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    "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926)",
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    "chunk_id": "1926:freemasonry:d4ec9b05c0b4",
    "title": "FREEMASONRY",
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    "verified_text": "the total membership has at least doubled since 1910 and, according to the masonic year book, chicago, is (1926) about 3,922,318. in addition there are at least 1,000,000 “ unrecognised ’’ masons, the most important group being the ‘‘ negro”? masons of the united states of america. of the “regular” masons, all save 208,388 belong to the various grand lodges of the u.s.a. and of the british empire, which indicates that freemasonry ts essentially an anglo-saxon institution. 3 social werk.—in the u.s.a. and holland the most noticeable change has been a tendency to take an active part in the social betterment of the nation. while avoiding controversial political questions, the aim 1s to increase the interest of members in the well-being of their fellow citizens outside the door of the lodge. this tendency is less marked in the british grand lodges, owing to their anxiety to avoid any appearance of interfering as masons in politics, although in the field of charity they are particularly active. anthropological school of research among british masons one of the most notable changes has been the rise of a new school of masonic research, which aims at tracing the history of freemasonry anterior to 1717. faced by the paucity of documentary evidence, due to the nature of the obligations taken by medieval masons, this school has adopted the principles used in the study of anthropology and of comparative religions. it has discovered that figures carved, fremiet—french african literature or painted, by medieval masons, are often depicted making certain signs still known to freemasons, and that in the scenes represented these clearly convey the same inner meaning as to-day. examples of such secret messages have been found in medieval and comacine work and also in that done by members of the roman collegia. there also exists documentary evidence connecting these three groups of builders. a similar use of signs in ancient egypt, in the hung society of china and among savage races when initiating a boy into manhood, has also been demonstrated. on the basis of these facts, which are unquestionable, the theory is being developed that speculative freemasonry is descended via the comacines, the roman collegia and the mysteries from primitive rites, once univer- sal in the dawn of history, survivals of which are to be found to this day in central africa and australia. concurrent with this work has been the careful study of the modern rituals, and the comparison of certain peculiar features in them with similar incidents in the ancient mysteries and in savage rites, the facts so far disclosed suggest that in modern freemasonry we may have an intellectualised survival of the cult of the dying god and of the fertility rites. although this schoo! has produced much interesting data, its conclusions are not yet universally accepted by the older or ‘‘ documentary ” school, the members of which consider that coincidence may explain the similarities to which their attention has been directed. if, however, the views of the anthropological school are ultimately accepted, the result will be that the origin of freemasonry will be pushed back thousands of years. the mystical school.—quite as important has been the rise of a distinctly spiritual school of thought, which endeavours to interpret the meaning of the ceremonies, and considers that in the rituals of the various degrees we have an allegory of the quest of the soul after mystic union with the supreme being. while often differing in de- tail, since they approach the subject from different angles, all the exponents of this school agree in the main principles, although in historical research they are often sharply divided, some belonging to the documentary school and others to the anthropological. per- haps, however, the most important fact is the ever increasing inter- est among the rank and file in a subject which, even a few years ago, would have been treated with complete indifference, masonic relations—since to1c events have proved that the breach between latin and anglo-saxon masonry was based on a fundamental divergence of opinion as to the basic principles on which the order rests, and this breach tends to grow wider year by year. the disastrous results of interfering in politics has been shown by the fact that the italian and hungarian govts. have declared freemasonry to be a danger to the state, and have suppressed it within their jurisdictions. in france opposition to the political activities of the grand orient cul- minated in 1914 in the formation of a new body, “ grande loge nationale independante et reguliere pour la france,” which avoids politics, and insists on belief in god. this body, which has increased rapidly in numbers, is recognised by the grand lodge of england. at the same time, one by one, most of the american grand lodges which were still in fraternal relations with the grand orient have felt compelled to sever relations. brpliograpiry.—anthropological: dr. a. churchward, signs and symbols of primordial man (1910); j.s. m. ward, freemasonry and the ancient gods (1921); major g. m. sanderson, an examination of the masonic ritual (1923); j. s. m. ward, who was hiram abiff 1925). of ical a. e. waite, the secret tradition tn freemasonry (1g11); w. l. wilmshurst, the meaning of masonry (1922); j.s. m. ward, the fe. a.’s and the f, c.'’s handbooks and the m. m.'s books (1923); freemasonry: fis aims and ideals (1923); an interpretation of our masonic symbols (1924); w. l. wilmshurst, the afasonic initiation (1924); a. e. waite, emblematice freemasonry (1925); j.s. m. ward, an explanation of the royal arch degree (1925). | (j. s. m. w.) united staies.—since 1920 freemasonry in the united states has grown with amazing rapidity, and in 1926 had a membership of nearly 4,000,000 men, organised in 50 grand lodges. while in many ways gratifying, the influx of new members raised many problems, to meet which two movements were started. first, the national masonic research society was organised in 1914, under the sanction of the grand lodge of iowa, to encourage the education of freemasons in the history, symbolism and philosophy of freemasonry. its headquarters are in st. louis, where its journal, the builder, is edited. second, the masonic service assn. of the united states organised in 1919 more than 30 grand lodges—the first great co-operative move- ment in american freemasonry. it grew out of the service of the fraternity in the war, and had two objects, as stated in its con- itl stitution; firstly relief in time of nation-wide calamity, whether it be war, pestilence or other disaster; secondly education—the teaching of freemasonry as it has to do with the daily lives of citizens and the problems of the nation. the educational programme of the association is based upon the doctrines of the fatherhood of god and the brotherhood of man, under five heads: religious liberty, equality before the law, equality of opportunity, the dignity of labour and charity. its work is carried on by means of short talk bulletins read in the lodges of member jurisdictions, speaker’s bulletins, lectures illustrated by films and moving pictures, books, ard its journal the master mason, edited from its headquarters in washington. the association is managed by ar executive commission, com- posed of one member from each group of states into which the country is divided. as a result of these movements a better kind of masonic literature has been created, at once more accu- rate and more popular—a national masonic library of nine vol- umes, and a little masonic library of 20 volumes. the whole intent of the movement is to know more about freemasonry and to do more with freemasonry for the service of mankind. recent years have witnessed the building of great temples of freemasonry in many of the chief cities of the country, and also a remarkable growth of philanthropic activity—the building of homes for the aged and indigent, orphanages and hospitals and the organisation of the national masonic tubercular sanitoria asso- ciation. since the world war there have been tentative at- tempts to form an international masonic assn. but they have been largely abortive, so far as american freemasons are con- cerned, owing to the refusal of freemasons in the united states to affiliate with foreign bodies which remove the bible from the lodge and do not require faith in a supreme being as a requisite of membership. bibliography.—j. fort newton, the builders; oliver d. street, symbolism of the three degrees; h.l. haywood, symbolical masonry; h. m. johnson, the beginnings of freemasonry in america; a. s. macbride, speculative masonry; ray v. denslow, territorial mason- ry; d. d. darrah, the story of freemasonry. (j. f.n fremiet, emmanuel (1824-1910), french sculptor (see 11.96), died sept. 11 1910. french, daniel chester (1850- ), american sculptor (sce 11.98}, numbers among his more notable recent works the four groups representing europe, america, asia and africa for the new york custom house; the melvin memorial at concord, mass. (1916); the 1st division war memorial, washington, d.c. (1924), and the statue “‘ memory ” (1911), which was purchased by henry walters and given to the metropolitan museum of art. his statue of abraham lincoln, executed for the lincoln memorial, washington, d.c. (1920), portraying lincoln seated and in a meditative mood, occupies a superb though simple setting and is considered the crowning work of french’s life. french african literature.—the enormous continent, of africa on account of its geographical configuration, is apt to appear as a single unit. but this could only be if all ne- groes were of the same race; whereas, ethnically speaking, owing to the intermingling of blood and the differences of latitude and longitude, there are as many races of negroes as there are african tribes. an englishman differs less from a russian than an ourlaf from a haoussa, and a haoussa from a kafhr. the outbreak of the world war brought home to france her need for man power, and she then began to turn her attention towards a race which sent her its men by thousands. in the midst of the madness and destruction that overwhelmed europe, she realised that she had to do with men who were like children and whose virgin minds required cultivation. she was forced to recognise that, in spite of solid, imposing and well-documented volumes, the theories with regard to the natural superiority of the aryan races, set forth by count gobineau in his essat sur pinegalite des races humaines (1853-5), had received an un- pleasant shock. moreover, the ideas which dr. cureau, a former governor of french equatorial africa, and a follower of gobineau, expressed in his learned and interesting soctees primitives de v afrique equatortale (1912) have, after much dis- iit2 cussion, been strongly attacked, first by jean finot, whose work le prejuge des races (1905) has attained world circulation, and later by doctor huot, in ‘ l’4me noire.’’! the soul of the negro, as compared with that of the white man, is emotional, unstable, variable and incomprehensible. it cannot be’fathomed either in the tales of the old navigators — they dealt too much in fable and fantasy—or in the journals of contemporary explorers. those who have lived long enough with the negro have learned to hold him in affection, which, according to stendhal, is nothing but the crystallisation of feel- ings and inclinations. we cannot number among the initiated either pierre lott, impassioned admirer of the exotic—the poet and magician who was inclined to bewitch himself with his own incantations—or even fromentin, whose un ete dans le sahara (1874) and une annee dans le sahel (1859) conjure up before us burning sand and blinding light; but we must include isabelle eberhardt, the bonne nomade, whose whole work is a glorification of islam; and a group of other writers of whom the most outstanding are robert randau, whose novels les colons (1907), les alg*rianistes a ea * 7 } (1912) and cassard le berbere are powerful and vivid; f. duchere with au pas lent des caravanes (1922), thamil’la (1923) and le roman du aledduh (1924); maximilienne heller with la mer rouge (1923) and mary others. these works, however, have been in- spired less by the influence of africa than by that of the medi- terranean. in spite of such works as terres de soleil et de sommeil (1916) and le voyage du centurion (1916) by lucien psichari, visions congolaises by louis de raulin and les explorateurs (1909) and le commandant ct les foulbe (1910) by robert ran- dau the true african influence has only prevailed since roto. since that time there has been a harvest of such literature, including the remarkable visage de la brousse by pierre bonardi (1920) and pisolement by dominique combatte, which exude the stifling atmosphere of a tropical forest. des inconnus citez moi (1920), by lucie cousturicr, is a work profoundly true, pro- foundly human as well as infinitely pathetic. batouala by rene maran (1921), la randonnee de samba diouf (1922) by the brothers tharaud, affi (1922) by gaston joseph, diato, a mine of mandingo folk-lore, by andre demaison (1923), afstempsy- cose by madeleine de valcombe (1923), pellobell2, gentilhomne soudanais, by oswald durand, ulyse, cafre (1924) by the broth- ers marius-ary lebland, les chansons de kou-singa by jean marville have also contributed to the researches of such men as delafosse, bruel and missionaries of all classes, lay, military, commercial and religious. these works may not perhaps have the lyric character which runs through a travers ll’ afrique (r910) by captain baratier, nor the humour of that caustic ad- venturer to whom pierre mille, the french kipling, has given the name barnavaux. they are, however, a valuable contribu- tion to the study of the negro mind, and as such increase our knowledge of humanity. (r. ma.*) french literature (see 11.110)—the 15 years between rgtr and 1925 were overshadowed historically by the events wiich preceded the war of ror4, by the war itself and by post- war preoccupations and difficulties. if the course of literature was not entirely determined by this concurrence of great events, it at least responded to them, and bears deep traces of their influence. these marks can be found in the writings of prac- tically all those who were at work during this period. two literary generations occupied these 15 years; one, the older, that of the writers who belonged to the preceding period, already famous or recognised in r911, who were only continuing their work; the other, a younger generation, that of the writers who made their first appearance in 1914 or after 1918. i. the pre-war generation the most important writers of rgtr and succeeding years have already been accounted for in the preceding period. it will suffice here then merely to recall their names and the books which they published after rorz. it will be more interesting to note the general tendency of literature at this point. 