GEORGIA, U.S.A

the population of georgia in 1925 was 3,058,260, as against 2,895,832 in 1920 and 2,609,121 in igto, an increase of 17-2° for the 15 years. during 1910-20 negroes increased from 1,176,987 to 1,206,365, but relatively they decreased from 45-1°% of the total population to 41-7 %. the urban population was 25:1°%> as compared with 20-6%% in 1o1e. the density of population in 1920 was 49°3 per sq. m. as against 44:4 in rg10. the census of 1920 revealed an impor- tant movement of population from the mountain counties of 188 the northern portion of the state and from central georgia to south-central and southeastern georgia, duc to the presence of large areas of undeveloped and fertile land in the southern half of the state. the highest density of population, however, was still to be found in the northern half. agriculture —although scarcely perceptible in 1914, by 1916 the boll weevil had spread over the coastal plain of georgia, and in the following years covered the entire state. the grow- ing of long-staple cotton was abandoned and the production of the short-staple was sharply curtailed, falling from 2,718,037 bales in 1914, the largest crop in the history of the state, to an average of 30°% less in the four years following. this situa- tion gave a powerful impetus to diversified farming, the move- ment being aided by the high prices of foodstuffs due to the world war. the most important of the new crops is tobacco. beginning with a production of 1,088,000 lb. in 1010, this crop in 1925 had grown to 47,880,000 pounds. meanwhile there have been tremendous increases in the production of hogs, sweet potatoes, peanuts, melons and fruits, particularly peaches and apples, and pecans. education.—in 1910 the total enrolment in the public schools was 555,7945 in 1924, 709,760; the state appropriation for elementary schools in rg10 was $2,237,000; in 1925, $4,500,000; there was raised by local taxation in 1910, $1,307,000; in 1924, $8,732,923. the total amount spent from all sources for ele- mentary schools in 1924 was $22,701,973. laws were enacted 1910-20 for the modernising of the educational system. a constitutional clause limiting the taxing power of the counties to taxation for elementary schools only was removed (1910). the state board of education, hitherto composed of state officials, was made a professional board (1911), and a uniform text-book law passed, the duty of selecting the books being placed upon the board. compulsory education dates from 1916. the law, as amended by the new school code of 1919 required attendance through the seventh grade. provision was made for attendance officers. a training school for negro teachers was authorised in 1922. the federal smith-lever act of 1914, and the smith-hughes act of 1917, both accepted by georgia, provided for extension work in agriculture and home economics, and for the teaching of vocational subjects in the schools. in rgrg the policy was adopted of setting apart one-half of the total income of the state for the schools. in the same year a constitutional amendment was adopted, by which the counties were required to levy local taxation of not less than one mill nor more than five mills for the support of clementary schools as a supplement to the state appropriation. to encourage the consolidation of small schools, the legislature appropriated (1919) $100,000 from which the state offered to pay annually a bonus of $500 to any county which combined small schools into larger ones and where a four-year high school was provided, an additional bonus of $1,000 was authorised. this bonus fund was increased to $200,000 in 1924. an illiteracy commission was established (1919) to make a study of adult illiteracy and in 1920 local taxation for the support of schools for adult illiterates was authorised. noteworthy progress was being made in the eradication of illiteracy. white illiteracy declined from 7°8 to 5:4%; negro from 36-5 to 29:1%. during the period 1905-25 the number of four-year high schools increased from “to 275. the total state appropriations for higher institutions, including the district agricultural schools, the academies for the blind and deaf, and various training schools for defective classes, was in 1910 $436,500; in 1924 $1,284,450. government.—the period 19r0—-25 in georgia was characterised by legislation designed to further social progress and economic improvement. the standard of medical education was materially raised (1913); only four-year medical colleges were recognised and the requirements for entrance were increased. a new board of health was established (1914) to exercise control over the county boards of health. provision was made for paid sanitary commissioners in all sanitary districts, which consist of one or more counties. a vital statistics law of 1914 provided for the registration of births and deaths and the publication of statistics. georgia—gerard the employment of children under 14 years of age was pro- hibited (1914), and factory inspectors were provided in 10916. a ‘training school for mental defectives was established (19109); and a state board of public welfare (1919) was set up, charged primarily with the duty of inspecting all state institutions for the dependent, defective, delinquent and criminal classes. an act of 1920 provided for rehabilitation of persons disabled in industry or otherwise, assented to the federal vocational act and pledged the state to equal appropriations made by the united states. a state board of vocational education was created (1917), charged with the administration of the rehabili- tation training. in 1922 a commission was created to study the laws of this and other states and propose legislation to safeguard the welfare of children within the state. a dept. of commerce and labour was created (1911), in which was later (1917) included a free employment bureau. the dept. of insurance dates from 1912. the state highway dept. (1916) was reconstituted in 1919 to bring the state system into harmony with national legislation providing aid in the construction of rural post roads. a bureau of markets (1917) was created to gather and disseminate information of value to producers and consumers of agricultural products; and, in 1921 an act was passed to encourage co-operative marketing of agricultural products, their storage, canning, packing, etc., the supplying of agricultural machinery, and the financing of these operations. to further the erection of modern warehouses for the weighing, grading and storage of lint cotton, a warehouse commission was authorised in 1918. a new banking code (1920), modelled on the national bank act, corrected many defects in the old banking system and provided for adequate inspection. an employers’ liability act (1920) set aside the common law defence of contributory negligence of fellow- employees and provided for compensation for industrial acci- dents, a commission being created to administer the act. the uniform negotiable instruments law was adopted in 1924. finances.—the assessed value of the taxable property of georgia in 1910 was $766,000,000 and in 1924, $1,213,423,073. the yicld of taxes in 1924 was $16,765,264. the principal source of revenue was the general property tax. in recent years two special tax commissions appointed by the governor have made reports urging the classification of property for taxation purposes, the adoption of the income tax, and other changes in the system; but the legislature had up to 1925 failed to act. ‘the bonded indebtedness of georgia was reduced from $6,944,000 in 1910 to $5,284,202 in 1924. history.—the governors of the state during the period r911— 26 were: ihloke smith (dem.), 1911-2 (shortly after his inaugura- tion smith was elected by the legislature to succeed j. m. terrell as u.s. senator); joseph m. brown (dem.), 1912-3 (elected at a special election to fill smith’s unexpired term); john m. slaton (dem.), 1913-5; nathaniel e. harris (dem.), 19ts-7; hugh m. dorsey, to17-21; thomas w. hardwick (dem.), 1921-3; clifford m. walker (dem.),1923-. (r.p.b.) georgia (see 11.758), a soviet republic forming part of the transcaucasian federation of soviet republics. the capital is tiflis (see transcaucasia). gerard, james watson (1867- ), american lawyer and diplomat, was born at geneseo, n.y., aug. 25 1867. educated at columbia university and at the new york law school, he was admitted to the bar in 1892 and began to practise in new york city. in 1908 he became associate justice of the supreme court of new york, resigning in 1913, on being appointed ambassador to germany. at the outbreak of the world war in. 1914 he assumed the care of british, japanese, rumanian and serbian interests in germany, later visiting the camps where british and other prisoners were confined and doing much to alleviate their condition. his responsibilities were further in- creased by the fact that german interests in france, great britain and russia were placed in the care of the american embassies in those countries, the american embassy in berlin thus becoming a sort of clearing house. after the sinking of the ‘ lusitania ’ with many americans on board, on may 7 3915, gerault-richard—german literature the american ambassador’s position became more difficult, and finally, on feb. 3 1917, diplomatic relations were broken off by america and he was recalled. while in germany in 1914 he was democratic nominee in new york for the u.s. senate, but with- out success. on his return to america he resumed the practice of law in new york city. he reccived the vote of several states in the democratic national convention of 1920 and 1924 and was chairman of the finance committee of the national demo- cratic campaign in 1920 and ‘treasurer in 1924. in 1917 he pub- lished afy four yeurs in germany and in 1918 face to face with katserism. for his services to england he was decorated with the g.c.b. gerault-richard, alfred leon (1860-1911), french journalist and politician (see 11.766), died dec. 6 rort. german literature (see 11.783), like every form of spirit- ual activity in germany, experienced between 1910 and 1920 deep alterations in thought, feeling, values and form. charac- teristic of the older generation was its pleasure in the external picture of the world. man, with joy and confidence, felt himself a part of this picture. the younger generation seeks to reveal the inner meanings of the world. a time of suffering leads towards infinite horizons. former standards of measurement are replaced by a sense of the immeasurable. we no longer tread our bit of the world as a solid piece of reality, but long for escape into the infinite. its symbol is the horizon always receding, never attained. the forerunners of expressionism—but what appears at first sight to be a bridgeless gap made by disruption is really only the last stage of a continuous development already begun between 1890 and 1910. during those two decades the point of view had shifted, gradually but steadily, until by rors it already had come half-circle. all typical writers of the “ impressionist ”’ period had turned symbolists in their later works; stefan george and his circle, or rainer maria rilke, gerhart hauptmann himself in his later work (und pippa tanst, emanuel quint) are only to be understood from this angle. even when “ impressionism ” was at its height there were writers whose work was strange to their age, and only jater became quite intelligible when they were scen as the forerunners of an age of “ expressionism.” in fiction, [ermann conradi, johannes schlaf, hermann stehr and jakob wassermann looked towards new life and personality; while julius hast, paul scheerbart and gustav meyrink strove for new form and shape; and heinrich mann’s evolution from renaissance poet to central european democrat meant increas- ing sympathy with the new youth. dramatists had already attempted to create a new drama of style to break the suprem- acy of the old naturalistic drama of situations or the neo-ro- mantic drama of sentiment. herbert eulcnberg and wilhelm schmidtbonn had dared to make a new drama out of passion or excitement; paul ernst in a hard struggle for dramatic form sought to create a new classical drama, and thereby was first in the far-reaching light against the dominant relativist and psy- chological cult. frank wedekind had broken with every tradi- tion and spoken with the voice of primitive impulse. while the lyric poets, peter hille, alfred mombert, christian morgen- stern, had one foot in the ficld of the new art, others from 1900 onwards took their full stand on that ground. instance the pocts of charon, particularly otto zur linde (b. 1873, collected works, 1910 seq.), karl rottger and rudolf paunwitz. the expressionist movement—the term “ expressionism ”’ as applied to the theory and practice of this new art came into general use between 1910 and 1920. the word is, on the whole, felicitous. it shows clearly how the new art contrasts with nat- uralistic impressionism which was all facts and feelings; as equally with aesthetic, neo-romantic fantasy; opposed thus to zola and hoffmansthal alike. instead of the impression received from without we have now expression of the inward self. in- stead of transcribing some trait of nature that awakens a certain state of feeling, we have relief of the spiritual tension that con- ceives all concrete things as signs and symbols devoid of separate meaning and even of incidental help towards the better recogni- tion of the outward world. instead of being the humble inter- preter of any outer thing, the artist’s idea now absorbs the object 189g in order that he may free himself from its tyranny and find his own salvation in the idea. instead of pleasure in the object, pleasure that enlightens or transfigures, there 1s now torment from which respite must be won if life is to be borne. eternal circumstance yields to the eternal act; the cool observer to the ardent believer and worker in a holy cause; the poct to the polit- ical leader; description and cloquence to pathetic appeal, even to the scream of pain. earth and nature yield to spirit, to the all, to god; positivism to metaphysics and rationalism to the irrational; logic to mysticism, understanding to use, potential ability to active will and decided opinion; form to matter; society to community, the logical and psychological man to the inspired. in short “i” yields to “‘ you”? and ‘f one another; ” the mis- trusting mood to the trustful. for: ‘‘ man is good; “ man is the centre of his world;” “‘ with man the world begins.” in the history of ideas the new sweep of tendency is thus a variety of those foaming, overflowing movements known in germany as “ sturm und drang ” or “ romanticism.”” chrono- logically, it is the expression of the inevitable change from one generation to another. this new art had, indeed, leaders older than itself; but in the main it manifests the spirit of the new youth—its will to live, its urge towards artistic creation. the generation born between 1880 and 1890 or later breaks clean away from its predecessors born in the ’sixties or there- abouts. but what this fresh generation feels, and means to prove, is that its break with the immediate past is something fundamentally different from the new departures of 1880 or 1840 or 1800. this artistic revolution stands out against the world’s more profoundly significant background. it begins with a far different spiritual atmosphere—itself only one aspect of a whole world’s violent moral crises. before this, the revolts of youth against age were familiar enough, but really meant bolder ad- vance on lines marked out by the fathers, and by the forebears for 400 years. ‘this time the standpoint is quite changed. it 1s impossible, says youth now, to link up with our predecessors. their past is worthless; the present is a disgrace; our task to-day is to “ break all bridges and begin again.” the naturalistic revo- lution of its fathers is regarded as a false development by t..eir sons who overthrow it. to them it seems merely the last stage of a process set up a century ago or even four centuries ago, when the epoch of humanism began to make the world “‘ measurable and ponderable.” now, the aim is to make a new beginning. the former phase displayed the victorious advance of the natural sciences, their processional entry, as it were, into human life, their permeation of all its knowledge, feeling, thought, activity. the resultant rise of machine-industry and technical resources gave an unparalleled command of nature by man. the young generation proclaims the end of this era in a europe that went to pieces in the world war. it mocks the so-called mighty achievements which only led to unexampled violations of the spirit. this is why they reject and execrate the idols of science and repudiate its votaries, the brain, the head. this is why they acclaim as prophets the idol-breakers strindberg and claudel. this is why they reject the “law of causality ” in lterature, together with the materialist theory of the soul, and the corre- spondent psychology. hence, from their language, they banish logic and sweep away the parts of speech like articles and copu- latives, which merely scrve logical uses. they rather look to children and savages for instruction in the principles of true and direct existence. simple as these principles appear on the one hand, not all the young talents are fully able to adapt them, but, on the other hand, they lend themselves to many varicties of imaginative and reflective creation. there is room not only for the despisers of culture and civilisation, but also for those who, like the “ futur- ists,’ hope to create a new art by the enhanced employment of all new technical possibilities; room no less for a leading expres- sionist writer of fiction like alfred deblin, who answers the almost fashionable derision of modern science by protesting that the need is for “ more and more natural science.”” besides expres- sionism of the western types there is an eastern cult; while one school is actively political another is mystical and abstract; igo while an international school calls for a new humanity, a german school demands a new german type of humanity. these groups are not susceptible to such clear local distinctions as in painting, whicre the munich set of the “ blauer reiter ” stands apart from the dresden “ briicke”’ set. the prague group, with mey- rink, brod, kafka and werfel, is perhaps more eastern and mystical, the group assembled in the .[aftion in berlin more ‘activist ” and political. but berlin is also the home of the poets of the charon and of the sturnz, the one an essentially nordic-germanic cult of metaphysical “ expressionism ”’ while the other bears the stamp of abstract internationalism. the first phase of expressionism.—in point of time, the new literary movement falls mainly within the decade 1910-20. it broke through in two main thrusts. with “ manifestos ”’ and “radical strophes ” the “ apocalyptic striplings ” led the onsct. kurt hiller in berlin gathered adherents into the “‘ neuer klub,” the “ gnu ” and similar associations; he collected their verses in the condor in 1912. franz pfemfert welcomed them in the aktion, alfred richard meyer in the biichcrei alaiandros and in his lyrische flugblattcr. so paul zech in dus neue pathos, iernst blass, in heidelberg, in die argonauten, herman meister in saturn, and he also published in the /7/ut collection a first anthology of the most recent belles lettres. in munich two of f, s. bachmair’s periodicals were entitled die revolution and neue iunst respectively. but this poetry, especially at first, often betrayed the influence of george and rilke in form, and still more in rhythm; although, straining out bevond it. not for nothing were the new periodicals which dauecr began to issue in berlin in 1910 and rort, called der sturm and die akiion. after these two, the most important periodical of the new school was the leipzig weisse bletter, which first appeared in the autumn of 1913. the many-voiced yearnings of the time, their yeas and nays, find their most emphatic, clearest and purest artistic utter- ance in theodore diubler’s three-volume epic das nordlicht (1910), otto zur linde’s collected works (1910 seq.), yranz wer- fel’s poems (wir sind, 1913), the verses of georg heym, georg trakl, ernst stadler, gottfried benn, august stramm, carl sternheim’s dramatic work, reinhard johannes sorge’s betiler (1912) and george kaiser’ s die birger von caluis (1914). already at this time, just before the war, a new publishing house on a large scale (curt wolff) was founded in the interests of the new movement; and its collection, te newest day, gave a first sur- vey of the new art and its chiet authors. the second phase.—the second mazin offensive, opened in 1914 with walter hasenclever’s play der sofn, was held up at first by the war. the radical ideas of the new movement suffered ie a rigorous government censorship. ‘the aktion, originally “ periodical for liberal politics and literature,” became per- ae for years a purely literary affair; the messe blatter, of which rene schickele became editor in 1915, was issued outside germany, in ziirich, where it served as a mouthpiece for young writers such as johannes r. becker, albert ehrenstein, leon- hard prank, rudolph leonhard, alfred wolfenstein, walte hasenclever, ludwig rubiner. the more revolutionary ideas gained ground as the war dragged on, the more violently did the whole movement break through the dams, until the highest flood-mark was reached in 1918 and 1gi9. the breakthrough was signalled by a host of periodicals, usually shortlived, whose very titles flamed like beacons; and by new publishing firms. besides the jiingster tag series, the neue reihe appearcd, con- taining old and new names. from r1o14 on, the breakthrough had visible effect on artistic forms. in lyrical poctry the change comes with j. r. becker’s verfall und triumph and august stramm’s gedichte. the “ analytic ’’ drama of the immediate past gives way more and more to the new form of a “ synthetic ” series of pictures. strindberg set the example. originally lyrical and ecstatic, given to dramatic monologue—for monologue gives relicf from the sober, practical methods or crude psychology of the preceding decades—the movement at the same time invaded prose-fiction. so, by the sicle of the new lyric and dramatic poets —fritz von unruh, reinhard goering, paul kornfeld—we find new novelists like leonhard frank, gottfried benn, franz kafka, german literature kasimir edschmid, alfred deblin. the years 19019 and 1920 mark the close of an oll period and the beginning of a new one. what real progress had been made was shown in the excellent anthologies and collections of this time. in the symphonie qiinester dichtung—m enschheitsddmimerung, put together by kurt pinthus in r920, the anth ologie junger tih v erkiindi- guizg, issucd by rudolf kayser in 19213; in ludwig rubiner’s collections of poems weltrevelution—kameraden der menschiett (ro1g) and in the nezellen an die zeit— die entfaltung issued by kfax krell in 1921—-in all these works an effort is made to assert the real value of the new achievements. a periodical such as der genius, which attempted to be for the expressionist cra what pan had been for the impressionist; such also as the two year- books of new creative and critical literature issued by alfred wolfenstein in r919g and 1920 under the title of die erhebung— these were partly retrospective. dramatic pictures like alfred brust’s play die schlacht der teilunde or arnolt bronnen’s vaternord already indicated new developments, as did wolf przygede’s series, die dich.! in the period of naturalism, theory and criticism were the creative and directing forces; they created the novel of experience oa frank “ realism.” now it is otherwise; theory docs not direct the work of art, but develops with it. charo poetry preceded the theory of charonism. edschmid’s famous siucaucians on poetic expressionisni came after the early works which decided him. kornfeld’s studies of inspired man and psychological man appeared after his verfithrung. the order is only reversed in the eccentricities of the movement, in the purely intellectual experiments. yet here, as everywhere, will and deed fertilise each other. the most illuminating of the early books dealing with the movement ere really those which treat of it in painting and sculpture; as kandiusky’s book on das geisitge in der kunst, wilhelm worringer’s beitrug sur styipsychologie, abstraktion und einfiihlung and his formprobleme der gotik. bergson, with his doctrine of creative development, takes the place of taine. sieg- mund freud’s teaching is greedily devoured; his psycho-analysis, the first real investigation of the soul, replaces the old dogma- tism. others are influenced by one who stands at the opposite pole from hiller and rubiner—the zionist martin buber, the champion of every kind of belief in the vitality of myth and the redceming strength of the soul. rudolph steiner’s anthropo- sophic writings also have their effect. and if the new artist asks his hearer to rise to his level, to take a creative part in his work, yet two austrian philos« yphers of the older generation, born in 1860—alexander meinong and edmund ifusserl—had already laid a scientific basis for these emotional demands in their u'ater- suchungen zur gegenstandstheorie und psychologie, in which they explode od the “ empiric bases of our knowledge,” their [deen su einer retnen phinomenologie und phinomenologischen philosophie and their doctrine of pure “‘ wesensschau.” then between 1915 and 1920 appeared the publications which summed up what had gone before and laid down definite aims: ludwig rubiner’s col- lection of fiery appeals, der afensch in der mitte and his deku- micnte der geistigen wellwende, known as die genreinschaft, kurt il:ller’s year-books of spiritual policy, des ziel and kasimir edschmid’s voluminous collection tribtine der kunst und zeit. lhe new lyric.—in the period of naturalism prose-fiction predominated, but in the decade 191020, the lyric. the drama is lyrical, and even the novel is stecped in lyricism; ; despite itself, the influence of the lyric gives it something of the ballad in this decade. as every realist drama bore the marks of its derivation from the story or sketch, so every drama of this period bears the marks of its lyrical origin, down to the very stage directions. the lyric poem itself in this period is generally an endless flow of melody; it is also characterised by a wealth of interjections; it relicves its emotions by an excess of o’s, ah’s and how’s, sug- gesting an elemental outburst of dark, shapeless, chaotic forces. ‘ expressionism apparently began as a secret language for the initiated, but within a few years it had become the fashion, the cur- rent jargon of the literary market. its divine fire, its exaltation and ecstasy were made ludicrous by the “‘ dada '’ movement; the artist, the prophet, the creator of values were succeeded by mountebanks who denied all values. german literature at first calmer, more harmoniously restrained temperaments beheved fervently in evolution without cnd, in a new art not needing to renounce a noble heritage. this faith inspires the work of ernst lissauer (b. 1882), leo sternberg (b. 1876) and georg hadwiger. it is significant that these authors are closely bound up with the ballad and the ballad-mind, that when the war affects them it does so as the fate of the german world, german humanity, as a german war—not as a world war, as the murder of man’s image as a whole. but the thought that a new art can only be won at the price of a frightful world catastrophe, darkly foreshadowing itself in art, breaking in advance all moral laws before shaking the world of the past into chaos boding it is—shown in images, emotions, rhythms, not yet degraded into lyrics of war or revo- [ution—that gives the poems of george haym (1887-1012), georg trakl (1887-1914) or ernst stadler (1883-1914) their peculiar position. these are as yet no agitators; they are still pure poets, prophets; they were broken before the war began, or they broke in its first months. only a happier star preserved paul zech (b. 1881) and armin t. wegner (b. 1886) from a similar fate; they too might have been broken by the irreconcil- able antagonisms of their experience, pit and forest, country and town, had not a new consciousness of community preserved them. it 1s this same feeling of community, or the longing for it, that gives the analytic “ brain poetry ” of iloddis, lichtenstein, boldt, benn, lotz and klemm the strength and light which shines through the verses of the amfbruch der jugend. the same feeling in the poems of franz werfel, who as regards form js by no means always a ‘ new ” lyricist, accounts for their eifect on a whole young gencration, which gives him secure significance by taxing him for a model. this is the feeling, enhanced by war and revolution, which fills the verses of alfred wolfenstein (b. 1888) and rene schickerle (b. 1883), till in the hymns of johannes r. becker (b. 1801), the poet of utopias, it rises to boiling-point and evaporates. ¥ct it would be a mistake to suppose that this fecling of community, this creed of “ thou and one another,” is the only element in the poctry of the time. there are loncly brooclers, like ilse lasker (b. 1876), theodor diubler ()b. 187 76), albert ehrenstein (b. 1886), w hose poctry springs from quite other sources. herwarth walden’s stwrmz united all lyric poets who repudiate any continuity of thought as inartistic and wish to weld the lyric into a pure linguistic form of vowels and con- sonants, a pattern of “ associated ” sounds. the new draisaa—german expressionist drama does not break quite such new ground as expressionist poetry. it has two models, franz wedekind and august strindberg, and it rings contiaual changes on their themes, in their works they present the nev problems, and at the same time solve these problems in the exemplary manner, whether as spectacular or interpretative dramatists. they create the new acting and the new staging. strindberg and wedekind are accepted as masters by many without tradition who cherish a confessed or unavowed longing for moorings and firm anchorage. these are loncly bearers of the message of community; the defeated who ve must seck to save either the world or themselves; the godless who yearn after god; slaves of impulse whose instincts are unsure; beast-men in the grip of dark forces, brain-men who have experienced in their own lives the curse of a purely intellectual estimate of all life; these oppressed by a sense of the meaninglessness of many a life, or of all life, who yet long to tind a meaning. the votaries of this world, those who adore fiesh and blood, ive on wedekind; those of the world beyond, who worship the spirit, live on strindberg; but both alike are unredeemed victims following a way ol the cross. whether calling themselves saints or penitents, they are torn by a torment which drives them through “ heaven and hell.” it is no mere chance that these latter words are the title of an essentially important work of this time, a play, by paul kornfeld. but besides wedekind and strindberg there is a third origi- nating ancestor and an earlier—georg biichner (1813-1851), the creator of joyzek, that drama which is nothing but a way of the cross, nothing but a view of the world through the soul of a hapless martyr. there is hardly one expressionist drama with- iqi cut the woyzek frame of mind, the woyzek characterisation, the woyzek life-blood. these outlines may suflice to show how inadequate is the term ‘ expressionist dramatists; ’”? how varied ean be the world which an “ expressionist ’’ dramatist reflects. halfway between the two periods stands carl sternheim (b. 1881). in his hatred of the bourgeois which inspired the come- dies lus dem biirgerlichen heldenleben he is akin to wedekind; but he desptses the doctrine of brotherliness and love of mankind, he is dry and cold, ervstal-clear, free from mist, a virtuoso of form, his every word plain and unmistakable. georg kaiser (b. 1878), the “ cubist ” of drama, is as true to form, but you cannot grasp him; the man is an enigma like each of his works. they scem to come out of some ot her a age then ours and to pass into yet another—cres utions of impassioned suffering or of pleas- ure in the “ game of thinking,” as kaiser once termed his ideal of drama. what have sternheim and kaiser in common, beyond the joy in solid construction? not even that connection exists between them and another pair, the poet of the blessed ego and him of the accursed ego, the poet of bettler and the poet of (zinz- mei und imelle, reinhardt johannes sorge (1891-1916), that pious disciple of christianity; and paul kornfeld (b. 1889), the young apostle of an all-believing orientalism. or what have these ‘ philosophic politicians ”’ in common with the real politicians, with ludwig rubiner (1888-1920) and ernst toller (b. 1893), the author of afasse mensch, or with reinhard goering, author of seeschlacht and scapa flow, or with fritz von unruh, the writer of louis ferdinand and ein geschlecht, whose whole work is inspired by the desire to show the symbolic meaning of the sorrows of mankind to-day in a myth of mankind future? the young humanity of walter hasenclever (b. 1890) revealed in his der sohn, what has it in common with the other young humanity of hans johst (b. 1890) in his der junge afensch? or that other again of anton wildgans (b. 1881) in his dies irae? what is the link between the two artists from the sister realm of painting and sculpture, the terrified dreamer oskar kokoschka (b. 1886) and “ ernst barlach ” (b. 1870), that secker after god? lwriters like dietzenschmidt (b. 1893) on the one hand sd rolf lauckner (>. 1887) or alfred brust (b. 1891) on the other? we see that expressionist drama, almost more even than the expressionist lyric, is the utterance of an age of confusion: it reflects the death-pangs of one world, the birth- pangs of another. lhe new prose-fiction—the picture that we gain of expres- slonist prose-iiction is quieter. ‘the reason is not far to seek; for if ‘‘ the substance of the age ’’—all it “ holds ” of the past, pres- ent and future—is more clearly shown here than anywhere else, yet the novel seems alien to the “ form of the age,” the expres- sionist style. expressionism is lyrical compulsion, dramatic impulsion, not epic propulsion. the longing of the age for the images of a new humanity and a new community offers many- sided satisfactions to the novelist. he is tempted to bring uto- pias nearer our reach. but in conjuring up the picture of a future world, he forsakes to-day’s world of chaos; out of its wreckage he makes a new world by new laws; but, above all, he sces one thing: that the spirit can create no world unless it begs nature to assist it. many a modern catchword is shattered by the re- strictions of tale-telling art: among them phrases like “ pure spirit ”’ or “ metaphysical space.” there have been only iso- lated attempts to create pure “ brain work.’’ in fact, novelists like gustav sack, kasimir edschmid, alfred deblin, have proved, both by their work itself and by their own pronouncc- ments on it, that they will have nothing to do with narrow- minded antagonism to nature. certainly their work is no mere passive reflection of nature. trose fiction of to-day requires scenic description, where life and its circumstances must be represented as in the historical or exotic novel; yet this is not now done at a leisurely length unbroken by action, but by a more concentrated method seizing on the decisive moments when significance springs out of circumstance. similarly, the outward and surrounding world is always being absorbed into the world within us; each man creates for himself a new outer world, which is nothing but his own soul projected 192 into external form, the representation of all its impulses, the laying bare of its inmost secrets. the manner of narration, too, with its terse words and concise sentences, the accents of unrest and agitation—this is the very opposite of the old descriptive mode. the impression which all this gives is heightened by an avalanche of incidents. events come thick and fast to match the hurrying giddy frivolity of life to-day, a whirling vortex chafing nerve and spirit. the long-starved appetite for material is glutted. we have a variegated cinema-world shown often by a cinematic method in novel-writing—jerky, abrupt, tempes- tuous, with flickering lights. we may pass by the hangers-on and imitators of the true expressionist movement. the weary search of this age after a meaning in existence is tragically uttered in the works of the best novelists of expres- sionism. metaphysicians and believers like max brod (b. 1884), unbelievers like gustav sack (1885-1916) and gottfried benn (b. 1886), exhaust themselves in struggles of joy or despair. kasimir edschmid (b. 1890) flies to adventure for a firm foot- hold and plain idea; ‘‘ klabund ” (alfred henschke, b. 1892) ceasclessly changes his phases; leonhard frank (b. 1882), author of der mensch ist gut (a collection of short stories), believes that he can find salvation in a renewed feeling of community. an- other, franz kafka (d. 1924) sees that in this world there is no salvation, that all we can do is to gain a glimpse of the heaven of another world through the artistry of pure literature. others again, as “ mynona ”’ (salomo friedlander, b. 1871), construct a fabulous realm of new forces and seek to prove that nothing is more fantastical, more like a utopia than nature. the work of alfred doblin (b. 1878) is inspired by the same feeling and leads him to the same conclusion in his romance of the future, berge meere giganten, which describes titanic battles between mankind and nature. the reaction.—as indicated above, the wave of expressionism reached its height in 1920 and then suddenly broke altogether. after the boundless over-conceit which every revolution brings came a moment when the artist paused to reflect while the public was sobered. will and deed, claim and achievement, promise and performance had been taken as one. in expressionism men had seen the revolt of the spirit against matter, of liberty against mechanical slavery, of creative force against the receptive mood and formal reason. all this was regarded as a vision of the future illuminating the background of a shattered past. but the course of the political revolution, in particular, showed that new hu- manity, after all, was subject to the original sin of all existence, the luckless children of a luckless age which lets no man be with- out devouring him again asa victim. expressionism, in its latest phase, is usually the tortured outcry of the mangled victims of an age who yet believe themselves its saviours. it is thus not surprising that literature once more seeks and finds contact again with powers and forces to which artistic teaching just before had denied any importance whether for substance or form. in our survey of the development of prose- fiction we have mentioned the return to nature. in literature, as in all art, there was talk of a “ new reality,” a “‘ new objec- tivity,” a new kind of literal naturalism. this new realism was termed ““magianism,’ to signifythatit had borrowed essential char- acteristics from expressionism, and like it satisfied metaphysical needs. the name “ verism’’ means much the same. jiand in hand with a new reverence for nature goes a new regard for science, even for technique where it is creative. a novelist like josef ponten (b. 1883) is struggling, consciously or unconsciously, towards a marriage of science and art. the new task appears to be to spiritualise, elevate, to mythify everything belonging to science and mechanism, and all the characteristic factors of civilisation in our time. in the same way re-arises respect for tradition. the consciousness of a culture, nourished by all ages and peoples, comes to its own again;it finds its highest expression in the writings of albrecht schaeffer (b. 1885) whose compre- hensive three-volume /felianth (1920) is one of those romances of education peculiarly significant in german literature, while his parzival (1920) is one of the equally typical poems of deliver- ance. but another part of german literature took new blood german offensive irom new spiritual experience. the all-embracing international love which poets and playwrights, especially of jewish origin, had proclaimed with particular fervour, was ruthlessly destroyed after the war by the events of foreign and domestic politics. then writers began again to think of the elemental forces of race and nationality, out of which the super-national, super-temporal always sprang. finally, a german neo-catholic school of letters is undeniably growing up (r. j. sorge, 1891-1916; dietzen- schmidt, b. 1893; leo weismantel, b. 1888). this renewal of substance is accompanied by a revision of form. here, too, faith in the tranquillising, uniting forces tends to gain the upper hand over faith in revolutionary and disruptive forces. idiom is becoming fixed; dramatic and epic structure more coherent; the form of the lyric more crystallised. in close connection with the new thinking there is a fresh appreciation of workmanship, of ability, of technical mastery—things laughed at by a yesterday which had forgotten the “‘ how ” in its concern with the “ what.’’ the development of the novel and the drama show most clearly why the art of the most recent years is tending towards a compromise between naturalism and impressionism on the one side, expressionism on the other. how varied can be the forms of this compromise is shown by the work of novelists like albrecht schaeffer, josef ponten, wilhelm lehmann (b. 1882), rudolf g. binding (b. 1867), otto flake (b. 1882), frank thiess (b. 1890), arnold ulitz (b. 1888). a good survey of this modern art of prose-fiction may be obtained from the “ library ” of modern stories der falke, which has been appearing since 1923. in drama the tendency to get lost in utopian ideals, with the vagueness which often accompanied it, has given way to a method that comes nearer to earth with more sureness and firm- ness of outline. where the dramas of arnold bronnen (b. 1894), bertolt brecht (b. 1894), max mohr (b. 1891), otto briies (b. 1897), friedrich griese (b. 1890), rolf lauckner (b. 1887), hans w. fischer (b. 1876), paul gurk (b. 1880) are in advance of the dramas of the pure expressionists is in their genuine feeling for the theatre itself. in lyric poetry the new purpose and the new faculty are seen in the work of oskar loerke (b. 1889), friedrich schnack (b. 1888), anton schnack (b. 1892), fritz walter bis- choff (b. 1896), ina seidel (b. 1885 and ludwig strauss (b. 1892). the word world-inwardness (weltinntgkeit), chosen by ina seidel as the title of a volume of poems, well defines the spirit of the new poetry. biibliography.—oskar walzel, die deutsche dichtung seit goethes tod (1919, 2nd ed. 1920); adolf bartels, die deutsche dichtung der gegenwaurt (1921); friedrich v. d. leyen, deutsche dichtung in neuer zeit (1920); b. diebold, anarchie tm drama (1921); hans naumann, die deutsche dichtung der gegenwart (1923); wolfgang stammler, deutsche literatur von naturalismus sur gegenwart (1924); albert soergel, dichtung und dichter der zeit; zweite folge, liz bunne des ex pressionismus (1925). (a. soe.) german offensive (march—june 1918).—after the loss of the battle of the marne, in sept. 1914, and the abortive operations which followed it on the aisne and in flanders, the german higher command changed the idea which underlay their strategy. in aug. 1914 their main blow was to be dealt against their strongest adversary, and france was to be crushed before russia could develop her strength. the decisive victory of tannenberg had, however, opened their cyes to the rottenness of the russian army, and from oct. 1914 onwards until march ro18 the aim of the german general staff was to hit at weakness in order to isolate their strongest adversary, namely, the french. the series of battles carried out during the first six months of 1916 in the neighbourhood of verdun was no exception to this crucial strategical idea, since its aim was defensive—that is, its intentions was not to gain a decisive victory in the west, but to dislocate the impending french and british operations and gain time wherein to defeat russia. the campaign in russia, however, dragged on, the same con- ditions appearing as in 1812—climate, lack of communications and distance rendering every tactical victory abortive. tomake up for this delay, in the autumn of 1916 rumania is selected as the weakest point of attack, and is overrun. a year later italy is selected, and the result is the italian debacle at caporetto. german offensive simultaneously russia, to all intents and purposes, «lisappears as a hostile power, so that by the end of 1917 germany could once again turn to the task she had abandoned in the autumn of 1914, namely, the defeat of the french now so strongly supported by the british empire. the political situation which faced the imperial govt. in berlin was one which demanded a rapid conclusion of the war. not only had unrestricted submarine warfare failed to produce the attrition expected, but the stranglehold of the british navy was daily reducing the morale of the german people. of her allies, turkey was the only one who scemed to be in earnest. bulgaria’s interest in the war was waning, and austria and wungary were worn out, having lost nearly 2,000,000 men in prisoners alone. these conditions demanded immediate and decisive action if the war was to be won | before america could develop her strength. whilst the central powers had been isan at weakness, great britain had been engaged in a similar strategy. the stalemate which had been established on the western front, and the abortive campaigns which had followed this stalemate, had forced her into seeking a line of least resistance by means of her navy, with the result that, by the endof 1917,a serious dispersion of fighting force had taken place, extensive operations being in progress in palestine, macedonia and mesopotamia, without counting minor campaigns in africa. further, the british forces in france had been bled white, the arras, messines, ypres and cambrai battles having alone accounted for 650,000 men. the general situation was that whilst france had been recover- ing her strength the british forces had grown steadily weaker. the offensive initiated by germany on the western front in march 1918 is here described as three main battles, namely, i. st. quentin; it. the lys; and iil. soissons-reims. i. the battle of st. quentin general ludendorff, who by now had become the directing genius of the german war brain, was faced by the problem of where the decisive blow should be struck, and determining to strike at weakness he selected the british front for the de- cisive attack. this front may be divided into three sectors —flanders, the bruay area and the country southeast of it between cambrai and st. quentin. the first of these was obviously unsuited for offensive action of a decisive nature, as the british operations of 1917 had clearly shown. the second offered an opportunity of striking at the french coal supply, a vital factor, but the front of attack was restricted and dificult. the third included good offensive country, as it consisted of open field land and led to the valley of the oise, a natural avenue leading to paris. ludendorff’s | opinion—though ludendorfi writes that “tactics had to be considered before purely strategical objects which it is futile to pursue unless tactical success is possible, ” a successful attack in this direction would not only isolate the british forces by severing their connection with the french, but, if pushed towards paris, would jeopardise the line of communi- cations of all the french forces situated east of soissons. the strategical possibilities of such an attack are therefore closely comparable with those of the original plan of campaign worked out by schlieffen long before the war. to deliver this blow ludendorff proposed to muster every available man and gun and further to accentuate the force of numbers by surprise, for the tank attack at cambrai and hutier’s gas attack at riga had demonstrated the overwhelming power of an unexpected assault. he saw clearly that the forthcoming struggle would be no light one, and in an audience at homburg with the kaiser and the chancellor he said:— | “the battle in the west is the greatest military task that has ever been imposed upon an army. . . . it cannot be success- fully accomplished unless the authorities who conduct the war are relieved of all intolerable shackles, unless the very last man is employed in the decisive conflict, and is animated, not only by love jor his emperor and his native land, but by confidence in the strength of the military leadership and the greatness of our 193 country. these spiritual forces must not be underestimated, they are the foundations of the greatest deeds. ... we must not imagine that this offensive will be like those in galicia or italy; it will be an immense struggle that will begin at one point, continue at another, and take a long time; it is difficult, but it will be victorious.’ the opposing forces.