GREAT LAKES AND ST. LAWRENCE

great lakes and st. lawrence (see 12.399 and 24.21).— the great lakes and the st. lawrence form one of the greatest and most important transportation routes in the world, rivalling in tonnage and economy of operation any other existing water transportation route. to july 1 1924 the united states federal govt. had expended about $150,000,000 for improvements in the great lakes-st. lawrence system, exclusive of expendi- tures by canada, by states or provinces and by municipalities. trafic —during the 30 years 1895-1925 over 1,500 million tons of freight moved through the locks at sault ste. marie alone. the 72,000,000 tons which passed through these locks tn 1924 in- cluded 13,500,000 tons of flour and grain and 42,500,000 of ore, moving east, and 13,500,000 tons of coal moving west. except for the construction of several experimental diesel engine-driven vessels, no great developments were made in the type of the large bulk freighter in the 15-year period ending in r1g25. the highly specialised freight-handling equipment at the terminals, which has in large measure accounted for the economic system of transfer, has developed only in size during the same period. the record for handling cargo between shore and ship is 16} min. for loading 12,508 gross tons of ore and 3 hr. 5 min. for unloading. during the 20 years 1905-25 a considerable tonnige in lime- stone and sulphur grew up. the stone, used as a flux in ore fur- naces, is transported on self-unloading vessels between harbours on lake huron and the great iron and steel centres in the vicinity of lakes michigan and erie. sulphur is carried by water from the wells in texas and louisiana to new york, and thence in barges through the new york state barge canal to buffalo, cleveland and other points on the great lakes. package freight on the great lakes has not kept pace with bulk freight, though still amounting to over 1,000,000 tons. over 90° of the com- merce has been confined to the upper lakes, a small portion only passing into lake ontario and the st. lawrence. traffic on the upper lakes has increased to such an extent that the locks at sault ste. marie in existence in 1910 (two american and one canadian) were not suflicient to cope with the tratlic, and two new locks (numbered 3 and 4) were constructed on the american side and put in operation in 1918. hach of the new locks is 1,350 [t. long and so ft. wide, with 245 ft. of water over the sill. the old weitzel lock has not been in operation since 1918. htarvbours —originally the mouths of rivers were used as har- bours on the lakes. it was necessary to dig out the bars which usually formed at the lake entrance, and later picrs were con- structed at river mouths which contracted the area of flow and tended to keep the channels scoured out. still later, breakwaters were built in the lakes to protect pier entrances from wave ac- tion. as conditions became more congested in the rivers, the breakwaters were extended to form large outer harbours. these structures were originally stone-filled timber cribs, the tops of which, after the timber decayed, were replaced by concrete or stone. the more recently constructed breakwaters are formed of a line of concrete caissons sunk side by side, or of a long rubble mound composed of stones varying from half a ton to ro and 12 tons in weight, more or less carefully placed. some of these outer harbours are as much as four and five m. long and afford ample protection to the largest lake vessels. maintenance dredging must be carried on at all times in most of the harbours of the great lakes. about 65 harbours on the upper lakes (excluding lake ontario) have an authorised pro- 280 ject depth of 19 ft. or more at low water; about 65 others on the great lakes-st. lawrence system have been improved so as to be available for smaller vessels. connecting waterways —the critical points in the navigation of the lakes are the connecting waterways. these, like the har- bours, require continuous dredging to preserve project depths and to remove obstructions. the lake carriers’ association, a federation including nearly all the owners of f{reight-carriers on the lakes, have formed an efficient system of communication and supervision which permits them to take advantage of water conditions and load their vessels to the greatest possible depth. the deepening and widening of the connecting channels author- ized some years ago have practically been completed; and at many of the most critical points, such as the neebish channels below sault ste. marie and the channels between lakes huron and erie, separate upbound and downbound passageways are maintained. on the upper lakes the minimum width of channels used for two-way traffic is 500 ft., whereas 293 ft. is the least width of channel now used for one-way traffic. the controlling depth of water between lakes erie and superior is still 20 ft. at low-water datum. a dike on which sluice gates are installed has been constructed across st. mary’s river near sault ste. marie. the gates are operated under the supervision of an international board of control in order to maintain water-levels in lake su- perior and to compensate for diversions on both the canadian and the american sides at sault ste. marie for power purposes. the question of diversion of water from lake michigan into the chicago drainage canal for the purpose of sewage disposal has not been settled. itthe supreme court of the united states decided against chicago in a suit instituted to enjoin the chicago sanitary district against withdrawing water. however, in order to permit the chicago sanitary commission to prepare plans and construct works necessary to take the place of the prevailing system of sewage disposal, temporary authority to divert 8,500 cu. ft. of water per sec. from lake michigan was granted by the united states war department for a period of five years under certain conditions, which, when carried out, will permit the re- duction and perhaps the eventual discontinuance of the diversion for sewage purposes. the question is of importance because of enormous losses claimed by shipping interests on account of lower water levels. it has been stated by government engineers that the diversion of 8,800 ft. from lake michigan affects the level of lake erie from -38 to -43 ft.; of lakes michigan and huron from -42 to -44 ft.; and of the st. lawrence river at lock no. 25 from -6 to -65 of a foot. erie-oniario routes —two navigable routes (1926) connect lake erie with lake ontario. the erie branch of the new york state barge canal system, completed in 1918, connects lake erie and the niagara river through the oswego branch of the barge canal with lake ontario at oswego. the barge canal route con- tinues through the state of new york and connects with the hudson river at troy, forming a complete watcrway available for vessels of less than 12-ft. draft and requiring not more than 154 ft. of head room. anew welland canal between lake erie and lake ontario is being constructed to replace the existing one. it is estimated the work will be completed in 1930. seven lift locks will replace the 25 locks in the present canal, and the dis- tance between the two iakes will be shortened to 25 miles. the new canal is being excavated to a depth of from 25 to 263 ft. be- low canadian low-water level. the new locks will be 820 ft. long by 80 ft. wide, and, in order to provide for possible future decp- ening of the canal, will be constructed so as to accommodate vessels drawing 30 ft. of water. the estimated cost of the com- pleted structure is $110,000,000. the question of improvement of the st. lawrence river from lake ontario to tidewater in