HEJAZ

under the ottoman regime the hejaz, extending from ma‘an and ‘aqaba in the north to hali point on the red sea coast in the south, formed a vilayat with a wali resident at mecca, controlling a garrison of about 7,000 troops. in 1904 turkish control of the northern part of the hejaz was strengthened by the completion of the hejaz railway down to medina. in 1908 husain ibn ‘ali was appointed to be amir of mecca, and soon set himself to thwart the turkish govt., partic- ularly in the matter of the extension of the railway to the city of mecca. the war period. e turks at the outset of the world war made arabia a source of potential danger to the allied cause. effective control of the hejaz would have enabled the turks and their allies to threaten the sea route to the east, and great britain sought to counter this danger by entcring into negotiations wjth sharif husain. the latter, in- spired by great personal ambition, was ripe for rebellion against the turks, and, after a lengthy correspondence on the subject of the terms on which he should espouse the allied cause, raised the standard of revolt on june 5 1916. mecca and jidda (the latter after bombardment by british ships) were soon wrested from the turks, and taif surrendered to the sharifian forces in september. the sharifian armies were unable to make any impression on the strong turkish defences at medina, but at this time col. t. e. lawrence appeared upon the scene, and in concert with husain’s third son, amir faisal, organised a brilliant guerilla campaign against the hejaz railway and the turkish positions further north. the ports of yenbo’, wejh and ‘aqaba (1917) fell in rapid succession, and with the subsequent capture of ma‘an and shaubak, the hejaz reached the northern frontier which it kept till july 1925. medina, successfully defended by fakhri pasha till the end of the war, only surrendered on the receipt of explicit orders from constantinople in jan. r1o1o0. the amir faisal represented husain, who had assumed the title of king in 1916, at the peace conference of 1919 at paris, and the hejaz was admitted as an original member of the league of nations, but king husain eventually refused to ratify the peace treaties. in march 1919 king husain’s relations with ibn sa‘ud became strained owing to a dispute over the oasis of khur- ma, and in may his forces advanced to occupy the place. they were routed by the wahhabis at turaba, and later (1922) khai- | bar and taima were in turn occupied by ibn sa‘ud. 338 meanwhile, in the summer of 1921, lawrence visited jidda on behalf of the british govt. to negotiate a treaty with king hu- sain, but negotiations broke down owing to the latter’s inability to accept the de fucto position in palestine. negotiations were subsequently kept alive by dr. naji al asil, hashimite repre- sentative in london, but were finally abandoned on the out- break of war between nejd and hejaz in sept. 1924. post-war events.—the sharifian administration, mild enough during the war, became more and more autocratic and even tyrannical with the passage of time. king husain alienated the sympathies of his own people, and went out of his way to court the enmity of his neighbours. by the terms of the peace treaties he undertook to maintain the annual pilgrimage under satis- factory conditions for all moslems, but this part of his adminis- tration left much to be desired. there was much corruption in all government departments. education was wholly neglected. even the army was not maintained on an efficient basis. an air force was inaugurated in 1921, but was allowed to disinte- grate owing to the king’s parsimony—it was revived in the autumn of 1924 by his successor and reorganised in 1925. an effective scheme of wireless communication, with eight or ninc well-equipped stations, was perhaps the brightest feature of king husain’s administration. the nucleus of a transport fleet (four ships) was also formed by him, and proved invaluable during the war with nejd. a local coinage and stamp issue emanated from mecca during these years, and a semi-official newspaper (al oibla) was started by the king for propaganda purposes. meanwhile the storm was approaching. king husain refused until too