— between nov. 1 1917 and march 2r 1918 the german divisions on the western front were increased from 146 to 192, troops being withdrawn from russia, galicia, italy and the east. by these means the german armies in the west were reinforced by no less than 18,492 officers and 553,794 other ranks. finally it was decided to make available 62 divisions and 1,706 batteries for the main attack. ‘these troops were care- fully trained for mobile warfare on any sector of the french and british fronts, the greatest secrecy being maintained as to the actual area of attack, which extended from the south of lens in the north to a little south of la fere. on the side of the allies, except for a few miles in the north, this front was held by the iii. and y. british armies respectively, commanded by sir julian byng and sir hubert gough. the front of the iii. army extended from just south of the village of gavrelle to half a mile north of gouzeaucourt (263 m.), and on march 21 was held by ro divisions in line and seven in reserve. the v. army front(42 m.) ran from the right of the hi. army to the village of barisis, a little south of the river oise, between the forests of coucy and st. gobain. on this extended front there were 11 divisions in line and three in reserve. german plans.—the plans of attack were issued by the supreme command on jan. 24 1918. the attack was to be carried out by four armies :— (a2) xvii. army (below), comprising 17 on the frontage gavrelle-moeuvres. (oy al. army (marwitz), comprising 18 divisions, was to attack from moeuvres to pontru (north of st. quentin). (c) xviii. army (hutier), comprising 24 divisions, was to attack from pontru to vendeuil (south of st. quentin). (2) vii. army (gayl) was to demonstrate with three divisions against la fere. divisions, was to attack the various attacks were named as follows: xvii. army, left wing attack ‘“‘ mars” (south of bapaume), right wing “ michael [.”” (north of bapaume); ii. army, “f michael it.,” to the north of the omignon brook; xviii. army, ‘‘ michael iii.,” north and south of st. quentin; vii. army, ‘‘ archangel, ” south of the river oise. the “‘ michael ” attacks were to be delivered on the first day of the battle, followed a day or two later by the ‘‘ mars ” and ‘‘ archangel ” attacks. the object of the ‘f michael ” attacks was to penetrate the enemy’s front, and then, supported by the “ mars ”’ attack, both were to push on through peronne-arras and peronne-la fre. to bewilder the enemy as to the frontage selected for the main attack, subsidiary operations were prepared all along the allied front, at ypres-la bassee, reims, the argonne and in champagne. from march 14 onwards the crown prince was to bombard the enemy’s headquarters on his front and make a show of bringing up reinforcements, and gallwitz was to carry out an attack on verdun up to the point of engaging his infantry. preparations for the attack—the forming up for deploy- ment of the attacking armies was begun on march 10, the divi- sions being organised in groups normally in a depth of three lines. the first or assault line was made the strongest, and was moved close up to the front on march 20. the second line of divisions was some three to five km. in rear, and the third seven to ten km. behind the second line; this third line was to be held in reserve under the higher command, and was only to be used as the operations developed. on march 20 all was in readiness for the attack, which was to be preceded by a three hours’ hurricane bombardment in which gas was to be employed extensively by the artillery and minenwerfers. by this means it was hoped to paralyse the enemy. on the 2oth, however, the wind was at first unfavour- able, but by midday conditions had sufficiently improved to permit of the bombardment taking place. it was opened at 3:30 a.m. on the aist, the allied batteries being first gassed. 194 german offensive the infantry attack did not, however, take place until 9:40 a.st., | right captured helnon and holnon wood; its centre got to savy when a general move forward was made under a creeping | and dallon, and its left captured a part of essigny and benay, barrage supplemented by low-flying aeroplanes. but was checked a little west of vendeuil. march 21—the attack of the xvii. army was met by strong on the 22nd the attack was continued with vigour. the opposition, which was accentuated by the fact that the infantry | xviii. army was reinforced and was ordered to advance on st quentin offensive march 215t — april 4tm 1919 english miles 0 2 a g 68 9) kilometres ooo 2 4 6 6 main roads m railways as approx. front line march 2/5t geen a oe ese ”" nightememem 0 ” oe * 22° eememeee ms * 254 weemecu omy ve * 280 see oeecae aeo0oqcedo aopeme e * ° eve sucourt ‘ | of °° neuville y \ gneuviy iy a ‘97 ?martinpuich ] 4 ou °j by: ~ mfins ff @ jj # laboisel! e y/ ; © le tart % ‘ epehy & fricourt \ bouchavesnes ; as * llongavesnes f curl %, ry % | erempieu jrrencourt g | 2 marcialix e bray &, > a es . som a y : esievvergus r re) r. 5 i 7 i a \ “ : ontru sx 9 villers i @ aframervilig4 tertry & cau negy rt %sbretonneuxo — omg =a 129% wholnon\, ° a —~ 4 e r 0 : 2 holnon yy te °o . ~ y y \ perme ea y gy a gi fe & fox ao 8 fco,° 6 qaim were unable to keep up with the barrage. at vaulx-vraucourt and doignies strong counter-attacks were launched against them, and by nightfall the german divisions had to be reinforced by second line troops. the ii. army advanced to the line gouzeaucourt-epehy-templeux-le verguier, a fierce struggle taking place at epehy, which throughout the day remained in british hands. the xviii. army was more successful. its a°* 2 bapaumexg ee fre'm; doigni i rae, micor, © olgnies 2 & j e m eo po >) 1 os ps puca'tm qhermies e t lege r @ & moeuv7es ee: rig ce om morchi ics ies 7 riencourt ~~ beaumetz t al morchain % fluquieres g bet, encour tertry to facilitate the operations of the it. army, which had outrun its artillery support. the brunt of the fighting fell on the xvii. army, which attacked the british second line of defence again and again, only to be met by vigorous counter- attacks supported by tanks. towards the close of the day, but only after having been reinforced by third line units, it suc- ceeded in capturing croiselles, vaulx-vraucourt, morchies and german offensive hermies. the ii. army pushed forward to fins-longavesnes- marquaix-caulaincourt, and the xviii. army captured fluquieres and crossed the crozat canal between jussy and terguler. from the positions held on the 22nd the xvii. army advanced on bapaume and captured driencourt, st. leger, beaumetz and lebucquiere. the ii. army reached the line neuville-bou- chavesnes-brie, and the nviii. army crossed the somme at bethencourt and captured the town ham. between the 24th and the 26th the advance was steadily continued, and on these three days the german front was ad- vanced to the following lines respectively: (@) 24th, chauny guiscard—morchain—west of peronne—curlu—l'remincourt— fampoux; (5) 2sth, noyon—east of roye—east of chaulnes— frise—beaucourt—boiry; (c) 26th, west of noyon—le ques- noy—framerville—bray—east of albert—pusicux—boiry. ludendorff’s second plan.—the first great stage of the attack now drew to a close, for not only had british resistance stiffened, but the difficulties of supplying the advancing armies over the old somme battlefield were so great that it was found impossible to maintain the leading troops. the result of this was that on the evening of the 26th ludendorff determined on a change in plan. he now decided to separate the british and french forces by wheeling the ii. and xviii. armies against the latter. the difficulty of supply was, however, too great for this change of front to succeed, consequently on the 27th ludendorff made a further change. he ordered the xvii. army to close down the attack, and the xviii. army and left of the ii. army to attack the french between the oise and the somme. by march 30 this attack advanced the huge pocket which had been found in the allied front from a little south of noyon to west of montdidier, thence through haricourt and hangard to the somme north of hamel. between this date and april 4, further attacks, mostly of a minor nature, extended the pocket from west of montdidier to east of rouvrel, thence through hangard east of villers- bretonneux to east of corbie on the somme. on april 4 the great battle to all intents and purposes came to an end. the initial success had been great; since march 21 from a base of 74m. a penctration of no less than 38 m. had been effected; the ground lost in 1916 and abandoned in 1917 had been more than made good, and enormous booty as well as 90,000 prisoners and 1,200 guns had been captured. the british armies had been seriously defeated, and 20 i'rench divisions had been drawn into the battle; yet, in spite of the fact that 90 german divisions had been engaged, neither the transition to a war of movement nor the separation of the british and french forces had been achieved. causes of german success—the initial successes of this great battle were due to the length of front attacked; the com- parative weakness of the british forces when compared with the length of line held by them; the rawness of these forces due to the losses suffered during 1917 which had been made good by hastily trained troops; and the surprise of the attack itself, for though the british higher command suspected an attack on the fronts of the v. and iii. armies, when the attack was launched many of the reserve divisions were still in the flanders area. the failure of the battle was due to well ascertainable causes, the two most important being the comparative narrowness of the front when compared with the depth of penetration required in order to obtain a decisive result, and the insuperable difficulty of keeping an advancing front of many divisions supplied. the ger- man front of attack on march 21 stretched from three m. south of la fere to three m. south of lens, a distance of about 74 m. and by apri] 4 the depth of the penctration effected was some 38 miles. a study of the various pockets formed by frontal attacks throughout the war will show that the depth of penetration was approximately half the length of the front attacked. con- sequently, if it was necessary to reach abbeville, which is about 6o m. from the original german front, in order to effect a separa- tion of the british and french forces, so as to enable a change of front on the line abbeville-soissons being made towards 195 paris, the initial front of attack should have been as least 120 m. in width. though the german forces were insufficient to attack on such a frontage, had they been sufficient the second factor, namely, difficulty of supply, would in all probability have wrecked their plan. we thus see that any attempt on the part of the germans to win the war by an immense frontal attack before the americans could develop their strength was, as long as the allies resisted stubbornly, virtually an impossible operation, this by april 4 was realised by the german higher command, for the battle on the amiens-noyon front was closed down, save for minor operations south of la fere, and other fronts of attack were sought, namely, those west of lille, south of laon and north of compiegne, which were attacked on april 9, may 27 and june 9 respectively. . : bipliograpuy.—sir f. b. maurice, the last four months (1919), l. madelin, la bataille de france, 21 mars—11 nov. 1918 (1920); c. m. e. mangin, comment finit la guerre (1920); r. recouly, la bataille de foch (1920). (see also world war: bibliography.) op g.f) il. the battle of the lys in the general scheme of the great german offensive of 1918, the idea of breaking through the british-portuguese front in french flanders was considered by the german high command. although this scheme became secondary to the great offensive further south, the preparations for it were carried out, firstly in order to mislead the british and allied headquarters, and sec- ondly that the germans might be able to revert quickly to it in case the somme offensive should come to a standstill. when on march 30 it became obvious that no further prog- ress was possible in the southern battle area, the german su- preme command decided to put into effect the flanders attack, the preparations for which were nearly complete. although they did not anticipate that they would be able to force a deci- sion in this area, there were certain definite advantages to be obtained froma successful blow in the direction of st. omer-haze- brouck and the local situation favoured, in their opinion, the pros- pect of success. this was to be the second blow struck against the british army, a great proportion of which had already been em- ployed on the southern front. the main weight of the initial blow was to fall on the portuguese division, known to be less expcrienced and of less fighting value than british formations. the abnormally dry weather gave good grounds for hope that the lys valley would be practicable, a state of affairs which was not the case till much later in the spring in a normal year. the only lateral lines of communication in this sector of the british zone, other than the coast railway, ran through st. pol-lillers- hazebrouck, and if the use of this could be denied to the british, problems of supply and reinforcement would be immeasurably complicated. it was above all important, in the view of the ger- man supreme command, to retain the initiative, and to strike a second blow before the french could organise a counter-attack against the somewhat vulnerable southern flank of the salient which had been created by the success of the somme offensive. plan of attack.—the general plan of attack was that the main blow should be struck by quast’s vi. army on the front between armenticres and the la bassee canal, in the direction of haze- brouck. if the vi. army’s attack met with sufficient success, the [v. army under arnim was to advance north of armentieres, which was to be made to fall by envelopment, with the eventual object of securing the heights stretching from kemmel to mt. des cats, south of the ypres-poperinghe road. if this were achieved the british and belgian positions in the ypres salient and on the yser would be threatened from the rear. the exten- sion of the attack southwards was a secondary consideration, but it was hoped that at least the destruction of the important min- ing area south of bethune might be achieved. | forces engaged.—the forces available for the operation of the german vi. army were four corps, from north to south, the bavarian ii. and german xix., lv. and iv., to which were allotted nine divisions in the first line and five in corps reserve. three more divisions were retained in army reserve. the sub- april,i9i8 english miles 2 3 ! a kilometres 6 ‘ 2 3 4 5 6 7 a rr rr ———e a | approximate situation on morning april 9th, /9/8 = night 9 ow on = (oth ,, epeows eccce ” led ow lid - te main roads other 4 main ratlways cana/s oe ' nas ig a is, gygodewaersvelde sant em dais*s, a nas 2, oe. ee ete so oe nn = &: : hae y {= a = mz ae. des cats “sx, ows * os = “tens st be ith ss aot = german offensive mine - - oo 4 it 60 e es 7 4 3 < holiebeked e 0%} 2 eae: & ye fd baa ie a pa ea atin® = potty | xy ri ad { :y - " 2 @ : as syl e ue bere & ie ¢ <.. * de membich nosp reroer, qui © = < ff af : tle 8 <3 : yd noutre tus ht ‘i 4 se ) x : yi; ya sailly sur lys - calonne® , e st venant y sidiary attack of the german iv. army was to be delivered by the x. and xviii. res. corps, with three divisions in the first and one in the second fine. the initial blow fell on the left of the i. and right of the ii. british armies, under sir ilenry horne and sir herbert plumer, the point of junction between which was, on april g, the lys, east of armentieres. the xi. corps (british 55th and portu- guese 2nd divs.) and the xv. corps (40th and 34th divs.) held the front from the la bassee canal to the lys, while the ix. corps (25th, roth and goth divs.) continued the line from the lys to the ypres-comines canal. with the exception of the 55th, all these british divisions had already taken part in the southern battle and had been rapidly made up with reinforce- ments from home. ‘three more battle-worn divisions were in corps reserve. the batile opens —at about 4 a.m. on april 9 the battle opened with an intense bombardment of the whole front from lens to armentieres, with both gas and high-explosive shell. the front trenches were subjected to a rain of high explosive, while battery positions, cross roads, headquarters and railheads far in rear were treated with both gas and high explosive. armentieres itsel1 and the british position south of the la bassee canal were deluged with mustard gas. the foggy morning made observa- tion difficult, and, according to german accounts, the counter- german offensive bombardment was inefiective. between 8 and 9 a.m. nine ger- man divisions, with ample reserves at hand, were launched against the two british and one portuguese divisions. in the centre the weight of the attack of the german nix. and lv. corps overwhelmed the portuguese 2nd div., and both corps advanced steadily towards their objectives. the right of the bavarian ii. corps was held firmly by the goth div., but the left of the bavarians succeeded in advancing past the right flank of that division. on the british right the s5th div. held stoutly on to givenchy and north of that place withdrew slowly from the outpost position to the main line of resistance which ran just east of festubert. all available british reserves were hurried up; the reserve brigade of the s5th div. was employed to form a defensive tlank facing north, from festubert, south of le tourct to the lawe. the 11th cyclist bn. and king edward’s horse were rushed up to lacouture, vicille-chapelle and huit maisons and by their heroic resistance effectually prevented any extension of the break through to the south. the 51st and soth divs. were moved up from the back areas to the river lawe and the neighbourhood of estaires respectively. meanwhile the 55th div. continucd to hold its position at givenchy and festubert throughout the day and in counter-attacks against elements of the enemy, which had penetrated into their position, captured over 750 prisoncrs. the magnificent fight put up by this division completely broke the attack of the prussian iv. corps. on the northern flank of the battle, the bavarian ii. corps suc- ceeded eventually in occupying the forward posts of the right battalion of the 4oth-div., and gradually worked their way north- wards. by ro:15 a.m. on april 9 the bavarians were in rouge de bout, some 2,000 yd. in rear of the headquarters of the right battalion of the 4oth div., which was still holding out in petillon. by noon the division was forced back by pressure in front and flank to a position facing south from bois grenier through fleur- baix to sailly-sur-lys. owing to the rapid advance of the ger- man centre the soth div. was unable to gain touch with the goth, the right flank of which withdrew across the lys at bac st. maur early in the afternoon. the remainder of this division, reinforced by troops of the 34th div., successfully maintained their line covering the approaches to erquinghem and armentieres from the south, till the evening. | the saxon xix. corps had rapidly followed up the right of the goth div. and about 3 p.m. succeeded in passing small bodies of troops across the lys at bac st. maur. during the remainder of the afternoon and evening the strength of the german force north of the river steadily increased, and they eventually reached croix du bac, where they were successfully counter-attacked and driven back by a brigade of the 25th division. during the night the germans established themselves firmly on the north bank, in the gap between the goth and soth british divisions. renewal of the attack—on april ro the attacks were renewed all along the line. practically no progress was made by the iv. corps on the left. it was only just before nightfall that the lv. corps succeeded in gaining a footing on the west bank of the lawe between lestrem and vieille-chapelle, and at lestrem it- self. at estaires the soth div. defended itself with great gal- lantry and intlicted very heavy casualties on the enemy in the street fighting which continued all day. it was only at nightfall that this division was forced to withdraw to a prepared position north and west of the town. east of estaires the german corps, which had now got up artillery in support of its infantry and machine guns, pushed back the thin british line to a position north of steenwerck, where the arrival of rcinforcements for a time effectually held up the german advance. meanwhile, after an intense preliminary bombardment of the british positions between frelinghien and hill 60 north of the ypres-comines canal, the german iv. army about 5:30 a.m, attacked the british vill corps. the outposts of the 25th and roth divs. were driven in and under cover of mist the ger- man x. and xviii. res. corps worked their way up the valleys of the warnave and douve rivers on the flanks of the british positions in ploegsteert wood and messines. by midday the 197 village of dloegsteert, the southeast corner of the wood and messines had been captured. during the afternoon the german attack succeeded in capturing the outpost position as far north as the ypres-comines canal, but was held up on the crest of the wytschaete ridge and in front of ifollebeke by the oth divi- sion. the south african brigade of the same division retook messines during the afternoon. this further success of the ger- mans, combined with the progress made by the right flank of the german vi. army, gravely imperilled the situation of the 34th div. which was holding the original line east of armenticres and had not been attacked. a withdrawal to the north bank of the lys was therefore decided on, and was completed by 9:30 p.m. when the lys bridges were destroyed. on april 11 the attack was continued. the german 1v. corps again failed to make any progress between givenchy and the lawe river. north of locon the british 51st and soth divs., weakened by continuous fighting, were slowly pushed back by the german ly. and xix. corps. the british divisions fought with the greatest gallantry and inflicted very heavy casualties, but bodies of german infantry worked their way through gaps in the attenuated line and by nightfall they had reached neuf- berquin and were in occupation of merville. further east prog- ress was checked by a counter-attack of the 31st div., which had arrived from the southern battlefield, but the bavarian it. corps pushed forward through nieppe to steenwerck. slight progress was made by the german iv. army between nieppe and messines. renewed attacks —d uring april 12 the arrival of reinforce- ments, mostly from the southern battle front, began to have its effect. the right flank of the british still held firm, but the ger- man lv. corps, attacking before dawn in the mist, broke through the left centre of the 51st div., and reached pacaut and riez du vinage, where their progress was checked by two batteries of artillery. the british 3rd div. had come into action about locon, which village was lost to the german ly. corps, but the german advance was checked and their troops suffered heavy casualties. the right flank of the same german corps was checked in calonne by the 61st div., which, like the 3rd, had arrived from the somme battle area. meantime the bavarian ii. and german xix. corps attacked in great strength between vieux berquin and steenwerck. in spite of the gallant defence put up by the 2oth and 31st divs. they succeeded in occupying doulieu and la becque, forming a gap southwest of bailleul, which enabled the germans to seize the villages of outtersteene and merris. this gap was eventually blocked by a brigade of the 33rd div. reinforced by a party of cyclists, a pioneer battalion and by every available man from the local schools and reinforcement camps. further to the left the 25th, 34th and 49th divs. maintained their positions against all aitacks. during april 12 headquarters of prince rupert’s group of armies issued orders for the continuance of the attack by the inner wings of the two armies, with the dual objectives of hazebrouck and the range of hills north of bailleul. the vi. army was also to prepare to continue the pressure of their left wing towards bethune. on april 13 the german attacks north of the lys were continued with great vigour. on the left, ele- ments of the lv. corps, which had penetrated into the out- skirts of the nieppe forest, were driven back by the british sth div., which, advancing by two roads south of and through the forest, soon established themselves on a firm line clear of the woods, and finally checked the german advance in this area. _ the german xlx. corps continued to attack the 29th and 31st british divs., now greatly diminished in strength by continuous fighting, but these formations, reinforced by the 4th guards bde., held on with the greatest heroism to their extended lines of nearly 10,000 yards. except at vicux berquin, which was cap- tured by the germans, who brought up guns to point blank range, those divisions carried out their instructions to hold their posi- tions at all costs and cover the detrainment of the australian ist division. the arrival of the australians in the evening definitely closed the approach to hazebrouck. further north- east a succession of heavy attacks was driven off by the 33rd 198 and 34th divs. about meteren and la creche. in the early morning the german 36th res. div. penetrated with heavy loss into neuve eglise, but before noon they were driven out by the british 33rd and 4aoth divisions. early on the morning of april 14 the british troops withdrew without interference to a new line in front of the ravelsburg heights between bailleul and neuve eglise. the latter village, after intense fighting all day, was finally captured by the ger- mans by midnight on the 14th. elsewhere all attacks were repulsed, and the british 4th div., coming up cast of robeca, between the 61st and ard divs., recaptured riez du vinage with a number of prisoners. on april 15 the german attacks were renewed. by this time their troops had been reinforced by the guard res. corps on the left wing of the iv. army. the ix. res. corps had come in on the right of the iv. corps, and the bavarian iii. corps had replaced the bavarian ii. corps. heavy attacks developed during the day culminated in the cap- ture of bailleul and the ravelsburg ridge. british withdrawal. on the night of april 15-16 a withdrawal of the british troops from the ypres salient to a line east of ypres through st. julien and along the westhoek and wyt- schacte ridges was completed without interference. this move had been commenced on the night of the 12-13 by direction of british g.h.q. in order to set free additional troops, and to forestall any plans the germans might be entertaining for the extension of the battle front to the north. the withdrawal was well timed, as the germans were preparing an offensive from the houthulst forest, and the preparations were almost complete when the british withdrawal took place. on april 16 strong local attacks were made at various points on the metheren-wytschaete front, all of which were repulsed by the 25th, 34th and 49th divs., except on the extreme flanks, where both villages, after intense fighting, eventually fell into german hands. on the following day determined efforts to take mt. kemmel and to advance on the meteren-merris front were repulsed, and the belgian army achieved 2 notable success in defeating a powerful assault against their right flank about the ypres-staden railway, in which they captured over 700 prisoners. meantime the germans had been preparing to renew the attack on the british right flank, and on the 18th, after a very intense bombardment, the iv. and [x. res. corps advanced to the assault of the british positions about givenchy-festubert and mt. bernenchon-hinges. on the british right they pene- trated at certain points, but were thrown back by the 1st div. which had relieved the 55th. everywhere else they failed to obtain even an initial success, and were driven back with great loss by the 4th and 61st divisions. for nearly a weck the battle died down. on the british right minor operations were success- fully undertaken to improve the position of the 4th and 6rst divs., northeast of robecq, which resulted in the capture of numerous prisoners. in the left centre of the british front french troops, which had been brought up from the south, relieved some of the wearied british divisions, and by the morning of the 21st had taken over the sector between metheren and spanbroeckmolen. new german plans.—during this pause the german higher command readjusted their plans. on the 18th the army group suggested that the main operations should be abandoned, and it was finally decided on the 2oth that further operations should be limited to the capture of mt. kemmel on the north, and the villages of givenchy and festubert on the south. no success whatever was obtained on the southern tlank, but the attacks about mt. kemmel led to further bitter fighting. at 3:30 a.m. on april 25 an intense bombardment was opened on the french and british positions extending from bailleul to the ypres-comines canal. the main object of the attack was the capture of kemmel hill by direct assault on the french, com- bined with an attack on the british right south of wytschacte, intended to separate it from the french. the attack was entrusted to the xviii. res., alpine and x. res. corps, to which were allotted nine divisions, five of which were fresh. german offensive between 6 and 7 a.m. the german infantry advanced, supported by large numbers of squadrons of battle planes and bombers. after intense fighting they succeeded by 10 a.m. in wresting kemmel hill and village from the french, detachments of whom, however, though surrounded, held out till late in the day. the weight of the initial attack on the british front fell on the oth div., who inflicted very heavy casualties on their encmy bul by midday were forced back to vierstraat. further north the 21st div., after a gallant resistance, was in the aiternoon compelled to withdraw to a line hill 60-vormezeele. on april 26 the attack was renewed, and many counter-attacks were car- ried out both by british and french troops, the latter recap- turing locre. on april 27 and 28 local fighting continued without sub- stantial alteration in the situation. during the night of april 26-27 the salient east of ypres was further reduced by a with- drawal without interference to the line pilkem-zillebeke-lake- voormezcele. final attuck.—the german final effort took place on april 29. the action started with a bombardment of exceptional intensity at 3:10 am. at 5 a.m. powerful attacks commenced against the french and british troops from west of dranoutre to voorme- zeele. after very heavy fighting the germans gained a tem- porary success north of locre, but were driven back by the irench troops holding the sector. on the british front the posi- tions held by the 21st, 49th and 25th divs. were again and again attacked by german infantry, which advanced with great courage in massed formation. the assaulting troops suffered the heaviest losses, but their valour was of no avail. the british artillery and infantry fought with magnificent bravery and this final german effort was repulsed with practically no loss of ground. results of the battle—thus ended the battle of the lys. the second great german offensive had succeeded in penetrating the british front on 2 front of about 20 m. to an extreme depth of about 12 miles. a large number of towns and villages had been taken and nearly 30,000 allied prisoners and 450 guns had been captured. but the attack had failed to gain its main objects. the lateral railway communication between st. pol and haze- brouck was still intact, the mining area south of bethune was safe. except for the detached hill of kemmel, the high ground dominating the poperinghe-ypres road still remained in allied hands. a pronounced salient had been formed in the german front which was to cost them dear in the succeeding months. on the other hand, the british had been forced to abandon the almost equally pronounced salient east of ypres, and with it all the ground which had been gained at so great a cost in the battle of passchendaele the previous year. the losses on both sides had been very heavy. to achieve these results the germans had employed 42 divisions, of which 33 were fresh; 25 british divisions were employed, of which only eight had not been engaged in the battle of the somme. bibliography.—l. madelin, za bataiile de france, 21 mars.-rr nov. 1918 (1920); c. m. e. mangin, comment finit la guerre (1920); r. recouly, la batailie de foch (1920). (see also world war: bibliography.) (j. e. 5.5.) ill. the battle of soissons-reims after the relative failure of the german offensives of march and april it was incumbent upon the germans, if they wished to preserve the initiative, to deliver another powerful blow without delay. the choice of the front of attack and the battle-ground fell on the oft-contested chain of heights between the ailette and the aisne, the chemin-des-dames. dispositions for the german altack—the german supreme command had decided to attack with the vii. and j. armies from the district southwestward of laon—southwards of berry- au-rbac in the direction soissons-fismes-reims. if this attack proceeded favourably it was to be prolonged on the right over the ailette to the oise and on the left as far as reims. simul- taneously an attack by the nviii. army was to be prepared westwards of the oise with its centre of gravity in the direction german offinsive of compiegne. the german supreme command hoped that the push southward would succeed in reaching the neighbourhood of soissons and fismes, and by this means attract strong forces from flanders, so that it might be possible to continue the attack there according to plan. the army group under the crown prince rupprecht was to remain purely on the defensive. on this front, as on other sections of the western front where attack was not intended, feigned preparations for attack were to be made. preparations began about the middle of may. the vii. army under behm was charged with the main attack across the chem- in-des-dames, the i. army under below with the neighbouring attack on the left, and the xviii. army under hutier with the attack in the direction of compiegne. the right wing of the main attack, the liv. corps and the viii. res. corps, had the task of pushing forward in a southwesterly direction on both sides of soissons. the xxv. res. corps was to make its way on both sides of cerny-en-laonnais direct towards braisne, and on the east to take as much country as possible towards the south; the iv. res. corps was to attack the ‘‘ winterberg ” (z.e., the height | soissons - reims offensive may-june 1918 engiish miles r) ® kilcmetres el a 6 aparex front hee bay 27% oy 2° ee fe ef | a 0 ro a" spe an ¢ me mm y pargnye? fee yh ie as \ se st ooh k ol dad | ant wee : = be. i e oo ;' = 7 ae =. or a . she. a fontenoy" ay ~— marek 2} 2 td oo ¢.0 np rere s neafire the gt denois ee ps “couldnbes * i ® f at fad sm, f y loman eae j mon roads o sellecs raat wih 6. a a ressteay’s chateau thierry at the eastern end of the chemin-des-dames, immediately north of craonne) with the main force and advance farther in the general direction of fismes; in concert with this on the left the lxy. corps was to occupy with its left wing the river bend north of berry-au-bac. of the i. army at first only one corps, ad- vancing simultaneously with the vii. army, was to throw the opposing forces over the aisne-marne canal. the corps was to provide itself with bridgcheads in order to take the heights of cormicy if the attack of the vii. army proceeded favourably. a further attack to the right of the main attack was prepared by the vii. corps of the vii. army, which was to push forward over the ailette, making its way in a southwesterly direction towards the oise. the number of divisions taking part in the attack was 41. for success there were two essentials: the first, surprise; and the second, effective artillery preparation. most elaborate and thorough precautions were taken to secure secrecy. as regards artillery preparation the ascent of the steep slopes on the heights of the chemin-des-dames was only possible if the germans should succeed in silencing the bulk of the opposing guns. all registration was to be abandoned in order to surprise the enemy as much as possible. the first aim was to be a thorough gassing of the allied position right down into the aisne valley. prepara- tions were completed by the evening of may 26 1918. in the night of may 26-7 at 2 a.m. the german artillery bom- bardment began, completely surprising the french and english. the whole valley of the ailette, the steep slopes of the chemin- des-dames, the chemin-des-dames itself, and the country lying far behind down to the aisne, were in a short time thoroughly gassed. after an hour and a half’s bombardment, the opposing infantry and artillery were sufficiently subdued to enable the german infantry to venture the assault. 199 the infantry attack.—at 4:40 a.m., while it was still dark, the german infantry advanced to the attack. without difficulty or delay they crossed the ailette valley, which was covered with bushes in some places and marshy in others; during the ascent to the chemin-des-dames scrious infantry fights only developed at chavignon, pargny and fillain; on the other sections of the front the german infantry pushed forward almost without resist- ance on to the heights of the chemin-des-dames. here the re- markable effect of the artillery preparations was already ap- parent; the steep slopes had been surmounted and the first lines were taken almost without firing a shot. by 7 a.m. the i. army had already reached the canal, and part had crossed it. since they were to await the left wing of the vii. army before further advance, a halt had to be made there, and the opposing army gained time io reform their units and to rally, while those in front of the vii. army were overrun by the advance of the at- tacking divisions so long as they felt the effect of overwhelming german artillery fire. ‘this was an essential difference between the attack of the i. and vii. armies, and was to be of decisive importance. by 9 a.m. the german infantry had reached the line vauxaillon-jouy-pontavert-berry-au-bac. soon after 11 a.m. the first german companies crossed over to the southern bank of the aisne on bridges mostly intact. a vast and unexpected success had been gained. a wide and apparently impassable stretch of country, which had been for years the scene of the heaviest fighting, had been captured within a few hours after a short artillery preparation. of the divisions of the defenders two english and three french had almost ceased to ex- ist. the survivors streamed into the prisoners’ collecting stations, while countless guns stood abandoned in their positions, some of them undamaged. in the afternoon and evening the attack on ihe principal fighting front of the vii. army went forward with- out a pause farther in the direction of the vesle valley. en- gineering and road-making troops worked with the utmost effort to level a path for the columns following through the enemy positions and over the steep way up to and down from the chemin-des-dames. on the two wings the advance was con- siderably slower. the vesle was reached by the aav. and iv. res. corps, and sections of the xxv. res. corps passed south- wards of courcelles and paars, while sections of the lv. res. corps occupied the steep slopes at fismes and magneux. on this very first day of fighting the germans had penetrated the enemy positions over a front of about 60 km. to a depth of about 20 kilometers. over 15,000 prisoners and vast army supplies had been taken. the german losses were proportionately small. allied resistance increascs—the second day of the battle, may 28, saw the first violent counter-attack of the opposing army against the right flank of the german attacking troops. never- theless the speed of the german advance was not lessened on this day. on the right wing the liv. corps, after repulsing french counter-attacks, captured the heights north and northeast of soissons. on the left the german divisions pressed forward until midday, over the whole sector of the vesle, as far as the north- western fort of the fortress of reims. the objective was thus reached after a day and a half’s fighting. but in the ardour of the pursuit the troops stormed on without orders, though in agree- ment with the intentions of the higher command, in order to improve their success by determined pursuit. the order given by the supreme army command at noon of the 28th to continue the attack as far as the line of heights southwest of soissons- l’¢re-en-tardenois—the heights south of coulonges—reached the troops when they were already storming forwards. on the right wing of the vii. army, the vii. corps had already joined the attack on may 28 without waiting for the completion of the preparations begun at this point. here, however, the resistance was so obstinate that it was only in the course of may 2g that the dominating heights at crecy-au-mont were captured. on the following days the vii. army pushed on with its centre in a southern direction as far as the marne. the right wing of the 1. army, which had extended the attack towards reims on the left, pressed forward between the marne and the vesle against the wooded hills of reims, but soon met here with unconqucrable 200 resistance. the right wing of the vii. army took soissons, and between the aisne and the marne gained ground towards the heights southwest of sg@issons, and up to the eastern edge of the forest of villers-cotterets. on the 20th the occupation of the important road and rail centre of soissons as well as of fere-en- tardenois was of tactical importance. in both places immense masses of material fell into the hands of the germans. on the left wing all the roads and railways leading from reims to the marne lay under german fire. french counter-attacks —on may 30 violent counter-thrusts by the french had held up the advance of the german right wing, while the german centre in a rapid advance had by midday reached the heights of the northern bank of the marne between chateau-thierry and dormans. on both days the pursuing german troops had passed beyond the objectives fixed by the supreme army command, so that they reached the marne carlicr than had been thought possible. a further advance of the centre, pushed out southward like a wedge, beyond the marne, seemed to involve great risk so long as the german wings on the east and west had not won further ground and thus been able to broaden the base of attack. on may 31 instructions went out from the supreme army command not to penetrate farther south over the marne, but to extend the successes against the wooded heights of reims and up the marne towards the west in the direction of villers- cotterets. on may 30-1, and particularly in the first days of june, strong counter-attacks were made by the french and later by the americans. in the first days of june the fighting became steadily more severe, as the allicd resistance grew more obstinate and the counter-attacks progressively more violent and extended. the germans therefore succeeded in gaining only little ground. the powerful impctus of the german attack had come to an end. on june 17 the german armies stood with their right wing and centre roughly on the line noyon-fontenoy, the eastern edge of the forest of villers-cotterets, chateau-thicrry, and up the marne to verneuil; the left wing had penetrated to the outlying woods west of the wooded heights of reims, and close to the west, north and east front of reims, which was closely encircled. results of the buattle—the tactical result of the battle of soissons-reims for the germans was great beyond all expecta- tion. over 65,000 prisoners fell into their hands. the booty included about 7oo guns and 2,500 machine-guns; in addition, the french and english losses in materiel were enormous. but there was areverse side to the shield. the battle had brought home to the germans that not only were there amcrican troops now on the western front but that they possessed a fighting capacity and quality not hitherto sus- pected by them. the first notable appearance of american troops was at cantigny on may 28. here the american rst div., in taking and holding the village against the best efforts the germans could make, had proved itself absolutely depend- able. and within a few days the 2nd div. had shown itself, in front of chateau-thierry, at belleau wood and vaux, to be a first class fighting unit. the conduct of these two divisions did much to hearten the allies, whose morale had been somewhat depressed by the series of german successes since march. the extent to which the fighting of the americans impressed the allied generals can be gauged from the change of opinion as to how best these reinforcements might be employed. [tora time it had been thought that it would be too much to expect that america could produce, without a long probationary period, commanders and stalis capable of handling large bodies of troops in action under modern war conditions. by the end of june it was clear that american commanders and staffs were eminently competent to direct divisions in any battle. early in july the american i. corps took over a sector from the french vi. army, a step amply justified by the resistance offered by the americans at chiateau-thierry in the middle of that month. brstrograpuy.—f, palmer, america in france (1919); fe. j. requin, la course de amerique & la victotre (1919); earl haig, dispatches, 1915-19 (1919). (see also world war: bibliograpiiy.) feke we) germany germany (sce 11.803), a republic of central eurepe (das deutsche reich). the german empire, formed in 1871, included 26 states: the states of the north german confederation, the south german states and alsace-lorraine. until 1918 germany retained this form unchanged, having an area of about 208,830 sq.m. anda population (1910) of 64,925,903 (estimated popula- tion, july 1914, 67,800,000). i. area and population in nov. 1918 germany became a republic, and her states free states and, later, under the constitution of aug. if 1919, territories of the german reich. there are now 18 of these territories in the reich, viz.: prussia, bavaria, saxony, wiirttemberg, baden, thuringia, hesse, hamburg, mecklenburg-schwerin, oldenburg, brunswick, anhalt, bremen, lippe, liibeck, mecklenburg-strelitz, waldeck and schaumburg-lippe. under the treaty of versailles (jan. 10 1920), alsace-lorraine was returned to france with validity from nov. 11 1918; large areas in west and east prussia, pomerania, posen and silesia fell to poland; portions of schleswig-holstein to denmark; a small province of upper silesia to czechoslovakia; eupen and malmedy to belgium; the town and area of danzig became a free state, and the memel region was allotted to lithuania. germany’s outline was thus changed, particularly in the east. dart of germany, consisting mainly of east prussia, was severed from the remainder by the ‘‘ polish corridor’ to the baltic. the rhine became to some extent the franco-german frontier. direct com- munication with russia was cut off by poland and the border states. germany’s present area is 186,517 sq. m.; it is bounded, w. by holland, belgium, luxembourg and france; s. by switzerland, austria and czechoslovakia; and e. by poland and lithuania. this area hada population of 59,800,000 in ig19. on june 16 1925 the population was 63,250,000 (including the saar valley, where however the census was not taken). there has heen a steady increase in the density of population in germany from 123-1 to the sq. km. in i9io to 133-2 in 1925. apart froin the three city states of hamburg, bremen and liibeck, saxony is the most denscly populated area (332 persons to the sq. km.); then hesse and baden. the least densely populated are the agricultural territories of mecklenburg, waldeck, oldenburg and bavaria (97 persons to the square kilo- metre). prussia, with 120,is not far below the average for the reich. increase of urban population.