indian revenues are largely dependent on the seasonal rains. if the monsoons are weak and the crops fail, land revenue has to be remitted or its collection postponed, railway receipts fall off, the agricultural population consumes less, the customs and excise revenue declines, heavy expenditure is incurred in the relief of distress, exports diminish and the exchanges move against india, increasing the cost of meeting her obligations abroad. good and bad seasons tend to occur in cycles. lord hardinge’s viceroyalty started in a good cycle. the four years ig10~4 were years of financial prosperity. the ordinary revenues were expanding, and there were large windfalls in the opium re- ceipts, due to the high prices which the chinese were offering during the last few years of a trade that was being steadily re- duced under an agreement for the complete cessation of the export of opium from india to china in a given period. it thus became possible to make large grants to the provinces for educa- tion and public health. the war period.—with the outbreak of war in 1914, indian finance enlarged its experiences. direct expenditure on the war was at first small, as india was charged only with the normal cost of her armies engaged on the various fronts; and the pre- war military charges of about {20,000,000 rose only gradually to £29,000,000 in 1917-8. but india’s external trade was dis- located, and her railway and customs receipts suffered accord- ingly; so that the first two years were marked by deficits. in 1916-7 additional taxation was imposed, but the export of war material had now begun to assume large proportions, and agricul- ture was also flourishing. in 1917 the financial position was sufh- ciently strong to justify the indian govt., with the approval of the legislative council, in making a contribution of {100,- 000,000 to the home government towards the cost of the war; and in 1918 a further contribution was volunteered, which had, however, to be subsequently revised after the afghan war, and was adjusted finally at about {14,000,000. in 1917-8 taxation was again increased, but such was the activity of trade and the general prosperity of the country that a surplus of {8,000,000 was realised. then the tide turned, and for a series of years the national accounts failed to balance. the old standard of military expend- iture was doubled; the afghan war of 1919 and the succeeding troubles in waziristan threw a heavy burden on the revenues; a weak monsoon in 1920 was followed by considerable agricul- tural distress; the trade boom which had been stimulated by the heavy manufacture of war material slowly exhausted itself, and exchange was crumbling; while a rapid rise in the cost of living left the government with no option but to make some corre- sponding increase in the wages of its army of employees. the deficits were met by temporary expedients which had recently been strangers to the indian financial system—dipping into balances, accommodation from the banks and borrowing for revenue purposes. the new system.—with 1921-2 started a new era. the esti- mates of the central administration were entirely separated from those of the provinces; and the former were for the first time sub- jected, with reservations already explained, to the vote of a popular assembly, which took the place of the old and compara- tively complacent legislative council. in an attempt to balance the budget, the customs tariff was raised from a general ad valorem rate of 73% to 11%, with 20% on certain luxury articles; postal and railway rates were enhanced, and the taxation on in- comes stiffened. but a severe trade depression had now set in, and there had been two feeble monsoons. the year closed with over {22,000,000 to the bad; and, what was even worse, the gov- ernment was compelled to budget for a further deficit in 1922-3, the legislature having rejected several of its proposals, among which a rise in the salt duty was prominent, for improving the revenue. but sharp retrenchment had now become imperative; and in the winter of 1922 a special committee under lord inchcape 1 [pn this section the rupee is taken throughout at a conventional value of 16 pence. the full story of exchange is discussed later. india attacked the whole problem of expenditure. their recommenda- tions,” comprehensive and drastic, extending to military as wellas civil charges, were put into effect, so far as time admitted, in the estimates which were laid before the assembly in march 1923 for the ensuing year. to complete the rehabilitation of the bud- get, the government proposed to double the salt tax (roughly froma farthing toa half-penny per pound) ; and when this proposal was defeated in the assembly the viceroy restored it by the use of his exceptional powers, thereby provoking a fierce political controversy. the result justified the means, for a marked re- vival in trade combined with the financial reforms to show a small surplus at the end of 1923-4. the budget for the succeed- ing year was wrecked as the result of an extremist demonstra- tion in the assembly; and the viceroy had again to interpose his arbitrary authority, though he was careful to certify expenditure at a minimum figure which allowed the salt tax to revert to its old rate of 1} rupees per 82 pounds. railways.