HUNGARIAN LITERATURE

hungarian litera- ture at the beginning of the 20th century was on the brink of a revolution. the intellectual life of the country was undergoing a crisis. after 1,000 years of a history sometimes glorious, but more often tragic, hungary was faced by new difficulties which threatened her very life: the social question, the defence of her civilisation and her language against the slav and teutonic races, and the antagonism between the essentially rural nature of the hungarian people and the americanism and cosmopoli- tanism of the capital, budapest. writers were divided into two camps: the traditionalists and the moderns. this division still persists. the older generation, inspired by hungarian nationalism, had joined in the celebration of the country’s 1,cooth anniversary in 1896 and had accepted modern civilisation but remained firmly opposed to cosmopoli- tanism and radicalism. they still longed for the hungarian steppes and the old folk songs. from this generation originated what is known as the turanian movement, which draws its inspiration and its themes from the east and endeavours to arouse in the hungarian people the consciousness of their non- european origin. the numbers of this older generation diminish year by year. the patriotic and classical poets, joseph levay (1825-1918) and alexander endredi (1850-1920), followers of jean arany, towards the end of their lives burst again into song. in 1910 hungary lost the novelist koloman mikszath, the most notable successor of jekai, the immortal painter of the slovak peasant and the aristocracy of northern hungary. among con- temporary writers of this school are the poets jules vargha and andre kozma, the novelist ferencz ilerczeg and the critic and essayist eugene rakosi, their organ being the review budapesti szenle, edited by geza voinovich. in opposition to the older generation were the moderns, who hailed the advent of capitalism and industrialism in place of the old provincial spirit. these intellectual radicals wished to eliminate from literature all national characteristics, and to promote the cause of realism with its materialistic philosophy. they turned their faces towards the west, not the chauvinistic west, but the home of cosmopolitanism and anti-nationalism. the moderns gathered their forces in the early years of the 2oth century, using as their rallying point a review with the symbolic title vyugat, edited by ignotus. round it gathered the young poets of the symbolist and romantic school. 390 chief among these men was andre ady, an original magyar genius, whose primitive and prophetic gifts place him in the first rank of hungarian poets. influenced as he was by french symbolism as well as by the works of zola, he drew inspiration also from the days before the school of arany, from the mel- ancholy, sometimes crudely expressed, protestant hymns of the 16th century, from the songs of the rebels against the austrians, from the archaic and primitive beauties of the hungarian bible. his robust language and brilliant vision illumine the depths of the soul. he tilts against conventional morality and describes love with all the voluptuousness of the realist: a trait which is, in fact, common to all the moderns. he is distinguished by a certain aristocracy of mind, as, for instance, in his attitude towards the nietzschean cult of the ego, but in his general outlook, and in his hedonistic glorification of blood and treasure, and above all, in his sympathy for the poor and despised, he inclines towards socialism. compared with him, modern lyrical poets such as michael babits, jules juh4sz, desire kosztolanyi, arpid teth, gabriel olah, erne szep have confined themselves to pure aestheticism, seeking to express the emotions of a cultivated, almost neuras- thenic, minority. the realistic novelists found a successor in sigismond mericz, whose preoccupation with brutish peasants and corrupt petty tradesmen reflect his political tendencies. his work is the antithesis of that of idealistic novelists such as geza gardonyi (d. 1923) and cecile tormay. when the world war broke out, these two camps, the tradi- tionalists and the moderns, were still divided by a great gulf. cosmopolitan literature was silent for a time. the poets of tradition hailed the contlict with acclamation. one poct, a soldier, geza gyeni, in a language learnt from the moderns, turning his back on /’urt pour v’art, succeeded in expressing the horrors and pathos of the war. the moderns were not long in making themselves heard, but, as might have been expected, their pacifist leanings were only accentuated by what had hap- pened. far from joining in the martial chorus which then predominated, their symbolist and decadent verse reilected the trouble in their souls, whilst glorifying man and life. the final disaster, and the revolution of oct. 1918 unmasked the political connections of nvrgat; its contributors joined hands with the rabble. in the intoxication of the first success the moderns threw otf the mask. their review declared itself to be definitely on the side of the revolution and of count karolyi. they looked forward to the end of the old feudal agricultural hungary, the hungary of officialdom, of the nobility and of the nationalist writers grouped around both. during its four months’ reign bolshevism kept literature under strict control. newspapers were suppressed and the right of publication withdrawn. a single publisher held all the world of thought in fee: the state printed nothing but propagandist papers and pamphlets. the socialised theatres were forced to produce plays in celebration of the revolution. futurist and expressionist writers alone were protected and subsidised by the “literary directory.’”’ this upheaval brought no good to litera- ture. expressionism pushed to extremes led nowhere. after the fall of communism, literature set itself to assist in the task of national regeneration. with no definite theories of art or literary programme it expressed the gricf of the divided country and its longing for the lost provinces. although historic hungary was divided into five parts, magyar literature kept its unity. in political hungary the novel took the place of the lyrical poetry of the pre-war period. desire szabe, in his loftily conceived work, describes the great cataclysm of the world war and the determined defence made by the hungarians, in both the material and moral spheres, against the foreign invader. hungarian literature from this time onward endeavoured to break the bonds of torpid decadence and of anti-national radi- calism, and to place before a people, struggling in the shadows of adversity, a new conception of the world which should be healthy, energetic and modern, thus again proving that hun- garian literature has always been something more than a mere exercise in aesthetics. modern drama is striving to create new hungary and lasting values, both poetic and philosophical. romanticism has reappeared, and talented dramatists such as ferencz herczeg, ferencz molnar, louis bire and melchior lengyel have attained to well-deserved success in the theatres of europe, and even in those of america. realism and purely theatrical effects have, for the time, being quite vanished from the hungarian stage. in discussing hungarian literature we must not forget that of the lost provinces of hungary. in transylvania in particular there has been a remarkable renaissance. the reawakening of a feeling for the mother country has also made itself felt in the northern carpathians. there, poets such as the transylvanian vegvari often express under pseudonyms the sadness which, as magyars, they cannot but feel. brptiocrraruy.— fr. riedl, a j7istory of hungarian literature (1906); ignacz kont, brblographie frangatse de la hongrie, 1521- rgro (1913), continued by z. baranyai in the revue des eiudes hongrotses since 1923; bethge, die lyrik des ausiandes (1908); brajjer, moderne ungarische lyrtk (1914); heinrich horvath, neue ungarische lyrik (1918); robert gragger, bibliographica hungarica (hungarian institute of berlin university, 1920, etc.); eugene pinter, history of itungarian literature, in hungarian (budapest, 1921); vertes-lebourg, echos frangats de la lyre hongroise (1921); leffler, ungersk lyrik (stockholm, 1922); ivan goll, les cing con- tinents (1922). (bp 2.) hungary (macyarorszac, sce 13.894), an independent king- dom of central europe. previous to 1918 hungary formed part of the austro-hungarian empire, whose monarch was apostolic king of hungary. the lands of the hungarian crown had an area of 125,402 sq.m., of which croatia and slavonia, which were in political union with hungary, occupied 16,420 8q. miles. the census of rgro gave the population of hungary as 20,886,487, including 10,050,575 magyars (for racial statistics see austria- huncary). the treaty of trianon (see trianon) in 1920 de- prived hungary of all croatia, slavonia and transylvania and much of hungary proper. her new frontier runs as follows:— starting from the junction of the czechoslovak and austrian frontiers near bratislava, southeast to the mouth of the ipel river, then along its course to a point 10 km. below lucenec; hence south- east above salgotarjan, northeast up to a point fying 20 km. south of kosice, southeast above satoraljatjhely to csap, thence along the tisza to the junction of the rumanian and czechoslovak fron- tiers. after running west of the satul mare oradia-mare line, it turns west, and runs south of make to the yugoslav frontier below szeged; hence south of the junction of the maros and tisza south- west to a point on the drava south of pecs; hence west and north- west along the drava to the mouth of the mur; along the mur, then north to szentgotthard; hence north to keszeg, then makes a loop to include sopron, crosses lake neusiedler (ferte), thence north to the czechoslovak frontier. the area comprised within these frontiers is 35,916 square miles. population (1920), 7,989,143. of these 7,147,530 were magyars, 551,211 germans, 141,882 slovaks, 23,760 rumanians, 36,858 croats, 17,131 serbs, 1,500 ruthenians, 69,271 other races. some 3,250,000 magyars were living within the frontiers of czechoslovakia, rumania, yugoslavia and austria (see minorities). the treaty took from livngary all her gold, silver, copper, salt and mercury mines; all but one of her iron mines; her jargest and best collieries; and 86°% of her forests. the only branch of productive territory of which she retained over half is viticulture (68°). the strongest social element left to her was her peasant class (4,449,105 persons were engaged in agriculture). there was a very large intellectual class, composed largely of ex-state employees formerly resident in the territory of the present succession states, the settlement of which formed a grave problem. i. political history at the fateful crown councils of july 7 and july 19 1914, the only person present who opposed the idea of an attack on serbia or any measure beyond the formulation of severe but acceptable demands to serbia was count stephen tisza, then hungarian minister president. thanks to his influence alone, a passage was entered in the minutes of the second council as follows: the common cabinet council, on the motion of the minister president of hungary, decided that immediately after the com- mencement of hostilities the foreign powers should be notified of the fact that the monarchy was not waging a war of conquest, and that it was not the object of the monarchy to annex the kingdom of serbia. tisza, however, made no statement on his conduct until oct. 17 1918 when he mentioned it in the lower chamber of the hungary fiala sitiyhymap @ “a's i te ‘ xe $ ya & g wi 1 ; alaegerszegh 2 3 phe ol kesdchdly == ; aie qunafoldvdr® } f: = ifaks } ; ‘ kolocsa, xn - on. = f pete eee, fi agykany, s@ 4, w]e all ays ri le € l - pie et f "tpeecs .