the interest of navigation and power development is being seriously considered by joint action of the united states and canada. the st. lawrence river affords opportunity for the development of over 4,000,000 i.p. of hydro- electric energy. on account of the many interests involved on both sides of the border, it had been difficult to effect an agree- ment on the question of the st. lawrence improvement. great lakes and st. lawrence by treaty stipulation the amount of water that may be <i- verted from the niagara river for power purposes has been lim- ited to 36,000 cu. ft. per sec. on the canadian side and 20,000 cu. ft. per sec. on the united states side. of the canadian diversion all but about 10,000 cu. ft. per sec. is used by the il ydroelectric power commission of ontario, in three plants, the largest of which, near queenstown, has a head of over 300 ft. and develops about 500,c00 h.p. from the nine turbo-generators installed. of the american diversion practically all the water is utilised by one concern with an installation of over 500,000 horsepower. boundary water treaty —in 1909 the united states and great britain signed a treaty known as the “ boundary water treaty,”’ whereby the waters between the united states and canada were guaranteed free and open to the inhabitants of both countries on equal terms, and principles governing the use of boundary waters were laid down. an international joint commission, con- sisting of three members from canada and three members from the united states, was established. table i. d es 26 = ' a > oa 5 ez els gs “a 7 o 5 s351 os oe a wary a <3 pany a vu 2 4 cr es su slits ao eo lakes = co = e212 .| am ae sh | 28 /hoe e58] os | es of b s| 3s 25] ws-s bea a4 |-seleas| est) e248 | soe o aq|saz|ssur| goxe | go3 <—f a > @ a os sq. miles} feet | feet | feet superior 31,810 | 1,180] 601-6] 2-5 |april 23; dec. 9 michigan 22,400 870] 579°6| 2-8 |april 12 | dec. 15 huron 23,010 7501579:6| 2:6 |april 6 | dee. 17 st. clair 460 261573°8| .. |march3o0 | dec. 18 erie ; 9,940 210{| 570-8} 3-0 |march2g | dec. 17 ontario 7,5: 738 ]244°5] 3:3 /april § | dec. 18 table ii. a aw “i 2 |3./28| = s| & | 22) 48 | 8 <) — az ea, wo rivers ee — % ez | ¢ 9 = v ke | @ 3s | 33 ]/8s| 88 5 | § 2 |e" | sh) ga a) - o -) u = miles | feet feet feet | miles | cubic per foot- | hour | seconds st. marys ; 63 300] 24,000 21 1-33 i strait of mac- kinac . ; 30 | 10,900] 100,000 | 110 47,000 st. cla . 40 800} 5,100 20 i-5 | 203,000 detroit —. 31 1,900} 19,000 22 i-6 | 208,000 upper niagara. 20 | 1,500] 8,000 |} 10-23] i-7 | 207,000 aver niagara 15 210] 2,600 30 i-23 | 207,000 st. lawrence to montreal 179 1,200! 40,000 14 i-6 | 240,000 1 tn its original condition the mean stage discharge of the st. marys river was about 78,000 cu. foot- seconds. the flow of this river is now entirely controlled by regulating works. table iti. contmerce (in short tons) on the great lakes n.y. total u.s.| canals | petroit |welland | st. law- state ; commerce | at sault river cane rence rarec year, on great (ste. marie : a, canals 2ats (esti- |creport-| + canal eres 21] cseort mated) ed ihe (re- (adjusted) ed) ported) po rted) i91o 92,044, 84362,363,2187 3.526, 602/2,326,3902,760, 752 3,073, 412! 1920 i11,139, fea 75,0723, 067 19621421 ,434 1921| 71,400,17048,259,25463,973,3083,076,. 223,734) 0651,457, $02 1922, 94,038,09066, aaah 497 ,062 3,391,4194,319,919 2,260,763 1923 125,517,551 91,379,65892, 170,460 3,755,9124,541,5282,572,635° 1924 109,831,27972,037,39080,073,8505,037,4125,536,3742, 658, o74" 1 old canal system partly closed down between ig10 and 1918 dur- ing construction of a new 12-ft. canal. - includes 566,351 and 626,357 tons for 1923 and 1924 respec- tively of local terminal traffic that did not pass through an canals. 7) greco-turkish war—greece greco-turkish war: sce balkan wars. greece (see 12.425), a republic of southern europe anda mem- ber of the league of nations. its area is 49,200 square miles. the area of old greece in 1912 was 24,400 square miles. the bal- kan wars of 1912-3 resulted in the addition of new greece, con- koza np seri see gfr wvenal ns ah preveza® as greece english miles oo —__ $6 100 kilometres 50a 100 © ; : a bay mediferranean | sea we) 0 main railwa se nome boundaries bedeutudgerete a)__ea"__—s~c~« by c~c~*~“c*e‘«‘ nds eas of grcenwich 2h cyc‘ oc‘ sisting of macedonia, epirus, crete and a number of islands in the aegean, with an area of about 21,600 sq. m., making the total area of the country about 46,000 sq.m.in 1914. after the world war, greece occupied thrace and a part of the vilayet of aidin in asia minor, and these occupations were confirmed by the treaties of neuilly and sevres. but, as the result of the asia minor campaign, greece in 1922 evacuated asia minor and eastern thrace in favour of turkey, and by the treaty of lau- sanne in 1923 she also retroceded imbros and tencdos. the area of greece after these various changes, is now about 49,200 square miles. eestrecet prislesetererep time otetetig iscetts ae cf ; * fe des ree eesestedoeceaes & ¥ £900 linn sosanioe, nem op (24 ue ees .e ato ane to aces +e, dessa 2 ie roo re ems lp ha sk ns a : mate 2 ae: a 3 ye a ¥ - mp li orte fl 2 yeu ’ ae ei | cy | vj ooh bent ags, ‘sc basen p ae i a r oz 4, « “¥ & e ° wi : ~ arayrok y ea 3 saar f 7 . ee pi roni 50 apres ot se rs ai» se 5 err > corfuctes, a fic q f : py ie hed , eh 3 et a a8 : corf i oe a ae ? ; esi" « ow sonian es is sy pe wes ’ " ‘ oh sea at ea say pte ry ee oe 3 . = % r * hf os be : " eed e es, 5 & a ag : = . o—_ pe f rc a ous ed cephalonia g acy lipo rg oe > % ehakel\4 ct ra : one wy e/ bt ea < a nees 38 pf: : boeq ty (ythera £. kapela antikytheran 281 a census taken in 1920 gave the total population of old and new greece as 5,536,375, including thrace. an estimate which allows, on the one hand, for the subsequent loss of territory and for the transfer of the moslem inhabitants of greece to turkey, and, on the other hand, for the influx of some 1,400,000 refugees samethrac rl iit athos -lmbros fs , repunon lemnos ¢ omu ros. ls lo” tenedos} ge. aeg eans | ’ so *e, aaneee® ft ao red 9 ete wr northern dove las ae as ee misiva ny crs s keos? “sd: enos % syros pye hag konos 7 : eapolis €. malea : 4 1 ot oly, c litsaas from turkey after the war in asia minor, would place the popu- lation in 1925 in the neighbourhood of 6,200,000. the various racial migrations which have been brought about by the wars from 1912 onwards, whether voluntary or compul- sory, involving the transfers, in either direction, of nearly 2,500,000 greeks, bulgarians and turks, have had the result of introducing homogeneity in the regions affected, where before there was great diversity. thus the proportion of greeks in the population of macedonia and western thrace, which stood at 43 and 36% respectively before the balkan wars, is, in 1925, 88 and 62%. (l. g. r.) 282 i. political history in jan. 1910 the military league had summoned veniselos from crete as their political adviser, and he had arranged for the election of a national assembly. but the obstruction of the party leaders soon obliged him to take the premiership himself and to appeal once more to the electorate. when the second revisionary national assembly met on jan. 22 1911, he took office at the head of an overwhelming majority. during the following 18 months the constitution was revised, internal admin- istration was thoroughly overhauled, army and navy were re- modelled and trained under french and british missions, and the macedonian feud was forgotten. the balkan wars.