FOOTBALL, RUGBY

the history of the game of rugby since 1910, not only in great britain and ireland, but in the british dominions overseas and also in france, has been one of steady development. rugby is the national game in new zealand and in south africa, and to a less extent in aus- tralia, while in a somewhat different way it is played in amer- ica. in france it has obtained the official recognition of the government, so that it is now played over the entire country. france possesses more clubs and more players than any other nation. in england many public schools, which have for years been devoted to the assn. game, now play rugby. since the world war there has been a marked increase in the number of rugby clubs in england, and the game is now played in many districts where at one time its very name was almost unknown. in the northern counties, which suffered so severely from the inroads of professionalism, rugby is rapidly regaining its old popularity and prestige, and for some years now they have been able to provide valuable members of the english team. the number of old boy clubs, particularly in london, has been greatly increased. i. the british empire and france the year 1010 was an annus mirabilis for england, since it saw the opening of the national ground at twickenham, middlesex, with a brilliant victory over wales. the revival of english rugby may fairly be said to date from this year, for england won the championship for the first time since 1892, and from then till 1925 has won it outright on five occasions, besides dividing the honours twice. the visit of the all blacks in 1905 had demonstrated the weakness of the game in england, and for some seasons players had been endeavouring to improve both their tactics and their physical condition. much of the credit must go to a. d. stoop, who persevered amid much discouragement in developing the open style of play, and who without doubt had his reward. he gathered round him a band of brilliant halves and three-quarters, and after a few years had the satisfaction of seeing his principles generally adopted and england gaining victory after victory. next in importance to these tactics was the improvement in english forward play. for many years now the english selectors have aimed at discovering an all-round type of forward, clever with hands and feet and able to hold his own in the rough and tumble of international matches. forwards are no longer con- tent to be mere pushing machines, their duties do not nowadays finish with the breaking up of the scrummage, rather do they then begin. from ror1o to the end of 1925 england won 9 out of 11 matches with scotland; 9 out of rr with ireland, the other 2 being drawn; 8 out of r1 with wales; and 10 out of 11 with france. that is to say, out of 44 matches england won 36, drew 3 and lost 5, a record probably without parallel. scottish rugby.—in scotland rugby continues to flourish, new clubs are springing up and old ones are showing a decided increase in power and in the standard of their play. the national side has achieved a very fair record since the world war, though it had to wait a long time for its first victory over england and for its first actual championship triumph since 1907. during the last few seasons scotland has had to come south, especially 67 to oxford, for her three-quarters. scottish forwards are as formidable as ever, the halves are sound, and, unlike england, scotland has been fortunate in the possession of a succession of really first-class full-backs. the chief blots on the scottish escutcheon since the world war are the three defeats by france, one of which was inflicted at inverleith, where in 1921 france won by a try to nil. there are signs that scottish rugby is now at the beginning of a new era of prosperity. trish rugby.—lrish rugby naturally suffered severely during the world war, and also after it, owing to the disturbed state of the country generally. indeed the wonder is, not that irish teams have been defeated, but that they have been able to exist at all. but now old-established clubs are regaining their normal strength, and new ones are making good. during the last few seasons several international matches have been won, and the prospects for the future are bright. a number of young and promising players have been discovered, and irish back play is developing well. the forwards too are recovering their old dash anc are again a force to be reckoned with. welsh rugby.—in toro wales lost a sensational match to england, the first english victory since 1898, but they were still a formidable side, and in 1911 secured the international championship once more. gradually welsh rugby began to lose its force, and triumph no longer automatically followed triumph. the world war dealt welsh rugby a very heavy blow, and although wales gained a brilliant victory over england at swansea in 1920, and carried off the championship in 1922, the welsh game has not bcen up to its former standard. the curious point is that welsh club football is practically as zood as ever, or at any rate is still superior to english club rugby, and saxon victories over the great welsh organisations are still few and far between. yet the national side 1s no longer the force it once was, and the natural conclusion is that something is wrong with the principle of selection. defections to the pro- fessional game now and again deprive wales of potential inter- national players, but not to an extent sufficient to explain the decadence of the welsh fiftecn. french rugby.—in france the game prospers amazingly. reference has already been made to the three victories gained over scotland. ireland has also been beaten three times, but england and wales have so far escaped defeat. england, it is true, had a very narrow escape in 1922, when the match at twickenham ended in a draw, of which it is only fair to say that france had very much the better and were unlucky not to win. tours in france are very popular nowadays with british clubs and they do an immerse amount of good in more ways than one. french rugby has suffered a good deal from the indiscriminate praise lavished on it in the early days, when it really needed constructive criticism, but the french authorities themselves were never misled, and always recognised the necessity of inter- changing visits with british clubs and also of strict and adequate refereeing. south african rugby.—since 1910 only two teams from the colonies have visited this country. in 1912 a south african side, under w. a. millar’s captaincy, paid a visit which was remarkably successful. of the 27 matches played, 24 were won and only three lost. a record was set up by their defeat of all the five countries, a feat no other touring side has rivalled. the matches lost were with newport, london and swansea. the strength of the team lay in the forwards, who were excep- tionally powerful and fast, but the backs, if not as effective as those of the 1906 contingent, were by no means negligible. in 1t910 dr. t. smith, an irish international, captained a british side in south africa. it met with moderate success, winning 13 matches out of 24, and losing eight. of the three test matches one was won and two were lost. about 12 inter- national players took part, but the team was, of course, very far from representative of the full strength of great britain and ireland. r. cove-smith led the fifth british team to tour in south africa, but with rather unsatisfactory results. of the 21 matches played nine were won and nine lost. three of the four test matches ended in defeat, the other being drawn. 68 persistent ill-luck followed the team in the matter of casualties, and the side, none too powerful to start with, was hardly ever at fulistrength. indeed, toward the end it was difficult to find filteen men sound enough to play. most of the defeats were by com- paratively moderate margins, but there is little doubt that the team was not strong enough for the task it undertook. new zealand rughy.—in sept. 1924 the second new zealand team, captained by c. g. porter, began a wonderfully successful tour. they actually won all their 28 matches in england, ire- land and wales, no fixtures having been arranged in scotland. their triumphs were due to their splendid physical condition, and to their marvellous and intensive combination. nothing finer has ever been seen in rugby than the way in which the men supported one another; there was always somebody at hand to carry on and drive home an attack. they were natu- rally hardly at home in their first few matches, and they had a very narrow escape from defeat by newport. but they steadily improved and in due course developed into a very fine side indeed, though in the opinion of many they were never quite the equals of gallaher’s men. bipliography.—j. e. raphael, modern rugby football (1918); e. h, d. sewell, rugby football up-to-date (1921); g. 1). hlenderson, football book of records, 1888-1923 (1923); r. dansey, special official souvenir all blacks in england (1924); h. grierson, the ramblings of a rabbit (1924); rev. f. marshall and l. r. tosswiil, football, the rugby union game (1923); l. r. tosswill, rugby foot- ball (1923). (ef. j83e:) ii. the game in the united states the rules that govern american rugby football were dras- tically changed in the winter of 1906 by a combined rules com- mittee, six of whom represented the newly formed national collegiate athletic assn., the other six being members of the old rules committee. this amalgamated committee was the out- growth of a conference of representatives of a large number of colleges and universities which, because of the large and in- creasing number of deaths and serious injuries, was called for the purpose of doing away with football, or of radically changing the rules. this conference was a direct result of the football season of 1905 which had been marked by 21 deaths and by many serious injuries. changes in the rules—vital changes in the rules were made at the meeting of this combined committee, these being on the following lines: (x) doing away with heavy mass play, (a) by making it impossible for tackles and guards to be used as batter- ing rams to precede the runner with the ball; (b) by doing away with “ chain interference ” and (c) by abolishing pushing and pulling of the runner with the ball. (2) encouraging attempts to advance by throwing the ball forward, provided it was thrown across the line of scrimmage not nearer than five yards to the point where it was put in play. (this has since been changed to allow the ball to be thrown anywhere over the line of scrimmage.) (3) stimulating kicking by making all players on the kicking side, except the centre, cligible to receive the ball as soon as it touched the ground. (this rule has since been re- scinded.) (4) encouraging the offensive team to take chances in free running, forward passing and on side kicking, by compelling the offensive team to make ro yards instead of five in three trials. (5) shortening the playing period of each half from 35 min. to 30 min., thereby reducing the strain. in 1912, each half was divided into two 15-min. periods, with a 2-min. interval to permit time to change goals. the above changes proved to be effective in doing away with serious injurics; also in opening up the game. since then, comparatively few changes of importance have been made in the rules. one of the most important changes occurred when the forward pass was allowed to be thrown anywhere over the line of scrim- mage and at any time, provided the passer was at least five yards behind the line. this change, together with one allowing the man who first received the ball from centre to cross the lines of scrimmage at any point, permitted the doing away with the checker-board marking of the field, thereby reverting to the gridiron or cross marking that was in vogue preceding 1903. football, rugby another important change adopted in roro required seven men of the offensive side to be on the line of scrimmage. the develop- ment of the forward pass brought about a change in the shorten- ing of the field between the goal lines from 330 ft. to 300 ft., with end zones of 30 ft. beyond each goal line in which forward passes could be completed. with the shortening of the field, the kick-off was moved from the centre of the field to the 4o0-yd. line of the kicking side. the value of a touch-down has gone through a series of changes, in which it has counted four, five and finally six points. in the same way, a goal from the field, whether from a drop kick or a place kick, has had a similar variation, but downward from five to four and finally to three points. four trials instead of three are now allowed to gain to yards. development of the gante-—the game itself has developed in a most interesting way. previous to 1915, it was rare to see a team which did not play its quarter-back close up behind centre to receive the ball and pass it to the runner, or carry the ball himself. nowadays, however, none of the men in the backfield need play in specified positions all the time. the quarter-back calls the signals, but arranges the backfield in one of a variety of formations from which the center makes a direct pass to one of the backs. probably the most common arrangement of the linemen is to have four on one side of the centre and two on the other, creating what is called the “ unbalanced ” line with a strong and a weak side. some coaches instruct their players to assume these positions deliberately, the strong side being on the right or left according to the signal. others have a preliminary arrangement of the guards or tackles lined up behind the centre and jump into position either to the right or left, thus forming a strong side. a favourite backfield formation is to line one back, known as the wing back, slightly outside and a yard behind the end man on the strong side, while the other three men form a diagonal tandem, the back man assuming a position four to five yards behind centre. sometimes one of the other two men forms a wing back in a similar position on the short side. some teams play a “ solid line”; others direct the end man on the long side to play out from one to two yards, while the end on the short side lines out from two to four feet, in which case the wing back on the strong side usually lines behind the opening. another favourite formation is known as the punt formation, in which two backs usually arrange themselves in tandem from three to four yards back of the line of scrimmage on the right, while a single man stands about three yards back in a corresponding position on the left, and the fourth man from six to ten yards directly back of centre, | this formation lends itself peculiarly well to what is termed the “triple threat ” style of play, in which the man farthest back may run, make a forward pass or punt. shift plays are being used by many coaches; in these usually four line men assume a preliminary position from one to two yards behind the line of scrimmage and then jump into balanced lines or into lines with one man over or two men over, while the four men in the backfield adjust themselves in various ways according to the plan of the coach. owing to the tremendous noise attending games, at some of which there are as many as 80,000, of go,000 spectators, some of the teams use what is called the “ huddle system.” instead of the quarter-back calling out a string of numbers with the players in their regular positions, he gathers the team around him and tells them the play. the team then quickly springs into position, and the play begins, either with or without a further signal. offence and defence —the offence in football has now reached a certain degree of standardisation after many years of ex~ perimentation of the widest divergence. fortunately, offensive football will never be completely standardised, because the possibilities of manoeuvring the players are so many that coaches of inventive genius are constantly lured into the multi- farious forms of strategy always possible to the clever tactician. in defence, the general usage is to employ either a six or seven man line. if a six man line is used, the centre and four other men are arranged in what is called the 2-2-1 formation, foraker—ford that is, two men backing up the line two or three yards behind it and separated from each other by three or four yards, while two others line up about to yards back of the defensive ends, and the safety man plays from 15 to 30 yards back. another favour- ite style is known as the “ box ”’ defence, in which seven men play in the line with two men backing up the line from two to four yards back and three to five yards apart, while two other men play at points from 12 to 18 yards back and behind their respective ends. many coaches still favour the ‘‘ diamond ” defence, in which seven men play on the line of scrimmage, while one man plays from three to five yards behind centre and two backs line up ro to 12 yards behind the defensive ends, the safety man lining up 20 to 30 yards from the scrimmage. the above three defensive formations have become quite standard- ised. some teams employ all three kinds, according to the part of the ficld they are in and according to the number of the “down,” the number of yards to be gained, also the type of formation the opponents are using. until 1926, the use of the forward pass has been encouraged because it has made possible the playing of games between small and large institutions. in 1926 a new rule came into effect that a penalty of five yards is to be inflicted for every uncom- pleted forward pass, after the first one. formerly, all school and college teams were coached by graduates without salary. later, paid seasonal coaches were employed. in 1925, most coaches were members of the athletic department. since the world war, football in the united states has had an unprecedented public interest. an era of stadia building has swept over the country, most colleges and univer- sities having built or planned to build one. many high schools also have them, and several cities have erected stadia holding 100,000 people. (a. a. st.) foraker, joseph benson (1846-1917), american poli- tician (see 10.628), died in cincinnati may 10 1917. in 1916 he published notes of a busy life. forced labour: see slavery and forced labour. ford, henry (1863- ), american manufacturer, was born on a farm near dearborn, mich., nine miles west of de- troit, of william and mary litogot ford. william ford was of english descent but born near cork, ireland, whence the ford family emigrated to america in 1847, settling near dearborn. mary litogot was born in the united states of dutch parents. mrs. ford died when her son was 12. henry ford went to school until he was about 15, but worked on the farm after school hours and during vacations. he began early to develop an intense interest in mechanics. he was attracted first to watches, and at 13 he took a watch apart and put it together again. in a little while he was repairing watches and clocks throughout the sur- rounding country, not for pay but because he had a burning curiosity to see how watches and clocks were made. his only tools were a screwdriver made from a knitting needle and a pair of tweezers fashioned from an old watch spring. all this work was done at night; later it was done secretly, because william ford objected to the son giving his services free. also, he wanted the boy to be a farmer, while the boy wanted to be a mechanic. at 16 henry could no longer tolerate farm work. he left home, walked to detroit, and apprenticed himself in a machine shop at a weekly wage of $2.50, working ro hours a day. his board and lodging cost him $3.50 a week. in order to make up the deficit he took employment with a jeweler from 7 to 11 in the evening, for which he received $2.00 a week. in about a year he turned from machine shop to an engine shop to learn something of the building of engines. there he stayed two years. a com- pany manufacturing small steam engines for farm use needed a man to install them; ford took the place and for two years more set up and repaired these engines. he had gone back to the farm to live; there he spent all of his spare time in a little workshop trying to build a farm tractor—for his experience with the portable engines, as well as his own farm experience, had convinced him that power should be put to work on the farm and that it was a waste to keep horses. 69 eventually he built a single-cylinder engine steam tractor, but he could not devise a boiler to provide pressure enough to keep the tractor at work ploughing and yet be light enough for his requirements. for the time being he gave up his tractor until he could discover a more suitable boiler. large steam trac- tors were already in use, but ford’s thought even then was in the direction of inexpensive, simple apparatus which could be bought by everyone. in 1884 ford’s father offered him 4o ac. of land in order to draw himaway from his mechanics. the land was mostly wooded. henry cut the timber, set up a sawmill and sold lumber. in the summer he repaired farm engines. in 1887 he married clara bryant, who lived in the neighbourhood. he sawed the lumber for his house, which he built himself on his plot of ground, and having done this he moved his workshop from his father’s farm to his new home. securing a job with the detroit edison co. as an engineer and machinist he moved from the farm to detroit, where he set up his shop in a shed at the back of his house. after hours he worked on the building of a gasolene motor car. in 1892 he completed it—although it did not run properly until the following year. this, his first car, had two cylinders with a 2}-in. bore and a 6-in. stroke, set side by side over the rear axle, and developed about 4 h.p., which was transmitted from the motor to the counter- shaft by a belt and from the countershaft to the rear wheel by a chain. he ran this car about 1,000 m. and then sold it for $200, in order to start the building of another car which would be lighter and stronger. in 1899, feeling that he had the experience he needed, ford left his job with the electric light company and went into the making of automobiles as a business, with a company, of which he was the chief engineer, known as the detroit automobile company. he held only a small portion of the stock, and the company would not follow the lines of manufacturing to which he had committed himself. the directors wanted to make cars to order only; ford had in his mind a universal car which could be made in quantities. in 1902 he resigned in order to go into business for himseli—when the opportunity arose. in the mean- time he rented a one-story brick shed and continued his exper- iments. he built several cars, two of them solely for speed. one he called the “999” and the other the “ arrow.”’ each had a four- cylinder engine giving 80 horsepower. the “ 999’ won every race it entered, and in 1903, on the reputation of this speed car, ford formed the ford motor co., with a capitalisation of $100,- ooo. actually only $28,000 in stock was ever subscribed, and of this only about one-half was in actual cash. the company in 1926 had assets of about $1,000,000,000. it is the largest motor car company in the world and the third largest industry in the united states, comprising in itself about 50 other industries and employing some 200,000 people directly and an equal number indirectly. it has been built up entirely by turning back profits into construction. the company has never issued bonds or borrowed money; nor has it issued stock otherwise than to en- large the original capitalisation so as to have it more nearly cor- respond with values. the company is entirely owned by henry ford and his son, edsel b. ford, they having bought out the minority stock- holders in 1919 for $70,000,000. | during its first year the company built a two-cylinder, 8 h.p. car with a chain drive, and of these 1,708 were produced and sold. in the second year the company made three models and for five years the company made various models of four-and six- cylinder cars. the automobile at that time was considered a pleasure vehicle, but ford had conceived of it as a universal method of individual transportation and he was working to produce a light car of great strength, which would require a minimum of care and cost in upkeep. what delayed him was finding a steel sufficiently strong for his purpose, and it was quite by accident that he came upon a piece of vanadium steel, which was not then made in the united states. with that steel he designed model t—which is what is known today as the * ford car.”” in 1909 mr. ford announced that thereafter the 7o company would build only one type of chassis, that it would be model t, and that ‘‘ any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants, so long as it is black.” the principles upon which the ford industries are founded, as mr. ford has stated them, are:— 1. an absence of fear of the future or veneration for the past. one who fears the future, who fears failure, limits his activities. failure is only the opportunity more intelligently to begin again. there is no disgrace in honest failure; there is disgrace in fearing to fail. what is past is useful only as it suggests ways and means for progress. 2. a disregard of competition. whoever does a thing best ought to be the one to do it. 1t is criminal to try to get business away from another man —criminal because one is then trying to lower for per- sonal gain the condition of one’s fellowmen—to rule by force instead of by intelligence. 3. the putting of service before profit. without a profit, business cannot extend. there is nothing inherently wrong about making a profit. well-conducted business enterprise cannot fail to return a profit, but profit must and inevitably will come as a reward for good service. it cannot be the basis—it must be the result of service. 