1 mercure de france (sept. 1921). french literature the peculiar characteristic of french literature in 1911 lay in the fact that the great movement of reaction against the ex- cesses of naturalism which had started 20 years before had reached its culmination, and with entire success. about 1889 the doctrine of naturalism was still triumphant, and had im- posed a general conception of things which was affirmed by the scientific spirit. it was material, subject to reason, in no way sentimental. it had invaded the novel with zola, the theatre, and even made its way into philosophy. it claimed te make use of the discoveries of savants, of berthelot in chemistry and darwin in biology. it was fatalistic, pessimistic, setting itself avainst religious beliefs and even against the tradition of the things of the spirit. it claimed to reduce all life, even the life of the soul itself, to a mechanism of causes and effects, to a purely physiological basis. it was about the year 1889 that new tendencies were mani- fested simultaneously in poetry, in philosophy, in criticism and in the novel. while keeping as a fundamental principle the recognition of the fact, that is to say the method of observation, the newcomers insisted upon their observation being complete, upon its taking into account the whole of reality, not merely facts, but also all the stuff of feeling, aspiration, of the impulses of the soul, of spiritual energy. as a result of all this, thought became re-invigorated, took a new lease of life. such was the accomplishment of men very different in their inspiration and their convictions. paul bourget and barres among the novelists, ifenri de regnier among the poets, remy de gourmont, charles maurras and andre gide among the critics, played a great part in this change. groups like those of the afercure de rance, the nouvelle revue francaise, the cahiers de la quinzaine, under the leadership of charles peguy, did their capable share. it may be said that in 1911 the distinction had been clearly mide between science, which establishes laws and fundamental causes and sets them forth in abstract terms, and art, which minifests these causes sympathetically by appealing at one and the same time to the reason, the heart and the senses. the works of a mathematician of genius, like jules henri poincare, had made for the development of a more exact conception of science and the scientific method. the books of henri bergson, especially the one which appeared in 1907 (l’evolution creatrice), hil created a new spiritual awakening. everything thus con- tributed’ towards liberating the spirit from the narrow bound- aries of naturalism. a literary outburst was the result, the miin characteristic of which is that each work reflects the tem- perament and the tastes of the author, without dependence on any school. certain writers remain faithful to their conception of the novel (gustave geffroy, cecile pommier, 1922), and the academie goncourt continue the tradition of objectivity and naturalism. but the brilliant group of psychological writers that followed paul bourget and maurice barres goes back to benjamin constant and stendhal, indeed even invokes balzac, and attempts to make of the novel a complete representation of life, of the spiritual life as well as the social and material. during the 15 years (1910-25) there appeared a brilliant series of psychological studies. writers already famous continued their work. paul bourget produced le demon de midi (1914), nemesis (1918). maurice barres wrote greco, ou le secret de tolede (1912), la colline inspiree (1913), and just before his death published that engueie aux pays du levant (1923), which unites in itself all his peculiar qualities of thought and expression and which remains one of his finest books. rene bazin (les nouveaux oberle, 1919); henry bordeaux (la maison, 1913, and la resurrection de la chair, 1920); rene boylesve (tu nes plus rien, 1914, elise, 1921); louis bertrand (jean serbal, 1924); edouard estaunie (les choses voient, 1913, l’ascenston de m. baslevre, 1920), attest the vitality of a genre which was tried with success also by emile clermont (1878-1915), author of laure (1913); louis codet (1877-1918), author of la petite chiquette (1911), cesar caperan (1918), la fortune de becot (1919); and roger martin du gard, of a more philosophical turn (jean barots, 1914, and les thibault, 1922). the analytic and descriptive novel of manners continued with french literature henri lavedan, irene olette, le chemin du salut, 1920-3); abel hermant les renards (1912), l’aube ardenie (1919), la journee breve (1920); with gaston cherau (la prison de verre, 1912, le monstre, 1913). jereme and jean tharaud (l’ombre de la croix, 1917, and un royaume de dien, 1920); gilbert de voisins (leenfant qui prit peur, 1912); the tales of henri duvernois (le veau gras, 1912, edgar, 1912); edmond jaloux, marcel boulenger, eugene montfort, claude anet, charles geniaux. an offshoot of the symbolist movement, the poetic novel of fantasy has its most illustrious exponents in the poet henri de regnier (la pecheresse, 1920, le divertissement provincial, 1923); in the poct francis jammes (mm. le cure d'ozeron, 1918, le pocte rustigue, 1920); and in the young alain fournier (1886-1914), snatched away too soon from letters by the war, whose book le grand meaulnes (1914) remains a charming and impressive work. finally, exotic literature, dominated by the great name of pierre loti, finds brilliant expression in claude farrere (la bataille, 1911, dix-sept histoires de marins, 1914); jerdme and jean tharaud (la fete arabe, 1912); pierre mille, marius- ary leblond, and in the posthumous book of lauis iiemon on canada, maria chapdelaine (1916), which had a prodigious success. women have always excelled in the literature of imagination. three writers occupy the first rank in this respect—colette, who has added to her already famous list of works la vagabonde (1910), l’entrave (1914), chert (1920), la maison de claudine (1922) and la fin de cheri (1926); gerard d’houville, daughter of the great poet j. m. de heredia, wife of henri de regnier, who has a rare poetic gift and who tells in the most fluid style prose stories of charming and often profound imagination, (le seducteur, 1914, jeune fille, 1916, taunt pis pour tot, 1920), and who has written in l’erfane (1926) a little masterpiece; and comtesse de noailles, a poet of passionate and inspired quality as well, who in 1923 under the title of les tunocentes published a series of novelettes and meditations in whicn tyricism is made the vehicle of a daring frankness. mme. marcelle tinayre pub- lished in 1920 persephone and in 1922 priscille severac. mme. lucie delaruc-mardrus, a very gifted story-teller, observant and poetic, wrote l’dme aux trois visages in totg and graine au vent in 1925. mme. andree corthes received in 1920 the novel prize of the academie francaise for her book entitled pour moi seule, at the theatre that most personal of writers, francois de curel, produced terre inhumaine (1923), la viveuse and le moribond (1925). g. de porto-riche pursued his vigourous studies of passion with le wei homme (1911) and le marchand d’ estampes (1918). maurice donnay, so charming, and, at the same time, so melancholy and whimsical, has continued his social studies in les eclairenses (1913) and la chasse dvhomme (1920). alfred capus, a lucid realist, ironical and with a gift for natural dialogue, produced zelene ardouin in 1913 and l’institut de beaute in ror4. henry bataille (1872-1922), hypersensitive, slightly involved and exotic, brought out le phalene in t914 and l’homme @ la rose in 1922. henry bernstein after a series of dramatic and violent plays (l’assazi, 1922), brought out le secret (1917), in which his effects are drawn from psychology and character. comedy has owed its greatest successes to robert de flers (l’habit vert, 1913, m. brotannean, 1914, les nouveaux messieurs, 1925); to tristan bernard (les petites curteuses, 1920); to francis de croisset (le cocur dispose, 1912); and to sacha guitry. whose vivacity and wit find trium- phant expression in le veilleur de nuit (1911), l’illusionniste (1921) and l’amour masque (1924). the most interesting attempts in the way of original work have been made by fran- cois porche, who in les butors et la finette (1918) and le cheva- fier de colomb (1922} combines in a curious way the relics of ancient traditions with an entirely modern feeling for symbolism; and by p. claudel, author of l’otage (1911), l’annonce faite da marie (1912), le pere humilie (1920) and le pain dur (1918), works sometimes obscure, but freighted with purpose of an in- contestable quality, and with austere emotion. in the domain of poetry all the squabbles of the schools had 113 already been silenced by 1911. symbolism had done its work. its most illustrious representative, henri de regnicr, had returned to traditional forms. master of rhythm and of rhyme, connoisseur of language, sumptuous and self-contained, he has amplitude and richness. cultured, a great reader of history and old books, he knows the past. he has at his command all the images supplicd by legend, history, nature and art. the outcome of this is a magnificent and lordly poetry which is the mirror of the passions, the adventures, the glories and all the multiple forms of human destiny (poesies, 1907, vestigia flam- mac, 1921). much nearer symbolism, francis viele-gniffin has studied the ancient myths and has attempted to interpret their eternal significance (voix d’tonic, 1914). francis jammes is the poet of nature and divinity. he knows the country well, and he speaks of it with a charming simplicity and freshness (les georgigues chrelicnnes, 1911-2). he shows the same ingenuous- ness, the same healthy realism, the same humility in his poetry of religious inspirations; he has in him something at once bucolic and christian (la vierge ef les sonnets, 1919). comtesse de noailles is on the contrary pantheistic and pagan. impetuous and consciously unrestrained, heavy with doom like a priestess of old time, she has sung in eloquent and remarkably rhythmical verse of youth, love, the beauty of the universe, and also cf human unhappiness, implacable destiny and death (les vivants et les morts, 1913, les forces eternelles, 1920). in her last verses (poeme de amour, 1924) she has adopted a deliberately simy le and bare style, in which is traceable a growing mclancholy, a strange lassitude in her ardent work, and, by way of substitute for resignation, a courage full of serenity. paul claudel, a vigorous personality, penetrated by a faith which, unlike the tenderness of francis jammes, is austere and sometimes sombre, and has written poems (lu cantate & trois voix, 1914, trots boemes de guerrc, 1915, la mcsse id-bas, 1919), which present a mixture of rather obscure metaphysics, rather self-conscious simplicity, and vivid and powerful imagery. charles peguy, ardent, sophisticated and simple, socialist and patriot, has shown in his poems le mvsterve de la charite de jeanne d’are (1910), le mystere des saints innocents (1912), fve (1914) a fluency which is slightly wearing because of his repetition cf the same themes, but at the same time a real power due 1. sincerity, tenderness and the human need for faith and piety. finally, paul valery, who had made his appearance between 1889 and 1898 in reviews of poetry and letters, la con- gue and le centaure, after having kept silence for a long while, published in 1917 le jeune pargue, and in 1922 charmes. these two extremely slender collections contained much substance under an unpretentious form, and established his reputation. mathematician and philosopher, a subtle and experienced artist, a disciple of mallarme, to whom he owes much, he gives expression to an abstract and intellectual life which though slightly arid is still passionate, and his work has a deep full note. the tendency to return to simple, pure and classical sources is found also with paul fort, whose ballades frangaises are full of colour and imagination; with j. p. toulct, fernand gregh, abel bonnard, franc-nohain, whose fabies (1921) are delight- fully humorous; with alfred droin and pierre camo; while symbolistic description 1s the more natural vehicle for jean roytre. if one were obliged, in spite of this diversity of temperaments, to characterise the period between ro11 and 1914, one might make two observations. one is that in mattcrs of form pre-war writers went back almost without exception to classical tradi- tions, to proportion, simplicity, clearness. the other js, that as far as guiding principles went they were for the most fart occupied with furnishing a moral discipline to their contem- poraries, and that in the wake of dilettantism and naturalistic pessimism they laboured to restore notions of order, of decorum, of hicrarchy, which to them seemed useful to the national life. whatever may have been the glory of anatole france, it was not he who was then a leader, and who exercised an influence over men’s souls; it was paul bourget and maurice barres. there appeared at the approach of that danger constituted by 114 the war a phenomenon worthy of remark by historians of the future. the grandson of renan, ernest psichari, wrote in 1913 lappel des armes, and shortly afterwards le voyage du centurion (1916). political crises and intellectual visionings had brought about a state of uncertainty that might prove a cause of weak- ness. under the pressure of national exigencies that were apparent to all thoughtful minds, french literature in 1911 was mainly inspired by the attempt, which has been justified by the facts, to assure the future of the threatened country, to make readers acquainted with the strenuous life and the funda- mental principles of the social and moral worlds. il. the post-war generation the war abruptly ended the literary careers of many young men, who were killed on the field of battle, men who in all branches of literary activity gave high promise—novelists like alain fournier and emile clermont, poets like paul drouot and j. m. bernard, essayists ike dufresnoy and pierre gilbert. but with those who survived it and had passed through its fires it only stimulated the desire for expression. during the course of the war there appeared a serics of brilliant books of diverse character, but sincere and passionate, retracing the heroic years. it is impossible to mention all, but we must at least set down here le songe (1922), by henry de montherlant; les croix de bois (1919), by roland dorgeles; le fex (1916), by henri barbusse; la flamme au poing (1917), by h. malherbe; gaspard (1916), by rene benjamin; civilisation (1918) and la vie des martyrs (1917), by georges duhamel; sous verdun (1916), by maurice genevoix; la guerre d vingt ans (1924), by philippe barres; fond de cantine (1920), by pierre drieu la rochelle, and les reciis de guerre dits &@ une femme, by camille mayran. none of these books pretends to give a summary or to describe the whole of the war. it will be a long time before these great events will find their poet to synthesise and express them; bonaparte had to wait for victor hugo. but all these works powerfully represent direct impressions and strong emo- tions; they have a meaning, and our grandchildren will find in them one day a sincerely moving record of a period that was shaken by a terrible storm. this interesting and noble outburst necessarily faded as the