late to send a representative to the conference con- vened at kuwait by the british government. in jan. 1924 he arrived in transjordania on a visit to his son, ‘abdullah, and, while there, he assumed the vacant title of a/a/ifa on the deposi- tion of the turkish sultan-khalifa by the kemalist govt. of angora. he then hastened back to mecca to issue invitations to the moslem world to recognise his new status, but his overtures met with little success, and the wahhabi sultan realised that his ambitious enemy must be crushed at once. husain abdicates—in sept. 1924 ibn sa‘ud jaunched his armies on the hejaz. taif fell without a show of resistance. consternation reigned at mecca, and king husain, under pres- sure from the notables of jidda, abdicated on oct. 5 in favour of his eldest son, ‘ali, who was acclaimed as “ king of the hejaz only.” king ‘ali evacuated mecca and hastily recruited an army from palestine, syria and transjordan to defend jidda. tahsin pasha al fagir, the commander of the so-called “ victory ” division, organised a strong defensive position of trenches and barbed-wire entanglements in a semi-circle round the town. ibn sa‘ud himself arrived at mecca in dec. and the attack on jidda began on jan. 4 1925. the wahhabis occupied the few villages outside the entrenched position, but had not suc- ceeded in reducing the town at the end of june when the siege was temporarily raised to enable them to perform the pilgrimage. meanwhile ibn sa‘ud, having occupied the ports of qunfida and lith south of jidda and that of rabigh north of it, extended his operations further north. medina and its seaport yenbo’ were invested, while umlaj, north of the latter, was occupied. on dec. 5 medina surrendered and wejh followed suit. king ‘ali realised that his situation was hopeless and abdicated on dec. 19. jidda then surrendered simultaneously with yenbo’, and ibn sa‘ud was master of all hejaz, of which he was formally proclaimed king at mecca on jan. 8 1926. for bibliography see arabia. cel sioa obs) helfferich, karl (1872-1924), german financier and politician, was born in neustadt-on-the-havel july 22 1872. in 1901 he became a professor of political science in berlin, and in 1906 went to constantinople as manager of the anatolian railway. he returned to berlin in 1908 to take up the chair- manship of the deutsche bank. in 1913 he was the chief german delegate at the paris conference for the settlement of balkan financial affairs. in tors helfferich was appointed secretary of state for the imperial treasury, where he followed the principle of defraying the cost of the war by borrowing rather than by helfferich—heligoland bight, battle of the fresh taxation, relying on a final german victory. in june 1916 he left the treasury for the home office. in june 1918 he was appointed to succeed count mirbach, who had been assassinated, as germany’s representative in moscow. he was, however, unable to occupy this post, and returned to berlin to conduct the economic and industrial demobilisation of germany after the armistice. he was fatally injured in a railway accident near bellinzona april 23 1924. helicopter: see airscrew. heligoland bight, battle of the.—this naval action was fought in the bight on aug. 28 1914 between british and german navai forces. according to the original british plan three submarines were to lie off heligoland to attack german cruisers, while three others were to be posted to the west to entice their destroyers out. the harwich flotillas were then to come in from the north and, sweeping on a nine miles front to the westward, were to cut off any light craft patrolling to the west of heligoland. adml. jellicoe proposed to reinforce the flotilla with vice-adml. beatty’s battle cruisers and the tst light cruiser squadron, this proposal was only approved on aug. 26 and, as there was no time to send the operation orders north, beatty left scapa with only a general idea of the plan and no details of the intended movements of the submarines. the forces from harwich had already sailed and did not know that beatty was on his way to reinforce them. british forces-—on aug. 27 the british forces were all on their way to the bight, organised as follows:— table. 