4. manufacturing is not buying low andl selling high. it is the process of buying materials fairly and, with the smallest possible addition of cost, transforming those materials into a consumable product and giving it to the consumer. gambling, speculating and sharp dealing tend only to clog this progression. in the ford practice the cycle of production starts with the consumer. mr. ford holds that a commodity must first of all be designed to fit the needs of the largest possible number of con- sumers both in quality and price, and that the number of con- sumers will be continuously increased by constantly lowering the price of the article. at the same time, by paying the highest possible wages to those engaged in the production and distribu- tion of the article, he creates a high buying power. in jan. rot4 mr. ford raised all wages in his industries toa minimum of $5.00 for an eight-hour day. the average wage throughout his indus- tries at that time was $2.40 for a nine-hour day. the minimum wage in 1926 was $6.00 a day, with an average of $8.00. model t (the touring car), which in the beginning cost $850, in 1926, with the average wage about four times larger than then and with materials costing at least double, sold for $310, with a self- starter and many improvements. from the introduction of model t on oct. 1 1908 it took the company until dec. 10 1915 to produce 1,000,000 cars, but under the new wage programme and the constant lowering of prices the company was in 1926 producing at the rate of 2;000,000 cars a year. the general theory of production in the ford plants is that everything must be kept moving and that the work must go to the man instead of the man to the work. for example, the cylin- der block is cast on a moving platform in a mould made on a moving platform. thereafter it passes, without stopping, through a series of machines which perform all the necessary operations, and then, still moving, it passes into assembly, where to it are added, one by one, the hundreds of parts to create a complete motor. then it moves into the final assembly, where it is joined by other parts until eventually an automobile leaves the final assembly line under its own power. every part of the motor car has a similar train of construction and assembly, all converging either into the final assembly or into boxes or freight cars for ’ shipment. no man uses more than one tool, all the work comes waist high, a man never has to stoop or to move his feet to get any- thing, and the speed of the work is controlled not by the worker’s will but by the pace of the conveyer. the ford industries have been steadily reaching back to sources in order to cut out intermediate profits. the industries have their own iron mines, coal mines and forests, their own rail- way, and an extensive fleet of lake- and ocean-going steamships, all of which are operated on the principle of high wages, high production and low cost. in the forests no tree is permitted to be cut under ro inches. the logs are taken directly to the sawmill and, instead of being first converted into lumber and the parts sawed from the lumber, the parts are sawed directly from the log. all the wood-working is done at the forest mill, the waste goes to a wood distillation plant, and there is no waste whatso- ever in shipment. at the river rouge plant, the iron from the foreign languaghs, teaching of furnace goes directly into the foundries and is poured without reheating. the slag from the furnaces goes to a cement plant. a combination of electric furnaces and a large rolling mill con- verts all of the steel scrap. in every direction the pressure is toward preventing the waste of time, men or material. as the business developed, it became apparent that it was a waste to assemble the cars at the factory and ship them com- plete. the manufacturing plants then ceased in effect to manu- facture automobiles; instead, they make parts, and these are shipped to 35 branches in the united states, where they are assembled into complete motor cars. similar branches or associ- ated companies are located in nearly every part of the world, and these branches also manufacture if the costs permit. foreign branches, under the theory of building consumption, employ only natives of the country in which they are located. all the branches use the same methods and pay the same wages as the home plants. the industry does not use a single warehouse— everything is in transit. the centre of the industry is at detroit, mich., and at river rouge, mich., on the outskirts of detroit; but with the method of assembling cars at the point of-use, a decentralising of manu- facturing is taking place and comparatively small plants are being located out in the country wherever proper water-power sites are available. each of these plants makes only a single part; the thought behind their establishment is to strike a balance between industry and agriculture. none of these plants em- ploys more than 500 men, and in most cases the men divide their time between agriculture and industry. this is one of the most important developments. mr. ford is firmly against paternalism in any form. he be- lieves charity greatly harms those who receive it. carrying out this thought, he has a trade school for the education of boys with dependents, in which the boys make useful articles. they earn an average of about $15 a weck while receiving their edu- cation. the henry ford hospital in detroit, which is open to any one, is conceived on the theory that a hospital should be self- supporting. all its rooms are precisely alike, all have baths at- tached, all the fees and services are at a scheduled rate, which is the same to everyone, and all the surgeons, physicians and nurses are on salary and have no financial relations with the patients. the ford motor co. also builds a light farm tractor under the same methods and principles as the motor car, and in 1926 was building experimentally all-metal airplanes and main- taining for experimental purposes a number of air routes with the eventual aim of putting the ford principlesinto aeronautics. yenry ford has taken no active part in politics, although he was nominated in 1918 for united states senator from michigan; at the election he was defeated by a small margin. he took no part whatsoever in the campaign. in 1915 he was convinced by certain peace advocates of foreign extraction that it might be possible to end the world war if a sufficient gesture were made. he thereupon chartered a ship and proceeded to christiania, norway. then, convinced that the mission was futile, he re- turned home. mr. ford does not believe in war, but he is not an active pacificist. for this encyclopaedia he wrote the article mass production. a full account of the origins, theories and practices of the ford industries is contained in afy life and work (1922), and today and tomorrow (1926), both by henry ford in collaboration with samuel crowther. (s. cr.) foreign languages, teaching of.—the revolution that has taken place in the methods of teaching modern languages may be said to date from vietor’s pamphlet der sprachiunterricht muss umkehren (1886). his doctrines were largely adopted in the frankfurter reformschulen, but it was not till after 1900 that the movement became widespread in england and france. broadly speaking, the idea of the reformers was to substitute direct comprehension and acquisition of the foreign language for mere knowledge attained through the medium of the mother tongue. they insisted on oral study at the outset of the language, involving explanations in the foreign tongue itself, on inductive forestry methods of learning grammar and on the use of reading and of free composition in place of formal grammar and translation from or into the foreign language. hence the introduction of the phonetic script and chart; the employment of gesture; the utilisation of pictures, postcards, coins and other realien; and the stress laid on the teacher and not the text-book being the centre of the instruction—the whole idea being to render the classroom a sort of french or german enclave, and to make the pupil think as far as possible in the language. some of these doctrines were pushed to excess. certain teachers attempted to exclude the mother tongue entirely from the classroom; others devoted an inordinate time to phonetics or conversation on pictures, and exalted the oral side as the goal of all teaching. others again neglected the grammar or inter- preted their new-won liberty as a right to teach as they pleased, irrespective of their colleagues. to-day, while phonetics (q.2.) have been generally accepted in england (though not in france), it is seen that the extent of their use (apart from the chart) may be left to the choice of the teacher. again, new grammar points should be learnt inductively, but the grammar must be system- atised and codified. with most pupils grammatical points are more safely explained in english. due co-ordination of method can usually be secured by the appointment of a head of depart- ment. translation from or into the foreign language is often begun two years before the final examination and not often earlier. as regards the exclusion of the mother tongue, we may take it as an axiom that the cleverer the child the more direct the teaching. hence with the duller child the aim should probably be to concentrate rather on reading and translation than on composition (free or otherwise). at the extreme end of the scale there are, in the opinion of some experts, a few non- linguistic pupils who would be more profitably engaged in con- fining themselves to the mother tongue. it is probable that the earlier reformers laid insufficient stress on the rapid acquisition of vocabulary, possibly from their dread of rote-work. to-day there is a fruitful tendency to learn by heart, not merely poems but duly prepared prose passages, a practice that is at the back of much of the mastery attained by the french in their own language. of course such passages need occasional revision. again, the principle of private reading, which has made such strides in english, has been promoted by the formation of class and school libraries, and the practice has been further fostered by the introduction of free study periods in certain schools. such are the main features of the teaching in english secondary schools, up to the first school examination. in the central schools, which often prepare their fifth-year pupils for similar examinations, the methods are largely the same, except that in the first year the classes, which are larger, are sometimes divided for conversation, with excellent results. in the advanced courses of the secondary schools, the methods of reading and lecture expliquee without translation are largely followed, and essays on literature are written in the foreign language. a burning point is that the universitics which con- duct the higher certificate examinations appear to prefer an- swets in english in the literature papers. a possible solution would be the award of extra marks for one question to be an- swered in the foreign tongue. in the evening schools methods have been modernised, but the need of covering the ground more quickly necessarily limits the employment of the more leisurely practices of the direct method. (c. bre.) in the united states the attempt to make general the employment of the “ di- rect method ” in the teaching of the foreign modern languages in the united states had begun to subside before 1go9, when it became clear that the method was looked on askance in the best high schools and preparatory schools, and especially in the col- leges and universities. many teachers were well acquainted with foreign languages by ancestry and study abroad; but some could not speak such languages with ease. also, the increasing | 71 1o develop. in the universities and colleges, the professors laughed the method out of court. an anecdote is told about a professor of french in a certain university, who, when asked if he spoke french, answered: “‘ i don’t speak french, i teach it.” when we consider, however, that at present no teacher of french in the united states would answer in this way, we see that the agitation over the direct method has borne fruit. indeed, nearly all the text-books in modern languages bear an imprint, however faint, of the direct method, whose iniluence has been beneficial. it is true, furthermore, that the war gave a strong and perhaps lasting impulse to the study of the spoken language. it is said that when the united states entered the war, the accredited hewspaper reporters sent to europe were remarkable in only one regard: their inability to say the slightest thing in french. this would no longer be the case. much of the improvement in the teaching of the modern janguages came from another source: the introduction of pho- netics. this study made its way under two forms: formal or theoretical phonetics and experimental phonetics. the first came from both france and germany, as well as from the eng- lish school of bell and sweet; the latter came from france. the french influence was secn in the steady extension through the universities and high schools of the international phonetic alpha- bet, which is now the only one used in teaching the foreign spoken languages. this alphabet was contrived by paul passy (who took hints from ellis, bell, sweet and others) and commenced to be known im the early ‘nineties. its use has become so general that it forms the basis of instruction in diction, music and pho- netics, as is seen in the brilliant work being done in new york by such teachers and authors as adele baldwin, marguerite dewitt, may laird-brown and william tilly. experimental phonetics came from the indefatigable zeal of its founder, the abbe rousselot, whose laboratory at first was in the institut catholique, paris, then in the college de france. two or three americans had begun experimental research at about the same time as rousselot, but they did not have labora- tories at their disposal. none the less, their example prepared the way for the introcduction of rousselot’s methods, which have left a permanent impress on the teaching of the modern languages in the united states. the war favoured the extension of french. combined reports from about 76° of the elementary schools, public and private, and the high schools and academies and from about 89% of the colleges and universities indicate an enrolment during the year 1923-4 of 629,000 students of french, 392,000 of spanish, and 65,000 of german. (r. we.*) forestry (sce 10.645).—no summary of the timber resources of the world can be described in any sense as accurate or reliable. the facts available are insufficient, the statistics on which esti- mates are based are often incomparable and even the sources of information are not always above suspicion; overstatements by government departments to attract capital or to justify increased exploitation are as common as understatements by foresters or traders to insure conservation of resources or enhanced prices. the british empire contains not less than 1,100 million acres of woodlands, but has under 1,100 forest officers—that is to say, taking the empire as a whole, less than an average of one forest oflicer for every 1,000,000 acres. brazil with 1,000 million acres of tropical and semi-tropical forests has in the european sense no organised forest service at all. the information about the russian forests, said to be 1,200 to 1,500 million acres in extent, even before the war, was unsatisfactory, especially as regards the virgin softwood forests in asia and northern europe. since the war little authoritative information 1s obtainable, and such information as there is, ts, therefore, for the most part, too old to be of any real utility. the world’ss timber resources for purposes of comparison the timber resources of the world may be divided into hardwoods and softwoods, the former desire for travel in europe, now so manifest, was only beginning ! being, generally speaking, broad-leaved and, in the temperate 72 zone, deciduous trees; the latter coniferous and non-deciduous. the hardwoods themselves fall naturally into two classes— hardwoods of the temperate zone, some 1,200 million acres in extent, and tropical hardwoods, estimated at 3,600 million acres. the softwoods of the world cover a much smaller area, just over 2,500 million acres. these forests, with the exception of the parana pine forests of brazil, chile, india and australasia, are situated in the northern hemisphere, over 80% of the total being found between the 45th and 7oth parallel north. the more im- portant commercial timbers of the world, the softwoods and temperate hardwoods (calculated on an acreage basis), are sit- uated to the extent of 95°% and 89% respectively in the northern hemisphere, where 75°% of the population exists. while, as a means of estimating timber resources, a calculation by acreage is unsatisfactory, the stand of timber to the acre varying with species, soil and climatic conditions, no unit of measurement can be given which more accurately gives a picture of forest wealth. only about 10 to 15% of the world’s forests are worked under systematic management, and about these forests alone is reliable information available as to stocks, annual growth, fellings or losses by pests, etc. of the other forests, 15 to 20% may be classed as commercial forests either in process of exploitation or about to be exploited. about these forests some general trade information is usually available. the balance 65 to 75%, is virgin forest not utilised for commercial purposes, and about which information is non-existent or unreliable. the estimates of acreage have, in the main, been taken from the work of messrs. zon and sparhawk entitled forcst resources of the world. these two distinguished members of the united states forest service have succeeded in making a more or less coherent picture of the available data about the forests of the world, supplemented by personal investigations and inquiry where full information was not previously available. harpdwoop supplies the hardwood timber supply of the world need give little real cause for anxiety. there will be in the future, as in the past, shortages of supplies of individual species. the hardwood forests, however, are so vast in extent, and include so many different types of timber, that the increase of information about recently developed countries, and the advance in the science of timber testing, seasoning and wood icchnology, should make the sub- stitution of new species for old a more simple and certain pro- ceeding than has formerly been the case. the solution of the hardwood supply question would therefore appear to lie not only in the conservation of existing resources, but also in the ordered investigation of new sources of supply, together with the initiation of such steps as are necessary to make such supplies aviilable as and when they are found in quantities that make their exploitation commercially possible. united statics —the united states has taken the jead in this matter. owing to the wholesale clearances of their more acces- sible hardwood forests by uncontrolled felling, and the almost complete destruction of their valuable chestnut forests by the chestnut bark disease (fudothia parasitica), the federal u.s. department of agriculture has for some time been inquiring through its forest products lahoratory, madison, wis., about the potential supplies of hardwood timber outside the states. iim- portant results have already been obtained in central and south america. british empire——inside the british empire equally good work has been and is being done; at dehra din in india, at montreal in canada and in england under the aegis of the forest products research board, at kew, as well as at the im- perial institute, timbers are being tested and new species iden- tified. in this section of imperial development it is necessary to insist on one point that has been passed over, viz., that it is not only necessary to educate and indeed to persuade the consumer by scientilic and practical tests of the possibilities of a given substitute species, it is also necessary to prove to the satisfaction of wood merchants that that substitute is available on a com- mercial scale and that the forests in which it is found are suitably forestry situated for exploitation. an imperial forestry bureau advo- cated by two consecutive imperial forestry conferences is a necessary link between the consumer and the merchant on the one hand, and the systematic botanist, the timber testing centre and the producing units of the empire overseas on the other. sortwoop supplies the future supply of softwood timber is disquieting, the most unsatisfactory feature being the rapidity with which the acces- sible virgin forests are being destroyed. in the more progressive and industrially developed countries timber, other than fire- wood, is used in the proportion of 80% of softwood to 20% of hardwood. great britain, the greatest importing country in the world, brings in softwood in the proportion of nine to one hard- wood. according to the latest figure available, finland and siberia are the only two “net” exporting countries in the world where the resources of softwood timber are not being reduced by annual felling at a greater rate than is made good by annual growth. united states—the united states, which consumes nearly one-half the converted timber of the world, is using up its soft- wood timber reserves at about four times their rate of growth. only 137,000,000 ac. of virgin forest remain. these are being felled at the rate of 5,500,000 ac. per annum. the situation has caused such general anxiety that the president himself made the following statement in 1924: “‘ expressed roughly we have left about 745 billion cu. ft. of timber. from this the annual drain is 25 billion cu. feet. this total drain is most significant when we reflect that towards offsetting it we have an annual growth of onfy six billion cu. ft., and even in our young forests where this growth is taking place cutting has already out- stripped growth. we must face the situation that at this rate we are not far from timber exhaustion.” the course of timber denudation in the united states is in- teresting. first the new england states, then the lake states and now the south atlantic states have been cut out in rapid succession. in the southern states the departmental report of 1920 states that of the 5,400 mills owning or controlling prac- tically the entire remaining virgin stand in the south, 4,419 mills will be cut out in five years or less, and that a further 800 mills will cut out their timber in the next ten years, i.c., by the end of 1930 or thereabouts. when this last forest reserve on the eastern freeboard is exhausted, the export trade of softwood timber will be concen- trated almost entirely in the pacific states, distant from the main commercial centres by 2,000 m. of railroad or 4,000 m. by sea. this fact is important from two points of view—(a) the price of timber must rise very considerably in the eastern states, where four-fifths of the population are centred; (6) that, consequent on a rise in prices due to the lack of local supplies, sea freight and canal charges, america may come into the european market for construction timber, just as she does to-day into the canadian and european markets for her pulp-wood. in a statement made by col. w. b. greeley, chief of the united states forest service, at the british empire forestry conference in 1923, the virgin softwood forests of the united states at the then rate of destruction would be cut out in 25 years, and after that date the industry would have to depend on “ cut-over ”’ woods and the less accessible of the federal reserves. cunada.—the position in canada is but little more satisfac- tory. according to mr. craig, the canadian statistical officer (report of 1923), the total amount of softwood in canada amounts to 198,000 million cu. ft., one-half of which can be profitably operated under existing conditions. the amount of softwood used annually for all purposes is about 900,000,000 cu. ft., but owing to the method of exploitation this entails the destruction of 1,700,000,000 cu. ft. of standing timber. in five years the annual loss of merchantable timber from fire had amounted to “90,000,000 cu. ft., and in 10 years destruction by the spruce bud worm had averaged 1,300,000,000 cu. feet. other insects and forest diseases have also caused serious loss in the forest, so that the annual drain on the resources of the dominion is probably formosa not less than 4,000,000,000 cu. feet. at this rate the accessible stands of virgin forest would last 25 years. europe—in europe the softwood position is by no means satisfactory. the demand of industrial life for an adequate timber supply increases in volume much more quickly than the growth of the population, yet there is no margin for increased production outside russia, and the estimates of russian reserves are founded on quite insufficient data. three of the principal softwood exporting countries in europe are norway, sweden and finland. norway has been living on her forest capital for many years, and her softwood timber con- sumption exceeds growth by about 51,000,000 cu. feet. sweden until recently was supposed to be living well within her forest means. a recent survey has shown that the annual growth, especially in the north, is less than was previously calculated, and consumption exceeds growth by 100,000,000 cu. feet. finland ts reported to be using 140,000,000 cu. ft., less than the annual growth. two facts must be borne in mind—(a) that her calcula- tion of annual growth will probably have to be revised, (8) that the extension of her saw-milling industry is rapid. russia.—to what extent the virgin forests of russia can come to the aid of europe and america is difficult to estimate. apart from political questions there are certain limiting factors which are bound to affect continuous production. 1. the main group of softwood forests is situated north of the soth parallel. the rate of growth is necessarily slow; on the finnish and swedish analogy, probably not more than 20 cu. ft. per ac. per annum. jn the extreme north the rate of growth is probably only half that rate, while owing to the infrequency of seed years restocking must necessarily be a slow process. 2. the extent of land over which russian forests are spread is so great and the communications so poor that only a relatively small ortion is accessible under existing conditions and at present day umber prices. mr. fraser story in his review of the softwood resources of europe estimates that 90,000,000 ac. of the russian forests are merchantable as opposed to 243,000,c00 ac. unmerchantable. he includes as unmerchantable all woods in which the cost of extraction is prohibitive, or on which the land is so poorly stocked or the timber of such a character of growth as to be un- suitable for commercial use. ‘the merchantable area includes the areas which before the war could have been exploited without undue commercial risk with the means of extraction and utilisa- tion then available. 3. russia has a population nearly as large as the united states. she is already an importer of timber in her southern states. her consumption of hardwoods and softwoods before the war was cal- culated at only 66 cu. ft. per capita per annum, it 1s not improbable that with the relaxation of forest regulations her per capita consump- tion has materially increased and may approach that of norway and sweden, 130 cu. ft. per annum. ; 4. it is calculated that before the war russia was living on her capital, t.e., that her consumption exceeded her annual growth by 1,851 million cu. ft. per annum. siberia.—the productive russian forests in asia probably amount to 500 to 600,000,000 acres. only one-fifth of this area has ever been surveyed. the pacific slopes and the forests tributary to the amur and other small coastal rivers are the only areas capable of exploitation under existing trade conditions, and may amount to 40,000,000 acres of softwood and hardwood forests, only one-tenth of which has been surveyed. the main supplies of central siberia will only be available when political conditions are such as to permit of the investment of capital, the creation of railways and the establishment of banks and credit institutions. even in the more easily developed area an export trade will have to be built up from its very foundations. before the war there were said to be only 74 producing saw- mills in siberia; since the war exports of timber to japan and china have increased; but even to-day, considering the. size of the country, they are relatively unimportant. other areas.