—despite this untoward start, 1924-5 went well; trade steadily improved, and with it exchange revived, the year ending with a substantial surplus. its course was marked by two important financial changes. on the one hand, the finance of the railways was definitely separated from the general accounts and now became a self-regulating entity instead of a handmaid to the general revenues and the sport of their vicissitudes. the railway budget is now framed upon considerations of a consistent railway policy, and its only connection with the national budget is that it is bound to make an annual contribution from its re- ceipts, calculated at 1°% on the capital liability of the penultimate year, plus one-fifth of the surplus profits, if any, in that year. the protective tariff.—the second landmark of 1924 was the enforcement in practice of the policy of discriminative protection which a tariff committce of some years earlier? had recommended: for the steel industry protection act of 1924 imposed import duties which were clearly expected to be prohibitive on certain articles man- ufactured from steel, while it granted bounties on heavy steel rails, fishplates and railway wagons manufactured in india. hardly was the act passed when the bounties were found inadequate to their purpose and were enhanced. schemes for similar protection to other domestic industries continued to be formulated, and the whole trend of indian political opinion is in their support. the following year saw another fiscal measure of great, if more sentimental, importance. the excise duty on cotton goods manufactured in india, which had originally been imposed to counterbalance the tariff on imported cottons, and which had for many years been resented as a sacrifice of indian interests to lancashire, was at last abolished from dec. 1 1925, in fulfilment of an arrangement which had been reached in settlement of a disastrous strike among the cotton-mill workers in bombay. the accounts for 1925-6 seemed likely to close on the right side; and the estimates for 1926-7 again presumed a surplus, although the law of averages would point to the near approach of a short monsoon, budget of 1925-6.—the main constituents of the central budget, if 1925-6 be taken as a sample, are as follows:— source revenue object ap 7 ee millions millions customs . 30°9 defence (net) 37°5 taxes on income 11-6 debt services i2°1 salt . 4-6 civil administra- | opium . : : 2-4 tion. ; e-| 7°3 railways (net). 3°5 other charges. 8-3 currency and mint 27 65-2 provincial contribu- surplus . ¢ : 5 tions : other reccipts the customs tariff, which long stood on a purely revenue footing with a 5° charge all round, is now divided into protective, non- protective and general sections. the protective section is at present restricted to manufactured iron and steel, but the so-called non- protective duties include luxury rates, such as 25% on sugar and 75° on cigars, while the ad valorem duties in the general section range from 2} °% to 30%. there is a low export tariff on jute, hides, rice and tea. the taxation on incomes includes a supertax, and close attention has been given to perfecting what used to be a most un- satisfactory source of revenue; all income from agriculture is exempt. 2 report of the indian retrenchment committee (delhi, 1923). ° report of the indian fiscal commitiee, 1921-2 (cmd. 17064). india the production of salt, whether from mines, lakes or sea water, is 2 government monopoly, and the duty on it used to be treated as the reserve or balancing factor in the indian budget; but popular pres- sure now seems likely to standardise it at 1} rupees per maund, or about one farthing per pound. opium is a steadily diminishing figure; in 1918 there were 207,000 ac. under cultivation for the opium poppy, in 1924 there were only 133,000 ac.; exports to the chinese market were extinguished, and in may 1926, it was announced that all exports of every kind are to cease, even to foreign governments. this cessation is to be by a tenth each year, provincial finance-—obviously, however, the figures quoted above do not cover the whole field of the state’s revenue and ex- penditure. quite {50,000,000 of receipts, representing their collec- tions of land and irrigation revenue, excise, stamps andl forest in- come, appear in the budgets of the nine provincial governments. a similar sum is expended by them on their administrative business, justice, education, public works, police and gaols, public health, etc. this clear-cut demarcation of financial responsibility was part of the new constitution. from 1833 up to 1921 the accounts of the imperial and provincial authorities had been amalgamated; in the budget of 1921-2 they were separated. the local governments now receive the yield of the sources which they administer, and are responsible for the expenditure of the provincial departments, both reserved and