—in 1871 17°4°, of the population lived in towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants; in 1925, 46:1°>. the 45 towns with over 100,000 inhabitants absorb 16,500,000 or one quarter of the total population of germany. the trend towards the towns is identical with the trend towards the workshops. this was specially noticeable during the years 1914-8, when internal migration assumed enormous proportions, being directed away from those places where the conditions of war had restricted production towards the centres of increased production arising out of war requirements. after the signature of the armistice, there were extensive movements of population, still governed by prospects of production and there- fore of wage-earning. at the same time rural districts experienced a not inconsiderable increase in population, as did also the coal-mining districts, the region of the ruhr, upper silesia and the lignite dis- tricts, on account of the coal famine and consequent increase in pro- duction, in 1926 germany was in the midst of a new shifting of the population, caused by the excess of coal and the attempt to put industry on a sound footing; this movement would be more pro- nounced but for the housing shortage. the proportion of forcigners speaking their own language is now very small. there are many germans outside the boundaries of the reich. the contiguous wholly or partly german-speaking areas of [europe cover 15 states and include over 80 million germans. the present area of the german reich contained 38-1 million evangelicals and 19-3 million catholics in ro10. for figures of emigration and immigration see migration. the birth-rate from 1870 to 1900 was consistently high (36-8 to 42-6 per 1,000). about 1-8 million children were born alive each year. the average annual surplus of births over deaths was approxt- mately 600,000. phe death-rate was also high, fluctuating during 1870-1900 between 21-7 and 31-0 per thousand. from 1900 on- wards the birth-rate steadily decreased, and in 1914 it was only 26:8 per 1,000 of the average population. the death-rate declined from 23-2 per 1,000 in 1900 to 15-8 in 1913, and infant mortality from 207 per 1,000 infants born alive fell to 151. from the middle of 1915 the birth-rate dropped rapidly, and reached its lowest point in 1917, namely 14-4 per 1,000 of the population. in this year only 912,109 children were born alive. the rate of mortality rose during the same period owing to the war and the blockade. the highcst death-rate was in 1918, when it rose to 25:2, assisted by the influenza epidemic, after the armistice, the hirth-rate began to recover. in 1920 it stood at 26-7, but then fell steadily until in 1924 it reached 21-1. the rate of mortality improved, once the blockade had been removed and the population were again able to obtain adequate nourishment. in 1921 the death-rate stood at 15-6 and sank again to 12-9 in 1924. the year 1925 brought further improvement. the rate of births and deaths was as follows:— germany | per 1,000 of the we total : still- population year births deaths births : (inclusive of still- births | deaths bilrths) (inclusiv|e of still- bir|ths) 1900 | 2,060,657 | 1,300,900 64,518 36°8 23:2 i9io | 1,982,836 | 1,103,723 538,058 320°7 17°1 1924 | 1,381,044 802,166 42,502 2ts1 12°9 infant mortality, which in 1913 was 151 per 1,000 born alive, was 131 in 1920 and 108 in 1924. see statistisches jahrbuch des deutschen reichs (berlin, annual). (w. gr.) ii. constitution from the old reich to the new.a—in the german empire (reich) the supreme authority was vested in the king of prussia as german emperor, the imperial chancellor (appointed by the kaiser) as president of the government, the federal council (bundesrat) representing the individual states, and the national representative assembly (reichsiag) representing the nation. the states—kingdoms, duchies, principalities and free states— had retained their sovereign rights, which they exercised in a twofold manner: first, in internal politics, by maintaining their own diets or councils, and secondly through the bundesrat, which, both in accordance with the rules of the constitution and in practice, had a greater influence on the policy of the reich than the reichstag. prussian hegemony in the reich was not laid down as a principle of the constitution but was a natural consequence of the disparity in size of the states. when the new germany was constituted in 1919, the union of german-austria and germany was made impossible by the treaties of peace. this being so, prussia’s natural hegemony in germany could be avoided only by the formation of a unifted reich or by the division of prussia into a number of provinces equal in size to the other territories. but when the constituent national assembly was elected on jan. 19 1919 the question of a unified or a federal constitution was overshadowed by other problems. the communist party and a section of the left socialists re- garded this election and the demand for a_ constitution by the other political parties as bourgeois opposition to a dictatorship of the councils, and the communists refrained from voting. the 18s socialist deputies, who, like the communists, stood for centralism, were the strongest party, but could only form a majority with the help of the 75 democrats, and, even so, they would have opposed to them the german nationals (44 deputies), the german people’s party (19), the catholic centre (91) and the seven deputies of the small agrarian parties. the socialists and democrats were obliged to join hands with the third great republican party, the catholic centre, and thus there arose the so-called ‘‘ weimar coalition,” supported by 329 deputies and over 23,000,000 votes, leaving out of account the left socialists, who still cherished hopes of a dictatorship. | the scheme for the new constitution was drafted by dr. hugo preuss, former secretary of state and at that time minister of the interior. it was then reconstituted, by a commission ap- pointed by the territorial governments (staaienausscitiutss),in such a manner as to strengthen the position of the individual terri- tories in relation to preuss’s unified reich. in a special com- mittee of the national assembly, erzberger, the actual leader of the centre, went over to the side of those who advocated a strong central power for the reich, and a resolution was passed which gave to the reich the financial authority which had hitherto rested principally with the territories (art. 8). on aug. 11 1919 president ebert proclaimed the weimar constitution. the democratic republic—the preamble to the constitution lays stress on the fact that the german people has given itself this constitution as by sovereign right:— 1 the words das deutsche reich were, before the revolution of nov. 1918, invariably translated ‘‘german empire.”’ but the word reich has, for historical reasons, been retained by the german re- publican commonwealth as its official territorial and political desig- nation. reich is an old germanic word found in early and middle english, and surviving in composition in the word bishopric. | (ed. £.b.) 2ot the german nation, united in its peoples (stemme) and inspired by the determination to renew and to establish its reich in freedem and justice, to promote peace at home and abroad, and to further social progress, has given itself this constitution. between a monarchy and a republic there was no longer any choice. the choice lay rather between “ direct ’? and ‘“ indi- rect ’’ democracy. “ direct ’’ democracy is seen in the clection of the president of the reich by the most extended form of franchise in which ‘' the whole german nation ” takes part,? and in the referendum which, how- ever, is only admissible in the case of an adverse vote by the whole nation on a draft or a bill passed by the reichstag [initiative or demand of the people (volksbegehren), and decision of the people (volksentscheid), art. 73-6].3 “indirect ’’ democracy, on the other hand, is seen in the reichstag, which has only one chamber, elected by the people entirely on the basis of proportional representation and with scrutin de fiste,* that is, according to the party lists. no by-election takes place during the legislative period. the men at the head of the party list are replaced, when they go, by the men below them (art. 53, 54). the ministry, which is nominated by the president of the reich, must possess the confidence of the reichstag; and, as the reichstag is clected fora term of four years, and as a presidential election a national vote of censure or dissolution of the reichstag only rarely occurs, german democracy is far more directly parliamentary than the swiss or north american, both of which are frequently namec! as its models. the president of the reich may, after obtaining the counter- signature of the chancellor or other competent minister, dissolve the reichstag, though such an expedient would of course only be resorted to in exceptional cases. not only can the reichstag force the minis- try to retire by a vote of no-confidence but, with a two-thirds major- ity, can submit to the nation a proposal for the deposition of the president (art. 43). a hundred members of the reichstag can im- peach president, cnancellor or minister for having culpably violated the constitution or a law of the reich. judgment is then given after regular proceedings at law by a special supreme court (staatsgerichts- hof) (art. 59), not to be confused with the supreme court which sits at leipzig. the reich and the territories —oi the 26 states which consti- tuted the old reich, 18 now (1926) remain and are called territories (linder). the constitution prescribes a republican form of government, but in other aspects the territories determine their own constitution, some of them having their own presidents. in their parliaments the majority lies frequently with those parties who belong to the opposition in the reichstag. this is particu- larly the case in bavaria where, since r919, the bavarian na- tional party, belonging to the right, has had a majority and forms the government—and temporarily in saxony and thurin- gia, where in 1926 the left socialists and communists held the majority. the territories are represented in the central government by the council of the reich (reichsrat), to which their governments (not their parliaments as the preuss scheme prescribed) send representa- tives. each territory has at least one vote, but no one territory can have more than two-fifths of the total votes. in any case the num- ber of votes is regulated according to the population (art. 61). out of the 26 prussian votes half are assigned to the prussian provinces (of which berlin is one) which are thus placed on the same footing as the other territories. on account of the peculiar majority regulations ® in the provincial diets, these provinces sometimes vote against the policy of the prussian territorial government. unlike the old federal council (buadesrat), the reichsrat has no direct part in legislation. the government of the reich lays its 2 hence the expression " plebiscitary president.” 3 president and people may also work hand-in-hand, as when the president lays a bill that has been passed by the reichstag before the people's referendum (wolksenischeid). 4 the list is chosen, not the single deputy. in each electoral dis- trict as many seats are allotted to the list as the number of times by which the number of votes cast for that list is divisible by 60,000. remainders are worked out in two ways: either by associating the lists within the electoral districts or by crediting the remainder to the reich list of the party; here again 60,000 votes are necessary to elect a deputy. 5 a candidate, in order to be elected, must have received one more than half of the number of votes cast. § still less docs the economic council of the reich (reichswirt- schaftsrat) possess legislative powers. [t consists of representatives of the employers’ and workers’ organisations and of economists. the government is obliged to consult the council before placing social and economic bills of fundamental importance before the reichstag. the council can itself prepare such measures and bring them before that body (art. 165). 202 th helmzhaven a sooup et as neolstade : an cp saps © saar: aus ad fais f be nn <iy'9 j : “pa" uryuch yan e pris bills before it in the first instance, but if the council reject them they can still be taken to the reichstag. the council also has the right to veto bills passed by the reichstag, but this, again, can be overridden by a two-thirds majority in the reichstag. in respect of legislation, the competence of the reich ipso facto excludes the competence of the territories in such important spheres as foreign affairs, migration, the army, commerce and communica- tions (art. 7). ‘taxation is almost entirely administered by the reich: citizenship, penal laws and legal rights were administered by the old reich for all germany, likewise the social laws. of these, education alone was left to the territories, but now the reich is concerning itself with that also. in administration the territories take a larger part. their govern- ments are still allowed to nominate the greater number of the officials of the so-called intcrior administration. the appointment of the revenue officials has, however, been taken from them since erzberger’s reform of the finance department of the reich, and the reich has also taken over railway administration, while the post office officials were, with the exception of bavaria, already under the reich. the reich has power to coerce the territories (art. 48). if they fail in their duties to the reich or endanger its safety by disturbances in their areas, the president has power to take up arms against them and temporarily to suspend their territorial constitutional rights (‘ federal execution "'). the reichstag may insist on the repeal of such measures if it disapproves of them. the constitution and foreign affairs —accepted principles of international law have in germany the force of laws of the reich (art. 4). decisions on war and peace can only be taken subject to a law of the reich. alliances and treaties with forcign states require the consent of the reichstag (art. 45, sections 2, 3). the president of the reich appoints the officials of the foreign office, in the same manner as other officials, with the counter- signature of the chancellor or the foreign minister. in the case of ambassadors and attaches the president may claim a per- sonal right of choice. thus president ebcrt associated himself arr) =| == sea = on " metralsund eh ; & dresden a pao | germany on 1 bornholm —— tr canzigg i x . zs 5 za y ~ coloerg e 4 schneidemtityt af i landsbherg | nett in al re iz uel vez gf (ra f a, breslau* 4 i i gi q or 6, = oppel. : english miles 50 ioa kilometres 0 5o main railways ie ee 20° (e in the selection of new candidates for nearly all the important diplomatic posts after the world war. the reichstag com- mittce for foreign affairs is permanent (art. 35). | the first five years of the constitution.—the constitution stood the test of its dificult early years well. it gained in the general estcem by the effective use that was made of armed force (placed in the hands of the government by the constitution) in various emergencies. its reputation was further enhanced by the stabilisation of the currency, and by the fact that the prime mover in this—dr. schacht, president of the reichsbank—-was an avowed partisan of the republic. it was realised that with such a constitution the economic life of the nation could be re- vived, in spite of the alarming art. 156, giving ‘‘ authority for the socialisation of the reich.’”’ the article which is most se- verely criticised, in north germany especially, is art. 3, which orders that the colours of the reich shall be black-red-gold; it is significant, however, that the majority of those who cling to the old reich colours would be willing to accept black-white-red as the colours of the republic. the territories demand greater independence in relation to the reich, particularly as regards the right to levy their own taxes. this demand was definitely formulated in the memoran- dum of the bavarian govt. on the revision of the constitution (jan. 5 1924).! but even bavaria, the ancient stronghold of federalism, only asks for the revision and not for the suppression of the constitution. 1 a change in the constitution can only be made by a two-thirds majority in the reichstag with two-thirds of the deputics present; in the reichsrat a two-thirds majority is required, and in a referendum or people’s decision a majority of the whole electorate, not only of the actual voters. germany two attempts made in the prussian provinces to create inde- pendent territories by means of a plebiscite were defeated by the people themselves (upper silesia nov. 3 1922; hfanover may 5 1924). on the other hand, saxe-weimar, saxe-meiningen, saxe-gotha, saxe-altenburg and four small mid-german states have united to form the free state of thuringia; coburg has joined bavaria and waldeck prussia. the franchise and the one-chamber system have been widely criticised. the first presidential election showed that a candi- date who had not figured in the first ballot at all might be elected on a relative majority in the second. but this president, though elected by a minority, had after a year in office gained the confidence of an overwhelming majority of the people, though losing, on the other hand, that of a portion of his electors. similarly, president ebert, who was elected by the reichstag and not by the people, owed the strength of his position, even with the parliamentary partics, to the confidence with which his personality inspired large masses of-the people. the franchise not only excludes strong action on the part of the people—a “landslide ’—but returns the same parties again and again with only a slight alteration in the mandate, with the result that elec- tors become weary and indifferent. by-clections would serve the purpose of indicating to some extent the political fecling that obtains among the people; and, further, as there is no upper house or senate, independent statesmen have no opportunity of voicing the public opinion of the country. neither is this want supplied by the big newspapers, which are almost all in the em- ploy of definite parties or definite economic groups. bibliograpily.—the old constitution: laband, das staatsrecht des deutschen reichs, 5th ed. (freiburg and tiibingen, 1914); the constitution of the german commonwealth in the league of nations, vol. il. (world peace foundation, 1919); the new constitu- tion: anschtitz, die verfassung des deutschen retchs, 3rd_ ed. (tiibingen, 1926) (annotated text); wittmayer, die wetmarer reichs- verfassung (tibingen, 1922); triepel, der /ederalismus und die ke- viston der weimarer verfassung in zeitschrift fiir politik, vol. 14; poetzsch, “vom staatsleben unter der weimarer verfassung"' in the jahrbuch des oeffentlichen rechts, vol. 13; mendelssohn-bartholdy, ‘’ von den beiden kammern cines parlaments,’”’ in the nene rund- schau (sept. 1925); fetzer, dus referendum im deutschen staatsrecht (1923). (a. m.-b.) iii. political history the domestic situation 1910-2.—when th. von bethmann hollweg, the fifth imperial german chancellor, presented him- self to parliament as prime minister of prussia? in jan. rgro, he enjoyed the confidence of the conservatives, while the socialists, liberals and catholic centre all opposed him. ilis bill for the alteration of the prussian franchise of feb. 4 1910, which upheld the “ three class voting system ”’ and open ballot, was rejected even by the national liberals, while the left wing liberals branded it as an insult to the very principle of franchise, and it was rejected in may, a coalition of all the non-conservative parties in the chamber of deputies having decided to vote for the secret ballot, while the upper house rejected it. in the reichstag the opposition to the chancellor was simi- larly composed of the centre, liberals and socialists. the cath- olic centre was the great patron in germany of the polish catholic minorities in the eastern provinces of prussia. it there- fore joined with the left in embittered protests when disciplinary action was taken against certain non-political government ofli- cials (of the the postal and railway services) who had supported the greater poland party in the municipal elections in katto- witz. the antagonism was the more violent since the chan- cellor himself belonged to the prussian protestant official class which had used its social status to establish an unwritten monop- oly over the higher administrative posts. if bethmann hollweg, later in 1917, was the champion of the “oreat coalition,” exiending from the national libcrals to the social democrats, and the particular bete wozre of the conserva- tives, it was not he but the situation and the partics that had 1 other small states will probably later join their greater neighbour states, ee 2 he assumed that position in july 1909. 203 changed since 1910. he remained throughout a perfectly loyal and devoted public official, but stubborn and dogmatic, and con- temptuous of the counsels of the outer world. bethmann’s position, both at home and abroad, was difficult. the differences over the internal shipping dues had been labori- ously composed, but the struggle still troubled the harmony of the confederated governments. saxony and baden, in particular, as the two states lying on the upper courses of the rhine and the elbe, felt themselves overreached by prussia, which, situated at the mouth, sought to abolish the traffic-duecs on the great rivers in the interests of her schemes for canal construction. in bavaria under the new regent, subsequently king ludwig iit., the gov- ernment guarded the particularist rights and the parity of the state with prussia far more jealously than it had done under king ludwig it. or the regent, prince luitpold. in the reichs- tag, on the other hand, there was already a considerable major- ity which demanded stronger powers for the imperial] govt. in its dealings with individual states. it called for the removal of the remaining restrictions imposed upon the catholic church in predominantly lutheran states, and urged the imperial chan- cellor to take action in virtue of his imperial powers to abolish the old constitution of estates still in force in mecklenburg, which entailed the domination of the great landed proprietors, and to establish a diet with universal suffrage. the question of framing a constitution for alsace-lorrains was particularly difficult. those sections in the “ reichsland ” most anxious for a permanent association with germany—the german-speaking old alsatians and german lorrainers, the industrialists and traders, the centre party, official and univer- sity circles—demanded a ‘‘ home rule ” under which the reichs- land should become a federal state with full parity of rights, with powers to frame a state constitution by means of a constitu- ent assembly, and representation in the bundesrat proportion- ate to the population, the people electing deputies to the reichs- tag and to the local diet. this involved the question of the future position of the german emperor, who had hitherto ruled as de fucto soveccign, without a dict, indeed often against the wishes of the alsace-lorraine deputies as expressed 1n the reichs- tag. in any case, his powers as supreme war lord in a frontier and fortified region remained very effective even against the civil administration, and would outshadow those of another ter- ritorial ruler. morcover, the mutual jealousies of the reigning houses made it hard to appoint a member of one of them to rule in alsace-lorraine. yet if the emperor, who was also king of prussia, retained his position, with the right to appoint the statthalter, the new state constitution would of itself entitle him to instruct the delegates of alsace-lorraine to the bundesrat, so that their votes would simply strengthen the prussian vote in that council. finally, on may 26 1911, the act embodying the constitution of alsace-lorraine was adopted as a compromise. ‘the territory was now torank asa federal state; its constitution, however, was fixed by a decision of the legislative body of the empire. of the two houses of parliament, one was chosen by universal suffrage, while the other was in part nominated by the government, in part composed of high officials. the emperor remained reigning prince, the votes in the bundesrat thus deriv- ing from his government; but where a prussian majority in the bundesrat depended on the votes of alsace-lorraine the latter were not to be counted. such an intricate constitutional instru- ment would probably never have been popular. it increased the confidence of the moderate middle-class parties in the chancel- lor’s domestic policy; but the right and left were equally dis- . satished. the conservatives regarded any step towards con- stitutional government in the reichsland as unsound, and many of them would have preferred the continuance of rigid military rule in the “‘ conquered ” territory. indeed, the hostility of the extreme conservatives and of the pan-germans towards beth- mann hollweg dates from this period. the radical left wing were alienated because they had hoped that the constitution would do away with the dominance of the prussian bureaucracy in alsace-lorraine and lead to parliamentary government similar to that of the three south german states. 204 in other directions, also, in domestic politics the parties of the two wings began to move towards extremes. this process, at first interrupted by the war, was renewed with great violence after- wards, and still hampers the formation of anything like a two- party system, or, indeed, of parliamentary government at all. for the right wing of the group of moderate parties which lies between these extremescannot sit in the same cabinet with theextreme left, whilst their left wing cannot co-operate with the extreme right. the conservative party associated themselves with the agrarians, whose organisation, the farmers union (bund der landwirte), from the outset adopted demagogic tactics and appealed frankly to the power of the producers of indispensable foodstuffs. heavy industry moved away from liberalism and joined the agrarians; and the pan-germans, formerly recruited from the national liberals, and the anti semites drew closer to the parties of the right, voting with them in questions of foreign policy and defence and collaborating with them at elections. in 1914 two of these right parties, the german party of reform and the german social party, combined under an anti semite to form the new deutschvolkische partei. on dec. 7 1911 the reichstag was dissolved, the elections being fixed for jan. 12 1912. the government called for an alliance of the middle-class parties against the socialists to “‘ continue our present policy of commercial treaties and protection to ger- man labour,” and to “ maintain our army and navy permanently in a state of the highest efficiency, and to fill up any gaps in our armament.” the association for combating social democracy issued the same message, which was indeed the same as had been used in the last elections by the conservatives and national liberals, but then against the centre, to-day on behalf of the * blue and black bloc” of the centre and conservatives. the message was unconvincing, and in fact the elections brought the social democrats unexpected success. with 110 members they formed the strongest single party in the reichstag, even as they had proved the largest single party in the electorate. they had gained 69 seats and lost 12. the three conservative parties be- tween them had gained 14 seats and lost 49, and even if with the centre they still commanded about 170 votes, to 152 votes of the left, the decision upon tariff and fiscal policy now lay with the 45 national liberal deputies. the strength of the parties was tested in the elections of the president and vice-presidents of the chamber. a socialist— and that scheidemann, particularly hated by the conservatives on account of his speech in the reichstag two years earlier, when he had said, “‘ iam too well acquainted with prussian history not to know that broken promises belong, so to speak, to the most exalted traditions of the ruling house of prussia’’—was for the first time elected first vice-president. the president and second vice-president resigned rather than work with him; in the end, after much juggling, the progressives (who numbered only 41 deputies) secured the offices of president and first vice- president, the second vice-president being a national liberal. thus party intrigues perpetuated the curse of german political life, the exclusion of the social democrats from all positions of public responsibility; while the centre, the second strongest party, was also excluded from presidential office. another grave symptom was the fact that during these elections and in the work of the reichstag organised commercial interests became an open political force. a vehement protest was made during the elections by an honest and uncompromising deputy, count posadowsky. foreign policy before the war.—in foreign policy, too, beth- -mann hollweg had found a much more diflicult situation than appeared on the surface. the secret documents of the foreign office, published as regards the years 1871-1912 in 30 volumes at the beginning of 1926, show where the key to the policy of the european powers lay since the beginning of the 2oth century, and why the western powers could consider themselves endan- gered by a threat of german hegemony at the same time that germany could complain of isolation and “ encirclement.”’ the key lay in the unreality of the triple alliance, the southern part- ner of which could now only be considered an ally as a matter of germany form, not in reality. when bismarck, after long hesitation and consideration, concluded the first treaty of the triple alliance in 1882 at italy’s request, relations between italy and france in the mediterranean were so strained that war between france and italy was more probable than a french attack on germany. the triple alliance therefore gave security for immediate mutual help in case of a french attack on germany or italy; it afforded italy security and ient the necessary weight to its claims to the north coast of africa and to equality of rights with france and great britain in all mediterranean questions. when, how- ever, italy had come to an agreement with france on the delimi- tation of her spheres of influence in tunis, algiers and morocco on the one hand and tripoli on the other, and when the e:gypt- morocco agreement between france and great britain (1904) had drawn britain also into this mediterranean entente, all danger for italy of a french attack vanished, and thus any sup- port from germany became superfluous. it was remembered also in italy that it was precisely the fox eign ministers who had been true to the tripic alliance who had complained that germany was holding italy back from her natu- ral expansion in north africa out of fear of being drawn into a mediterranean conflict. this complaint over the passivity of the triple alliance policy, which was especially clearly put by baron blanc in his great “ aide-memoire ” of july 14 1895 to lord salisbury and to the other two powers of the triple entente is the direct origin of italy’s rapprochement with france at the end of the roth century. since 1901 the german foreign office and general staff fully realised that even in case of unconcealed i'rench aggression, if it took place on the rhine, germany could not reckon on the military assistance which italy had promised to send her over the brenner and through the tirol and south germany, and that no italian govt. would be able to iet italy fight with germany against france, in the face of public opinion. it is clear from a communication of von schlieffen, chief of the german general staff,) that public admission of this fact was only prevented by fear that austria-hungary would lose all con- fidence in the triple alliance, and even in the alliance with ger- many, if she learnt that in no circumstances could reliance be placed upon italy’s military assistance. even prince billow, the most loyal friend of the italian alli- ance deliberated whether it would not be better, in view of the real situation, to let the triple alliance lapse and openly admit ger- many’s isolation. he believed, however, that the agitation which such open dealing would at first provoke in europe would bring such a great danger for peace that again and again he plastered over the rent. consequently, whenever germany was confronted with a proposal for conference of the great powers, her foreign oflice sought to avoid her participation. such proposals always looked as though they would lead to an unbiased adjustment of views between two equally strong groups of which neither could outvote the other; for in every issue between the great powers, whether it arose over morocco, the near east, the bal- kans or the i'ar east, a state of the triple alliance and a state of the entente always at first appeared as adversaries. their part- ners played the rele of mediating powers, two against two, and their parity seemed specially to fit them to bring about a com- promise. such was the apparent position. but the german foreign office knew that italy could not and would not stand by austria in a german encounter with great britain or france, nor by germany in a conflict between austria and russia, but that she would always have closer diplomatic contact with france and britain, and even with russia, than with her allies, who on their side did not usually consult her before negotiating on balkan questions with one another or with the entente powers. when germany did take part in the algeciras conference (jan. ro—-april 17 19re), in fact insisted against the wishes of irrance that this conference be held—the reason was that ger- many believed that she would be supported outside evrope. 1 tt may be explained that von schlieffen retired towards the end of 1905. for the history of ‘‘ the plan " up to the outbreak of war, see the official record der weltkrieg, compiled from the archives of the reich, vol. 1, pp. 6-19 (berlin, 1925). ed. £.b, germany thanks to the ties which had been formed between the emperor and president roosevelt by the german ambassador speck von sternburg, germany expected that the united states would advocate the principle of the ‘‘ open door ” in the moroccan question, and would join germany in opposing the grant of a preferential mandate for france. therefore biilow did not then think that germany’s isolation in europe was an obstacle to the conference. all the greater was the disillusionment when ger- many and austria-hungary stood alone at algeciras as elsewhere. bethmann hollweg directly experienced not onlv this disappoint- ment but the effects of biilow’s subsequent procedure in the bosnian annexation crisis of 1908-9. the agadir incident and the settlement in africa—since the first moroccan crisis the emperor had acquiesced, though un- willingly, in the policy of the chancellor and of the feraign office, particularly in morocco and the near east, and therefore the foreign office had always to strive to confront him with a fait accompli. the chancellor, who was naturally extremely pru- dent, took the responsibility for the sensational “ panther leap ” to agadir (july 1 rorz). if a conference was to be avoided be- cause germany was doomed to isolation (shared, at the very best, with austria), an understanding made directly with france was essential. the secretary of state, von kidcrlen-wichter, thought that this could be appropriately initiated by sending a warship to protect german commercial interests in southern morocco. he subsequently secured the franco-german african convention of nov. 4 roti after negotiations with the french ambassador jules cambon. kiderlen was neither a junker nor a prussian; he came from wiirttemberg, home of the south german spirit of independence and democracy. he was, moreover, no militarist. he entertained a keen, even personal hostility towards admiral von tirpitz and the emperor’s military entourage, and was convinced that germany could and must maintain her position by diplomatic means and without war. he claims for himself the credit of avert- ing the danger of hostilities between austria-hungary and russia over the annexation of bosnia and serbia’s demand for compen- sation in novi-pazar. the note of march 21 1909, in which biilow informed the russian govt. that germany would “‘ let things take their course ” if russia did not accept her proposal for mediation, was drafted by kiderlen; he had made its tone that of an ultimatum in demanding from isvolsky ‘‘ a clear and categoric answer, a precise answer—yes or no.”! kiderlen was at the time ambassador at bucharest, but in the interval he assumed office as foreign secretary, in spite of the emperor’s personal dislike of him. he was the more inclined to a repetition of surprise tactics in diplomacy as they enabled him to exclude the emperor himself from the direction of policy. incidentally, kiderlen treated parliament cven more brusquely, if possible, than he did his sovereign and his military advisers. the dispatch of the “‘ panther ” to agadir became known on july r 1911. on july 9 kiderlen resumed his conversations with jules cambon. at the end of the month the press of the right and right centre began to attack bethmann hollweg and the emperor himself for weakness towards france in morocco. kiderlen, in order to conciliate nationalist opposition to nego- tiations with france, had created the belief that france would cede the french congo entire to germany; there was therefore deep disappointment when it became clear that germany would only receive a strip of territory securing her trade communica- tions with the congo river and the belgian congo. bethmann hollweg and kiderlen, however, continued the negotiations. the morocco-congo agreement was signed on nov. 4 and pub- lished on nov. 7. germany accorded a material recognition of the french protectorate over morocco; france promised only freedom of trade and equality of treatment to the nationals of the european powers, particularly as regards concessions for public works; but ceded to germany 275,000 sq. km. in the north and northwest of the french congo, receiving in exchange 12,000 sq. km. in the region of lake chad. germany obtained access to the congo river, while france acquired the right to construct 1 grosse polittk, no. 9,460. 205 military roads and a railway through the territory ceded to ger- many, to connect the coast with the interior. the morocco agreement was, in general, welcomed by the left but censured by the right. the critics designated the newly acquired strip of southern cameroon as worthless, and qualified the recognition of french predominance in morocco as a feeble withdrawal before england’s menaces, as expressed in particular in lloyd george’s mansion house speech (july 21). the chan- cellor defended the agreement in a great speech before the reichs- tag on nov. 9, in which he dealt in particular with the charge of irresolute policy: — from the very beginning our programme has been: to accord increased political rights to france only in return for increased security for our commercial interests in morocco, and for the acquisi- tion of colonial territory. we have not at any moment sought for territorial acquisition in morocco itself. negotiations between our- selves and france alone, not before an international congress, nor with the inclusion of a third party—this is the programme which we have laid down, and we have carried it out. diplomatic representations had been made in london respect- ing lloyd george’s speech. in the meantime, the british govt. itself had held back, not desiring to intervene in the franco- german negotiations. a ‘ vigorous policy,” such as the right wing critics demanded, was only possible for germany if she were strong on the continent and avoided untenable positions outside europe. morocco had proved a festering sore not only in franco-german but also in anglo-german relations. the cause of peace was served by closing the wound. and finally:— others, gentlemen, would favour a preventive war, against france, or against england, or against both together. but preventive war was a mistake, war must be avoided whenever possible. no one can tell whether hereafter germany may be called upon to carry on war with her neighbours. the responsibility to-day is mine, and i say that it is my duty to conduct affairs in such a way that a war which might be avoided, a war which ts not demanded by germany's honour, is indeed avoided. the conservative opposition was directed by heydebrand, known as the “uncrowned king of prussia,” and it was observed that the crown prince applauded him from the tribune in par- liament. the crown prince’s criticism was really personal to the emperor, and so william ii. took it; he transferred his son from danzig, where he was commanding a cavalry regiment, to work on the general staff. this agreement had removed morocco from among the direct political causes of a european war, even as the franco-british mediterranean agreement had removed egypt. it was to be expected that new unrest would now break out elsewhere, and since the termination of the russo-japanese war the balkans and the near east seemed destined for this part. german foreign policy was now concentrated upon the peace- ful settlement of the baghdad railway question, first by means of the agreement with russia of aug. 19 1911, and then on the negotiations which resulted in the agreement with great britain concluded in july 1914. the death of von kiderlen, on dec. 30 1912, and of marschall von bieberstein, ambassador in london, (sept. 24) were serious losses to the german diplomatic service. the death of marschall dangerously reinforced austrian influ- ence in berlin. as the most energetic promoter of fnendship between germany and turkey, marschall, from his post at con- stantinople, had strongly opposed all austrian encroachments in the balkans, particularly before and during the bosnian crisis of 1908-g. unlike count aehrenthal, he never allowed himself to be influenced by prejudices of domestic policy in his idea of the necessary co-operation between the three empires. as am- bassador in london, a post which he had hardly assumed when he died, marschall would probably also have easily found the right attitude towards english parliamentary policy. the turco-italian war, for which emperor and people alike strongly condemned the italians, would probably have injured the triple alliance more if any illusions had been entertained in berlin. it was only because nobody expected italy to have any regard for her allies that germany was content to look on while turkey, the only power with which she was in close and friendly relations, was deprived of one of her provinces and suffered heav- 206 ily from the war. during the war, on the occasion of the em- peror’s visit to venice in march 1912, the stability of the triple alliance was affirmed. in dec. rgr2 the alliance was renewed without comment, its renewal on cach previous occasion having been preceded by protracted negotiations. when the first bal- kan war (1912) gaverise toa new and acute danger, and mobilisa- tion seemed imminent on the austro-russian frontier, with all the results which it entailed in the summer of 1914, german policy, in close co-operation with that of sir edward grey, brought pressure on vienna, whilst the emperor used his influence with the archduke francis ferdinand, during the latter’s visit to springe (nov. 22~3 1912), to dissuade austria from threatening serbia, and russia from emphasising her rele of serbia’s pro- tector. the supporters of the policy of preventive wars were bitterly disappointed, and they spread broadcast an utterance attributed to the emperor, in which he was said to have insisted that ‘‘ the austrians must not rattle the german sword.”! home politics 1912-4.—in the two years preceding the out- break of the war, however, the foreign political situation was much less acute than the domestic. in the former field may be mentioned the characteristic incident of the emperor’s visit to switzerland, with the sincere good feelings which it aroused, and his energetic commendation of the swiss citizen army (sept. 3-§ 1912). the year 1912 brought the first ominous symptoms: the plans for strengthening the army and navy (the latter un- happily coinciding with the visit of lord haldane to berlin); the resignation of wermuth, secretary to the imperial treasury, in march 1912, which was interpreted as an abandonment of the death duties; the miners’ strike of march 1912, and the much more serious and enduring phenomenon of the rise in meat prices in the autumn and winter of 191 2-3—a powerful weapon of agita- tion in the hands of the left, for the agrarians of the right and centre opposed the import of cheap foreign meat; the even more threatening insecurity of the parliamentary majority, for a violent contest had arisen between the two protectionist parties of the “ blue and black ” bloc since the campaign opened by the centre (originating in bavaria) to secure the abrogation of the jesuit law. on that question the national liberals voted with the conservatives; the left wing liberals and socialists, as op- posed in principle to all exceptional legislation, with the centre. but, above all, the emperor and the prussian court and mili- tary authorities were finding great difficulty in accommodating themselves to the new conditions in alsace. almost all the con- flicts of this period arose among the german-speaking and ger- man-bred alsatians and not in predominantly french lorraine. when the administration of alsace withheld government orders from a factory in grafenstaden on account of the alleged provoc- ative and anti-german conduct of the manager, it had the land- tag against it (unanimous vote of censure by the second chamber on may 7 1912). ata dinner given by the governor in stras- bourg the emperor had expressed the intention of destroying the alsatian constitution and converting alsace-lorraine into a prussian province if matters went on like this. this was not taken very seriously by the alsatians themselves. the alsatian papers even admitted that it was comprehensible that the em- peror should feel the opposition of the landtag as ingratitude. in the reichstag, however, scheidemann seized upon the em- peror’s pronouncement to remark that in any case to become prussian was the harshest punishment germany could inilict. the chancellor and the ministers walked out, and the president afterwards called the speaker to order. but the social demo- crats had moved a stage further left. social legislation—the principal sufferers irom stringent conditions in the german reich were the numerous government administrative officials (members of the post-office, railways, revenue office, clerks), although their loyalty made them slow to voice their grievances. the manual workers vented upon the 1 the official records of the conversations in politics between the emperor and the archduke at this mecting, and at the emperor’s subsequent visit to konopischt in june 1914, will be published in volumes 32 and 35 of the collection of german archives: die grosse politik der europiischen kabinette. until their appearance it 1s wiser to suspend judgment. germany big stores, the chief of which were in the hands of jews, their anger at the high prices of necessaries and became anti- semites. the workers who were organised in trade unions were materially not badly off. state insurance for disabled persons and dependants of the deceased, for the victims of accidents and for the sick, was now established on a uniform basis for the empire (imperial insurance act of july 19 rorr). con- siderable power was assured to the opcratives, particularly in the establishment of the local sickness funds, so much so that the doctors constantly complained that they were at the mercy of the local officials concerned with the funds, who were almost all social democrats. for a time the doctors even threatened to strike on this issue. a new chapter of jurisprudence of great im- portance was opened: the “‘ labour laws.’? this summed up in a comprehensive code the regulation of conditions of labour under public and civil law. there was also talk of establishing “labour courts ” in which civil cases between workers and em- ployers were to be decided. the court was to consist, on the model of the industrial and mercantile courts, of a lawyer as president and two assessors (one an employer and one a worker), elected by the employers and workers of the district. in these elections the principle of proportional representation was tried for the first time in germany on a considerable scale. the for- mation of chambers of labour was also planned. these were to have the same standing in economic life as the chambers of com- merce and of agriculture. they were, however, to be formed ona footing of equality—that is to say, workers’ representatives were also to be included. on july 1 1912 persons in receipt of disablement pay numbered 953, 057; in receipt of sickness benefit 15,866. old age pensioners numbered 91,331; and the total pensions paid since jan. 1 1900, 510,838. under the provision for pensions for the widows and orphans of insured persons in the act of 1911, 4,562 pensions had been paid by june 30 r9r2 and £,059 single grants. the centenary commemorations, 1913.