—the remaining virgin softwood forests of the world can be dismissed in a very few words. in japan consump- tion is rapidly overtaking production. japan has for long been anxious about future supplies, and has embarked on the largest fe: planting programme of any country in the world. the recent survey by the united states forest service in alaska has proved disappointing. while the hinterland contains important reserves of pulp wood, the milling timber is confined to a strip of land on the coast averaging, it is said, only a few miles in width. australia and new zealand, despite their softwood supplies, are importing countries. the parana pine forests of brazil, once considered as an important timber reserve for the southern hemisphere, are being rapidly cut out and no system of reforestation has yet been adopted. conclusion.—it would appear that while information about the softwood forests of the world leaves much to be desired, there are sufficient data to warrant certain conclusions:— 1. that except in russia—an unknown quantity —the main soft- wood virgin timber reserves will be exhausted before very long, and producers will have to depend more and more on ‘ cut-over " forests or woods raised or restocked by the agency of man. 2. that the united states shortage is likely to come more quickly than the european one. 3. that the more the american supply becomes centred in the pacific coast states the greater is the probability of the industrial states of north-eastern america coming into the european market for saw-timber in the same way as they do now for pulp of wood. 4. that as the united states consumes 13,750 million cu. ft. of softwoods as opposed to a total european consumption of 9,120 million cu. ft., the united states advent into european markets wil] have an important bearing on european prices. birliography.—british empire forestry conference, proceedings (1920-3); a. l. howard and 5. fitzgerald, timbers of the world (1920); r. zon and w. m. sparhawk, forest resources of the world (1923); capper, u.s. forest service report. (lr.) formosa (sce 10.669).—the island of formosa (taiwan) has an area of 13,839 sq. m. and on oct. 1 1920 the population was 3,655,308, representing a density per sq. m. of 264 inhabitants. the population was estimated at 3,758,goo on oct. 1 1923. the chief towns are taihoku, tainan, kagi and taichu. the hokoto is. (pescadores) are included in taiwan. administration and finance —taiwan was placed under a civil administration in april 1896, and legislative steps were taken in the following year to put the finances of the island on an independent footing. meanwhile a grant was made from the imperial treasury, but the subvention was withdrawn in 1906 owing to the satisfactory financial condition of the island. furthermore, with the development of its industry and the increase of various public establishments, finance was greatly expanded and the total revenue and expenditure in the budget for 1924-5 are put at 91,553,193 yen (excluding the extraordi- nary budget). government monopolies—the government monopoly under- takings on the island are opium, salt, camphor and tobacco, the importation of opium and the manufacture and smoking of the drug being strictly prohibited since 1896, except by licence in the case of confirmed smokers. the number of licensed smokers had decreased from 117,000 in 1900 to 38,673 at the end of 1923. in may 1899 the government took steps to improve the quality and increase the quantity of salt produced, which had hitherto suffered from the fluctuations due to irregular and sporadic private enterprise. the total area of the salt-fields is now over 2,348 k6 (about 4,500 ac.); the quality of the salt has decidedly improved, and the annual output has been steadily increasing, having risen to 404,000,000 kin (242,400 metric tons) in 1923, sufficient to satisfy local requirements and also for export to japan, chosen, karafuto, etc. in 1899 the production of camphor was also controlled, and in 1905 the monopoly sys- tem was extended to taiwan-cut tobacco, in both cases with beneficial results. trade.—the chief commodities exported from taiwan are tea, rice, sugar, camphor, turmeric, llax, hemp, jute and coal. foreign trade, consisting of oversea trade and trade with the homeland (japan proper), has grown year by year. the development of taiwan trade with foreign countries was affected adversely by the duties which have been increased frequently since the revision of customs tarifls in 1890, but its trade with the homeland has made steady progress with the development of various industries, 74 stimulated by the growing perfection of banking and communi- cation facilities in the island. in 1907 the volume of trade with japan and overseas trade was 58,340,000 yen, while in igi0 it was 108,880,000 yen (largely owing to the development of the sugar industry}. in 1923 the total trade reached 308,720,000 yen. of this the exports to foreign countries were valued at 29,150,000 yen, and the exports to japan proper at 169,440,000 yen, a total of 198,590,000 yen. the imports amounted to 39,110,000 yen from foreign countries, and 71,010,000 yen from the homeland, totalling 110,120,000 yen. thus the excess of total exports over total imports for 1923 amounted to 88,460,000 yen. agriculture and industryye—almost the whole of taiwan is a rice- growing country, yielding two crops a year. in 1923 the rice crops amounted to 4,866,087 koku (24,102,639 bu.), though in that year they suffered from the worst drought ever known. the oolong and souchong teas, produced in the north of the island, are important exports to foreign countries; the value of the oolong exported abroad in 1923 was 5,160,965 yen, the sugar industry enjoyed great prosperity in 1916 and 1917, the value of exports being 11,317,643 yen and 15,775,205 yen respec- tively. the area under sugar-cane cultivation in 1923 was 114,710 k6 (1 kg =2-45 ac.) which, owing tothe satisfactory growth of the plant, yielded raw sugar amounting to 6,192,040,773 kin (1 kin = 1-323 lb.). there were operating 44 plants of the latest style with a capacity of 34,650 english tons, 11 improved-style factories with a capacity of 820 english tons and tot old-style factories, which al- together produced 521,501,144 kin of centrifugals, 59,878,831 kin of refined sugar and 10,860,026 kin of brown sugar, aggregating 592,240,001 kin, gold, atluvial gold, silver, copper, coal, petroleum and sulphur are all found in the northern part of the island. the total value of mineral products in 1923 was 12,915,908 yen, being an increase of a little over 210% over the 1913 figure. the gold produced in 1923 was 411,649 grammes; placer gold, 8,306 grammes; silver, 569,376 grammes; coal, 1,445,000 metric tons; and petroleum, 25,29 hectolitres. the fishing industry of taiwan owes much of its present pros- perity to government encouragement, although owing to the favourable ocean currents, fishing can be carried on all around the island. artificial rearing of oysters, prawns, carp, etc., is accom- plished both in salt and brackish waters, and it is a characteristic of the formosan fisheries that whilst the natural produce is valued at about 4,000,000 yen, the value of the products of fish culture is 2,000,000 yen. banking.—the bank of taiwan (est. 1897) is the central bank of the island, and has an authorised capital of 45,000,000 yen and a aid-up capital of 39,375,000 yen. the bank is empowered to issue fiksagie and to transact ordinary banking and foreign exchange business. there are several ordinary banks and many credit associations. a great increase in the business of the post-office savings bank took place during rg10~23, the number of depositors having risen from 90,893 in 1909-10 to 457,869 in 1922-3, the deposits increasing from 1,900,700 yen to 8,171,201 yen. in 1899 the government commenced planning out a trunk line from north to south of the island, connecting the ports of keelung and taku and passing through taihoku, taichu and tainan. branch lines, further opening up the rice, sugar, tea and mining districts, were gradually completed, so that at the end of the financial year 1922-3 there were 468-70 m. of railway open to traffic. in the same year over 13,000,000 passengers and more than 3,000,000 tons of goods were carried, the receipts being over 12,000,000 yen. in addition to the state railways, there were at the end of 1922 1,242 m. of railway belonging prin- cipally to sugar factories and 547 m. of track for hand-propelled cars, an important means of local transport peculiar to the island. (lis sass km) forrest, john forrest, ist baron (1847-1918), aus- tralian statesman and explorer (see 10.672), was acting pre- mier of australia in 1907 during the absence of mr. deakin in london. he took office again as treasurer in mr. ilughes’s ‘“ national ” cabinet of 1917, but resigned owing to ill-health early in 1918, when he was raised to the peerage, being the first australian to be so honoured. he died at sea on his way to london to take his seat in the iiouse of lords, sept. 3 1918. forster, edward morgan (1879- ), british novelist, was educated at tonbridge school and king’s college, cam- bridge. his first novel, where angels fear to tread (1905) was followed by the longest journey (1907) and a room with a view (1908). wider attention was won by howards end (ro10), forrest—fosdick but thereafter, except for some short stories, the celestial omnibus (1911), he published little until 1924, when a passage to india appeared. this was a fruit of first hand observation of modern indian life and with it forster entered intoa fuller public recognition of his powers as a writer with a gift for keen analysis of social character and relationships. wartime work in egypt enabled him to write a useful book on alexandria: a history and a guide (1922), from which came the material for the short studies of alexandrian history, ancient and modern, in pharos and pharillon (1923). forsyth, peter taylor (1838-1921), british noncon- formist divine (see 10.677), died in london nov. 11 1921. among his later works were the persen and place of christ (1909); the principle of :luthority (1912) and this life and the next (19178). fortification: see siegecraft. fort worth, tex., u.s.a. (see 10.728), entered on a period of rapid development after the establishment of camp bowie (1917) and three flying fields for the training of canadian and american aviators, and the erection (1918) of the army and navy helium plant. with the discovery of the ranger and burkburnett and other important new oilfields, it became the geographical centre of the oil-producing region of the southwest, and by 1925 was the greatest petroleum pipe-line centre in the world. its refineries had a daily crude capacity of 75,000 barrels. natural gas was brought in from 15 fields. beginning about 1920, the transition in western texas from ranching to stock- farming and diversified agriculture (especially cotton, wheat and feed crops) added a large and prosperous population to fort worth’s trading territory, supplied raw materials for new in- dustries, stimulated meat-packing and flour-and-feed-mills and enlarged its grain and livestock markets. a textile mill was established in 1924; a cement plant in 1925. bank deposits were $15,425,000 in 1910; $78,540,000 in 1925. the value of manu- factured products was $8,661,000 in 1909; $38,160,000 in 1919; $75,163,236 in 1923. in 1922 the area of the city was more than doubled by the annexation of 22 sq. m., including niles poly- technic, and a large suburban territory. the population in 1920 was 106,482, of whom 15,896 were negroes and 7,502 foreign-born; in 1925, 185,000 according to a local estimate, taking into account the suburban territory annexed in 1922. a new charter, adopted in april 1925, established the council- manager form of government and created a city plan board. plans were under way (1925) for the construction of a union passenger station and an interchange belt railway, and for a great project of water conservation, flood control and irrigation, by tarrant county water improvement district number 1. the leading educational institutions include texas christian university, southwestern baptist theological seminary and texas woman’s college, established in 1914, with which the older polytechnic college was merged. fosdick, harry emerson (1878- ), american divine, was born at buffalo, n.y., may 24 1878. he graduated from colgate university in 1900, proceeding thence to union theo- logical seminary, new york city. ordained into the baptist ministry in 1903, he was pastor of the first baptist church, mont- clair, n.j., r904-15. he rapidly acquired a high reputation as a preacher, especially among the universities. becoming instruc- tor in homiletics at union theological seminary in 1908, he was appointed morris k. jesup professor of practical theology in 1915. in 1918 the first presbyterian church of new york city was founded by amalgamation of the old first, madison square and university dace churches, and dr. fosdick became its associate minister and permanent preacher dec. 29 1018. on may 21 1922 he preached a sermon entitled ‘ shall the fundamentalists win?” making a wide plea for tolerance in religion and asking that the door of christian fellowship be left open to all who sincerely desired to follow christ, regardless of specific credal belief. the presbytery of philadelphia formally brought the matter of dr. fosdick’s teaching before the general assembly of the presbyterian church at indianapolis in 1923, stigmatising it as heretical and demanding action. the new foster—fourteen points, the > york presbytery, acting on the request of the assembly, ap- pointed an investigating committee which reported to the gen- eral assembly of 1924 that they found dr. fosdick’s teaching and preaching to be in accordance with presbyterian stand- ards. this report was vehemently attacked by the fundamen- talist element in the assembly and was referred to the judicial commission of the church, which, after hearing evidence, de- cided that dr. fosdick must take the vows of a presbyterian minister (implying acceptance of the westminster confession) or vacate his pulpit. he thereupon tendered his resignation, oct. 6 1924, which was accepted and took effect march 1 1925. immediately thereafter the park avenue baptist church of new york called dr. fosdick to its pastorate, agreeing to open its membership to all christians without insisting on its tradi- tional ordinance of baptism and also to remove from its present site and binld an amply equipped church on morningside hfeights—the educational centre of the city. his works include the secend mile (1909); the manhood of the master (1913); the assurance of immortality (1913); the meaning of prayer (1918); the challenge of the present crists (1917); the meaning of faith (1918); the meaning of service (1920); christianity and progress (1922); the modern use of ihe bible (yale lectures, 1924). foster, sir george eulas (1847- ), canadian states- man, was born in new brunswick sept. 3 1847. educated in new brunswick, edinburgh and heidelberg, he took up teach- ing in canada. in 1882 he became conservative member in the canadian parliament, representing new brunswick, and in 1885 became minister of marine and fisheries. from 1888—1896 he was minister of finance. in the borden administration of 1911 he was minister of trade and commerce, retaining the portfolio in the union govt. of 1917. in 1917 foster was sum- moned to the senate of canada. he was a great advocate of preferential trade within the empire, and in 1903 he madea series of speeches in england in support of mr. chamberlain's policy. sworn of the imperial privy council in 1916, he was in the same year appointed one of great britain’s four repre- sentatives at the economic conference at paris. in 1918 fos- ter was created k.c.m.g., and he represented canada at the peace conference, 1919, and at the first assembly of the league of nations in 1921. he was later elected a vice-president of the assembly. fouillee, alfred jules emile (1838-1912), french philosopher (see 10.737 and 18.250), died at lyons july 16 1912. fourteen points, the.—-during the winter of 1917-8 talk of peace was prevalent throughout the world. between russia and germany actual! peace negotiations were in progress during the opening months of 1918; and on jan. 5 1918 the british pre- mier outlined the terms upon which great britain and her allies would be prepared to negotiate for peace. on jan. 8, three days after lloyd george’s speech, president woodrow wilson, in his address to the joint session of congress, formulated under r4 separate heads his ideas as to the essential nature of a post-war settlement. before the delivery of his ad- dress he had received from a committee of inquiry, set up by col. house in sept. 1917,a report upon the territorial settlement that should follow the conclusion of the war. it has been stated that no fewer than six, and these the territorial points, of wilson’s fourteen points were “ directly framed’ upon the recom- mendations contained in the report. it has also been stated that the report was drawn up by dr. s. mezes, d. h. miller, and walter lippmann.t in any consideration of the fourteen points it must be borne in mind that in drafting the points, especially the first five, regard was had not merely to the future, but also to the fact that they could be used as a diplomatic weapon in the present.? in drafting point 4 the president was probably inspired by the ex- ample of the united states, where each state has only a militia for the preservation of internal order; the safety of all from exter- nal attack being guarded by the federal army. the fourteen points were:— 'r,s. baker, woodrow wilson, vol. 1, pp. 110-1. 2c, seymour, woodrow wilson, pp. 235 seq. ffs t. open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. 2. absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. 3. the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themsclves for its main- tenance, 4. adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 5. a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equi- table claims of the government whose title is to be determined. 6. the evacuation of all russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting russia as will secure the best and freest co- operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing, and more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. the treatment accorded russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their goodwill, of their com- prehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. 7, belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. no other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. 8. all french territory should be freed, and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to france by prussia in 1871 in the matter of alsace-lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly 50 years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all. g. a readjustment of the frontiers of italy should be effected along clearly recognisable lines of nationality. 10. the peoples of austria-iiungary, whose place among the na- tions we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. ti. rumania, serbia and montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several balkan states should be entered into. 12. the turkish portions of the present ottoman empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under inter- national guarantees. 13. an independent polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant. 14. a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. president wilson developed his theories during 1918 jn a series of speeches, to which reference was subsequently made during the armistice negotiations. these are as follows:— the four principles—ain the “‘ four principles ’ congress, feb. 11 1918, he declared:— > speech in 1. that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent; 2. that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were chattels or pawns in a gaine, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that 3. every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and 4. that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introduc- ing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of europe, and conse- quently of the world. the four ends.—in the “ four ends ”’ speech of july 4 1918 occurs the following passage:— these are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace :— 1. the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world, or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduc- tion to virtual impotence. 2. the settlement of every question, whether of territory or sover- eizhty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material in- terest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery. 3. the consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct to- wards each other by the same principles of honour and of respect for the common law of civilised society that govern the individual citi- zens of all modern states, and in their relations with one another, to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right. 4. the establishment of an organisation of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned. these great objects can be put into a single sentence. what we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organised opinion of mankind. the five particulars——the “ five particulars’ (speech of sept. 27 1918) were:— 1. the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimina- tion between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. it must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned. 2. nospecial or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all. 3. there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the league of nations. 4. and, more specifically, there can be no special selfish economic combinations within the league and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty, by exclusion from the markets of the world, may be vested in the league of nations itself as a means of discipline and control. 5. all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world. special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. it would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms. (see also eurore.) bibliography.-—the text of the fourteen points will be found in c. seymour, woodrow wilson and the world war, vol. 3, pp. 42-5 (1921). see also r. s. baker, woodrow wilson and world settlement, 3 vol. (1923); h. w. v. temperley, f/tstory of the peace conference of parts, vol. 1, pp. 431-5 (london, 1920). fox-hunting (sce 13.947).—the years immediately preced- ing the world war were in many ways the golden age of this great english sport. money was plentiful and it was noticeable that newcomers to the country-side were inclined to favour hunting rather than shooting. increased facilities for transport enabled people to hunt from towns. horse-breeding and hound- breeding had been placed on a sound basis, and hunting, gen- erally, had been organised and stabilised under the supreme authority of the masters of foxhounds association. war dificultics —then came the war. the drain on horses was tremendous; subscription lists dropped to practically noth- ing; and, worst of all, at the height of the submarine menace, the feeding of hounds became an almost insoluble problem. the expense was enormous and there was a considerable outcry to the effect that hounds should be suppressed altogether as uscless animals which consumed useful food. in 1917-8 hunting very fox-hunting—fractures nearly ceased altogether, and had it once come to an end it is extremely improbable that it would ever have been revived. the association of m. f. h., however, in collaboration with sir william buxton, tackled the problem. all over the country the number of hounds was reduced, the reduction being effected partly by killing off hounds, but mainly by drafting large numbers out of the country, notably to america, and by breeding fewer. these drastic measures had their reward. not only was hunt- ing saved, but it was far easier for the staffs, greatly depleted by the war, to deal efficiently with these reduced packs. further, half a century of hound shows had given the general breeder a very sound idea at what to aim; so that, in spite of these reduc- tions, not only was the total number of hounds in england in 1925 very nearly up to the pre-war strength, but the quality of english hounds was as high as ever. not a single well-known hunt ceased to exist. in 1926 there were over 200 packs of fox- hounds in the british is. and 86 in the united states and the british dominions. post-war developments.—the end of the war by no means put an end to the difficulties which faced hunting. judicious reductions, compensated for by breeding on sound lines, settled the hound difficulty. the question of horses largely answered itself by the release of an enormous number of animals from the army. after the war, too, whether as a direct result or not it is impossible to say, there was a decided improvement in the quality of the horses; this has been accentuated by the judg- ments given at horse shows. before the war the showing animal and the hunter were two distinct types; the animal that won prizes was not likely to prove of much use across country and vice versa. but after the war the show animal was displaced by the real hunter, whois quite capable of winning a prize in the show ring in the summer and a point-to-point in the spring, the ideal at which toaim. the subscriber difficulty was also automatically solved by the return of the armies and, at any rate immediately after the armistice, there were more people hunting than before the war. speaking generally, then, fox-hunting recovered in a surprising way from the direct consequences of the war. but an indirect consequence still had a great and adverse effect on the sport, namcly, the change in the social and territorial conditions of rural england. this began before 1914, but was enormously accentuated by the war. in the old days rural england was largely in the hands of the great landowners, who were probably hunting men themselves, or at any rate supporters of hunting, and their tenant farmers, who took their cue from their landlord. then came the extensive sales of landed property, due to the heavy taxation of the war period and after with its adverse effects on the sport. (c.-l. br.) fractures.—the treatment of fractures has received con- siderable attention during the 15 years i91t0-25, with a cor- responding improvement in the general level of results. the development of radiography (sce radiotherapy) and its more general application have produced a greater knowledge of the displacements which occur and may remain after a fracture, and a more critical spirit toward the results of these injuries has developed. normal form.