events moved further away. the current of life which had been interrupted for four years took up its course again. all countries had to repair the consequences of the conflict. new problems arose. difficulties mounted. the combined effect of all these causes was that there was no longer a collective effort. everyone returned to his own preoccupations, to the world of his own imagination and fancy. more or less indifferent to the heritage of their elders, the young writers appeared to be under the im- pression of existing in a new world where they had to recreate everything. but nevertheless they remained under the influence of the past, sometimes without suspecting it themselves. they discovered, by the very fact that they lived in a predetermined epoch, the result of the labours of their elders. tendencies, varieties of talent and aspirations are very diverse. there is little unity in the literature of the younger gencration. every- one follows the inclinations of his own temperament. the situa- tion viewed as a whole gives the impression of a melting pot in which everything is in a state of fusion but out of which one day something new and unforeseen will spring. let us try, in so far as we can to-day, to discern what this may be. the dominating form in modern literature is always the novel, and it will serve as a type. it is not distinctively, in spite of the definition, a narrative representing life, but often con- sists of recollections like a book of memoirs or of reflections like a book of essays. the strongest influence to appear has been that of marcel proust (1873-1923). according to the date of his birth he belongs to the pre-war generation; but one finds that his work appeared almost entirely during or since the war. only the first volume of his great novel a la recherche du temps perdu, namely du cete de chez swann, had appeared by the end of the year 1913. all the others appeared in sequence down to 1925. marcel proust is remarkable for the depth and daring french literature of his analysis. gifted with an acute, morbid sensitivity, he probed deeply into the motives of the heart and soul. with an extraordinary delicacy and detail, he succeeded in express- ing new and original nuances of thought in sinuous and often interminable sentences. the bold analysis of the emotions in french literature had begun some years before marcel proust; by anatole france but with discretion, and later with more freedom by the female writers; but marcel proust has gone much further. he has carried the taste and feeling for intro- spection to the extreme limits. by this one can say he has enlarged the scope of the novel, and that is the reason for his great prestige and influence among post-war writers. this preoccupation with analysis is found in a series of works the most characteristic of which are: jacques riviere’s aimee (1921), jacques de lacretelle’s silbcrmann (1922) and la bonifas (1925), and drieu la rochelle’s etat civil (1921). in reality a gift as personal and exceptional as that of marcel proust encourages tendencies more than it provokes imitation. psychological introspection is part of our period. it appeared in the course of the war more acutely and frequently than ever. carried to the extreme, it has resulted in the formation of the super-realist (sur-realiste) school, which in essentials existed already before the war, but which has been revivified by younger enthusiasts. the object of literature in the opinion of this school is to seize upon the pure thought itself, in its barely con- scious stage. the outcome of this is a series of jottings, often obscure, or at least unintelligible according to the ordinary processes of the understanding, and a series of images which has certain associations with the art of the cinema and which neg- lects traditional logic. at this extreme point the work of analy- sis is entirely occupied with the subjective, and hardly takes into account at all the exterior world. although there have been young men of talent like aragon among the followers of this school, it has as yet produced no work which has touched the world outside the literary cliques. those who appear to have the most individual temperaments have detached them- selves from the group, like j. cocteau (thomas vimposteur, 1923) and drieu la rochelle (plainte contre inconnu, 1924), and they are little by little returning to the classical forms. this attempt has had, however, up to the time of writing one result :— it has rid literature of all trace of rhetoric. in spite of a marked tendency towards simplicity and brevity for many years, there still remained traces of a declamation whose origin went very far back. the prestige of the sublimities of hugo and of de michelet was very great, and it nourished a love of the phrase. with all its excesses, the development in the direction of sketchy notations, suppression of logical associations and extravagant simplification has been made at the cost of a classic and sober art. the writers who have been most successful in these last years escape any attempt at classification. each follows his own temperament and inclination. recourse to the past is necessary to distinguish influences, forerunners, schools. in contemporary literature the only thing that can be distinguished is the indi- vidual. the choir of voung poets protest their personal freedom (tristan dereme, charles derennes, geraldy, roger allard, chabaneix). the novelists do the same; m. pierre benoit is a master of the novel of adventure; he knows how to construct; he knows how to tell a story; and addressing himself to a public which, as after every period of upheaval, is in need of distrac- tion, he has been able to captivate the attention in a series of well-made novels (/coenigsmark, 1918; l’ atlantide, 1919; mlle. de la ferte, 1923; le putts de jacob, 1924)—in which he shows a remarkable facility in employing imaginary or historical events and in keeping the reader breathless with suspense over the turns of his stories. it is only necessary to recall le kilometre 83, by henry da- gucrches (1913), to show that since before the war the taste for the novel of adventure had been revived. the influence of anglo-saxon literature, and particularly that of kipling, had been a powerful stimulant in this development. the war naturally only accentuated this tendency. a proof of this is french literature found in the books of pierre macorlan (la cavaliere elsa, 1921), of louis chadourne (terre de chanaan, 1921) of jean d’esme (les barbeeres, 1925), of roland dorgeles (le revetl des morts, 1923), of rene bizet (la sirene hurle, 1921) and of j. kessil (la steppe rouge, 1922, l’ equipage, 1924). all of these appeared between 1918 and 1925. actually, however, it docs not seem that this form of literature is capable of much further develop- ment, except in the case of the exotic, historical or colonial novel. french literature is traditionally psychological. it is characteristic that the best book of pierre benoit, the most - popular writer of novels of adventure, is a novel of manners, mile. de la ferte (1923). francis carco is a painter of the lower depths of society, of the world of the apaches and of the outer boulevards. he deals, as did francois villon in his day, with the world of thieves. he has handled this difficult subject with a great deal of tact (les innocents, 1916, l’homme traque, 1g22, perversiies). francis carco is a true artist with a quick sensitivity. he has made a study of those who take no count of laws nor of social conven- tions; he has caught human beings with all their passions and all their energies. he has shown how they live beyond the law and current morality; how they have made their own laws, created their own code of honour and conventions. there are in his work many amusing, picturesque and curious scenes, but there is more. he has analysed, often with profound sympathy, these creatures of an outcast world and their imagination, dreams and miseries. jean giraudoux is also a subtle analyst. he has a capricious imagination and a very individual, if somewhat complicated, poetic manner, which makes him difficult reading; but he is pro- vocative. there is in him much humour, often of an unexpected kind, difficult to understand. the world of images has no secrets from him. unusual comparisons and strange associations of ideas abound in his books. the most successful of these is suzanne et le pacifique (1921), the story of a shipwrecked young girl who lives alone on a desert island. she has to reorganise her life, and by a series of chances and deductions she discovers that the war, of which she knew nothing when she left, is going on. psychology in this book takes precedence over adventure, for the author primarily wished to portray the reactions of an iso- lated human being in face of the vast world. henry de montherlant is one of the most gifted among the young writers. he hasa sense of style, and is capable of vigorous mental activity. after le songe (1922) he wrote about verdun, and about sports (les onze devant la porte doree, 1924), books which disclose his national and moral preoccupations. he is interested in the disciplines which make a human being master of himself, permit him to live under the best conditions, and give the greatest possible value to his acts. he is very modern, and at the same time deeply attached to tradition; his works are filled with youthful ardour, strength of will, and an impetu- osity which express themselves in vivid and poetic language. francois mauriac is a harsh and powerful novelist. his books (le baiser au lepreux, 1922, genitrix, 1923, le desert de l’amour, 1925) have placed him among the most notable writers of his generation. brought up in the catholic tradition and attached to his faith, francois mauriac is aware both of the demands imposed by a christian life and of the weaknesses of most human beings. all his work, which incidentally is open-minded, seems dominated by the idea of sin, by the necessary artifices in which egotism and passion entangle human beings, by the nothingness of their desires and the need for discipline. he combines realism, austerity and even daring. just as in cathe- drals, where bold sculpture representing vice and demoniac in- spirations are adjacent to sacred arthitectural motives, so he has put into his work scenes that are sordid enough, side by side with aspirations towards purity. andre maurois, who during the war was interpreter with the british army, made his debut with an impressionistic book, entitled les silences du colonel bramble (1918), which had a great success. he published in 1923 ariel, ou la vie de shelley, which had great charm, and des dialogues sur le commandement 15 (1924). he is less a novelist than an essayist. he has a pene- trating, highly cultivated mind and loves the play of ideas; he excels in delicate analyses, in the nuances of the emotions and in psychological insight. valery larbaud is interested in the manifestations of the international mind, and has written fascinating novels. fermina marquez 1s an original study of the life of young peoplesin south american schools. le journal d’? a.o. barnabeooth, which fol- lowed, is a novel in which satire is mingled with poetic fancy. in it he amuses himself with drawing the life of a millionaire who can see everything, buy everything, and almost do what he pleases, and yet is stifled with boredom and doubt, finding pleasure only in doing everything that runs counter to the con- ventions of his social position. this story of the weariness of one of the inheritors of the earth is written with a vivacity which is one of the most curious characteristics of modern art. paul morand represents the impressionist school at its acme of success. his short stories ouvert la nuit (1922), and his novel lewis ct ireue (1924) are certainly among the most entertaining studies of the present time. paul morand has a keen feeling for the feverishness and instability of contemporary life. he is also keenly aware of the international aspect of post-war cities—the mingling in all countries in the same places, restaurants and hotels of people belonging to every race and nation. he has caught finally the clementary flashes which these cosmopolitans have in common by way of certain instincts and manifestations. his pictures are alive and chaotic. the author contents him- self with incisive characterisations and brief formulas. he is full of verbal coinages. he reduces the recital to the bare essential. there is something acrobatic and artificial in this art, but the feat is always successful and entertaining. a great number of other writers and books should be added to this summary. there is much diversity of literary activity. works like les metiers blesses (1919), by pierre hamp, and les entretiens dans le tumulie (1919) and la confession de minuit (1920), by g. duhamel, are a combination of social study and meditation; others, like those of jean rostand (de la vanite), revive the tradition of the writers of maxims and of the moralists; others, like those of alexandre arnoux (la nuit de saint bar- gabe), constitute in the form of a narrative an interesting attempt to represent material civilisation and to give a picture of the modern industrial and mechanical world. the attempts at a revival of the theatre, undertaken by the ““ theatre du vieux colombier,” are continued chiefly by the “* atelier.” while plays with deval and natanson were rather psychological, with zimmer rather sombre, with marcel achard rather fantastic, with geraldy rather sentimental, the modern play is sketchy, containing little action, and above all else designed to portray character. so it at least appears among the last comers, j. j. bernard, obey, amiel, steve passeur. the construction is loose, without complications. the young dramatic authors seem to desire chiefly directness; they have no ambition to uphold theses, and wish only to amuse and to pro- voke reflection. this article does not pretend to give a complete survey of present-day literature. it is being made, and there is no history at present. all that is possible is to indicate general charac- teristics; the appearance of men of talent may change every- thing to-morrow; the appearance of a genius may accentuate current tendencies or transform them. if one wished to sum- marise the various comments which have been made, one might sav that literature in 1926 is still dominated by pre-war writers after the activity which showed itself in the years 1918-20, it seems there should have been a sort of fruition. many talents with a certain ingenuity have been revealed, many young writers with distinctive personal qualities have published their books: but no single work dominates recent years” or seems capable of exercising a determining influence. it is then towards the masters of yesterday, who are ‘still living to-day (except barres and marcel proust) and who are still exercising their influence, that little by little the younger men are turning their attention. the names of paul bourget, 116 maurice barres and henri de regnier, and those of colette, marcel proust and charles maurras are dominating our period. even when they know them only slightly or when they try to free themselves from them, the newcomers live in a society the ideas of which have in some way been fashioned by their elders. they breathe in air which is that of their time. one notices that the psychological analysis of marcel proust has strongly influenced some, that the impressionistic realism of colette has attracted others, while the disciplines formulated by bourget and barres form the mainstay of a great number. it is signifi- cant that a young writer like drieu la rochelle should leave his particular set and return to the barres tradition, and that after years of charming unconformity jean cocteau should entitle a book of essays, rappel & ordre. thus after a detour of 10 years, violently disturbed by the war and its aftermaths, one can say that in 1925 french literature again took up the road which was foreshadowed in 1914. all the schools, after their trials and struggles, have achieved their work and have transmitted the best that was in them. the quarrels between romanticism and naturalism, be- tiveen the parnassians and the symbolists have come to an end. the opposition between scientific rattonalism and the world of the spirit has become less acute. it was a long struggle, bearing witness to the vitality of literature; of all the doctrines nothing is left but the trace of whatever in them was useful and true. present-day french literature seems to be going in the direction of a classic revival in which certain other elements are mingled. brbliography.