trans- ferred. by far the most important of their resources is the land revenue, which, together with the cognate reccipts from irrigation, compose more than half the total budget provision of the provinces. opinions differ as to whether it is a rent or a tax; but it is a legacy from mogul rule, and proceeds on the assumption that all the land is the property of the crown. in bengal and northern india a class of intermediary landlords has been gradually evolved, and they are assessed on their rent rolls; in madras and bombay the revenue is assessed directly upon the ryot or cultivating occupant, with reference to the estimated output of his land. the whole system is being caught up into the region of political argument, as problems of much importance are beginning to divide popular feeling, e.g., the permanency or otherwise of the assessments, the security of tenure in the landlord provinces and the right of the state to determine rents. in order to enable local govern- ments to discharge their new functions, they have been given powers of taxation, scheduled so as not to invade the sphere earmarked for the requirements of the central government. they have been authorised, for the first time under the new constitution, to raise loans, either through the central government or independently, and some of the provinces have already borrowed, for works of improve- ment such as irrigation and city development schemes. provincial contributions.—vthe severance of provincial finance from the general accounts brought to the front a problem inherent in all federal constitutions, even if they are as embryonic as in india to-day. in former years the central government used to finance it- self in part by taking a share of the revenues collected in the prov- inces; and incidentally it thereby kept alive its right to intervene in the management of the sources from which such revenues flowed. when on the road to provincial autonomy a point was reached at which this right was curtailed, and the provincial revenues were credited wholly to the provincial exchequers, it became apparent that the central government had no longer the control of funds sufficient for its own business. in india the customs, salt, opium and net railway receipts, income tax, etc., when once they ceased to be supplemented by a share of the provincial land revenue, stamps and excise receipts, etc., proved inadequate to mect the demands of defence, the public debt and the other liabilities reserved by the cen- tral government. under this compulsion, and arguing that the provinces should equitably: contribute to the defence of the country, ‘the govt. of india (with the full concurrence of the sclect joint committee of parliament) imposed a levy on the provinces. the total sum which they were asked to pay was about £6,500,000. it was distributed among the provinces in rough ratio to the advantage which each had gained by ceasing to share its provincial revenues with the central government; and hopes were entertained that the central finances would improve with sufficient rapidity to enable those tributes to be gradually reduced and in a short period completely remitted. ad- versity defeated those hopes, and the reduction has been slow and irregular. meanwhile the provincial legislatures, with rare exceptions, have fastened on the arrangement as the main cause of their own financial stringency, and have magnified a not unreasonable and purely temporary expedient into an intolerable grievance, under cover of which there has been a tendency to evade the imposition of taxation that might have balanced their own budgets. several local governments claim, in addition to their own separate revenues, a share of the taxation upon income collected within their boundaries; and some concession on this point has heen yielded as an exception to the general rule of separate resources, by giving each province an allowance of three pies for every rupee by which the income assessed within the province exceeds the income that was similarly assessed in 1920-1. local finance.—the 772 municipalities of british india have the disposal of an annual revenue of over £9,000,000, exclusive of govern- ment grants and borrowings; and the district and local boards have a normal revenue of about {£8,000,000, both classes of bodies have 445 been endowed by the 1919 constitution with a financial independence commensurate in its degree with that of the provinces, the six port trusts have statutory powers for their own business, and control an income in the neighbourhood of £5,000,000; bombay and calcutta in particular having raised considerable loans which rank only second in the indian market to government securities, indebtedness of india.