—the restoration of the normal form of the broken bone is an important factor if the best result is to be ob- tained. after the fracture of a long bone of the lower extremity, correctness of alignment is undoubtedly of the greatest im- portance; in the upper extremity, however, good functional re- sults may be obtained when the position of the bone deviates considerably from the normal. the demand for accurate reposi- tion of fragments has been met by wider use of open operations, whereby replacements of the fragments can be carried out under the eye of the surgeon, and fixation secured by the insertion of metal or bone plates, or suture material. with the precision of modern surgical technique, such intervention is possible without the risk of infection which held back the older surgeons from undertaking such procedures save in exceptional cases. function.—the restoration of function in the injured limb | after a bone has been broken has received increasing notice. the france, anatole problem is recognised as a complicated one, each aspect of which must receive consideration. restoration of the normal line of the bone is of the first importance, but the repair of the soft structures overlying the fracture has an equal influence on the final result. moreover, stiffness in joints near the fracture may develop in cases immobilised for too long, and, if persistent, is a source of serious disability. these complications have been avoided or minimised by modified splint treatment, carly massage and con- trolled movements. various forms of electrical treatment have also been found helpful. war experience —the intensive experience in the treatment of fractures afforded by the world war came during the develop- ment of methods on the above lines, and yielded a store of 1m- provements in technique, while it tended to crystallise opinion on the relative value of various methods of treatment for the individual case. the general introduction of splints, which allow traction to be made on the injured limb, facilitated the control of bone alignment without open operation. other mechanical improvements elaborated enable direct traction to be made on bone fragments. the transfixion of the bone with pins, and the use of metal calipers to grip the fragments, are examples of such procedures. present tendency.—in general at the present time the ten- dency to carry out open operations on all fractures of long bones is less in evidence. this is due partly to the advance in methods of splintage, but also to the fact that operations of this character, coupled with rigid fixation by means of metal plates, delay the process of union, and may be the source of subsequent adhesions between bones and the subjacent soft structures. in america there has been a movement to employ slips of the patient’s own bone for the purpose of fixation at open operations. this pro- cedure involves a more elaborate technique, but certainly over- comes some of the disadvantages of plating with metal. compound or open fractures —the introduction of infection into a fracture has always been a bugbear of surgeons, as, once suppuration is established in bones, it runs a slow course and is liable to lead to sequestration, or death, of some part of the bone, and slow union. war experience has shown clearly that anti- septics are of little value in the disinfection of a lacerated wound. the best method of eradicating infection in connection with wounds of this kind was found to be the excision of the track and the removal of all contaminated tissues. the application of this process of wound excision or debridement to the more severe types of compound fracture has greatly improved the results. once the infection has been avoided or overcome, a compound fracture offers no more serious problem in treatment than does a simple one. un-united fractures —though delay in the process of union is common enough for several reasons, failure of bones to unite firmly in healthy individuals is rare. it is, however, met with in those cases in which a large part of the bone substance has been destroyed or damaged by the primary injury or subsequent infection. these cases are now treated with a high measure of success by bone grafting. iresh bone taken from the patient himself gives the most reliable results. in cases in which the original broken bone ends can actually be brought together, a beef bone and preserved human bone have been employed with some measure of success. as to the degree to which the grafted bone replaces normal bone, the consensus of opinion is that the graft acts as a scaffold along which new bone grows, rather than that it becomes a part of the host skeleton. at any rate it forms a firm bond about which, under suitable conditions, new bone formation takes place. (cui france, anatole (1844-1924), french man of letters (sce 10.775).—for 30 years french literature was dominated in the eyes of all the world by the fame of anatole france. although his influence declined in the last period of his life the value of his art was still widely recognised. his ideas were questioned, but not his style nor the services rendered by him to the language. in his old age he was revered as a genius and a patriarch. no reputation since voltaire’s has been found comparable with his. the son of a bookseller called thibault, this youth who was to 77 make illustrious the pseudonym of anatole france started his career quite humbly. he was fond of literature, he was studious and erudite, but negligently preferred reading to writing. he composed publishers’ puffs and contributed a weekly article signed “ gereme ” to the univers iilusitre. for his own amuse- ment he wrote verse, les poemes dores (1875) and les noces corinthiennes (1876), which showed learning, charm and taste. in 1879 he published his first volume of stories, jocaste et le chat atatere, and in 1881 his first novel, le crime de sylvestre bonnard, which was acclaimed by the discriminating as delightful. in 1883 he first met madame arman de caillavet, with results that profoundly influenced his career. mme. de caillavet be- came his life-long friend. she was clever and active; she had a host of acquaintances and her receptions were attended by the leading figures of literature and politics. she laboured for the fame of anatole france, and she forced him out of his inertia into composition. the extracts from her correspondence with him prove the important share she took in his writings, and in the dedication of cratnquebille (1904) anatole france could say: “to madame de caillavet, this book which i should not have written without her help, for without her help i should write no books.” for 40 years anatole france poured out a series of lively, solid, graceful and profound works. there are the pungent and mis- chievous short stories, bulthazar (1889), l’etut de nacre (1802), le puits de sainte-claire (1895); the meditative and critical books, les opinions de jereme coignard (1893), la vie litteraire (4 vol. 1883-92); a philosophical novel, la retisserie dela reine pedaugue (1893); an historico-philosophic novel, thais (1890), describing alexandria at the beginning of our era and contrast- ing the ideals of dying paganism with those of nascent chris- tianity; an admirable novel on the french revolution and the terror, les dieux ont soif (1912); a society novel, le lys rouge (1894), a powerful study of jealousy set amid the artistic treas- ures and lovely vistas of florence; then the series of political satires, the four volumes of l’kistoire contemporaine—l’orme du mail (1897), le mannequin d’osier (1897), l’anneau d’amethyste (1899), al. bergeret d paris (1901), where anatole france cre- ates the legendary figure of m. bergeret and portrays society before and during the dreyfus affair; novels of a revolutionary tendency, sur la pierre blanche (1903), l’tle des pingoutns (1908}, la revolte des anges (1914), a biography of joan of arc (1g09~10); lastly the reminiscences, le petit pierre (1918), la vie en fleur (1922). such is the sum of this work admirable in its wealth and variety. the philosophy of anatole france developed during the course of his career. until 1900 he was primarily a sceptic. as voltaire’s spiritual son, he delighted in the play of ideas and observed with- out pity the stupidity and the silliness of men. he probed the past and the present and spared no example of human inconsist- ency, error or weakness. les opinions de jereme cotgnard gives the reader much pleasure, so witty and mischievous is the author, and gives him, too, a complete lesson in scepticism. the same remark may be passed on les dicitx ont soif, where anatole france considers almost exclusively the failures of the french revolution. at this time the author seems to have kept respect for beauty alone, the beauty of natural or artistic forms or of such superior intelligence as was shown in the great greek and latin writers. meanwhile he beamed indulgently upon an im- perfect universe. as he believed in nothing, he did not believe in a better or a worse. in the writings prior to 1g00 may even be found conservative and aristocratic maxims. a supreme indif- ference inclined him to accept what is rather than risk what might be. : on the outbreak of the political crisis of 1900, his temper changed. he was then seen to show a preference for the pro- gressive parties, and little by little went on to the revolutionary parties which became honoured by his support. he was no ora- tor; words came slowly, and neither his mind nor his phrases were of the kind likely to be popular. the part taken by him at public meetings was undistinguished, being limited to signing manifestos and applauding resolutions, especially those with an 78 international objective. he was more powerful with his pen. an opponent of church and state, he seemed to put his faith in the people and to expect the world to be renewed by some kind of revolution. on this point his ideas remained rather vague. in one of his books, sur la pierre blanche, he ends the description of future society with a dreadful cataclysm that destroys every- thing, and here he is nearer to nihilism than to socialism. the world war changed the trend of his thoughts. as he was too old to serve in the field he wanted at least to show his good will and asked to be employed in a tours office. this great upheaval left him uncertain concerning the destinies of humanity. perhaps extreme scepticism is not for long tolerable, and anatole france felt the need of escape into a revolutionary faith which he refused to define, leaving it a mere aspiration. what is indisputable is the quality of anatole france's art. the younger generations, tried by war, and witnessing the conse- quent political difficulties, ill comprehend the detachment of dilettante m. bergeret. they need more moral discipline, they believe more in virtue and action. but they do not deny the master who charmed their elders with his graceful wit and magic phrases. as a storyteller, in lucidity of thought and form, ana- tole france is incomparable. in his style, too, there is a sweet- ness, an almost voluptuous grace, which distinguishes his phrases from those of any other writer. he owed much to voltaire, much to renan, much to the old french romances, to memoirs and to chronicles. he had read and remembered much; but what he borrowed he made his own; all was changed, and for the better, by his style and interpretation. he translated into a pungent idiom all that could delight or stimulate the intelligence of his cultured contemporaries. he was a deep admirer of classicism, and to the end of his life, when he mentioned moli¢re, racine ot stendhal his conversation or his writing attained their richest substance and most pleasant harmonies. he makes another strong claim on the attention of posterity. he was the finest flower of the latin genius. his knowledge of antiquity was great, and his work contained the essentials of greek and latin wisdom. he portrayed in thais characters who distil the philosophy of the ancients. he put into the mouth of jer6me coignard maxims which likewise represent the sum of the meditations and arguments common to antiquity. if all the works of the hellenic and roman periods were lost their shadow and purpose might be found in the works of anatole france. he knew what he owed them, and paid them the most splendid homage. lastly, in all periods of his career, whatever his theories, he was a deep student of human nature. he expressed in tuncful sentences most of the wisdom that may be acquired from the observation of life and the reading of history. he created char- acters who persist in the memory: jereme coignard, jacques tournebroche, m. bergeret, madame|martin belleme, catherine, the lace worker, paphmuce, nicias, evariste gamelin. he de- scribed what was comic and evil in mortals. he described, too, what was august in man, sacred in man’s labours and suflerings. though he lacked enthusiasm and ardour, his critical intelligence did not prevent him from brooding over human misery, and in the story of crainquebille he showed his heart. while humbling himself before the invincible forces of fate and lust, he dedicated his work now to irony—which brought brightness into his life— and now to pity—which at other times reminded him that life deserves a serious, a solemn attention. and so he became twice fortunate, for he was at once a subtle artist acclaimed by the critics and a universally respected publicist who influenced the simple-minded. ife dicd at tours, oct. 13 1924. the works of anatole france have been translated and edited by frederic chapman and james lewis may and published by the bodley head, london. bibliography.—m. gaffter, les theories sociales d’ anatole france (1923); g. a. masson, anatole france; son oeuvre (1923); m. le goff, anatole france @ la bechelleni (1924); c, maurras, anatole france, politique et potte (1924); j. l. may, anatole france, etc., (1924); j. roujon, la vie et les opinions d'anatole france (1924); g. truc, anatole france, artiste et le penseur (1924); j. j. brousson, anatole france en pantoufles (1925); g. des hlons, anatole france et france racine (1925); j. l. dirick, franciana, opinions, anecdotes, pensees de af. anatole france (1925); g. girard, la jeunesse d’anatole france (1925); r. johannet, anatole france est-il grand ecrivain? (1925); h. de noussanne, anatole france, philosophe sceptique (1925); n. segur, conversations avec anatole france, etc. (1925); j. tharaud, afonsteur france, bergeret et frere leon (1925). (a. cu.*) france (see 10.775), a republic of western europe and mem- ber of the league of nations. the area of france, increased on nov. tr 1918 by the addition of alsace-lorraine, is now 212,737 sq. miles. her domiciled population (1921) was 39,200,518. i. political history the situation of france at the beginning of 1o1t was difficult enough, though no acute trouble was manifest at any point to account for the general uneasiness everywhere apparent. in nov. roro m. briand, after breaking the great railway strike, reconstructed the ministry, over which he had presided since the fall of m. clemenceau in july 1909, to include a larger pro- portion of moderate elements. as is usual in such cases, the reconstruction had disintegrated the governmental majority instead of strengthening it. the chamber elected in 1910 leaned further to the left than the prime minister, and showed its dis- satisfaction by reducing the majority to 16 on a vote of con- fidence on the application of the congregation laws. m. briand might still have remained in power had he really wished, but he preferred to resign (feb. 20 1911) with honour rather than cling to office. although himself sprung from the socialist ranks, he felt the necessity of preserving public order against subversive elements, and saw that the deputies were more and more inclined to force the issue, and moreover, he saw no way of extricating himself satisfactorily from the very delicate negotia- tions with germany. the years before the war the conflict over morocco.—since the algeciras conference in 1909 french diplomacy had alternated between two courses. confident in the russian alliance and the entente of april 8 -t904 with england, she had effectively resisted german pres- sure. but she saw on all sides evidence that germany intended to obtain by indirect means what she had failed to win by intim- idation—a footing in morocco and the disruption of the triple entente. the berlin cabinet took every opportunity of thwart- ing the organisation of a french protectorate in the shereefian empire; moreover, acting in conjunction with vienna, they. persistently insinuated in political and journalistic circles in paris that france would enjoy greater facilities in morocco in return for complaisance towards german expansion in the east. this alluring propaganda had its effect upon the radicals and socialists, while the russian alliance and the entente cordiale found favour mainly among the conservatives, pro- gressives and liberals. to the left of these parties—whom the pacifists accused of militarism—-hopes were entertained of an understanding with germany which, by removing the risk of war, would permit of the normal development of democratic institutions. m. pichon, foreign minister in the clemenceau and briand cabinets, did not share this view; but, inspired with a great desire for conciliation, he gave certain confidential assurances to berlin, supplementing the franco-german declara- tion of feb. 9 r909, under which nationals of both countries were to be associated in morocco in any transactions for which they could obtain contracts. but at the beginning of ror11 the cabinets of paris and berlin were in fact in complete disagree- ment on the application of the 1909 declaration, and it was therefore without regret that pichon left the quai d’crsay. monis, a senator from la gironde, formed (march 2) a radical ministry, giving caillaux finance, berteaux war, steeg public instruction, delcasse the navy, messimy the colonies and paul-boncour labour. he immediately found himself in aifficulties of various kinds. himself opposed to pro- portional representation, he had to deal with a chamber which favoured this method; and although he yielded to socialist pressure on social questions he was unable to calm the efferves- cence of the extreme left. in the department of aube he was france threatened by a quasi-revolt of the vine-growers, whose right to sell their wine under the name of champagne had been dis- puted. the moroccan question was again disquicting. the strongest personality in the ministry was caillaux, who, though he stood for better relations with germany, cherished the ambi- tion of “ giving” morocco to france—that is to say, releasing the protectorate in morocco from the obligations of algeciras by arrangement with berlin. with the concurrence of berteaux he pressed forward the morocco campaign. his foreign min- ister, the lawyer cruppi, failed to realise the risk of military initiative without diplomatic preparation. in april, when the french troops entered fez, germany formulated reservations, and spain claimed her right to similar military occupations, notably at larache. the question of calling a second conference at once arose; at the moment of this diplomatic crisis a tragic accident put an end to the monis ministry, for berteaux was killed and monis seriously wounded (may 20) by the fall of an aeroplane on the aerodrome at issy-les-moulineaux. for a month the govt. struggled on. the senate settled the aube wine question by removing the strict definition of champagne. on june 23 the govt. was defeated in the chamber, and resigned. invited to form a ministry, caillaux took the interior himself, assigned finance to klotz, left steeg and delcasse at public instruction and the navy, gave messimy war and entrusted foreign affairs to de selves, a senator and a successful prefect of the seine. caillaux’s programme included a project for the “ reorganisation of africa.’’ this scheme, previously worked out with messimy, had formed the subject of secret negotiation with the german govt. in the spring. at that time the proposals entailed the cession to germany of the political administration of french equatorial africa under the form of railway exploitation. a document, which was to remain secret, stipulated that: “‘ if the construction of the railway is authorised, germany may be prac- tically assured that sooner or later cameroon will be able to annex the sanga, ubangi and shari basins. the economic preponder- ance of germany in these countries will in effect inevitably entail her political ascendancy.’! this move, which meant disguised annexation, failed; but the german govt., disillusioned by the failure of the agreements made with the briand ministry, pro- ceeded with a definite plan. jules cambon, french ambassador in berlin, went to kissingen during the ministerial crisis to talk over matters with kiderlen-waechter. the agadir incident—on july 1, the day after the reading of the ministerial declaration in parliament, the reply came. ger- many’s representatives abroad notified all the powers signatory to the act of algeciras that in response to the appeal of german commercial firms and of german proteges for the protection of agadir, their government had sent a warship, the ‘‘ panther,” to the moroccan port. this brusque announcement, which meant that france must either forego the military protectorate of morocco or compensate germany, was made two days before the date fixed for the embarkation of the president, m. fallieres, and the for- eign minister, m. de selves, on a visit to the queen of holland. for four months the new ministry was absorbed in extremcly delicate negotiations. confronted with the uncompromising attitude of great britain and russia, germany, whose military and naval equipment was not yet complete, did not persist in her original claims on the congo. to hasten the issue, caillaux ventured, unknown to de selves, to make to berlin secret pro- posals exceeding the limits conceived possible by the foreign minister. disagreeable complications ensued. finally, on nov. 5, a treaty was signed ceding to germany territory which gave access to the ubangi and the congo and organising an economic protectorate in morocco. the bill for the ratification of the treaty provoked stormy debates in the chamber. it was passed at the end of dec.; but when, some days later, m. caillaux’s secret offers were disclosed at the commission on foreign affairs of the senate, at which leon bourgeois presided, there was a dramatic scene which led to de selves’s resignation. caillaux offered the foreign office 1 documents secrets, published by a.g. journal des debats jan. 11 1912. 79 to m. delcasse, who hesitated; the marine successively to poin- care, admiral germinet and pierre baudin, who refused. finding it impossible to complete his cabinet, the prime minister resigned on jan. io. the replacement of a third of the senate on the first sunday in jan. 1912 produced no sensible modification in either the spirit or the composition of the upper chamber. at the request of falli¢res, raymond poincare now quickly formed a ministry. taking the foreign office himself, he made briand minister of justice, gave leon bourgeois labour, steeg the interior and delcasse the navy. in his declaration on jan. 16 he announced as his programme the prompt ratification of the treaty of nov. 4, an entente loyale with spain, courteous and frank relations with germany, loyalty to alliances and friend- ships, the restoration of the principle of authority, rigid repres- sion of crime and of offences against persons or property and electoral reform. under the influence of the prime minister moderate ideas began to find favour. when henri brisson died, paul deschanel was elected to succeed him as president of the chamber. the municipal elections in may were in favour of the moderates. a rather complicated franchise act embodying pro- portional representation was passed by the chamber. but, as in the previous year, attention was riveted primarily upon foreign affairs. a treaty providing for the protectorate was signed by the sultan of morocco on march 30, and gen. lyautey was appointed resident-general. there followed disturbances at fez, negotia- tions with spain and long discussions in parliament. the sultan moulai-hafid abdicated, and was replaced by moulai- youssef. the liquidation of the moroccan affair was attended by a series of complications. the balkan crisis.