-- hungarian parliament, enumerating the documents in which it was recorded (see austria-hungary). the collapse of the monarchy.—the causes of the catastrophe of 1918 were partly internal, partly international. after the death of francis joseph i. on nov. 21 1916 the rule of the dual monarchy gradually lost its character of stability. austria was already weak; and the dismissal of tisza (may 22 1917) made hungary, too, helpless. however, as the armies of the monarchy still occupied considerable enemy territories, few people thought of the possibility of its sudden collapse. the protracted war had become extremely and increasingly unpopular. the general desire for peace and the weak and irresolute policy of the gov- ernment contributed to encourage the defeatist agitation. the peace propaganda was furthered by the publication on jan. 8 1918 of president wilson’s fourteen points, which were accepted with implicit faith by the hungarian people, who have always shown a sincere enthusiasm for the great ideas of mankind. the return home of large numbers of soldiers released from russian captivity after the treaty of brest-litovsk (mar. 3 1918) fur- thered the growth of communistic and anti-militarist ideas, which were enormously strengthened by the privations and suffering caused by the blockade. only on the capitulation of bulgaria (sept. 29 1918) did the situation become quite clear. the rev- olutionary movement now ceased to be a merely sporadic phe- nomenon; foretokens of the coming upheaval became everyday occurrences. the first signal of the process of upheaval was a demonstration of students on oct. 25, the crowd being, however, dispersed by the police. the same day the so-called national council was formed, with karolyi as its president, together with a soldiers’ council and a students’ council. lieut.-gen. baron lukachich, who had been appointed military governor of budapest, sug- gested that karolyi and the membets of the national council be arrested; but the suggestion was not approved by the govern- ment just resigned. two days later the national council issued a proclamation with the title ‘‘ amnesty and land for the sol- ciers,’? which foreshadowed the coming of bolshevism. now events succeeded one another with bewildering rapidity. two companies ordered to the front mutinied and, joining the groups { kbeskemet s acske an / by ketiinhales * \ sebi =" : es ee gem . yg bid pe ia; ea | hanes mezikovess} ra ai miszeroksedlias eri nen alte arme ry, ee ae at 7 debreczesty = = ugh . a ~ saszbereny on paths a scdllds ~ ~ <torokszentintklos s £ on fas es sebes karas 4 ey ¥ a: : . es ¥ ceeds as fe ha nl ag so . ae se iigexbvisgrhey sera | hungary ase ee gee at . yes english miles . ~ : : isnerses 5g 2s main railways eo of demonstrators during the evening of oct. 30, attacked and seized the headquarters of the commander of the garrison, the telephone exchange and the general post office. gen. lukachich telephoned to vienna for instructions, but the king refused to consent to the employment of the armed forces at the baron’s disposal. by the morning of oct. 31 the town was completely in the hands of the revolutionaries; karolyi was appointed prime minister. his cabinet included principally persons with- out seats in parliament, social democrats and radicals; of the parliamentary parties only the independence party (kossuth party) was represented in the government, several of the minis- ters chosen by karolyi belonging to it. the same afternoon count stephen tisza was murdered, probably by emissaries of the soldiers’ council. his friends had repeatedly warned him; but he had remained in budapest in a final effort to unite all the elements of order against the rabble. tisza knew how critical was the situation and he knew that he was threatened by death. the followers of k4rolyi ordained as a national holiday the very day on which they laid tisza low. on the other hand, it appeared to k4rolyi’s opponents that with the disappearance of a formidableantagonist he lost his per- sonal initiative and became little more than a puppet in the hands of jaszi, the radical party and the socialists. the first measure taken by the new government was to de- mobilise and scatter in all directions the soldiers pouring back from the front. the war minister—bela linder—declared that he “ did not wish to see soldiers ”; and hungary was thus dis- armed and rendered powerless both to stem the internal anarchy of the country and to resist occupation from without. the first result was universal looting and robbery; then followed the in- vasion of the czechs, rumanians and yugoslavs. the czechs were able to occupy the almost impregnable fortress of komarom on the danube without striking a blow, for the troops of occu- pation met not the slightest resistance anywhere. in vain did the inhabitants everywhere protest against the occupation; the government was both unable and unwilling to do anything to lend weight to their protests. on nov. 1 the austro-hungarian delegates had met the italian 392 generals diaz and badoglio to conclude an armistice. point 3 of the conditions enunciated was that the austro-hungarian troops were to evacuate all enemy territory occupied in the war; a line of demarcation was drawn in the southwest; elsewhere it was to consist of the former political frontier. gen, weber, who was authorised by the hungarian govt. to negotiate for hun- gary, accepted these conditions in the name of hungary. kar- olyi and a delegation of his government, however, believing that he could get better terms from the entente, called on gen. franchet d’esperey in belgrade, who concluded a separate ‘“‘ military convention ” with them on nov. 13. this fixed a line of demarcation well within the old political frontier (bis- trita- nagy-szamos-marosfalli-subotica-baja-pecs), the line of the drava. hungarian troops were to withdraw behind this line, but hungarian police, gendarmerie and civilian control - would continue to function. the allies were entitled 10 occupy any towns or other points of strategic importance but would not interfere with the internal administration. hungarian troops were to remain to secure the line of demarcation. in fact, however, the occupying troops, backed by the inter- allied missions in budapest, denied hungary any sovereign rights in the territory outside the line of demarcation; assumed the civilian administration, removing the hungarian officials; disarmed the gendarmerie and police; set up an economic bound- ary; interrupted communications; forced inhabitants to take an oath of allegiance to themselves, and even pressed them into military service. it thus became abundantly clear that k4rolyi could not obtain better terms from the entente, and his popu- larity at once began to wane. proclamation of the republic —on nov. 13 charles iv. issued the eckartsau manifesto, declaring that he “ resigned all share in the conduct of state affairs and was prepared in advance to accept any decision to be taken by government respecting the future form of government of efungary.’’ the karolyi govt., without consulting parliament, at a mass meeting in budapest proclaimed hungary a republic (nov. 16). under pressure from the government the house of deputies proclaimed its dissolu- tion; the only protest against this arbitrary measure was that contained in the declaration read by baron wlassich, president of the upper house (house of magnates), who at the same time announced that the upper house had adjourned its sittings for an indefinite period. the counter-revolution received legal sanc- tion from the illegality of the proclamation of the republic. william behm, who was minister of war under ka4rolyi, writes that there were 50 cases of riot, most of them involving fatal consequences, while 14 different military formations were raised to deal with the counter-revolutionary movement. complete anarchy prevailed in the administration. the government admitted that the ‘‘ national councils ” of the provincial towns were daily guilty of grave abuses but alleged that it was power- less to prevent them. jaszi admitted that they had made a revo- lution without having any men to do the everyday work. not only did they fail to do anything to save the territorial integrity of hungary, they were even incapable of achieving any radical reform. they were not satisfied with a mere republic, ‘it had to be a people’s republic.” the plebiscite promised by the national council was never held by the karoly: govt., for their few months of power yet sufficed to make them not dare to appeal to that national public opinion in the name of which they consistently spoke and acted. karolyi was proclaimed president of the republic on jan. 1: 1919 and on jan. 19 formed a cabinet under the presidency of denis berinkei, then minister of justice. it had no proper support either among the bourgeoisie or among the socialists; yet