—the govt. of india borrows both locally in rupees and in england in sterling—the former now to a very much larger extent than before the war. the position at the beginning of the war was thus described officially :— out of a total debt equivalent to £274,006,000 outstanding at the end of march 1914, only about £13,000,000 represented ordinary or unproductive debt. the annual interest on the latter was £750,000 only, and on the productive debt about £8,500,000, so that our total interest charges amounted to some f9,250,000. railways and irrigation works in the same year yielded us a return of £15,250,000. thus we had left some {6,000,000 of clear revenue from our great capital undertakings, after meeting interest charges on our entire public debt. this was the result of a long, careful policy of converting unpro- ductive debt, i.e., money raised for military purposes and the like, into productive debt, by the device of short borrowing for the capital required on railways and irrigation. it had put india into a very strong position to face the changes brought ahout by the war. the war debt, inclusive of the gifts to the home exchequer, the loans for the expenditure on the afghan war and subsequent frontier opera- tions, as well as the borrowing necessitated by the series of budget deficits, all went to swell the volume of the unproductive debt; and on march 31 1926 the total indebtedness of india was:— in india crores of rupees loans : ; : . : : ; 368-35 borrowed from the paper currency reserve 49-65 other obligations . : 5 : : ; ; : 93-27 511-27 in england millions loans : ’ ; i , : . ‘ 266-43 other obligations . . . .« .« «.« «© - 76:05 342-48 of the total it was considered that about 23 °% was unproductive. the productive loans included the capital liabilities for irrigation, which were taken over by the provinces when that subject became wholly provincial. the “ other obligations ’"’ are mostly unfunded debt, such as post-office cash certificates and savings bank accumu- lations, provident funds, etc.; while in england £57,500,000 are accounted for by capitalising liabilities which are being liquidated by certain terminable railway annuities, in licu of a general sinking fund an arrangement was started in 1924 by which an annual sum is appropriated from revenue for the reduction or avoidance of debt; it is calculated at four crores plus one-cightieth of the amount by which the outstanding debt of the year exceeds the debt outstanding on march 31 1923. vii. currency and exchange the foundation of the currency system is the rupee (16 annas or 192 pies), a coin weighing 180 gr. and containing 165 gr. of pure silver. the subsidiary coinage comprises pieces of silver, nickel and bronze; all being legal tender up to one rupce only, except the 8-anna piece, which, like the rupee itself, is legal tender without limit, the sovereign also circulates as freely as gresham’s law permits. along- side of these is a paper currency, at first of slow and lingering growth, in the form of government currency notes, the higher denominations of which are, strictly speaking, encashable only in the currency circle (usually an area of one or two provinces) for which they were printed. the favourite notes are for 1, 5, 0 and 100 rupees; but there are also others for 24, 20, 50, 500, 1,000 and 10,000 rupees. the note circula- tion as a whole is backed, as to more than one-half, by arcserve of gold and silver, and as to the balance by government securities held partly in england and partly in india, with a margin for seasonal expansion based on trade bills up to a strictly defined amount. the exchange value of the rupee follows the ordinary economic law and depends on [india’s trade balance with the outer world. when there is a big surplus of exports, import bills are at a premium and the rupee rises in terms of sterling; when in bad years exports decline and there is a relative glut of import bills, the rupee falls in terms of sterling. the operation of this law, however, assumes a fairly constant adjustment of the volume of currency to the require- ments of trade. if there were no restriction on the output of rupces, the gold value of the coin would tend to fluctuate with the gold value of silver. up to 1873, although the indian mints were open, the rupee continued steady at an exchange value of 2s.; then the price of silver began to tumble until the rupee dropped almost to is., and so disastrous were the consequences to the finances of the coun- try that in 1893 it was decided to close the mint to free coinage and establish a “‘ managed ”’ currency, with the rupee as a token coin. by this policy an equilibrium was sought. 446 the rupee during the war.—by the beginning of the war this system had reached considerable strength. the rupee had been given by law a parity of 16d., and trade conditions had never put it beyond the power of the government to maintain the exchange at approximately that figure. the machinery for managing the cur- rency was simple. the indian govt. bought silver and coined rupees to mect the requirements of the country. so long as silver was under 43d. an oz, there was a profit on the operation, which was placed to the gold standard reserve and (except for a brief and partial diversion) invested in sterling securities in london. against this reserve the govt. of india could sel! sterling drafts (technically known as “‘ reverse councils '’), if the exchange value of the rupee threatened to fall. on