—the year 1913 opened with festivals commemorating 1813, and what to the german peo- ple was the great war of liberation of its history. it was a genu- ine celebration of freedom and a national festival. the german dynasties, the governments and the political partics showed themselves ready to allay old quarrels. the betrothal of the em- peror’s daughter to prince ernest augustus of brunswick, the grandson and heir of the last guelph king of hanover, brought about a reconciliation with the duke of cumberland, whose son ascended the throne of the federal state of brunswick. it was announced on the emperor’s 25th jubilee (june 16) that he had destroyed a secret testament of frederick william iv. in which the latter had enjoined upon all his successors to abolish the prussian constitution before assuming rule. on the occasion of the emperor’s jubilee, for which almost all the federal princes assembled in berlin, the prince regent of bavaria, ludwig, who in nov. 1913 was empowered by law to assume the royal office in view of the persistence of king otto’s incurable mental ailment, pledged the loyalty of the states to the empire. in reply, the emperor styled the sovereigns of the german states and the burgomasters of the free towns his “ allies,” and declared that in their independence, as guaranteed by the constitution, lay the strength of the empire itself. in the reichstag the motion of the centre on the jesuits was adopted on feb. 19 1913, after a peaceful discussion. during the debates on the colonial budget, erzberger, formerly the keenest critic of the abuses existing in certain colonies, supported the colonial policy of the government. passing of the army reform bill—ven the army bill, offi- cially announced on march r, encountered no very bitter oppo- sition. the bill increased the peace strength from 544,271 men to 661,176, entailing the creation of 84 new battalions and squad- rons. the total cost was to amount to an initial outlay of 1,050 million marks, and subsequently of 180,000,000 to 190,000,000 marks annually. the initial costs were to be covered by a capital impost for one year only, and in the case of high incomes by a single levy on income (‘‘ contribution towards national defence *’) both non-recurring. the current expenses were to be met by an increase of the quota contributed towards the imperial finances germany by the federal states, which those states levied through their own taxation upon capital or income. the discussions in the reichstag turned less upon the strengthening of the army than upon the means of meeting the cost. the left wing parties <le- manded, and in part secured, that property, particularly un- earned increment, should bear the chief burden of the single levy, and further the introduction of a steep, progressive graduation of the rates of taxation. apart from the fact that they were in general favourable to the army bill, the parties of the right found satisfaction in the abandonment, at any rate for the time, of the plan of permanent death duties. on the death on aug. 13 of bebel, the venerable leader of german social democracy, all partics united in a tribute of respect to his character, and integ- rity and none denied that he was a “ good german.” the zabern incident—y¥et how delusive was this tranquility was manifested by the zabern incident of nov. 1913 (see alsace- lorrainf); an incident so trivial in itself that its procligious consequences can only be explained by the existence of a general state of political tension. the government’s position was weak- ened, for its attitude over the incident was censured by 293 votes against s4 in the reichstag, unanimously in the lower chamber of the alsatian landtag and by 33 votes against three in the upper chamber. at the same time the imperial chancellor had incurred the definite hostility of the military party. in an important debate in the prussian upper house on jan. 10 1914 bethmann hollweg developed his whole policy in a discussion with the spokesman of the conservatives, count yorck zu war- tenburg. zabern was not discussed, but it was present in the thoughts of every speaker. bethmann defended the constitution of alsace-lorraine. he vindicated his right, disputed by count yorck, of calling a commission of inquiry with the co-operation of deputies of the reichstag to report on the conditions and abuses in the army contracts’ department. but he, on the other hand, admitted that precisely in the empire with its universal and free suffrage and the social tendencies of its legislation a prussia with a different “ internal structure,” that is without universal suffrage and without responsible parliamentary government and with a ‘‘ firm military foundation,” seemed essential. the government aimed at compromises between the emperor and parliament and between prussia and the empire. but the parties and the politically minded section of the nation all felt that alike in domestic and foreign politics the government was lacking in decision. how little, however, the professional poli- ticians knew of the reality may be seen from the fact that the appointment of herr von loebell, who during and after the war proved himself a leader of the reactionaries, as prussian minister of the interior was characterised as a concession to liberalism. the war period the sarajevo murder —when the news of the murder at sara- jevo on june 28 1914 became known in germany, the horror generally felt was mingled in pacifist circles with a certain silent relief. rumour had assigned the murdered man to the war party. from the new heir to the austro-iiungarian throne a peaceful policy might be expected. it was anticipated that austria- hungary would take speedy action against serbia, as far as possible in agreement with russia. it was thought that the sym- pathies of the world were on austria’s side, even if she should undertake a short punitive expedition against serbia. the most recent and very meticulous examination of all the archives and the utterances of all witnesses have made it clear that in the early days of july the emperor and his entourage had no thoughts whatever of a eurcpean war, and that neither a crown council, still less a council of war—as the american am- bassador morgenthau claimed to have heard from the german ambassador in constantinople—was held in potsdam or berlin. but when von tschirschky, the german ambassador in vienna, reported on june 30 that vienna desired to use the opportunity to settle accounts with the serbs thoroughly, but that he himself seized every occasion to “ issue calm but very emphatic and seri- ous warnings against precipitate action,” the emperor com- mented: “ who has authorised him to do so? it is very stupid. 207 tt is no business of his. what austria thinks of doing is solely her affair.”” ‘vhenceforward the ambassador let the austrians go their own way, and as on july 5 the emperor had received a letter from the emperor francis joseph and a memorandum drawn up by count berchtold, and the chancellor had declared that in harmony with his obligations as an ally the emperor would stand loyally by the side of austria-hungary (july 5 and 6), vienna felt that it could rely on german aid in its balkan plans. but the emperor and the chancellor merely intended that austria should demand satisfaction from serbia as speedily and energetically as possible, before the murder of the heir be- came a european question. it, therefore, implied no change of view that the emperor received the serbian answer to the aus- trian ultimatum of july 23 with the comment:— a brilliant achievement for a grace of 48 hours. jt is more than could have been expected. a great moral triumph for vienna. but every reason for war now disappears, and giesl ought to have re- mained quietly at belgrade. on the strength of this ] would never have ordered mobilisation. when austria rejected the serbian reply, and on july 28 de- clared war on serbia without having previously consulted berlin, the chancellor and the secretary of state, von jagow, realised the danger of the position—no doubt much too late. on july 29 bethmann telegraphed to vienna:— i view the attitude of the government in vienna and its incon- sistent attitude towards the different cabinets with increasing dis- comfort. in st. petersburg it asserts its territorial disinterestedness, it leaves us entirely in the dark as to its programme, feedls rome with meaningless phrases regarding the compensation question, whilst in london count mensdorff gives away portions of serbia to bulgaria and albania and proceeds to contradict the solemn declarations in st. petersburg. from these contradictions i must draw the conclu- sions that . . . the viennese government harbours plans which it deems it wise to conceal from us, to assure itself in any event of german support and not by an open avowal to run the risk of a possible refusal. for a conference, however, as proposed in particular by grey, berlin was equally disinclined, as conferences had always been unwelcome to her since algeciras. the last hope, therefore, lay in successful direct negotiations between vienna and st. peters- burg. when these broke down on july 30, germany supported in vienna (july 30) the final british proposal for mediation to the effect that after the capture of belgrade, austria should announce her intention of advancing no further until the powers should have mediated between herself and russia. count berch- told’s temporising defeated this proposal. with the general mob- ilisations of russia and austria on july 31 and that of germany on aug. 1 a state of war was actually in being, although the declarations of war followed later. for in the three states imme- diately involved the chiefs of the general staffs were now unani- mous in asserting that any further dclay would endanger the prospects of success in the field, and no civilian chancellor could take the responsibility of opposing this view. moreover, the executive power had now passed in accordance with the constitu- tion to the supreme military authority. (sce also europe.) the invasion of belgium—the german plan of campaign for a war on two fronts, as framed by the elder von moltke, had en- visaged defensive action on the west, offensive on the cast. sub- sequently for a short time there were two alternative plans. the official account of the war by the german general staff proves that in 1892 under count schlicffen the plan of an eastern offen- sive was abandoned, the offensive on the western front with the march through belgium being retained as the sole plan. the foreign office was not consulted.! the emperor made a single 11t is necessary, however, for the understanding of the schlieffen plan, which originally contemplated the violation of dutch as well as belgian neutrality, to read graf von schlieffen, by freytag-loring- hoven (berlin, 1920), and also erinnerungen, briefe, dokumente 1877-1916, by the second von moltke, especially pp. 429, 430 (stuttgart, 1922). from before the end of the 19th century the manoeuvres were obviously based on the principle of a turning move- ment through belgium and luxembourg (reichsarchiv, der welt- krieg, vol. 1, berlin, 1925); the kaiser’s statesmen were aware that strategical railway facilities were continually developed in the same direction and provided for in the budget. there is no doubt that the schlieffen plan was officially regarded as a life-and-death necessity of german policy in case of war.—ed. £.b. 208 allusion to the plan in a personal letter to prince biilow, who re- turned a dilatory answer. bethmann hollweg and his secretary of state for foreign affairs, von jagow, were never asked whether they approved of the military plan which contemplated an offen- sive against france and the violation of belgian neutrality. ac- cording to the constitution, the emperor, as supreme war lord, had to decide during war time in cases of differences of opinion between the civil and military authoritics. but once set in motion, the machine of mobilisation revolved so rapidly that even the emperor could no longer have interposed. bethmann hollweg declared in the reichstag on aug. 4 1914:— we are now acting in self-defence, and necessity knows no law. our troops have occupied luxembourg and have perhaps already entered belgian territory. this is in contravention of the behests of international law. it is true that the french government stated in brussels its intention of respecting the neutrality of belgium, as long as the enemy respects it. we knew, however, that france was ready to march in. france could wait, we could not. a french flank attack on the lower rhine might have proved fatal. we were thus com- pelled to disregard the justified protests of the governments of luxembourg and belgium. the wrong that we are thereby inflicting —i speak openly—we will strive to repair as soon as our military objective is attained. early stages of the war.—the parties concluded a truce, and the social democrats voted credits for the war, which they re- garded as a defensive war against tsarist russia. the people everywhere accepted the situation very gravely. the immediate summons to the colours of the whole landsturm up to 45 brought home the danger to all. the general nervous feeling during the first weeks was betrayed in the hunts after spies and transports of russian gold. when the first prisoners of war arrived, the mili- tary authorities feared that the people would fraternize with them, and strictly forbade any intercourse. the civil authority at home was transferred to the generals commanding army corps areas in germany, whose staffs consisted usually of superannuated and not always very intelligent officers, who were entrusted with all emergency defence measures and with censor- ship of the press and all other printed matter. thanks to the censorship, the defeat on the marne could at first be kept almost entirely secret. the war for positions was declared to be the deliberate plan of the general staff. although von moltke was dismissed, and although it was already determined that the high seas fleet should not risk itself in open battle, general ifead- quarters still hoped for victory. the fatal effects for austria of the failure to give her speedy help against the russian army were not realised, especially in view of hindenburg’s striking success in the east. it thus seemed clear that the prolongation of the war and all the accompanying distress was solely due to the blockade. this blockade, initiated by great britain, was regarded, like the se- questration of enemy property, as a violation of international law. since the anglo-american conception, which treated indi- vidual nationals of enemy states as “ alien enemies,’’ was new to germany the opinion arose that it was the specific english mode of warfare—as distinct from the french or the russian—which was inhumane and contrary to international law, particularly as the indignation aroused in europe, and especially in france by the application of the same methods in the boer war was not forgotten, while of course the decisions in british and ameri- can courts on which the blockade rested were unknown.! in the first year of the war the conviction had already arisen that the german army was invincible, and that the sole source of dan- ger lay in the “‘ war of hunger ” which threatened women and children. if the population at home could “ hold out,’ in the end the war must be won. as the war dragged on questions of internal politics and eco- nomics revived. the people considered that their sacrifices in human lives—volunteers, officers of the reserve, substitutes as well as those on active service—and the privations which they had borne in meeting the costs of the war and in the internal loans, which had been in the first instance subscribed by the holders of small savings-funds, entitled them to claim full politi- cal nights. the reichstag voiced this opinion and the rights of 1for the general casc see blockade. germany the civil authority with increasing firmness. the civil adminis- tration, however, was powerless against the military authorities. since general ludendorff had become quartermaster-general, and a number of his personal adherents had converted the war press bureau, and later the “ patriotic instruction ” given to the troops, into an instrument of political propaganda, the zabern episode was re-enacted on a large scale. the military authorities thought the chancellor and the foreign office too weak in their attitude towards foreign countries and towards the reichstag, and that when the civilian authority broke down the military must take over their duties. the real test of strength came on the question of submarine warfare, to which the chancellor, the foreign office and, of the other ministers in particular, helfferich, the influential secre- tary to the imperial treasury, stood opposed, when general headquarters demanded it again in ro17 after the conferences at pless of aug. 30 1916 and jan. 9 1917.2, the supreme military authorities, supported by the chief of the naval stalf, pointed out that the exchange of notes between the german and the entente govts. with the united states and the other neutral govern- ments between dec. 12 1916 and jan. 12 1917 had proved that peace offers could not be negotiated through diplomatic channels. lhe german peace offer, dec. 1916.—that might be true, but the intrinsic weakness of the german notes (see urorr) had re- sided in the fact that public opinion, the reichstag, and possibly the government itself, falsely informed by general headquarters on the military position, considered the offers contained in them to be quite acceptable and even generous. in particular, no plain admission of a duty of reparation towards belgium was made, because general headquarters insisted that if germany was to renounce territorial aggrandisement she must receive guarantees in the west and east. moreover, heavy industry, at that time closely allied with general headquarters, desired to see the economic predominance of germany in belgium and northeastern france established by the conditions of peace. bethmann himself and after him helfferich at length gave way to the military authorities jan. 9 1917, and the emperor issued orders to begin unrestricted u-boat warfare on feb. 1. when on jan. 23 1917 president wilson proposed mediation to count bernstortf through colonel house, and inquired the german terms of peace, the chancellor, who received the communication on the 28th, lacked the strength to stop unrestricted u-boat warfare, and thereby destroyed his own position. he remained in office long enough to issue the so-called easter message of april 7 1917 from the emperor as king of prussia, in which the abolition of the prussian three-class franchise was promised, in order to reconcile the social democrats. but the new “ father- land party ” (“vaterlandspartei ’’), which enjoyed the support of general heacquarters, and in particular its co-founder kapp, attacked the chancellor without mercy. when he fell at last, this was partly due to eerzberger’s attack in the main committee of the reichstag on july 6 1917 (recording the complete failure of u-boat warfare); partly to the military leaders who had come to berlin on july 7 and, above all, to ludendorff’s alter ego, colonel bauer; finally, ludendorff and hindenburg extorted the resignation of the chancellor from the emperor by threatening their own resignation (july 13). his successor, michaelis, was nominated at the instance of the emperor’s entourage, without negotiations with the reichs- tag. his restrictive interpretation of the peace resolution of the reichstag, adopted on july 19 1917, deprived it of all value abroad (sce europe). his ambiguous attitude, moreover, was partly responsible for the failure of the pacific activities of pope benedict nv. in aug. 1917. the vice-chancellor helfferich was the most influential member of the government. he en- 2 the first occasion was feb. 4 1915, when the government—this time against the advice of tirpitz—declared the british territorial waters to be a war-area as from feb. 18. mr. wilson's mediatory proposal, that germany should recognise the rules in force for cruiser warfare as applying to u-boat warfare, and that in return england should permit the passage of american provisions, failed. when the “ lusitania ” was sunk, the protest of the united states of may 15 resulted in the suspension of the u-boat war (july 8 1915; finally on may 4 1916). germany 209 joyed the special confidence of the supreme command, whose | for alsace-lorraine. prince max of baden became chancellor; views he regularly imposed on the civilian authorities. economic measures.—in the meantime, the economic struc- ture of the german empire had undergone a complete change. on aug. 8 1914 walter rathenau founded the department deal- ing with raw materials for war industries in the prussian war office (‘‘ kriegsrohstoffabteilung des preussischen kriegsminis- teriums ’’), which for a considerable time met the demand for the chief imported raw materials of war industries, particularly metals, cotton, grease, india-rubber and glycerine, by economic handling of home supplies, organising imports from neutral countrics (‘ compensation trade ”’) and by stimulating the dis- covery of substitutes (nitrogen from the atmosphere, raw mate- rial for textiles from nettles and wood, etc.). foodstuffs were early rationed. the vicld of the soil declined owing to the lack of manure and skilled labour. ration cards were introduced, first for bread, then fats, sugar, milk, eggs, meat and potatoes. from the winter of 1916-7 onwards, the quantities allowed no longer sufficed to nourish children and young people. the home producers were also, in principle, limited to these rations; but watertight control was impossible, and smuggling and _ illicit sales became habitual. the sequestration of brass and copper articles in the smallest households excited much bitterness, since it was suspected that the treasures of the rich were being spared, those of the poor taken. while the economic capacity of the individual, particularly of the lower middle-classes and officials, was thus physically and morally undermined and the mass of the population compulsorily socialised, on the basis of a bare subsistence rate, the economic capacity of individual industries expanded cnormously, and the workers employed in them demanded a higher standard of living. the so-called “‘ hindenburg programme ”’ (hindenburg’s only in name) carried out by the war department (ariegsamte) founded on nov. 1 1916 in accordance with the law of auxiliary services (hilfsdienstgesctz), was a prime cause of the economic collapse. by an economically unjustifiable increase in munition workers’ wages it disorganised other industries, in some cases brought about a stoppage and constructed at enormous expense blast furnaces which stood idle for lack of fuel. the “ conscrip- tion of labour ” provided welcome material for radical agitators, while the melting down of church bells offended the devout. war expenditure rose from two milliard marks a month in aug. 1916 to more than three milliards in dec. 1916, and to almost five milliards by nov. rgt8. moreover, this programme laid the foundations of the political power of the great rhineland-west- phalian industrials. in the autumn of rgt7 the civil authority reasserted itself. helfferich was replaced by the democrat payer, from wirttem- berg. from nov. 1917 the “ interparty commission ” of the reichstag, in which erzberger and scheidemann were the chief figures, sat in permanence. on jan. 24 1918 the emperor stated to hindenburg and ludendorff that he himself and the chan- cellor bore the sole responsibility for the direction of political issues. in reality, however, particularly since general head- quarters had forced on him a new chief of cabinet, the emperor was entirely subservient to the military authoritics. the su- preme command took its revenge in 1918; the peace of brest litovsk with russia (march 3 1918) and of bucharest with ru- mania (may 7 1918) were purely military <lictates, bringing no lasting goodwill; although it is true that only a dictated peace could bring finland and the border states freedom and self- determination. general iicadquarters regarded the spring offensive of 1918 as the last chance of securing a peace ‘‘ which should strengthen the monarchy and extend germany’s power.” when it broke down, the war was lost from a military standpoint; even luden- dorff recognised this on the “ black day ”’ of the breakthrough at villiers-bretonneux (aug. 8 1918). in sept. and oct. the bul- garian, turkish and austrian fronts collapsed. on sept. 24 the main committee of the reichstag brought social democrats into the government as secretarics of state, reformed the prussian franchise and proposed full autonomy ? but general headquarters retained their iniluence, especially as the emperor always retired to their shelter at any decisive moments. the supreme army command determined the spe- cific character of the notes sent by the german govt. to president wilson in oct. 1918, and demanded that the note asking for an armistice should be sent out on the night of oct. 3-4 at the latest, in view of the threatened collapse of the german front; and were also responsible for the second note of oct. 12, dictated by the necessities of the military situation. only when wilson’s note of oct. 14 had to be answered did the cabinet withstand the views of ludendorff, who now again asserted that the front line could be held, and themselves continue the exchange of notes with president wilson. on oct. 26 the cabinet obtained ludendorff’s resignation,! and hindenburg thereby regained the simple and honourable position, free from the taint of politics, which had won him the people’s confidence in the early years of the war, and now en- abled him to jead the army home, in the face of the pursuing enemy, without the occurrence of mutiny or plunder. ludendorff did not, indeed, leave his post as quartermaster-general without first disseminating the contention later known as the “ legend of the stab in the back,” that it had been the slackening of re- sistance at home which had made it impossible to the army to continue fighting. bistiograruy,—general: landbuch der politik, 5 vol. (berlin, 1920, ff.); schulthess, huropdischer geschichiskalender, seit 1910 (munich, 1911, ff.);l. bergstrisser, geschichte der politischen parteien in deutschland, 3rd ed. (berlin, 1924); e. brandenburg, von bis- marck sum weltkriege, 2nd ed. (berlin, 1924); h. fricdjung, das zeitalter des imperiaitsmus (berlin, 1919 and 1922); o. hammann, deutsche weltpolitik 1890 bts ror2 (berlin, 1924); f. hartung, deutsche geschichte vom frankfurter frieden bis sum vertrag von versailles (bonn, 1924); j. hohlfeld, geschichte des deutschen reiches 1871-1024 (leipzig, 1924); f. payer, von bethmann itollweg bis ebert (frankfurt a.m. 1923). 1910-4: die grosse politik der europdischen kabinette, vol. 26 seq. (berlin, 1925); w. von massow, die deutsche tnnere politik unter kaiser withelm it, (stuttgart, 1913); graf ernst zu keventlow, deuischlands auswirtige politik, t888-ror4, 11th ed. (berlin. 1918); e. jaeckh (ed.), kiderlen-wichter, der siaatsmann und aflensch, 2 vol. (stuttgart, 1924); admiral alfred von tirpitz, erinnerungen (leipzig, 1919); id., polttische dokumente (stuttgart, 1924); ii. hterkner, die arbetterfrage (berlin, 1922); g. schmoller, die soszale frage (munich, 1918); id., zwansig jahre deutscher politik (1897- 1917) (munich, 1920). _ the war pertod: works, dealing with military operations, including the memories of military leaders, are given under world war. see further: die schuld am kriege, german white book (charlottenburg, 1919); white books of the german parliamentary commission, zur vorgeschichie des weltkriegs, 2 vol. (berlin, 1920, ff.); th. von bethmann hollweg, betrachtungen sum weltkriege, 2 parts (berlin, 1919 and 1921), trans. by g. young under title reflections on the world war (london, 1920); m. erzberger, amfeine eriebnisse im weltkrieg (stuttgart, 1920); k. helfferich, der weltkrieg, 3 vol. (berlin, r919); karl graf von hertling, zin jahr in der reichskanzlet (freiburg i.b., 1919); g. von jagow, ursachen und aushruch des weltkriegs (berlin, 1919); fiirst karl m. lichnowksy, ametne lon- doner mission, 1912-24 (berlin,1919), trans. under title afy afission to london, 1912-4 (london, 1918); th. mann, polttische betrachtungen eines unpolitischen (berlin, 1917); michaelis, far staat und wolk (berlin, 1922); graf max montgelas, letifaden sur kriegsschuldfrage (berlin, 1923), trans. as the case for the central powers (london, 1925); f. naumann, afitteleuropa (berlin, 1915), trans. by c. m. meredith under title central europe (london, 1916); k. f. nowak, der sturs der miitelimdchte (munich, 1921), trans. by p. lochner and e. w. dickes under title the collapse of central eurepe (london, 1924); id., chaos (munich, 1923); graf f. von pourtales, am scheidewege swischen krieg und frieden (berlin, 1919); freiherr w. e. von schoen, erlebtes (stuttgart, 1921). (a. mi.-b.) the revolution and the republic the fall of ludendorff was deeply significant. the essence of prussian tradition had always been the subordination of the civil- inn to the military power. in the first successful years of the war this tradition had naturally been fortified, and the military had assumed even more complete control over the conduct of politics. the emperor and his entourage were entirely dominated by the supreme command, as was much of what ought to have been sensible conservative opinion. when military defeat approached, 1 for a fuller explanation of the circumstances see ludendorff. 210 the vaterlandspartei and similar circles, like the emperor, attrib- uted it, not to errors or weakness of the supreme command, but to the fact that civilian authority and opinion had not yet been entirely stificd. : in moderate liberal and democratic circles exactly the opposite process took place. their leaders were driven by the intransigent and imperialist attitude of the extreme right into strong sym- pathy with the left. the great party of the left was social democracy; but now when events seemed to be laytng the future in its hands german social democracy found itself fatally dis- united. hampered by the undemocratic prussian franchise and much frank repression, the german socialist party had yet grown rapidly during the years of stress and rising prices which preceded the war. it had achieved a stake in the country, a complex organisation and considerable funds. fear of losing these acquisitions, combined with natural patriotism and the dread of russian autocracy, determined the attitude of the party leaders towards the war. on the crucial aug. 4 ror4 they aban-~ doned the international; voted unanimously for the war credits in the reichstag and concluded a “ truce ” with the other po- litical parties. in return the emperor, under pressure from the government removed the restrictions on socialist literature and admitted organised workmen into the state railway and other services. on sept. 9 the socialist leaders protested against the anti-german attitude of the international socialist bureau; and their spokesmen vigorously defended their national cause in the already vexed question of war guilt. the moderate socialists had really moved towards the left centre. a small fraction, however, dissented. in may 1915 one voice—that of liebknecht—voted against a fresh war credit; and a group under liebknecht and rosa luxemburg began to agitate for refusal of credits and a general strike to stop the war. in nov. 1915, 18 socialist deputies voted against the credits. the opposition now grew rapidly, but was itself divided. the jarger group, under haase, kautsky, ledebour and bernstein, split definitely from the majority in march 1916 over the ques- tion of submarine warfare, and formed a separate group which at easter 1917 took the title of the “‘ independent social democrat party of germany,” with a programme of early peace without annexations. the extreme left under liebknecht (which in 1916 had begun to issue a secret paper named spartacus) was already in touch with lenin, trotsky and radek in switzerland, and had adopted the programme of the zimmerwald congress. both these parties were still largely heads without bodies, while the extremists were weakened by the imprisonment of liebknecht in 1916. the majority socialists commanded the prestige and the organisation. but although the russian revolution of march 1917 emboldened them, and at the international socialist con- ference at stockholm in june 1917 they made a declaration against annexations and indemnities; and although the emperor found it wise in his “‘ easter message ”’ of 1917 to promise a re- form of the franchise, they might have been ignored had not erzberger obtained and communicated to his colleagues of the centre on july 6 a copy of count czernin’s famous memoir in which he described austria-hungary as being on the verge of revolution, and victory as impossible. erzberger now propounded a resolution in favour of “ peace by understanding,” and the centre and the majority socialists were definitely allied against the imperialist aims of the govern- ment and the supreme command. the latter were not yet ready for concessions; bethmann hollweg’s successor, michaelis, was their nominee. only when hertling succeeded him was a bill introduced which provided for a really democratic reform of the franchise; and the discussions on it outlasted the fall of the em- pire. certain concessions were, however, introduced; a minor electoral reform was carried on june 8 1918. the bolshevik revolution in russia (nov. 1917) widened the split in the socialist camp. the majority condemned bolshevik methods in russia, the independent socialists looked on them with much sympathy, and their following was strongly rein- forced by unorganised labour, whose imagination was fired by the example of russia and by the prisoners of war who began germany to return after the peace of brest-litovsk. the spartacists were frankly out for the establishment of a dictatorship of the prole- tariat in germany, and began to organise with the arms and money which the russian agitators transmitted to them. ah three groups, however, were alike emboldened by events in russia; in jan. and feb. ror8 a series of munition strikes broke out in germany which almost reached the scale of a revolution, their extent and order showing the vast power of the majority socialists, who, although they had not organised the strike, put themselves at its head to gain control of it. the great munitions strikes, which were largely spontaneous, were symptomatic of an almost universal state of feeling. the almost intolerable strain and privations resulting from nearly four years of continuous war and blockade had affected practical- ly the whole population. hardly one man in a hundred saw in events in russia the triumph of a new doctrine, the establish- ment of a new system, but those were innumerable who saw in it the end of a tyranny, of a driving of men beyond their powers, above all, of war and slaughter. the active policy of the so- cialist leaders drew its strength from the great passivity of the over-driven masses; revolution was becoming the line of least resistance. the main motive in the german revolution, which substituted a socialist for a monarchical government, was to be anything but socialist; it was the longing of workman and soldier to relieve themselves of the tyranny of the state in army and workshop. in sept. 1918 the general staff at last admitted the probability of defeat, and the government prepared to make concessions to the moderates. prince max of baden, the new chancellor, asked the majority socialists to enter the gevernment. they made their acceptance conditional on far-reaching internal reforms; the liberation of belgium; the evacuation of all occupied terri- . tory; and the abandonment of the treaties of brest-litovsk and bucharest. prince max accepted the conditions, and took schei- demann and gustav bauer, and later other majority socialists, into his cabinet. the party then appealed to the independents to re-unite; but the latter, who rejected all co-operation with bourgeois partics and demanded an immediate peace, refused brusquely. the outbreak of revolution.—prince max filled the remainder of his cabinet with liberals and democrats, including erzberger. on oct. 5 he propounded a programme containing a decided pro- fession of democracy, with self-determination of nations. on oct. 28, when germany’s allies had already failed her, he intro- duced a number of measures to democratise the constitution and control the prerogatives of the emperor, and especially to reduce the power of the military authorities. meanwhile, how- ever, germany’s own fighting forces had become infected. on oct. 28 the fleet received orders to put out to sea “‘ for manoeu- vres.” the crews, rightly suspecting that the real object was a last and desperate attack, refused to weigh anchor. their ring- leaders were arrested. on nov. 5 a great meeting demanded their liberation. it was refused, and the demonstrators fired on. the next day the whole fleet was in uproar. there had been a naval mutiny in 1917, and a connection had been traced between the mutineers and the independent leaders haase and ditt- mann. the situation was obviously critical. noske, a majority socialist leader, was sent to kiel to negotiate; he arrived to finda sailors’ council in full control. he recommended that all their requests be granted, and remained in kiel, where he was joined by haase and ledebour. further councils were formed. on the 6th the dock labourers in hamburg revolted; a dictatorship of the proletariat was formed in liibeck and demanded “ imme- diate armistice and peace.” bremen joined on the same day; hanover, brunswick and cologne on the 7th. the movement spread towards berlin; revolutionary bodies took possession of magdeburg, leipzig and dresden. thanks to the lamentable socialist split, the whole of these movements were very confused. the majority socialists had still far the strongest organisation, but the movements in north- ern germany were largely spontaneous, the work of the unorgan- ised proletariat. it was the outcome of a deep craving for peace germany and a reaction against authority. many concerned in it followed the lead of the independent socialists, who were not compromised by their connection with the government, many that of the spartacists, whose leader liebknecht had been released from prison and was conducting a violent extremist agitation. the spartarcists, numerically the smallest group, had the great ad- vantage of a fixed programme, although, an unattainable one. the most urgent question, in view of germany’s defeat, was how far continuity with the previous regime should be preserved. the parties of the centre and left centre had not in the main gone further than the idea of a constitutional republic; and the emperor had subscribed to the constitution of oct. 28, and on nov. 2 had declared that the old order was destroyed and that the emperor was the “ servant of the people.”” but this declara- tion was issued from spa, whither william had fled on oct. 20. the servant of the people had made an unfortunate beginning in sheltering himself from them behind the bayonets of his soldiers in a town on occupied foreign territory. his conduct disheart- ened the monarchists and thinned their ranks, besides making it almost impossible for his loyal adherents to concert their policy, with its object away at the safe end of a long telephone wire. the republican movement received a great impetus. the majority socialists were anxious not to break with the bourgeois parties, which enjoyed the confidence of the peasants and middle classes and commanded practically all administrative talent; while the independents believed that a complete break with the past would ensure germany better conditions of armi- stice. the majority socialists, carried forward on the tide of events, moved almost daily further left, since to stand still would have meant losing their adherents to the independents. on nov. 4 they made up their minds in favour of a republic; and on nov. 7 the rapid march of events outside berlin dceter- mined them to present an ultimatum to the government, demanding the abdication of the emperor and the crown prince, under threat of withdrawing their members from the govern- ment and proclaiming a gencral strike. the emperor was still debating whether he could not lead the army back to restore order at home. the new quartermaster-general, groener, and hindenburg pronounced this impossible on nov. 9. the iim- peror therefore telegraphed his abdication as german emperor. on the roth he tled to holland. : proclamation of the republic—events had outrun him. prince max had announced the abdication on the morning of the gth. his telephone conversations with william had given him the impression that the latter abdicated both as german kmpcror and king of prussia, and he still hoped to save the throne to the dynasty; but republics had already been declared on the 8th in munich and brunswick. the general strike was proclaimed; and prince max formally appointed ebert, the leader of the majority socialists, as his successor, and retired. almost his last act was to order the troops not to shoot on the vast processions already filling the streets of berlin. the power had thus devolved on the majority socialists, who made great efforts at once to preserve order—for which the col- laboration of bourgeois parties was necessary—and to restore the unity of the labour front. in bavaria and some of the smaller states—every state in germany, without an exception, was pro- claiming the republic and forming more or less revolutionary governments—this was effected without friction. in berlin and the government of the reich it was more difficult. the independent socialists agreed to enter a government, on con- dition that the cabinet be purely socialist. the heads of non- political ministries were allowed to belong to other parties, but each was “controlled”? by a majority and an independent socialist. the government proper entitled itself a “‘ council of commissioners of the people” and was composed of ebert, scheidemann and landsberg for the majority socialists and haase, dittmann and barth for the independents. it exercised dictatorial powers. schcidemann proclaimed the republic from the buildings of the reichstag on nov. 9. the new government hurriedly passed a series of decrees abolishing the state of siege, with the various restrictions on freedom in force and proclaiming 2iif a general amnesty, but affirming the right to private property. its chief task, however, was to conclude the armistice; and erz- berger, who had remained in office as secretary of state, had on behalf of the german govt. received the conditions of armistice from the allies in the forest of compi¢gne on nov. 8. the con- ditions made the resumption of hostilities by germany impossible. as president wilson had demanded, they laid down the evacua- tion of the left bank of the rhine, the occupation of the bridge- heads of cologne, mainz and coblenz, the restitution of prison- ers of war without reciprocity and the continuance of the block- ade. an answer was required by nov. 11, and on that morning the government was obliged to accept the terms without modi- fication. at the same time they asked that peace negotiations should be initiated. the struggle against the fxtreme left-—the severity of the terms was a blow to the moderates and encouraged the extreme left. workmen’s and soldiers’ councils were already springing into existence everywhere; a last order of the supreme command had been to allow their formation unimpeded. some were quite spontaneous, others organised by the independents and sparta- cists. liebknecht had refused a generous offer to join the gov- ernment, and he and rosa luxemburg, assisted by radek, rep- resenting bolshevik russia, worked furiously to proclaim a soviet dictatorship on the spot. the majority socialists, on the other hand, considered themselves only mandatories till the real will of the people should have been ascertained by a constituent assembly. it was a struggle between dictatorship and democ- racy, and the issue hung in the balance. on dec. 1 a “* national executive committee of workmen’s and soldiers’ councils” was formed under the independent datimig. the extremists in it regarded it as the supreme authority of germany, which, since the councils system ipso facte excludes the bourgeoisie, involved the dictatorship of the proletariat. on dec. 16 the committee met in berlin. after a stormy debate lasting three days, the views of the majority socialists prevailed. the powers of the committee were limited to summoning and dissolving the coun- cil of representatives, which received both executive and legis- lative powers. elections for a constituent assembly to deter- mine the future form of the german state were fixed for jan. 19. the independents condemned this decision as “ social treachery,” and a few days later the spartacists appealed to arms, the council called out troops against them, defeating the spar- tacists, after heavy fighting, on dec. 24. the independents, in consequence, seceded from the government on dec. 29. the spartacists, who had adopted the name of ‘‘ communist party of germany ”’ on jan. 1 1919, prepared to renew the strug- gle. meanwhile, however, noske, who had been appointed minister of national defence, had hurriedly organised a force which again defeated the spartacists after fighting which lasted from jan. 5-13. liebknecht and rosa luxemburg were arrested and murdered by their escorts, apparently in cold blood. during the next few months, noske was probably the most powerful man in germany. he was entirely ruthless. “ somebody,” he remarked “ must be the bloodhound.” till now, the change of system had been almost bloodless, and had indeed been accom- plished with remarkable smoothness. no member of a ruling house was injured, some indeed were genuincly regretted by their subjects. the administration continued to function; the soldiers dispersed to their homes in order, largely thanks to the irreproachable conduct of hindenburg. the spartacists alone appealed to arms; and it is probable that in putting them down without mercy, noske saved his country from much anarchy. but he did it by dangerous mecthods—although, indeed, these were the only methods open to him; he employed the old corps of officers to serve a republic which most of them loved but little. thus only a few weeks after the revolution, officers of the former army were appearing as saviours of society against socialists; and a revival of german militarism so obnoxious both to the allies and to liberal and socialist germany was thus provoked. the constituent assembly and the treaty of versailles—the non-socialist parties reorganised hurriedly. the conservatives 212 founded the german national people’s party (deutschnationale volkspartei) and announced their readiness to co-onerate tn “any form of government in which justice and order held sway.”’ certain of the national liberals under stresemann formed the german people’s party. the german democratic party repre- sented the middle-class electors, but was largely an organisation of leaders, with iess backing from the electorate. the centre styled itself the christian democratic people’s party. the elec- tions for the constituent assembly on jan. 19 gave the majority socialists 163 votes, the independent socialists 22, the german nationalists 44, the german people’s party 14, the centre 91, the democrats, with the peasants’ league, 81. the communists abstained from voting. the national assembly opened its sitting in weimar on feb. 6. the independents refused to enter a coali- tion with non-socialist parties; a coalition was therefore formed of the majerity socialists, the centre and the democrats. schei- demann became chancellor; and ebert was elected president of the reich. a chicf task of the constituent assembly was the elaboration of the constitution, which was proclaimed on aug. 11 rorg. elections in the principal states took place shortly after those for the constituent assembly. in prussia the results were very similar to those for the reich, berlin and the industrial districts voting strongly socialist. in saxony the two socialist parties had a majority over all others combined. in bavaria, on the other hind, the clerical “ christian people’s party ” formed the strongest group. the spring of 1919 was accompanied by continued trouble from the left. the berlin spartacists made a fresh attempt to set up a soviet govt. in march. it decreed a general strike throughout germany, which reached considerable dimensions in berlin. it was quelled with bloodshed in berlin, halle, leip- zig, stuttgart, hamburg and other cities. in bavaria the minis- ter president, an independent socialist, kurt eisner, was mur- dered by a nationalist officer. a violent struggle ensued, and a soviet republic was proclaimed in munich and ruled there till may 1. much of this unrest was due to the uncontrollable effects of the aftermath of the war, the continuance of the blockade, universal underfeeding and unemployment; some to foreign agita- tion and some toirresponsibility. the weimar coalition had under- taken a far harder task than that of opposition; but it struggled manfully to preserve the unity of germany, to prevent bloodshed and, by disarming and respecting the armistice conditions, to allow the allies no excuse forapplying sanctions. exaggerated rumours were current as to the prevalence of democratic feeling and broth- erly love in great britain and elsewhere, and the government hoped that the peace terms, when they came, would strengthen their hand. the publication of the terms aroused deep conster- nation in germany. scheidemann resigned, saying “let the hand wither that signs this treaty.”” the democrats left the government. the