it created a whole series of laws and ordinances. never had there been so rapid and so general a promotion of public employees, for the older employces were in general regarded as unreliable following the precedent of the united states k4rolyi as ‘ provisional president of the republic’ took part in the cabinet councils and frequently spoke at these meetings. there were two questions of first-rate importance: universal suffrage and land reform. a protracted discussion preceded the hungary . drafting of an ultra-modern suffrage bill (drafted and passed intra muros, without reference to parliament, which did not exist). but the bourgeois parties were beginning to recover from their apathy. the suppression of individual liberty, the intimi- dation of the bourgeois press, and the policy of internment at jast began to change their initial lethargy into a determination to rally their forces; and it was already clear that a very strong catholic party would contest the elections; consequently, gov- ernment continually postponed the elections and finally manoeu- vred them off altogether. nor did government materialise the promised scheme of land reform. . the allied powers meanwhile bombarded hungary with ukases. col. vyx, their representative in budapest, permitted the czechs, rumanians and yugoslavs to pass at will beyond the line of demarcation. the government still maintained that a ‘‘ peace by agreement ” would follow; shortly afterwards, however, the radicals and jaszi resigned from the cabinet, which was now-clearly lacking the support of public opinion. the soviet republic—the agents of the russian soviet had long since begun their work in budapest. bela kun, who had been sent home from russia to organise the hungarian soviet, had been in budapest with some associates since nov. 19. these men had money; they were daring and active and rapidly gained a following, not only in the organised proletariat but also among the socialists and the “ intellectuals.” they arranged demon- strations among the soldiers returned from the front; they de- manded the payment to these men of immediate relief. con- tinuously increasing their demands, they gained larger and larger masses to the cause of revolution. on feb. 20 1919 a mass meet- ing of unemployed yielded entirely to communistic influence. to intimidate the socialists they attacked the offices of their organ the nepszave, killing seven policemen and wounding 8o. after protracted discussion the government imprisoned bela kun and his followers. the funeral of the murdered policemen was a gigantic demonstration of the people against bolshevism and in favour of socialism. it seemed as if bolshevism had been finally overthrown. on the morning of march 20, col. vyx handed karolyi a note establishing a new neutral zone between the hungarian and rumanian troops. this area comprised some 2,000 sq. m. of predominantly magyar territory. vyx afterwards stated that the zone was to be purely neutral, remaining under hungarian administration. karolyi contended that vyx had stated that rumanian troops would occupy this area. at a cabinet council the same evening karolyi resigned as president of the republic, and a resolution was passed that, as the coalition govt. saw no prospect of solving the political crisis or of ensuring production, the social democrats must take over the government. the socialists, however, were too weak unless supported by the com- munists. on march 21, at noon, the socialists decided to come to terms with the communists, undoubtedly at k4arolyi’s per- sonal instance. it is true that the difficulties were numerous; but karolyi and j4szi had been unequal to them. the hopes aroused by their promises had not been fulfilled and their phase of the revolution had ended in chaos. the agreement between the socialists and bela kun was made in the prison. the communists dictated and the socialists accepted everything. the whole social democratic party united en bloc with the communists. pending the decision of the third international the new party was styled “‘ the socialist party of hungary ”’; it was to take over the power at once in the name of the proletariat; the dictatorship was to be wielded by the labourers, peasants and soldiers’ council; urgent steps were to be taken to organise a “‘ class army ” and completely disarm the bourgeoisie; a reign of terror was to be proclaimed to ensure the rule of the proletariat; a close military and spiritual alliance was to be made with the russian soviet. by the evening (march 21 19109) the streets were in the hands of armed communists; at 6 p.m. the public prosecutor visited the prisons to release the prisoners. at the head of the governing council was placed alexander garbai, a bricklayer. his asso- hungary ciates in the council of people’s commissaries were kun, joseph pogany, president of the soldiers’ council and sigismund kunfh, a secondary school teacher who had been a member of karolyi’s cabinet. the people’s commissaries and practically all the lead- ing persons were jews, a fact which explains the anti-jewish feeling which later prevailed in hungary. ka4rolyi’s revolution had been in part an imitation of that of kerensky; hungarian communism took lenin as its model, though lenin is said to have warned bela kun to take into due account the fact that conditions in hungary were essentially different from those pre- vailing in russia. as the majority of the people’s commissaries had been prisoners of war in russia, they often spoke russian at their meetings. they ordained the “ communisation ” of the land, of industrial establishments, of houses and factories, of all undertakings and shops. jewels of a value in excess of 2,000 crowns were to be surrendered; the deposits entrusted to the banks (both savings and current account deposits) were seized and communised. from the outset there were two distinct currents of opinion in the government: a moderate and an extremist. at first the socialist influence predominated and the action of the communists was more of a chicanery than a persecution. on april 4 gen. smuts arrived in budapest to negotiate with kun’s government on behalf of the allies. we offered to recognise the disputed line, not as a political frontier, but as a line of demarcation only, to be bordered by a neutral zone. kun insisted that the bol- shevik system must be introduced in the neutral zone. smuts broke off negotiations. on april 16 the rumanians advanced along the line of demarcation up to the tisza (theiss). as their position was now menaced by the danger of a counter-revolu- tion, the bolsheviks resorted to undisguised persecution. in budapest alone they took 481 “‘ hostages,” and several thousands more throughout the country. the red army was organised, primarily to ensure the maintenance of the dictatorship. later, when they saw that the national feeling and popular exaspera- lion was growing even more formidable, and that terror, intern- ment, torture and assassination could no longer keep passions in check, the bolsheviks commenced an offensive campaign, defeated the czechs, occupied kosice (kaschau) and advanced up to the polish frontier at bardiov (bartfa). but, after receiv- ing clemenceau’s note of protest dated june 8, they withdrew their troops, and on june 13 were fixed the definitive frontiers which condemned hungary to dismemberment and helplessness. this catastrophe instilled fresh courage into the counter- revolutionaries. on june 24 the cadets and officers of the mili- tary academy, assisted by the danube monitors, some of which were stationed in the winter harbour at o-buda, assumed the offensive. on this occasion the red army suppressed the coun- ter-revolution; bul communism never recovered from the shock, and no one believed it could long maintain its position. as there had been counter-revolutionary movements in the provinces too, the red terror made its appearance. indisputable official data have recorded the murder by the terrorists of 585 persons, includ- ing louis de navay, a former speaker of the itouse of deputies and one of the most distinguished hungarians of his day; the number of persons of obscure origin who may also have fallen victims to szamuely’s thirst for blood is unknown. throughout the commune budapest suffered from a disastrous shortage of provisions, due not only to the blockade, but still more to the passive resistance of the peasantry. the communists employed their money for propaganda pur- poses, particularly in austria. budapest lived mainly on pearl barley and vegetable marrow; anyone desirous of obtaining bet- ter food was compelled to go to the provinces and offer clothes or petroleum in exchange for meat or bread. unrest and dis- content were general; even the trade unions were beginning to turn in secret against the soviet regime. there was a breach between bela kun and haubrich, commander of budapest and leader of the iron and metal workers. as an open rupture seemed imminent, it was proposed that the garrison of budapest should be placed under szamuely, the most bloodthirsty of all the jack ketches in the service of the dictatorship. luckily, the italian 393 colonel, romanelli—who had already collaborated with the american mission to save the lives of hostages and prisoners— prevented this baleful scheme. on july 20 bela kun began hostilities against the rumanians in the hope that his propaganda had demoralised their troops. the rumanians defeated him easily and advanced on budapest; whereupon the outbreak of internal discontent overthrew the bolshevik regime. the soviet govt. resigned on aug. 1. most of its leaders fled to austria. a socialist govt. under peidl was formed, which guaranteed the sanctity of private property. on aug. 4 the rumanians entered budapest. two days later the organised bourgeoisie overthrew the socialist govt. in which they felt no confidence since its recent connection with the communists, and a government was formed under the presidency of stephen friedrich. the counter- revolution —the restoration of a stable regime in hungary proved extremely difficult. in may rg919 a counter-revolutionary government had been formed at arad— then already occupied by the rumanians—under the presidency of count gyula (julius) karolyi, which endeavoured to act as the representative—as against the reign of terror of the com- mune—of the ideas of bourgeois order, of the