the other hand, if it were rising, the secretary of state could increase his normal sales of rupee drafts on india (technically known as ‘‘ councils '’), which would be met out of the govt. of india's reserves of rupees or, if necessary, by fresh minting. should this fail to check the rising exchange, it was generally possible to count on a free importation of private gold which would either pass into circulation or be presented to the government for the purchase of rupees. all these arrangements were working smoothly in 1914. the gold standard reserve stood at £26,000,000, all except {4,000,000 being held in gold or gold securities in england. a continued favourable balance of trade had encouraged the import of gold, of which £70,000,000 worth had been absorbed between ig10 and 1914. the paper currency reserve had £24,000,000 in gold or gold securities, and the note circulation had risen to 66 crores (£44,000,000). with the war came new and disturbing demands. india was called upon to supply the british govt. and the allies with immense quantities of raw materials, manufactured goods and foodstuffs for war purposes, and also to provide funds in india and in countries where indian troops were fighting. the indian govt. had therefore to disburse a rupee currency in very large amounts. the home government repaid its debts by credits in london, but the indian govt. required money in india, and the difficulty was to remit specie. gold was unobtainable, silver was becoming very scarce in the london and american markets. the indian govt. was there- fore compelled to increase the note issue without a corresponding increase of rupees held against the notes. the notes were con- vertible and their encashment drained away the reserve stock of rupees. the time drew near when either inconvertibility must be declared or silver obtained in large quantities for coinage. so seriously were the political effects of inconvertibility regarded that the gov- ernment strained every nerve to avert it. the i-rupee and 2}-rupee notes were invented; the import and export of the precious metals were put under the strictest regulation; and the mints worked night and day. the pittman act,—yct, with the world shortage of silver, incon- vertibility was all but reached in 1918, when help came from the govt. of the united states. congress was prevailed upon to pass the pittman act as an emergency measure. this act enabled the government to borrow from the treasury the greater part of the dollar reserve of 375,000,000 0z., held as security for silver certifi- cates, the united states govt., as soon as it obtained this authority, allowed the indian govt. to purchase 200,000,000 oz. of silver dollars on terms much below the current market prices, and accelerated the dispatch of the metal to india. from july 1918 onwards american silver began to arrive in large quantities and was coined into rupces. for some months the new money went out of the reserves as fast as it was coined, but by dec. 1918 the convertibility of the note issue was secured. between march 1916 and march 1920 the output of the mints was represented by the cnormous quantity of 1,390 million new rupees ({93,000,000) as currency. throughout this struggle another anxiety grew apace, in the risk of being unable to maintain the rupee as a token coin at its statutory parity with sterling. sterling was depreciating and silver was rapidly appreciating. from its pre-war price of about 26d. per oz., silver advanced to an average of 31d. in 1916, of 48d. in 1918 and of 61d. in 1920, touching the figure of 89d. in feb. of that year. as the conversion of the rupee into bullion became profitable when silver touched 43d., the rapid rise beyond that figure led to a wholesale melting down of rupees for clandestine export; and the government was forced to protect itself by hurriedly pushing up the parity of the rupee until it stood at 2s. 4d. in dec. 1919, while for a short time private remittances fetched over 2s. iod. the indian currency committee—the whole problem was then referred to a committee of currency and banking experts sitting in london. reporting early in 1920, this body (with one notable dis- sentient) recommended! that the rupee should be correlated to gold, and not to sterling, which by that time had depreciated in relation to gold and had no certain value, and that it should be given a new statutory ratio equivalent to one-tenth of the gold contained in a sovereign. this would give the rupee the equivalence of 2s. when the pound sterling returned to parity with the sovereign. ‘the com- mittee were of opinion that the price of silver expressed in pence would remain at the point that would make the retention of a is. qd. rupee impossible unless the coin itself was diminished in weight or fineness. this alternative they rejected. they thought that, having 1 report of committee on indian currency (delhi, 1920). indiana regard to the higher price levels of the world, india would still be able to maintain a favourable trade balance with a 2s. rupee, and that any consequent readjustment of rupee prices of