majority socialists and catholic centre alone, and they with dissentient voices, agreed to take the responsibility of signing, under threat of the continuance of blockade, an allied march into germany and possibly the loss of the country’s unity. germany signed the treaty of versailles on june 28 1919 (see versailles, treaty of), the national assembly giving its assent to the signature on july 9 by 208 votes to 115. the policy of fulfilment —even while signing germany refused to admit the sole responsibility for the war, and made every ef- fort to prove by history that the charge was unjust, in the hope that this would lead to a revision of the treaty. the government hoped and long believed that such a revision would come. im- mediately after the ratification of the treaty, on jan. 10 1920, president ebert circulated a message that “‘ we shall honestly endeavour to fulfil our engagements towards the entente accord- ing to the peace treaty, but if there are clauses which prove to be absolutely unrealisable, we must hope that the entente will understand this and be able to meet us in our difficulties.” for the time, however, the government saw no course but to make the best of a bad job, and meanwhile strengthen republi- can and democratic elements at home. its position was danger- ous. the extreme left had relupsed into comparative quiescence germany after the failure of the spring disturbances, but the opposition of the right now began to rally. they saw that great brit- ain and america had favoured more moderate terms in the treaty of versailles, but that the die had really been cast against them by the presence of the great french army. they declared that germany had only been forced to accept the treaty by her own action in disarming; that the treaty was imposed by force majeure and involved no moral obligation; that any attempt to fulfil its terms was high treason; and that the duty of a patriotic german was sabotage of the treaty, to resist disarmament, indeed to re-arm and to repudiate the treaty at the earliest mo- ment when germany’s military power allowed it. anyone con- nected with the “policy of fulfilment ” was a traitor, and in the views of the extreme secret organisations which rapidly sprang into being, it was a patriotic duty to murder such a person. the advocacy of assassination, disguised as patriotism, became com- mon; and was responsible for the murder, first of erzberger, then of rathenau. owing to the number of jews among the democratic and especially socialist politicians, this nationalist agitation was also preached as the struggle of the pure-bred german against the “hidden hand ”’of jewry. finally, and in reality most essentially, it soon took the form of a conilict of social democracy against the anti-socialist forces of the rural districts and capitalism. unfortunately for the socialists, they hact been obliged to take almost the sole responsibility for signing the treaty; although re- fusal to sign had been out of the question. the association of socialism with national treachery was thus:as easy as it was un- just. the industrialists financed the nationalist movement heav- ily; the influence of the roman catholic church was generally anti-socialist and no doubt helped to detach from socialism the peasants and small tradesmen whose republican sympathies had led them into the enemy camp. in the autumn the national assembly returned to berlin. the democrats re-entered the cabinet. the right was already agi- lating for new general elections, on the ground that the constit- uent assembly had finished its task by passing the constitu- tion. the demand was unwelcome to the social democrats, who were losing ground in the constituencies; and they hastened to pass what legislation they could. the eight-hour day had al- ready been decreed.: a bill, providing for the formation of works councils, was now introduced. a socialisation law laid down in principle the transference of the whole mining industry to state ownership; but the committees of inquiry had not finished their investigations as to how this was to be done before the op- portunity passed. moreover, the fear that the allied and asso- ciated powers might take over the nationalised properties acted as a deterrent on the socialists. erzberger, as minister of fi- nance, introduced some drastic measures of taxation on war increases of income and an emergency contribution which con- templated the sequestration of a considerable percentage of pri- vate fortunes, (see industrial relations; works councils.) reactionary and communist outbreaks —on jan. 10 1920 the treaty of versailles came into force. very soon afterward ger- many had to face her first and most serious attempt ata monarchist reaction, what is known as the aupp putsch was short- lived, and in some aspects almost ridiculous; but it was inevi- table that it should be made, and the fact that it failed was mo- mentous. only now was the german republic firmly established and the unsettled elements left stranded by the end of the war were forced to see that the new order was not merely provisional. h[enceforward, gradually, and with an ill-will which is not incom- prehensible considering their circumstance and traditions, they adapted themselves and began to look on the new republican reich as an established fact. the movers in the aupp putsch were the old officers who, their occupation gone, comprised a dangerous and unabsorbed element, which at this moment was reinforced by the return of general von der goltz’s formations from the baltic states. the treaty had provided for the reduc- tion of germany’s army to 1roc,ocoo by march 31 1920. this re- duction had not been made. germany desired permission to keep a permanent force of 200,000; but the allies granted only a fur- germany ther grace of three months in which to complete the full reduc- tion. the officers were faced with starvation and ready for any adventure. kapp, a founder of the “‘ vaterlandspartei ” seized the pretext to agitate against ebert’s position as unconstitutional. on march 13 kapp, von liittwitz, erhardt and colonel bauer, formerly ludendorff’s chief of staff, seized the public buildings in berlin with the aid of the marine troops quartered at diberitz, and proclaimed a “ government of order, liberty and action ” consisting mainly of themselves. the real government tled to dresden and thence to stuttgart, the socialists of berlin pro- claimed a general strike. the movement collapsed in a few days. the leaders alone were punished, but most of them made their escape. : the strike had been completely successful; but it soon got out of hand. the threat of a reaction infuriated the workmen; rus- sian propaganda accused the majority socialists of complicity. instead of returning to work, the workmen formed soviets. the communist element had long been secretly organising a red army. it now came into action in many parts of germany. in leipzig the government had to use aeroplanes against the city. in berlin, wiirttemberg and bavaria the troops put down the rioters easily, but in the saxon vogiland a communist government maintained power for some weeks. in the ruhr a red army 50,000 strong conducted regular operations. this was a demili- tarised zone, into which german troops beyond a small perma- nent garrison might not enter; and when, after some hesitation, a force of the reichswehr actually entered the zone, french troops immediately marched in and occupied frankfurt, darmstadt and homburg, remaining until may 17, by which date the german troops had left. reorganisation of the reichswehr.—aas a sequel to this incident noske retired. his place was taken by the bavarian democrat gessler, who together with general von seeckt reorganised the reichswehr. many reactionary elements were eliminated from the reichswehr (and simultaneously from the civil service), and it was henceforward a sufficiently trustworthy arm of the civil government, although strongly conserva- tive in feeling. von seeckt engaged in a prolonged if unacknowl- edged duel with the inter-allied commissions of control, which remained in the country for some years. technically, few vio- lations of the treaty were proved. great masses of war material were actually surrendered and destroyed; only in july 1920 was germany admittedly and demonstrably in arrears in this respect. on the other hand, it is scarcely denied that much remained concealed; that a very high proportion of the men of military age and youths of germany received what was military training in all but name from their respective political party or- ganisations; that germany wasat notime without the nucleusof a highly-trained army, and could at any time have put into the held a formidable force; while her rifles and artillery were short, her chemists and scientists were working hard to discover new offensive and defensive methods which the treaty of versailles had not anticipated. the first reichstag.—after the collapse of the communist rising, the national assembly considered its work as finished. the elections for the first reichstag (june 6 1920) followed hard on those stormy events. the modcrates of cach wing feared the violence of the other, and voted in self defence for their own extremists. the independent socialists increased their votes to 81, the german people’s party to 62, the german nationals to 66. the democrats were reduced to 45, the majority socialists to 112, the centre to 70. to avert the danger from the left, the pcople’s party agreed to enter a coalition with the centre and the democrats. the majority socialists supported the government without entering it. herr fehrenbach became premier, dr. wirth minister of finance and dr. simons foreign minister. the government followed the policy of its predecessor. almost its first action was to meet the allies at spa (july 5), a somewhat stormy mecting, chiefly concerned—outside the question of german coal-deliveries and the inter-allied arrangements regarding the distribution of reparations—with germany’s failure to “treaty were settled during this period. 213 disarm. during the remainder of the year, however, ger- many enjoyed comparative quict, and really began to disarm. a number of minor questions arising out of the peace the plebiscites in schleswig (¢.v.) had been held on feb. 10 and march 14; those in fupen and malmedy (see eupen) on july 24; those in east and west prussia on july 11. the only important territorial arrange- ment outstanding was that of upper silesia. the question of the trial and punishment. of the “ war crimi- nals ”’ aroused much ill-feeling. holland’s refusal in jan., feb. and march 1920 to extradite the ex-emperor william probably robbed international law of many interesting decisions. the al- lies had demanded the arrest and delivery of many hundreds of war criminals; but in face of german protests, the allies agreed (feb. 16 1920) to allow tria! before german courts. twelve persons were finally tried at leipzig (may 23—july 16 1921), six being convicted. the year r921t saw renewed trouble. a militia known as the ein- wohnerwehr had been organised in bavaria, and von kahr, the bavarian premicr, declared himself unable to dissolve it in view of the bolshevik danger. already all the elements of reaction were concentrating in bavaria. von escherich, the prime mover in the einwohnerwehr, had also formed a second organisation, the “ orgesch ” (organisation escherich) obscurely connected with the einwohnerwehr but receiving no official recognition. the orgesch was spreading throughout germany and assuming the proportions of a secret army, while the government professed it- self unable to control it in view of its own weakness. the allied ultimatum of may 5 1921 at last decided von kahr, the bavarian premier, nominally to disband the einwohnerwehr under threat of an occupation of the ruhr. the bolshevik danger was real enough. the majority social- ists had adhered to the second international at geneva in aug. 1920; the independents had joined the third international (a minority dissenting) and coalesced with the communists as the “united communist party of germany ” (v.k.p.d.). a small and even more radical group formed a section of the fourth international as the ‘communist labour part of germany ” (k.a.p.d.). in march 1921 moscow considered germany “ripe for revolution ” and a widespread rising broke out in cen- tral germany. the v.k.p.d. maintained a communist regime in halle, mansfeld and eisleben for several weeks. the insurrec- tion, which spread as far as hamburg, was put down with great difficulty. lhe reparations problem.—mcanwhile the question of repara- tions was assuming the overwhelming importance which it was to retain for four years. germany’s financial situation was curi- ous. apart from the effects of war and blockade, she had been permanently weakened by the losses of large portions of terri- tory. nevertheless, her currency was low and her exports cheap, her territory unravaged, her population industrious. the mid- dle-classes and officials were suffering severely, and districts such as saxony, where industry depended on imported raw material and coal, were badly hit, so that in germany there were now some 2,000,000 unemployed and at least 4,000,000 working half- time. in other places, however, where raw material was available, industry was flourishing. notably the great industrial centres of westphalia were reorganising and expanding most rapidly. here germany’s chief wealth was concentrating and accumu- lating, especially in the hands of a few enormous combines, the most sensational of which was that which was founded and directed by hugo stinnes. so long as complete uncertainty reigned as to what sum ger- many would have to pay in reparations, the industrialists, who were strongly opposed to any “ policy of fulfilment ”’ made no at- tempt to relieve the financial distress of their country as a whole; they concentrated on maintaining their own prosperity and that of the districts under their own control, transferring capital abroad, speculating d@ /a baisse on the mark, and paying their taxes in arrears and incompletely. it must be admitted that by their policy the industrialists did not only amass fortunes for themselves, but also saved the workmen in their concerns from 214 otherwise inevitable unemployment, which would have had incalculable economic and political consequences. the reichs- bank, by granting the industrialists almost unlimited credit, encouraged this policy. enormous wealth had thus accumulated in germany in a few private hands, while the government was almost bankrupt. when the allies, by jan. 1921, had at last decided on the bi!l to be presented to germany and its allotment among themselves, the difference between the wealth obviously present in germany and that at the disposal of the government was glaring. the es~ sential problem was that of tapping the wealth of westphalia. when the german govt. declared the conditions of the allied note of jan. 29 1921 (sce reparations) impossible of fulfil- ment, and dr. simons, on a visit to london, was unable to come to any financial terms with the allies, besides arousing their hostility by again repudiating germany’s war guilt, the allies occupied duisburg, ruhrort and diisseldorf on march 8 as “sanctions ” and drew a customs cordon between occupied and unoccupicd territory. it was this move which made possible the later occupation of the ruhr district and opinion in germany did not doubt that it was deliberately taken with a view to such later occupation. the fehrenbach cabinet resigned. the allies threatened to occupy the ruhr and apply other sanctions. the “ policy of ful- filment” became again a burning question; but in order “to save the german reich and its unity, to save german territory from invasion and to retain german frecdom ” a new coalition gov- ernment under wirth, composed of the centre, the majority socialists and the democrats was formed on may 10 and accepted the allied ultimatum. germany, by exertions which jeopardised the stability of the mark, paid the first milliard of gold marks on aug. 31. an carly result of the nationalist agitation against the “ poli- cy of fulfilment,” which broke out with renewed violence, was the assassination of erzberger (whose financial policy was particu- larly unpopular with the moneyed classes) on aug. 25. the independent socialist gartis was murdered in munich, and the publicist maximilian harden wounded in berlin, and an attempt made to poison stresemann. a monarchist demonstration took place in berlin; but although monarchist feeling was reviving, it lacked unity owing to the personal unpopularity of the members of the hohenzollern family. the plediscite in upper silesia-—the murder of erzberger was followed by a further fall of the mark, which grew more pro- nounced in the autumn. the plebiscite in upper silesia had been taken on march 20, and had given 717,122 votes for germany, 483,514 to poland. the polish high commissioner, korfanty, had thereupon raised an armed revolt, and the french troops sta- tioned in the district were less successful in dealing with him than with the german defence force raised by gencral hofer. as the supreme council was unable to agree on the fate of upper silesia, it turned the question over to the league of nations, which awarded practically all the important industrial districts to poland on grounds which were recondite in the eyes of many. this decision, which was taken in oct., caused a crisis, more especially as it came at a moment when the “ reichswirtschalts- rat” had just evolved a plan under which the rich landowners and industrialists at last consented to make heavy sacrifices in order to stabilise the financial situation. these oflers were now withdrawn. the second and third wirth governments —wirth resigned, but formed a second cabinet against the opposition of the extreme right and left. all other questions were now dominated by that of reparations, which in its turn brought fresh conflicts be- tween left and right. the burden of reparations was being borne almost solely by the wage-earning and salaried classes, from whose pay the taxes were deducted on payment. as the fall of the mark accelerated, the proviso under which industry and ag- riculture were allowed to pay their taxes in arrcars reduced their burdens to a trifle, while they were able to pay off debts and mortgages at a fraction of their real value. the reactionary agi- tation increased daily; but owing to emergency legislation germany passed in aug. 1021 the year passed off without disturbance. in 1922, however, the state deficit increased enormously. the government was obliged to beg for moratoria and to allow the reparations commission the right of scrutiny over german financial measures. on june 24 rathenau, germany’s greatest statesman, was murdered by nationalists. he was the one man in germany who had shown himself capable of a positive policy. in june ro2r he had come to a direct agreement with m. lou- cheur regarding the reconstruction of the devastated regions of northern france. on april 16 1922, as one of the german repre- sentatives at the conference of genoa, he had signed the treaty of rapallo with russia. the treaty had slightly eased germany’s financial situation and had opened up a new field of activity to her industry, but by proving her unwillingness to remain a cy- pher in foreign policy it deeply irritated the allies. in aug. poincare came to the conclusion that germany could only yield reparations if ‘‘ productive pledges ” were seized; that is, if the allies actually took the ruhr districts and managed them for their own profit. france’s allies were unwilling to consent to this, but the threat overshadowed the situation. the financial distress and continued fall of the mark made stabili- sation the most urgent necessity. but the allies rejected ger- many’s suggestion to make this possible by reducing reparations; the reichsbank was unwilling to risk its last gold reserves; the socialists refused to increase production by allowing hours of labour to be lengthened, maintaining that the profit would go into the pockets of the capitalists. thus germany remained politi- cally disunited. on sept. 24 1922 the majority socialists, who had revised their programme at gorlitz on sept. 18 1921, re-united with the independents.! as a counterpoise, the moderate bourgeois par- tics formed a “‘ working agreement ” with the people’s party. the social democrats having refused to enter a government with the people’s party, dr. wirth resigned and on nov. 23 1922 formed a minority “ business government ”’ of middle-class rep- resentatives and permanent officials. it carried on the financial policy of its predecessor, stabilisation through reduction of repa- rations. . the occupation of the ruhr.—on dec. 26 1922 and jan. 9 1923 the reparations commission, the british member dissenting, de- clared an “intentional default ?? on the part of germany. on jan. rx french and belgian troops occupied the territory of the ruhr. the history of this struggle is told elsewhere (see ruwr). the population of the ruhr adopted an attitude of “ passive re- sistance ” which was supported by the government. for cight months the government maintained as a charge on its finances the population which ordinarily yielded its chief source of reve- nue. it could only meet this expenditure by unlimited inflation, which was aggravated by singularly incompetent administra- tion of the reichsbank. by june the mark was quoted at 150,000 to the dollar; on july 30 at 1,000,000; nov. 20 at 4-2 billions. austria’s financial collapse paled before conditions in germany; starvation for the working and middle-classes, mushroom for- punes won by speculation, the rise of prices marked by a multi- plication so that people entered a shop with a considerable sum in taper and found it too little to buy a crust of bread by the time they reached the counter. in view of the growing unrest, the social democrats agreed to enter a government on a broad basis, with stresemann, known to be a strong man, as chancellor and foreign minister. the “ grand coalition ” was at last formed in aug. 1923. hilferding, a social democrat, became minister of finance. an attempt to stabilise the currency under existing condittons broke down. on sept. 26 the government proclaimed the abandonment of passive resistance in the ruhr, and relieved itself of the financial expend- iture involved. on the following day, it announced its inten- tion to use all means to put down any attempt to create disturb- ances, and proclaimed martial law throughout the reich. 1 the united socialists joined the second international at the congress of hamburg may 21-7 1923, when the “23 (vienna) international” of the german independents, the austrian social democrats and the british [.l.p. ceased to exist (see socialism). germany political unrest —the appalling financial catastrophe had pro- duced a most dangerous political situation. in the rhineland and the bavarian palatinate (see rhineland), the french were working to create a separatist movement. in bavaria proper the agitation was less artificial. there were two great movements in bavaria. von kahr, who had been premier in 1920 and tga2r, based his power on the bavarian people’s party. he wished to transfer the “ centre of gravity ’’ of germany to the catholic south, and while he denied any aim further than revising the weimar constitution in the favour of federalism, he was an avowed monarchist—the bavarian dynasty occupied a position in bavaria little inferior to that which it had enjoyed up to 1918 — his party had been compromised by revelations of their relations with the french, and he had involved himself in various schemes to create a catholic danube monarchy of the south to include parts of austria. a second party was led by hitler, an immi- grant workman from austria, and gen. ludendorff, supported by numerous refugees from the kapp putsch. its adherents styled themselves ‘‘ national socialists ’ but were in fact not socialists at all. the programme was to “regenerate the reich through bavaria.’’ these two groups were constantly intriguing with cach other and with various reactionary and catholic parties outside bavaria and outside germany. a dangerous situation had been created in the summer of 1922, when bavaria refused to recog- nise the legislation and tribunals of the reich. it was smoothed over, and von knilling had since acted as premier, with an un- clear policy. throughout 1923 the agitation of hitler’s “ vel- kische” party grew sorapidly that acoup wasalmost daily expected, which would have been accompanied by military reaction in north germany. the government considered the monarchists the lesser danger; on sept. 26 civil law was suspended in bavaria, and von kahr appointed general commissary with dictatorial powers. he instantaneously consolidated his position by lower- ing the price of beer. the state of saxony and thuringia were no less disturbed. a new bolshevik centre had been established in dresden and the premier, an extraordinary figure named zeigner, was ruling at the head of a coalition of communists and left wing socialists. a red army had been formed, and was only waiting for a reac- tionary outbreak in bavaria, which would give it the sympathy of the workmen in berlin, to establish a soviet govt. and red terror. in addition, quite apart from the separatist move- ment, there were grave communist disturbances among the un- employed in the ruhr. the plans of the third international, which was directing this movement, regarded saxony only as a “jumping off place ” and envisaged a general rising with the centre in west germany. the government had, however, searched the offices of the russian trade delegation in berlin on may 3; and although relations between germany and russia were in consequence very strained throughout the summer, the german govt. had obtained valuable information on the plans of the communists. the proclamation of martial law by the government was an- swered by defiant demonstrations by all the malcontents and an actual outbreak by the separatists in diisseldorf on sept. 3o. the saxon finance minister, bettcher, called on the proletariat to arm. fortunately, each side wailed for the other to move while the government of the reich passed through a fresh crisis. the german people’s party were alarmed at the presence in the cabinct of hilferding, who was known to be a champion of nationalisation. they desired legislation for increasing produc- tion without regard to the eight-hour day, and that the govern- ment should receive dictatorial powers to issue orders of this nature with the force of law without consulting the reichstag. the socialists were determined to oppose any tampering with the eight-hour day. the parties finally agreed on the principle of a “new regulation of laws regarding hours of work, with retention in principle of the eight-hour day.” the stresemann cabinet was reconstructed in early october. tphlferding left it, and dr. luther became finance minister. the cabinet received the de- sired emergency powers on oct. 13. it was now able to deal suc- cessfully with the communists. the military commander in 215 saxony called on zeigner to repudiate bettcher’s speech. zeigner refused; troops of the reichswehr then entered saxony on oct. 22, forced zeigner to resign and restored order. other troops oc- cupied thuringia and disbanded the red army, and a rising in hamburg was put down. in bavaria the military commander, von lossow, sided with the bavarian govt., refused von seeckt’s order to resign, and allowed the bavarian authorities to appoint him provincial commander. ‘the bavarian govt., in defiance of the law, ex- acted a special oath of allegiance from the bavarian troops. many officers of the reichswehr openly sympathised with lu- dendorff against the government of the reich, and hitler and ludendorff were encouraged to believe their hour had come. on nov. 8 they seized von kahr and von lossow and proclaimed a government, consisting of themselves. von kahr at first ap- peared to fallin with their plans and announced himself as “ vice- roy of the king of bavaria.’? but as soon as he saw that the reichswehr would act against the insurgents, he called in troops, which fired on the revolutionaries. ludendorff fell on the pave- ment and shammed dead till all was over. his much-enduring reputation could not stand this strain. his fellow conspirators were arrested, and the pricked bubble of the “ vilkische ” collapsed. in the following spring the chief participants were tried. ludendorff was acquitted. hitler and other leaders imprisoned. the trial aroused great excitement on both sides. the separatist movement in the occupied territory reached its climax about the same time. the “ rhincland repub- lic”? was proclaimed at aachen on oct. 31; at coblenz on oct. 25; and in other rhineland towns at the same time. the move- ment then gradually decayed, and had disappeared by feb. 11 1924, except in the bavarian palatinate. the official birthday of this government was nov. 11, and french support of it was more than usually tenacious. it finally vanished at the end of i'cb. 1924. financial reconstruction —this proved to be the climax of germany’s troubles; but her internal political situation was still uncertain. the socialists withdrew their support from the gov- ernment on account of the different treatment of the insurgents in saxony and in bavaria. stresemann failed to secure a fresh vote of confidence and a new emergency powers act, and resigned on nov. 23. on dec. 1, marx formed a minority ‘* middle-class ” government with stresemann as foreign minister and luther as minister of finance. the government received a new emer- gency powers act to carry through the work of stabilisation and reconstruction during a limited period. by the appointed date (feb. 15 192.4) the budget was balanced by means of these cmer- gency decrees. the first reduced the number of officials, read- justed taxation and ordained pre-payment of taxes. the second stabilised the mark, introducing a strictly limited issue of ‘ rentenmarks,” each equivalent to one billion paper marks, and limiting credits. the third carried through the principle of valorisation of public and private debts which had been tnaugu- rated before the inflation period set in. at the same time the ruhr industries reached an agreement with the m.i.c.u.m. (mission interalliee de contrele des usines ct des mines) regard- ing deliveries in kind on reparation account which formed the transition to a new settlement of reparation obligations. the dawes plan.—on jan. 14 1924 the committee of ex- perts for the examination of germany’s capacity to pay met in paris under gen. dawes. its relations with germany were not unhappy, and it frequently consulted schacht, the new presi- dent of the reichsbank. a british labour ministry entered office on jan. 22, and poincare gave way to herriot in i'rance in may. germany’s internal and foreign position now improved very rap- idly. on feb. 5 the british prime minister expressed the hope that germany would join the league of nations. soon after, a german ambassador was appointed to france, for the first time since the war. von kahr and von lossow retired on feb. 18, and the powers of the bavarian general commissariat came to an end. the state of siege in saxony and thuringia lapsed on march 1. the dawes plan (see reparations) was accepted in principle by the governments of the reich and of the territorics on april 216 14, and by the association of industrialists on april 24; but the new elections for the reichstag had been fixed for may 4, and were fought almost solely on the dawes plan as an issue. in view of the great distress following the sudden deflation, restriction of credit and rise of prices, the extreme parties of both wings gained votes at the elections. all the government parties lost heavily, while the communists secured 62 votes, the ‘“ vel- kische ’’ 32 and the german nationals 96. nevertheless a vote of non-confidence in the old ministry, which had remained in office, was defeated on june 6 by 239 votes to 194 and marx and strese- mann left for london on aug. 4 as the representatives of ger- many. the decisions of the conference of london were initialled on aug. 16. they provided for the restoration of germany’s fis- cal and economic unity; the military evacuation of the ruhr by aug. 16 1925 (by separate agreement between marx and herriot); the issue of a banker’s loan to germany of £40,000,000; and the continuance of reparations deliveriesin hand. the dawes scheme was to come into full operation by oct. 5. the government was just able to carry the acceptance of the dawes plan. the german nationalists consented to allow its members to vote independently. the essential laws (the dena- tionalisation of the state railways, the bank law, the private bank- note law, the jaw liquidating the rentenbank and the coinage law) were passed and the agreement on the dawes plan was rati- fied on aug. 29. the laws in question came into force on oct. 12. the complaisancy of the nationalists had been bought at a considerable price. they regarded their concessions purely as business arrangements, as facilitating the influx of foreign capi- tal and reducing the danger of fresh communist disturbances. but they were growing ever less ready to accept germany’s posi- tion as an outcast; and demanded from stresemann a statement repudiating germany’s war guilt, as well as a place in the minis- try. a statement in accordance with the first demand was made in the reichstag, whilein the autumn stresemann began to sound the ground regarding gcrmany’s entry into the league of nations. on sept. 23 the cabinet arrived at a decision in prin- ciple to seek the speedy entry of germany into the league. as, however, the british and french govts. could not give a definite answer to the memorandum which she addressed to them on sept. 29 asking “‘ whether the guarantees requisite for an applica- tion for membership and the status of germany within the league, and also other definite and inseparable questions, were forthcoming,”’ the matter was left temporarily in suspense. the second nationalist condition led to the dissolution of the reichstag on oct. 20, as it proved impossible to induce the social democrats and nationalists to sit together. the general elections were held on dec. 7. but by this time the general situation had grown much easier. the regie railways and mines in the west, and the customs, were again in german hands. the customs barrier between occupied and unoccupied territory had vanished. the m.i.c.u.m. agreement had become void. there were general symptoms of a revival in trade. the extremists lost votes again; the communists were reduced to 45, the ‘‘ velkische” to 14, while the socialists rose to 131. the numerous parties of the right centre formed the strongest parliamentary group. a luther cabinet, inclucling four german nationalists, held a pre-: carious tenure in which it endeavoured to compromise between the demands of various interests. protective tariffs for agricul- ture were introduced, the sales tax lowered, restrictions on deals in foreign currency for commercial purposes abolished, official salaries raised, the goods tariff and certain postal dues reduced, the tax-free limit of income raised to 60 marks a month, and old claims valorised in july 1925 by alaw of the reich. the middle- class government of the reich, was, however, confronted by the incessant hostility of the prussian govt., where the parties of the weimar coalition were in power. although her parlia- ment was a mass of small, jealous parties, germany at large was divided into two broad groups of the right and left which at- tacked each other bitterly. each raked up a series of scandals against the other; this unsavoury proccss culminated when a judge, in his summing up on a small case, stated that the presi- dent of the reich had been guilty of high treason to the reich by germany his part in directing the munitions strike in 1918. the national- ist press broke out into violent invective against ebert; the whole legend of the ‘‘ stab in the back ” was revived. the cam- paign was the more cruel that it was directed against a sick man. he died after an operation on feb. 28 1925. few men have served their country so well. von hindenburg’s presideacy—seven parties chose to put forward candidates for ebert’s vacant post, and these included such names as ludendortf and the communist thilmann. the first poll gave no candidite a sufficient majority. the right then united to bring hindenburg forward; the left proposed marx; the communists stood apart. on april 26 hindenburg was elected by 14,639,000 votes against 13,740,000 cast for marx and 4,900,000 for thalmann. many socialist votes had been withheld from marx on account of his catholic tenets. hindenburg’s election aroused great apprehension outside germany, but in point of fact the old field marshal preserved his dignity and his common sense as perfectly as he had throughout the war and the revolution. foreign relations —with the balance thus held evenly be- tween left and right, the extremists discredited and the unity of the reich established, the interest in german politics was now almost confined to foreign affairs. if little has been said hitherto on this topic, it is because the course of events in 1918 had assigned germany an almost purely passive rele. of all her old friends or sympathisers, the only one which did not disown her in her defeat (if we except the small minority of die-hard generals in other defeated countries who dreamed of reversing the results of the war with fantastically inadequate means) was the little republic of austria. the peace treaties forbade the union of germany and austria. the decision was a bitter one for austria, but hardly awoke equal sorrow in germany. not only was austria economically a heavily passive factor, but the inclusion of her would have made it impossible to centralise the reich as was done by the weimar constitution, and that constitution would certainly have to be revised should austria join germany at some later date. for the rest, allied and associated powers of older or more recent standing surrounded germany as soon as the armistice was signed. with the treaty of versailles, which assigned the whole guilt of the war to germany, was incorporated the covenant of the league of nations, which built up a great structure for the maintenance of the peace of europe, which germany was not invited to join. at first, indeed, she showed no anxiety to join. hostility to the league was almost universal owing to its asso- ciation with the treaty of versailles which even the advocates of the “ policy of fulfilment ”’ denounced as unjust in many respects. the feeling was aggravated by doubts as to the impar- tiality of the league’s administration of the saar basin and reached its climax when the decision of the council of the league sanctioned arrangements in upper silesia which german opinion resented violently. nor was it confined to the nationalists. soviet russia repudiated the league as a capitalist institution. the german communists followed the lead of moscow, and the socialists saw far more hope in a revival of the international. after the first passions had cooled, germany began to dis- tinguish between the various territorial provisions of the treaty of versailles. the cessions to denmark and czechoslovakia aroused little resentment; those to belgium were small. the justice of the loss of parts of alsace-lorraine was not greatly disputed. the three most important questions remained those of the rhineland, of the frontier with poland and of the german colonies. the problem of germany’s western frontier differed from others, both by its urgent economic importance and by the fact that germany could claim that here she was only defending her rights within the treaty. she contended that the occupation of the ruhr was illegal, but so long as the threat of it, or its actu- ality, was not removed, it was impossible for her to initiate an active policy; it was equally unthinkable for either perty that germany and france could meet as colleagues within the coun- cil of the league of nations. germany thus up to 1924 germany’s foreign policy was almost entirely defensive. a number of minor treaties and agreements, mainly of commercial character, were concluded; the most important being the treaty of arbitration with switzerland (dec. 3 1921). but the only treaty of outstanding importance was that con- cluded with russia on april 16 1922. the text of this treaty of rapallo (q.e.) was not in itself such as to justify the protests with which it was greeted. these were rather duc to the fear that the treaty contained secret clauses of a political nature, and especially clauses aimed against the integrity of poland. the existence of such clauses was dented and, 1n fact, no polit- ical developments could be traced as arising out of the treaty during 1923 or 1924. it was a tactical error in so far as it increased france’s and poland’s nervous instinct; it certainly looked as though germany was drawing her conclusions from the treaty of versailles with too much logic in associating herself with the second great power which remained by mutual consent outside the european concert. germany, however, claimed that she had no quarrel with russia. with the advent to power of m. ilerriot in france in 1924 the situation changed. moderate opinion in germany was will- ing to accept the permanent loss of alsace-lorraine in return for security on the demilitarised western frontiers. if ger- many could become a member of the council of the league, there was some hope that readjustments on her eastern frontier might prove possible at some future date, and this position would also give her a chance of acquiring some day a colonial mandate. the general improvement of relations between france and germany made their collaboration within the league possible, while germany was rapidly frecing hersclf from the restrictions imposed on her national sovereignty. a sudden shock was given to the improving relations by the report of the commission of control on june 29, that germany had not yet fulfilled the disarmament conditions, and that the cologne zone could consequently not be evacuated in jan. 1925. during the year, however, the commission finished its work and the cologne zone was evacuated on jan. 31 1926. in july 1925 the troops had been withdrawn from the ruhr, and in aug. from the districts occupied in 1921. the question of giving germany her proper place in europe now became urgent. the pact of locarno —on march 4 1925 was published stresemann’s offer of a guarantee pact in respect of germany's frontiers with france and belgium and an undertaking to refrain from military means of revision of her polish frontier. this policy occupied the attention of europe throughout 1925, and was finally embodied in the pact of locarno, after discus- sions between the european diplomats which lasted from oct. 5-16. at locarno germany concluded a number of treaties which practically guaranteed peace between her and her neigh- bours (see locarno; securriry). the pact was to come into effect on germany’s admission as a member of the council of the league of nations. stresemann’s policy was not easily accepted in germany. the widespread distrust of the league could not vanish in a day. the nationalists objected violently tothe permanent renunciation of alsace and lorraine involved in the pact. but they had not gained in strength so much as they had hoped during 1925; in particular, ilindenburg’s sensible attitude had deeply disappointed them. the pact was ratified on nov. 27 1925 and duly signed in london on dec. 1. luther’s cabinet then resigned, but after a prolonged crisis luther formed a fresh minority cabinet of the centre on jan. 19 1926. the social- ists promised him their support on condition that he pursued a republican policy and carried out the terms of locarno. the nationalists opened a violent campaign against him,while fecling between right and left was further embittered by revelations regarding the naval mutiny of 1918. it was the more disastrous that, when germany’s application for admission came before the league of nations in march 1926, brazil vetoed her admission unless she herself were also given a seat on the council. speaking in the reichstag, on march 2g, | 217 stresemann declared that germany had received ‘ moral reha- bilitation ” in geneva, and that the policy of locarno must not be allowed to lapse. most of the german parties agreed to sup- port him. the nationalist spokesman found it easy to revile the league and germany's attempts at reconciliation. lhe russo-german treaty, april 24 1926.—considerable excitement was aroused shortly after, when it was announced that germany and russia were again in negotiation for a treaty. this new treaty was signed in berlin on april 24 1926 and pub- lished, together with an exchange of notes between the signa- tories (stresemann and krestinsky) on april 26. the basis of relations between germany and russia was stated to be the treaty of rapallo. ‘the two governments promised to remain in friendly touch with one another. article 2 ran “ should one of the contracting parties in despite of its peaceful attitude be attacked by a third party or by several third parties the other contracting party will observe neutrality during the entire duration of the conflict.” by article 3 each party promised not to participate in any “ economic or financial boycott ” imposed on the other in times of war or peace. the treaty was to be valid for five years. the third paragraph of the note for which stresemann was responsible declared explicitly that “ this fundamental attitude of german policy towards the u.s.s.r. cannot be adversely influenced by the loyal observation of the obligations (arising out of articles 16 and 17 of the covenant of the league and relating to the application of sanctions) which would come into existence for germany as the consequence of her entry into the league of nations,” as such sanetions could only come into force if russia were the aggressor, in germany’s own view, the views of other powers not being binding on her. whether germany would take part in the application of sanctions at all, and to what extent, depended on the interpretation of the note of dec. i 1925 on the interpretation of article 16 addressed to the german govt. on the signature of the treaty complex of locarno (the gist of this note being that no state could be held to under- takings manifestly beyond its powers). germany maintained that this treaty was a necessary and proper adaptation of the situation under the treaty of rapallo to that created by the pact of locarno. opinion in france and czechoslovakia was inclined to question this view.! bip_ltograruy.