4, sweeping force (commodore reginald tyrwhitt): ‘ arethusa,” 2 6-in., 6 4-in., 28-5 knots; ‘‘ fearless,” 10 4-in., 26 knots. third flotilla, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th divs., 16 destroyers; first flotilla, ist, 2nd, 3rd and 5th divs., 15 destroyers. total: 2 light cruisers, 31 destroyers. submarine force (commodore roger keyes): ‘“ lurcher,’’ “ fire- er e4, e5, eg (off heligoland); e6, 7, e8 (west of heligo- an ° battle cruiser force (vice-adml{. sir david beatty): ist battle cruiser sqn., ‘‘ lion,’’ ‘queen mary,” “ princess royal,” aul 8 13-5-inch. light cruiser squadron (commodore w. e. goodenough): “ southampton,” ‘‘ falmouth," both 8 6-in.; “ birmingham,” “ nottingham,” ‘“‘ lowestoft,” 9 6-in.; ‘‘ liverpool,” 2 6-in., io 4-inch. cruiser force k (rear-adml. sir a. g. moore): ‘ invincible,” ‘““new zealand,’’ with four destroyers. cruiser force c (rear-adml. a. christian): ‘ euryalus,” ‘ bac- chante,” “ cressy,” ‘‘ hogue,” “‘ aboukir,” all 2 9-2-in., 12 6-in.; ‘“ amethyst,’”’ 12 4-in, total forces: 5 battle cruisers, 9 light cruisers, 5 armoured cruisers, 37 destroyers, 6 submarines, it was light at 4 4.m. goodenough with the 1st light cruiser squadron had met tyrwhitt at 3:45 a.m. and was at first mistaken for an enemy, but the cruisers were recognised in time. by 5 a.m. the sun had risen, and the forces were in position some 60 m. northwest of heligoland. it was a fine morning with a smooth sea and a gentle breeze blowing from the northwest. beatty’s battle cruisers were some 30 m. to the westward and all was ready. the flotillas started off to the southeast at 20 knots, the “ arethusa ” and 3rd flotilla ahead, with the “ fearless ” and ist flotilla 2m. astern. the rst light cruiser squadron followed $8 m. behind. from a point 12 m. west of heligoland, which he should reach at 8 a.m., tyrwhitt intended to -turn west and sweep anything in the bight into his net. the germans knew nothing of the impending attack. posted round heligoland in a semi-circle they had two lines of patrols, an outer line of nine destroyers 25 m. from the island and an inner line of older ves- sels (3rd minesweeping div.) 13 m. from it. these were sup- ported by a flotilla at heligoland, three cruisers on outpost duty, and a battleship in the jade. german forces —the german disposition in detail was as follows :— table ii. outpost forces: outposts, outer line, 9 destroyers; inner line, 11 torpedo boats. in support of outposts: 11 destroyers, 5th flotilla (heligoland). light cruisers, “ stettin’’ (10 4-1-in.), ‘ hela,” 4 4-i-in. (off. heligoland bight, battle of the heligoland), ‘‘ frauenlob,” 10 4-1-in. (off jade). battleship, “* heligoland,’’ 12 12-in. (in jade). in wilhelmshaven roads, withelmshaven and off the ems: light cruisers, “ ariadne,” ‘“* kolberg,” ‘ celn ” (rear adml. maas, first leader of fiotillas), “strassburg,” ‘‘ stralsund,” ‘* rostock,” “mainz ’’ (off the ems). battle cruisers, ist scouting group, “‘ seydlitz,"’ ‘‘ moltke,” ‘‘ von der tann,” “‘ blucher.” battle- ships: ist and 3rd sqilns. (7 dreadnoughts). total forces: 8 battleships, 4 battle cruisers, 10 light cruisers, 20 destroyers, 11 torpedo boats, 8 submarines. the movements of the heavy german ships were governed entirely by the time of low water on the outer jade bar. this was at 9:33 a.m. and meant that between 7 a.m. and noon no german battleship nor battle cruiser could put to sea. tue early operations the activities of this eventful day started at 4:45 a.m. when the british submarine e7 fired a torpedo at the de- stroyer grio4 patrolling some 25 m. northwest of heligoland, and rear-adml. maas, the german flotilla admiral, at 6:45 a.m. sent out the sth flotilla from heligoland to hunt the submarine. the sca was smooth, the sky overcast and weather dull. at 6:53 a.m. the “‘ arethusa ” struck the outer patrol line and sent gro4 flying towards heligoland with the ‘ laurel” and her division in hot pursuit. they drew away to the east and at »:26 am. tyrwhitt turned to the southeast to support them. a few minutes later they sighted the german 5th flotilla com- ing up, and sent it also flying back. the report from g1o4 reached the german flagship about 4:30 a.m., and on it