—a treaty was signed with bulgaria (may 1912) who had already signed a treaty with serbia for the partition of macedonia, 'and in oct., the first balkan war broke out. montenegro declared war on turkey, oct. 8; turkey declared war on bulgaria and serbia, oct. 17, but offered grecce the island of crete and other concessions to remain neutral. venisclos however realised the supreme importance of including greece in the new grouping. the long-excluded cretan deputies were admitted to the greek chamber and greece declared war on turkey on oct, 18 1912. the balkan allies gained rapid success, “the greek army cleared macedonia and occupied salonika (nov. 9); the fleet blockaded the dardanelles. greece refused to sign the armistice obtained from the other allies (dec. 3) but joined the conference which met a fortnight later in london, the allies demanded from turkey the surrender of all the territory their armies actually held in europe together with the fortresses invested. the seizure of power by the ‘“‘ young turk- ish" party at constantinople prevented the acceptance of these terms, and hostilities were re-opened on feb. 3 1913. but after adrianople had surrendered to bulgarians and serbs, scutari to the montenegrins, and janina to the greeks under prince con- stantine—who 12 days later (march 18) became king on the assassi- nation of his father george i. at salonika—turkey by the treaty of london (may 30) signed away collectively to the balkan allics all her territory in europe west of a line drawn from midia on the black sea to enos on the aegean sea, leaving the powers to settle the prob- lems of albania and the aegean islands. : second balkan war.—vhe erection of an independent kingdom of albania, by excluding serbia from the adriatic, rendered inevitable a quarrel between the allies. greece, alarmed at the menacing attitude of bulgaria, had in june signed a defensive alliance with serbia, and when bulgaria attacked without warning (june 30) she was heavily defeated, and after the intervention of rumania was compelled to sign the treaty of bucharest (aug. io 1913) which excluded her from the acgean port of kavalla and carried the frontier of greek macedonia eastwards to the river mesta and northwards to doiran and florina. the course of events had thus compelled veniseclos to substitute a policy of balance of power for that of a balkan league. the aegean islands.—the powers assigned to greece (conference of london, feb. 1914) all the islands, of the acgean actually occupied by the greck flect during the war, with the exception of tenedos and imbros and of the islands of the dodecanese which italy had occupied in 1912 as security for the turkish fulfilment of the treaty of lausanne (oct. 18 1912) pledging her good faith that her occupation should be conditional and temporary. after the world war, veniselos negotiated an agreement with signor tittoni (july 29 1919) by which all these islands were to revert to greece uncon- ditionally, the cession of rhodes alone being made contingent on a plebiscite to be held within five years of england's cession of cyprus, this agreement was recognised by the supreme council, the time limit within which the plebiscite was to be held being extended to 15 years, on the signature of the treaty of sevres (aug. 10 1920) in accordance with which tenedos, imbros and lemnos, which had been occupied during the war by the british fleet, were handed over to the greek authorities on june 25 1921. the tittoni agree- ment was repudiated by italy, who remained in occupation of the dodecanese, after the fall of venisclos and the non-ratification of the treaty of sevres. turkey closed the balkan war with greece by a provisional agreement (treaty of athens, nov. 13 1913) but refused to accept the decision of the powers of feb. 1914; consequently the de jure possession of the islands remained in suspense until the treaty of lausanne (july 24 1923) whereby turkey renounced in favour of italy all rights over the dodecanese, and recognised greck sovereignty over the remaining islands as conferred by the con- ference of london, subject to certain provisions for their demilitarisa- tion, and with the exception of imbros and tenedos, which were retroceded to turkey on condition that they should enjoy full local autonomy. the world war.—greece definitely annexed crete and thus emerged from the balkan wars with a very large acquisition of territory in epirus, macedonia, crete and the aegean islands, with a total population of over 1,800,000, or almost as much as greece that of “‘ old greece.” turkey’s refusal to recognise the ruling of the london conference was accompanied by a boycott of greek shipping and an organised persecution of the greeks in asia minor. but her evident intention of re-opening hostilities with greece was anticipated by the outbreak of the world war. the attitude of the greek govt. as stated by veniselos was never in doubt. not only did her interests and tradition bind her to support great britain and france; she was bound to serbia by her defensive alliance, the purpose of which would best be served if greece stood by to prevent bulgaria from making any hostile move and to guard serbian communications with the aegean. king constantine on the other hand naturally inclined to ger- many for family reasons, and believed in her victory; but he never found the courage to declare openly his intention to remain neutral, preferring to temporise. in feb. 1915, when england definitely required greck help for attacking the dardanelles, the proposals of veniselos for specific greek forces to co-operate with the british fleet were unanimously approved by his own majority in the chamber, and by a crown council of all the political leaders in the king- dom. king constantine however dismissed venisclos and dis- solved the chamber (april 10 1915). the newpremier gounaris co-operated with the german propaganda in athens to represent venisclos as inspired only by love of war and hatred of the king. king constantine was thus brought into party politics as a per- sonal opponent of veniselos and leader of the “‘ pro-german ” policy of neutrality. in mid-june the electors nevertheless re- turned the liberal (veniselist) party with a majority. but when veniselos, after a delay excused by the king’s illness, at last returned to office (aug. 22), his efforts to immobilise bulgaria by threatening greek action were useless, because germany had already been secretly informed that greek neutrality would be guaranteed by king constantine even in the event of a bul- garian attack on serbia. bulgaria mobilised on sept. 19 19015, and king constantine allowed his prime minister to order a counter-mobilisation, and even to suggest to england and france that they might reinforce the greco-serbian co-operation with some of their own troops, a suggestion which led to the allied landing at salonika. but as soon as veniselos, on the eve of the bulgarian attack, explained once more his well-known policy of defending serbia and received a vote of confidence, he was abruptly dismissed, and m. zaimes was put up (oct. 5) to explain that the greco-serbian treaty had “a purely balkan charac- ter.””’ the chamber was again dissolved and elections held in december. the liberals abstained from the polls, as a protest against this second and unconstitutional dissolution, and a gov- ernment was formed under m. skouloudes (nov. 6), who declared “very benevolent neutrality ” towards the entente. from this time forward the king began not only to expect but eagerly to desire a german victory. the violence of his partisans was aggravated when the “ three protecting powers,” britain, france and russia, demanded certain administrative changes which might prevent any connivance between the govt. and the german espionage (june 21 1916). the greek army, which owing to the known