historical integrity of hungary and of the principle of legal continuity. at first this was little more than a demonstration, since it lacked real power. after a few days the rumanians sent this government under military escort, first to the state estate at mezihegyes and then to szeged which, was at that date occupied by french troops. the szeged govt. began to organise a counter-revolutionary army out of a nucleus of volunteers who had distinguished them- selves during the war and had fled to szeged to escape the bol- shevik terror. its sphere of authority hardly extended beyond the inner confines of the town, but the authorities in occupation made many difficulties for both the military organisation and the civil administration. a certain success was achieved by the szeged govt. through its representatives in vienna, under the guidance of count bethlen. this “ detachment” kept in touch with foreign countries and informed public opinion of the west of the misdeeds of the hungarian soviet regime. after the fall of the commune the szeged govt. suspended its activity, and those detachments of the hungarian national army which had been formed at and near szeged moved their quarters to siefok on lake balaton. the government appointed ad- miral nicholas horthy commander-in-chief of the national army. in budapest, meanwhile, the popular archduke joseph as- sumed the government, assisted by stephen friedrich as prime minister; but the supreme council in paris refused to recognise any ilabsburg in a position of authority in hungary and sent four generals to budapest to represent the four principal allied powers. the archduke joseph was forced to resign. the four generals were fully occupied in thwarting the excesses of the rumanian troops of occupation in budapest, who plundered and destroyed property wholesale. according to the report dispatched by col. lorce to paris, the value of the goods requisi- tioned by the rumanians exceeded g0,000,c00 gold crowns (about £3,750,000). the rumanians also aggravated the diffi- culty of the friedrich government. the entente then deputed sir george clerk to negotiate as plenipotentiary delegate of the supreme council and pave the way for the constitution of a coalition government to include all the political parties with which the entente could properly conclude peace. on nov. 22 friedrich resigned, and a government, including representatives of all parties, was formed, huszar being minister president. on nov. 14 the rumanians withdrew to the line of the tisza (theiss), and horthy entered budapest at the head of the small national army, amid the enthusiasm of his many adherents. general elections were held in jan. 1920 on the basis of a suffrage (secret ballot) of a practically universal character. they gave a considerable majority for the parties of the right which formed the government alone. this was a natural reaction after nearly a year of excesses committed by the extreme left. those regrettable 394 acts of violence known and described abroad as the “ atroc- ities of the white terror ” sprang from a similar revulsion. it is a fact that, immediately after the fall of the commune, certain ‘‘ detachments ” were formed in various parts of the country, which arbitrarily executed communists; however, such atrocities were nothing like as numerous as those committed by the sovict regime. the victims of the period following the overthrow of communist dictatorship number, according to data compiled by the hungarian ministry of justice:— victims of the white terror 279 killed while attempting armed resistance . . . . te) willedineiight: <p 2. wee se bbs te, ate ws a a to total 307 by act i. of 1920 the new national assembly restored and once more put into force all that part of the ancient constitution which had been destroyed or eliminated by the revolutions. act xlv. of 1921 proclaimed hungary to be a monarchy (king- dom), the decision relative to the exercise of the kingly power being postponed to a later period. on march 1 1920 the na- tional assembly elected horthy to the ofiice of regent unani- mously and by acclamation. at the same time a law was passed defining the constitutional power of the regent. the treaty of trianon—the hungarian peace delegation, headed by count albert apponyi, count paul teleki and count bethlen, arrived in paris jan. 7 1920. on jan. 1§ it re- ceived the conditions of peace framed by the allied powers, to which it replied on feb. 27 in the form of a long memorandum, which, together with count apponyi’s speech made when hand- ing it over to the representatives of the allied powers, took the view that the conditions were unjust and must lead to catastrophic results. but the leading members of the peace conference would not agree to a plebiscite. the delega- tion was, however, allowed to put its observations before the peace conference itself with better success. thus, m. millerand promised, in the name of the allied powers, that the boundary commissions should be instructed, where they found the new frontiers involved any economic or ethnical injustice, to appeal to the league of nations. unfortunately, the conference of ambassadors found that any alteration of the frontiers, however slight, would be equivalent to a breach of the peace treaty. the treaty of peace was signed on june 4 1920 in the trianon by the hungarian delegates and ratified by the hungarian par- liament on nov. 15. m. simonyi-semadam, who had succeeded m. husz4r as prime minister in march 1920 with a transition cabinet, resigned in july 1920. count paul telcki, the new prime minister, carried through the first stages of hungarian consolidation. there were only slight differences among the four government parties. the orthodox legitimists and lib- erals formed the opposition. on the monarchist question legit- imists and free electionists were found in government and opposition parties alike. king charles’ attempts ait restoratton.—on march 27 1921 king charles iv., misled by the general depression which fol- lowed the signature of the treaty, and ill-advised by his entour- age, arrived at szombathely, whence he motored to budapest, driving straight to the residence of the regent, whom he called upon to hand him over the power. horthy replied that the nation was spiritually unprepared for so sudden a change, which might involve a grave upheaval. the little entente might use the restoration as a pretext to annihilate hungary’s indepen- dence. king charles returned to szombathely. meanwhile the ministers of the great powers, of yugoslavia and of czechoslo- vakia declared that the continued residence of king charles in hungary might involve the most serious consequences. on oct. 20 of the same year king charles and queen zita left switzerland by aeroplane, landing at denesfa, near sopron. the gendarme battalion stationed at sopron joined the king, and its example was followed by other troops. the king appointed a cabinet, with stephen rakovszky as premier, and on oct. 22 he started for budapest, his soldiers following him. telegraphic and telephonic communication with budapest had been inter- ( hungary rupted. as soon as the government were informed of what had happened, they declared that, in view of the foreign political situation, the king was not entitled to exercise royal preroga- tives in hungary and called upon him to leave the territory of the country. the regent sent a letter to the king explaining to him that, if he entered budapest, this might result in the ruin of hungary. his majesty should come alone, unaccompanied by soldiers or by his cabinet, and clear the situation tn conference with the legal government of hungary and with the ministers of the entente powers. however, the king continued his jour- ney,, refusing all intervention. on the next morning, oct. 23, a small skirmish took place between the king’s troops and those of the government, at budaers, near the capital. the king’s troops retired and dispersed. the royal couple were taken to the abbey of tihany, near lake balaton, there to await the decision of the entente powers. yugoslavia and czechoslovakia had already decreed mobilisation. on oct. 31 the conference of ambassadors demanded the formal deposition of charles and of the dynasty. on nov. 3 the ijungarian govt. introduced a bill abrogating charles’ sovereign rights, and on nov. 5 declared that before proceeding to settle the question of the election of a future king, they will agree previously with the great powers represented on the conference of ambassadors, and will not act without their consent.! on nov. 1 the king and queen had left hlungary on the british monitor h.m.s. “‘ glowworm ”’ for funchal on the island of madeira (sce charles). period of depression.—in april 1921 count bethlen had suc- ceecled count teleki as premier. the international position of hungary had been seriously shaken by the royal attempts at restoration. the tension only abated very gradually and the events at budaers were doubly unfortunate since they followed closely on the venice conference (oct. 11 and 12 1921) by which, thanks to the intervention of italy, an agreement had been reached with austria that a plebiscite should decide the future of the town and environs of sopron (oedenburg). the plebiscite went in favour of ilungary (see burgenland). . at the end of the commune the hungarian crown had still been quoted tn zurich at 20° of its pre-war value. since then it had de- clined steadily. the chief cause of the financial catastrophe was naturally the historical and political collapse of ilungary, which had been followed very rapidly by a general economic crisis. from the occupied territories several hundreds of thousands of public employees and their families had been pouring into the country, and they had to be provided for by the government. as there was a great dearth of housing accommodation in budapest, most of the miser- able refugees had to live in railway trucks, indeed, incidentally monopolising for years a considerable proportion of the rolling stock of the state railways, already grievously diminished by rumanian requisitioning. the destitution and misery of the population was fearful; everybody everywhere demanded assistance from the state, which, despite tts meagre revenue, was compelled to assist, unless thousands were to die of starvation. the state resorted to inflation and the currency soon