—italy had thought it necessary to under- take a parallel enterprise in tripoli, thus involving herself in a war with turkey. certain questions of neutrality arising out of this led to unpleasant incidents, one of which—that of the * carthage ” and the “‘ manouba ’’—caused acute tension be- tween paris and rome. here arbitration prevented actual con- flict. but the annexation pure and simple of the whole of libya by italy, the closing of the dardanelles and various other inci- dents aroused such excitement and such hopes in the balkans that a balkan league was formed for the purpose of liberating the christian races on the peninsula. poincare was briefly in- formed of this by izvolski on april 1, and of the details only in aug. on the occasion of his visit to nicholas it. at st. petersburg. he attempted to intervene as a moderator, but the german and austrian cabinets which had had warning from secret sources at the beginning of april, allowed events to take their course in the hope that serbia might be crushed. during the balkan wars poincare continued to urge the localisation of the conflict and the maintenance by the great powers of a disinterested attitude in respect of territory. at the london conference, which opened in dec., his thesis was: ‘“‘ the balkans for the balkan states.” the diplomatic crisis had become serious over the question of scutari and of serbia’s access to the sea when, falli¢res’s tenure of office having expired, poincare was elected president of the republic (jan. 17 1913) by 483 votes against pams with 269. he carried the day in spite of clemenceau and the preliminary nom- ination of pams by a majority of the left groups. in his presi- dential address to the chambers he made clear his intention to take a more active part than his predecessors had done in the politics of his country. “‘ weakening of the executive power ” he said, ‘‘ is no part of the creed of chamber or country.” he insisted further on the necessity of maintaining the military power of france at its highest level, for “ it is not possible for a nation to have an effectively pacific policy unless it be always prepared for war.” , briand’s cabinet of jan. 1913 was formed in accordance with these ideas. taking the interior himself, he gave foreign affairs to jonnart and justice to barthou, leaving most of the other ministers in their offices. he demanded extraondinary credits for material of war, and put forward a bill for the re-establish- ment of three years’ service, proposing thus to counterbalance 80 the military measures of the german govt., which had asked for a special grant of a milliard marks for the reorganisation of the army (see germany). meanwhile he was placed in a minority in the senate on the question of proportional represen- tation and, on march 18, gave in his resignation. barthou, who now became prime minister, with pichon as his foreign minister, set himself to secure the passing of the three years’ service bill, considered indispensable for national security by the french general staff. meanwhile he decided to retain with the colours the class whose term of service would expire in october. it was only after a hard struggle and in the face of violent opposition from the socialists throughout the country that the bill was passed by the chamber, and then only with an amendment made by painleve which placed recruitment a year earlier, at 20 instead of 21, so that the r912 and 1913 classes were called up together, allowing the roto class to be released at the appointed time. the senate passed the bill almost unanimously. barthou’s ultimate success was due to the ever-growing menace of a european war. in april a petty dispute between german travellers at nancy and the inhabitants nearly led to a diplo- matic quarrel. even when the peace of bucharest (aug. 10 1913) ended the second balkan war, the air was still charged with elec- tricity, both in europe and the east. in france anxiety increased with the rapid growth of pan-germanism and the concentrated pressure exercised on the quai d’orsay by the cabinets of vienna and berlin with the object of raising loans to drain french sav- ings invested in those countries which were under the iniluence of the two empires. in the beginning of nov. pichon learned through jules cambon, who had been confidentially charged by the king of the belgians to convey the warning to the french govt., that the kaiser had said to king albert at his official visit to potsdam: “ war with france is inevitable and imminent. .... this time it must be decisive. your majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm that will sweep over the entire german nation when that day comes.” other remarks, of no less grave import, were made by von moltke, chief of the german general staff, who was in attendance. vigorously attacked by the left, barthou had to contend with strong opposition from the radicals, led by caillaux, and the socialists. after the parliamentary vacation his majority col- lapsed on a question of finance. the floating debt, which had been increased by the expenses in morocco, made it necessary to raise a loan. the loan proposed by dumont, minister of finance, was defeated by 290 to 265. the objection to the extension of the guarantee of fiscal immunity enjoyed by the existing reiies to the new rente demanded by the minister was, however, only the nominal pretext; the real opposition of the left was due to dumont’s refusal to impose an income tax. ribot and jean dupuy failed successively in their attempts to form a moderate cabinet on account of radical opposition of which caillaux was the rallying point. poincare, mindful of caillaux’s diplomatic activities in rgt1, was unwilling to put him into power. he therefore instructed doumergue to form a radical ministry in which that statesman would take foreign affairs. doumergue entrusted caillaux with vinance, rene renoult with the interior and viviani with public instruction. he obtained a vote of confidence from the chamber (302 votes against 141) for “ a policy of democratic reforms, based on repub- lican opinion and supported by an exclusively republican major- ity.’ this new govt. indicated a reversion to the sectarian policy known as “ combisme.” it was in favour of a tax on income, which was adopted by the chamber. the reform of the franchise was definitely rejected by the senate in march, and the approaching elections were therefore to be on the old basis of the scrutin @ arrondissement. the menace of ‘“‘ preventive’? war—although the ministry had promised the loyal application of the three years’ service law, it was known to dislike the system. but the external situa- tion became more and more disquieting. german militarism entered upon a provocative phase. the zabern incident (see alsace-lorraine) produced a deep impression throughout the france country. in march the kelnische zettung stated that the “legend ”’ of historical russo-german friendship had been finally exploded. the question of the “ preventive ” war was openly discussed in the principal berlin papers. the kreuzzetiung expressed regret that germany, in 1905, had missed the oppor- tunity of demanding a decisive explanation from france when the conditions were most favourable. the berliner tagebdlatt held the view that “ in certain cases, a state surrounded by too- powerful neighbours owed it to herself not to wait for the knock- out blow to be delivered.” it and other papers declared that germany must make haste to act before the habsburg empire fell to pieces. for several weeks the newspapers harped on this theme. the cordial sentiments exchanged at the elysee on april 21, when the king and queen of england visited paris, reassured the public for a time; but fresh signs of trouble soon disturbed its peace. a noisy campaign was organised in germany against the foreign legion, and complications arose at various points in the east. the assassination of gaston calmetic, and the elections.+—a sensation was caused on the eve of the elections by the assassina- tion of gaston calmette, editor of the figaro, by madame cail- laux. on caillaux’s resignation renoult became minister of finance, and malvy minister of the interior. the elections took place a month later (april 26 and may 10). the re-election of deschanel by 401 votes as president of the chamber made a majority for the radicals and socialists seem unlikely. all the vice-presidents too were chosen from among the partisans of the three years’ service bill. nevertheless the unified socialists carried 102 seats, and the radicals were reinforced; their com- bined strength was such that no cabinet could dispense with their support. doumergue, deferring to custom, had resigned after the elections, and the president of the republic appointed viviani with instructions to maintain the three years’ service law. but viviani, confronted with the opposition of the radical- socialists, who demanded a return to two years’ service, resigned. poincare then called on ribot, who completed on june 9 a cab- inet composed of moderates and of friendly radicals, such as leon bourgeois and jean dupuy. but this cabinet fell at the first meeting of the chamber on june £2, when a majority of 306 against 26 announced the resolve: “‘ to give a vote of confi- dence only to a government capable of bringing about the union of the left groups.’ ribot had drawn the attention of the chamber to the gravity of the general situation and the increase in german armaments; but the socialist deputies, absorbed in their own affairs, maintained that these armaments were not directed against france. viviani, summoned once more by poincare, now found the radicals more accommodating, and succeeded in his task. he took foreign affairs himself; gave justice to bienvenu-martin, the interior to malvy, war to messimy and the navy to augagneur. the ministerial declara- tion announced the government’s intention of applying the three years’ law until further notice and of carrying into effect the income-tax proposals so long held up by the senate. the ministry secured a vote of confidence by 370 against 137 votes. the european crisis on june 28 the archduke francis ferdinand and his wife were assassinated at sarajevo by two bosnians who were austrc- hungarian subjects. while diplomatic and military preparations for a war of aggression were being carried on in the greatest secrecy in vienna and berlin, president poincare and vivian were embarking for russia on a visit to the tsar, while the french people were passionately absorbed in the proceedings against madame caillaux (july 20-8) at the seine assizes. the verdict of acquittal produced a great sensation, but at this very moment the designs of austria and germany were revealed in a flash. poincare had scarcely left russia, on july 23, when—at a mo- ment chosen by vienna and berlin to prevent the president and the tsar from coming to any agreement—the austro-hungarian foreign minister sent serbia an ultimatum couched in terms which were intended to make it unacceptable. in paris, the austrian and german ambassadors declared to bienvenu-martin, france acting premier and foreign minister, that the conflict was to be localised to austria and serbia. m. de schoen added that “any intervention by another power would, automatically, under the existing alliances, produce incalculable results.”” a wireless message led poincare and viviani to cut short their pro- posed stay in stockholm and cancel their visits to christiania and copenhagen; they arrived at dunkirk on july 29. on resuming the direction of affairs on the night of the 29- 3oth, viviani found the situation desperate on the night of the 25th austria had broken off diplomatic relations with serbia, and declared war on the 28th. at the quai d’orsay schoen in- sistently demanded from bienvenu-martin and philippe berthe- lot a public declaration of the “ political solidarity of france and germany ’’—that is to say, the abandonment of russia by france. on the 31st graf lichtenfeld, bavarian charge d’af- faires in berlin, informed munich that ‘‘ the prussian great general staff face war against france with the most complete confidence and count upon the complete defeat of france in four weeks.” during the presidential voyage anxious french socialists had got in touch with german socialists at brussels. jouhaux, gen- eral secretary of the confederation generale du travail, quired categorically of legien, the social-democrat representative, whether his party would allow themselves to be mobilised in case of aggression on the part of germany. he received no reply. on the morning of the 31st the german govt. declared a“ state of emergency’ (kriegsgefahrzustand) preliminary to general mobilisation. on the same day the austrian and russian gov- ernments simultaneously ordered a general mobilisation. at 3:30 p.m., bethmann hollweg desired schoen to inform viviani that the german mobilisation inevitably meant war, and to ask him whether in a war between russia and germany france would remain neutral. his concluding instructions—marked * secret ’’—to schoen were: if, as there is no reason to suppose, the french govt. should declare that they will remain neutral, [ beg your e-xcellency to inform the french govt. that we should require, as pledges of their neutrality, the handing-over of the fortresses of ‘toul and verdun; these we should occupy and return after the war. the reply to this question should be in our hands before 4 p.m. to-morrow. at 7 o’clock schoen fulfilled his mission to the quai d’orsay. a few minutes later, jean jaurcs, leader of the french socialist party, who had returned, greatly disheartened, from brussels, was assassinated by a fanatic in a restaurant. during the day three councils were held at the elysee. poincare sent king george an urgent lettcr, insisting on the importance of unity of diplomatic action on the part of the triple entente and on the moderating effect that could not fail to be produced in vienna and berlin by the certainty “ that the entente cordiale would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side.” in spite of the extreme gravity of the situation viviani had not yet ordered general mobilisation, but only the completion of the second defence line. no moderating influence could now alter the course of events, determined by the two central powers. the french govt. had concurred in all the british and russian proposals for the prevention of a general con‘lagration, whether by the summoning of a conference, by arbitration by the hague court, or by mediation. in spite of some wavering between vienna and berlin at the cleventh hour the situition was so well defined that schoen made his prepara- tions for departure on the evening of the 31st, without waiting for the reply that viviani was to give him the next day. with the ‘‘ punishment ” of serbia as the initial pretext, the conilict insensibly assumed the form desired by the german gencral staff. from austro-serbian and austro-russian it became ger- man-irench, without a mistake or even the slightest imprudence having been committed at any point by the french government. the declurations of war-—on aug. 1, without awaiting replies from france and russia, william ii. approved the text of the declarations of war against these two powers. the federal council assembled in berlin took note of the two documents, and agreed to their dispatch in case the expected replies should si prove unsatisfactory. at 11 a.m. viviani replied to schoen that france woul! do what her interests demanded. ‘there was no mention of toul and verdun by schoen. at 3:40 p.m. france ordered a general mobilisation. at the same hour, and before the arrival in berlin of schoen’s telegram relating his interview with viviani, the order for general mobilisation was given in berlin, the public announcement following at 5 o’clock. at 5:30 schoen went again to the quai d’orsay, where viviani expressed to him his hope that, in spite of the mobilisation, negotiations would be continued on the basis of the most recent proposal put forward by england, which had the warm support of the french cabinet. at 7 p.m. count pourtales delivered germany’s dec- laration of war to sazonov. at midnight izvolski appeared at the elysee, where a cabinet meeting was in progress, to ask what france intended to do. the cabinet decision was to fulfil all the obligations of the alliance, but that france should not take the initiative in breaking off relations nor declare war. a state of siege was proclaimed, and the chambers were convoked for the following tuesday. during the night german detachments invaded french territory at four different points. on the morning of aug. 2 a french corporal was killed on the delle road by a german lieutenant who had entered france at the head of a patrol. in berlin the expediency of an immediate invasion of france was being discussed. after consulting the war ministers and the general staff, the chancellor decided in the negative. ‘‘ we hope,” he reported to the kaiser, “ that the french will attack us.” but this hope was not realised, the french troops having orders not to respond to provocation. the german cabinet then ordered the german minister at brussels to carry out the instructions contained in a sealed note that had been sent with a telegram on july 29; these instructions were that the belgian govt. be summoned to allow the passage of the german army. at the same time the chief of the german ad- miralty informed the commander of the fleet that hostilities against france would probably commence on aug. 3. the bel- gian govt. rejected the german summons, as also the rroposal of h. klobukowski, the french minister, to send five french army corps to defend belgium’s neutrality. in london assur- ances were made to m. cambon by sir edward grey that if the german fleet came into the channel or through the north sea to undertake military operations against the french coast or shipping, the british fleet would give all the protection in its powcr, and that the british govt. were considering whether they would declare in parliament the next day that the violation of belgium should be regarded as a casus beilt. on aug. 3, france having nowhere furnished any pretext for aggression, the german authorities spread false reports of sup- posed invasions of german soil or german skies by trench sol- diers. bethmann vollweg telegraphed to all the furopean capitals that “ france’s action was the most serious violation of neutrality imaginable.”? between 1 and 2 o’clock he ordered schoen to deliver to the french govt. at 6 p.m. the same day a declaration of war couched in these terms:— , the german administrative and military authorities have estab- lished a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts conimitted on ger- man territory by i'rench military aviators. several of these have openly violated the neutrality of belgium by flying over the territory of that country. one has attempted to destroy buildings near wesel; others have been seen in the district of the eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near karlsruhe and niirnberg. i am instructed, and [ have the honour to inform your excellency that, in the presence of these acts of aggression, the german empire considers itself in a state of war with france in consequence of the acts of this latter power. viviani made vigorous protests both to schoen and in a note sent to the representatives of the powers in paris. there was some brawling in the streets of the capital where german or austro-hungarian subjects owned shops and some of these wer’, pillaged. but order once being restored by viviani, no further disturbance took place in the following days. that evening he reconstructed his cabinet to suit the circumstances, himself remaining president of the council but relinquishing foreign affairs, which passed to doumergue. augagneur succeeded gauthier for the navy. 82 on aug. 4, amid general excitement but without disturbance anywhere, parliament reassembled to hear the government's communication. in his message the president of the republic recalled the fact that for over 40 years france, resolutely putting aside her desire for legitimate reparation, had used her rejuve- nated energy solely in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity; that she might be justly proud of having made su- preme efforts to avert the war which had just broken out, the crushing responsibility of which would be laid upon the german empire by history. the message, to which the two assemblies, greatly moved, listened standing, proclaimed the “ zion sacree ” of all sons of france. viviani then explained at length the events and negotiations that had taken place, concluding with these words: “ we are without fear, we shall be without reproach.” thus invoked, the “ sacred union ”’ became a reality. even as the army mobilisation proceeded throughout the country in perfect order, so the mobilisation of the spirit, which prepared the population to endure long and terrible trials, was effected with a quiet dignity. parties ceased to exist. bowing to the evidence of german aggression the socialists stood loyally by the government. they sought no vengeance for the murder of jaures, and the viviani cabinet, confident in their patriotism, refrained from using their discretionary powers of preventive arrest even on the most suspect in their ranks—those whose names were on “ list b.”?” the whole country, moved by one will, rose with the same enthusiasm against the invader. by a succession of laws, passed without debate, the country was organised for a state of war. the state of siege was to be maintained for the duration of the war; commercial settlements were postponed and credits prolonged; legal proceedings against citizens called up for service were suspended, and a moratorium was decreed for bank deposits. allowances were voted for neces- sitous families whose breadwinners were in the army; the govt. was authorised to open by decree credits for the requirements of national defence. notes on the banque de france became com- pulsory currency, and the limit of emission was raised to 12 mil- liards. measures were taken against alcoholism, in particular the sale of absinthe was forbidden. to avoid press indiscretions it was forbidden, under penalty of imprisonment, to publish any information regarding national defence apart from that given in official communications, or any military or any diplomatic article of a nature ‘‘ favourable to the enemy or calculated to depress the minds of the army and the population.” no preventive cen- sorship was established, but a press bureau installed at the min- istry of war received the damp proof-sheets of the newspapers and marked such passages as were not to be printed. any paper which failed to comply was liable to be warned, and, in case of a second offence, suspended. the passages suppressed were rep- resented by blank spaces as it was impossible to replace them at the last moment; these were known as “‘ caviare.”’ in a few days the conflagration had spread from one end of europe to the other. austria, however—the original instigator— affected a sort of ignorance of events in her relation to trance. her ambassador continued his functions in paris. under pressure of public opinion, infuriated by this cynical attitude, doumergue sent graf szecsen his passports on aug. ro and instructed du- maine to ask for his. the british cabinet followed the same course with regard to count mensdorff. the war period after the loss of the battle of the frontiers (aug. 20-4) the ministry realised the need of reconstruction or—as viviani phrased it—of broadening its basis. on aug. 26 the government of national defence was constituted, containing representatives of the republican parties, and including for the first time two socialists, guesde and sembat. viviani remained as prime min- ister without portfolio; with briand, delcass¢, malvy, millerand, ribot, sarraut and doumergue. at the same time jouhaux, together with the archbishop of paris, cardinal amette, was appointed to the national aid committee (comite de l’oeuvre du secours national), created for the assistance of refugees from the invaded departments and presided over by the head of the paris france faculty of science, m. appel. no sooner was the new govt. formed than it departed to bordeaux (sept. 3) unwilling to risk being shut up in paris as in 1870. the capital was left in the hands of a military governor, gen. gallieni, whose short procla- mation became famous: ‘‘ inhabitants of paris, the members of the govt. of the republic have left paris in order to give a new impulse to national defence. i have received a mandate to defend paris against the invader; this mandate i shall carry out to the end ”’ (sept. 3). nevertheless more than a third of the population left the citv. german aeroplanes flew over paris daily. the installation at bordeaux of the govt., the foreign missions, the principal departments of state, the most important paris newspapers, and a multitude of pusillanimous or curious persons was not effected without some disorder at first, and even some scandals. but life in the provisional capital rapidly attained the necessary dignity. on the side of the govt. it showed great activity. on sept. 5 m. delcasse obtained through m. cambon a declaration signed in london by which the british, french and russian governments mutually agreed to conclude no separate peace during the existing war, nor, when peace terms came to be discussed, to propose conditions without first coming to an agreement with each of the othcr allies. the victory of the marne (sept. 6-10) brought relief, and, indeed, gave rise to exaggerated hopes; but disillusionment was to follow. on aug. 2 a german-turkish alliance had been con- cluded, unknown to the ambassadors of the triple entente duped by the triumvirate talaat-enver-djemal; there followed the disaster of tannenberg, the penetration of the “‘ goeben ” and the ‘‘ breslau ”’ into the sea of marmara, and turkey’s entry into the war on the side of germany at the end of october. munitions became exhausted and the line of trenches now ex- tended continuously from the vosges to the sea. paris was no longer in danger, but six departments had been invaded, and none could say when they would be liberated. the situation being thus stabilised, the govt. was reinstalled in paris in the latter half of december. the chambers which had not sat at bordeaux, although assembly rooms had been reserved for them, met again on dec. 22. thenceforward they were to be perma- nently in session with but few interruptions. the experience of the preceding months had shown that there were serious objec- tions to the suppression of parliament and of the press. an out- side stimulus was needed to correct the errors of judgment and fatal imprudences that had been committed. in the chamber the criticisms were many and vigorous; notably these formulated with asperity by clemenceau in his paper /’ homme libre which, after being suppressed by the censor, reappeared as 1’ lomme enchaine. but viviani was able to curb excessive recriminations in the chamber and to insist on the maintenance of the union sacree. he consented to the formation of big parliamentary com- missions, which were to prove discreet and very useful collabo- rators of the government. certain deputies and senators were sent on missions to the armies. annual budgets were dispensed with. all credits were voted by douziemes described as provisional. as taxes were not coming in well and it was considered impolitic to raise them at a time when the nation’s whole resources were being strained to restrict invasion, resort was had to loans. the most successful financial resource was the issue of national defence bonds, which had been ribot’s idea. these were actually treasury bonds in the form of coupons bearing a fixed rate of interest, payable in advance, which could be realised at three, six or 12 months and were nego- tiable at sight. the ministry was vigorously attacked on the subject of the men—named embusques—mobilised or liable to be mobilised, who shirked service at the front. in the hurry to produce muni- tions many factories had to be set working again and authority was given to their directors to recall such of their workpeople or staff as seemed to them indispensable. similarly, members of the universities and specialists whose technical knowledge was indispensable to different services had to be allotted to non- combatant corps. as a result the trenches had been held, since the middle of 1915, mainly by peasants and employees. on the franc] initiative of dalbiez, therefore, the chamber passed a rigorous law (june 26), which did not however entirely remove the en- busques scandal. in july two under-secretaryships were created: joseph thierry for supply and justin godard for the medical services. the discussion aroused by all these complicated ques- tions weakened millerand’s position. in the senate, clemenceau, as president of the army commission, carried on a ruthless cam- paign for the adaptation of the services to the needs revealed by the war. the intervention of italy—in the field of foreign politics the spring was a period of great promise followed by great disappoint- ment. in the dardanelles the naval expedition sent to force the straits failed (march 18) with heavy losses. in may there was joy on hearing of italy’s intervention on the side of the allies. a treaty between the triple entente and italy, of which the tenor remained a secret for the whole of the war, had been signed on april 26 in london. although the clauses relating to the pro- posed cession to italy of territory inhabited by slavs were not divulged, they were known in substance to the slav peoples and created great indignation, thus strengthening austro-hungarian resistance. then, 100, in defiance of a formal stipulation in the treaty of london, sonnino declared war on austria only. it was not until aug. of the following year that he declared war on ger- many, who benefited meanwhile by italy’s neutrality. then again, england and france, who were already providing military material for russia, had now to manufacture it for italy also, although they had not enough for themselves. ‘the crowning humiliation was rumania’s failure to come in till over a year later instead of with italy, as the allies had expected. the intervention of bulgaria —yet another intervention was to follow, disconcerting the allied ministers and precipitating the fall of viviani’s cabinet. when