sentiments of its general staff threatened, or at least inconvenienced, the allied base at salenika, was at last demobilised; whereupon the bulgarians invaded macedonia and seized kavalla. meanwhile king constantine would from time to time change his premicr,(zaimes, june 23; kulogero- poulos, sept. 16; lambros, oct. 9; zaimes, may 3 1917) and ask the french or british minister to suggest terms on which it might suit him to abandon his “ neutrality.” when in aug. rumania joined the allics and the king still refused to move, veniselos seceded to salonika (sept. 25 1916) with gen. dankles and adm. condouriotes, set up a provisional government and out of half the kingdom which declared its allegiance to the triumvirate began to organise a state militant. the allies refused their oflicial recognition to the salonika govt., although venisclist troops were already fighting for them. at athens the french admiral suggested that king constantine might surrender some of his war material. the king was understood to consent; but when french and british marines landed to take delivery they greece were shot down by greek troops from prepared positions (dec. i 1916). | the allies now broke off relations with the king, but, owing to the hesitations of russia’and italy, did not demand his abdi- cation till june 19017. he retired to switzerland (june 12) and his second son alexander was put on the throne. veniselos returned to athens as prime minister of a nominally united greece (june 26), recalled the chamber which had been uncon- stitutionally dissolved in nov. 1915 and formally declared war against germany, turkey and bulgaria (june 29). by april 1918, the greek army had been mobilised and re-equipped. in july 250,000 greek troops shared in the macedonian offensive which culminated in the capitulation of bulgaria (sept. 30 1918). treaty of sevres and fall of venisefos—at the peace confer- ence (paris, jan. 1919) venisclos’ presentation of the greek claims was remarkably successful. as affecting bulgaria these were embodied in the treaty of neuilly, to which was annexed a greco-bulgarian convention for the protection of racial minori- ties,etc. (nov. 27 1919). bulgaria was cut off from the aegean, the allies undertaking to ensure her an “‘ economic outlet.”” this problem has not hitherto been solved, as it was found impossible at lausanne (jan. 1923), even with the guarantee of the league of nations, to devise any scheme, other than a territorial cor- ridor, acceptable to bulgaria. the treaty of sevres (aug. 10 1920) assigned to greece the greater part of thrace, and a man- date, based on greece’s interest in the greek population of asia minor. it also assigned to her the basin and hinterland of smyrna under a strictly controlled regime. greek troops had landed at smyrna at the request of the supreme council on may 15 1910. unfortunately during these negotiations veniselos had lost touch with his people, and the govt.at athens had proven incom- pelent and corrupted. the resulting discontents were exploited by constantine’s agents. not the greek peasants only but many of the urban population were innately averse to veniselos’ 2oth-century ideas. in aug. 1920 veniselos returned to athens tired out, and angrily refused any eclectioneering compromise with the 16 leaders of opposition. then king alexander, playing with a pet monkey, was bitten. he died of blood-poisoning (oct. 25) and his younger brother prince paul having refused the government’s offer of the throne, the restoration of king constantine became the real issue at the general election. on nov. 14 1920 veniselos was heavily defeated at the polls. he resigned, and with many of his ministers and officials left the country. a government was formed by the aged demetrius ralli which entrusted the regency to the dowager queen olga. after the formality of a plebiscite king constantine returned to athens (dec. 19 1920). the allied powers refused to recog- nise him officially, withdrew their financial assistance, and agreed to reconsider the treaty of sevres, which though signed had not been ratified and had already been repudiated by the turkish nationalists. the withdrawal of their support was serious. the armistice concluded with turkey (oct. 30 1918) had made very incomplete provision for the disarmament of the turkish forces and it was partly in order to restore order in asia minor and protect the christian populations that greek forces had been authorised to land at smyrna. but the supreme council, al- though it had finally (july 1920) asked the greek troops, in mr. lloyd george’s words, ‘to clear up the whole neighbourhood between smyrna and the dardanclles,” a task successfully accomplished in 1o days, had set very definite limits to the greek army of occupation: and mustafa kemal had had time to organise a formidable force. greece was isolated; france and italy both, overtly or covertly, supported turkey, and great britain de- clined to embark on expensive eastern adventures. greco-turkish war—yct the new premicr m. kalogeropoulos (feb. 7 1921) and his successor m. gounaris (april 7) rejected the moderate proposals of a conference of the three powers (britain, france and italy) which met in london (feb. 21) to reconsider the treaty of sevres; and instead actually ordered from london an offensive (march 24) against the turkish na- tionalist positions, which after seizing afiun qarahisar and eski- 283 shehr, was disastrously defeated (april 5) with 4,000 killed and wounded. on june 11 (anniversary of the fall of constantinople in 1453) king constantine left for smyrna hailed by the govern- ment press as emperor designate of constantinople and com- mander of the anglo-greek forces in the near east. on june 19 the allied powers again offered ‘ their friendly services to prevent the reopening of hostilties,” but the offer was magniloquently rejected. the greek forces opened their new offensive in july. a month later they were within 60 m. of angora. but in august they were disastrously defeated on the river sakkaria with very heavy losses. on sept. 29 1921 king constantine returned to athens. on oct. 16 gounaris and his foreign minister bal- tazzi, after receiving a vote of confidence in the chamber, left for london and at last placed the interests of greece without any reserve in the hands of lord curzon. meanwhile the french ‘ franklin-bouillon ” agreement with kemal had been signed at angora (oct. 20 1921); and lord curzon’s ability to make peace was limited by the difficulty of coming to a preliminary agreement with france and italy. gounaris thus abandoned all greek interests vested in the treaty of sevres. he also gave up all claim to the balance of credits guaranteed to greece by the allies during the war and reccived in return permission to raise a loan on the open market if he could (agreement with sir r. itorne, dec. 21 1921). at athens this was represented as a finan- cial triumph, and thus arose considerable outcry in british press and parliament to the effect that england was secretly financing the greek army. meanwhile the truc situation was hidden from the greek people; the persecution of liberal deputies and jour- nalists continued. nor were the liberals consulted when gounaris on returning to athens (march to 1922) was compelled to reform his government. when the near east conference met in paris, proposals for an armistice and the evacuation of asia minor by the greek army were transmitted to athens and the two turkish governments of constantinople and angora (march 26). the real ‘turkish power, that of angora, explained away the apparent acceptance of these terms at constantinople by making it plain that turkey would accept only