—k. eisner, die mene zeit (munich, 1919); e. j. gumbel, ziwet jahre mord, 1918-20 (1921); also verschworer (1924); w. rathenau, der neue staat (1919); also cannes und genua (1922); h. schumann, karl liebknecht (dresden, 1919); g. noske, von kiel bis kapp (1920); h. potthoff, rafesystem und berufsparlament (munich, 1920); e. bernstein, die deutsche revolution (1921); r. mann, afit ehrhard durch deutschland (1921); p. scheidemann, der zusammenbruch (1921); ah. strocbel, die deutsche revolution (1922); t. mann, won der deutschen republik (1923); m.p. price, germany in transition (1923); slmiiiche urkunden sur vorgeschichte des waffen- stillstandes 1918, 2nd enlarged ec. (1924); j. hohlfeld, geschichte des deutschen reiches 1871-1924 (leipzig, 1924); r. miiller, vom aazser- reich sur republik (1924); g. p. gooch, germany (1925); m. muller- jabusch, politischer amanack 1925 (1925); die ursachen des deut- schen zusammenbruchs 1m jahre 1918, 3 vol. (1925); see also das werk des untersuchungsausschusses der deutschen verfassunggebenden nationalversammiung und des deutschen reichstags (1919-26). c. a. ml.) 10n may 5 the luther cabinet decided that a flag bearing the imperial colours, black, white and red, should be flown over the legations and missions of germany, alongsile with the black, red and gold of the republic. the democrats, clissatisfied with the attitude of luther on this question, carried a motion against him on may 12 by 176 votes to 46. herr [luther thereupon resigned, and herr marx succeeded him as chancellor. a serious difference of opinion arose over the proposal to con- fiscate the property of the former ruling houses, including the hohen- zollerns. “pheir large properties should, it was suggested, be devoted to benefiting the unemployed, war widows and other necessitous classes, while their castles and palaces should be used for welfare and educational purposes. the measure, which was opposed by president hindenburg, was submitted to a referendum which took place on june 20. the total vote polled was 15.026,312, of which 14,441,590 were cast for confiscation, ancl 584,722 against. as, however, the constitution provides that more than one-half of the total votes—at that time 39,690,559——are necessary for success, the proposal faile:l. ced, de 2) 218 general survey the chronicler must not aspire to be a prophet. he may, however, reach a point from which he can survey the crowd of personalities and events grouped about him. how fares the germany of 1925 in comparison with the germany of 1910? no such comparison can apply to economic life, since the inroads of the war have been too formidable and the conse- quences of the false economic policy which accompanied it could only gradually be surmounted. but it may be asserted that germany has made a relatively rapid recovery from the unsound experiment of forming “ vertical” trusts (liquidation of the stinnes concern in aug. 1925), and is striving by an energetic concentration of the operations of cognate industries to simplify the official organisation, to effect economics and to strengthen every enterprise included in the combine in its own capacity for output... it is also a good sign that the influence of the most inventive and generally beneficent industry, the chemical in- dustry, particularly the dyes branch (medicines, tropical thera- peutics), has increased in industry as a whole. education and justice-—as regards popular education, the arts and science, comparison is easicr. for in these realms, where the warand revolution—which even in germany party-life have strictly speaking only resulied in a change of nomencla- ture, produced a stagnation, a species of stupor, lasting indeed for years—development has been resumed at the point at which it broke off in 1914. onc evil omen for the state is that popular confidence in the law has been shattered (in some cases through no fault of the judges) because during the period of inflation procedure in civil cases became farcical. there are others. the control of industry, which took the place of competition, bene- fited no one but the profitecrs. in political trials the impar— tiality ofthe judges was often doubtful; in other trials, owing to the introduction of special courts, erroneous verdicts were laid to the charge of the jaw itself; young people only 14 or 15 vears old, with unformed opinions, become members of contending political associations which do not subsist by their own strength but upon the funds of the adult party organisations. finally, despite the diminished consumption of alcohol, popular amuse- ments have become less harmless and ‘‘ sociable.” this is due in the great towns to the “ revues,” and in the medium-sized and smaller towns to the cinematograph, which before the most diverse audiences produces the same pieces and _ films, thereby destroying a healthy individual attitude towards art and recreation. the relations between the german citizen and the state remain the same. he continues to regard himself as something clistinct from the collective body. just as during childhood he secs an enemy in the school and the teacher, so as a grown man he re- gards the state and the government as an adversary rather than as something in which he himself bears a part and for which he is responsible. if ‘‘ fiscal ’? morality is no worse, it is equally no better. the great problem of the schools has, moreover, not yet been solved, although attempts have been made in the con- stitution itself and in a law of the reich. it is sought to establish standard schools (einheitsschule) providing an uniform educa- tion for the children of all classes up to the age of ro, and to give more instruction in german at the expense of the ancient tongues. but the problem of clerical influence in the school is still unsolved, and the process of converting purely scientific teaching into moral training for the young has been barely begun. the “‘ movement of youth,” which in the years before the war was making very great strides and led its members to the adoption of a simpler, more natural mode of life, to a greater readiness to help others, and, in many cascs too, to a greater love of home, has split up 1 f.9,, the amalgamations effected since feb. 1925: association of locomotive builders, of steclworks, of spirituous industrics, the syndicate of ruhr coal and mid-german brown-coal industries, of dealers in tubing, of wire-rolling mills, of dye industries, of aerial and shipping communications. in the autumn of 1925 an agreement was reached between the amalgamated german and the kelgian wire industries regulating the conditions of export on lines similar to the earlier franco-german agreement respecting potash (see cartels). germany into numerous sects. it has been ruined or impeded by the need for earning a livelihood at an early age by work in the towns. in many respects, however, improvement is manifest. after the complete ruin of all means of communication in the last year of the war, order and punctuality have been restored within the services with astonishing rapidity. the credit for this be- longs to a great extent to the minister for transport, groener. the system of communications, so important an index for the modern state, is once more as efficient as before the war, and zealous efforts are being made to improve it. the police feel that they are there not so much to command as to render help 1o the public. many old officers serve the state honourably as members of the force. the great mass of the oflicial class has remained intact, and performs as much or more work for a salary which commands a purchasing power only equal to about half that of pre-war salaries. the aris —parallel with the progress made in the chemical industry, in products demanding accuracy of workmanship and in the construction of machinery, taste and the sense of form have undergone a universal improvement. vhotography and its application to open-air subjects produce excellent films. applied art, in which, however, german austria holds the first place, besides producing masterpieces in the luxury trades and in the form of efficient advertisements, has once more called a genuine popular art into existence. moreover, although in itself unimportant it is of excellent omen that germany to-day pos- sesses not only toys but also children’s picture-books ce. krei- dolf, else wenz, wanda ebel, elsa eisgruber) such as no other country has. since the death of max reger, germany has no longer any composer to carry on the tale of her greatest creative minds. ‘the musical tradition is, however, kept alive by distin- guished conductors and performers. germany has found a new and more serious rendering of music than she possessed at the beginning of the century. in literature the books that are read are of more significance than those that are written. side by side with dostoievsky and the scandina- vians, the early german romantics, helderlin and novalis, are most read, but also jean paul, the object of enthusiastic admira- tion by the young. the writings alike of goethe and ifeine, treating of political and social topics, continue to exercise a powerful influence. the great national poct of german switzer- land, jeremias gotthelf, whom ruskin admired, has been re- vived; and while young dramatists—unruh, toller, brecht, bronnen—in part powerfully influenced by wedekind, espouse an exuberant ‘ activism,” thomas mann, taking up theodore fontane’s subtle and genuinely realistic portrayal of north german society, has become, particularly by his last novel of contemporary life, der zauberberg, the undisputed master of prose narrative. the principal characters in this book, even if to some extent endowed with foreign traits, embody the whole of intellectual germany in the same sense 1n which the spirit of english society lived and moved in the greatest novels of george meredith. the clearest indication, however, of a turn for the better in germany is given by town-planning and architecture. even the terrible material stress of the war and post-war period has been unable to hold this in check. examples may be found in schumacher’s town-planning scheme for cologne, the railway station by bonatz at stuttgart and the chile house in hamburg. (a. m.-b.) iv. germany’s naval policy? it has been frequently asserted that the creation of the german navy was the main cause of the world war. such an assertion implics not only that it was admittedly constructed on the right lines from a technical point of view—for no one would plunge into war for the sake of a negligible quantity—but also the admis- sion that germany’s sea power was to be forcibly kept down. from the german standpoint a firm protest must be entered 2 admiral von scheer’s article is full of disputable propositions, but is published unchanged in accordance with the principle of the thirteenth edition of the encyclopedia britanzica—to allow each nation to state its own case through recognized spokesmen.—itd. | ee. germany against the view that as a politica] factor the german navy con- stituted a menace to foreign interests which could apparently be removed only by warlike methods. the tendency which emerges from the german naval laws, as carried into effect, is that of aiming only at the preservation of justifiable self-interests without encroaching too much on the maritime interests of other nations. ‘ defence is one of the most impressive and visible expressions of the state’s will to independ- ence.” this pronouncement was made in 1922 by the bundes- rat of switzerland, a country which can in no wise be accused of cherishing schemes for attacking its neighbours. the preservation of independence is the predominant principle of state for civilised nations to whom the conception of liberty is their very life element, and germany cannot be reproached for undertaking the construction of a navy proportionate to her economic requirements. for impotence at sea is an intolerable condition of weakness for a seafaring people, let their land defence be what it will. so much was made plain by the german- danish war of 1848-9, when prussia, with ten times more inhabit ants than denmark, was forced to yield for lack of a fleet to raise the danish blockade of the baltic ports, the economic lusses sustained by her sea-trade being greater than the advantages ob- tainable by a land war against denmark. it was with a view to readjusting the situation that the prussian navy came into exist- ence. founded in 1853, it passed in 1867 into the possession of the north german federation, established after the separation of the ilabsburg dual monarchy from germany. this perfectly natural aspiration to escape from the german small state powerlessness and form a national state such as other peoples (england and france) had long since secured for them- selves, had its origin in the progressive tendency of the age. the great state-making forces which gripped europe in the beginning of the roth century after the napoleonic wars of conquest were the direct consequence of the overthrow, with british aid, of the irench domination of that continent. although germany’s expectations of securing state unity by way of reward for her share in the war of liberation were, for the time being, dashed by the ruling of the vienna congress of 1815, her ambition, once aroused, left her no peace until she had se- cured the establishment of the reich after the war of 1870-1 against france, who stood in the way of a united german state. with the reannexation at the peace treaty of alsace-lorraine, the imperial provinces seized by louis niv., the german em- pire became—in bismarck’s words—saturated. territorial ex- pansion in europe was no part of the programme. its efforts were directed towards keeping the peace in europe so that its full strength might be devoted to building up the reich. the produc- tive capacity of the concentrated and greatly enlarged economic area represented by the reich grew to considerable importance favoured by the progress of technical methods. international commerce provided goods in bulk, in particular raw material for an enormously expanding industry, and foodstuffs for the rapidly increasing populations of the civilised states. some of these were utterly unable to supply the needs of life from their own resources, for example england, and also germany, whose population of over 40,000,000 had risen within a few decades to over 60 millions. the former large migration of germany’s surplus population to overseas had now ceased. the german colonies by reason of their inadequate development and geographical situation were ill-suited to absorb any numbers worth considering. the growing industrialisation of the country, on the other hand, offered new possibilities of livelihood to the increasing population. as early as the ’eightics, the annual emigration figures [cll from 200,000 to one-tenth of that figure. at the same time germany’s depend- ence on other countries increased, as may be seen from the trade returns. the relations of the new state structure with foreign countrics brought about the naval foundation-plan of 1873, which aimed at creating a sea power of the second rank within the space of 10 years. it was not until the close of the roth century that the possibility of grave conflicts with other european pow- ers arising out of trade competition became a serious factor. 219 england, with a technical equipment decades in advance of the german and a predominant position in world commerce, could watch the new competitor the more coolly, in that the opening up of the world offered so many new sources of trade that she alone could never control them. in addition, her established commer- cial connections, large mercantile marine and colossal colonial possessions placed her in so favourable a position that the develop- ment of new trading enterprise could not but be welcome. ger- many became almost her best customer, and english exports to that country always exceeded in value the imports therefrom, to which, by her free trade principles, she opposed no obstacle prejucicial to mutual relations. now while the great territorial powers, with their armies pretty evenly balanced, at a time when those armies count millions of men not lightly to be unleashed, it becomes more important to be able to throw the power of a big fleet into the scales. for the personnel needed is small, the country will not be directly plunged into suffering and the population is able to go about its daily task almost unheeding, while the silent pressure of sea power can exer- cise a definite influence. it was on these grounds that england’s influential position in the european concert was founded. her rele emerged the more clearly after two definite groups of powers had been formed in europe, which, while approximately well balanced, persisted in a state of intent hostility. it there- fore became necessary to keep england from throwing her weight against germany. the construction of the german fleet was a political move against this possibility in that it would prevent a shifting of the european balance to the detriment of the central powers. after the carrying out of the naval programme of 1873 the german navy had, between 1883 and 1897, fallen completely be- hind and become obsolete. this stagnation set in with the ap- pointment of general caprivi to the admiralty. under his rule coast defence filled the picture. obsolete ironclads were not re- placed because no one had any clear views on naval tactics. the same uncertainty prevailed in other navies continually experi- menting to find the best type of battleship. this state of things was brought to an end by the english admiralty with the naval defence act of 1880. in germany, too, it was realised that a coast defence consisting of fortifications and torpedo boats was but an incomplete form of armament, uscless for any far-ranging operations at sea. from the time of kaiser wilhelm ii.’s accession (1888), efforts to mod- ernise the fleet were made, though with small success. four bat- tleships of the “* brandenburg ”’ class with 10,000 tons displace- ment were authorised by the reichstag in 1890, but after that construction again came to a standstill. in spite, however, of the bad quality and insutliciency of building material during those years, the time was well spent in the navy, for definite tactical and strategical conclusions were reached as to the manner of using a fleet. on these conclusions was based the first navy law introduced after admiral tirpitz’s appointment as secretary of state for the imperial navy in 1897. ‘this committed the government as to the number of ships and the reichstag to the necessary expendi- ture. the programme was to be spread over six years at an ex- penditure of 409,000,000 marks (about {21,000,000 sterling). england had thus an advantage of almost 10 years, and was building onto an existing fleet, whereas germany lacked a work- ing basis. according to the new scheme the number of ships demanded was based upon their tactical division into two squadrons, each containing eight battleships (16), in addition to which there were to be a fleet ‘lag ship an<d two reserve battleships, making in all 19 battleships. besides, 12 large and 30 small cruisers, to serve as scouts for the home battle fleet and for service abroad, were asked for. a navy law in this sense was passed in 1898. the preamble declared that “‘ as opposed to the greater naval powers the battle fleet will have importance solely in sorties.’? this was evident, both from the limitation in the number of vessels and from the circumstance that 12 of the old battleships were to be included in the figure to be reached in the course of six years. 220 the conflict of battleships now came to the fore as the strate- gic task of the fleet. this alone, according to the teaching of na- val history, was the means by which command of the sea could be maintained. the limitation of the said control to germany’s home waters, the baltic and the north sea, was imposed by the relative strength of the german navy to other navies. for a time, it is truc, germany was influenced by the young french school, which set forth the destruction of the enemy’s sea-trade as the main task of a navy, but the principles were not only never applied but in the end definitely rejected in favour of the decision to build a battle fleet. adherence to this decision was the principle underlying the further upbuilding of the german fleet, a measure that could no longer be delayed in face of the developments in forcign politics at the turn of the century. england's attitude towards germany had become definitely hostile. the franco-russian alliance was obviously directed against germany, and the clash between france and england over the fashoda incident was smoothed out of existence by england’s vigorous action. the pressure exercised by england through her fleet on this occasion might well be regarded as a hint of what germany might expect onc day, especially as her interests at sea were definitely on the up-grade owing to the increase in trade. a comparison of the fizures showing the rate of this increase for the two countries affords convincing proof of the possibility of peaceful parallel development. the total foreign trade returns (export and import) amounted in millions of marks (20-4 m.={1) to:— 1900 i910 1912 1913 15,300 | 17,900 | 24,733 |27.- 28,632°5 $195 | 11,089 | 17,615 |21 22,546°6 great britain germany . the increase over 20 years from 1890 to 1910 was thus 9,433 mil- lion marks for england and 9,420 for germany. but the increase in england's population from 38,000,000 to 46,000,000 during the same period was only half that of germany’s, which rose from 50,000,000 to 66,000,000. in proportion to the population, the increase in england’s trade returns was therefore twice that of germany’s. the total foreign trade returns of the more imnortant coun- tries were as follows:— milliard marks germany think of the better protection of her sea connections. accordingly, after taking the first step (in 1897) of modernising her out-of- date fleet, she took (in 1899) the second step of doubling her battleship squadrons from two to four on the basis of the declara- tion: “‘ germany must possess a battle fleet so strong that war with it would involve even the mightiest naval power in perils of such a kind as to jeopardise its own supremacy.’’ those who per- sist in regarding this extended naval programme and its basis as a proof of hostility to english supremacy at sea have misunder- stood the development of germany’s economic position and ignored the change which had taken place in the international political situation. at the time of the great colonial wars of the 17th and 18th centuries, england had to deal with only ene sea-trade rival at a time—spain, holland or france.t1 the commercial centre of gravily in the course of centuries had been shifted by england’s historic interventions from cadiz, lisbon and amsterdam to lon- don. but london was no longer all-important. new york, antwerp and hamburg were centres also. the trend of circum- stances was towards the establishment of a sort of international balance of power. a struggle between england and one of her commercial rivals for the possession of the world’s markets would no doubt have ended in her favour, thanks to the over- whelming superiority of british sea power; but the remaining competitors for the world’s trade would have taken advantage of england in her inevitable exhaustion after victory to aim blows at her commerce which even she would have difficulty in repelling. no one will deny that great britain, with her divisions of empire scattered all over the globe, with her leading position in international trade, with her dependence upon oversea communi- cations arising from her insular situation and extensive industries, and finally with her strong hold on international commerce, has the right and the duty of maintaining a fleet considerably larger and more powerful than those of other nations. this supremacy is ungrudgingly allowed her. but should it lead to the preven- tion of free commercial competition, all the other nations inter- ested in international commerce would presumably unite to safeguard themselves. this is the idea which found expression in the german navy law; in adopting it germany only followed the example of other states. the table below shows the battleships of over 10,000 tons and armoured cruisers of over 5,000 tons, not more than 20 years old, possessed by various countrics in 1900. with the respective strengths of the flects thus distributed, eee fo ey bee ss se se 73 england had no need to fear that she would be ousted from her intgtroroughly . . . ea 147 position; but it was necessary for germany to protect herself in-tere roughly < -s os. a ww “w. & “se 169 against the eventuality of england’s weight being thrown on the germany england united states france japan 1900 : displace- displace- . displace- t displace- - displace- ko. ment no ment no ment no ment ko. ment battleships 9. . tt r; 73,300 40 543,800 9 110,550 17 105,920 5 71,030 armoured cruisers i 10,690 10 75,580 2 19,270 5 35,910 3 29,720 total ‘ . : : 8 83,990 50 619,380 ii 129,820 22 141,830 8 100,750 iqio displace- displace- ‘ displace- displace- displace- no. ment no ment no ment no. ment, no. ment battleships : , p : 28 360,990 56 859,990 2 451,320 16 207,430 i2 174,630 armoured cruisers. 9 ~ 95,590 38 475,880 15 208,980 17 172,320 2 125,000 | total go ou = ok aa 456,580 94 | 1,335,870 44 660, 300 33 379,750 24 299,630 between 1890 and 1910 an increase of 100% is shown. increase of population over the same period in england=20%. as these 20% achieved a trade increase of 62° ¢ there could hardly be any serious question of germany’s crowding out england. in germany, the growing volume of trade was more and more sea-borne trade; the maritime proportion became 70% of the whole. in view of this development germany had necessarily to side of the group opposing the central european powers. that england would supposedly risk little or nothing in so doing is indicated in churchill’s slogan ‘‘ business as usual ’’? at the ‘in the 18th century and just after england usually had to fight france and spain together, and had always to reckon with the probability of their combination.—ed. £.b. 2’'this phrase was not mr. churchill’s.—ed. £.b. germany 224 beginning of the war; whether or not he was mistaken those in | shown; when time and a recognition of the common interest england can best judge. the long duration of the war and the unexpected capacity for resistance displayed by the central powers affected the tech- nique of the war, on sea as on land, to an extent that could not have been foreseen. submarines, flying and the use of gas are new and terrible phenomena of great possibilities, still in their infancy. in future, technical power in these respects must play so great a part that insular security will be a thing of the past. the question whether a true insight into such changes in the con- ditions of power and security might have suggested a less light- hearted view of the consequences of the war is not for discussion here; neither can we discuss the possible results of a different course of english policy. none the less, one is tempted to imag- ine the reply of the delphic oracle if consulted by british states- men before entering into the war: “ if you cross the north sea you will destroy a great empire ’—not the german empire only being meant. the growth of the fleet by no means represented merely mili- tary rivalry at sea; rather ought that development to be regarded as an insurance premium for the great increase in trade interests during the same period, and as one aspect of a general forward movement in all countries chiefly concerned in international commerce. the increase in germany’s naval establishment was probably the most steady and uniform, for the plan laid down in 1900 was strictly adhered to and no surprises were sprung upon the other sea powers. no essential altcration was made in the standard of strength which, up till 1917, was aimed at, viz.: a fleet of two double squadrons and 20 first-class cruisers (58 capi- tal ships). it was also germany’s policy to refrain from such improvements in the ship types as would initiate a process of building. on the contrary, england was invariably allowed precedence in this respect, although germany was obliged to guard against any inferiority in her material, especially after 1905 when the new type of super-battleship was ushered in by the building of the ‘‘ dreadnought.” this event had the effect of accelerating the fixed rate of german construction (in rg00 we had eight ships; in 1910, 37, representing an increase of some 30 ships in 10 years), from three capital ships a year at the outset to four per year between 1908 and to11, in order that, after the start of the new building phase, germany should not lag too far behind. that england, annoyed by her mistake, should vent her ill-humour on germany is only another example of the common tendency to make others responsible. to reach the standard set for 1917 (58 capital ships against england’s 94 in 1910) it was necessary to lay down three ships yearly, the statutory life of a ship being fixed at 20 years. the scheme by which the german fleet was to be brought up to the required standard by 1917, providing for the gradual elim- ination of obsolete units, was known toall the world. oneconomic grounds alone, and also because the lines of construction had from the first been on a small scale, all over-haste was avoided. the latest addition to the navy law in 1912 provided for an addi- tion of not more than three ships to the nominal strength. its chief aim was to place the navy in a better state of readiness, an aim which the threatening political situation of 1911 appeared to justify. it is not to be denied that it was disagreeable to eng- land’s supremacy to watch the growth across the north sea of a new naval power, whose strength she by no means underesti- mated. whether the suppression of this navy has repaid eng- land for her active participation in the world war, when she had the alternative of ot placing the mighty power of her own navy at the disposal of germany’s enemies on land, thereby in all probability preserving peace, must remain an open question. low as germany has fallen, she can still look back with pride on the fact that the glorious british fleet did not beat the german in an open fight at sea. the very regrettable enmity which exists between two racially akin nations who, during centuries of history, have been found side by side, but never as embittered enemies, will, it is hoped, become softened when an unprejudiced appreciation of the cir- cumstances governing germany’s struggle for sea power has been of these ‘‘ two white nations ’’ !have done their work. the s.) v. defence the constitution of the armed forces of germany has not been determined by the nation itself; on the contrary, its size, organ- isation and armament are fixed by the provisions of the versailles treaty.* -lrnzy.—the enlistment must be voluntary, not on the basis of compulsory service. the recruit must bind himself to serve for 12 years or—i/i he wishes to become an ofticer—for 25 years. the strength of the army allowed is as follows: 3,797 officers, 20,297 n.c.o.’s, 74,499 privates, 1,407 administrative officers; in addition there are 300 medical and 200 veterinary staff. of these (including n.c.o.’s) 51,506 are infantry, 15,767 cavalry, 10,644 artillery, 2,838 pionecrs, 2,079 signalling troops, 5,572 communication troops and 2,800 medical service. the army is divided into seven infantry and three cav. div., which are formed into two group commands. territorial divisions—germany is divided into military regions, in each of which one infantry division is stationed. the seven regions are as follows:— region i. embraces the countries east of the vistula (headquarters: konigsberg). region iti. includes pomerania, mecklenburg, schleswig-holstein (headquarters: stettin). region iii. includes brandenburg and silesia (headquarters: berlin). region iv. includes the country and the province of saxony (headquarters: dresden). region v. includes thuringia, hesse-nassau, hesse, wiirttem- berg, baden (headquarters: stuttgart). region vi. includes hanover and westphalia (headquarters: miinster). region vii. includes bavaria (headquarters: munich). the cavalry regiments are distributed over the whole reich. the headquarters of the i. cav. div. is at frankfurt-on-oder, that of the il. cav. div. at breslau, and that of the tei. at weimar. each divisional staff includes an infantry commander and an artillery commander. the pioncer battalions are under the infantry commander and the transport under the artillery commander. army untts.—there are 63 battalions with 189 infantry companies, 63 machine-gun companies and 21 trench mortar companies; 79 squadrons, of which 72 belong to cavalry divisions and 7 to infantry divisions; 72 batteries, of which 9 go to form the horse artillery brigades of the cavalry divisions; 14 pioneer companies; 14 signalling companies; 28 horse transport squadrons; 21 motor transport com- panies, and 7 divisional medical detachments. the infantry is armed with the 1898 rifle. it also carries 1,134 light and 756 heavy ma- chine-guns, and 126 light and 42 medium trench mortars. the artillery is armed with 204 field-guns (7-7 cm.) and 84 light field howitzers (10-5 cm.). in addition, the fortress of kenigsberg in east prussia has 22 picces of heavier calibre. heavy artillery, tanks and aircraft are non-existent. administration—the minister of defence is the highest authority for command and administration. at its head is a political minister, who is assisted in matters of military technique by the chef der heeresleitung, who, according to the defence law, is a general and the superior of all soldicrs. for training officer candidates there are one infantry, one cavalry, one artil- lery and one pioneer school. enlistment is managed by the smallest units (company, squadron, battery). the proviso that soldiers may not leave the army until after 12 years’ service is a great obstacle to maintaining the full strength. the versailles treaty directs that only 5% shall receive their discharge before the appointed time in any one year, and in practice this percen- tage hardly covers the discharges for sickness, incompetence and undesirability. an appeal for premature discharge can therefore only be granted in the rarest cases. this naturally deters many young men from joining, as they are alarmed at the idea of being forced to remain 12 years in the army whether promoted to the higher ranks or not. | ' “the two white nations ” was the toast whispered in the ear of the captain of the “ breslau” by the english admiral when dining on board his vessel, together with other commanders of all nation- alities, off the coast of albania in june 1913. (sce preface, kiel and jutland, commander georg von hase, london,—<a uthor’s note. ?part v. military, naval and lir clauses articles 159-211. z22 recruiting and training.—recruiting is, in fact, influenced by the economic conditions of the moment; under present con- ditions (1926) recruiting is adequate. recruits first spend six months at the depots, one of which is provided for each regiment. only after this half-year’s training are they admitted to their companies, etc. cadets reccive at least four years’ training before becoming licutenants; of these, two years at least are spent with the troops and at least two in schools for the different arms. anyone who has passed the prescribed cadet examination can become an officer. soldiers who hold a school-leaving certificate can enter for this examination at the end of 1} years, others at the end of 3} years; that is to say, after they have acquired the necessary knowledge for passing a preliminary examination. every cadet is promoted to oflicer’s rank, irrespective of his origin and purely on the merits of his service, knowledge and his abilities. the men are trained during their period of service for the calling which they intend to follow on discharge. they are assured of a post in the public service at the conclusion of their 12 years unless they prefer an independent career. in every unit some of the soldiers are elected by their comracles as proxies for economic affairs. a soldier takes no part in politics, but is al- lowed to join economic and non-political societies. the defence law provides power, however, to forbid his association with such societies should they be subversive of military discipline and order in. the army. for the protection of army interests there is an army chamber, which is elected by direct voting and is summoned from time to time by the minister for defence. members of the army are under civil law, and only in case of war may courts-martial be appointed. in view of the historical development of germany and her army the defence law takes specially into consideration the interests of the several states, and too rigorous an application of the centralising principle is not allowed to disturb the terri- torial constitution of the regiment. regiments are required to draw their recruits from the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of their stations. bavaria is allowed a special influence in respect of appointments to commands in the vii. infantry div., which is stationed entirely in bavaria. the supreme authority is, however, vested only in the president of the reich, who nomi- nates, removes, promotes and releases both officers and admin- istrative officials of the army. on leaving the army the men reccive—according to the defence forces pensions law of aug. 4 1921-—a gratuity on which to live until they find other employment and, further, a civil service certificate which entitles them to apply for an official post in the imperial, state or municipal services. in addition, they receive outfit expenses and, on request, government se- curity to assist them in settling on the land. officers receive retired pay, which may also be commuted as a lump sum. the defence problem.—the versailles treaty declares the aim of the german army to be the preservation of order in the interior and the ‘‘ control of the frontiers.”’ in the first of these tasks the german army has until now been successful; the at- tacks made by the right and left radical parties on the govern- ment at the time of the financial and economic crash of 1923 were defeated and greater disturbances nipped in the bud. the second task is not easy to carry out with the german army of 100,000 men. germany’s frontiers are 5,000 km. long, exclusive of coast- line; one province is cut off by the so-called polish corridor; on the west, the country on the bank left of the rhine and a stretch of 50 km. east of that river may not be entered by german troops—and it is in this unprotected zone that the west german industrial district lies. beyond germany’s frontiers lie, on the west, the french army, with a war strength of some 5,000,000 and the allied belgian army, with a war strength of about 800,- 000; on the east the ring is closed by the czech army (war strength, 1,000,000) and the polish army, with a war strength of 2,000,000 men. all these armies are provided with excellent modern equipment, and are uniformly trained on the french model. the german frontiers are exposed, and have no protec- tion from natural barriers. in the west, fortresses no longer germany exist, those in the east are out-of-date and without armament. the eastern frontier is only 170 km. from berlin. the german army has no possibilities of expansion, since all preparations for mobilisation are forbidden by the terms of the versailles treaty. germany’s military inferiority must therefore become greater after the outbreak of hostilities, for the losses could not be made good as fast as they occurred, owing to the absence of any draft organisation, and could in the case of a prolonged war hardly be made good at all; for the german empire would speedily become the theatre of war and any possible sources from which reserves might be drawn would accordingly be blocked. navy.—by the terms of the versailles treaty, the german fleet was allowed to retain 6 battleships not exceeding 10,000 tons, 6 light cruisers not exceeding 6,000 tons, 12 destroyers not exceeding 800 tons and 12 torpedo-boats not exceeding 200 tons. battleships may be replaced 20 years after being launched, destroyers and torpedo-boats after 15 years. the material is now very much out of date; the battleships were launched in 1902-6 and the crutsers in 1899-1903. one light cruiser in replacement was laid down in 1920 and finished in 1925. in 1924 the first replacement destroyer was authorised, and in 1925 the second replacement cruiser and 5 replacement destroyers. the total personnel of the navy numbers 15,0co men. the control of the navy is vested in the ministry of defence (reichswehr- ministerium). under it are placed (1) the fleet command at wilhelmshaven, with the ‘‘ braunschweig” as fleet flag-ship; the commander of the fleet also commands the battleship divi- sion, and has under him both the commander of the north sea naval forces at wilhelmshaven (battleships: “ braunschweig,” ** tfannover ”’; cruisers: ‘‘ amazone,”’ “ iemden” and the 2nd torpedo-boat flotilla) and the commander of the baltic naval forces at kiel (battleships: ‘‘ elsass,” ‘‘ hessen ’’; cruiser:— “ nymphe ”’; surveying-ship ‘‘ panther”; rst torpedo-boat flotilla and 1st mine-sweeper half-flotilla); (2) the naval stations in the baltic and the north sea; (3) the inspection of training at kiel with the naval schools at flensburg-miirwik for training the supply of naval executive officers and quartermasters, those at kiel-wik for training technical and non-commissioned officers and also the training ships ** berlin ’ and ‘‘ hamburg ” (cruisers) and the “ niobe ” (sailing-ship); (4) the inspection of the torpedo and mines department at kiel; (5) the inspection of the naval artillery at wilhelmshaven, with the coast defence artillery school (wilhelmshaven) and the naval gunnery school at kiel- wik; (6) the inspection of the naval depets at wilhelmshaven. technical institutes are the naval dockyard at wilhelmshaven and the naval arsenal at kiel. thus germany has now at her disposal only the navy of a small power. air.—article 198 of the treaty of versailles prohibited ger- many from maintaining any military or naval air forces. an inter-allied aeronautical commission of control, paid by the german govt. on reparations account, took charge of the de- struction of german aircraft, parts and apparatus. this com- mission was disbanded on may 5 1922. as civil aviation is allowed to germany, an agreement was reached with the ger- man govt. by which certain technical points were enumerated as qualifying aeroplanes for use in warfare, and the possession of aircraft possessing these characteristics was forbidden. a new inter-allied aeronautical committce of guarantee was established by agreement with the german govt. (may 1 1922). it is paid by the governments concerned, has branches in berlin, france and great britain, receives lists of all german workshops in which flying material is manufactured, of machines and of pilots and sees that the provisions of the agreement are not infringed. (kk. von o.) brisliograpiy.—a. j. toynbee, surrey of international affairs, 1920-3, pp. 104-113 (1925); reichsgesetsblatt 31 mdrsz (1921); |¥ehr- gesels von 23 alidrs (1921); league of nations: armaments year book, 1924-6 (geneva, 1926); a. honnorat, le desarmement de lalle- magne. texies et documenis (paris, 1924). vi. national finance financial situation before the war.—the central problem of german finance since 1871 had always been the difficulty of germany delimiting the limits of the respective powers of taxation of the reich and the states (the “ linder ’”’ of the constitution of aug. ii tog). the financial policy of bismarck had solved that problem, not formally but in actual practice, by allotting to the federal govt. the customs and excise duties, and to the states the power of direct taxation, which were also the main sources of income of local and municipal government. the income of the german empire from indirect taxation was never adequate; therefore bismarck made the reich ‘sa boarder of the states.” the latter had to make good the deficiency by contributions (matrikularbettragc). before the world war, this system failed once in 1913, when the requirements of pre-war armaments necessitated a larger revenue for the reich, and the great defence contribution (reichswehrbetirag) of that year for the first time gave the reich unprecedented powers in the field of direct taxa- tion. one milliard of gold marks was raised by a non-recurring levy on all property. apart from this distinction of federal and state income by the nature of their respective sources, there was 2 further significant circumstance in the pre-war financial situation. while the reich administered the postal service except in a few states, the railways belonged to the states; thus prussia had a revenue of {rom 220,000,000 to 240,000,000 marks annually from the rail- ways, amounting to from one-third to one-quarter of the total revenue of the state from taxation and state-owned property. the revenue of the reich derived about 70,000,000 marks annu- ally from the postal service, and every year a large amount of the net revenue of the state undertakings was reinvested. with regard to the railways, the real actual annual excess of revenue over expenditure for the whole of the german systems inmmedi- ately before the war was estimated at not far below a milliard marks. the total revenue of the reich, the states and the municipal corporations from taxation amounted to about 45 milliards of marks in 1913. the total public expenditure was considerably larger, since the states and municipalities also drew considerable income from state and municipal land property, from water, gas, electricity, etc., works. of the revenue from taxation about two-fifths went to the imperial govt., which, in 1913, failed to balance the budget, and had to carry over a deficit of more than 250 millions. this deficit would have been covered in normal times either by the states or probably by a loan. the total amount of the indebtedness of the government of the reich at the beginning of the war was about 4,900,000,000 marks. thus, the reich entered the war with a financial system which com- pared unfavourably with the high degree of economic develop- ment of the country at large. the war period.—no wonder that the strain of war expendi- ture broke down the whole system. the optimism, common to all the belligerents, based on the idea that “ the others would pay”? stimulated the policy of war loans and therefore of some inflation. the latter, tripling the amount of pre- -war mark note supply, did not exceed the similar procedure in most of the belligerent nations. by the end of the war, the debt of the reich had been swollen by 150 milliards of new debts, of which about one-half had been funded; the other half was floating debt 1n the form of treasury bills, which after the peace, could only be met when due by printing new mark notes. the revolutionary period of rgt9-20 favoured inflation, and the facts indeed made it sometimes even a necessity, the purchasing power of the mark being one of the expedients for the restoration and maintenance of public order under enormously difficult conditions. the requirements of demobilisation, the occupation payments and the numerous kinds of tribute demanded by the allics added to the financial difficulties of the reich. the erzberger reforms.—nevetrtheless, the whole system of finance was in 1919-20 remodelled by minister erzberger, whose work remains the basis of the present financial system. while the federal constitution of 1919 weakened the power of the individual “lander” and strengthened the federal govt., the great financial reform of 1920 fundamentally changed the finan- cial system of germany, applying the new constitutional prin- 223 ciple of unitarism in the field of taxation. practically the lander (territories) became now the “boarders” of the reich, the exact opposite of the pre-war position. the first intention of the german republican government was to increase income and property taxes as much as possible. but after a short interval in 1920 inflation was renewed, as heavy repuration payments due under the london ultimatum spoiled any chance of balancing the budget. the bases of the german budget, in addition to the customs duties, which immediately after the war gave very low results, were: the income tax, and, especially, the taxation of wages and the turnover tax. the turnover tax began at the rate of $°o, and was raised steadily until it reached ak o on any sale made in germany, and in the occupied territories in 1923 even 33%. this tax proved to be an enormous burden on consumption, since any commodity on the average changes hands four times in germany before reaching the consumer. but under a policy of inflation any such burden, heavy at the moment when it fell due, became light at the time of payment, because in the meantime inflation had depressed the purchasing power of money anid especially of delayed taxes. fora time certain taxes based upon the difference of the purchas- ing power which was high in germany and lower abroad gave considerable revenues; ¢.g., the coal tax, which was reckoned at 40°4 on the price of coal, and from 1920 onwards the newly created export tax which yielded in the most difficult times nearly one-sixth of all state revenues. both were obviously only transitory in character, the difference between the interior pur- chasing power of a currency and its value in foreign markets being large during that slow development of a depreciation of currency; if the depreciation becomes rapid, internal prices tend to rise to a gold basis and the gap disappears. the difficulties of german finance were aggravated in the most unhappy manner by the first attempts to finance reparation payments (see the other sections of this article on currency and on economic history). but far more important than the purely financial process of stabilisation was the energy of the finance minister, dr. luther, who stabilised the budget by strict refusal to pay anything else in other way than by raising taxes. the ‘ miracle of the rentenmark ” is more due to this obstinate determination than to any technical means of stabilisation. thus germany entered on her new period of financial and economic life with a very severe taxation. the mark was stabilised in nov.