becoming clear that a considerable force of british destroyers had penetrated into the bight, the light cruisers were ordered to proceed. the ‘ stettin ’’ was already on her way at 7:58 a.m., though she had not raised a full head of steam. by this time the german sth flotilla was calling loudly for cruiser support. the alarm had gone at heligoland, and by 7:s0 a.m. the whole fortress was standing to its guns. the visibility was then about 16,000 yd., and german destroyers came into view driving pcll-mell towards the island. the british were overhauling them. one of the destroyers had been hit in the stokehold at 7:50 a.m. and her position was becoming critical, when at 7:58 a.m. the “ stettin,’? coming round the north of heligoland, appeared on the scene and opened fire on the “ lau- rel’s” division at 9,300 yards. a 8:05 a.m. the “ fearless ” sighted her and opened fire; the “ stettin ” retired behind heli- goland to get up steam for full speed, while the “ fearless,” receiving a signal at 8:12 a.m. to alter course to west-quarter- south, turned accordingly to begin the sweep. this brief respite had enabled the german 5th flotilla to get clear and they came streaming in towards heligoland. the inner patrol line was under a heavy fire from the “ arethusa,” and the torpedo boats d8 and t33 suffered severely, but at 8:08 a.m. the “ frauenlob” arrived on the scene from the south and engaged the ‘‘ arethusa ” on a southwest course. a sharp action ensued at 6,500 to 4,000 yards. only the forecastle gun of the “ arethusa ”’ remained in action, and eight men were killed. the “ frauenlob ” received some to hits and had nine killed and 28 wounded. at 8:25 a.m. the “ arcthusa ” turned to west-quarter-south and the “ frauenlob” turning south broke off the action. the second phase (see fig. 1).—by 8:30 a.m. this phase of the operation was over and both flotillas were proceeding to the west with the “ fearless”? some 6 m. north of the “‘ arethusa.” goodenough’s light cruisers had also turned west at 8:30 a.m. and were some 12 m. to the westward. beatty was moving to and fro with his battle cruisers about 45 m. to the northwest. the attack had not developed according to plan, for the german patrols had broken back and reached home with one exception. this was v187, the flotilla leader’s boat, which the ‘ fearless ”’ sighted to the westward at 8:15 a.m., and which was sunk aiter a hot chase by the “ goshawk,” ‘f phoenix ” and “‘ ferret ” at 9:10 a.m. the destroyers had lowered boats to rescue the sur- vivors, but the “ stettin,” which had now got steam up, reap- peared on the scene and drove them off. five boats in the 339 scurry had to be left behind, but ey (lt.-comm. e. w. leir), emerging suddenly, rescued the ‘‘ defender’s ”” men, took an oflicer and two of v187’s crew “as a sample,” then disappeared as suddenly and silently as she came. by 8:55 a.m. the “ fear- less ” had rejoined the ‘‘ arethusa ” and the ilotillas were now from 12 to 15 m. west of hcligoland steering west-quarter-south. commodore keyes, in the “ lurcher,”’ not knowing good- cnough’s cruisers were on the scene, had mistaken them for the enemy and asked for help, but recognised them at ro a.m., and as the “southampton ” had already attempted to ram e6, goodenough decided to withdraw to the west and leave the field clear for the submarines. tyrwhitt had turned boldly back to help keyes at 9:45 a.m. the “ arethusa ” stopped for repairs , at 10:17; her engines were disabled and she was only able to go to knots. a jull of half an hour ensued. by this time the ger- mans were beginning to appreciate the situation. at 8:20 a.m. the commander-in-chief, adml. von ingenohl, had taken over the command from hipper, the admiral of scouting forces, and had ordered the battle cruisers to raise steam and to proceed as heligoland bight aug. catm [s14 oe 4'dfath laurel kaeeag german § % ff ‘* “german b& fi, ora biti ty a lowestorr ‘nottingham \ se . i stettin heligoland "v 187 @ 10, [eogact f lic. 1.