the immediate evacuation of asia minor. a few days before the conference gounaris had privately addressed to lord curzon a desperate appeal for help and con- fession of imminent disaster. on may 11, after vainly following mr. lloyd george to genoa, he resigned and joined m., stratos in a coalition under the premiership of m. protopapadakes, who had previously as minister of finance raised a forced internal loan by cutting in half all the bank notes in circulation. the first act of the new govt. was to remove the commander-in- chief, gen. papoulas, who had privately advocated strengthen- ing the front by the reinstatement of veniselist officers previously removed, and to appoint in his stead gen. hadjanestes. in july the govt. had the independence of ionia proclaimed by the high commissioner of smyrna, m. sterghiades. they also issued a report that the allics would shortly allow the greek army to occupy constantinople; while gen. hadjanestes, a figure of notorious eccentricity, completed the demoralisation of the front and actually transferred large bodies of troops from asia minor to thrace. the turks attacked on aug. 26 and entered smyrna on sept. 9 1922; five days later the whole city, with the exception of the turkish quarter, was burned to the ground. revolution of chios—~the govt. resigned on sept. 8, after ordering the demobilisation of the troops who were leaving smyrna. but the attempt to scatter the remnants of the army as they were evacuated from asia minor failed. many units landed on the island of chios; and there a revolution headed by col. plasteras broke out on sept. 26. king constantine left the country and died in the following jan.at palermo. eight of his principal ministers and advisers indicted by a special commission of enquiry were tried before an extraordinary court martial of tr officers. six of the accused (gounaris, stratos, baltazzi, theotokes, protopapadakes and hadjanestes) were shot imme- diately after the verdict (nov. 28 1922). the executions shocked europe. the british minister, mr. lindley, who had refused to take the responsibility of guaranteeing that the accused, if 284 reprieved, should never again take part in politics, left athens. but they had a salutary effect on the greek army. thousands of deserters returned to the colours, and a small but efficient army, reformed on the thracian frontier under the command of gen. pangalos, greatly strengthened the hands of the greek rep- resentative (veniselos, who had consented to represent his coun- try abroad) and of all the allies at the second conference of lausanne which finally succeeded in signing peace with the turks on july 24 1923. | refugees and minorities —neanwhile the revolutionary govt., after proclaiming an amnesty for all political offences (jan. 22 1923), was confronted with the problem of the million destitute refugees expelled from asia minor. for some months the settlement of the refugees on a productive basis was organised with the help of american charitable societies; later the greek authorities had to depend entirely on their own resources until a loan was raised (dec. 1924) the administration of which was guaranteed by the league of nations. in 18 months the refugee settlement commission of the league of nations had settled more than half a million refugees in new villages and urban districts throughout greece. ‘this scttlement increased the homogencity of population on the greck frontiers, where the problem of alien minorities had already been reduced by a system of exchanging populations, embodied in the greco- bulgarian convention (1919) for the voluntary emigration of minoritics and the greco-turkish ‘convention (jan. 30 1923) for the compulsory exchange of moslem and greck-orthodox minorities. these agree- ments (together with the turco-bulgarian agreement of 1913) completed and regularised a series of migratory movements which had begun with the balkan wars and had transformed the popula- tions of thrace and macedonia. thrace east of the maritsa is now completely turkish, western thrace predominantly greek; and in sept. 1925, the league of nations refugee settlement comission reported that greek macedonia was then “ crowded with an active and industrious population, of which more than 90%, were greeks by race and sentiment ” (see refugees). the corfu incident.—on aug. 27 1923, the murder of the italian member of the greco-albanian frontier commission led to the italian bombardment of corfu. greece appealed to the league of nations through whose agency the dispute was ultimately settled (see league of nations). greece’s correct and conciliatory attitude in this unfortunate dispute did her great credit. return of veniselos —at home the revolutionary govt., led by cols. gonatas and [plasteras with m. alexandres as foreign minister, made genuine attempts to return to constitutional government, they failed however to form a moderate centre party (sept. 1923); and a month later the extreme royalists, under gen. metaxas, attempted to raise a counter revolution, which was easily suppressed. there was evidence that gen. metaxas had been in communication with king george hl. the republicans thus received a tremendous impetus, and though at the elections (dec. 16 1923), from which the royalists ab- stained, they were defeated, they had secured the support of the army and the navy, under the influence of gen. pangalos and capt. hadjikyriakos, whose pressure was so energetic that the govt. to avoid disorder requested the king to absent himseli during the meeting of the national assembly which was to decide the future of the throne. on dec. 18 1923 the king and queen left for rumania. adm. condouriotes was appointed regent and veniselos was invited to return to greece. in view of the apparent unanimity of the appeal he found it impossible longer to refuse. he returned (jan. 4 1924) only, he was careful to announce, temporarily, in order to “ put an end to civil war,” and proposed to solve the constitutional problem by an imme- diate plebiscite. the revolutionary committee resigned and col. plasteras retired into private life. establishment of a republic-—a week after his arrival veni- sclos unwillingly accepted the premiership. he proposed (jin. 23) that a plebiscite should be held in two months’ time, under the supervision of committees representing every party, to decide whether a republic was desirable, and if not who should be king. the decision was to be followed by a general election held under a system of proportional representation. he found himsell opposed however by the extreme republicans under m. papanas- tasiou who insisted on the immediate expulsion of the dynasty and establishment of a republic by a vote of the assembly. veni- selos resigned the premicrship (feb. 4) to m. kafantares who also favoured a plebiscite. he succeeded (eb. 27) in defeating the republican motions in the chamber and was proceeding to greece negotiate for a joint programme with the royalists when the officers league was reformed and demanded from regent and premier that a republic should be set up without more ado. m. kafantares resigned, veniselos left greece (march 10) and a government was formed by m. papanastasiou, who proposed to settle the fate of the throne by a resolution of the chamber to be ratified by asubsequent plebiscite. after the king had refused a very gencrous offer if he would abdicate voluntarily, there was no difficulty in gelling the necessary vote. the republic was proclaimed on march 25 1924. the plebiscite, the arrangements for which were accepted by the royalists, was held on april 13 when 758,742 voted for the republic and 325,322 for a monarchy. the republic under the