—dec. 1923, and in the be- ginning of dec. 1923 the finance minister issued two tax decrees, introducing the gold basis for all tax payments and reorganising the whole system of direct taxation. the sales tax was placed on a 24°, basis; income tax was to be paid by all business people on the basis of their turnover, and the tax-free minimum for wage-earners was fixed at 50 marks (£2 10s.) per month. the customs and liquor taxes were completed by a property tax and about a dozen taxes of minor importance. the bulk of the in- come of the reich for 1924—-5, e.g., about 70% of all, was covered by wages taxes, turnover taxes, customs and indirect taxation of articles of mass consumption. it was a very crude system of taxation which was thus established, though the coal tax neces- sarily had disappeared with the vanishing difference between interior and world market prices. but it served its purpose. revenue and expenditure were balanced, and in 1924-5 an unexpected excess of revenue over expenditure became visible. when the dawes plan was finally adopted (sept. 1924) the financial situation of germany was reasonably sound. the plan brought about two important changes. the railways, which had been forced by the minister of finance in 1924 to balance their accounts, were handed over to the reich’s railway company and burdened with a yearly payment for interest and sinking fund of about 660 millions of gold marks for reparations. the customs duties and most of the indirect taxes were to serve as a guarantee for the regular fulfilment of its obligations by the reich. readjustment of 1924. from nov. 1924 a period of tax reductions began. especially the limit of exemption from income tax was raised, and the sales tax rate was lowered, in addition to minor tax reductions. in spite of the reductions, the financial year 1924-5 224 closed with a large surplus of about two milliards of gold marks ({100,000,000). in july 1925, accordingly, the whole systein of taxation was again revised. income tax rates were lowered, and are now on a progressive scale ranging from 10 to 40%. the tax-free minimum of wage-earners was raised first to 80 marks per month in po march 1926 to 0:75 °%. the so-called luxury tax almost disappeared. at the same time consumption taxes on tobacco and beer were raise.l. simultaneously the financial relationship between the reich and the lander (territories) was ordered anew. the territories receive a fixed amount of the revenue from the income tax and the sales tax, at least 2,300 millions. the most important taxes levied by them- selves are the land and rent taxes; this latter tax is practically the only important remainder of a far-reaching price contro! system established during the war. rents are fixed by the state govern- ments; about 50°, of the rent goes to the owner of the house, while the states raise the remainder as rental tax; the total receipts are shared between the local authorities for these expenses under this head and the provision of capital for the building of new houses, which is still largely carried out with the help of subsidies financed by the rental tax. the system of taxation of the reich draws its most important resources from the income tax (2,200,000,000 marks), the sales tax (1,300,000,000 marks), the customs duties and consumption taxes (1,700,000,000 marks), amounting to about four-fifths of the total tax revenue of the reich and to about one-half of the total of taxes paid by the german nation. it is much more difficult to give accurate data with regard to expenditure. the most important change is the reduction of ex- penditure for the army and navy, which is, however, more than bal- anced by war pensions and the payments under the peace treaty amounting at present to about 600,000,000 marks annually, but ascending to 1,650 millions in the year 1926-7. the payments to be effected in the “ normal year" of the dawes plan (e.g., 1928-9) should be covered in the following way :— gold marks railways debentures interest and sinking fund . 660,000,000 interest and sinking fund of debentures of indus- trial and commercial enterprises given to the reparation commission budget. ps + ‘ax total. . : , ; , the total expenditure of the reich, the territories and the local authorities for 1926-7 is summed up in the following approximate figurcs:— 300,000,000 1,5.40,000,000 2,500,000,000 cjold marks 4,000,000,000 i ,000,000,000 expenditure of the reich reparation payments expenditure of the territories:— (a) derived from the reich : 2,250,000,000 (b) raised by themselves . ; : : t ,006,000,000 8,250,000,000 local authoritics 3,000,000,000 total in the normal year of the dawes plan, e.g., after oct. 1928, this burden will be about 1,500,000,000 marks higher. very probably additional expenditure will be incurred on account of unemployment. _ j. el") 11,250,000,000 vii. economic wistory the dominating note of germany’s economic development before the war was the growth of industrialism. her population had increased rapidly. it had grown since the foundation of the empire from 41 millions to 67-8 millions in 1914. the density per sq. m. had increased from 196.6 to 333.1. emigration had fallen from about 142,000 in 1880-5 to scarcely 26,000 in 1913; germany had even become a country of immigrants. apart from the seasonal labourers who went there regularly mostly from russia and austria, returning at christmas, there was a foreign resident population in 1910 of almost 1-3 millions. in 1882 42°5% of the people had been engaged in agriculture; this percentage had fallen to 27-1 in 1907. the growth of industrial- ism was accompanied by urbanisation. in 1910 over one third of the german people lived in cities above 20,000, nearly a quarter in citics over 100,000, and the drift to the towns was renewed after the war. industrialisation.—industrialisation had become possible by the growing economic expansion of the world, in which germany participated through her foreign trade. her own but recently germany acquired colonies did not count for much in the actual growth. though developing at great speed they were rather a reserve for the future than a present source of wealth. notwithstanding tariffs, the growing development of north and south america, of the african countries and of the far east, brought about by the great efflux of men, the export of capital and the application of the methods of capitalistic organisation to backward coun- tries, enlarged the markets of the world. germany’s import trade, which had averaged 19 million tons 1880-5, had risen to 72} million tons in 1908-13, whilst her exports had grown from 20:8 to 64-9 million tons. her progress was mainly due to the application of scientific discoveries to industrial purposes, to a very carefully planned out system of industrial and commercial organisation and to the intelligence and adaptability of the german working men. her commercial policy favouring trusts and combines in industry facilitated exports at the cost of the home consumers who, having to live under a system of agricultural protection as well, would have fared badly if the general development of the world had not lowered the cost of living all round in comparison with days gone by, though after the beginning of the new century an upward tendency in the movement of prices was visible. tuee post-war crisis treaty of versailles —the treaty of versailles caused a far- reaching disintegration of germany’s economic life. she lost 10% of her population, but over 13 % of her territory in europe. large agricultural areas were cut off in the east; in the west important industries like the iron industry were deprived of their raw material. the 1913 home supply of iron ore had amounted to 35 million tons; it had fallen to 5-1 million tons in 1923. but for the great importance of scrap iron in after-war days, ger- many would have been almost totally dependent on ore imports fromabroad. a large part of the metallurgical industry domiciled in lorraine and upper silesia was lost (26-7 %% of the blast furnaces and 15-8°% of the rolling mills), also the important textile indus- try (5,866 works) mostly in upper alsace were lost. german owners were forcibly expropriated in the ceded territories; they had to be compensated by the german government. ‘the same principle of confiscation of private property was applied to ger- man-owned bonds and shares and to german-ownced ships. the total proceeds of these confiscations to the allies have been valued at 6 milliards gold marks, whilst the actual losses to germany have been figured at about 30 milliards. the old established relations between the producers of raw material and the manufacturers of finished goods were cut asunder, especially in lorraine and in upper silesia. the german industrialists whose property had been confiscated were bound to use the money they received as compensation in rebuilding new works in germany. they owned the coal needed for running them, whilst their french competitors had to rely on reparation coal delivered to them under the treaty of versailles from the pits of the same rivals, whose works they had bought cheaply. the productive capacity of the iron and the steel industry on the european continent was thus artificially expanded at a time when markets were contracting. the exchange of iron ancl coal ceased to be a natural process, and became part of international high politics. the allied powers at versailles assumed that germany could quickly rebuild her economic life, as little physical destruction had taken place within her boundaries. to even up their own chances, germany was to be handicapped. she was bound to grant the allies most-favoured nation treatment for five years; she had to admit during that period the produce of the ceded territories, especially of alsace-lorraine and of poland duty free in such quantities as she had drawn from them formerly. she herself was denied the most-favoured nation treatment, and her nationals were excluded or subject to severe discrimination; she was not allowed a moratorium. though the total sum of her obligations was not settled owing to the inability of the allies to agree amongst themselves, she had to pay within two years a milliard sterling. germany as she had to hand over a considerable part of her implements of production (ships, mines, cables, etc.) and most of her foreign investments, her future capacity to make payments abroad was limited by the excess of exports over her imports as shown by her balance of trade. not knowing her total liabilities germany had no inducement to pay the first instalment as quickly as possible; her capacity to clo so would have resulted in an increased burden two years later, when the definite settlement had to take place. effects of the war—german economics were permanently influenced by the war. the cutting off of supplies, the loss of markets, the scarcity of labour due to the demands of the army, and the wear and tear to which the industrial plant had been subjected had forced a system of control on germany which was more severe than that existing in other belligerent countries. food and many raw materials was rationed, and the production of many industrial commodities was supervised by centralised authorities. in a country traditionally run by a bureaucratic hierarchy who considered themselves the born rulers of men, always eager for new activitics, and where democracy was largely represented by socialists, imbued with the idea of state intervention in business alfairs, that situation was bound to produce lasting effects. though generally speaking the control of economics during the war was not oversuccessful the idea of state socialism appeared to be greatly strengthened. the collapse of the old regime seemed to clear the way for its advent. but the internecine struggle between the small bolshe- vist element, who wanted to follow the russian example and the mass of the organisedl working men who wanted to bring about socialism in a peaceful orderly way, occupied the revolu- tionary government which ruled germany from novy. 1918 to feb. 1919. they succeeded in defeating bolshevism and in saving germany (and with it western europe) from its ravages. they were very eager for “ nationalisation,” at least for the socialisation of monopolistic industries. two commissions were appointed to inquire into this problem, especially into the nation- alisation of mines. they issued some very interesting reports but could not agree upon a practical policy. the coalition govt. which came into power early in ro19 was not very keen on nationalisation. they realised that it was easy enough to take over a smoothly running concern and man- age it by government officials; but it was extremely difficult to reorganise a broken-down plant. the more energetic part of the working class demanded nationalisation without compensa- tion; they wanted syndicalised industries rather than govern- ment-run concerns. in these circumstances very little was done. with the object of paying-lip service to the principle of national- isation and to the council schemes latcly imported from russia, national councils for coal mining and potash mining were set up, where masters and men, producers and consumers, were allowed ‘to sit, to talk and to vote, without being in a position to wrench control from the owners. the weimar constitution provides for the creation of a central economic council (reichswirt- schaftsrat), provincial economic councils and works councils for individual concerns. these latter were to send two of their members into the board of the company so as to give the workers partial control of the business—a provision the only effect of which has been to deprive most boards of directors of their former influence, which was concentrated in the hands of some extremely uncommunicative executive officers working hand in hand with a few big shareholders. some kind of soctalistic tradition survived however. food prices were controlled for quite a considerable time. rents even now are still being fixed; in the days of inflation they amounted to next to nothing when calculated in gold. the entire house- owning class was despoiled. wages were lowered pro tanto, as rents did not enter into them, and the cost of production was reduced. in many cases foreign consumers of german exports were thus given the rent taken from the german house-owner. the failure of socialism to bring about the nationalisation of monopolistic concerns and its success in despoiling the middle class and in irritating the farmers redounded to the advantage 225 of industrial capitalism. socialists had not dared to take over the broken down industries; industrial owners were quite willing to reconstruct them. they had to make concessions to the work- ing class. they had accepted the eight-hour working day, col- lective bargaining, greatly improved wages for unskilled labour, the temporary abolition of piece work and the works councils. they did not mind this as long as they could keep the control of prices to themselves. ‘treaty clauses for delivering coal had put the execution of important peace terms into their hands; they had acquired a place on the international stage. with the continuation of inflation they seemed to wax rich, whilst the state got weaker and poorer. they embarked on a policy of industrial aggregation; whilst formerly there had been a tendency to horizontal trusts, they now aimed at vertical combines to create self-suflicing enterprises, where raw matcrials, semi-manu- factured and manufactured goods were in the same hand. as time went on economic power became separated from polit- ical power. a coalition govt. of socialists, democrats and centrists ruled the state. they were held responsible for the humiliations inflicted on germany, whilst the real power, the economic power, was in the hands of the industrialists and the slowly recovering landed interest, impeded but little by organised labour. as inilation progressed labour became less and less powerful, and when the infuriated middle class tumed away from the coalition parties, the weight of political power was turned into the same direction into which economic power had gone before. the state was broken; big business seemed to rule, depreciation of the mark—from the summer of 191g to the end of 1923 german economic life was mainly dominated by the depreciation of the mark. the dollar had risen from par (4-2 marks), to about 14 marks after the signing of the peace in the summer of rorg. it went up continuously until it bought too marks by the end of feb. 1920. after that it fell to 40 in may. owing to the joan contracted at spa it remained between 50-70 until early in rgo21. the beginning of the reparations payment under the london plan (may 1921) forced the mark down to 80 by the end of july. it stood at 100 jate in september. its downward movement was greatly accelerated in oct. of that year, when the news of the partial loss of upper silesia became known. before the genoa conference the mark hovered round 300 to the dollar, to go down considerably after its failure, its downward course gathering speed after the murder of rathenau (june 24 1922). the demand for a moratorium and the abortive conferences about it brought it down to 4,o00 in oct. and 8,o00 in nov., where it remained through the rest of the autumn of 1922. on the day after the occupation of the ruhr (jan. 11 1923), it quickly fell to 30,000, reaching 49,000 on jan. 31. at that time the reichsbank intervened, bringing down the dollar to 20,000 and keeping it there until april 18. but the dislocation of economic life and the great strain on the finances caused by the struggle of the ruhr forced the govern- ment to use the printing press at a formerly unheard of rate. the stabilised mark collapsed. by the end of aug. the dollar had risen to 10:3 millions. and when currency reform was under way, just before the issue of the new rentenmark, the price of the dollar was practically settled at 2:5 billion marks. no depre- ciation on such a scale had ever been known, save in russia. the primary cause of the decline of the mark was faulty gov- ernment finance. at the end of the war the funded debt was estimated at 103 milliards gold marks. current expenditure had been met by treasury bills, which the reichsbank was allowed to discount and to use as cover for its notes. from time to time the outstanding treasury bills were converted into a funded loan, nine different issues of which were placed amongst the public, bringing in a total of 98-5 milliards. the war was followed by a revolution. demobilisation had to be carried out under very difficult conditions. the revenue went down almost to nothing. so most of the expenditure had to be met by treasury bills. the reichsbank became the chief support of the government, issuing notes against such treasury bills as were not taken up by the public. retrenchment was impossible. when armed insurrection is threatening the foun- 226 dations of the state, extravagance may be wise and saving may be foolish. as soon as the worst danger was over, financial reform was undertaken. but the chances for its success were small. the organised working class who were the main support of the gov- ernment and on whose co-opcration the maintenance of order depended were rather disillusioned. there was a great deal of privation all over germany. the millennium which they had dreamed of had not come. they had not succeeded in wrenching the control of capital from the capitalistic classes. ‘the least they could do to meet their supporters was to claim for them an enlarged share of the nation’s income by way of increased wages. the revolution, it has been said, degenerated into a struggle for higher wages, short working hours, and overemployment in works and government departments, so as to avoid dismissals. this meant increased government expenditure, which could not be met by taxation of the working class. in a country where prices are rising rapidly and where there is an actual scarcity of commodities indirect taxation cannot be resorted to by a gov- ernment mainly dependent on the masses, the support of which is by no means certain. taxation was bound to fall on the prop- ertied classes. as long as the socialistic movement was in the ascendant— even at the election of 1919 socialists failed to get a majority— the capitalist classes, including the landed interest kept quiet. they did not openly fight against taxation. but they naturally tried to save as much as they could. notwithstanding all sorts of severe regulations a great deal of movable property left ger- many in the revolutionary days 1918-9. the so-called “ flight of capital”? started—a movement quite legitimate in early days, when violent confiscation seemed imminent. later on it devel- oped into an effort to save property from the severe taxation involved in the financial reform proposed by erzberger. the erzberger reforms.—in feb. 1919 a coalition govt. had been formed by the majority socialists, the centre party and the democrats. differences of opinion about signing the treaty of versailles led to the withdrawal of the democratic par- ty. the majority socialists and the centre, who counted 253 in a house of 423 formed a new government. and erzberger, who up to now had been minister without portfolio became chan- cellor of the exchequer. being dependent on the socialist vote and having been all his life the representative of a small, rather anti-capitalistic group in the centre party, his scheme of taxation was bound to weigh heavily on the propertied classes. he intro- duced a capital levy originally devised to wipe out the dead- weight debt and a thorough going taxation of war profits, which nearly wiped them out. he clearly saw that the treaty of ver- sailles, which put a crushing burden on the reich, necessitated the creation of a central exchequer to which the individual states must be made subservient. all through german history the states have jealously guarded their rights of financial sovereignty. even prince bismarck in the hey-day of his power had not been strong enough to make the central treasury independent of their control. erzberger made the reich the dominant part- ner in finance. ile «deprived the states of the main sources of tax- ation, such as the income tax. he organised an imperial service for their collection and their administration, superseding the old state services. he amalgamated the railways, which hitherto had been the property of the individual states, into the impe- rial railways. under the shadow of the treaty of versailles he succeeded where prince bismarck had failed. though part of this legislation was watered down while pass- ing through parliament, it would have weighed heavily on the propertied classes, if the taxes had been paid immediately in stable money, with no interval for the further depreciation of money. but this was plainly impossible, as the new imperial inland reve- nue service could not start immediately. if properties were val- ued in marks at a time when the value of the mark was fairly high, and if taxes assessed on this value were paid at a later time when values were low, the burden of taxation could be easily shifted. at the same time the burden of the government debt would decrease automatically. germany reparations.—as the treaty of peace had not fixed germany's total obligations before may 1921, the budget did not con- tain proper estimates for reparation payments. this was not merely a grave technical hindrance to reform, it put a premium on financial procrastination. for it was clear that a country whose finances were sound and solid would be charged with a heavier indemnity than a country on the verge of bankruptcy. balancing a budget after a long spell of inflation is always a difh- cult and very unpopular undertaking. if by balancing it early the total obligations are likely to be increased in the interest of hostile foreign creditors, the impetus to reform will be greatly weakened. and the same holds gocd of the taxpaying moral of the individual taxpayer. what good is it, he was bound to say to himself, to strain every nerve so as to enable the exchequer to square all its liabilities, if by doing so i am merely throwing on it new indefinite habilities? the london ultimatum (may 6 1921) enormously strength- ened this attitude. the total demands on germany amounted to 132 milliards of gold marks; the yearly payments might easily rise to eight milliards, or twice the german exports and about double the total revenue of the empire before the war. the outlook for financial reform became hopeless. inflation proceeded, and the business world began to realise that the public’s loss might be their private gain. they began to look upon the further depre- ciation of the mark as upon a fateful destiny and, being unavoid- able, as quite a legitimate means for getting rid of their debts. the budget.—some courageous efforts to balance the budget were made nevertheless. a plan of either valorising the taxes or revaluing the amount of taxes payable on the day on which they fell due was discussed in t92r. but as it was unwisely called “taxation of real values’? and imbued with a certain amount of socialistic acerbity it could not be carried. it was transformed much later into a forced loan, levied from all property owners, but in such a stupid way that the owners could take up the loan in paper marks at a time when it cost next to nothing. when the loan was passed in july 1922 the owner of a property worth 100,000 gold marks, had to subscribe 1%, which at the then rate would have come to about 150,000 paper marks. if he did not pay in time he was subject to a fine. but if he did pay the fine and settled at the end of the year he had reduced his liability from 1,000 gold marks to 90 gold marks. so the issue of treasury bills against which notes were printed, remained the chief prop of government finance. as time went on and as the public became more sceptical the proportion of the bills taken up by the reichsbank and those taken up by the public changed considerably. in jan. 1921 the bank held 50.6 milliards and the public 104-9; in oct. 1922 the figures were reversed: the bank held 477.2 milliards and the public 126-3. morcover, political events continually upset the balancing of the budget. the equilibrium established at the rate of 300 marks to the dollar, would immediately be upset if, in consequence of some political action, the mark went down and prices went up. there was no immediate parallel movement between the amount of notes issued and the depreciation of the mark, but there was a very distinct connection between political events and the fall of the exchange. the loss of upper silesia, the acts of the reparation commission, the murder of rathenau, the occupation of the ruhr, the speeches of poincare are the outstanding dates at which the mark took a headlong downward ilight. each new political crisis brought about a huge demand for foreign exchange in germany. as the german business world had to get raw ma- terials, or the means to pay for raw materials, or the chance for keeping part of their stock intact, they had to buy foreign ex- change, whilst foreign purchasers of marks got frightened and sold out at any price. notwithstanding stringent regulations cap- ital fled from germany in many forms. . in the autumn of 1922 the situation had become almost hope- less. the german government had been asking for a morato- rium. the reparation commission might have been willing to grant it, but the french government proved recalcitrant. a conference of neutral experts was called to berlin to consider the possibilities of stabilising the mark. ]t agreed with a small group germany of german economists that the mark could be stabilised provi- sionally with the gold of the reichsbank, and that an effort in that direction might be made the basis for a reasonable repara- tion settlement. public opinion, however, greatly influenced by business interests, considered a previous agreement on repara- tions conditional to stabilisation. nothing could be done; the last chance for bold action was missed. occupation of the ruhy—a few months later the ruhr was occupied. the mark immediately responded by falling te 49,000 marks to the dollar. a tardy stabilisation effort was made in jan. which succeeded for about eight weeks. but the gov- ernment expenditure for the support of the people in the ruhr. whose works had come to a complete standstill, was enormous, by the end of july the total note issue had reached 43-6 billions against two billions at the end of jan., the amount of treasury bills outstanding 57-8 billions, whilst private bills discounted by the bank had risen to 18-7 billion marks. selling bills to the bank had become a very profitable business. debts were con- tracted in marks when the dollar was 30,000 and paid back three months afterwards when it had risen to 1,100,000; even a bank rate of 18°% was of no avail. by the end of may the bank’s gold fund had fallen from one milliard to 758 millions; on dec. 1923 it was down to 467 million marks. in the summer of 1923 social disorganisation had become im- minent. the farmers refused to sell goods against depreciating paper; the big industrial works revised and paid wages bi-weckly, starting from a kind of dollar basis. but if the money received was not spent before the new quotations from new york hacl reached the shops its purchasing power might be halved. whilst the country was drowned in a flood of paper money a scarcity in actual notes was frequent, for the printing press could not keep pace with the rise of prices. for a long time wages had been below the level of the world market, as home prices had been rising more slowly than prices abroad. it was expected that this advantage in the cost of pro- duction would enable germany to produce more cheaply than other countries and to flood the world market. nothing of the sort took place. for 1922 german export reached 6-2 milliard gold marks and for 1923 5-4 milliard gold marks, against 10-2 milliard in 1913. though the accuracy of these figures may well be doubted in some respects, there is no evidence whatsoever to assume a flooding of foreign markets, the total weight of german exports having dwindled from 74 million tons in 1913 to 22 mil- lion tons in 1922. as foreign trade was controlled by all sorts of semi-oflicial syndicates, exports were often restricted with the object of keeping the home customer quiet. and as german ex- ports depended on imported raw materials, the scope for expan- sion of industrial exports was small indeed, as imports were im- peded by the fall of the mark. the fear of further depreciation induced the german exporters to keep part of their revenucs abroad rather than return them to germany. the mckenna report valued german assets outside germany at about seven mil- lard gold marks. such people as were unable to invest their sav- ings in 2 foreign country bought dollar or pound notes; and though the ordinary citizen was forbidden by law to purchase these notes they circulated quite frecly though, of course, clandestinely, all over germany. the rentenmark.—at midsummer 1923 the mark as medium of circulation was doomed. an emergency currency such as ‘ gold certificates ” was suggested. to stave off the crisis, whilst currency discussion went on, taxation was put on a gold basis; for the first time for many years the landed interest had to bear its share. the plan of the reformers of oct. 1922 to stabilise first and to settle the reparation business later on was taken up by its quondam opponents. but the obstacles to reform had grown enormously. the reichsbank, which had not been willing to risk its gold in 1922 when there was a fair chance of success, had thrown away half of its holdings in the hopeless endeavour to raise the course of the mark at a time when the printing of marks proceeded at fantastical speed. a foreign loan, 10 ensure success, could not be had; a home loan, it was supposed, was out of the question. 227 a plan for the issue of a new money, to be guaranteed by mort- gage bonds, inscribed on real estate, was broached. these notes— they were later called the rentenmark—were to be secured by interesi-bearing bonds; they could automatically be converted into them. the interest was to be a first charge on real estate. the total issue of the new money was to be limited to 4-2 mi!- lards, 2-3 of which were to be lent to the government; the rest to private concerns. the plan which was to provide the govern- ment with funds to carry on the struggle in the ruhr would have failed lamentably if the stresemann govt. had not had the cour- age to stop the fight, thus doing away with the main cause for unlimited expenditure. it cut down the total issue to 3-2 mil- liards, and greatly modified the whole scheme. the govern- ment succeeded, against all expectations, in floating a gold loan, which gave it a breathing space; it was echeloned in such small points that it could be used as stable currency during the period of transition. when luther became chancellor of the exchequer the new currency, the rentenmark, was issued, and the work of stabilisation began. it succeeded completely, the cessation of passive resistance in the ruhr was followed by the ruthless cutting down of expenditure, especially of sala- ries in government offices, at a rate probably never heard of be- fore in a civilised country. this brought about the equilibrium of the budget, the gold loan and the loan from the rentenmark issue bridging over the temporary gap. the new president of the reichsbank, dr. schacht, restricted the bank’s credit facilities, thus cutting off business from their accustomed supply of cheap money. they had to rely on their own savings which they had invested in forcign exchange. these hoards played the part of a foreign loan usually contracted for stabilisation purposes. they constituted the foreign currency fund on which the bank could draw for maintaining the mark exchange. german business necding cash had to sell foreign exchange, against which the bank issued its notes, which thus became gold exchange covered. the flight from the mark, which originally had destroyed the german currency, later on provided germany with the means of stabilising it. after the first quarter of 1924 the foundations for monetary reform had been safely laid. and on this basis negotia- tions for a reasonable settlement of the reparation problem were started which ended in the acceptance of the dawes plan. the dawes plan.—as her economic life was at a low ebb, germany could not be made liable for a lump sum anywhere within reach of french expectations. the experts had to fix ger- many’s obligations in such a way as not to sap her cnergy by in- certitude, and at the same time give the allics a chance of partic- ipation in her growing wealth in case she made a quick recovery. to do this germany’s obligations were, so to speak, divided in two halves; the one was to consist of 11 milliard gold mark bonds secured on the german govt. railways and of five milliards bonds registered as obligations on german industrial property. at a rate of 5° interest and 1% sinking fund these bonds yielded 960 million marks a year, which were to come from the proceeds of the mortgaged propertics. these 960 million consti- tuted the minimum annuity to which germany was liable. ifthese bonds could be sold at par their total value would be 16 milliard gold marks; the value of two milliard gold marks preference shares of the german railways might be added. this capital sum of nominally 18 milliard gold marks would be paid off within 37 to 38 years by means of a sinking fund of 1%. the other half was an annuity not yet capitalised, the pro- cecds of the railway tax and of customs and excise yielding about 1,250 million gold marks a year. the administration of these revenues has to be supervised. an additional surplus was to be paid, in case germany’s capacity to pay increased, which was to be deducted from a carefully constructed index. if the contrary movement took place and if its transfer abroad affected the exchange unfavourably these revenues were to accumulate up to five milliard marks. when this figure was reached payments from these sources would be stopped, until an improved economic situ- ation could permit the resumption of payments abroad. <a transitional regime, including a kind of a diluted moratorium, was to be in force from 1924-7 when the yearly payments were to 228 j be 1,000, 1,200, 1,220, 1,750 million gold marks, part of them to be defrayed from loans or from sales of railway shares. the first result of the dawes plan was the flotation of a ger- man loan of 800 million marks in the financial centres of the world, which enabled germany to pay most of the reparation payments of the first year and to put the reichsbank on a sound basis. reorganisation was to furnish amongst other things the mecha- nism for the gradual disappearance of the rentenmark. the counttry's recovery after inflation germany was an empty shell. the middle class, the owners of mortgages, of state, municipal and industrial bonds were practically ruined; so were the house-owners who had received scarcely any rent. a tardy restoration was enforced by public opinion 1924~5: private debentures, especially mortgages, were to be, valorised at 25% of their original value, the payment to be postponed until 1932. the owners of public securities were to receive but scanty compensation, owing to the prior licen of reparation claims. the loss of the creditors has not benefited the debtors. states and municipalitics were, no doubt, relicved of their burdens, but the ruin of well-to-do tax-payers was a very heavy burden to them. agriculture.—as far as agriculture is concerned, no fundamen- tal changes have taken place. the big cstates have not been split up, though under the different closer settlement schemes 7,300 new holdings have been created in prussia. big entails (fideikommiss) have been brokenup. but untillately land has not come into the market in great quantities. it is only now, when an agrarian crisis is setting in, that estates, especially big estates, can be had for a song. whilst inflation lasted agriculturists had a good time. they saved the money due on their mortgages; some of them may have relaxed their eflorts and produced less; others raised their standard of living. the wiser ones—and there were many of them—spent largely on permanent improvements. the great progress in ‘the chemical industry, especially the produc- tion of artificial nitrates, enabled them to intensify their produc- tion. with a good harvest prices were bound to fall. working capital, especially for big owners, was rather scarce. as the rate of interest had risen considerably, the number of years’ purchase to be given for an estate had considerably diminished, and the total assets capable of being mortgaged had shrunk, whilst the total interest remained the same. moreover, mortgages were very diffi- cult to get. so financing was done by bills of exchange, which fell due after the harvest and forced the owners to sell at low prices. the agricultural crisis imminent in the summer of 1925 was aggravated by an embargo on grain; its abolition brought prices to the level of the world market, a rise which has not been considered sufficient, inasmuch asa good world harvest depressed the general level. new corn duties of three marks per doppelzent- ner anda refund for exportation were clamoured for and granted; so far they have been a failure as a remedy for the crisis. industry.—the bonded debt of industry, from which inflation freed it, has been estimated at about five milliards of gold marks. apart from that, the bank had granted huge credits to industrial- ists, which were paid back in valueless money and cost them very little. many enterprises used these savings for purposes of expan- sion, thus increasing their productive capacity; though this is by no means true of all enterprises. many works, not having been subject to competition for a long time, want modernisation badly; entire trades, like the textile trade, have greatly shrunk. the number of spindles in cotton mills fell from 11,186,000 in 1913 to 9,464,000 in 1924; the consumption of cotton from 486,000 tons to 271,000. ' changes all over the world have greatly affected the position of german industry. the production of bituminous coal is suffering from the competition of lignite, of electricity and of oil. the iron industry, quite apart from the structural changes brought about through loss of territory, has lost the armament market as well as the building market; the construction of houses is far below the pre-war output of 200,000 dwellings a year. the great use of scrap iron has diminished for the time the importance of iron ores. germany inflation greatly facilitated the concentration of industries in a few hands by all sorts of combines. shrewd business men borrowed money from the banks to buy shares and plants, and repaid the loans in valueless paper money. some of the new combines were mere amorphous aggregations which fell to pieces immediately when credit becamedear. others chose the so-called vertical combination, trying to concentrate in one hand works representing the different stages of production. this was the type which has been closely identified with the name of stinnes. the home market was secure, as, owing to falling exchanges, foreign goods could not compete. wages reckoned in gold were low, trading conditions profitable. after the mark was stabilised, it was quite clear that industry as well as agriculture was a loser. the midille class, having been ruined, had no purchasing power. wages, though considerably higher than during inflation days, were below the peace level. the average weekly wages of a skilled metal worker had been 36-36 marks in pre-war days; they were 31-27 marks in april 1924. as the cost of living index had risen to 111 (rent included), wages represented a good deal less purchasing power than before. forcign trade —exports could not make good the deficit of purchasing power at home. germany’s total exports had fallen to 6-5 milliard gold marks, 1923-5, against 10-2 milliard gold marks in 1913, not making allowance for the rise of prices. as the purchasing power of neither the home market nor the foreign market equalled the productive capacity of increased plants, many works were running at half speed. and as over- head cost added an increasing proportion to costs when the oulput was small, prices needs must be comparatively high. given the small purchasing power of the home market high prices were bound to lead to reduced sales, and reduced sales in their turn must bring about rising costs. adjustment was very slow as for a long time there was no real free competition in germany. forcign competition was kept out by tarifis as well as by the use of import licenses (a practice which has almost disappeared by now). the sheltered home market was con- trolled by cartels whose policy was to give a chance of living to the most inefficient member-works. all this really meant a reversal of the old german business policy, which had insisted on a big turn-over and a small profit; the new policy aimed at big profits and small turn-overs. as the political power in economic affairs remained in the hands of the highly organised producers of raw materials and half-finished goods who insist on high prices, the general price level was driven up. by the ehd of 1925 the cost of living index had reacted, and nominal wages were above the pre-war level. the average for the metal workers in dec, 1925 was 46-24 gold marks (skilled) and 31-16 gok! marks (un- skilled). in the midst of a crisis germany had high prices and rising wages. most of the legal obstacles to exportation had disappeared in 1925. germany was admitted to the most favoured-nation treatment, and the licence system was on the wane. but hostile tariffs and decreased international purchasing power have remained, affecting german forcign trade in a peculiar way. whilst english exports have risen from 284 marks per head 1913 to 385 marks 1923, germany’s quota has fallen from 149 gold marks to 139:6 gold marks 1925. german industry clamoured for a tariff, with the double object of fighting hostile customs barriers and of enabling her to recoup herself on the home market whilst exporting cheaply abroad. the tariff was carried by a combination of the landed interest and the pro- ducers of raw materials and half-finished goods. it came into force on oct. 1 1925. credit position. —gencrally speaking it has not achieved much. it may have facilitated the conclusion of minor commercial treaties. but the poverty of the consumer who can either buy goods or keep his money in the bank, but who is unable to do both as he did in days gone by, has deprived industry of its working capital, though the valuation of the plants is rather high. capital is scarce, and rates of interest (long term) at 12% and more are even now by no means the exception. the reichsbank was bound to restrict credit, as it had to protect the currency and germany statistics of germany’'s production, 191 3° agriculture :— total area under cultivation mn thousands of hectares) area (in thousands of hectares) under :— wheat . ; ; 1,974 1,676 rye : 2 ee oe 6,414 5,259 oats 4,438 3,92 sugar beet 569 407 potatoes silo 2,802 grass 5,992 5,3613 total production (in thousands of metric tons) :— wheat ; : 4,656 4,036 rye ; ; ‘ . : ; 12,222 10,130 oats. . ‘ ; ; : ; 9,714 5615 sugar beet - 4%! .& a 16,919 13,986 potatoes 54,121 a45013 livestock (o00' s omitted) :— cattle 20,994 18,474 horses . 4,558 3,807! sheep 5,521 4,988 pigs 25,659 22,533 industry:— production (in millions of metric tons):— coal . ; 190°1 140°8 lignite ; : 87-2 87 +2 steel . 18-35 118 tonnage launched (in thousands of reg. tons) . 495-2 new capital issues (in mill. marks) (stock exchanges) . 2.351 savings bank deposits (dee. 31) (in mill. marks). 19,689 unemployment (total) (excluding short-time workers (dec. 31) (o00's omitted) : ; ; - wages. miners (hewers per shift. |r.m. 6°51 dec. (black coal) (marks) (average) cost of living (dec.) (marks) 100 wholesale prices (in gol] marks) 100 trade railways:— goods traffic carried (iu millions of tons) 5011 445°'0 waterways:— goods traffic carried {in millions of tons) 99‘6 shipping clearances (in thousands of reg. tons) a . : . ; 24972 dep ; ; , : 24,022 special trade:— imports (home consumption) quantity (in thousands of tons) 72,832 values (in mill. marks) . ; 10,770 exports (domestic produce) quan- tity (in thousands of tons) 72 914 values (in mill, marks) . 10,097 1 the pre-war area. ? the present areca excluding the saar. above figures are obtained from official german sources. wanted to force down prices. ‘government increased the stringency by overtaxing the people from fear of failing in their obligations under the dawes scheme. the surplus in the treasury has either gone to states or municipalities which not always used it wiscly, or lent it out directly or through the banks in rather an indiscriminate way. foreign credits have been re- sorted to on a considerable scale. they have been estimated at 33 milliard marks, which accounts of course for germany’s unfavourable balance of trade (imports 12-5 milliard gold marks, exports 8-8 milliards gold marks). the lending capacity of the banks is very limited, the total capital of the four big berlin banks before the war (reserves included) amounted to 1,059 million marks, their deposits to 2 milliards. at the end of 1925 capital and reserves have shrunk to 546 million marks and deposits to 1-76 milliards. the savings bank «deposits have fallen from 18 milliards gold marks to 2-3 milliards. the result of this scarcity of credit, which is really due to insufficiency of income, has been a crisis which is now at its 8 including saar. occupied territory. 7 according to new basis. * 19 ports only. ® returns incomplete owing to occupation of ruhr. 229 industry and trade 1920" 1921? 1922? 192 3° 19247 19257 1,375 1,441 1,374 1,478 1,466 1,552 4,285 4,265 4,142 4,306 4,260 4,709 3,213 3,162 3,202 3345 31525 3,452 326 389 417 384 394 403 2422 2,647 2,721 2,727 2,761 2,809 2,247 2,933 1,958 2,897 2,428 3,218 4,934 6,798 5,234 6,682 5,730 8,063 4,826 5,004 4,015 6,107 5,654 5,585 7:935 7,980 10,790 8,696 10,267 10,32 27,874 20,149 40,661 32,550 36,402 41,718 16,806 16,791 16,316 16,691 17,326 17,183 3,588 3,666 3,650 a 3,855 3.915 6,150 5,801 5,566 6,105 5,735 4,742 14,178 15,818 14,678 17,308 16,895 16,160 107°5 113-9 119-2 62:3 118-8 | 132-7 i11i-9 123:1 137°2 118-8 124-6 139°8 8-4 99 11-2 6-3 '9°3 12:2 909°1 525°‘8 34571 17511 4064 14,927 2,321 600 1,612 410 165 65° 1,533° 536 1,483 ms oe es sn 7-51 8°30 1,158 1,928 68 , 506 t2447 milliards 122°6 141-27 105°8 82:7 82-0 95'1 122°5 130°4 3371 3540 374°4 | 246-3? 271-3" 43°3 40-6 58-8 34°3 70°9 12,545 19,169 26,488 20,560 29,6928 | 33,193° 12,360 eee 26,450 30, £99 29,677% | 33,5168 18,842 25,663 45,868 46,685 38,647 51,982 3,939" 5,732” 6,290"° 6,150 9,083 12,428 19,838 13,804 21,650 12,740 15,841 328,325 3.7099 2,991" 6,1871° 6,102 6,555 8,798 > including luxemburg. ® un- 1913 values. all the (aw. gr.) * including army horses, height. amorphous aggregations like those of the barmats have long ago gone to pieces, but even vertical combines, like the stinnes concern, had to be dissolved. and the typically german form of the horizontal combine, the cartel, which is an organisa- tion of works producing the same class of goods with the object of getting a monopoly price high enough to keep the weakest partner going, has broken down. there is a tendency already materialised in the chemical trade, and on the way to materiali- sation in the steel trade, to form a real trust with its advan- tages of large scale production. germany is on the way to recovery. but the transition is slow and painful. owners are naturally unwilling to write down capital on the necessary scale, as indicated perhaps too pessimistically by the valuation of shares on the stock exchange. bankruptcy 1s rampant. in dec. 1925 commercial failures, which were as low as 30 a month in jan. 1924, have gone up to 1,660, thus greatly surpassing the monthly average of 815 in 1913. unemployment is spreading. whilst during the hey-days of inflation (second half of 1922) 230 less than 50,000 people received unemployment benefit, their number had grown to 1,485,931 at the end of dec. 1925. emi- gration is starting again, notwithstanding all sorts of obstacles; 58,714 emigrants left germany in 1925. fortunately, trade unionism has regained its strength. the problem lying ahead of germany is, how can she become a country with a low level of prices and a comparatively high level of wages. brbiiogcrapiy.