bulgaria ordered a general mobilisation on sept. 22, the allies flattered themselves that it was directed against turkey. for three days delcasse and mil- lerand denied the evidence. when the truth came out, delcasse, on being questioned in the chamber, was subjected to such severe criticism that he had to retire. viviani then took over the portfolio of foreign affairs (oct. 13). he was still able to obtain a vote of confidence of 372 to 9; but, by the abstention of the socialists and a large number of radicals, the wazon sacree was broken. viviani was a victim of the general uneasiness caused by successive disappointments and by the non-success of the great offensive in champagne (sept. 15). sensible of the disaffection of the majority, who were opposed to the secret committees instituted by the chamber, viviani handed in his resignation on oct. 28. briand rapidly formed a new cabinet, keeping foreign affairs himself. the ministry of justice fell to viviani, war to gen. gallieni, navy to adm. lacaze, public instruction and invention to painleve; ribot retained finance and malvy the interior. five seats in the cabinet without portfolio were created for de freycinet, leon bourgeois, combes, guesde and denys cachin, and an under-secretariat for munitions for albert thomas, the young socialist deputy. the ministry, which embraced political veterans of all parties and some new men in addition, was unusu- ally well received. briand’s speech, taking as its motto: “ peace through victory,” was followed by a vote of confidence in the chamber of 516 to 1. the union sacree seemed to be restored in spite of the sympathy shown by a considerable and energetic socialist minority with the pacifist resolutions passed at the in- ternational socialist conference at zimmerwakl carly in septem- ber. this minority grew gradually bolder. at the second interna- tional socialist conference, held also in switzerland at kienthal in april 1916, three french deputies presented themselves. restrictions and finance-——in spite of goodwill the briand cabinet had some hard knocks at home and abroad. in the hope of preventing a rise in the price of essential foods and of slowing down the increase in the cost of living, the govt. pro- vided the bakers with flour (at a loss) and fixed maximum prices for certain commodities. they had eventually to proceed to stricter measures and to ration each family for bread, coal and sugar. summer time, introduced in june for the sake of econo- 83 mising coal, was maintained in spite of the dislike of the rural population. the prolongation of the war made it more difficult to enforce extraordinary regulations which had been accepted originally as temporary. the restrictions on the consumption of alcohol, to which the trade raised strong objections, and the prohibitions laid down by the military authorities aroused com- plaints which reverberated unpleasantly in the chamber. on feb. 1 1916 gallieni, having been rudely interrupted, left the tribune and even the hall. although he was brought back it was only to complain, ‘‘ you force me to de work for which i am not fitted.” it was not for long. gallieni, being exhausted and threatened with appendicitis, resigned on march 16. on may 26 he died as the result of an operation. his funeral was made a national event. he was succeeded by gen. roques, who was thus the fourth war minister in 20 months. the necessity of providing the treasury with other resources than those raised by loans compelled the govt. to demand new sicrifices. a tax on income, passed by the chamber before the war, but laid aside by the senate, had already been imposed; but owing to the respite granted to mobilised men only 133,000 were found to have an income over 5,000 fr. (the minimum tax- able figure), and as their total income was under three milliards, only half the expected sum was realised. ribot hoped at least to cover the interest on new loans by the tax. he therefore pro- posed to double the tax on land, the tax on income, and to in- crease the duties on tobacco, sugar and alcohol; also to suppress the rights of vinevard proprictors to distil without paving duty on the yield of their vintage. on this latter point in particular ribot met much opposition, and exemption on 10 litres of pure alcohol per family was conceded. the senate accepted this con- dition, though objecting to the distillers’ privileges. the dou- bling of direct taxes was rejected in favour of a tax on war profits, which from this time onward often appeared excessive. the socialists took advantage of the national unrest to promote their cause, and internationalism made some headway in the national council of french socialists. late in aug. a vote was passed protesting against the doctrine which denied that a country had the right to defend itself when attacked, and calling for a durable peace based upon reparation of the wrong done in 1871 and the restoration of independence to oppressed nations. but the minority continued to grow and, by dec. 28, had 1,081 votes against 1,836. only by 1,637 votes against 1,372 was thomas authorised by the party to return to munitions. verdun and the somme—wduring the whole of 1916 military interest was concentrated on the siege of verdun (q¢.v.). by june the general anxiety had reached such a pitch that viviani consented to let the chamber sit in secret committee (june 16- 22). after animated discussion a resolution was passed, by 440 against 97, expressing at the same time confidence in the govt. and the chamber’s desire “‘ to exercise effective control of all services engaged in providing for the requirements of the army . while strictly abstaining from interference with the con- ception, direction or execution of military operations.” actually this control was carried out without serious hitches, and the committee continued to sit in secret whenever the situation was felt by the deputies to be too serious to be discussed at a public sitting. on july 1a franco-british massed attack was launched against the line of the somme. it was a brilliant performance, with heavy losses on both sides, but the result was negative; for after wecks of struggle the allied line had only advanced some kilo- metres to the east. on the second anniversary of the war efforts were made to sustain the morale of the army and the population by proclamations from the president of the republic, the prime minister and the army chiefs. the govt. urged private individ- uals to put their gold into the banque de france and place their realisable foreign securities at the disposal of the state. in response to these appeals some three milliards were collected, making it possible to limit depreciation of the franc to 10 or 12%. the eastern campaitgns.—but events in the east took a dis- astrous turn. the second dardanelles expedition—no more suc- cessful than the first—was abandoned in the autumn, and the 84 troops thus released were sent to salonika and placed under gen. sarrail, who had instructions to go to the aid of serbia. but sarrail, lacking adequate means and thwarted by the opposition of king constantine, was unable to get into touch with the serbs, whose army retreated under terrible conditions across albania to the adriatic. in vain did the british and french governments urge constantine to range himself on the side of the allies; he dismissed veniselos and the chamber, and persisted in an unfriendly neutrality. briand opened negotiations with the greek govt., which produced nothing but irritation and disappointment to france. on aug. 17 1916 a treaty of alliance with rumania brought the allies renewed hopes of an early victory. but after some success there came a fresh disaster. rumania was attacked by bulgaria, on whose neutrality she had relied; the russian contingents promised to her were de- laved, the promised offensive by sarrail’s army was not launched and her territory was finally invaded and occupied by the enemy as far as moldavia. encouraged by these events and urged on by berlin, constantine went so far as to attack some detach- ments of french marines on the outskirts of athens and a num- ber of veniselists in the streets of the city. french residents had to take refuge with the fleet. briand and adm. dartige du fourmet, commanding in greek waters, had been doubtfully advised in their later negotiations with the cabinet in athens. thev had in fact speculated on constantine’s goodwill. in france, where the rumanian catas- trophe had come as a surprise, these latest events made a painful impression. a secret committee of the chamber (nov. 28-dec. 7) passed a resolution “ taking note of the government’s dec- larations on the reorganisation of the command and approving its resolution to concentrate on the conduct of the war and its economic organisation.” briand thereupon reconstituted his cabinet. he suppressed the five ministers of state, made gen. lyautey war minister (replacing him in morocco by gen. gou- raud), promoted thomas to be minister of munitions, and gave herriot supplies. loucheur was made under-secretary of munitions. a war committce of five ministers was formed and, at the end of the month, the reform of the high command, so long desired by the many who had lost confidence in jofire’s methods, was timidly brought about. joffre was attached to the war committee as technical adviser, and was made a marshal of france. his successor was neither foch nor petain, but gen. nivelle, who was appointed commander of the armies of the north and northeast. but briand’s authority was now seriously impaired. in the chamber he was subjected to wearisome criti- cism and recrimination, and the deputies refused him the neces- sary powers to deal by administrative order with questions affecting national defence. even the senate’s vote of confidence was only passed by 190 votes against 37. with each successive vote his majority decreased while the number of abstentions steadily increased. at last, during a session tin which certain deputies demanded a secret committee on military questions, gen. lyautey retorted bluntly that there were some things which could not be said even in secret committee. this suggestion of possible indiscretions—there had been leakages—was greeted with angry murmurs, and lyautey decided to resign. as pain- leve refused to take his place, briand tendered the resignation of the whole cabinet on march 17 1917. peace offers —one of the last acts of the cabinet had been the rejection of a disputable offer from the four enemy govern- ments “to enter upon peace negotiations.” this proposition, couched in grandiloquent phrases and enhanced by sensational addresses from the heads of the governments in berlin, vienna and sofia, lacked precision. as m. briand said, speaking on dec. 1 1916, it was a proposition to “ d@’ avoir a negocier la paix.” the russian, italian and british ministers denounced its insin- cerity. about the same time, too, a note from mr. lansing invited the belligercnts in the name of president wilson to ‘“‘ take soundings.” it was a profound shock to france to see all the belligerents—aggressors and victims——put thus on the same footing. two days later the swiss govt. made a similar move. on dec. 23 the trench senate announced its determination france “to carry on the war which has been imposed upon us to a victorious conclusion.” the governments of the other allies expressed their determination with equal force. on dec. 30 they sent collective and identical notes to the neutral states charged with the protection of their interests in enemy countries, stating that the conclusion of peace was contingent upon the restoration of rights and liberties that had been violated and recognition of the complete independence of the small states. wilson still pleaded for “‘ peace without victory ” at the senate on jan. 22; but, germany having declared for unrestricted sub- marine warfare, (feb. 1) he broke off diplomatic relations with that country on feb. 3. . paul deschanel, the president of the chamber, having declined to undertake to form the new ministry, it fell to ribot to accom- plish this task in 24 hours. taking foreign affairs himself, he gave war to painleve, labour to leon bourgeois, and retained several of the former ministers—notably malvy as minister of the interior. lyautey returned to morocco. the ministerial declaration, of considerable substance and detail, was approved by 440 votes against 61 abstentions. ribot was confronted with some extremely important problems. the russian revolution, the forced abdication of the tsar, and the installation of the weak provisional govt.—soon to be succeeded by the bolshe- viks—upset all the military combinations of the allies on the eve of a great offensive for which minute preparations had been in progress for months. at the same moment (march 17-24) the germans effected a strategic retreat on the somme front, leaving a desert behind them. a formidable problem presented itself: should the offensive, prepared in conjunction with the british, be carried out in spite of the modification in the general conditions unfavourable to the alhes? to what extent should the govt. interfere in the direction of military operations? inti- mate discussions took place between the ministers and gen. nivelle. the declaration of war on germany by the united states (april 6) served, it is true, to restore the equilibrium de- stroyed by the russian revolution, but it would be many months before it could have any effect on the military situation. as the govt. still hesitated nivelle offered his resignation, but withdrew it on receiving definite assurance that the offensive would take place as arranged. on april 16 the french troops, who had been magnificent in launching their attack, were brought up against insurmountable obstacles and came to a standstill after heavy losses. he depression felt by the army and the public led, among other changes, to the replacement of nivelle by petain, with foch as chief of the general staff, side by side with military operations, secret negotiations were proceeding between paris and vienna. in jan. and feb. the emperor charles i. commissioned his brother-in-law prince sixtus of bourbon to communicate his desire for peace to presi- dent poincare. after several journeys prince sixtus of bourbon presented austria’s peace conditions (may 5) at the elysee. they were the conditions of a conqueror, and the alliance with germany, bulgaria and turkey was again affirmed. after another journey to vienna, prince sixtus returned to the elysee with a personal letter from the emperor, who expressed his will- ingness ‘ to forward in every possible way the just claims of france to alsace-lorraine and to use his personal intluence with his allies to that end.” although these conditions were unac- ceptable to the allies of france, poincare and ribot did not reject them offhand. on april 19 ribot went to st. jean-de- maurienne with lloyd george, who had been fully informed, to meet sonnino. lloyd george offered sonnino smyrna if he would give up trieste; but the italian minister insisted that the conditions of the treaty of london had represented a minimum and that any concession would provoke risings in italy which would place the govt. in danger. subsequent conversations only attested the impotent vacillation of the austro-hungarian government. other secret proposals were exchanged during the summer at fribourg in switzerland between count rever- tera, for austria, and count armand for the french general staff. but these emphasized the inconsistency of proposals which proved abortive. france french action in athens.—it was thought that only by force of arms could the enemy be checkmated. ribot therefore de- cided, after consulting the british govt. in london, to settle the greek question by expelling constantine and freeing the salonika expeditionary force from the risk of attack by the germanophil greek forces. he gave full powers to senator jon- nart, appointed high commissioner of the allied powers for the occasion. jonnart left for brindisi on june 2 and appeared before the piraeus at the head of a tleet on the sth. in spite of strong protests from the british, italian and russian ministers at athens, all of whom were opposed to the expulsion of the king, jonnart demanded and obtained constantine’s capitulation, after having had thessaly and the isthmus of corinth occupied by allied troops. on june 13 king constantine left athens with his family. jonnart then recalled veniselos, who had consti- tuted a provisional government at salonika, and the king’s second son, prince alexander was called to the throne with the title of king alexander i., his elder brother george being passed over because of his german sympathics. the socialist movement.—this success was warmly approved in paris inside and outside parliament. it helped to consolidate the cabinet, which, however, was soon to be shaken by the socialist manoeuvres. at a plenary session of the party held in may, the socialists had decided to attend the international congress at stockholm which had been called with the object of stopping the war. the govt. refused their passports, and the chamber, after a secret session, passed a resolution of approval by 467 votes against 52, and with a further resolution on the conditions of peace that:— the chamber, while countersigning the unanimous protest made to the national assembly in 1871 by the representatives of alsace- lorraine, forcibly torn from france, announces that it expects, as the result of the war imposed upon europe by the aggression of impcrialist germany, not only the liberation i invaded territory, but the restoration of alsace-lorraine to the mother-country and just reparation for damages. the chamber further declared itself to be “ far from any idea of conquest or of the subjection of foreign populations,” and defined the goal towards which the armics of the republic were striving as “ the laying down of permanent guarantees of peace and independence for great and little nations by an organisation of which the basis is now being prepared by the league of na- tions.”” on june 7 a similar motion was passed unanimously in the senate, which in addition requested the govt. to take all necessary precautions at home and abroad for the safety of the nation, in view of the number of recent strikes of a suspicious nature in which undesirable foreigners had taken part. these transient troubles, which yielded to firm handling, coin- cided with a peace move staged in berlin (see europe), and rumours on the subject of a journey to leningrad (]etrograd) undertaken by doumergue and castelnau under the late min- istry. as regards the latter, ribot stated in the chamber on july 31 that doumergue had made a note of the tsar’s promise to support the re-annexation of alsace-lorraine to france and ** to leave france free to seek guarantees against renewed aggres- sion, not by annexing the territories on the left bank of the rhine, but by creating if necessary an autonomous state out of these territories, which would protect us, as well as belgium, from invasion from beyond the rhine.” meanwhile disturbances stirred up by teutonic influences with the aim of depressing french opinion and bringing into power in paris men who would be willing to take the initiative in peace proposals, provoked a governmental crisis. in view of the anti-patriotic propaganda that was being carried on by means of pamphlets and the revo- lutionary paper le bonnet rouge, the senate held a secret com- mittee (july 19-20). clemenceau took malvy, minister of the interior, vigorously to task on the matter of his relations with almereyda, an adventurer who edited le bonnet rouge. this episode marks an epoch in the internal history of france during the war, for it created the schism between the socialists and the government. the senate and the chamber successively passed votes of confidence, in spite of the resignation of adm. lacaze and denys 85 cochin. the socialist group allowed albert thomas to remain in the cabinet; but the rupture took place, following on the action brought against le bonnet rouge. almereyda, who had been arrested on aug. 6, was found dead in his cell on the rath. he had been strangled with one of his bootlaces. the official experts gave a verdict of suicide, but such a suicide was at lowest a singular reflection on the supervision exercised, and public opmion was up in arms, malvy had been away a few days for his health, but he now resumed his functions. mean- while it was learnt that a cheque of suspicious origin which had been seized at the frontier from the director of le bonnet rouge had been restored to him by the favour of leymarie, director of public safety, and at the same time director of the bureau of the minister. leymarie declared he had acted without consulting the minister, and resigned. on aug. 31 malvy, accused of having relations with almereyda, resigned. it was first thought that the ministry might be simply reconstituted, but the attempt failed, and the cabinet resigned on sept. 7. ribot, charged with the task of forming a new ministry, failed, because the socialists refused to collaborate with him, while painleve refused to remain in the cabinet unless the socialists came back. the socialists could not forgive ribot for refusing passports to stockholm, and painleve was being pushed into power by friends who regarded him as the man of the hour. thus it fell to painleve to form a cabinet which, by a curious contradiction, did not include a single socialist. he was his own war minister; ribot retained foreign affairs, and loucheur became minister of munitions. on sept. 18 painleve secured a vote of confidence, unanimous but for the abstention of the socialists and some radicals (among them caillaux). the min- isterial declaration contained nothing new in general policy, but promised that justice would take its course, unhesitatingly and without any respect of persons, in the judicial inquiries then pro- ceeding or about to be opened. this promise the ministry was almost immediately called upon to fulfil. on oct. 7 turmel, a deputy, was arrested for having received money of suspicious origin. then came the bolo scandal. it was discovered that bolo—known as bolo pasha, that title having been conferred on him by the former khedive, now dethroned and an instrument of the central powers—had received 10,000,000 fr. in the united states from von bernstorff, the german ambassador. with this sum he had bought 1,100 shares in the journal, the editor of which, senator charles humbert, had made himself known by a noisy campaign demanding “ guns and munitions.” bolo was arrested on sept. 29. on oct. 4 malvy himself appeared in the dock. the former minister of the interior was accused of treason by leon daudet, editor of the action franguise, in a letter addressed to the president of the republic, which was read out in the chamber. after a judicial inquiry the govt. announced, on oct. 15, that there was no foundation for daudet’s accusa- tions. the govt. obtained only 246 votes against 89 in the chamber on an interpellation on the subject. it was shaken; an outside incident brought about its fall. lhe lancken- briand incident.— mcanwhile the berlin cabinet, itself torn by internal dissensions, was trying to implicate cer- tain frenchmen in its defaitzst negotiations. m.de lancken, german civil commissioner in brussels, conveyed proposals to briand by means of belgian intermediaries—notably baron coppee and his son. he told him that william ii. was ready to make peace and to send a qualified personage to switzerland to confer with the former prime minister. briand wrote to inform ribot, and suggested the conditions under which conversations might be initiated; but ribot strongly opposed conversations which might be exploited by the germans. lancken therefore waited in vain for briand at ouchy, and the matter dropped. but a legend grew in the lobbies of the chamber to the effect that ribot had turned down peace feelers which held some promise of the return of alsace-lorraine to france. on oct. 12, when georges leygues made an interpellation in the chamber on the personnel and action of the diplomatic body, ribot took the opportunily to denounce in veiled language austria’s manoeuvre to separate france from italy and the pitfalls laid by germany, 86 “who only the other day, caused perfidious suggestions to be whispered in the ear of a man of high standing.”” the concluding words of this sentence caused a commotion at the palais bour- bon, and were therefore suppressed in the official records. on the 16th, the socialist deputy mayeras moved to discuss the discrepancy between the words spoken in parliament and the text as printed. the motion was discussed in a stormy secret committee which gave the govt. a small majority. briand’s friends, displeased with the allusion of oct. 12, voted with the socialists, who were still full of resentment over the refusal of the stockholm passports. the cabinet were so badly hit that painleve contemplated resignation. poincare would not accept his resignation, but ribot and his other colleagues handed in theirs collectively so as to give the prime minister a free hand to reconstruct his cabinet. on oct. 28 the ministry was recon- stituted, painleve contenting himself with replacing ribot by barthou; but far from consolidating the govt. the substitution only weakened it. the ministerial majority, which had stood at 362 on the 12th and 316 on the roth, fell to 288 after painleve’s and barthou’s speeches on the 2sth. nevertheless, painleve took the same attitude as ribot to- wards stockholm, and refused passports for the congress then in progress. he hoped to appease the sacialists by an investiga- tion of the action francaise affair, but the court found no cause to prosecute. meanwhile le bonnet rouge and the jsozrial scandals grew more serious, and caillaux himself was attacked in 2’ homme lnchaine for his conduct when travelling in italy. then came the italian disaster of caporetto and the advent of the bolsheviks in russia, which made it necessary to hold an inter-allied conference at rapallo for the co-ordination of mili- tary effort. the rapallo conference over, a troubled period set in for france. m. paix-seailles, who had formerly been attached to painleve’s bureau, was accused of divulging information from documents dealing with national defence. caillaux was brought before the juge d’instruction to give an account of his relations with bolo pasha, and had an exchange of letters with clemen- ceau which caused a sensation. on nov. 13 painleve announced in the chamber the results of the rapallo conference. these were, an extension of the british front, franco-british economic co-operation, the strengthening of the blockade and the creation of an inter-allied supreme war council. only 230 votes were recorded in approval against 192, a further diminution of the government majority. this was speedily transformed into a minority when the prime minister demanded the postponement of motions relating to internal order until after the inter-allied conference to be held at the quai d’orsay at the end of the month. the chamber voted against the postponement by 277 against 186, and at the close of the sitting painleve handed his resignation to poincare: his authority in parliament was at an end. | the clemenceau minisiry.