provisional presidency of adm. con- douriotes was recognised on april 23 by england, who had resumed diplomatic relations on jan. 16. the govt. of m. papanastasiou was strengthened by the inclusion of gen. pangalos, col. kondyles and adm. hadjiky- riakos; but the two last-named officers soon left it again and m. papanastasiou resigned, and was succeeded by m. sofoules on july 19, after a violent attack on the minister for war, gen. pangalos, by m. mihalakopoulos who himself formed a govern- ment on oct. 7. the unratified protocol —at the end of july 1924, bulgarian komi- tadjis captured on greek territory at tarlis were shot down by their escort, and a month later a commission of inquiry appointed by the league of nations censured the local authorities though it exonerated the greek govt.;a satisfactory feature was that the report was signed by the greek member of the commission. on sept. 29 the bulzarian and greek delegates (col. kalfoff and m. politis) meeting at creneva signed a protocol providing that each power should ap- point as its official advisers for carrying out the treaty protecting the interests of minorities col. corfe (british) and major de roover (belgian), who were already at work on the frontier as members of the existing mixed commission for the exchange of populations ap- pointed under the greco-bulgarian convention of 1919. their authority would be a protocol embodying provisions contained in the treaty of neuilly and repeated in an annexe to the treaty of sevres. unfortunately this sincere and generous movement was re- garded at belgrade as an arbitrary recognition of the existence of “ bulgar’ minorities in greece which might lead bulgaria to claim sunilar privileges for “‘ bulgar * minorities in serbia. serbian an- noyance and greek suspicion were quickened by exaggerated rejoicing in the bulgarian press. on nov. 27 serbia denounced the alliance with greece and this undoubtedly determined greek repudiation of m. politis. on veb. 3 1925, the greek chamber refused to ratify the protocol and on march 14 it fell to veni- selos to announce and defend this refusal before the council of the league, negotiations with serbia.—on april 27 1925 negotiations for re- newal of the greco-serbian alliance were opened at belgrade and soon broke down over the preliminary demands of serbia. serbia demanded the control and exploitation of the railway from ghevegeli to salonika; an extension of the serbian zone on the harbour of salonika; and a recognition that the slavs of macedonia were not “ bulyars’’ but ‘serbs.’ this last demand was referred by greece to the league of nations. with regard to the railway line she offered to rebuild and reorganise the line or to appoint a per- manent league of nations ofhcial to arbitrate on all serbian com- plaints but objected to any such cession of rights as would be not only a diminution of sovereignty but a continual source of friction. the negotiations were broken off on june 1, and a subsequent pro- posal that the line should be worked by a french company (oct. 9) was not more successful. with regard to the larger question of the alliance, which remained in suspense, there was a possibility that, both powers having disclaimed any territorial ambitions, negotia- tions might be re-opened (jan. 1926) for the conclusion of a balkan security pact analogous to that of locarno. the patriarchate.—at the conference of lausanne the turks had consented to the maintenance of the oecumenical patriarch at the phanar provided he exercised no civil or administrative powers. but on jan. 30 1925 the new oecumenical patriarch was expelled from constantinople by the turks, who contended that he was not an ‘ inhabitant of constantinople ’’ and that accordingly he was not exempted by the treaty of lausanne from the provisions of the convention for the exchange of populations. in any case the greeks had put themselves in the wrong by ignoring the usual formalities of election and failing to obtain turkish consent to his candidature. the council of the league of nations referred the dispute to the hague court (march 14); but meanwhile greece and turkey arrived at a settlement, greece persuading the expelled patriarch to resign, gen. pangalos seizes government—meanwhile the national assembly had not yet succeeded in voting the new constitution greece and there were numerous complaints of peculation and admin- istrative inefliciency. on june 16 m. mihalakopoulos reformed his government but to days later, confronted by an ultimatum from gen. pangalos and adml. hadjikyriakos, he resigned. gen. pangalos formed a government (june 26) including adml. hadji- kyriakos, m. kofinas and, later, m. rentes (july 2), an experi- enced diplomatist, and after receiving a vote of confidence dis- solved the assembly. the new constitution, issued by procla- mation on sept. 30, provides for a president to be elected for a term of five vears and a senate of 150 members, roo to he elected by the parliamentary franchise, 30 by various guilds and cor- porations and 20 by chamber and senate. gen. pangalos promised that it should be submitted for ratification after elec- tions to be held in the new year. a proposal to court martial m. papanastasiou for issuing a democratic manifesto was can- celled (oct. 5) but gen. plasteras was expelled from athens (oct. 24). two officials were publicly hanged for embezzlement. on oct. 19 there occurred a fresh frontier “ incident ”’ with bulgaria, in the course of which the latter appealed to the league of nations (see league of nations: work of the first six years). the commission ordered greece to pay damages and found she had violated the covenant by occupying bulgarian territory with her troops. the commission also made various recommendations for avoiding frontier incidents (including a system of frontier guards under neutral officers), and for com- pleting without friction the convention for the exchange of populations. the undoubted success of the league was obscured in athens by an inevitable comparison with the corfu affair, but the decision of the council in accordance with the report was accepted by the greek govt. on dec. 15. meanwhile gen. pangalos was making strenuous eflorts to suppress political rancour at home. on nov. 24 at a confcrence with the party leaders he reccived assurances that the constitu- tional question would not be raised at the elections in march and on this understanding the election of a senate was fixed for jan. 10, and two royalists, m. l. roufos and m. sehiotes, entered the government. apparently however it was too much to expect political leaders not to talk politics, on jan. 3 1626 and in sub- sequent proclamations gen. pangalos announced that the sena- torial and parliamentary elections would be indefinitely post- poned and that his government had decided to concentrate ail executive and administrative powers in its own hands; with the declared aims of economy and internal order and the forcible reconciliation of contending factions the ministries of national economy and public assistance were abolished, the permancnce of the civil service was suspended and the press was forbidden to publish any articles written hy mim. kafantares, papanas- tasiou and mihalakopoulos. adml. hadjikyriakos and m1. schi- otes immediately resigned. at the ministry of finance m, tan- talides, replacing m. kofinas who had gone on a debt-funding mission to washington, issued a forced loan simijar to that of 1922 from which foreigners were not to be exempted (jan. 23). all lhese measures were received by the people with the fatigue and listlessness which were becoming almost a substitute lor political stability. indeed while the agreeable m. roufos re- mained at the foreign office to develop the improving relations with serbia, italy and albania there was a prospect that greece might at last enjoy a period of tranquillity and good government. the dictatorship of gen. pangalos had the merits as well as the defects of a fire-ecating common sense, and it had the advantage of not being disguised in any pretentious idcology. (j. n.m.