—flotillas at 8:30 a.m. soon as there was water on the bar. the german light cruisers, eager to attack, were pushing out as soon as they could raise steam. they now began to appear on the scene. the “ arethusa ” had got under way again at 10:40 a.m. and was making slowly to the west when at 10:46 a.m. the “ strass- burg,” which was trying to get in touch with the “ stettin,” appeared in the southeast, coming up on a north-north-west course. she opened fire at about 8,400 yd., crossed the “ are- thusa’s ” stern, turned and disappeared to the north in the mist. the “ celn ” had come up behind her at 11:5 a.m., but after exchanging a few salvos she too passed on. at 11:16 a.m.! the ‘“‘ strassburg ’? reappeared to the north and steering a parallel course to the west opened a heavy fire at 8,650 yards. the ist and 2nd divs. of the ard flotilla went off to the northwest and, joined by the rst div. of the 1st flotilla, attacked her at 11:35 a.m. two torpedoes ran past her and she disappeared in the mist. the destroyers rejoined the “ arethusa’”’ and con- tinued their course to the westward. when the “ celn ” appeared tyrwhitt had signalled for sup- port, and when the “strassburg” came in sight the second time, capt. blunt of the “ fearless,” foreseeing the concentration which the german light cruisers were striving to achieve in the mist, sent an urgent signal to beatty for assistance. beatty had been waiting and watching round a position in 54° 28’ n., 6° 20’ east. the situation was obscure, but between 11 and 11:30 a.m. it was clear that tyrwhitt was engaging a cruiser some 30 m. to the eastward, and at 11:20 a.m. goodenough was ordered to support him. then came capt. blunt’s signal from the “fearless ” couched in terms of urgency. beatty did not know that the ‘‘ arcthusa ”’ could only go 10 knots, but he knew that 340 the flotillas were only 26 m. from heligoland, and that the german base at emden lay close to their flank. he decided at once to take his whole force in the bight. at rz:24 a.m. his battle cruisers had been formed in single line ahead, and working up to full speed he proceeded east-south-east to throw their tremendous weight into the issue of the day. the marin action the “ mainz ”’ had left the ems shortly after 7 a.m. and was making at full speed to the east to cut off the british destroyers and to join the “ strassburg ” and the ‘ stettin.” at 11:30 a.m. she was sighted almost right ahead by the and, ard and sth divs. of the british 1st flotilla as they came west with the ““ fearless ’’ and “ arethusa ” some miles behind. the ‘‘ mainz’ turned to the north and opening a heavy fire chased the de- stroyers to the north for 20 minutes. but at 11:50 a.m. the situation suddenly changed. out of the mist to the north-north- west there appeared four light cruisers coming down at high speed. they were goodenough’s cruisers. for an anxious minute the destroyers were uncertain whether they were friend or foe, then they recognised them and turned eagerly to join them. the “‘ mainz ” recognised them too and fled to the south- ward at 25 knots. the range was over 7,000 yvd.; she received two hits and drew away in the mist, sending at noon a signal— _~ pstrassburg ie i a“ aye ts ; beatty “a 4 | sraasseunc ~ ana ~“ anata an fire & sraain pe “eg fearless * _ wllsertes 8 maine anacog 1d 3 « \ra stralsund heligoland bight 9 ? ‘ ‘ (a (oe ae ee a, miles aug.28tm isi4 fic. 2.—beatty enters the fight. the last she sent—that she was being chased by a battle cruiser. it was received at 12:05 p.m. and the “‘ moltke ” and ‘‘ von der tann ” were ordered to proceed, screened by the german 8th flotilla. in the river it was clear, and no one had informed the german command of the mist prevailing in the bight. the “ mainz,” running to the southeast had hardly drawn away from the light cruisers when at 12:08 p.m. she sighted the “ fear- less’ and the 3rd flotilla coming west. she swung round to south as the 1st and 2nd divs. of the british ard flotilla turned to north and the 4th div. to south to engage her. sinking of the “ afainz.’