—g. le cardonnel and c. vellay, la litterature contemporaine (1905); f. strowski, tableau de la litterature fran- crise au xix, siecle (1912); c. h. le goffic, la litterature francaise au xix, siecle, 2 vol. (1919, 1923); r. canat, la litterature fran- caise au xix, siecle, 2 vol. (1921); r. lalou, ltstotre de la littera- ture contemporaine (1922, eng. tr. 1925); c. m. j. bedier and p. hazard, itistotre de la litterature francaise tliustree (the end of this history from page 281 onwards is devoted to the literature of the neal day), 2 vol. (1923-4); g. lanson, /yistotre tliustree de la itterature francaise (the last chapter is devoted to the literature of the present day) (1923-4). bernard fay, panorama de la litterature con- lem poraine (1924). (a. cu.*) freud, sigmund (1856- ), austrian physician and psy- choanalyst, was born on may 6 1856, at ireiburg in moravia, and studied medicine and psychology at vienna, being strongly in- fluenced by briicke in the latter subject. after working tn paris under charcot from 1885-6, he devoted himself, in co-operation with the viennese physician, josef breucr, to the study of nerve cases. the results of their joint investigations were published in 1893 as studien iiber hysterie, expounding a new treatment, the so-called catharsis. this consisted in putting the patient in a hypnotic state, and the examination by the physician, while under this condition, of the forgotten original circumstances under which the symptoms first appeared. subsequently freud pursued a path of his own, and developed a special technique (see psycho analysis). the technique and the results of this research work are explained in freud’s most important works: die traumdentung, 6th ed. (1921); zur psychopathologie des alltagslebens, 7th ed. (1920); dret abhandlungen zur sexual- theorie, 4th ed. (1920). freud’s shorter works were collected in four volumes under the title, kleinere beitrege zur neurosenlehre. freud also published two general sketches of his theory: a shorter one, fiinf vorlesungen iiber psychoanalyse (delivered at worcester, mass., in 1909) and a comprehensive one in vorles- ungen zur einfiihrung in die psychoanalyse (1917). these medi- cal-psychological studies yielded surprising results in relation to other subjects, and in the possibilities of their adaptation in other branches of knowledge, e.g., mythology and the history of re- ligion, civilisation and literature. the principal works in this connection are totem und tabu, 2nd ed. (1920); der witz, 3rd ed. (1921); eine kindhettserinnerung: leonardo da vinci (1916); jenseits des lustprinzips (1920); massenpsychologie und ich- analyse (1921). freud’s works have been translated into english. bibliography.—s. freud, collected papers, authorised trans. under the supervision of joan riviere (1924, etc.); fritz wittels, sigmund freud, etc. tone s. a. tannenbaum, the psychology of accidents, a critical analysis of freud’s theories (1924); j. lau- monier, le freudisme (1925). freud—frohman freycinet, charles louis de saulces de (1828-1923), french statesman (see 11.211) died in paris may 14 1923. frick, henry clay (1849-1919), american manufacturer and philanthropist, was bornat west overton, pa., june17 1840. as a boy he was clerk for his grandfather, who was a distiller and flour merchant; but he early became interested in the coke busi- ness. in 1871 he organised the firm of frick & co., which ulti- mately acquired large coal deposits and ran 12,000 coke ovens. he was chairman of the board of carnegie bros., from 1889 to 1892, and in the latter year, during the homestead strike, was shot and stabbed by alexander berkman, an anarchist. he wasa director of the pennsylvania, the santa fe and other railways, and of the u.s. steel corporation. he died in new york dec. 2 1919. besides large sums left to his family and friends, he left to the city of pittsburgh land for a park, together with an endowment of $2,000,000. his new york mansion, with its collection of paintings, bronzes and enamels, he bequeathed to the city on the death of his wife, with an endowment of $15,000,000. he di- vided his residuary estate, estimated at $50,000,000, between various hospitals and educational and charitable institutions. the value of his new york mansion and its art collection was estimated in 1920, to be $50,000,000. among the chief treasures are the fragonard panels, bellini’s ‘‘ st. francis in the desert,” velasquez’ “ philip iv.,”’ van dyck’s ‘ paola adorno,” rem- brandt’s ‘‘ portrait of himself,” gainsborough’s ‘‘ the mall,” and “the hon. anna duncan.” it includes also fine examples of titian, vermeer, frans hals, ruysdael, cuyp, rubens, el greco, goya, sir thomas lawrence, millet, raeburn, reynolds, romney and turner. friedjung, heinrich (1851-1020), austrian historian, was born at ro&stin, moravia, jan. 18 1851 of jewish parents. fried- jung spent much of his career in political journalism; he was a pronounced german nationalist, and the chief author of the nationalist unser programme of 1885. at the same time he devoted himself to historical research, especially over the period 1848-66, which he covered brilliantly and exhaustively in the three works oesterreich von 1849-60 (1908-12); der krim- krieg und die oesterreichische polittk (1907); and der kampf um die vorherrschaft in deutschland, toth ed. (1917). his other chief works are the volume historische aufsdlze (1919) and the monumental review of modern times das zeitalier des imperiat- ismus (1919-22), which was finished by professor a. f. ptibram after friedjung’s death in 1920. friedjung was a conscientious and an attractive historian, whose works cover all aspects of life during the period with which they deal. the point of view expressed in them is, how- ever, pronouncedly liberal, patriotic and anti-catholic, and shows little sympathy for the slav and magyar nattonalist movements in the dual monarchy. his last excursion into pol- itics was most unlucky, and undeservedly clouded his name; on march 24 1909 when the conflict between austria-hungary and serbia over the annexation of bosnia-herzegovina was at its height, he published an article in the neue freie presse, accusing the serbo-croat politicians in the monarchy of treasonable prac- tices with the government of serbia, and violently attacking conditions in serbia. fifty-two deputies of the croato-serb coalition and their leader supilo separately, sued friedjung for libel. it was disclosed that friedjung had received the docu- ments on which his article was based from the austro-hungarian foreign office, that he had accepted them in good faith but after most insufficient scrutiny and that some at least were blatant forgeries. the affair ended at last in a compromise, but not until it had assumed the proportions of a european cause celebre. friedjung died in vienna july 14 1920. see dr. r. w. seton-watson, the southern slav question and the habsburg monarchy (london, 1911). friedrich, johann (1836-1917), german theologian (see 11.216), died in munich, aug. 19 1917. frohman, charles (1860-1915), american theatrical manager, was born at sandusky, o., june 17 1860. at the age of 12 he started to work at night in the office of the new york frontiers, battles of the tribune, attending school by day. in 1874 he began work for the daily graphic. in 1877 he entered the theatrical business, being for a time associated with his brother daniel in managing the madison square theatre, new york. in 1890 he organised the charles frohman stock company. on jan. 25 1893 he opened his empire theatre, new york. other new york thea- tres with which he was at various times connected were the criterion, garrick, knickerbocker, lyceum and savoy. he was an adept in developing talent. among his successful players were maude adams, ethel barrymore, blanche bates, billie burke, william gillette and otis skinner. during 1905-6 he presented e. h. sothern and julia marlowe in shakespearean plays. he was one of the organisers of the syndicate which for several years controlled the american theatres. beginning in 1897 he presented many plays in london, leasing at different times such houses as the duke of york’s, globe, comedy, vaude- ville and adelphi. he perished when the “ lusitania” was sunk by a german submarine may 7 1915. frontiers, battles of the.—the generic name of “ bat- tles of the frontiers ’ covers the whole of the actions fought at the opening of the world war in aug. 1914, on or near the french frontiers. for convenience these are here divided into six sec- tions, each of which deals with a more or less distinct part of the series of operations. these are: i. early operations in upper alsace; ii. first battles in lorraine; iil. battle of the ardennes; iv. charleroi and mons; v. le cateau; and vi. guise. i. early operations in upper alsace at the beginning of the world war the french higher com- mand was governed by two ideas. one was to avoid posing as the aggressors, and consequently the covering troops were with- drawn 1o km. behind the frontier. the other idea was to plant the flag in the lost provinces as quickly as possible. not only, therefore, were strategy and politics not in harmony, but politics contained a double element, the one pacific, the other aggressive. first french advance.—immediately on the order for mobilisa- tion, an advance on mulhouse was ordered. the offensive began on the morning of aug. 7. its start was promising. mulhouse was reached and occupied in the evening of the 8th. the news of the approach of large german forces then became known. the french commander feared being caught in a trap, and after an eight-hour occupation the town was evacuated, a position in rear being occupied. during the evening of aug. 9, the ger- mans attacked with superior force and drove back the french. the success was not followed up, since german supreme head- quarters had prepared for a massed attack on luxembourg and belgium, which postulated a strict defensive in the south. the retreat from mulhouse was likely to have a prejudicial effect upon the french. to counteract it joffre formed a special army of alsace. early on aug. 1g the germans in front of mul- house were attacked and defeated, and at 4 p.m., for the second time in a fortnight, the victorious french entered the town. but though fortune seemed here for the moment to smile upon the french, reverses elsewhere extended their influence to alsace. orders were issued for the break-up of the army of alsace and the dispersion of its units. mulhouse was again evacuated on aug. 25. the fortress of belfort was thus exposed and open to hostile attack. belfort and dannemarie.—belfort had two reles to play, the one permanent and foreseen, the other thrust upon it very early in the war. in the first place, the fortress was designed to close the gap existing between the vosges and the jura. it was a vitally important rele, for if the germans secured the gap they might penetrate into the heart of france. the other rele was to form a pivot for the bending back of the whole french line, from the swiss frontier to belgium. a vast amount of work had been done during the preceding 40 years to convert the small fortress of 1870 into the immense stronghold of 1914. much, however, remained to be completed. the completion of the task was nec- essarily impeded by the fighting in which part of the garrison was engaged during august. nevertheless, by the time that the army of alsace was broken up the enormous undertaking was 1g 8 achieved. the armament of the forts had been completed; nu- merous batteries had been constructed and armed; centres of re- sistance had been organised; and inundations in front had strengthened the zone of defence. on the other hand, the german heavy artillery had introduced a new factor into war. the crushing of the resistance of liege and namur was disconcerting. by aug. 25 there could be no possible doubt that if the germans were allowed to plant their guns § km. from the forts the heart of the place would be bom- barded and the forts themselves smashed before the artillery of the defence could fire a shot. furthermore, by aug. 25 the allies were withdrawing all along the line. clearly the germans might make a special effort to seize the pivot on which this withdrawal hinged. in these circumstances, and knowing that he had only his own resources to count upon, gen. thevenet, governor of bel- fort, decided not to await the enemy’s attack, but at once to assume the offensive. the plan was quickly put into operation. the offensive reconnaissances in front of the fortress began on aug. 28, and from that date were pursued without interruption. so successful was the operation that by sept. 10 the advanced guards were over the frontier and 11 m. from the fortress. eight days later the headquarters of the 57th div., whose daily re- connaissances had been carried on uninterruptedly in advance of its front, was transferred from toussemagne to dannemarie. this transfer made a great impression in france, as also in alsace, and had all the importance of a victory. it was indeed a considerable success, for the occupation of dannemarie had been carried out with such precision and solidity that it had now to become definite. from sept. 18 1914 onward, the french flag never ceased to fly over the little alsatian town thus reconquered. bribliography.— french official reports, review of the first six months (1915); marshal joffre, rorg-15: preparation et conduite (1920). (see also world war: bibliography.) (f. e. w.*) if. first battles in lorraine the first french plan (general instructions no. 1 of aug. 8 igt4) was purely offensive. it proposed to seek action with all forces united with the right on the rhine. the two armies of lorraine (i. and ii.) were to lead, the i. in the direction of saar- burg, after having thrown back the german vij. army towards strasbourg and lower alsace, while an isolated corps, the vil., would make a diversion to the east of the vosges. the ii. army, covering itself from metz, was to attack in the direction of saarbriick, pivoting on the i. in the neighbourhood of etangs. the two left corps were situated to the west of the moselle, with a view to their eventual employment in the north. disposition of forces.