became worthless. business stag- nated. the rate of interest at times reached 40-50°% per month, speculation was rife. no efforts of the successive finance ministers, neither the stamping of the currency notes—a measure taken to avoid a further inflation —nor the sequestration of 20% of the cash deposits, 15° of the shares and 17°%.of the larger estates, could remedy the situation. the rate of exchange in zurich fell to 0-0003. one or two branches of industry—such as the textile industry— prospered, since they were protected by high tariffs and labour was cheap; but the state and a very large’ part of the population were faced with utter ruin. conditions at home required a strong government and a working majority in the national assembly, and such an issue could only be secured by new elections. on the expiration of the prescribed period of two years, in feb. 1922, the national assembly was dissolved, and the elections held in the spring gave the government a big majority. there was, however, a strong opposition consisting of liberals, democrats, kossuthites (independents), 24 socialists and 20 ‘‘ neutrals.” in order to secure the working capacity of the na- tional assembly, the standing orders of 1907 were revised with beneficial results. in the clections of june 1922 the.bethlen govern- ment secured a great majority and formed the united party of small- holders, bourgeois, industrials and great landed proprietors. out of 242 seats in the national assembly the united party secured 143, 1see letter from bauffy to the conference of ambassadors, nov. § 1921, in engagements internationaux pris par la ifongrie en ce qut concerne la dynastie des habsbourg. (league of nations, doc. 132 and 160 of 1922.) hungary the christian national united party 32. the social democrats secured 24 mandates. count bethlen now reconstructed his cabinet with a pro- gramme of *‘ the complete liquidation of the revolutionary spirit, the extension of civil rights and economic reconstruction.” his main object was to ensure consolidation. the tide of extremist passion was on the ebb, and the policy of the golden mean proved most likely to achieve favourable results. the conditions of public safety were restored. the outrages perpetrated against the elizabeth ward club (on april 2 1922) and against the inn csongrad (somewhat later) were the last attempts to subvert public order. it now became possible to set about realising the two most urgent reforms: agrarian reform and financial reconstruction. agrarian reform.—the land reform question is inseparably connected with the name of the late minister of agriculture, stephen szabo de nagyatad. to provide the landless with land a levy was raised upon the latifundia. official figures for the period jan. 1921 to nov. 1925 show that 845,567 cadastral ac. (t cadastral ac.=1-422 english ac.) were requisitioned and allotted respectively for 168,263 house sites and for the forma- tion of ‘* dwarf ” and small holdings, while in 650 parishes 123,- 763 cadastral ac. were taken over for the formation of small leaseholds. proceedings for the compulsory purchase of land for the purpose of grants to the landless have been instituted or applications for such institution filed in altogether 3,532 parishes. to carry through such proceedings, the national land distribu- tion tribunal has dispatched judges to 3,526 parishes, and the tribunal has exercised its right of pre-emption in 300 cases, affecting altogether an area of 15,816 cadastral acres. landed property has been parcelled out in 273 cases, the area involved being 62,328 cadastral acres. the reconstruction plan.—as a result of the world war and the subsequent revolutions, the hungarian state budget and balance of payments both showed a considerable deficit, while the unsettled reparations problem perpetuated grave uneasiness in hungary which again made foreign capital adopt an attitude of absolute reserve. the government was convinced that economic reconstruction was out of the question unless adequate capital was available to stabilise the crown until public finances were again balanced. ‘the govern- ment could only secure the necessary capital by means of a foreign loan, but there were grave obstacles in the way of a negotiation of such a loan, since, for the security of their reparation claims, the allied states had the right to regard those claims as a charge on all the assets and revenue of the hungarian state (“.. . the first charge upon all the assets and revenues of hungary shall be the cost of reparation and all other costs arising under the present treaty...” art. 180 of the treaty of trianon). the loan which the hungarian government desired to take up through the intervention of the league of nations could not be negotiated until the reparation com- mission had, with the consent of all the states claiming reparation, released the assets and revenues of hungary from the gencral charge thus stipulated, and until ilungary, as a member of the league of nations (she had been admitted sept. 18 1922), had submitted a re- quest to that effect. on oct. 17 1923 the reparation commission agreed in principle to suspend the priority of charges on the assets and revenues of hun- gary and thus to approve of the negotiation of the foreign loan to be taken up under the aegis of the league of nations. the council of the league, at its session in paris in dec., was thus able to discuss the flotation of the loan, while the experts sent to budapest by the council elaborated—in conjunction with the hungarian government—a programme of reconstruction. by request of the council the financial committee of the league—on the basis of negotiations carried on in respect of questions of detail with the ‘parties concerned—drafted two protocols (proces-verbals}, which were accepted by the parties concerned and adopted —zem. con.—at the meeting of the council held on dec. 20. the first protocol was of political nature. great britain, france, italy, rumania, yugoslavia and czechoslovakia engaged to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of hungary, not to endeavour to obtain any economic advantages calculated to endanger that independence, and to abstain from all action likely to run counter to the spirit of the agreements to be concluded for the purpose of furthering the financial reconstruction of hungary; hungary engaged to mect her international obligations faithfully and punctually, and similarly to abstain from all action in defiance of the agreements to be concluded for the purpose of furthering her financial reconstruction. the protocol affirms hungary’s full liberty of action in respect of all questions affecting her own economic system and commercial relations, while requiring her not to put into force in her relations with any other state such special measures as might be calculated to endanger her independence. s05 the second protocol contains the detailed conditions relating to the floating of the loan:— the }ilungarian government shall submit to the league the programme of reforms to be gradually materialised and of economic reconstruction; detailed statements being presented every six months during the period of reconstruction of the minimum revenue expected and the maximum expenditure which the country is able to under- take, and the measures proposed to decrease expenditure and increase revenue; the whole must comprise a scheme which shall provide for the restoration of the balance of the public budget by june 1926. the progranime must preclude any recourse being had to any other loan, or to inflation. ilungary engages to endeavour to conclude commercial agreements, in particular with the neighbouring states, for the purpose of eliminating the obstacles impeding trade. the hungarian govt. undertakes to secure the approval of the scheme by the national assembly. it is empowered—within the period required for the restoration of the balance of the budget --to take up a foreign loan of 250,000,000 gold crowns to secure surplus ex- penditure, the procceds of such loan to be available only in accord- ance with the provistons of the protocol. hungary consents to the league of nations appointing a commissioner-general to be resident in budapest, whose duty it shall be to control the execution of the rcform programme. the commissioner-general shall submit to the council a monthly report on the results obtained during the work- ing out of the programme. as security for the loan the ilungarian government mortgages the gross revenue of the customs, the sugar tax and the tobacco regie, the net revenue of the salt regie, and where required such other special sources of revenue (mortgage rights) as that government shall appoint by agreement with the commissioner-gencral, save only the revenue of the ilungarian state railways. the hungarian govt. engages not to take any such measures as in the opinion of the commissioner-general are cal- culated to prejudice the value of the charges thus stipulated. this protocol also contains a provision to the effect that the obligations devolving on the hungarian govt. shall only be in force in the event of the reparation commission taking a decision to that effect. at its mecting held on feb. 21 1924 the reparation commission released the state revenues acting as security for the loan, and agreed to the floating of a loan of 250,000,000 gold crowns. at the same time the reparation commission fixed the payments and de- liveries to be made by hungary in respect of reparation liability within the limits of a fixed schedule amounting to 200,000,000 gold kronen spread over 20 years. these payments and deliveries are graduated from 880 tons of coal or its equivalent in value from jan. i 1924 to dec. 31 1926; then until dec. 31 1928, annual payments of 5,000,000 gold kronen which increase by degrees until 14,000,000 per annum is reached in 1942 and 14943. this removed the last obstacle to the putting into force of the geneva protocol! which was formally signed at geneva on march 14 1924. the commissioncr- general appointed by the league of nations, mr. jeremiah smith, an american citizen, took up his duties on may © 1924. connected with the reparation question are the habilities under- taken by italy and by the succession states, viz.: poland, rumania, czechoslovakia and the serbo-croat-slovene state, to pay to the reparation commission the value of the state