*) tne country’s defence the normal duration of military service, which is compulsory for all greek citizens, is two ycars in the active army, ir in the reserve and eight in the territorial army. men are called up ut the age of 21, and are liable for service until 51. territorials are only called up in case of invasion or threat of invasion, and are only called up for training twice in the fourth and eighth year for a fortnight. the peace-time strength of the army is 12 in- fantry divisions, 1 cavalry division and a certain number of units unattached. the total personnel in 1924-5 was 66,454. 285 the greek navy consists of 5 old battleships, 1 armoured and 1 protected cruiser dating from before the world war, 11 de- stroyers and 36 smaller units, including 2 submarines. = (x..) bibliography.——d. j. cassavetti, [hellas and the balkan wars (1914); s. b. chester, life of venitselos (1921); w. christmas, king george of greece (1914); hi. a. gibbons, veniselos (1921); l. maccas, ainsi parla veniselos (1916) and other works; j. a. r. marriott, the eastern question (1917); p. f. martin, greece of the twentieth century (1913); w. miller, the ottoman empire and its successors (1923); w. miller, a /ztstory of the greek people (2821-1927) (1922); h. morgenthau, secrets of the bosphorus (1918); a. a, pallis, “ racial migrations in the balkans during 1912-24," geographical journal (1925); r. rankin, the inner iistory of the balkan wurs (1914); a. j. toynbee, greece (1915); the western question in greece ard turkey (1922); e. veniselos and others (speeches by), vindication of greek national policy (1918); h. c. woods, the cradle of the war (1918) and other works. iiandbooks prepared under the direction of the historical section of the foreign office on greece, afacedonia and the eastern question (1920); handbook on greece prepared by the geographical section of the naval intelligence division at the admiralty (1920); greek “ white books” (aitawparica tyypada, 2 vol., 1917). diplomatic and consular reports, treaties, ctc., issued by h.m. station- ery office; annual and monthly statistical bulletins, issued by the creek ministries; publications of the league of nations. see otee journal of league of nations and league of nations’ year boek, il. economic and financial history pre-war position.—the economic situation of greece during the early years of the present century, up to the outbreak of the balkan war in ig12, was marked by a steady if moderate progress. indus- trial enterprises for local purposes were established in considerable number. communications by road and railway were extended, and large additions were made to the mercantile marine. the premium on gold gradually declined, and finally disappeared in 1909. by the valaoritis law of 1910, providing for the automatic issue and with- drawal of notes against gold or forcign exchange, the currency was definitely stabilised at par on the gold exchange system, to the great advantage of the general economy and the credit of the country. the state of the public finances, though less satisfactory, also showed signs of improvement at the latter end of the period. a series of deficits from 1907 to i909 had to be met out of a portion of the proceeds of a new foreign joan raised for this and other purposes in 1j10. at the same time, a programme of fresh taxation was intro- duced, including income tax and succession duties, with the result that the accounts up to 1912 showed a substantial surplus of revenue over expenditure. the varying interest on the old gold loans, pay- able out of surplus revenues in the hands of the international finan- cial commission, marked a sensible upward progress, the balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 threw a considerable strain on the resources and the finances of greece, which was, however, re- lieved in some measure by the material assistance rendered by greeks abroad. immediate war expenses were defrayed chiefly out of the balance of the 1910 loan and the proceeds of various provi- sional loans, which were liquidated by means of a new consolidated loan issued in 1914, and taken up for the greater part in paris and london. this loan was secured on the revenues assigned to the international financial commission, an institution which, though regarded as an encroachment on the sovereign rights of the country, has been found useful on repeated occasions as a means of providing security for fresh loans. the economic strength of greece was greatly enhanced by the acquisition of territories of both actual and potential value, including the important port of salonika, the rich tobacco-growing districts of drama and kavalla and extensive arcas in macedonia capable of productive development. the world war.—alter the outbreak of the world war, and dur- ing the period of neutrality of greece, which lasted from ig9t4 until 1917, there was a considerable accumulation of private wealth in the form of forcign balances, but the country suffered severely from in- ternal conflicts, from the economic blockade of old greece in 1916-7 and from the prolonged mobilisation and war preparations. noteworthy economic events during this period were: the law of 1915 facilitating the formation of co-operative societies; the connec- tion, in 1916, of the railway system of greece with those of europe; and the agrarian legislation of 1917, which provided for the expro- priation of large estates in favour of the peasants, and at the same time prohibited the alienation or mortgage of the peasants’ holdings and their subdivision at death. the entry of greece into the war in 1917 involved a large increase in military and naval expenditure. fresh taxation was imposed, tn- cluding a tax on war profits, and a certain sum was raised by an internal loan and by the issue of national defence, bulls. but the bulk of the funds required was provided by advances in kind from the allied powers and by credits opened by the latter for expenditure in greece, against which payments were effected in notes by the greek government. these credits were treated as cover for the note issue, the very considerable expansion in the paper currency which re- sulted from these arrangements did not cause at first too heavy a 286 demand for exchange, for the factors which contributed to strengthen the foreign balances during the period of neutrality continued to operate until the end of the war. with the close of the war, however, and the suppression of restrictions on trade, the accumulated purchasing power of the country made itself felt in a large demand for foreign goods. large purchases of greek and other securities were made in foreign markets, and the depreciating currencies of europe offered an attractive field for the speculator. the resultant pressure on the exchange funds of the note-issue was so great that before the end of 1919 the available reserves were exhausted, the exchanges began to fall away from the gold parity, and the valaoritis law became a dead letter. in the course of 1920 a portion of the allied credits was realised, but this was quickly absorbed by purchases of supplies, and the excess of imports reached unprecedented proportions. eiffects of the greco-turkish war.