—in front of the i. and it. armies the germans had approximately equal strength (vi. and vii. armies). they would at first keep 1o the defensive, acting as a pivot to the huge wheel being made by their centre and right. the rapidity of the invasion of belgium determined the french to hasten the operations in the east in order to make a diversion. on aug. 13, the [. army had two corps on the meurthe (viii. and niit.). gen. dubail, commanding the i. army, counted be- sides on the co-operation of the two right corps of the ii. army and on that of the nni. corps descending from the vosges on his right. on aug. 16 the ii. cavalry corps was placed under his orders. the final concentration of the complete fighting force, however, could not be complete until the 18th. neverthe- less, the xiit. and viii. corps moved on the 14th, and on the 15th entered cirey and blamont, pushing back the i. bavarian corps, which retired toward saarburg. by the evening of the 17th the two french corps had reached the line vasperveiller-aspach-st. georges, and the xai. ex- tended the line toward the vosges. the ii. cavalry corps had orders to go ahead on the 18th towards saarburg, which was entered after a skirmish. the xxi. corps pushed to the north- east as far as walscheid; the xiii. held the heights north and east of saarburg; the viii., marching on heming, seized the passage of the marne-rhine canal and entered saarburg. the ii. cav- alry corps bivouacked toward diane-capelle, in haison with 118 the ii. army, which had reached the line bisping-chateau salins. the germans held entrenched positions on a front of 40 m., from the neighbourhood of dobbenheim to biberkirch. french offensives—it was decided that the i. army should attack with its left northwest of saarburg, its centre and right standing fast to repulse an eventual counter-attack in the vos- ges. the ii. cavalry corps was to move on saar-union in order to operate south of the saar. on aug. 19 the viil. corps com- menced the attack before dawn, gained the terrain northwest of saarburg and repulsed a counter-attack. on the 2oth it re- sumed the offensive, but during the morning it became evident that it was incapable of opening a passage for the cavalry corps; indeed it was necessary to bring back a division on the canal with heavy losses. in the centre and on the right the french were more fortunate. the xxi. corps met no resistance on the 19th, and the xiii. had not yet been engaged. on aug. 20, the xxi. corps, attacked by the german xiv. corps, inflicted on it a serious check near walscheid; the xiii. corps, coming into line, attacked to the northeast of saarburg, disengaging the right of the viii. corps, which held the town till nightfall. dubail’s intention was to entrench on the front kerprich-soldatenkopf, and to undertake afterwards a methodi- cal advance; but the check to the ii. army led jofire to direct a retreat in lorraine. on the morning of aug. 21 the i. army retired slowly towards blamont. afterwards it was necessary to accelerate the movement on account of the rapidity of the retreat of the ii. army. on the evening of the 23rd, the i. army ex- tended from dames-aux-bois to the col du bonhomme. it had suffered heavy losses, the casualties in the viii. corps amounting to more than §0 per cent. the offensive of the ii. army (de castelnau) had been still less fortunate. on aug. 14 the xvi. and xv. corps moved in the direction of avricourt, with the bulk of the xx., the re- mainder covering the front to the north. in the evening, it faced to the northeast on the high ground at gondrexon, the xv. corps alone having been stopped by the enemy at mon- court. on the 1sth the advance was still checked by the con- dition of the xy. corps, which had suffered heavily; the xvi. corps reached igney-avricourt, the xx. bezauge-la-petite and xanrey. the ix. corps remained on the grande couronne east of nancy and sent out detachments toward the northeast. on aug. 16 the germans continued their retreat and the french followed rapidly as far as morhange, northwest of don- nelay. on the 17th the army was to swing round to the northwest toward delme-chateau salins-dieuze. the xvi. corps pro- gressed without difficulty; the xv. occupied marsal, but could not bring its main body beyond the selle; the xx. corps, in possession of chateau salins, reconnoitred toward the north. rearguard fights only were expected, but on the 18th the xvi. corps from the early morning met the enemy in strength. the german artillery held the xv. corps in the valley of the seille and prevented it from occupying dieuze. the xvi. corps had to fall back on angviller, and only the xx. advanced to the north of morville-les-vic and chateau salins. in spite of the loss of the ix. corps, sent to the iv. army on aug. 18, de castelnau ordered for the roth the continuation of the offensive in the direction of loudrefing, bensdorf and morhange. french reireat: aug. i9-20.—from the morning of aug. 19 the xvi. corps was stopped on the salines canal; the xv. could not pass zommange and vergaville; and only the xx. could make a real advance, pushing a brigade as far as morhange. the 68th res. div., which had relieved the [x. corps, insufficiently cov- ered the left of the xx. corps. de castelnau ordered for aug. 20 a combined attack by the two other corps on the line cutting- dommon-bassing; the xx. was to consolidate its positions, ready to march to the north or northeast. on the zoth the corps on the right, instead of progressing, was attacked and even thrown back. the xx. having attacked and not having im- proved its positions was stopped by de castelnau, but the ger- mans, taking the offensive, threw the left back on chateau salins. the right followed this movement on lidrequin and the 68th div. resumed its position of the previous day. at 4 p.m. the gen- frontiers, battles of the eral ordered a retirement, which began during the night and con- tinued through aug. 21 under the protection of the xx. corps and the 68th division. in spite of the arrival of two new reserve divisions and the if. cavalry corps, the il. army had to retire to the west of the meurthe, the left to st. nicholas. to the north, three divisions held the grande couronne. french i. army action.—on aug. 23, the i. army commenced a three wecks’ battle destined to stop the enemy and support the strongly attacked hl. army. to effect this, it took the offensive on the 24th and 25th, while the ii. army threw back the ger- mans to the northeast. from the 28th to the 3rst the germans stopped the advance of the i. army, and their vi. and vii. armies even aimed at forcing “ the gap of charmes,”’ in such a manner as to carry out an enveloping movement to the west of the vosges. this action was helped by ordering the x xi. corps to take part in the battle of the marne. from these circumstances there resulted a series of very con- fused fights extending over a large front between the grande cou- ronne and the vosges. on sept. 6, the german vii. army, facing dubail, was broken up, divided between the vi. army and the german right then engaged on the ourcq against gen. maun- oury. but dubail's army was also enfeebled by the removal of the xiii. corps to the west of the oise; and at the same time the ii. army lost to the west the 18th div. and the xv. corps. evidently both sides had given up the idea of striking seriously in lorraine. after having gloriously held its positions to the east of nancy and on the meurthe, the ii. armv was itself to be broken up, to be reconstituted on the ieft of the french armies in the “ race to the sea.” thus, after checks resulting from an inopportune offensive, the i. and ii. armies had been first able to stop the german progress; then to throw the enemy back to the frontier. more- over, their merit was all the greater since they had been con- stantly weakened by the withdrawal of their best units. dur- ing the battle of the marne they provided the unshakable pivot of the vast movement undertaken by the allics. it was thanks to their efforts that that movement succeeded. but they had paid the price. a single reserve division between aug. 24 and sept. 12 lost 140 officers and more than 5,coo men. birliography.—carnet d’un officier de dragons, la victotre de lorraine (1915); r. christian-froge, morhange et les marsonins en lorraine (1917). (see also world war: bibliography.) (b..e: p.) ill. battle of the ardennes on the outbreak of the world war, the iii., iv. and v. french armies concentrated towards the frontier, west of the meuse, covered by the vi. corps in front of verdun, and the ii. corps in front of stenay. on hearing of the german attack on liege, gen. joffre decided to post the v. army (gen. lanrezac) toward the sambre and to direct the iv. army, which he had grouped between vitry-le-francais and sainte-menehould, in the region of stenay. the concentration, which had scarcely begun on aug. 8, was nearly finished on the 14th. until the commander-in-chief had all his forces at hand, no one was allowed to be drawn into an important action. the german high command had made a similar decision, hence the battle of the ardennes was the “ battle of the two blind men.” however, on aug. 10, a german mixed brigade arrived near mangiennes and was launched into a mad frontal attack against the advanced posts of the iv. corps (iii. army). while all its attention was taken up with the attack in front, a brigade of the ii. corps (under gen. cordonnier, iv. army) took it in the rear, and the german brigade was destroyed. after this adventure, no german force made any further attempt against the french covering troops. french plan of attack—the german plan of operations placed the v. army between thionville and tintigny, the iv. between tintigny and the meuse de dinant,! the iii. army be- tween dinant and the sambre, the ii. on the sambre and the i. in the neighbourhood of mons. the iti. army was still in the 1 name given to the meuse between mezie¢res and namur. frontiers, battles of the ardennes bchind the iv. and the i. army was hastening towards brussels and antwerp, when on aug. 22 joffre decided to attack. it was certainly a strategic success to bring about a battle with all his forces in the ardennes, while the german iii. army was unable to take part in it. joffre had disposed his iit. and iv. armies in echelon, the left in front, so that he could face the north or east as he wished. on aug. 16 he decided to attack to- wards the north with these two armies forming a rigid block, while the 7th cavalry div. reconnoitred towards thionville, and the 4th and oth cavalry divs. to the north towards the meuse. the result was that in front, and almost everywhere, the army corps had only weak and insufficient cavalry for reconnoitring purposes. the liaison between the two armies was to be kept on the axis marville-virton-etalle. during the night of aug. 20-1 the whole block moved for- ward. the only instructions given by g.h.q. were “ to attack the enemy wherever met.” g.h.q. estimated that the iv. army would have almost nothing in front of it, and yet it was precisely there that the germans had their iv. and iii. armies, the iii. being behind the iv. the lorraine army, which con- sisted of the reserve divisions, groups under gens. pol durand and de lamaze, was placed under the command of gen. maun- oury with orders to defend the hauts de meuse, or eventually, in the event of the advance of the iii. army, to besiege metz and thionville. these reserve divisions were mobilised after the active forces, the men were elderly, they had few officers, and their staffs were inexperienced, so that the iti. army could get little help from them. on the evening of aug. 21, after a long period, during which only patrols had been encountered, the block arrived on the line conz-lagranville (vi. corps), tellancourt (v. corps), virton (iv. corps). at virton the iv. corps tried to get in touch with the ii., which formed the right of the iv. army. the line of battle continued by villers-la-loue (ii. corps), geronville (colonial corps), florenville (xii. corps) and the semoy (xvii. and xi. corps). the ix corps had just arrived from the neigh- bourhood of nancy with the 17th div. (dumas); the moroccan div. (humbert) was not yet in ine. the iv. army (de langle de cary) was to push on towards the north, while the iit. army was to cover the right of the iv. army against any attack coming from the north or east. everywhere the advance was made in divisions, except in the case of the ii. corps, which marched entire on a single road. on aug. 22, all the columns started in a fog at a very early hour for a long march with the idea of “ attacking the enemy wherever met.”” tomarch quickly rather than to take precautions was the order of the day and almost everywhere the presence of the germans was only discovered by receiving shell fire. in the iii. army, the v. corps sent its infantry to the attack without the support of artillery, and it suffered such terrible losses that the leaders became completely unnerved, and gen. grossetti, chief of the staff, had to intervene to prevent a precipitate re- treat. in the lv. army the colonial corps exposed a division in column-of-route to the german guns. the xvii. corps also suffered from a sanguinary surprise. but the most serious danger arose on the right wing of the iv. army, uncovered by the pre- mature check of the iv. corps at virton; and on the right wing of the iii. army, which was not covered either by the 7th cavalry div. or the pol durand group of divisions. fortunately the ii. corps was in a single column so that the rear division was able to make up for the absence of the iv. corps. on the right of the iii. army there was a leader, gen. hache, who with his heroic division gained the necessary time for the other divisions to fall back. the germans did not exploit their tactical success, but remained practically stationary in their positions. this battle of the ardennes taught the french the necessity for co-operation of all arms in the field of battle. battle of the meuse—on aug. 23, 24 and 25 the iii. and iv. armies retired slowly without being disturbed. on the evening of aug. 23 the front of the iv. army was the line montherme (meuse)-montmedy; and that of the iii. army montmedy- spincourt. on aug. 24 they were a little farther to the rear, but 11g not pushed by the germans. a german staff commander, killed in his motor in front of avioth, was found to have on him the orders given to the german iv. army for the forcing of the chiers and meuse crossings on aug. 26 and 27. the iii. army had ob- tained in a similar way information to the effect that the ger- man 33rd div. was to leave metz and attack at etain. a trap was set, but the lorraine army (reserve troops) was not equal to the task and the germans escaped. lorraine aymy dissolved.