properties (railways, forests, public buildings, etc.) of the former austro-ll[ungarian monarchy situated in the territories ceded to them, and further a contribution to the expenses incurred by the allies in liberating the people of the said territories. these habilities, which in the aggregate would amount to a very large total, were to be paid off, with 5°% intcrest, in 30 years from jan. i 1926, but no payment has hith- certo been made. it should also be mentioned that italy and the succession states were, in accordance with a now generally accepted principle of international law, required to take over a share of the pre-war austrian and ilungatian public debts proportionate to the austrian and hungarian territories they respectively acquired. the reconstruction imposed heavy burdens on the hungarian people. the state was obliged to exercise the utmost economy in order to balance its budget; it had to dismiss many thousancs of public servants—25,000 had been dismisssed up to dec. 1925—and withdraw the subsidies previously granted to numcrous branches of production. all taxes had to be raised to the utmost point possible. yet the reconstruction proved a decided success, and the balance of the public finances was restored at the very opening of the period appointed for the reconstruction. the league of nations expressed great satisfaction at the success of the scheme; and both the council (in september 1925) and the gencral assembly, during its 1925 session, conveyed to the hungarian govt. and the commissioner- general its sincere apprcciation, also expressing its admiration for the generosity and self-sacrifice of the hlungarian taxpayers.! during 1924-5 the hungarian govt. was actively engaged in an endeavour to settle the questions still pending with other states, and in particu- lar with hungary’s immediate neighbours, and to develop the friendly character of hungary’s international relations. | lin june 1926 the council of the league of nations decided to terminate the control of [jungarian finance on june 30, the recon- struction having proceeded more rapidly than had been expected. supervision was retained in two respects only—over the revenues assigned as security for the reconstruction loans, and over the un- spent balance of those loans. 396 a sertes of agreements were concluded with austria, rumania, yugoslavia and czechoslovakia, referring to legal questions and a general rapprochement in ‘respect of economic and commercial questions and of financial and credit transactions. hereby the hungarian govt. has shown indubitably that it is desirous to remain true to its own policy, the cardinal principles of which are con- solidation and the solution of the fundamental problems of peace. ‘these latter naturally include also the securing of the cultural, economic and political liberty of the hungarian minorities living in the territories separated from hungary by the treaty of ae be. bibliography.—g. szekfii, der staat ungarn (1918); j. andrassy, dipiomatie und weltkrieg (1920); b. kolozsvary, von revolution su revolution (1920); a. szana, die bolschevistische wirtschaft im ungarn (1920); j. varga, die wirtschaftspolitischen probleme der proletarischen diktatur (vienna, 1920); trade union conditions in hungary (inter-labour office, geneva, 1921); ungarische jahrbticher (quarterly, berlin, 1921, etc.); bzbliographia ungartae (friedrich- wilhelms universitat, 1923, ctc.); m. h. h. macartney, five yeurs of european chaos (1923); m. karolyi, fighting the world. the struggle for peace (1924); o. jaszi, revolution and cotnter-revolu- tion in hungary (1924); reconstruction of iiungary, league of nations (geneva); league commntissioner-general smith's monthly reports (geneva). defence —under article 108 of the treaty of trianon the strength of the hungarian army (royal hungarian honved) is limited to 1,750 officers, 2,334 n.c.o.’s and 20,916 other ranks —35,000in all. up to july 1 1922 the honved officers had to be recruited exclusively from among former regular officers. the term of service for the rank and file is 12 consecutive years. only voluntary recruiting is permitted. the army consists of seven mixed brigades; there are also four regiments of hussars, four batteries, three battalions engineers. a mixed brigade consists of two regiments of infantry (each containing three battalions) one cyclist battalion, one squadron hussars, one artillery group of three batteries, one trench-mortar company, one signals com- pany, one horse-transport detachment, one mechanical trans- port detachment. heavy reductions were made on the applica- tion of the reconstruction scheme, and it is understood that the permanent establishment of the army in 1926 was much below strength. the police and gendarmerie consists of 2,100 officers and 9,900 men; the term of service is 20 years for the officers and 6 years for the men. see league of nations, armaments year book (1925-6). (x2) ii. economic and financial history agriculiure.—of the population of hungary in 1925 about 56% were engaged in agricultural work as compared with 30% in industry and commerce. agricultural production was there- fore the basis of the country’s economic development. in the five years which preceded the world war, hungary’s agricultural production showed a gradual but constant develop- ment in consequence of the draining of flooded areas and the extended use of agricultural machines and artificial manures. this development was arrested by the war, the succeeding revo- lutions, the occupation of the country by foreign powers and by the provisions of the peace treaty. owing to the scarcity of labour, draught animals and manure, the arable land, amounting to 5,600,000 hectares, could not be properly cultivated, and a considerable decrease of production resulted. the downward tendency reached its lowest level in the years 1919-20; from that time, progress, at first slow and later quicker, was visible, some crops showing in 1925 a yield which compared well with those of pre-war years. the index numbers of the five principal crops showing favour- able development (the average of the years tgi11—5 being equal to 100) are as follows: years wheat rye barley | maize | potatoes iqii-5 average 100 100 100 100 1920 . ‘ ; 52 64 66 84 i9g2i . ; : 79 79 67 67 1922 . f : 75 79 67 82 1923 - . - 2 99 75 93 1924 . ; 70 70 45 125 [925 . 95 96 73 156 | hungary the following table shows the yield of seven principal crops:— average of the years average of the years i91t1-5 in 1920 1921-4 in 1925 (in} metric quilntals) wheat . 119,950,076 | 10,322,119 | 15,812,439 | 18,942,014 tye... | 8,042,139] 5,143,169] 6,586,079] 7,742,259 barley 7,141,212| 4,718,519] 4,693,232] 5,224,057 oats 4,404,705) 3,237,901 | 3,187,092] 3,560,879 maize 15,055,696 | 12,742,081 | 13,444,601 | 23,483,383 potatoes 19,458,893 | 20,722,294 | 14,915,207 | 23,054,775 sugar beet 15,019,512] 6,398,261} 8,706,781 | 15,252,572 these results are due in part to favourable weather, but credit must also be given to the diligence and perseverance of the people of hungary. the abolition in 1923 of export and other arbi- trary restrictions on trading, and the subsequent stabilisation of the currency under the league of nations reconstruction plan, also greatly contributed to increased production by assuring the farmer sure markets at stable and profitable prices. the values in millions of pounds sterling of the seven principal crops mentioned above amounted in 1920 to 14:2, 1921 to 22-7, 1922 to 29'4, 1923 to 33°0, 1924 to §1°6 and in 1925 to 59-1 mil- lion sterling. before the war the same seven crops produced in the territory of present hungary (calculated on the basis of the prices of 1913) had a value of £48,400,000. the total value of the agricultural products for 1925 was approximately £80,000,000. there is no reason to think that the production of 1925 cannot be maintained or even improved, provided increased credit facilities for implements and plant are forthcoming. live stock, which in consequence of the war and occupations by the enemy had suffered serious losses, showed in 1925 an improvement both from the point of view of quantity and qual- ity. poultry farming also showed great advance after the war. while only £700,000 worth of poultry and poultry products (eggs, feathers, etc.) were exported by hungary in 1922 these exports approximated to £2,900,000 in 1925. the production of wine also showed an increase over pre-war figures for the same territory, and there was steady development in fruit-growing, bee-farming and silk production. land mortgage loans granted by the principal financial insti- tutions in hungary amounted in 1913 to £167-7 million, or 41% of their capital. the land mortgage loans granted by the same concerns at the end of 1924 only amounted to £83,000 or 0:3 % of their capital. in other words, the land in hungary was prac- tically free of all mortgage, owing to the depreciation of the currency. towards the close of 1925 the 9:3 million hectares of jand in hungary were worth {582-2 million, of which the 5-6 million hectares of arable land were valued at £406-5 million. industry.—the total production of hungarian industries (present territory) in 1913 amounted to 1,641-4 million gold crowns, and in 1924 only 1,531-12 million gold crowns, 7.¢., 6°5% less. the average production for each factory was 790,000 gold crowns in 1913 and only 560,c00 gold crowns in 1924, #.¢., a dimi- nution of 29:1°%. the value of the average working capacity of one worker was 7,485 gold crowns in 1913 and only 6,066 gold crowns in 1924 2.¢., a decrease of 19%. in the various industries production figures were as follows:— | value of production in industries millions of gold crowns 1924 193°58 160-49 92°34 36°14 51-62 193°44 31°86 7°23 702°55 84°20 18:07 1913 252°49 251-30 70°87 41-42 44°95 82°24 24°81 10-69 695°43 124°50 42-60 iron and metal . machines . . ; stone, pottery and glass . wood and bone . ; ; leather, hair and feathers spinning and weaving clothing ; paper . : foodstulfs . chemicals printing hungary the larger industries showing the greatest progress since the war are sugar and textiles. in 1924-5 the sugar industry manu- factured 1,770,000 and exported 892,0co0 quintals of refined sugar, as compared with an output of 1,500,000 quintals in 1923. out of home requirements in textiles amounting to 447,000,000 gold crowns, home production in 1925 was able to supply textiles to the value of 260,000,000 gold crowns, as compared with only 82,400,000 pre-war. next to minneapolis, budapest has prob- ably the largest flour-milling capacity in the world, but only about 30% of the capacity was utilised in 1925, owing to lack of the grain that formerly came to budapest from the southern territories now separated from hungary. foreign trade.