—in the action that ensued the “* mainz’s ” rudder was damaged and her port engine brought to a stop. she then concentrated her fire on the 4th div. at about 5,000 yards. the ‘‘ laurel” was hit by the first salvo; the fourth blew up a number of lyddite shells, and with her captain severely wounded and her after funnel blown away, she crawled away hidden in her own smoke and steam. the “ liberty ” had her mast shot away and her captain killed. the ‘ laertes ”’ was hit four times by a single salvo at 4,000 yd., and stopped dead. but the ‘‘ mainz ” had been hit at 12:15 p.m. on the port side amidships by a torpedo fired by one of the destroyers, anc goodenough’s cruisers which were now closing, opened a deadly fire which reduced her quickly to a wreck. at 12:25 p.m. they ceased fire; the ‘‘ lurcher ’’ coming alongside saved her crew and at 1:08 p.m. she settled by the bows and sank. british battle cruisers in action—the situation was still far from clear; the flotillas were scattered; the “‘ strassburg ” and “celn ” had appeared to the northeast and opened a heavy heliothera phy fire. then suddenly out of the mist there emerged beatty’s four great battle cruisers steaming at high speed. they swept past the sinking “‘ mainz ” and on to the northeast with goodenough and his light cruisers following in their wake. the german cruisers fled, but it was too late. at 12:37 p.ar. the ‘“ lion ” sighted the “‘ cein ” on the port bow and opened fire at 3,800 yd.; the “ celn ” ran desperately to the northeast, but a heavy shell disabled her engines. then she gained a brief respite, for the “ ariadne ” was sighted by the “ lion ” trying to cross her bows on a southeast course. fire was opened on her. she was hit by the first two salvos and disappeared in the mist to the southeast, on fire and sinking. beatty now decided to withdraw, and at 1:10 p.at. made the signal to retire. the “ lion” came gradually round to a west- erly course and at 1:25 p.m. sighted the ‘ celn ” again, steering slowly to the southeast. her admiral had fallen; her captain was seriously wounded. the “ lion” sent a 13-5-in. shell into her; she listed to port and sank with flag flying at 1:35 p.m. by this time both the “ stettin ” and “ strassburg ” had sighted and reported the british battle cruisers, and at 1:50 p.m. the german light cruisers were ordered to fall back on the “‘ moltke ” and “ von der tann.” it was not, however, till 2 p.m. that the battle cruisers passed the bar of the outer jade. the german battleships were then raising steam, and the battle cruisers were ordered (2:41 p.m.) not to advance against the british, but to wait for the “‘ seydlitz ” 25 m. west of iicligoland. by 3:50 p.m. the three german batile cruisers had reached that position, and there they were joined by the “ strassburg,” “kolberg ” and “ stralsund.”? they made a short sally, but there were no signs of any british ships, and they turned back before reaching the spot where the “ celn ” had sunk. for the british it remained only to get home. at 4:30 p.m. rear-adml. campbell’s cruisers met the destroyers and the “ laurel ”’ was taken in tow by “ amethyst.” the “ arethusa”’ struggled on at six knots till 7 p.ar., then signalled for assistance, and at 9:30 p.m. was taken in tow by the “‘ hogue ” and returned safely. resiutts of the battle.—mist, uncertainty and the speed of the german light cruisers had hampered the british submarines. the german submarines had all been held back off heligoland and by the time they were finally dispatched to attack the british battle cruisers, the latter were out of reach. the en- gagement was a severe blow to the german fleet. they lost three light cruisers and one destroyer, and their casualties were 63 officers and 649 men killed, 20 officers and 361 men wounded, nine officers and 140 men prisoners; a total of 1,242 against the british 35 killed and some 40 wounded. | the engagement had important ulterior consequences. when beatty swooped down on the bight, he drove a great wedge into german naval policy, for the loss of the cruisers confirmed the kaiser in his determination to restrict the german fleet to a strictly defensive policy. for the british navy and nation the victory came at an opportune time. the irresistible advance of the german army had filled many with something like dis- may. the news of a naval victory at the very gates of the enemy lightened the gloom, and gave the nation faith in the navy’s ability to face its gigantic task. bibliography. me s. corbett, history of the great war: operations (1920); kx. mantey, der krieg zur see. a