—on the morning of aug. 25, the right of the [v. army retired between the chiers and the meuse; the iii. army also approached the meuse facing eastwards. thus the two armies practically became one, and it is regrettable that from this time they were not placed under one leader. on the same day, the iv. corps (iii. army) suffered a severe check at marville and they feared they would lose their corps artillery, but the ii. corps came to their assistance and convoyed this artillery to stenay, where they crossed the meuse. this shows how intimate was the co-operation between the two armies. it was on aug. 25 also that joffre gave the first orders which con- tained the real beginnings of the battle of the marne. he de- cided to reinforce the left of the allied armies and to lose ground in order to gain the necessary time for his strategic plans. the lorraine army was dissolved; the pol durand group was to de- fend the hauts-de-meuse; verdun and toul were to have their respective mobile forces returned to them; the 55th and 56th divs. were entrained for montdidier. gen. maunoury had in these two divisions the nucleus of that vi. army which appeared on the ourcq and determined the victory of the marne. on the morning of aug. 26 the entire 1v. army was on the left bank of the meuse, protected on its left flank by the ix. corps and the 4th and goth cavalry divs. between mezieres- rocroi and signy-labbaye, and forming the connection be- tween the [v. and v. armies. on its right flank it was in im- mediate contact with the iii. army, which was concentrated on the left bank of the meuse with the exception of the 42nd divi- sion. so much feared was the envelopment of the iii. army’s right, that the 7th cavalry div. was sent to the rear to dom- basle, between verdun and clermont, as if an extensive enemy movement was expected to take place south of verdun. the iii. army took no part in the battle of the meuse; its 7th div. was summoned to beauclair in order to help the ii. corps on aug. 27, but it was not engaged. on the same day the 42nd div. was taken from the iii. army, reached varennes, and then served as part of foch’s army. defence of the meuse-—on aug. 26, the orders for the iv. army ran: “ from to-morrow the iv. army will fight a decisive battle on the meuse. . . . the corps will make every effort to prevent any attempt of the enemy to cross the river.” generally speaking, the iv. army was some distance from the left bank. its object was to carry out vigorous counter-attacks against german infantry who had passed the river before its artillery could come to its support. the colonial corps was somewhat driven back by the germans, who had crossed the meuse at inor and pouilly, but the arrival of reinforcements from the ii. corps soon checked this. the struggle was severe on the whole front. on the right wing the ii. corps had decided suc- cesses, three times throwing the germans back into the river at cesse and luzy. on the left wing, the success was still more maitked. there the xi. corps, reinforced by the 52nd and 60th res. divs., gained the battle of la marfee. the german 16th div., making the same mistake as did the french at the battle of the ardennes, advanced in massed formation without artillery support and were crushed, leaving in french hands the flag of the 68th prussian regiment. on the evening of aug. 27 gen. de langle de cary gave the following order: “‘ at all costs the germans must be thrown back into the river meuse. the successes gained by the offensive to- day make us hopeful that to-morrow will be equally successful.” however, aug. 28 was not so active as the previous day; the germans scarcely attacked at all, and the orders given by joffre for the coming retirement to the aisne kept the iv. army to its ground. on aug. 28 gen. de langle de cary, in a general order, 120 said: ‘‘ the army inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, yesterday and to-day. it returns to the aisne line, in accordance with orders received, to prepare for the offensive in a new direction.” on the 29th the movements towards the aisne commenced—the battle of the meuse was ended. the french iv. army had beaten the german iv. army—a victory without a to-morrow, but certainly a victory. battle of signy-l abbaye.—the french v. army, having been beaten by the german ii. army on aug. 22 and 23, had to re- treat, leaving a gap 25 m. wide between the iv. and v. armies. the germans poured into this open space. the only known units were the advanced troops of the xii. corps—it was really the iii. army commanded by von hausen. gen. dubois was ordered to fill up this gap and to cover the left of the iv. army, and was given command of the ix. corps, composed of the 17th div. (dumas), the moroccan div. (humbert), and the oth cavalry div. (de l’espee). the 4th cavalry div. had been given up to the v. army. two roads led to the region occupied by the germansat rethel. theroad mezieres-rethel was barred by the 17th div.and the oth cavalry div. at guignicourt, the road from rocroi to rethel by the moroccan div. at signy lvabbaye launois. on aug. 28, the 17th div., hearing the guns from la marfee, had its attention drawn in that direction. on the same day, at 3 a.m., the advanced posts of the moroccan div. were attacked by the xii. (saxon) corps. at 11 a.m. the moroccan div. was turned in the west by the enemy, who seized signy l’ abbaye and so opened up the way to rethel. but the germans did not ex- ploit their success and allowed themselves to be checked at novion-porcien. the battle manoeuvres lasted through aug. 29 and 30. dubois, by clever movements, brought his forces to the north of rethel, having thus accomplished his difficult mission. again german strategy had not made the best use of its superior strength. bisctrograpiy.—belgian army, official reports, la guerre de ro14 (1915); a. von kluck, der mfarsch auf paris und die marue- schlachi (1914); g. hanotaux, ttistoire illustree de la guerre de 1014 (1923). see also world war: bibliography. af re! re of iv. charleroi and mons charleroi and mons are the names given to the battles fought by the french v. army and the british army respectively in the latter part of aug. 1914, against the right and right centre of the germans. the french position.—inasmuch as the british did not come up intoline until aug. 22, it will be necessary to deal with the pure- ly french situation first. germany had declared war on france on aug. 2 and the right wing had crossed the belgian frontier on the sth. by aug. 20 1914 the forward movement of the german right-wing armies into belgium, and the failure of the oilensive of the french i. and ii. armies, had caused a modification in gen. joffre’s original plan of campaign. broadly speaking the intention now was to attack through luxembourg and belgian luxembourg with the object of threatening the communications of such german fortes as had crossedl the meuse between namur and the dutch frontier. this duty devolved primarily on the jii. and iv.—z.e., the centre—armies of the irench. in the south the i. and ii. armies were to make a secondary offensive between metz and the vosges to hold the enemy, who might otherwise be able to take in flank the french advancing through luxembourg; and the french v. army and the british army were to act upon the offensive, though this offensive would de- pend almost entirely on success ay the iii. and iv. armies to their right. on the evening of aug. 20 the french v. army was either actually within, or entering, the area bounded by the river sambre on the north and the river meuse on the east. the junction of these two rivers formed a very marked salient; but so far from being a point of weakness this locality was at the moment of great strength. it was sealed by the strong belgian fortress of namur which was to be the pivot of an allied right wheel in the projected offensive. on the 2oth there arrived from frontiers, battles of the g.h.q. the orders for gen. jofire’s new offensive. the orders were to the effect that all information pointed to the intention of the germans to carry out an outflanking movement in the north. the french iii. and iv. armies had been ordered to march against the line neufchateau-arlon. as for the v. army, its task was to pivot on namur and the meuse, and to seek out the main enemy mass in the north. on the left of the v. army the british army would advance towards soignies in the direction of nivelles. british expeditionary force.-—when england declared war on germany during the night of aug. 4-5 her forces available to take the field consisted of a cavalry division, six infantry divisions and some battalions of line-of-communication troops, the whole forming the expeditionary force for service overseas. ‘the govt. decided to retain two divisions temporarily in the united kingdom and to transport the rest of the expeditionary force to france. the first ships sailed on aug. 9 and, thanks to the per- fection of the arrangements for mobilisation and transportation, the operation was completed without a hitch by aug. 18. sir john french, the british commander-in-chief, had reached his headquarters at le cateau on the previous day; and his army consisted of the i. corps (1st and 2nd divs.), lt.-gen. sir douglas haig; iil. corps (3rd and 5th divs.), lt.-gen. sir hor- ace smith-dorrien; and the cavalry division under maj.-gen. allenby, as well as line-of-communication troops. concentration was completed by the zoth, south of maubeuge; and the post assigned to the british was on the left of the french v. army, preparatory to the advance north of the sambre towards soignies referred to above. while his army was concentrating, sir john french visited gen. joffre at vitry-le-francois on the 16th and discussed pos- sible alternatives of action depending on information of the enemy’s plans and dispositions. the main intention was, how- ever, to attack. next day, french visited gen. lanrezac at rethel and there conferred with the commander of the v. army. lanrezac considered that it was not possible to carry out at once the order to attack, so far as it affected his v. army. the whole of his troops had not yet come to hand. ‘then it had to be borne in mind that the british had not yet come up on the left, and that the action of the y. army would also depend upon the suc- cess of the french iv. army on the right. lanrezac therefore confined himself for the moment to issuing orders for the occu- pation of a defensive position by the x. and iii. corps, south of the sambre. german offensive plan.—on this same day (aug. 20), on the side of the germans, a combined attack had been arranged in which the ii. and iii. armies were simultaneously to attack the french v. army, from the north and cast respectively. the german i. and ii. armies were to close up to the line reached on that day, and an offensive against the enemy west of namur was to be carried out in co-operation with an attack by the iii. army against the line of the meuse between meuse and givet, details being left for decision by the army headquarters con- cerned. as regards the british, the german intelligence dept. was woefully at fault, for it was stated that a “ disembarkation of the british forces at boulogre and the neighbourhood must be taken into account. it is the opinion here, however, that a landing on a large scale has not yet taken place.” at the time, two-thirds of the british force was within 30 m. of gen. von biilow. during the day the germans attacked the french detachments on the sambre. the events of the day had resulted in dislocating lanrezac’s preparations for the offensive, and at 12:30 p.m. he wrote to joffre as follows: “i consider it dangerous to let the v. army cross the sambre during the 22nd, minus, on the one hand, the i. corps, which must hold the meuse until the iv. army has made sufficient progress north of semoy, and minus, on the other hand, the english who on the 22nd will not be able to get farther than mons.”’ during the evening a reply came from joffre to say that lanrezac could choose his own time for the offensive, and he accordingly decided that it would be launched on the twenty-third. frontiers, battles of the early on the 22nd, fighting was resumed all along the french front on the sambre. the x. corps was forced back, and during the afternoon the road from fosse to st. gerard was crowded with artillery, infantry and transport moving southward. fosse was occupied by the germans about 8 p.m. farther west the iii. corps had likewise to give ground. severe fighting took place early in the afternoon round chatelct, and both divisions had to retire, the 5th toward tarcienne and the 6th to nalinnes. by tv.m. the ill. corps had definitely to renounce its grip on the southern outskirts of charleroi. as for the xviii. corps, it came upon the field, but was south of the sambre between thuin and malines instead of be- ing, as lanrezac had hoped, on the mons—charlieroi road in touch with the british. the cavalry corps of gen. sordet had fallen back during the night to solre, and in the afternoon was sent to guard the crossings from jeumont to thuin, and also to hold the cross-roads at merbes ste. marie on the far side of the river. the night march following on long and arduous work in belgium had been fatiguing to the horses, and the cavalry corps was in need of rest. joffre had prescribed that it was to move to the british left, but lanrezac considered that it was not in a fit state to move until the twenty-third. it was not, how- ever, until the evening of aug. 25 that it arrived behind the left flank of the british. to lanrezac on the evening of the 22nd, the situation of the v. army seemed grave, but by no means desperate. only two of his corps, the x. and iii., had been engaged, and if these had suffered heavily they had also made the enemy pay the price. withdrawn to more open terrain, where their artillery could render better support, they could re-form and, so he hoped, in their turn take the offensive. further, the i. corps was intact and now becoming available on the right, as was also the xviii. corps on the other flank; and the reserve divisions of gen. valabregue were coming up to support it. the british were now arriving in position on the left, round mons. in one way lan- rezac was much more fortunate than he knew. von biilow had attacked prematurely by forcing the sambre on the 22nd instead of waiting for the attack of the iii. army against the namur- givet section of the meuse to take effect, and the retirement of the v. army during the 22nd had seriously discounted the german chances of enveloping it. the briitsh army in position —the british army had prac- tically completed its concentration on aug. 21 and on the following day took up a position from conde to mons and thence southwest of that town, so as to be able to co-operate in the forward movement, pivoting on namur, as ordered by joifre. as a matter of fact namur had been attacked by the germans and during this day was 7x extremis. this fact was, however, unknown to french, who motored early in the morning from his headquarters at le cateau to visit lanrezac at phil- ippeville. to his dismay french, on entering the arca of the french v. army, witnessed columns of infantry and artillery moving south. a british laison officer reported that the germans had forced the passage of the sambre and were also making a wide turning movement through belgium. | french at once decided to give up the attempt to find lan- rezac and returned to le cateau. from there he despatched a message to lanrezac to say that he was waiting for the i'rench cavalry corps to be posted on his left, as had been promised, and that he was prepared to fill the rele allotted to him when the v. army advanced to the attack. ie also pointed out that his position was much in advance of the line now held by that army and hinted that although prepared to carry out his rele he could not begin to do so until the french v. army should recover some of the ground already lost. late at night a french staff officer from lanrezac’s headquarters confirmed the news of the fighting which french had heard of during the day and asked if french, by striking at the right flank of the german columns, could thus relieve the pressure on the v. army. the british commander-in-chief considered that this was quite impracticable but agreed to hold on to his position for 24 hours. situation on aug. 23.