—aat the same time, the govt. found itself involved in fresh liabilities in connection with the military operations in asia minor. to raise the considerable funds required, recourse was had to a large internal lottery loan, to issues of national defence bills, to loans from the national bank and, finally, to inflationary issues of paper money. the fall in the exchanges was accelerated by the withdrawal of finan- cial support and credits by the allics on the return of king con- stantine in 1920. by the end of that year the drachma had lost 60% of its gold value. this depreciation of the currency reacted unfavourably on the budget, while the prosecution of the asia minor campaign entailed ever-increasing expenditure. in 1921 and 1922 issues of paper money and national defence bills were effected on a large scale, without authority from the international financial commission taxes were raised and a forced loan was extracted from note-holders by compelling them to surrender one- half of each note in exchange for a government bond. the dis- aster in asia minor in 1922 reduced the finances and credit of the country to the lowest ebb, and by the end of the year its securities were quoted on the international markets at prices yielding 20% to the investor, while the drachma had lost 94% of its gold value. this collapse of the monetary unit, with the concomitant rise in the price-level, profoundly disturbed eco- nomic conditions throughout the country, and caused serious losses among particular sections of the community. the bulk of the public debt being on a gold basis, the real charge of its service on the state finances was not greatly reduced by the depreciation. refugee scttlement.—the influx from asia minor and thrace of a vast number of destitute refugees threw a fresh burden on the resources of the country, and enlisted the sympathy and assistance of joreign countries, especially of england and amer- ica. under the auspices of the league of nations an independent refugee settlement commission was set up in 1923, for the estab- lishment of the refugees, and a refugee loan was issued in 1924, in london, new york and athens, guaranteed by revenues assigned to the international financial commission. mean- while, the govt. made strenuous eflorts to put its finances in order. considerable fresh taxation was imposed in 1923, includ- ing a capital levy to be spread over five years, which has given very mediocre results. the floating debt was largely increased in 1923 and 1924. a fresh uncovered issue of paper money was made in 1923, and at the same time a law was passed authorising further issues against cover in funds abroad. the exchange, after violent fluctuations, settled down in 1924 to about one-tenth of the gold parity. by 1925 the public finances had so far recovered that the govt. was able to allocate special revenues to the re- duction of the tloating debt, and to present a balanced budget. but this equilibrium was afterwards disturbed by fresh expendi- ture and by a renewed fall in the exchanges, due to an inflationary banking policy and a maladministration of the foreign exchange fund created by the law of 1923. at the end of 1925 the drachma had again fallen back to one-fifteenth of its gold parity. notwithstanding the instability of the political regime, of the public finances and of the monetary policy, the country as a whole showed remarkable powers of recuperation after a period of ro years of war ending ina great national disaster. the refugee population tended to become an asset instead of a burden. the refugees settled in macedonia, extended the cultivated area and increased the production of crops, while large numbers found greek literature, ancient employment in industrial and other occupations. the expro- priation of agricultural properties for the benefit of refugee and other peasants was accelerated, on terms very unfavourable to the owners, by special legislation in 1923 and 1924. the mer- cantile marine, which had been reduced by nearly two-thirds during the war by sales and losses through enemy action, was restored to its original strength. exports expanded slowly, but the growth of imports bore witness (apart from the portion attributable to foreign loans) to the extent of the country’s addi- tional resources in the form of shipping and other profits, of remittances from emigranis and of investments that were held abroad. the greatly increased burden of public debt was mitigated by the fact that the larger part of it was held by her own nationals. nascent local industries, hampered during the war for lack of fuel, took a fresh upward stride, stimulated in some degree by high tarifis and other protective measures, and by the influx of refugee labour. the extension of building operations and other forms of economic activity afforded evidence of increased pros- perity, but an exact measure of real progress could not be ascer- tained while inflation continued. railways, roads, ports and urban services gencrally were still in a backward state. at the end of 1925, however, numerous projects were in contemplation or in course of execution, with the aid of foreign capital, for extensive improvements in these directions and for the further development of local resources. statistical comparisons. —the following statistical table sum- marises the changes in some of the salient economic and financial features of greece over an interval of rather more than ten years, 1.€., ioi 4 to 1924. i9i4 present day area, square miles : 46,000] 1925 49,200 population —. : : 4,800,000] 1925 6,200,000 production of cereals, tons 847,000, 1925 871,000 production of tobacco, tons 25,000] 1925 66,000 production, currants, tons 158,000] 1925 133,000 production of emery, tons 16,000] 1925 20,000 production of lignite, tons 20,000| 1925 111,000 exports, drachmas 178,500,000] 1925 4,320,000,000' imports, drachmas 318,800,000] 1925 9,834,000,000! joint stock companies . 68} 1925 225 companies, capital of, drach- mas 6 363,000,000{ 1925 2,1g0,000,000' co-operative societies 5] 1925 3,655 letters carried : 29,810,000] 1924 73,403,000 telegrams despatched . 1,968,000] 1924 5,502,000 telegraph lines, miles 5,735) 1924 11,225 railways open, miles 1,366] 1925 1,689 piraeus entrics, steamships . 3,809 | 1925 7,915 piraeus entries, net tonnage | 4,067,000 | 1925 5,044,000 mercantile marine, steam- ships s : : a774) 1925 467 mercantile marine, gross ton- nage. : : : 830,000] 1925 qi 2,000 bank deposits, drachmas 474,000,000] 1925 5,755,000,000 bank deposits, postal sav- ings, drachmas , : 700,000] 1925 93,500,000 note circulation, drachmas. [253,000,000] 1925 5,339,000,000 public debt, gold £ 43,900,000} 1925 77,800,000 public debt, currency, drach- 173,600,000] 1925 7,918,000,000 207 ,700,000|1924-5 4,719,000,000 mas ; . ‘ ordinary revenue, drachmas athens cost of living, index no. ‘ : ‘ , 100| 1925 dec. 1,644 exchange on london, drach- mas per £. : , ; 25] 1925 dec. 27 ‘these figures must be considered in relation with the exchange. bibliograpity.—a, andreades, les finances de la grece (paris, 1915); fh. lefeuvre-meaulle, la grece economique et financtere en rors (paris, 1916); a. andreades, les progres economiques de la grece (paris, 1919); t. g. lecatzas, les finances de la grece pendant la guerre (athens, 1919); e. j. tsouderos, le relevement economique de la grece (paris, 1919); c. j. damiris, le systeme moneiatre grec et le change (paris, 1920); a. a. pallis, “‘ racial migrations in the balkans during the years 1912~24,"’ geographical journal (oct. 1925); also financial and statistical publications of the greek government; annual reports of the international financial commisston annuae reports of the national bank of greece; diplomatic and consular reports, etc. (l. g. r.) greek literature, ancient