—public opinion indicated clemen- ceau as prime minister, the senate supported the choice, and the chamber was prepared to acquiesce, little as it liked the remorseless controversialist who criticised ministers and even the president of the republic so fiercely in ? homme enchuatne, in spite of his 76 years, clemenceau was universally regarded as the incarnation of the determination to “ fight to a finish,” to punish weakness or faltering, whatever their origin, and to sub- ordinate everything to the pursuit of final victory. the great majority of frenchmen felt that such a man was needed at the head of the government. ignoring all other considerations, poincare therefore called upon clemenceau (nov. 15) to form the new cabinet. clemenceau accepted, and completed his mission the next day. fle took war himself, confiding foreign affairs to pichon, the interior to pams, navy to levguces, munitions to loucheur, finance to klotz; and divided the war services between five under-secretaries. the ministerial declara- tion announced the intention— to carry on the war, to punish crime and faltering: weakness would be complicity. accused persons to be tried by court-martial. no more pacifist campaigns, no more german conspiracies; neither france treason nor demi-treason; but the war and nothing but the war. our armies shall not be caught between two fires. law shall prevail. the country shall know that its defence is sure. in the debate on the declaration clemenceau spoke in the same tone. there were to be no more party men, himself not excepted. who has been more of a party man than j? i have been only too much of one, as i see to-day... i shared—and perhaps still share— many of your prejudices, but where i differ from you, deputies of the extreme left, is that you want to introduce purely intellectual con- ceptions into the domain of realities—and that is impossible. the vote of confidence was passed by 418 against 65. clemenceau was as good as his word. turmel, a deputy, was tried by court-martial on nov. 22; parliamentary impunity was suspended by the senate in the case of humbert; and malvy asked the chamber to appoint a commission to inquire into the grounds for his accusation. although the accusation had no legal basis, and the rules of the chamber did not prescribe the procedure in such a case, the chamber, greatly cmbarrassed, sent him before the senate, which, having reinstituted a pro- cedure in disuse since 1875, constituted itself a high court and ordered a supplementary inquiry (jan. 28). on dec. 22, at the request of gen. dubail, military governor of paris, the chamber voted for the suspension of parliamentary immunity for caillaux bv 306 against two votes and 100 abstentions. the accusation of intelligence with the enemy and of a criminal attempt against national security was founded on documents seized during the bolo case, indicating a singular intimacy between caillaux and bolo and almerevda. the oflicial reports of the french naval and military attaches in rome also drew attention to the atti- tude and the defeatist proposals of the former prime minister. on jan. 14 caillaux was arrested. inquiry conducted in the united states had revealed relations with the german legation at buenos aires, at the time of his mission in the argentine; and from various telegrams sent by von bernstorfl, german ambassa- dor in washington (deciphered by the state cryptographic dept.) it seemed that caillaux had spoken contemptuously of the mem- bers of the govit.— briand excepted. when reporting caillaux’s remarks to berlin, von bernstorff asked his govt. to instruct the german cruisers to take precautions with regard to the ship on which the french statesman was returning. finally, in the safe of a florentine bank rented by caillaux there was found among the securities a packet labelled ‘‘ rubicon,” which contained the outline of a scheme to be carried out when caillaux should again become prime minister. this scheme resembles the constitu- tion of the consulate. these events were discussed in the chamber, together with the royalist escapades of the action francaise, and the resolution passed stigmatised “ all proceedings, royalist or other, which tend to divide the country in the face of the enemy.’’ the socialists and caillautists voted against the words “ or other,” assuming that they referred to the “ rubicon.” bolo’s trial by court-martial (feb. 4-14} ended in sentence of death for the ex-pasha for his dealings with the enemy, which included rela- tions with the former khedive, transactions in america with von bernstorfi and the payment of german moneys intended for the purchase of french newspapers. he was executed at vincennes on april 17. to all attacks, direct or indirect, by the socialists, clemenceau presented an unmoved front, and claims of every kind—economic, financial and military—were met with the same imperturbability. by a bill passed on dec. 24 the election was postponed on account of the mobilisation of several million electors. a loan of to milliards was liberally supported. very severe restrictions on the consumption of bread were imposed, and the rorg class was called up prematurely. the russian defection.—this last measure was necessitated by the defection of the russians and by austrian arrogance. count czernin, in his elation over caporetto, boasted that he was fighting as much for the defence of germany as for the austro-hungarian frontiers—‘‘ we are fighting for alsace-lor- raine just as germany fought for lemberg and trieste. 1 make no distinction between trieste and strasbourg.” at brest- litovsk the bolsheviks concluded an armistice with germany, france in spite of russia’s undertaking, on sept. 4 tor4, not to nego- tiute or conclude a separate peace; they also intimated their intention not to honour the financial engagements of the tsarist government. the french govt. sent a note of protest, stating that ‘‘ financial engagements entered into previously in the name of russia were independent of the changes of government which had occurred since and might occur again in that country, and that, consequently, they were and would continue to be binding upon those by whom russia was represented.” ‘the socialists now asked for passports for leningrad (petrograd) to attempt to dissuade russia from making a separate peace; but clemenceau refused them, because he regarded such a step as useless, dangerous and even unseemly. the signing of the treaty of brest-litovsk on march 3 definitely broke the russian alliance. from the end of jan. 1918 the bombing of paris by aero- planes (‘‘ gothas,” as they were called) recommenced with fresh vigour after a long respite. the raid of jan. 31 took a toll of 45 killed (31 in paris and 14 in the suburbs) and 207 wounded; that on march 9, carried out by a dozen squadrons, left 13 dead and 50 wounded. life in paris was seriously inconvenienced by the precautions imposed—as the reduction of strect lighting, closed shutters and the warnings given by sirens. but it was quite another matter when, on march 23, shell, fired from colossal guns more than too km. distant, fell direct on paris, without there being at first any clue to their place of origin. monuments situated in the danger zones had to be protected by sandbags. on march 29 (good friday) a shell fell on the church of st. gervais, at 4 p.m., just as a sacred concert was beginning, killing +5 people and wounding go others, of whom several afterward succumbed. terrible bombardments at dunkirk, calais and rheims simultaneously drove the inhabitants into the cellars. the motive behind these attacks was that of terrorising the country at the moment when the german general staff was launching (march 21) a mass offensive against the british front which was intended to be decisive. but the morale of the coun- try was not shaken, any more than was the spirit of the high command. although there were days of acute strain in march and april clemenceau never faltered. at the end of march he obtained consent from the allies for foch’s nomination as gen- eralissimo of the armies on the western front. he then pro- ceeded to tighten food restrictions, ordered three meatless days a week, reduced the consumption of paper, etc. the czernin incident.—during these troubled times teutonic intrigues followed fast upon each other. the most sensational of these was that launched by czernin (april 2), when he boldly asserted in a speech delivered to the municipal representatives in vienna that clemenceau had asked him, shortly before the beginning of the western offensive, if he were “ prepared to enter into negotiations and on what basis.”” he went on to in- sist on austria’s loyalty to germany, and vowed “a terrible vengeance ’’ upon the enemies of the central powers. clemen- ceau’s reply was simply, ‘‘ count czernin lied.” by way of retort czernin recalled the pourparlers between count nicholas revertera and count armand in feb. 1918. on april 8 clemen- ceau exposed revertera’s “ attempt to decoy us into a german peace,” and announced “ another attempt of the same sort by a person of much higher rank.” czernin in reply accused clemen- ceau of having wrecked this effort by refusing to enter into nego- tiations based on the renunciation of the re-annexation of alsace- lorraine. clemenceau thereupon disclosed the fact that the austrian emperor had with his own hand recorded his willing- ness to agree to ‘the just claims of france on alsace-lorraine.”’ at this point the emperor charles himself intervened with a telegram to william ii., in which he declared clemenceau’s statement to be untrue and proclaimed the “ perfect solidarity ” between the two central empires. an official communique from vienna followed, emphasising this denial. on april 12 clemen- ceau published the emperor charles’ letter to prince sixtus. after some sharp dispute with the emperor and empress, czernin announced that the text of the letter, which had been entirely private and personal, had been published in paris in a 87 garbled version. he maintained that the emperor had written: * t would have used all my personal influence in favour of the french claims with respect to alsace-lorraine had they been just claims; but this they are not.” clemenceau again stated the facts, and denounced ‘les consciences pourris.’”?> an em- barrassed note from the ballhansplatz on the 15th then declared the incident closed. the decisive days—a fortnight later the bonnet rouge trial opened before the court-martial. although almereyda, the principal conspirator, was dead, the evidence revealed by the inquiry was sufficiently serious for sentence of death to be passed on duval—who had received over 1,000,000 fr. from a mannheim banker named marx—and for several of his asso- ciates to be sent to penal servitude. the socialist party, of which the anti-war section had won a majority in the national council of the party, agitated in vain for a “white peace’; the threat to refuse military credits left clemenceau unmoved. only for an instant at the end of may, when a new offensive brought the germans up to the marne from chateau-thierry to dormans, did he consider the idea of evacuating the govern- ment and a portion of the population from paris. he had be- come as military-minded as—if not more so than—the soldiers themselves. paris was a city like any other, and it seemed to him a wise precaution to abandon the capital as in 1914. but the circumstances were very different. after four years of fierce fighting the occupation of paris by the enemy would have appeared as a german triumph in the eves of the world at large, and the consequences, both material and moral, would have been incalculable. the evacuation project, which had been kept secret, was therefore opposed by the president of the republic and the presidents of both chambers. in a special council at the elysee, at which other persons besides ministers were pres- ent, it was finally decided that the govt. should stay in paris and that the decisive battles should take place in front of and not behind the capital. on june 11 a successful counter-attack by mangin’s army threw back the germans some kilometres, and, on july 18, foch opened the great offensive which was to continue until the armistice. czechoslovak and polish legions, formed of deserters and volunteers, fought side by side with french troops. on july 16, before the senate, sitting as a high court, malvy was accused of complicity “in treason which threatened the very existence of the country.” the senate, however, rejected the charge of treason, on aug. 6, unanimously but for two votes, and that of complicity in communicating with the enemy by 125 votes against 36. senator etienne flandin then made the subsidiary charge: “is malvy guilty of having committed the crime of forfaiiure while restcding in the territory of the republic and during the discharge of his ministerial functions within the jast 10 years?” at the following session this accusation was definitely formulated. it was directed against the minister’s attitude towards almereyda and certain other anarchists. on aug. 6 the senate declared malvy guilty of forfaiture by ro1 votes against 81, and condemned him to five years’ banishment, but without civic degradation. there remained the caillaux affair—by far the most serious. was caillaux to come before a court-martial or the high court? the govt. decided that if the case were one of intelligence with the enemy the court-martial should deal with it, but if it were that of crime against the securily of the state it should come before the high court. the latter solution was adopted, and the senate met for the purpose on oct. 29 and found that there were grounds for instituting an “instruction,” the aflair being thereby indefinitely adjourned. the armistices—beaten by the govt., the socialists confined themselves to protests. at their national congress in oct. the advanced group, headed by longuet, carried the day by 1,528 votes against 1,212 and 181. cachin was made editor of / huma- nite in place of renaudel. but the people remained indifferent, being concerned only with the retreat of the german armies, the crumbling of the bulgarian front, the abdication and flight of the tsar }’erdinand, the progressive reoccupation of the devas- tated departments and the entry of the belgian army into bruges. under these auspices was launched on oct. 20 the 88 fourth great loan, the liberation loan, which realised 22 mil- liards. on the night of oct. 30-31 turkish plenipotentiarics signed an armistice with adm. calthrop at mudros; on nov. 3 the austro-hungarian armics signed an armistice; the break-up of the old dual monarchy was already far advanced. a far-reaching problem now confronted the allies. was it wiser to conclude with germany the armistice which her des- perate govt. had asked from president wilson, or to force the german armies to capitulate, and so enter berlin? french ruling spirits were divided. foch held that ‘ war is only waged for its results, and, if these results are obtained by the armistice, no one has the right—the aim being achieved—to cause one more drop of blood to be shed.” the generalissimo knowing nothing of the developments of the revolution overshadowing germany believed that it would still take several months to throw back the enemy across the rhine. the conditions of the armistice were therefore discussed, first at senlis by the military delegates, then in paris and versailles among the heads of the govt. and the foreign ministers of the allied and associated powers, the discussions being based exclusively on military con- siderations. the statesmen agreed unreservedly to the proposals of the military council at versailles. many of them, at that moment, were so far from thinking the proposed conditions too mild that they feared the german plenipotentiaries would refuse certain exceptionally severe clauses, such as the surrender of the fleet and the fortresses of alsace-lorraine. the germans, however, terrified by the prospect of invading enemy armies who would be tempted to avenge themselves for the abominations committed in belgium and irance, signed all the conditions on nov. 11. the proclamation of the armistice, accompanied by the ringing of bells, led to scenes of enthusiasm that day in the streets and in parliament. the two chambers proclaimed that “ citizen clemenceau and marshal foch have deserved well of their country.” on the following day foch was elected a mem- ber of the academy of sciences, and on the arst the academie francaise elected foch and clemenceau, having previously elected joffre (feb. 14). clemenceau, a doctor of medicine, was elected a member of the academy of medicine on dec. 3. fi- nally the academie des sctences morales opened its doors to marshal petain, and the beaux arts elected gen. castelnau. only the socialists; while joining in the general rejoicings, pro- fessed an interest in the russian revolution which was hardly justified in view of russia’s behaviour at the end of the war. the motion drawn up by the “ permanent administrative commission ” of the party was disavowed by members of the minority, who announced their determination not to allow the methods even of revolutionary socialism to be confounded with bolshevik practices, which did not allow universal sufirage to function. the french authorities now took possession of alsace- lorraine. on nov. 17, in front of the statue of strasbourg on the place de la concorde, from which the emblems of mourning had at last been removed, a magnificent ceremony was staged. at metz petain was presented with his marshal’s baton, and on nov. 25 the victorious troops entered strasbourg amid scenes of frenzied enthusiasm. the war was over; it remained to “‘ win the peace.” tue peace the armistice of nov. 11 contained no political clause. it was assumed that, as was customary, some of the essential political conditions would be settled in peace preliminaries before the final treaty was signed. had preliminaries been so arranged as to coincide with one of the three renewals of the armistice, it should have been possible to take immediate measures for ensuring the position of those regions whose lot was to be changed—notably poland, upper silesia and the baltic states—where such measures were of the first importance. certain opinion in france urged that this should be done. but for reasons that are still unexplained, no steps were taken to arrange such preliminaries, which, if arranged a few weeks after the military capitulation—so it was agreed—would have enabled france the allics to insist on all the points that seemed to them advis- able. the end of the year was spent in rejoicings. the king of the belgians and the king of england paid official visits to paris, and president wilson, before settling in paris for the conference, visited england and italy. when the conference opened on jan. 18, germany was more or less reassured, and on vital points clemenceau was no longer in position to impose his views. we had to consult with president wilson and lloyd george. indeed, in consenting to the form of procedure—council of ten, council of five, council of four, absolute secrecy, rigorous censorhsip of diplomatic indiscretions—he automatical- ly forfeited the support which would have been gladly accorded to him by the representatives of the smaller powers, by par- liament and by influential publicists. although both the presi- dent of the republic and the presidents of the two chambers disapproved of these “cellar negotiations,” the system was maintained till the end. the conference only met in full open session to register preconcerted decisions. thus clemenceau, although he made spasmodic attempts at resistance, saw himself forced to concur in certain solutions that were contrary to his intentions. this was particularly the case with the rhine frontier. in common with the military authorities, many university men and several publicists, clemenceau would have constituted the rhine france’s military frontier and formed the german coun- tries lying between that river and the political frontier into an autonomous state. he was not even able to obtain the restitution of saarlouis and landau which had been severed from france by the allies of 1815, in spite of their formal engagement (signed on march 13 1815, after napojeon’s return from elba) to preserve intact france’s frontiers of may 30 1814. he com- mitted the imprudence of offending president wilson by scofling at the projected league of nations, and prevented m. bour- geois from bringing forward the plan of a league drawn up by french specialists. surrounded by colleagues chosen from among his immediate circle, he was not amenable to any advice or suggestion and was neither wise enough to limit his original demands to what might be accepted nor to exact eflective com- pensation for his successive concessions. to crown his mis- fortunes, he was wounded (feb. 18) by three shots from a revolver by an anarchist named cottin. when ncgotiations were resumed on march 14, after his recovery, decisions, con- trary to his wishes, had been taken. france was only to have alsace-lorraine; the inter-allied military occupation of the left bank of the rhine was fixed for 5, 10 or 15 years according to the zone; germany was to renounce all rights in morocco; power was taken to regulate the zones of savoy; and great britain and the united states were to give a military guarantee against unprovoked german aggression, britain’s guarantee being dependent upon the ratification of that of the united states by the senate in washington. the amount to be exacted for reparations for the terrible damages caused by the enemy was not fixed; a reparations committee was set up to settle it and to draw up the conditions of payment. germany was to pay down on reparations account a sum of 20 milliard gold marks before may 1 1921. it was assumed in france—and mr. lloyd george’s speeches in england appeared to justify the assumption—that germany would pay for everything. clemenceau and klotz were under that illusion, for they brought in a bill passed on april 17 1919 by which those who had suffered damages were enabled not only to claim the price of their possessions at a pre-war valuation, but also the cost of reinstalment or reconstruction, taking into account the rise in prices since 1914. this arrangement was fated to bring about a financial catastrophe. some hundred milliards had to be paid out on this score, and (in the event) germany was to go bankrupt to evade payment. it was the same with similarly lavish promises of demobilisation premiums, pensions and allowances to the military victims of the war and their dependants; these had been made on the conviction that germany would pay, but they made another deep hole in the budget. other holes were made by the extravagant decision to france buy in at the rate of 1-25 fr. all german marks left in alsace- lorraine (quoted then at o-7o fr.) and buy back in dollars for a large sum the american war stores which, if sold direct by the american stores department, could have been usefully absorbed by the population without involving the treasury. these rash measures were to react disastrously on the whole of the national life. the socialist movement—the propaganda carried on by german socialists infected their french comrades, who had been roused by the acquittal of the assassin of jaures on march 29 1919 at the assize court of the seine, and were to be appeased neither by the passing of the eight-hours’ day bill by both chambers at the end of april nor by the maintenance of the price of bread below cost price. on may 1 they proclaimed a strike, and proceeded to demonstrations which led to the dis- missal of several socialist leaders holding government posts. the disturbances lasted all through the spring. the confedera- tion generale du travail itsclf was powerless to maintain dis- cipline among its adherents; it alternately curbed their turbulence and yielded to their demands. when the peace treaty was being discussed with the german plenipotentiaries and the allied mili- tary intervention against the bolsheviks was proceeding, labour troubles became more marked. but the public faced the situa- tion with such firmness that the general strike arranged for july 21 miscarried. clemenceau was nevertheless awkwardly situated in the chamber and had to replace the food controller boret by noulens. the versailles treaty.—after several crises, particularly with respect to the question of the adriatic and danzig, the peace conditions, comprising 440 articles and numerous annexes, were ceremoniously presented to graf von brockdorff-rantzau, the german plenipotentiary. the counter-proposals made by the german delegation provoked lively discussion among the allies, several important modifications being supported by the british government. towards the middle of june the allies at last came to an agreement to maintain almost in its integrity the text of may 7, the only really significant modification being the substitution of a plebiscite in upper silesia for the annexation pure and simple of that province to poland. on june 16 the final text was submitted to brockdorff-rantzau with the warn- ing that it must be accepted without reservation within five days. he resigned, and an extension of two days was granted. on the 23rd a new german cabinet with gustav bauer at its head declared itself willing to sign, and on the 28th—the anni- versary of the serajevo murders—mm. hermann miller, bell and von hanicl, the german plenipotentiaries, in the [hall of mirrors at versailles in which the german empire had been pro- claimed in 1871, signed the treaty of peace which established the territorial integrity of france, celebrated the triumph of right over might and destroyed germany’s supreme effort to achieve a world hegemony. the treaty by which england and the united states agreed to assist france in case of unprovoked attack was signed by lloyd george and president wilson the same day. the treaties, taken as a whole, certainly were imposing, and marked an epoch in history. all the same, the french nation experienced a shiver when the clauses became known in detail. it was realised, as poincare said, that the peace was to be une creation continue. many serious problems were icft unsettled. several plebiscites, which would normally have been taken be- tween peace preliminarics and the conclusion of the treaty, were adjourned until a time when—the demobilisation of the allied armies having been effected—there would be no means of en- suring a true ballot. no precise sanctions had been stipulated in the event of the non-execution of the treaty by germany. the league of nations covenant, was held by french opinion to be vague as to the principal obligations of its members. ‘the terms were drawn in language permitting the contracting gov- ernments to interpret it in favour of evading liabilities. in short, it became plain to the french that the versailles treaty would be carried out to their advantage only if the allies, especially great britain, wished it. except for alsace-lorraine they had 89 received nothing but promises; their right to exact the fulfilment of germany’s engagements without the assent of all the allies, was contested. the ratification of the treaty (aug.