—on the morning of aug. 23—the day on lz] which the battle of mons was fought—the genera! situation of french and british was as follows: the french v. army faced in two directions, east and north. the i. corps was on or behind the meuse, where all bridges had been destroyed except those at dinant and hastiere. the x. corps had its right on the high ground south of fosse and vitrivel, its left at scry. the iii. corps (reinforced by a brigade from the xviii. corps) was deployed on the line gerpinnes-nalinnes-claquedent. the avill. corps was on the line tlam-thuin, with detachments on the sambre as far as merbes-le-chateau. the french cavalry corps was holding the passages of the sambre from the left of the nvi. corps to maubeuge. the 53rd and 60th reserve divs. (gen. valabregue) were about solre le chateau, and were to re- lieve the cavalry corps, which was to make for maubeuge with the object of emerging eventually on the left flank of the british army. the british right flank was north of the sambre between erquelinne and peissant. from here was the i. corps—looking northeast—with its left near mons. in front of the line, about binche, was the 5th cavalry bde., which was subsequently with- drawn. the ii. corps carried on this line, from and including mons, west of which there was a french division of territorials. the main body of the cavalry was in rear of the british left. in this position of the theatre of war the i., ii and iti. german armies were concerned. the german plan had been that the ii. army was to attack south across the sambre, while the iii. army was to co-operate by attacking west across the meuse, sending a strong force across the meuse towards rocroi to bar the irench line of retreat. during aug. 23, the i. army (von kluck) was to conform to this offensive movement. gen. von billow had, however, made the mistake of attacking pre- maturely with his ii. army; the combined movement with the ifi. army was unsuccessful, and consequently the trend of the fighting drifted westwards to where the advanced guards of the i. army were coming into contact with the british on the mons-conde canal. battle ef charlcrot.—in his published account of the battle of charleroi, lanrezac divides it into two distinct phases, the first from daybreak until 4 p.m., and the second from that hour until nightfall. in the first phase the course of the battle was as fol- lows: the right wing of the x. corps was driven back, and it re- formed between scry and st. gerard; the i. corps deployed on the high ground round st. gerard with its right about sart- st. laurent. this operation was completed about midday, and the i. corps was then well placed to act against the flank of the german guard corps, which was then attacking the x. corps sharply. gen. franchet d’esperey, commanding the i. corps, instantly resolved to seize the opportunity and to attack «i fond. ilis artillery prepared the way by an intense fire, and the germans, apparently taken by surprise, suspended their attack to deal with this new danger. it was now about 1 p.m. and franchet d’esperey was about to launch his infantry when disquieting news reached him from his right rear. the 51st reserve div., which had relieved the i. corps on the meuse, had failed in its task, and had allowed troops of the german iii. army to cross the river. the report went on to say that the reserve battalions had fallen back in disorder and that a detachment of the enemy had occupied onhaye behind the v. army. franchet d’esperey had no al- ternative but to suspend his attack and to send a division and a brigade to deal with the peril behind. emboldened by the en- forced inaction of the french, the guard corps again pressed on, its artillery maintaining a very severe fire. the french x. corps and the fraction left of the i. corps resisted energetically, with the result that in this portion of the field but little ground was lost, and connection was still maintained with the fortress of namur. while such was the state of affairs on the right wing, little was, in this first phase, taking place on the left wing. but after 4 p.m. a change for the worse set in, in that portion of the field. the left wing of the iit. corps was taken by surprise and driven back by a sharp attack, with the result that the whole iii. corps i22 fell back in confusion, while the xviii. corps, with its right now uncovered by the retirement of the iii. corps, was forced to withdraw to the stream which runs from thuilles to thuin. the reserve divisions of gen. valabregue, however, had come up to bousignies and thirlemont. on the right wing, in this second phase of the battle, the x. corps had been forced to admit a loss of ground, but it was only slight. as for the i. corps, the portion left at st. gerard was holding its ground. during aug. 23 gen. franchet d'esperey had been called upon to deal with the presence of a detachment of the german iii. army which had forced its way over the river. some sharp fighting took place, and about ro p.m. the french infantry car- ried onhaye with the bayonet. this attack by the french came upon the germans somewhat by surprise, and the units of the iii. army on the right bank of the meuse were in consequence retained there for the moment. at the end of aug. 23 lanrezac came to the conclusion that immediate retreat was called for on the part of the v. army. the chief causes of his decision are given by himself as follows: in the first place he had learnt definitely that the offensive of the iv. army had failed and that the beaten troops were falling back to the meuse with the left of the army on mezicres. the line of the river between that place and givet was guarded by but a few battalions of reserve troops. the rear of the v. army was thus threatened once again. in the second place namur had fallen; in addition the roads on the right flank of the v. army, already encumbered with thousands of civilian refugees, would be further blocked by the retreating belgian troops from the fortress. thirdly, the british army was checked, and would in all probability be compelled to retire. lanrezac, therefore, issued orders for the v. army to retire on aug. 24 to the line givet- philippeville-beaumont-maubeuge. lanrezac’s statement that his action was in part due to the conviction that the british would be forced to retire is a variant upon a previously held french opinion that such retirement actually preceded the retreat from charleroi. how far both these statements are from the truth will now be seen. the battle of mons.—the british position in detail was as follows: on the extreme left, about conde, was the british roth bde., made up of battalions of line-of-communication troops in touch with a french division of territorials. then came the 5th div., while next on the right was the 3rd div., holding a salient round mons as far southeast as villers st. ghislain. the line was continued by the british i. corps farther southeastwards to sotre-/e- chateau st f frontiers, battles of the peissant. the cavalry division was in rear of the british left, except the 5th cavalry bde., which was posted in advance of the right flank, but later withdrawn. the british position was thus in shape somewhat like a broad arrow, with the two army corps practically at right angles to one another and facing, generally speaking, north and northeast respectively. as matters turned out, the german attack was directed almost entirely against the ii. corps, and here on the left the situation was not unfavourable to the british, for the canal made a valuable defensive line, while the terrain on the far- ther side held numerous difficulties for the attackers. muddy ditches and barbed-wire fences impeded their movement, al- though, on the other hand, groups of trees and bushes gave cover from view and were of service for the enemy’s machine-guns. south of the canal the crests of the high ground afforded the british useful sites for artillery, but the slag heaps of the numer- ous mines limited observation to some extent. the line of the canal, however, had one very disadvantageous feature: after run- ning from conde to mons in a mathematically straight line, it forms a loop round mons, thus constituting a marked salient. such a position might easily be found to be untenable, and sir horace smith-dorrien had prepared another and more defensible line in rear running through frameries-paturages-wasmes- boussu. when day broke on aug. 23 von kluck had three active corps and von biilow one, or about 150,000 men and 600 guns, within striking distance of the british force of some 75,000 men and 300 guns. the german i. army was to march in a southeasterly direction. the british ii. corps on the mons canal was facing north. consequently the left of von kluck’s army must collide with the ii. corps in the neighbourhood of mons. as a matter of fact the german commander was in ignorance of the position of the british force. the march of the german i. army, on the 23rd, was therefore shrouded in the fog of war, and, quite early in the day, delay was caused by a report that tournai was held by british troops. these were actually two french territorial battalions, but, under the impression that they were british, orders were sent to the iv., iii. and ix. corps to halt on the leuze-mons-binche road, in view of the possibility that it might be necessary to make a wheel to the right so as to envelop tournai. later reports showed that the british were in strength on the canal, and that the troops at tournai, now known to be french, had retired toward lille. the advance of the german j. army was therefore resumed. but the orders for this resump- battles of the frontiers \\6 3 eitinks 4, in } asr eae english miles 10 kilometres a? ge i gerp ee 20 ss \\ \"lsfabciennes?e main railways main roads frontiers, battles of the tion of the march were late in reaching the iii. and iv. corps, with results that reacted on the german chances in the battle. the left column of von kluck’s army was the 17th div. of the ix. corps, and its march was directed towards st. symphorien and villers st. ghislain. on the british side the i. corps was on the line, generally, harmignies-peissant, and as it faced a gap between the german i. and ii. armies its share in the battle of mons was destined to be very small. it was shelled by german artillery, covered in its advance by the 16th dragoons, but the british casualties were slight. of active fighting there was none save for some spirited minor actions between the british divi- sional cavalry and cyclists on the one hand and german patrols on the other. the bulk of the day’s fighting fell upon the salient formed by the canal loop round mons. so soon as von kluck had grasped the real state of affairs his plan appears to have been to envelop both the british flanks while bombarding the front heavily with his guns. the envelopment of the british left did not succeed, owing chiefly to the delay referred to above. the battle opened in earnest about 10:30 a.m. with a bombard- ment by some batteries of the german ix. corps which came into action on a ridge to the north of orbourg, and from that time onward the guns were gradually extended westwards as battery after battery, first of the ix. and then of the iii. corps, came into action. at 1 p.m. the germans had established a great superiority of artillery against the front of the british ii. corps. the actual loop of the canal was held by the 4th royal fusiliers and the 4th middlesex regt., the former being responsible for the bridge at nimy while the right of the latter regiment held the crossing at orbourg. at both these places the fighting was very severe, but the british musketry proved a terrible surprise to the germans, who came on in masses which it was impossible to miss, and the british guns, though outnumbered by the german artillery, gave most effective support. finally, however, the germans were able through their superiority in numbers to make a converging attack against the salient from the north and east, and the british were gradually forced back east and south- east of mons. but the germans were cautious about pushing into the town, and it was not until after 7 p.at. that the 84th regt. of the 18th div. of the lx. corps entered mons, where it was thrown for a time into confusion by heavy fire. the british 3rd div. fell back to a line running east and west through nouvelles. west of mons the left division of the german iii. corps at- tacked the left of the british 3rd div.; and still farther west along the canal the right division of the iii. corps, and later towards evening, the advanced guards of the iv. corps, attacked the 5th div. of the british. the retirement of the ard div. from the salient round mons inevitably led to a slight withdrawal of the 5th div., and by nightfall the ii. corps was on a line which showed an average retirement of some three miles from the canal. the retreat begins —during the late afternoon and evening french had been receiving disquieting news as to the situation of the french v. army on his right. at 11:30 p.m. a telegram arrived confirming the reports, to the following effect: namur had fallen during the day; the french v. army had been heavily attacked, and was falling back to the line givet-philippeville- maubeuge; hastiere had been captured by the germans; the meuse was falling rapidly and had added to the difficulty of defence. in these circumstances not only was the original offen- sive out of the question, but the british line was now untenable. french, therefore, decided to retreat to a previously reconnoitred line from jerlain eastwards to maubeuge, and orders were issued accordingly in the early hours of aug. 24. the withdrawal was effected without serious loss, and for a moment french thought of taking advantage of the fortifications of maubeuge; but recol- lections of the fatal attraction of metz for bazaine induced him to pass the fortress, and orders were issued at 3 p.w. on the 24th for the retreat to be continued to the line le cateau-cambrai. bibliography.—a. corbett-smith, the retreat from mons (1916); g. hanotaux, l’enigme de charleroi (1917); r. von gleichen- russwurm and e. zurborn, schlacht bet mons (1919). (see also worcp war: bibliography.) 