—the foreign trade figures of hungary for 1925 showed rapid improvement. for the first time since the war there was a favourable balance in august. the figures for the six years ending 1925 are as follows:— , increase of import export bees ; year import export in millions of pounds sterling ee | 1920 17°3 6-8 10-5 100 100 | 1921 21-6 10-5 ii-i 125 155 1922 22-4 13°7 8-7 129 201 1923 17-6 i4e1 3°5 ioi 206 29:2 23:9 5°3 168 30°9 29:2 u7 1 the figures for 1925 are provisional. the increase of the unfavourable balance in 1924 may be explained by the fact that after the abolition of import restric- tions a great number of goods were imported in a short period. the steady tendency of the commercial balance towards equilib- rium was also shown by the decrease of the proportion of the unfavourable balance to total imports: 60:6% in 1920, 38:8% in 1922, 18°2% in 1924 and 5-5% in 1925. the new international commercial free harbour on the danube at budapest, which was partly open in 1925 for traffic, is likely to be an important aid to increased trade between the western states and the balkans and the levant. emplovment.—the unemployment returns compiled by the trade unions—the only available statistics—showed a reduction from over 36,000 in jan. 1925 to about 26,000 in nov. of the same year. the average wage level for full time was then over 100%, of pre-war in gold and between 80% and 90% in home purchasing power. price—the wholesale price index reached its peak at the beginning of 1925 at 159, and the retail index (pester lloyd) at 141, exclusive of rent. by nov. of that year they had fallen to 129 and 123 respectively. trade conventions.—-the breaking up of the austro-hungarian monarchy, with its single customs union, into seven independ- ent customs territories naturally proved a handicap to close trade relations between hungary and her neighbours. in the beginning of 1925 an autonomous customs tariff was brought into force. although the new duties—partly for the protection of home industries and partly as a basis of bargaining—were relatively high, there was a marked increase of imports, incli- cating that the duties were by no means prohibitive. by the end of 1925 hungary had concluded commercial agreements with 17 states on the basis of the most-favoured-nation clause, and definitive commercial treaties with five other states on the basis of special tariff concessions. negotiations with other and par- ticularly with neighbouring states were proceeding, though slowly, with a view to substituting the existing provisional agree- ments by definitive treaties. among the many obstacles was the unwillingness of adjacent states to avail themselves of the direct transit facilities offered by the hungarian railway lines. as a result of this diversion of traffic to more roundabout routes, encouraged by artificial rates, hungary’s ton-kilometre railway figures have fallen steadily—an instance of the problems that 397 confront any solution of the economic difficulties in the danu- bian basin. the country’s finances budget for 1924-5 and 1925~6.—the state budget for the fiscal year ending june 30 1925, as approved by the league of nations, provided for a deficit of £4,200,000. instead, there was a surplus of about £2,600,000. the budget for the year ending june 30 1926 estimated for a surplus of £1,200,000, although the league of nations had originally estimated that in this year there would be a deficit of f2,100,000. the results of the first six months of the fiscal year 1925-6 indicated that the more favourable estimates were being borne out by actual results. the principal items of the budget for 1925-6 were as follows:— million pounds budget headings sterling expenditure for material 3°6 state debts 2°4 treaty charges : 0-3 expenditure for personnel ; : : : 8-0 contribution to expenditure of autonomous bodies, comitats, etc.) : : ; 1-3 pensions ; 3°1 capital outlay . 0:5 total . : : ; 1g-2 deficit of undertakings . o-4 total of expenditure 19:6 receipts from revenue, etc. 20-8 surplus i-2 both expenditure and receipts showed increases over the league estimates, partly due to the rise of 17 % in the value of the crown since the date of stabilisation. in view of the satisfactory condition of the budget, the league of nations in june 1925 released for productive capital expenditure 30,000,000 gold crowns from the reconstruction loan which had not been needed, as originally anticipated, to balance the budget, and also agreed that the budget surplus for 1924-5 should be applied similarly and for bringing the salaries of state employces nearer to the pre-war level. in dec. 1925 the league released from the recon- struction loan a further sum of 20,000,000 gold crowns for capital expenditure in 1925-6; also, conditionally, 50,000,000 for 1926-7, leaving 82,000,000 out of the original loan of 250,000,000 gold crowns still to be released. as at nov. 30 1925 the commissioner-general’s account showed the available balance of reconstruction loan to be 152,000,000 gold crowns. state debt-—the total hungarian state debt amounted to £329,800,000 sterling before the war, which represents a burden of £15°7 per capita of population. the debt of present ilungary, as constituted under the peace treaty, amounted to £57,600,000 sterling at the end of 1924, due allowance having been made for the allocation of the pre-war debt and of part of the war debt as pro- vided by the peace treaty. of this amount {2,000,000 represents the funded internal debt, £48,700,000 the funded foreign debt and £6,900,000 the floating debt. the burden per capita of the popula- tion amounts to £7, much less than the pre-war burden, mainly in consequence of the depreciation in the value of the obligations of the state. savings and credit.—coincidently with the stabilisation of the ilungarian currency on the £ sterling there was a marked increase in savings deposits. figures from the postal savings banks and the 13 principal financial institutions in budapest show that savings de- posits steadily increased from £210,063 at dec. 31 1923 to {5,012,500 in nov. 1925, while current account deposits with the same institu- tions and over the same period increased from {4,876,952 to £13,029,- 166. the gross total of deposits is only about one-quarter of the pre-war amount. . the bank rate, which in march 1925 was 123° was gradually lowered until in oct. 1925 it reached 7%, credit and money condi- tions becoming correspondingly easier. this was facilitated by the introduction of foreign capital. in addition to relatively large short- term commodity credits for flour, sugar, etc., principally from eng- land, and the participation of forcign capital in two of the leading budapest banks, two long-term foreign loans were successfully floated towards the end of 1925, one of ey 0,000,000 in new york for 48 hungarian municipalities, and another of {1,000,000 sterling in london against land mortgages. taxation.—prior to the period of reconstruction in 1924 the hungarian govt. had recourse to many taxation expedients and drastic measures in their struggle to maintain revenue in the face of an ever-depreciating currency. the system of assessing taxation on the incomes and revenues of the previous year soon ceased to have any meaning. asa result of the war, the revolution and the rumanian occupation there were also outstanding arrears due for some three or four years. in 1920 there was a forced loan by the stamping of notes amounting to 50% of the currency then in circula- tion, in 1921 a heavy capital levy, and in 1924 another forced loan based on the earned income and capital of each individual or firm 398 operating in hungary. consumption (excise) taxes were fixed at a proportion of the actual price of the articles consumed, and the ‘“turn-over ”’ tax, payable simultaneously with the purchase of all articles, was introduced. the latter tax was fixed originally at 1-5 % and subsequently at 3° of the sale price of each article and on each handling, thus amounting in many instances to a tax of 12%. (in aug. 1925 this tax was reduced to 2%.) arrears of taxation were drastically compounded, and land taxes were made payable in wheat or wheat values. finally, by the passage of act [v. of 1924 the gov- ernment were empowercd to levy all taxes in values of gold crowns. in a report presented to the league of nations in oct. 1925, the j.eague comnussioner-general in elungary estimated that on the hungarian budget for 1925-6 the taxes levied by the state, exclud- ing local taxes, amounted to 60 gold crowns per capita of population. this compared with approximately 45 gold crowns per capita pre- war, which, after making allowance of 35% for the depreciation in the value of gold, also worked out at 60 gold crowns per caput, adiling local to state taxation, the commissioner-gencral estimated that the total per capita taxation was 72 gold crowns per heal. estimating the national income of hlungary at approximately 3,600 to 4,000 million gold crowns, the commissioner estimated that the total taxation of hungary represented between 14 and 17% of the national income. this compared with between 13 and 14°) pre- war. according to the same authority this taxation was by no means light for an agricultural country such as hungary. from one-fiith to one-quarter of these taxes were raised in 1925 by direct and from three-quarters to four-fifths by indirect taxation. on the basis of the government assessment for the fiscal year end- ing june 30 1926 the direct taxes, according to commisstoncr- general smith, were divided as follows:— millions of gold crowns land: tax «4 2 «: 4 « ee ee 42 house tax . . : : ne sy : 24 state participation in house rents : ; . , a3 corporation tax . : ¢ : . , ; 10 income tax : ‘ : ; ; : ’ ’ al property tax . ; : : : : : 8:7 lar 7 the estimates of indirect taxation for the same period are as fol- lows:— turnover tax. ; : ; ‘ : ; : 103°6 stamp and other similar taxes 2... et 52-4 ‘tax on commodities ; ‘ : : ; : 55:6 customs. : . : ; , ; ‘ , ‘ &5-6 salt monopoly (net) ey ee ee ee 11-2 tobacco monopoly (gross) . . . . . «| 97-6 transport tax . ; : ; ; : . 