indian export staples would be to the advantage of the indian consumer by acting as a drag on internal prices. the indian govt. accepted the committee’s recommendation, and in sept. 1920 the indian coinage act established the new ratio of the rupee as one-tenth of a gold pound. but currency was already laughing at the law. there was a rush of remittances to england, and at the same time the export trade of india fell off. in common with other countries whose exports consist of raw materials, india found the demand for its produce suddenly dry up.the former sur- plus of exports gave place during the second half of 1920 to a large adverse trade balance which had to be liquidated by bills on london. exchange persistently dropped from 2s. 6d. the rupee, which in the first months of 1920 roughly represented the parity of one-tenth of a gold sovereign, to below is. 4d. in the early part of 1921, and the price of silver receded to 32d. the ounce. the government endeav- oured to maintain the rupee at its new exchange value by selling drafts on their resources in london, but economic forces were too strong for them, and after they had diminished their gold holdings in this way by well over {50,000,000, they abandoned the struggle and left exchange to find its own level. it steadily dropped to between is. 4d. and is. §d., when the sale of councils was tentatively recom- menced, at whatever they could fetch without regard to the statu- tory parity. in the hope of ending this anomaly, another currency committee was appointed towards the end of 1925, when the rupee had become fairly steady near 1s. 6d.; it had not reported when lord reading resigned. meanwhile, the position had improved in readiness for any further attempt to control exchange. the gold standard reserve had reached {40,000,000 of sterling securities, a point at which it was decided that further accretions should be em- ployed in reducing the rupee securities in the paper currency reserve. the latter in march 1924 contained £68,000,000 in gold and silver, and over {9,000,000 in sterling securities. the strenuous efforts made during the war to preserve the con- vertibility of the currency notes were rewarded by a rapid expansion of their popularity. the circulation (66 crores) of march 1914 almost trebled in the next 10 years, touching 186 crores in march 1924, notwithstanding the practical disappearance of the 23-rupee and the 20-rupee notes. in 1920 the whole system was improved by the paper currency amendment act of that year, which allowed an unlimited note issue provided a metallic basis of 50% was observed, required the gold backing to be held in india and introduced the rinciple of a certain definite expansion of the note issue during the usy season against trade bills of a durance not exceeding 90 days. before the note circulation became so firmly established as it now is, several attempts were made to lighten the task of supplying india with silver currency by the employment of gold. among them was the opening of a branch of the british mint at bombay, intended to coin sovereigns and 15-rupee gold pieces. like all other similar expcriments, it was defeated by the immediate disappearance of gold into the hoards of the people. nearly 3,500,c00 gold coins were minted at bombay in 1918-9, and work was then abandoned. brbl1ograpiy.—in contrast with the former scarcity of good books on india, they now abound; and the following is necessarily an arbitrary selection from the newer works. the standard all-round text-book is the imperial gazetteer of india, vol. 1 to 4. add to this the statistical abstract of british india from 1914-5 to 1923-4 (cmd. 2534 of 1925); and the reports to parliament on the moral and material progress of india, now published as india in rors, 1010, 1920, 1921-2, 1022-3, 1923-4 and 1924-5, written by prof. rushbrook williams, and bringing a full narrative of current events up to date. historical: sir verney lovett’s india in the ‘' nations of to-day "” series (1923) is the latest authoritative work. sir v. chirol’s trilogy should be studied: indian unrest (1910); india old and new (1921); and “ india" in the modern world series (1926). constitutional and political: the key book is the report on indian constitutional reforms (cmd. 9109 of 1918) by the late e. s. montagu and lord chelmsford. with it read dyarchy by i.. curtis (oxford, 1920), which contains the text of the selborne committee and the act of 1919. other works are e. a. hlorne, the political system of british india (oxford, 1922); sir c. ilbert, the government of india (oxford, 1922); hbert and meston, the new constitution of india (1923). 7 problems of to-day: sir verney lovett, history of the indian ational movement (1920); bishop whitehead, indian problems (1924), and as studies in indian psychology, lord ronaldshay’s trilogy, lands of the thunderbolt, india a bird's-eye view, and the heart of aryavarta, published by constable in 1923-4, respectively. economic and finance: dr. p. p. pillai, economic conditions in india (1925) and gyan chand, the financial system of india (1926). (me.)