123 v. battle of le cateau the battle of le cateau was fought by the left wing of the british army on aug. 26 1914, during the retreat from mons. after bavai the retreat was handicapped by the foret de mor- mal, which compelled the british army during the 25th to march in two separated portions, the i. corps east of the forest and the il. on the west. during the previous night the detrainment of the 4th div. from england was almost completed, and it moved to its position towards solesmes. meanwhile reports showed that the french were retiring all along the line, and sir john french had now to decide whether to stand and fight on the line le cateau-cambrai, or to continue the retreat at daybreak on the 26th. he decided that the retreat should be continued, and orders to that effect were accordingly issued. the order was complied with by the i. corps, and after some delay caused by a violent attack by the germans on lan- drecies, the retirement was continued on the 25th in the direction of guise. in the ii. corps, however, shortly after midnight sir horace smith-dorrien came to the conclusion that, in view of the fact that many of his troops had just completed over 20 hours of heavy and continuous work, and that the enemy were close along his front, it was out of the question to continue his retirement at dawn. he therefore issued orders to fight on the ridge just south of the le cateau-cambrai road. disposition of the forces-——the force at smith-dorrien’s dis- posal was as follows, from right to left: the greater part of the cavalry was between le cateau and the sambre; later it moved to the left flank to get in touch with the french i. cavalry corps, which was in the neighbourhood of malincourt. then came the 5th division. the 3rd div. held the centre as far as caudry, and on the left lay the 4th division. thence to cam- brai was a gap filled by the 4th cavalry bde., and later by the french i. cavalry corps. the french 84th territorial div. was retiring slowly through cambrai. each british division had a front of approximately three miles. the 4th div. was incom- plete, lacking divisional cavalry, signal company, ambulances, ammunition columns and heavy artillery. the roth bde. was the general reserve. the german force on the heels of the british was the i. army whose commander, gen. von kluck, was the victim of faulty conclusions before, during and after the battle. he believed that the whole of the b.e.f. was opposite him; he thought that it was holding a position running north and south, whereas the line of the ii. corps was almost due east and west, and he was sure that it was either retreating or about to retreat in a westerly direction. his plan was similar to that which had been tried at mons, a frontal attack mainly with artillery followed by enveloping move- ments against both flanks. the cavalry was to pin the british left until the german infantry should arrive. the german attack.—soon after daybreak the british were engaged upon both flanks. on the right some german troops entered le cateau and confused fighting ensued, while on the left the 4th div. became engaged with the enemy. here the 4th div., after defending an advanced position for some time, fell back slowly to a second line and brought the enemy advance to a standstill. these events were but preliminaries, and the battle of le cateau proper opened with a heavy bombardment, which grew in intensity as the artillery of four german corps came into action. the british artillery made a spirited reply, though heavily outmatched in numbers and weight of metal, and dealt severely with attempts of the german infantry to push for- ward. these attempts were, however, practically limited to the ground near le cateau on the british right, and to the village of caudry, which now formed a salient in the centre of the line. throughout the forenoon constant infantry attacks, varied by bouts of heavy shelling, were made against the latter village, from which about noon the defenders were forced out by artillery fire; but a counter-attack at once regained part of it and the german infantry advance was held up. until 1 p.m. the line of the ii. corps was everywhere intact in spite of the superior numbers arrayed against it. but on the right the situation was becoming grave, for the 5th div., with its right 124 flank uncovered by the retirement of the i. corps, was being threatened by more and more german columns converging upon the field. smith-dorrien realised that at all costs the fight must be broken off if his force was to be saved. orders were sent to break off the fight and to continue the retirement of the previous days. before the orders for retreat had reached all concerned the british right had given way before overwhelming numerical superiority. but the germans failed to exploit this success, and the withdrawal of the ii. corps, thanks largely to the devotion of the british artillery and to the arrival of the french i. cavalry corps on the left, was effected with less difficulty than had been expected. smith-dorrien successfully withdrew his columns and marched them swiftly to the somme at and near ham. by aug. 28 the ii. corps was safely across the river. the losses of the british had been severe, 38 guns had been lost, and the casualties were over 7,800, the 4th div. suffering particularly. the retreat was practically unmolested, for von kluck hurried southwest instead of south, and thus missed a chance not likely often to occur in war. bibliography.—a. f. becke, the royal regiment of artillery at le cateau (1919). see also world war: bibliography. vi. battle of guise by aug. 25 the succession of victories achieved in lorraine, the ardennes and on the sambre had produced an atmosphere of optimism at german general headquarters. it was thought that forces might be safely diverted to east prussia to deal with the russian invasion. accordingly, on the 26th, two corps and a cavalry division received orders to proceed to the eastern front. on the side of the allies, on the other hand, it was imperative to take immediate steps to check the onrush of the german right wing. during the night of aug. 25-6 joffre issued a new directive concerning a “‘ new mass of manoeuvre ”’ to be formed on the left flank to carry out an offensive and to consist of the french iv. and v. armies, plus the british as well as a new french army— the vi.—to be made up of units moved by rail from other sections, chiefly from the right. on aug. 26 joffre and french had a conference on this pro- posed offensive at st. quentin, at which the commander of the french v. army, gen. lanrezac, was also present. british co- operation was, however, impossible, for on this day half of french’s army was engaged at le cateau, where it was very roughly handled. on the following day joffre promised that the french v. army would be immediately directed to take the pressure off the british. accordingly at 1 p.m. on this day an officer arrived at lanrezac’s headquarters with verbal instruc- tions to attack at once and with vigour toward st. quentin. the french v. army was at this time retiring over the oise above guise, and the attack it was called upon to carry out was with the object of following on the left flank of the german i. army in order to delay the german onrush. french support for the british army —nightfall on aug. 27 found the french v. army bchind the oise with its left below guise and its right about rumigny, the whole facing generally northeast. lanrezac’s task was a difficult one. he had to sus- pend a retirement toward the south and convert it into an attack toward the west. at noon on aug. 28 joffre came to see lanrezac at the latter’s headquarters at marle. lanrezac pointed out his difficulties and explained that his right flank would be consider- ably exposed in the operation enjoined upon him; but joffre peremptorily ordered lanrezac to proceed with the offensive and even threatened to relieve him of his command. the german advance delayed—at daybreak on aug. 29 the main body of the v. army began to cross the oise above and be- low origny, but the plan had to be modified owing to an attack made upon the right east of guise by two corps of the german ii. army. accordingly lanrezac decided to postpone the attack toward st. quentin and to deal with the threat against his right flank first. it was, however, impossible to carry out this new plan and it was now decided merely to mask st. quentin and to de- vote every effort to dealing with the german attack east of guise. the main body of the v. army, assisted by a cavalry frost—fry, sir edward division, carried out its task with vigour and about 5 p.m. a general offensive took place along the 18 m. front from origny- vervins towards guise. during the night the two german corps fell back across the oise. this success was somewhat neutralised by events between the oise and st. quentin, where the situation took an unfavourable turn for the french. having carried out its task of delaying the germans, the french v. army fell back during the evening of aug. 30. the operation had been skilfully carried out, but lanrezac was not in favour with french general headquarters and within a few days he was relieved of his command. birliography.— viscount french, rorg (1919), and despatches, april 1914-july 1916 (1917); marshal joffre, 7974-15: preparation et conduite (1920). see also world war: bibliography, (f. e. w.*) frost, robert (1875- ), american writer, was born in san francisco, march 26 1875. his father was a new englander and his mother was born in edinburgh. in 1885 he moved with his parents to lawrence, mass., studied in the public schools, and entered dartmouth college in 1892, remaining there one year. from 1897-9 he was a student at harvard, and from 1905- 11 taught english in the pinkerton academy, derry, n. h., and then for a year taught psychology at the n. h. normal school at plymouth. in ror2 he went to england, where he remained three years and published his first two volumes of verse. on his return to america he retired to a farm at derry and gave much time to active farming. during 1916-20 he was professor of english at amherst college, mass., a position which he resumed in 1923. his poems portray in realistic fashion everyday country life in new england. some of the work of his first volume had been denied publication for 20 years, and some of the second for 1o years. he is the author of a boy’s wall (1915); north of boston (1915); mountain interval (1916); a way out, a play (1917); new hampshire (1923). frunze, mikhailvassilievich (1885-1925), russian sol- dier, was the son of a peasant who had settled in turkistan and be- come a surgeon. while at school he came in contact with socialists, and on entering the polytechnical institute at st. petersburg (ileningrad) he joined the bolshevik group in the social democratic organisation. in 1905 he worked in the in- dustrial district of ivanovo-voznesensk and helped to organise the big textile strike of that year. he was frequently arrested and in 1907 was sentenced to four years penal servitude, and to a subsequent six years on the grounds that he had offered armed resistance to the police. at the end of to14 his penal servitude was exchanged for banishment to siberia, where he was arrested for revolutionary activities in the following year, but soon afterwards escaped from prison and the march revolution of 1917 found him in minsk at the head of an illegal organisation in the army. he became president of a front committee, and later president of soviet in the provinces, and at the time of the nov. revolution came to moscow with a detachment of 2,000 men, with which he took part in the fighting in that city. after the revolt in jaro- staw he became military commissar of that district, and in dec. 1918, commander of an army on the eastern front. he later became commander in chief of four armies and directed the operations against admiral kolchak. when the eastern front was divided, frunze became commander on the turkistan sec- tion of it, where he surrounded and destroye1 kolchak’s south- ern army. he afterwards took part in minor operations in central asia, returning to russia in sept. 1920 when he took command of the troops that eventually drove general wrangel out of the crimea. for this he was rewarded with a sword of honour and a portrait of karl marx. he then commanded the military forces in the ukraine. in 1924 he became vice-president of the revolutionary military council, and, in the absence of trotsky, the actual head of the red army. he became president of this council and people’s commissar for military and naval affairs in jan. 1925, but died before the end of the year. fry, sir edward (1827-10918), english judge (see 11.270), died at failand, near bristol, oct. 19 1918. fry— fuel problems fry, roger elligt (1866- ), british painter and art critic, son of sir edward fry, was born in london, and educated at clifton and king’s college, cambridge. he studied painting under francis bate and then in paris, and exhibited at the car- fax gallery, london, in 1903. his work, notably in his land- scapes, is marked by deep feeling for form and a scholarly sense of design and technical means. an active member and exhibitor of the london group, he gave an exhibition of his own paintings in 1920. as a critic, with his wide knowledge and acute sensibil- ity, fry became recognised in england and abroad as a leading expert. he published a study of bellini (1899) and edited reynold’s discourses (1905), but is best known by his champion- ship through much opposition and prejudice, of cezanne and the post-impressionists. among other publications are vision and design (1920); architectural heresies of a painter (1921), and a book of travel impressions, a sampler of castile (1923). he was also joint editor of the burlington magazine. fryatt, charles (1872-1916), british seaman, was born at parkeston, essex, dec. 2 1872. he entered the service of the great eastern railway co., and in 1904 became chief officer in their service of vessels plying between harwich and rotterdam. in 1913 he was promoted captain. at the end of july 1916, it was announced that his ship, “ brussels’ had been captured and the captain himself arrested and tried by court martial, on a charge of having attempted, on march 28 ro16, to ram a german submarine. the german authorities stated that cap- tain fryatt had confessed that he had acted under orders from the british admiralty; but the trial was hurried and secret, no intervention on the part of neutrals being allowed. ‘the captain was condemned to death and shot at bruges, july 27 1916. the body was, on july 7 1919, brought from belgium to england and was buried at dovercourt, near harwich. fuad i. (1868- ), king of egypt, was born at the palace of gizeh, march 26 1868, the youngest son of the khedive ismail pasha. after his father’s d¢bicle prince ahmed fuad, as he then was, went to italy where his youth was spent. ile returned to egypt in the ’ninecties and was appointed aide-de-camp to the khedive abbas hilmi. he found outlet for his energies by presiding over charitable and educational institutions and was largely responsible for the foundation of the egyptian univer- sity, of which he became president. in 1917 his elder brother, the sultan hussein kniamil died, and as the latter’s son, prince kemal ed din, renounced the rights of succession, prince fuad became sultan. after the termination of the british protec- torate on feb. 28 1922, he was proclaimed king of egypt (march 46). he had married on may 25 ro1o the princess nazli, daughter of abdel rehim sabri pasha, a former governor of cairo, and his heir, prince faruk, was born on l’eb. 11 1920.",
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