9-2 415-2 currency.—during the existence of the dual monarchy, hungary and austria had a joint monctary system and a joint bank of issue. after the outbreak of the revolution the austro-hungarian bank was able for some time to continue its work in iiungary, but the bolshevik regime seized the entire stock of notes. when these began to run short the so-called soviet republic issued their own notes. after the collapse of soviet rule in 1919, the ilungarian govt. issued the necessary decree to enable the austro-hungarian bank to con- tinue its statutory work as ‘‘ manager of the hungarian business of the austro-hungarian bank.” in march 1920 the government ordered the stamping of the notes of the austro-hungarian bank which were in circulation within the country, and requisitioned 50° of these notes as a forced loan in order to secure, so far as possible, the carrying on of the state administration without constant application to the note printing press. as the creation of a special issuing institution appeared to be inevitable in consequence of the liquidation under the peace treaties of the austro-hungarian bank, the state itself provisionally estab- lished the royal hungarian state note institute (m. kir. allami jegyintezet), which began its activities on aug. 1 1921. the notes of the austro-i[ungarian bank, which had been provided with the hungarian stamp, were exchanged in the same year against state notes. when the state note institute commenced its work, the financial and economic position was such as to compel the state to cover its budgetary requirements not from revenues but by means of the note printing press. this naturally resulted in the gradual depreciation of the crown. the forced loan raised by stamping notes had covered the budget deficit only for a short time. in 1921 the government had recourse to a non-recurring capital levy, but by the time most of the proceeds reached the treasury the value of the crown had so depreciated as to nullify these efforts. in the first half of 1921 the exchange rate of the crown rose temporarily in ziirich from 1-05 to 2-85 swiss francs (100 crowns), owing to the impression created by the taxation and other plans of the then minister of finance, m. hegedus. when it was seen that these plans were impossible of realisation, and as hungary’s balance of payments became more and more unfavourable, the crown continued to fall, until in march 1924 hunting—husain ibn ali it reached 0-0085 swiss francs for 100 crowns. as the result of long negotiations the league of nations loan was raised, and the restora- tion of normal economic and currency conditions was thus made possible (see above, political history). all restrictions in foreign exchange were abolished in oct. 1925, when the currency was con- sidered to be sufficiently stabilised to be left to fluctuate freely according to supply and demand. central bank.—the re-establishment of an independent bank of issue was in the forefront of the programme of reconstruction. the hungarian national bank was founded, with a capital of 30,000,000 gold crowns, and commenced its activitics on june 24 i1g24. from that day the state notes then in circulation were re- garded as bank-notes. under its statutes the bank is precluded from lending to the state, and is required to maintain against its note circulation a percentage of cover in precious metal and stable foreign exchanges, on an ascending scale, beginning at 20°, during the first five years. the bank return of dec. 31 1925 showed the proportion of cover to be 56-46 per cent. since july 1924 the currency has been stable on a sterling basis. in oct. 1925 the basis of stabilisation became gold, and all restrictions on dealings in foreign exchange were abolished. the following table shows the development of the note circula- tion:— circulation in date paper crowns dec. 34 1920 issuing institution wiungarian = manage- iment of austro-hun- garian bank . ; state note institute state note institute state note institute i 4,307,808,630 15,787,175,750 25,174,941, 187 931,337,334:630 aug. i 1921 dee; 3% 1921 dec. 31 1923 june 24.1924 ilungarian national bank . : : 2,520,11 3,700,576 dec. 31 1924 hungarian national bank . : : 4,513,989,561,419 dec. 311925 fhlungarian national bank . ; ; : 5,193,937,447;500 (415,514,995°79 penges) new currency.—on dec. 31 1925 the currency per capita of the population was approximately 43 gold crowns. in the latter part of 1925 the new monetary unit was chosen and named the penge, divided into 100 filler; 3,800 new units go to one kilogramme of fine gold, so that 1 penge contains 0-26315789 grammes of fine gold. the currency reform law passed on nov. 6 1925 provides for the minting of gold coins for 20 and io penges from an alloy consisting of goo parts of gold to 100 of copper, so that 3.420 pengds will be struck from one kilogramme of this alloy. the national bank is required to buy gold in bars at a fixed price without limit and on demand. silver coins of one penge will be put into circulation to a total nominal value of not more than 45,000,000 penge. from jan. 1 1927 the penge will be the obligatory unit of account in hungary. the rate of conversion from the old to the new currency is 12,500 paper crowns to one penge, or one gold crown =1-1585365 penge. 4 pengd is therefore cqual to 0-0359388 pound sterling, or o0-1748985 dollar. bipliograriy.—dafonthly reports of league commissioner- general jeremiah smith (geneva); reve itongroise de statistiques (budapest); department of overseas trade reports 1924 (1925). (w. go.*) hunting: sce fox hunting: shooting. husain ibna‘li (c. 1854- ), amir of mecca from 1908 to 1916 and king of hejaz from 1016 to 1924, was the second son of muhamnad ibn‘aun of the ‘abadila clan of ashraf. ile was brought up in bedouin surroundings, but spent a great part of his life at constantinople. reputed to harbour anglophil tenden- cies, he was deeply versed in the byways of ottoman politics and his best trait was a profound knowledge of the desert, for which he alwavs maintained a genuine affection. at the begin- ning of his amirate he won golden opinions by his sagacity and modesty and set himself vigorously to forward turkish interests in arabia. in roro he subdued a rebellion in ‘asir and subse- quently invaded qasim without result, but in r9r3 he began to show his true colours by opposing the extension of the ilejaz railway to mecca. when the world war broke out he entered into negotiations with the british, which culminated in the arab revolt in june 1916. in oct. he proclaimed himself “‘ king of the arab countries’ though he was formally recognised only as king of hejaz. at the versailles peace conference (1919) he was represented by his third son, faisal, but refused to ratify the treaty as a protest against the mandatory regimes imposed on syria, palestine and ‘iraq. subsequently his domestic policy was marked by ever increasing avarice and reaction, while he hurgronjl:—hyde sowed the seeds of future trouble by deliberately courting the enmity of ibn sa‘ud. in march 1924, while on a visit to trans- jordan, he proclaimed himself caliph, but war with ibn sa‘ud was already imminent and the wahhabi attack on zaif in sept. found him unprepared. on oct. 5 he abdicated and proceeded to ‘aqaba, whence in july 1925 he was conveyed by a british warship to cyprus, where he took up his residence. by his first marriage husain had three sons: ‘ali; ‘abdullah, amir of transjordan, and faisal. the first of these, ‘ali ibn husain, who was born about 1880, took no conspicuous part in affairs during his father’s amirate. after the world war he be- came amir of medina and in that capacity did much useful work in connection with the reconstruction of the hejaz railway. in 1924 he was pressed to accept the amirate of transjordan but declined in favour of returning to medina. he succeeded his father as second king of hejaz on oct. 3 1924, but abdicated on dec. 19 of the following year (see hejaz) and returned to bagh- dad to live as the guest of his brother faisal. hurgronje, christiaan snouck (1857- ), dutch orientalist, was born at oosterhaut feb. 8 1857. after com- pleting his studies in theology and oriental languages he went to arabia, where he stayed for several years, and to other parts of the near east. the result of these travels was his work mekka (2 vol., 1888-9}. he refused a nomination as professor of arabic at cambridge university in succession to robertson smith and also nominations in germany and at leyden, pre- ferring to continuc his studies on islam in the dutch east indies (1889-1906) where for some years’ he was counsellor to the government in mahommedan affairs. in 1893-4 he published de atjehers, which was translated into english in rg00. he returned to holland in 1906, where he accepted the chair of arabic at the university of leyden; in 1907 he was nominated counsellor for indian and arabian affairs to the dutch and the dutch east indies government. among his other works are ved- erland en de islam (1911); and verspreide geschriften (1923f1.). hutchinson, sir jonathan (1828-1013), british surgeon (see 14.13), died at haslemere, surrey, june 23 1913. hutments: see barracks. huysmans, camille (1871-— ), belgian politician, was born at bilsen in belgian limbourg may 26 1871. after gradu- ating in germanic philology at liege, he became a professor, first at the college liberal at ypres, and then at the universite nouvelle, brussels. he edited the petit bleu and the peuple and after the war started the volksgaset in antwerp. he entered the chamber in roro, first as deputy for brussels and then for antwerp, where he became an alderman of public instruction. in rorg he was secretary of the socialist international party and while in holland endeavoured to organise a congress at stock- holm. though he was severcly criticised for this by his fellow socialists at the time, he completely regained their confidence later and became the chief organiser of the socialist party in antwerp. in june 1925 he became minister of science and arts in m. poullet’s government. his chief works are: limburgsch. jaarboek (1891-5); zoponvmische studie over bilsen (in conjunc- tion with j. cuvelin) 1897; stockholm (1919); and numerous socialist brochures.