—am. j. bonn, die auflesung des modernen staates (berlin, 1921); das schicksal des deutschen kapitalismus (berlin, 1926); h. biicher, finans- und wirtschafts-entwickinung deiutsch- lands in den jahren 1921-5 (berlin, 1925); f. fulenburg, probleme der deutschen iandelspolitik (jena, 1925); w. gerloff, sieuerbelastung und hwiedergutmachung (munich, 1924); a. iorten, frfassung der sach- werte und reparationsproblem (berlin, 1922); e. lederer, deutschlands wirederaufbau und weltwirtschaftliche neuetngliederung durch sosiali- sierung (tiibingen. 1920); r. lewinsohn, dre unischichtung der europdischen verniegen (berlin, 1925); miinstermann, die koiserne der metallindustrie (leipzig, 1925); w. rathenau, die neue wirischaft (berlin, 1918); hl. f. simon, reparation und wiederanfban (berlin, 1925); r. wissell and r. von moellendorft, wirischaftliche selbst- verwaltung (jena, 1919); aktenstticke des auswirtigen amts, sur durchftthrung des versailler vertrages (official printing office, 1922); bericht der sosialisierungskommission tiber die frage der sosiali- sierung des kohlenbergbaus v. 31.7.20.(berlin,1920); verhandiungen und berichte der sosialisiterungskommission (berlin, 1920-2); aon- zerne der ametallindustrie, 2nd ed. (stuttgart, 1924); destschlands wirtschaft, wehrung und finanzen (german official report for the commissions of experts) (berlin, 1924); gutachten der internationalen finanzsachverstindigen tiber die stabilisierung (berlin, 1922); afate- rialien zur beurteilung der lage der deutschen landwirtschaft su beginu des jahres 1924, deutscher landwirtschaftsrat (berlin, 1924); die reichshank 1901-25 (berlin,1926); die reparationsleistungen 7m -ersten planjahr, dentschland unter dem dawesplan (berlin, 1926); reichsverband der deutschen industrie: 7dtigkeitsberichte (passint); id., deutschlands wirtschafts- und finanspolittk (berlin, 1925); publications of the “ verein ttir sozialpolitik ’: vol. 166, deutschlands zahlungsbilanz und stabiisierungsfragen, ed. f. eulenburg; vol. 165, geschichte der stabilisierungsversuche, ed. m. palyi; vol. 167, probleme der zahlungsbilans, ed. m. j. bonn; statistisches jahrbuch fiir das deuische reich (berlin, annual); vierteljahreshefle sur statistik des deutschen reichs (berlin, annual); wirtschaft wid statistik (berlin, annual); zahlen sur geldentwertung in deutschland 1914-23, special number of wirtschaft und statistik (berlin, 1925); volkswrtschaft- liche chrontk der jahrbticher fiir nationalekonomie und statistik (jena); volkswirtschafiliche chronik des archivs fiir sostalwissen- schaft und sozialpolitik (tiibingen). (m. bo.*) vu. currency. the new bank amendmeni act.—on jan. 1 1911 the provisions of the bank amendment act of june 1 1909 came in force. by this act the note issue privileges of the reichsbank were extended for a further 10 years, and the tax-free portion of the issue was again increased (from 450,000,000 marks to 550,000,000 marks; at the end of each quarter to 750,000,000 marks). the note circulation was permitted to exceed the cash reserves by those sums without the bank having to pay the 5°, note tax. this measure was partly due to the severe economic and financial crisis of 1906-7, which had led to abnormally high official discount rates, and to the institution of a thorough inquiry into the working of the central bank and of the whole german banking and credit system. the committee of investigation, of which dr. havenstein, the president of the reichs- bank, was chairman, had recommended, firstly, that the gold hold- ings of the reichsbank should be increased by a larger issue of small notes, by encouraging payments which did not involve the use of cash, and by corresponding measures in regard to forcign payments; secondly, that measures should be taken to diminish the demands for credit from the reichshank on the part of public and private bodies, and to strengthen the security and liquidity of the deposits in the banks. the new bank act gave effect to most of these recom- mendations. bi-monthly balance sheets of the banks were published in the reichsanseiger from 1912 to aug. i914 and again from the beginning of 1925. the liquidity of the german banking and cur- rency system was improved. vhe average annual gold holdings of the reichsbank rose from 827,600,000 marks in i91i to 1,067,600,000 marks in 1913, the note circulation of the bank from 1,663,600,000 marks to 1,958,200,000 marks, the gold cover from 49-7 % to 54°5 °o, the holding of bills from i,077,800,000 to 1,136,000,000 marks, and the total turnover from 377,500,000,000 to 422,300,000,000 marks. the official discount rate was fairly high during the years imme- diately preceding the war owing to expanding trade and to the ten- sion on foreign relations, the average rate for 1911 being 4-397 “o, for i9i2 4-:946% and for 1913 5°885%. credit transactions both at home and abroad were regulated by the gold standard, and fluctua- tions were lessened by the intervention of the reichsbank. the supply of and demand for capital were harmoniously adjusted, and the markets for short and long term loans were adapted to varying needs by the automatic operation of interest rates. the reichsbank germany acted as the bankers’ bank and as the ultimate source of credit in the country. the whole credit and currency system stood in the closest relation to the economic organisation of germany and to its develop- ment as a great industrial and international trading centre. ‘though the balance of trade was adverse, as in other advanced industrial countries, the invisible exports were sufficiently large to enable a steadily increasing volume of capital investment abroad. the war period.—when the world war broke out the reichsbank was faced with new tasks of unexampled magnitude, it also took over the management of the loan offices (reichsdarlehnskassen) which were set up in 1914 to facilitate borrowing against goods, stocks, shares, etc. tt was able to meet the tremendous demands for cash and joans during the mobilisation period and in the early stages of the war without any appreciable rise in its discount rate and with- out the necessity for a general moratorium. it is true that on aug. 4 i9i4 its notes were declared irredeemable in gold, and the liability to pay note tax on excess issucs was abolished. loan office notes were recognised as a cover for reichsbank notes, and treasury bills with not more than three months to run were admitted for discount at the reichsbank, and accepted as cover for the note issue. this disregard of well-established currency principles would probably not have had very serious results if, as was at first assumed, the war had been of short duration. as the reich acquired control over an ever larger proportion of the economic system for war purposes its demands for credit became predominant, and the requirements of private industry and com- merce, which at first were very great, fell increasingly into the back- ground, the necessary sums were in the first instance made avail- able by the reichsbank in the form of treasury bill credits, and then converted almost completely into long-term war loans. by a suc- cessful collection of gold from the hands of the public, a fund was created for external purposes which proved of the greatest tmpor- tance, both in the war and in the difficult post-war period, as a means of payment for vital imports. the reichsbank discount rate, which at the outbreak of the war was raised to 6%, was reduced in the middle of dec. 1914 to 5% and kept at that figure till the middle of 1922. but owing to the lack of a free gold market it lost a great part of its normal influence as a regulator of the economic system. the circulation of reichsbank notes rose from an average of 1,958,000,000 marks in 1913 to §,.409,000,000 in 1915, to 9,010,000,000 marks in 1917 and to 13,682,000,000 marks in 1918,' the average gold holdings of the reichsbank rose from 1,068,000,000 marks in 1913 to 2,387,000,000 marks in 1918. ‘the highest figure reached was 2,550,000,000 marks on nov. 7 1918 gncluding gold handed over by russia under the brest-litovsk treaty). the average gold cover of the note circulation fell from 54°5°% in 1913 to 17°5% in i9gi8, the value of the mark remained near to parity during the first two years of the war, and even at the end of the war had only fallen to about half its pre-war value. legal changes —the most important changes in the legal pro- visions affecting the reichsbank after the war were (1) the reduction in the minimum cover for the notes, by the act of may 9 1921; (2) the authorisation of the reichsbank to undertake forward ex- change business, by the act of dec. 16 1919; (3) the inclusion of gokl stocks held by the reichsbank in foreign central banks as primary cover for its notes, by the act of march 4 1922; (4) the so-called autonomy law of may 26 1922, which made the management of the reichsbank independent of the government of the reich and en- trusted it solely to the managing board of the reichsbank, though this did not appreciably affect the policy of the bank. inflation. during the years following the world war the eco- nomic life of germany declined, reaching its nadir in 1923. all attempts to stabilise the falling currency were unsuccessful in view of the various burdens imposed on germany by the allies. the value of the gold mark in terms of paper marks, as measured by the exchanges on countries with the gold standard, was 2-08 paper marks in dec. 1918, 10°8 in dec. 1919, 17°39 in dee. 1920, 45°72 in dec. 1921, 1,750 at the end of 1922 and after nov. 20 1923 a million million. since the printing press could not keep pace with the de- preciation, emergency money was issucd without proper control and utter confusion ensued. the money and capital market came to a complete standstill; interest rates rose to fantastic heights; the accumulation of capital ceased. there was a feverish chase after goods and foreign securities, the finances of the state lost all basis. the last phases of this evolution suddenly became catastrophic; the mark became useless as a medium of payment, for in many cases it was no longer accepted, and had already been largely rejected by the business community as either a measure of value or a basis of calculation. the rentenmark.—in the chaos of inflation there appeared the beginnings of the transition to a stable currency in the form of loans with a fixed value based on gold or commodities; mortgages, credit and insurance transactions, savings bank deposits, commercial contracts, etc., being reckoned in terms of gold or some other com- modity standard. finally, the rentenbank was created by the order of oct. 15 1923 and was astonishingly successful in leading the way to the stabilisation of the currency. while the convening of the 1 cf. the figures for the end of each year on pp. 120-1 of memoran- dum on currency and central banks, 1923-4 (geneva, 1925). ghent dawes committee was still under discussion germany succeeded, in circumstances of the greatest stress, in stabilising her currency un- aided, and in resuming control over her finances. the success of the rentenbank was largely due to the fact that with its help the finances of the reich were supported until the collection of the revenue in terms of the new currency, and energetic measures of economy had enabled the budget to be balanced. the reichsbank was able, on account of its credit policy, without legal regulation, to maintain the value of the rentenmark at the equivalence of i rentenmark=1r billion paper marks=1 gold mark, until the final currency reform was introduced. in order to support the value of the currency in the meantime, the german gold discount bank was created (april 1924) for the pur- pose of providing industry and commerce with gold credits, chictly for export purposes. ‘the unity of currency and credit policy was secured by entrusting to the reichsbank the management of the gold discount bank and the granting of rentenbank credits for business purposes. acts regulating the reform.—the adoption of the dawes plan led to the passing on aug. 30 1924 of four acts—the new bank act, the mint act, the private issue bank act and the act for the redemption of the notes in circulation of the rentenbank. these acts came into force on oct. 11 1924 after the floating of the german foreign loan of 800,000,000 reichsmarks, in accordance with the proposals of the experts. the rentenbank and the gold discount bank were put into liquidation, but the latter subsequently resumcd its activity asa credit institution in the guise of a department of the reichsbank. the further issue of rentenbank notes was prohibited, and the reichsbank was required to withdraw rentenbank notes in circula- tion, within a period of io years. by the mint act the gold standard was again proclaimed with the reichsmark as the currency unit, and with the same gold equivalence as the pre-war gold mark, #.e., 1 km. of fine gold = 2,790 reichsmarks. the old gold coins retained their validity and also the silver coins minted under the act of march 20 1924, the rentenpfennigs and the copper pfennigs issued under the law ot july 9 1873. all other coins previously minted of silver, nickel, aluminium, tron and zinc, lost their validity. the minting of silver coins to the value of 1-5 reichs- marks was authorised by the new mint law. apart from the reichs- bank notes only the gold coins were given unlimited legal tender. silver coins were legal tender up to 20 reichsmarks and smaller ~ token coins up to § reichsmarks, under the new bank act the essential features of the reichsbank were retained, but important modifications were made in accordance with the principles of the dawes plan, one of which was the introcduc- tion of an element of foreign co-operation exercised through the general council and the commissioner of the note [ssue, who is a foreign member of the general council. the management and administration of the reichsbank was placed, as under the old bank act, in the hands of the managing board of the reichsbank which consists exclusively of german nationals. the original capital of the bank was contracted from 180,000,000 marks to 90,000,000 reichs- marks. the new bank act provides for a capital of at least 300,000,000 reichsmarks. ‘the functions of the reichsbank, resulting from its position as the central bank of issue, were laid down in the same terms as in the old bank act, but the provisions in regard to credit were made more stringent. the power of the bank to grant credit to the reich, the federal states and the municipalities were narrowly limited or forbidden altogether. the reichsbank was also given the new func- tion of holding on deposit the sums paid in reparations, for the account of the agent for reparation payments. the exclusive right of issuing notes was granted to the reichsbank for 50 years. while on the one hand the note circulation was subjected to more severe condi- tions with regard to its cover, it wasalso made more elastic, and greater freedom of action was secured by the admission of foreign bills of exchange as cover for the notes in addition to gold. the obligation on the reichsbank to redeem its notes in gold was for the time being suspended, and its reintroduction was made dependent on_ the approval of both the managing board and the gencral council. quantity in circulation.—during 1925 gold coins were not in cir- culation. the following tables show the volume and composition of the money in circulation in germany at the end of 1913 and 1925:— iqot3 (in millions of marks) reichs- private gold token | treasury] pank rank _ total, coins coins notes nites nate circulation 2.750 850 too 2,593 160 6,453 ye 1935 (in millions of reichsmarks) | re; ” 2s eichs- private renten- ret | a bank bank bank ci i ce notes notes notes teese a1 _reichsbank policy.—the reichsbank was faced with very great difficulties in carrying out its economic functions after the stabilisa- tion of the currency owing to the inevitable crisis of economic recon- struction, to the reparation payments and to the flood of foreign credits which came into the country following on the dawes loan. although the new bank act had re-established sound principles of banking policy it was not possible for them to be applied in the same way as before the war. as a result of the disrupting effects of war and inflation upon circulating capital there arose a grave discrepancy between the supply of and demand for capital, which only by de- grees became less acute. the mechanism of the money and capital market, which had completely broken down, was at the beginning of 1926 still by no means normal, and the automatic regulation of the markets for short and long term loan capital was not yet restored. under such abnormal conditions the reichsbank (from april 1914 onwards) found itself compelled to put into force a drastic rationing of credit in addition to a cautious adjustment of its discount rate. it was not till the end of 1925 that it was able to modity in a tentative way the severity of its credit rationing. ‘the discount rate was fixed at 10°4 after the stabilisation, but was then much below the rates ot the private banks. even when it was lowered in feb. 1925 to 9 foil jan. 1926 to 8% and in march 1926 to 7 %, there remained an ab- normal divergence between the official rate and the rates for private bank credits. by degrees, however, these rates have tended to come closer together. the difficul’ies in the way of credit policy are enhanced by the restriction of the pre-\war freedom of the reichsbank in the control of its note issue, since the public funds, the reparation account and the foreign credits are more or less outside the direct influence of the reichsbank, and are liable to lead to the withdrawal of considerable quantities of notes. the requirements of modern currency policy therefore compel the reichsbank to watch most carefully the move- ment of the whole volume of purchasing power and its influence on prices, wages and other economic indices. it is incumbent on it to take or initiate the necessary measures to organise the money and capital market on sound lines, to encourage the formation of capital, and to secure the most economic use of all the available capital, including credits raised in foretgn countries. the reichsbank augmented its gold holdings from less than 500,000,000 marks in 1923 to about 1,500,000,000 reichsmarks at the end of april 1926. the holdings of gold and liquid assets avail- able for cover amount to 60 %% of the reichsbank notes in circulation, but this proportion is not a decisive basis for credit policy as the cir- culation of rentenbank notes has to be taken into consideration as well, from the middle of 1925 the total money circulation at the end of each month was in the neighbourhood of 5,000,000,000 marks. the total volume of private credit given by the reichsbank, the private note banks, the rentenbank, and the gold discount bank, and including bills rediscounted by the reichsbank to other bodies amounted in 1925 to about 3,000,000,000 reichsmarks. after the stabilising of the currency german industry and com- merce passed through a severe crisis, and thus heavy burdens were imposed on the reichsbank as the guardian of the currency. in spite of these difficulties, it proved possible to maintain the value of the reichsmark, and from the beginning of june 1924 onwards all demands for foreign exchange were fully satisfied. it ts not yet pos- sible to foresee when the existing restriction on a free gold currency in germany will be removed. in any case the fact that foreign ex- change is available without limitation in exchange for reichsbank notes is equivalent to the effective redemption of reichsbank notes in gold. (kk. no.) ghent, belgium (sce 11.919), had a population in 1923 of 163,877, and including the suburbs of ledeberg, ghentbrugge and st. amand of 212,096. ‘the city measures some 16 m. in circumference, much room being taken up by nurseries and gardens, for ghent has become an important horticultural centre, especially for the cultivation of flowers under glass. linen weav- ing has greatly developed, and schools of industry and mechanics have been established. a great international exhibition was held in 1913 in a palais des fetes, specially built in the pare de la citadelle. the old cast-iron steeple of the belfry was rebuilt in 1913; subsequently most of the copper work from the new one was removed by the germans. the hospital and almshouses for old men have been removed from the ancient byloke, which has been fitted up to house the archaeological museum, previously in the old carmelite church. the panels of the famous “ wor- ship of the lamb ” by hubert and jan van eyk, dispersed since 1816, were brought together again in 1920 under the provisions of the treaty of versailles. a plaque in memory of edith cavell has been fixed on an inn, de stad ouden aerde, where she stayed shortly before her arrest, and a memorial to the inter-allied dead was unveiled in the cemetery in oct. 1924. a new lock at ter- neuzen enables vessels up to 26 ft. draught to pass at any tide into or out of the canal between that port and ghent. 233 ghent was in the hands of the germans from oct. 1ory till armistice day, nov. 11 1918. the west part of the town suffered some damage in the final operations. the germans published there the vwlaamsche post, an organ professing flemish sympa- thies and advocating the partition of belgium, and made deter- mined efforts to transform the university of ghent into a purely flemish institution, in order to widen the breach between the flemish and walloon elements. the university was reopened in. oct, 1624: 7 giardino, gaetano (1864- ), italian soldier, was born at montemagno, italy, jan. 24 1864. he joined the army in 1882 and saw service in eritrea (1889-94) and in tripoli (1911- 2). on italy’s intervention in the world war he was appointed chief of staff to the ii. army and was promoted brigadier- general in aug. 1915. in june 1916 he was given command of the 48th brigade and played an important part in the attack on gorizia. in june 1917 he was promoted lieutenant-general but a few days later was chosen minister of war and made a senator. he held office until after caporetto, when he was appointed assist- ant chief of staff to the new commander-in-chief, gen. diaz. in april 1918 hewas given the command of the v.army in the grappa sector. at the battle of vittorio veneto (oct. 24—nov. 3 1918) he delivered a general attack on the austrian lines and after a hard struggle forced the enemy to retreat. in r919 he was promoted generel d’esercito. in sept. 1923 as the govt. of fiume was un- able to carry on, giardino was sent to take charge of the town, where he remained until its annexation by italy under the terms of the treaty between italy and yugoslavia in jan. 1924. gibbons, james (1834-1921), american roman catholic cardinal (see 11.936), in 1916 published retrospect of fifty years. he died in baltimore march 24 1921. gibraltar (sce 11.938) has been largely increased in strength as a naval base; with the extension of the mole the deep harbour has an area of 260 ac. and affords anchorage for the largest ships. it was of great importance during the world war as a coaling station and port of call. in 1922 an executive council was established, but all legisla- tive power remains with the governor. a city council has re- placed the board of sanitary commissioners, and currency notes have been issucd by the local authority since 1913. gibraltar is one of the most closely populated places in the world (0,888 to the sq. m. in rg2r), but it is not unhealthy, the death-rate in 1921 being 17 per thousand. the population in 1924 was 20,638: 17,160 civilian, 2,932 military and 546 naval. there is a regular motor-omnibus service to la linea, which has grown considerably and has a population of 63,000. a cross of sacrilice, in memory of those who died and were buried at gibraltar during the world war, was unveiled in 1922, and a war memorial in 1923. in 1915 a second reservoir was excavated, and the con- struction of another is contemplated. the exchange in commer- cial square, which was burnt down in 1919, was rebuilt and opened in 1922. <a public recreation ground was opened above the military school in 1920. thesignal station on the summit of the rock has been clismantled. since 1910 gibraltar has been a roman catholic bishopric, independent of the spanish hierarchy and subject directly to the vatican. gide, andre (1869- ), french essayist and novelist, was born in paris nov. 21 1869. jcducated at the ecole alsacienne and the lycee henri iv., he began his literary career with the cahiers and the poesies d@’ andre walter (x8q91—-2). his first suc- cess was followed by a series of works resembling philosophical causeries in which an introspective method and great delicacy of expression were combined in an original manner. his dra- matic works and criticism are characterised by the same sureness of touch and individual grace. he is considered one of the finest stylists in contemporary french literature, and exercised con- siderable influence outside his own country. as a novelist, how- ever (as in les caves du vuticun), he was less successful; he is more at home in the easy, discoursing flow of an essay. gide’s works include: le voyage d’urien (1893); paludes (1895): les nourritures terrestres (1897); le traite du narcisse (1899); le promethee mal enchaine (1899); l’tmmoraliste (1902). criticism: giardino—giner de los rios letires & angele (1900); pretextes (19053). drama: sani (1898); le rot candaule (1898); les caves du vatican (1911); isabelle (1911); la symphonie pastorale (1919); dostotersky (1923, tr. 1925); les faux monnayeurs (1926). gide, charles (1847- ), french economist, was born june 29 1847 at uzes (gard). educated at the college d’uzes, he entered the faculty of law of the university of paris. he early took up the study of economics and became professor of politica] economy, first at bordeaux, then at montpellier, and from 1898 to 1920 at the university of paris. he is the author of one of the best introductory treatises on political economy, principes d'economie politique, first published in 1884 and since translated into english and other languages, and is joint author with pro- fessor rist of an excellent work on the history of economic theory, lfistoire des doctrines economiques (3rd ed. 1920). gide devoted a great deal of time and energy to the encouragement and fur- therance of the co-operative movement in france, and wrote largely on this question. professor gide enjoys a wide measure of esteem amongst scholars in other countries, not only as an eminent economist, but also on account of his unremitting en- deavours to maintain and promote harmonious international relations and especially to preserve co-operation amongst intel- lectual workers in different countries. (see france.) gilbert, cass (1859- ), american architect, was born at zanesville, o., nov. 24 1859. he studied at the massachu- setts institute of technology and in 1883 began his career as an architect in st. paul, but subsequently moved to new york. he became perhaps most widely known as the architect of the woolworth building in new york, which has 57 stories and is 760 ft. in height, and, with the exception of the eiffel tower in paris, the tallest structure in the world. other buildings de- signed by him include the minnesota state caritol, st. paul; the endicott building, the dayton avenue church and st. clem- ent’s episcopal church, in st. paul; the united states custom hfouse and the union club, new york; the brazer building and the sutfolk savings bank, boston; art building and festival hall (for the loutsiana purchase exposition), and the central public library, st. louis; ives memorial library, new haven, conn.; public library, detroit. he also drew the plans for the university of minnesota and for the university of texas. he was appointed by president roosevelt a member of the council of the fine arts; and by president taft a member of the na- tional commission of fine arts, being reappointed by president wilson. in 1926 he was appointed design architect for the pro- posed bridge over the hudson river at new york city. gilbert, grove karl (1843-1018), american geologist (see 12.7), died at jackson, mich., may 1 1918. gilbert, seymour parker (1802-— ), american lawyer and financial expert, was born in bloomfield, n.j., oct. 13 1892. he graduated from rutgers college in 1912, and in the same vear entered the harvard law school, obtaining the ll.b. degree in 1915. after admission to the new york bar, he practised in new york city from rors to 1918. in the latter year, on the ini- tiative of r. c. leffingwood, a former associate secretary of the treasury, he joined the war loan staff as counsel. in june 1920 he became assistant secretary (later under-secretary) of the treasury in charge of fiscal affairs. he resigned nov. 17 1923, and became agent-general for reparation payments under the dawes plan oct. 31 1924. gilbert, sir william schwenk (1836—r1orr), british playwright and humorist (see 12.9), was drowned at harrow weald, middlesex, may 29 1911. ilis play, zhe hooligan, was produced a short time before his death. gilbey, sir walter (1831-1914), british wine merchant (sce 12.11), died at elsenham hall, essex, nov. 12 rg14. gildersleeve, basil lanneau (1831-1924), american scholar (see 12.12), died at baltimore, md., jan. 9 1924. giner de los rios, francisco (1840-1915), spanish phil- osopher and jurist, was born in ronda (andalusia) oct. 10 1840. he graduated in granada, and in 1867 went to the university of madrid as a professor of jurisprudence and there came under the influence of prof. sanz del rio, krause’s famous disciple. ~ginsburg—girl guides in accordance with his belief that philosophy should have a con- crete influence on practical life, he devoted himself to the educa- tional question. twice giner resigned his chair, together with several of his colleagues, in a stand for liberty of thought in the university against a reactionary government, and was twice reinstated. he helped to found the institucion libre de ense- nanza, an educational institution which did much to improve teaching methods in spain, by the application of philosophical thought to the problems of education. he many times refused election to the cortes, and in 1873 declined a post in the gov- ernment. his greatest influence was personal and direct, for he was a born teacher, a man of refined sensibility, pure in his life as in his ideals. giner published several volumes of essays—literary, educational, philosophical and religious—as well as lecctones sumarias de psicologia (1871); psicologia; idea del derecho, with alfredo calderon, ‘trans. from the german of: rider (1885); resumen de filesofia det derecho, with alfredo calderon (1898); and other works. a complete edition of his numerous works was undertaken a year after his death. see s. de madariaga, the genius of spain (1923). ginsburg, christian david (1831-1914), british hebrew scholar (see 12.29), died in london march 7 1914. giolitti, giovanni (1842- ), italian statesman (see 12.31). the elections of ‘1909 returned a strong giolittian majority, but giolitti as premier found himself faced with the necessity for renewing the steamship conventions which were about to lapse. the rill presented by his cabinet on this subject was open to much criticism, having been designed to conciliate conflicting political interests rather than to solve the actual problem. ‘the vigorous attacks of the opposition, led by baron sonnino, induced giolitti to adjourn the debate until the autumn, when, the cabinet having been defeated on a point of procedure, he resigned (dec 2). but he continued to play an active and in fact dominant part in parliamentary politics, for the majority of the chamber and of the senate, being thoroughly giolittian, the sonnino ministry and that of sig. luzzatti which succeeded it only remained in power at his discretion. when in march ror1r luzzatti resigned in consequence of the hostile vote of the radicals and the resignation of its two radical members, giolitti was again called upon to form a government (march 31). the chief event of his fourth cabinet was the libyan war. personally he was not enthusiastic over the african enterprise, as it introduced new and, to him, unaccustomed and unwelcome values into italian political life; but he realised that public opinion demanded it and he did not care to run counter to the current. he was criticised by the vestals of constitutional tradition for having declared war without consulting parlia- ment and for not having summoned it until several months later. during the campaign, he was, moreover, severely blamed on the ground that he acted as though the war were merely an affair of internal politics and party combinations. when peace was concluded fresh elections were held on the new franchise law introduced by the cabinet, which raised the electorate from 3,000,000 to 8,000,000 votes (oct. 26~-nov 2 1913); although a giolittian majority was again returned, his opponents, not only among the socialists, but also the constitutional parties, were now more numerous, and he felt that opposition to his rule was growing in the country at large even more than in parliament. the various awkward problems which now faced the government and the divisions among its own supporters induced him to seize the opportunity of a hostile vote by the radical group to resign (march 10 1914). , when the world war broke out his attitude was favourable to the absolute neutrality of italy,as he believed that his country’s interests lay in not siding with either group of belligerents, and on the eve of italian intervention he made an attempt, by using his personal hold over the parliamentary majority, to upset the salandra cabinet, but it was frustrated by an uprising of public opinion in favour of the war. during the progress of the cam- paign he avoided public affairs, although he assumed a cassandra- like attitude in all his utterances, and his henchmen in the press were frankly “ defeatist.””> he consequently lost his intluence 233 over the bulk of public opinion and in many quarters was regarded as little better than a traitor. but after the armistice the un- satisfactory consequences of the peace negotiations, the heavy burden of suffering and loss caused by the war, and, above all, the disputable internal policy of the nitti cabinet, which was accused of handing the country over to the bolshevik socialists, brought about the return of giolitti. when nitti was forced by the impossibility of governing the country to resign for the third and last time on june 9 1920 a new giolitti cabinet was the inevitable alternative. he suc- ceeded by june 15 in forming a cabinet which comprised a number of non-giolittians of all parties, but only a few of his own “ old guard,’ so that he won the support of a considerable part of the chamber, although the socialists and the popolari (cath- olics) rendered his hold somewhat precarious. his policy of inactivity during the occupation of the factories by the work- men organised by socialist leaders in sept. 1920 provoked the indignation not only of the manufacturers but of all the middle- class. ile appears to have acted under the impression that the socialists were much stronger than they really were, and there- fore gave them a free hand with the object of avoiding blood- shed, and also perhaps with that of proving to the workmen that they could not run industry without the capitalists and the technical experts. when he realised the strength of the national reaction, he allowed the fascists free rein to re-establish order and practically exercise many of the functions pertaining to the government, while he assumed an attitude of olympic calm and posed as being au-dessus de la melee, so as to avoid com- promising himself with any party. in foreign affairs giolitti succeeded in achieving a solution of the adriatic problem less unsatisfactory than most of the pre- vious proposals of the annexation of new provinces under the peace treaties and of the altered state of public opinion on inter- nal policy, he dissolved the chamber on april 7 1921, and was confirmed in power by the elections on may 15. but he resigned with his cabinet at the end of june, being succeeded as premier by signor bonomi. he played no part in the subsequent events, until at the time of the march on rome he was one of the statesmen who advised the premier signor facta to resign. on the advent of the fascist govt., he expressed his approval of it and instructed his followers to support it. at the elections of 1924 he presented a list of his own in piedmont, which was not in opposition to but independ- ent of the government, and in an election speech he attributed many of the achievements of fascism to his own policy. after the matteotti affair he definitely went over to the opposition but did not leave the chamber, and his hostility remained fairly moderate. in 1922 he published two volumes of memoirs entitled afemorie della mia vita. (li ve} girl guides, a movement for the training of girls based on similar principles to those of the boy scouts (q.v.). its aims are: to develop good citizenship; 1o train girls in habits of observa- tion; obedience, self-reliance, loyalty and thoughtfulness for others; to teach useful service and handicrafts; to promote physical development; to make them capable of keeping good homes and bringing up their children properly. the training runs mainly in four directions: character and intelligence; homecrafts and handicrafts; health and physical development; service for others. the movement is non-political and interdenominational. origin and iistory.—after the boy scout movement had been founded by sir robert baden-powell girls in different places be- gan to copy its activilies, and banded themselves together as girl scouts. to meet the needs of these girls, sir robert and his sister, miss agnes baden-powell, in rgro started a separate movement for girls, and gave it the name of girl guides. the movement received a charter of incorporation in rors and a royal charter in 1923. princess mary became president in 1920. lady baden-powell (wife of the chief scout) was elected chief guide in 1918. organisation.—the governing body of the girl guides is the council, which mects annually and clects an executive of nine mem- bers. sir robert baden-poweil is permanent chairman of the 234 executive. the executive appoints county commissioners, who in turn appoint division and district commissioners to assist them. u nder the latter come the captains, who do the actual training of the girls, grouped into companies. a guide company consists of from cight to 40 girls, and is subdivided into patrols, each under the charge of a patrol leader, who is herself a guide. she is cither appointed by the captain or elected by the other guides, and has entire authority over her patrol, and entire responsibility for its conduct and_ efficiency. the affairs of the company are managed by the court of honour, con- sisting of the patrol leaders, who meet periodically, under the chair- manship of the captain. a company usually mects once a week, and goes to camp, if possible, for one week in the year. _membership.—to become a member of the guide movement a girl or woman has to be enrolled. she makes a three-fold promise: to lo her best to do her duty to god and the king; to help other people at all times; to obey the guide laws. there are ro guide laws, namely: a guide’s honour is to be trusted; a guide is loyal; a guide's duty is to be useful and to help others; a guide is a friend to all and a sister to every other guide; a guide is courteous; a guide is a friend to animals; a guide obeys orders; a guide smiles and sings under all difficulties; a guide is thrifty; a guide is pure in thought, word and deed. after enrolment the members of the movement have the right to wear the guide uniform, navy blue with different badges to denote rank or proficiency. the badge of the guides is a trefoil, their motto is “ be prepared.” there are three main branches: the brownies, aged from 8 to 11, the girl guides, aged from i1 to 16, and the senior guides, from 16 upward, who may be either rangers or sea guides. the officers are called guiders; they can receive training in guide methods at foxlease park, lyndhurst, hants, england, which was presented to the organisation by mrs. archbold sanderson in 1922. the guide movement has spread to the british dominions and other countries. in 1924 a world camp, attended by some 1,100 guides, from over 30 different countrics, was held at foxlease. at the end of 1925 there were some 613,209 members throughout the world. the headquarters of the girl guides are at 25, buckingham- palace road, london, s.w. the movement is financially self- supporting. bribliography.—sir r. baden-powell, girl guiding, the official handbook (1918); the brownie ifandbook (1920); annual report, official (1925); rules, policy and organisation (1926). sce also the girl guides’ gazette. (m. meo.) girl scouts: see boy scouts. ; gladden, washington (1836-1918), american divine (see 12.63), died at columbus, o., july 2 1918. glasgow, scotland (sce 12.80), enlarged its boundaries in 1912 by the inclusion of govan, partick, pollokshaws and several suburban districts, making it again the second city in great britain in population, and increasing its area from 12,975 to 19,183 acres. the number of wards was increased from 26 to 37, and the membership of the corporation from 80 to 113— three representatives of each ward, and two ex-officio members (the dean of guild and the deacon convener of the trades). since 1918 glasgow has sent 15 members to parliament. a further ambitious scheme of enlargement of the burgh was promoted after the world war, owing to the congested state of the city and the fact that many of the housing schemes were situated outside the boundaries. it involved the incorporation of 22,000 ac., and met with opposition from adjacent counties and burghs; eventually, by an act of 1925 (coming into force in may 1926), about half the proposed area, taken from renfrewshire, lanark- shire and dumbartonshire, and including the important yoker area near clydebank, was incorporated. the population in 1921 was 1,034,174 and the rateable value in 1925 £11,040,693. the rent sirtke.—wousing conditions have been extremely bad, and the new houses erected insufficient to accommodate even the normal increase in population; there has also been much unemployment. a legal campaign by the tenants, contesting the validity of notices of increase of rent under the increase of rent (restriction) acts, served without previous notice to quit, was supported by the decision of the house of lords in a test case (kerr v. bryde) in 1922, and in the following year an amending act to regularise the position was passed. many tenants, how- ever, refused not only the increased rent but any rent at all, and demanded a return to the pre-war standard. a large number of eviction orders were granted in 1924 and early in 1925, but their execution was rendered impossible in most cases by the violent tactics of the tenants. in june 1925 the unrecovered rents rep- resented nearly a year’s rental of tenanted houses in the borough, and the local authorities were seriously embarrassed by the non- payment of rates. a rent commission was then appointed which girl scouts—glasgow, university of recommended the simplification of the form of notice required and other reforms in the working of the increase of rent (re- striction) acts. : public buildings, parks —additions to the municipal build- ings, connected by two bridges ‘with the older buildings, were completed in 1923. the mitchell library, the largest of the public libraries, was removed to north street in 1911; 25 branch libra- ries have been established. since 1913 14 new chairs have been founded in the university, and the western sections were being extended in 1926, to provide new classrooms and a memorial chapel. the block of the royal infirmary which contained the famous ward in which lord lister first applied the use of anti- septics was pulled down in the course of an extension scheme in 1924, in spite of widespread opposition. a new building for the kar, nose and throat hospital was opened in st. vincent square in 1926. in 1915 the corporation bought the balloch castle estate, of which 200 ac. were made into the loch lomond park. other purchases were the linn park of 180 ac. (1919); and the ruchazie and frankfield park of 300 ac. (1920). the newlands park was given in 1913, the glenconner park in 1914 and the dawsholm park in 1920. in ro11, 121 ac. of the grounds of pollok house were given for use as a public park for a period of io years. statues of lord kelvin (1913), lord roberts (1916), thomas carlyle (1916) and a war memorial 10 men of the came- ronians have been erected in kelvingrove park; and a war me- morial cenotaph was unveiled in george square in 1924. kelvin- grove and college united free church and kelvin tall, a large building used for exhibitions, etc., were destroyed by fire in 1925. in 1924 a beginning was made with the provision of further dock accommodation on an area of land acquired by the clyde navigation trustees between shieldhall and renfrew. contracts were signed for the construction of railway lines and a road to the new dock area from the new trunk road of the glasgow cor- poration scheme. a big electric generating station was opened at dalmarnoch bridge in 1920, and the largest gasworks of their kind in great britain were completed at govan in 1921. glasgow, university of (sce 12.82).—the following 20 new chairs have been founded since 1907: mining, medicine (royal infirmary), obstetrics and gynaecology (royal infir- mary), surgery (royal infirmary), pathology (royal infirmary), scottish history and literature, french, german, organic chem- istry, physiological chemistry, bacteriology, mercantile law, applied physics, theory and practice of heat engines, electrical engineering, public health, medical paediatrics, italian, spanish and accountancy. new lectureships have been instituted in celtic, psychology, social economics, geography, dermatology, clinical medicine, clinical surgery, clinical obstetrics, discases of the throat and nose, diseases of the ear (royal infirmary), ma- teria medica and pharmacology, electrical diagnosis and thera- peutics, russian, clinical tuberculosis. new buildings.—considerable progress has now been made with the extensions of buildings which were postponed owing to the world war. the new zoology building, erected at a cost of about £112,000, is now occupied, and the building which is to complete the west wing and includes the war memorial chapel is in course of erection. the estimated cost of this building is about £122,000. the students themselves have been active in furthering the student welfare scheme and, including grants from the govt., the carnegie trust and the proceeds of a bazaar, a sum of about {85,000 has been collected. out of this fund there have been provided a union for women students and the necessary expenditure to convert the houses presented by lord maclay and mr. lawrence macbravne into men students’ hostels and the house presented by mr. j. m. robertson into a women’s hostel. the money, about £12,000, necessary for the erection of a pavilion on the athletic ground at westerlands—which is now open—has also been provided out of this fund. grants have also been made to the athletic club and the boat club. the accom- modation of the present union for men students is quite inade- quate. a site for a new building has been secured and steps are being taken to secure the remainder of the necessary funds. glass, carter—glass sir donald mcalister became principal in 1907, and in the ‘university itself, as outside in university matters generally, has exercised a remarkable intluence. students session women total igio-i 2,108 682 2,790 1915-6 : 1,163 658 1,321 1920-1 : 3,57 1,132 4,708 1923-4 . 3:275 t,419 | 1924-5 ; 3,069 1,529 the figures for session 1910-i represent a normal year; i915-6 a war year. the figures for the other years show the large increase in the numbers of students which has taken place since the war. glass, carter (18s58- }, american politician, was born at lynchburg, va., jan. 4 1858. he received his education in the lynchburg schools and learned the printer’s trade, which he followed for several years, eventually becoming proprietor of the lynchburg daily news and daily advance. we was elected to the virginia state senate for two terms (1899-1903) and was a member of the state constitutional convention in 1901. he was clected in rg02 to the national house of representatives, and thereafter was continuously re-elected until his resignation in 1918. as chairman of the house banking committee he was active in framing and passing the federal reserve bank law. in 1or8 he entered president wilson’s cabinet as secretary of the treasury. under his guidance the fifth liberty loan was floated in april 1919. in nov. 101g he resigned, following his appointment and subsequent election to the united states sen- ate. in 1924 he was elected for the term 1925-31.