-sept.) there- fore aroused violent opposition in the chamber. men like louis marin and franklin-bouillon called for its rejection. to reassure the deputies the finance minister announced, on sept. 5, that germany would put down a round sum of 450 milliards. in the end the ratification was agreed by only 372 votes against 52, with 73 abstentions. by the senate, in oct., it was approved without difficulty. but very soon it became known that the american senate refused to ratify the treaty of versailles and the treaty of guarantee, and that, in consequence, the british guarantee disappeared. the most stupefying discovery was, however, that during the peace year of 1919 military expenditure exceeded that of 1918 with its fierce fighting, and that the national debt had risen during the 12 months of peace from 170 to 218 millards. under the shock of these affairs the country embarked on the election. the elections —it was indeed time to return to normal con- stitutional life. all the elective assemblics had to be renewed, having outlived their legal term. the parliamentary elections took place on nov. 16 according to the system adopted by the act of july 12 191g: scrudie de liste according to department, with proportional representation in cases where none of the lists showed an absolute majority, together with the support of 25° of the electors on the roll. it was at first intended to maintain the political aio sacree by including clemencistes, liberal, radical, radical-socialist and modcrate socialist candidates on the same list; but the unified socialists repudiated the union, and the moderates—such as herriot, viviani, and painleve—separated from the coalition after agreeing to it. lists were accordingly framed as follows: the bloc national in- cluding all moderate candidates—as, for instance, from millerand to maurice barres in paris; and lists for the unified socialists, radical socialists and independents of different categories. the bloc national had asits programme millerand’s paris speech of nov. 7 at the ba-ta-clan hall. this speech denounced the class struggles, indicated the need of strengthening the executive, of adopting a broader basis for the nomination of the president of the republic, and for the constitution of the senate. clemen- ceau for his part made a great anti-bolshevist speech at stras- bourg. at that moment, when demobilisation was complete and the opinions of the soldiers an unknown quantity, bol- shevism was thought to be the chicf danger. in the beginning of nov. a general strike was attempted. the newspapers were especially affected and, from nov. 11, they ceased to appear; but they agreed between themselves to publish one organ in common, the presse de paris, in which space was reserved for a brief political article from each paper. this expedient was well received by the public. soon the presse de paris appeared twice a day, corresponding to the morning and evening issues. the bloc won the elections, and the new chamber was made up of 56 unified socialists, 5 dissenting socialists, 28 republican socialists, 129 radicals and radical-socialists, 11.4. republicans of the left, 138 progressives, 15 liberals, 74 conservatives and 3 adherents of the action francaise. the bolshevist candidates were swept away; even in a suburb of paris the list containing the names of longuct and sadoul was lost. the municipal elections of nov. 30 gave the same results. from the outset the moderate elements carried all before them, not only in paris but in many towns where they had formerly been in a minority as, for instance, at toulouse. the check to the revolutionary parties was emphasized by the end of the news- paper strike on the same day. on dec. 14 consetls generaux and conseils d’arrondissement were elected. here the left was more successful in holding its seats, based as it was on solid local organisations, and was able to recover lost ground on the sen- atorial elections (jan 12), in which the prefects exercise con- siderable influence. only 26 seats were lost by the radicals, and leon bourgeois was elected president of the senate by 147 votes against antonin dubost (with 125), the retiring president, of much the same political tendency. go the presidency of the republic—opening on dec. 8, the chamber had no important affairs to deal with before procced- ing to elect a successor to poincare, whose seven years’ tenure expired on feb. 17 1920. the only outstanding event of its short session was the declaration of the alsace-lorraine depu- ties, whose entry into the palais-bourbon had been made an impressive ceremony. after recalling the protests of their ancestors against the treaty of frankfurt the representatives of the two reannexed provinces recorded the fact that no protest had been raised during the elections against the treaty of versailles. ‘‘ france,” they said, ‘‘ has obtained a unanimous vote at the genuinely plebiscitary elections of nov. 16.” on the choice of the future president of the republic opinion was divided. though he desired election, clemenceau had not come forward openly. deschanel stood as candidate. in spite of clemenceau’s disturbing antecedents, his popularity as victor was so great that the choice would have fallen upon him out of gratitude rather than from confidence in his political wisdom, had he not wounded the sensibilities of a large number of the bloc national. vie had steadily refused them the satisfaction of re-establishing diplomatic relations with the vatican, al- though they had pledged themselves to their constituencies to demand it. moreover, while declaring that he would in no case remain prime minister, he showed a marked preference for former ministers ousted by the bloc. he also retained among his most intimate colleagues certain men who inspired justifiable suspicion. unmoved by the insistence of the deputies, who were bent on seeing him rewarded by the supreme magistrature of the state, he refused to make any concession. indced, he openly announced his intention of reigning at the elysee as the head of the govt. and not as the constitutional head of the state, and thus alienated many of the electors. on the eve of the congress at a preliminary meeting, clemenceau obtained only 389 votes against deschanel’s 408. consequently he refused to stand, and deschanel was elected by 734 votes out of 688 (jan. 17 1920). the cabinet resigned next day. as leader of the bloc nutional millerand was called upon to form the new cabinet, which was constituted (jan. 19) as follows: millerand, foreign affairs; interior, steeg; public works, le trocquer; frangois-marsal (a banker, not a member of parliament), finance. poincare was appointed president of the reparations commission. on jan. 22 the chamber passed a vote of confidence by only 272 votes against 23, half the mem- bers having abstained from voting in token of their resentment at having a radical (steeg) appointed to the interior. but the majority rose to 481 against 70 on the 3oth, after explanations by the prime minister. strikes and the caillaux case—the internal situation did not realise the expectations inspired by the happy ending of the war. the confederation generale du travail, carried away by the masses it was supposed to control, instigated a strike of rail- waymen in the spring, which was followed by miners’, dockers’ and seamen’s strikes. none of these were successful, but they served to aggravate the industrial crisis caused by the rise in prices. that comminist ideas were gaining ground in the labour world was apparent at the socialist federal congress of the seine (feb. 22), when the extremist motion put by loriot, after an exchange of recriminations, was carried by an enormous majority. it looked as if the wave of revolution would sweep all before it. the disturbances coincided, not fortuitously, with the caillaux case, which took its course before the senate, con- stituted a high court, from feb. 20 to april 23. caillaux was condemned to three years’ imprisonment and ten years’ loss of civic rights; for five years his place of residence would be strictly that indicated by the govt., and he was ordered to pay the costs of the trial. he was found guilty of corresponding with the subjects of an enemy country since the declaration of war, and notably in 1914, 1915, 1916 and 1917, both in france (especially in paris) and abroad, the said correspondence having furnished the enemies of france with information detrimental to the military or political situation of france or her allies—(article 78 of the penal code). the high court admitted extenuating cir- france cumstances, and dismissed the charge of high treason. as caillaux had already been detained in preventive arrest for two years and four months, he was released. relations with the vatican—relations with the vatican, which had been suspended since 1904, were now re-established in accordance with the wishes of the majority in the chamber and in the country, by a bill granting the necessary credit for sctting up an embassy to the holy see. without waiting for the passage of the bill millerand sent a charge d’affatres to the vatican to prepare for the resumption of relations (march 23. 1920). the bill was not actually passed until nov. 30 by the chamber (379 votes against 109) and not until dec. 16 1921 by the senate (174 against 129). the senate, with its radical majority and anti-clerical traditions, bristled instinctively at any projects which looked like an infringement of laicisation, . and the situation was further complicated by the problem of voluntary parochial corporations (czituclles), which dated from the act of separation between church and state (1905). the holy see, having refused to acknowledge the separation, had forbidden the creation of culiuelles. even the simple mutual ecclesiastical associations which several of the bishops desired to found as retreats for aged priests came under the ban. the position of the french church was therefore ill-defined and precarious, and benedict xv. was as anxious to put an end to it as was the french government. since 1905, however, all the bishops had been nominated in rome from among can- didates intransigent towards the civil power, and the pope was surprised to find, on the occasion of the joan of arc canonisation festival (may 16 1920) when hanotaux represented the french govt., that they were strongly opposed to the bill. those of them who had come to rome delivered a collective letter to this effect to the pope. but as jonnart had been appointed ambassa- dor to the vatican on may 16 1921, the papacy responded by the appointment of a nuncio, mgr. cerretti, who arrived in paris on aug. 6. in spite of all efforts on both sides the question was still unsettled at the time of the pope’s death (jan. 23 1922). two years later, pius xj., his successor, promulgated the encyc- lical of jan. 18 1924, by which permission was given to organise, by way of an experiment, “ diocesan ”’ corporations—that being the name chosen in place of cidtuefle, as placing emphasis on the absolute power of the bishop over the corporation. execution of the versailles treaty.—the application of the treaty, both at home and abroad, was the chief concern of millerand’s cabinet. the reconstruction of the devastated regions swallowed up vast sums which germany—contrary to public expectation—failed to produce. considerable sums also went in restocking the country with essential materials, above all, coal. the british govt. exacted payment for british coal at a decidedly higher rate than the home prices. since 19109, too, it had done away with common accounts. during 1920 france had to borrow nearly 38 milliard francs, thus raising the budget to close on 20 milliard {as against 5 milliards in 1913). these sacrifices were not compensated by other facilitics from the allies. in successive conferences—held in london in feb., at san remo in april, at hythe in may and at spain in july— millerand obtained nothing but verbal expressions of sympathy although he gave way on some points of the treaty to the advan- tage of germany. at san remo, in return for the definite aban- donment of mosul, which came into the sphere of french influence as defined by the convention of may 16 1916 (sykes- picot agreement, see etropre; inter-allied diplomacy), france was presented with those shares in the turkish pe- troleum co. (25°%),which had formerly belonged to the german government. lloyd george felt obliged to devote himself prin- cipally to the economic recovery of germany, which he as- sumed to be a necessary condition for the development of ienglish markets in that country, and for the maintenance of european peace. millerand had to fight some hard diplomatic battles on this subject with the cabinet in london. he found himself in collision with lloyd george on the polish question when the bolsheviks invaded the young republic in august. lloyd george wanted the polish govt. to abandon warsaw; france millerand retaliated by recognising gen. wrangel’s government in south russia, and by sending a group of french officers to warsaw under gen. weygand’s orders. the friction thus caused was not dispelled by the retreat of the bolshevik armies, for while london was pessimistic as to poland’s future, paris re- garded poland’s independence as the keystone of the new europe. france complained that, in taking up her mandate over syria according to agreement, she was thwarted by british agents. a deplorable accident occurred to complicate the situation. on the night of may 24, when making an official journey, the president of the republic fell from his sleeping-car on to the railway line. although not seriously injured he was so badly shaken that he was forced to rest from his work, and resigned on sept. 16, bidding farewell to the chamber in a moving speech. on sept. 23 millerand was elected president of the republic by 695 out of 892 votes. in offering himself as a candidate he had announced his intention of making more effective use than his predecessors had done of the prerogative assigned to the head of the state by the constitution. after election he defined his views with greater emphasis, and, once installed at the elysec, he acted in conformity with his programme. the levgues cabinet—the changes in the ministry necessi- tated by millerand’s election as first magistrate were reduced toa minimum. georges leygues became president of the coun- cil and mihister of foreign affairs and the other ministers re- tained their portfolios. this cabinet had a brief and troubled life. the bloc national adopted an even more exacting and defiant attitude towards it than towards the preceding one. andre lefevre, minister of war, resigned on dec. 6 because he was not allowed a free hand in securing german disarmament. on jan. 12 1921, on the eve of a london conference and in con- sequence of an interpellation by bonnevay, the chamber over- threw leygues by 447 votes against 116 on the pretext that it wanted no “ negotiations in the dark.’”’ nevertheless leygues was in no way to blame; on the contrary, he had re-established the friendly relations with the states of the little entente which had been upset by the action of the quai d’orsay the year before. briand’s cabinet.—briand now formed a cabinet in which he held foreign affairs, giving justice to bonnevay, war to bar- thou, finance to doumer and the liberated provinces to loucheur. h[e was well received by the chamber on jan. 20 and obtained a vote of confidence by 462 votes against 77. the inter-allied conference for the settlement of reparations, which had been planned in london, was held in paris on jan. 24-8. it was with difficulty that an agreement was reached; germany’s payments were spread over a period of 42 years, the sanctions to be applicd in case of non-payment being left vague. they were to be as those securing german disarmament—1.c., prolongation if necessary of the occupation of the rhincland; the seizure of german customs; the occupation of new territory, including the ruhr; the application in rhineland of customs duties or others. in any case, as these sanctions were not to function automatically, negotiations would be neccssary cach time they were to be applied. from feb. 3 to 9 these questions were discussed by the chamber which finally approved the government’s action by 363 against 114. germany having by this time announced her inability to meet her immediate obliga- tions, a conference was held in london on feb. 20, as the result of which an ultimatum was sent to germany (march 3) stipulat- ing for: the occupation of duisburg, ruhrort and diisseldorf, a levy on the sales of german goods in the allied countries and the establishment of a customs frontier on the rhine if germany should persist in her opposition. these sanctions were to be applied automatically if germany did not send a favourable reply by march 7. the reply was not forthcoming, and the allied troops proceeded to a joint occupation of the three towns named. these events were discussed in the chamber on march 15-7 and a vote of confidence was passed by 490 votes against 69. meanwhile, the vote on the budget of 1921 had at last been taken, on april 30, after four deuziemes provtsoires. this time the budget exceeded 21 milliard francs. on april 30 a new conference was called in london to study | | of “ the situation created by the total failure of germany to fulfil the dispositions of the versailles treaty as regards disarmament, the punishment of guilty persons and the reparations.” ‘the reparations commission had fixed germany’s total payment at 132 milliards of gold marks. a sum of 12 milliards was due and could be exacted on may 1. it was not paid. the con- ference agreed to warn germany to meet the obligations named by the commission within 12 days, failing which the ruhr would be occupied. there was nevertheless great opposition to this form of sanction in england; the french govt., on the contrary, was acting under the pressure of public opinion. it was decided, on may 3, to mobilise the 1919 class, recently authorised, and the conseils generaux, then sitting, voted for the most part in approval of this attitude. on may 5 there appeared the official text of the allied declaration, which announced the occupation of the ruhr on the rath, failing the submission of germany. sut on the rith germany capitulated. the chamber, on its return from recess on may 109, held a debate on this whole affair, the upshot of which was a fresh vote of confidence (390 votes against 162). the governmental majority was even larger on june 3, when a debate was held on the advances made for damages in the liberated regions (457 votes against 67). when the chambers rose on july 12 the inter-allied conversations were resumed, taking place in paris (aug. 16) for the settlement of belgian priority and the costs of occupation and at wiesbaden (aug. 27) on deliveries in kind. ‘the conversations coincided with important negotiations of another description. the angora convention—with respect to turkey, briand held views which were not shared by observers of the eastern question. he believed turkey to be both powerful and sympathetic to france, and instead of endeavouring to consolidate the treaty of sevres (aug. 10 1920), by which eastern affairs had been settled with due regard to the just claims of the christian populations affected, he listened to the kemalists. acting under the influence of the hellenophobes and of the unfavourable impression he had formed of british agents, whether in syria or the neighbouring provinces, he sent out franklin bouillon—a pro-turk and anti-english deputy— to angora with instructions to make a special convention de- signed to put an end to disputes on the turco-syrian frontier. on oct. 20 bouillon signed an agreement at angora which made exorbitant territorial and political concessions to the turks, and contained additional clauses which were even more ques- tionable. the text was kept secret. it leaked out nevertheless that france stood committed by one of the annexed clauses “to endeavour to solve in a fricndly spirit (esprit de cordiale entenie) all questions dealing with the independence and sov- ercignty of turkey.” yielding to his turcophil obsession, bouillon had concluded something in the nature of an alliance rather than agreement of liquidation. he had even promised the turks war material, which he requested the high commis- sioner in syria to deliver to them; but this called forth such vigorous protests from those who were az fate with eastern affairs in paris that the material was stopped. briand hastened to have the angora agreement ratified by the president of the republic without submitting it to the chambers, which had met again on oct. 18. on oct. 28 he left for the conference on naval disarmament that was about to open in washington. the washington conference—in spite of repeated warnings from well-informed personages, briand insisted on going him- self to washington as france’s representative, his idea being to act as arbitrator between britain and the united states— assumed to be divided on the question of reducing naval arma- ments. he made one great public speech which for a moment gave him the illusion of success; but, as might have been fore- seen, the british delegation came to an agreement with the american govt. without considering french interests and even using arguments against them which were strongly challenged. by the washington convention the french navy, reduced by the war to a position in the third rank, was condemned to be placed on a still lower level. although the state of her shattered finances prevented france from resuming her former position q2 as a naval power, public opinion was hurt by an agreement which gave an official seal to the naval preponderance of friendly powers which had profited by circumstances to assert their dominion over the seas. briand’s authority was undermined, and it was not long before another negotiation compromised it still more. the cannes conference-——returning from washington in dec., briand departed almost immediately for london, where he was to confer with lloyd george on the subject of the pay- ments due on jan. 15 and feb. 15 1922 which germany declared herself unable to meet in full. but instead of insisting on the settlement of this particular matter he allowed himself to be persuaded into calling a meeting of the supreme council at cannes for jan. 6. in the interval he found himself placed in an awkward position in the chamber with regard to the industrial bank of china, a concern which was in difficulties and had been guilty of irregular transactions. one of the administrators, senator andre berthelot, was the brother of philippe berthelot, secretary-general of the ministry for foreign aflairs. at first briand tried to exonerate philippe berthelot, who was accused of having improperly used his influence to shteld the bank; but he finally gave up the attempt and, on dec. 27 1921, ac- cepted his resignation. on the following day his majority in the chamber was only 361 against 238. ilis fall was brought about by differences over the conference at cannes. as premicr, briand was aware that president miller- and, with a majority of the public behind him, was profoundly opposed to the recognition of the sovict republic and to the modification of the french claim on russia for the repayment of loans. but at cannes, briand agreed to a european conference at genoa, with a wide programme, to which russian represent- atives were invited. simultaneously, he was ncgotiating with lloyd george the scheme for a pact designed to replace the stillborn convention of june 28 toto, which had been made void by nonratification in the united states. in paris, the british guarantec, though almost identical with the former treaty, was regarded with suspicion because first, it contained no military convention, and secondly, it was accompanied by a memorandum which jaid down a common policy for britain and france, so limiting french liberty of action in europe. briand was bitterly accused of yielding to lloyd george’s persuasions and his policy was clenounced as “cinematographic.” the treaty made great britain responsible for resisting, with france, any violation by germany of the military and naval safeguards of the treaty of versailles but it was held that these guarantecs were insufficient. feeling ran high, in the senate particularly. the commission on foreign affairs, over which poincare pre- sided, dispatched a telegram to briand, reminding him of the indispensable conditions of an agreement, and the president of the republic took the further step of requesting his urgent return to paris. after a conversation at the elysee and without waiting for a motion by the chamber, to which he offered vague explanations, he gave in his resignation on jan. 12 1922. the porncare ministry in response to an almost universal public demand president millerand appealed to mr. raymond poincare to deal with the crisis. he formed a ministry on the 15th. he took forcign affairs, giving justice to barthou, finance to de lasteyrie, war to maginot and public works to le trocquer. the heads of the radical party had refused to join the new ministry. warmly welcomed by the public, poincare gained a vote of 434 against 84 in the chamber on his ministerial declaration which was unusually firm in tone. he had to take a firm stand at genoa without delay. he might have stopped the meetings and dis- sociated himself from the policy agreed upon by his predecessor without the government’s consent. this would have meant a quarrel with lloyd george. he preferred, however, to let the meetings fixed for the roth april proceed, and went over to boulogne for a talk with lloyd george on feb. 25. the only result of this somewhat chilly interview was a banal communique affirming the entente between the two governments. france the genoa conference-—at genoa, where barthou was in charge of the french delegation the entente was only preserved with difficulty. lloyd george who had, at the time of the peace conference, talked of inviting the bolshevik delegates to prin- kipo, now made marked advances to them on the pretext that russia’s collaboration was necessary to the restoration of normal life in europe. but the inopportune publication of a russo- german treaty, concluded at rapallo under the very nose of the conference, made it plain to all that the germans and the bol- sheviks were also concerned with their own interests, whatever the rest of the world might think about it. at the general council of the meuse, poincare, who was president, made a speech in which he reiterated his intention to allow no reduction or limitation of the claims and guarantees of france recognised by the treaty of versailles. the genoa conference, which had been marked by various tragic-comic incidents, ended its futile existence on may 19. the chamber signified its approval of the government by 436 votes against 96. during the conference the president of the republic had made an extended tour in morocco and algeria. meanwhile the chamber had been working at the reorganisa- tion of military service to meet post-war conditions. after lengthy debates a bill was passed (june 29) by 365 votes against 205, reducing the period of active service to 18 months and pre- scribing the incorporation of the 20-year-old recruits ih two con- tingents so that there would always be at least two half-classes with the colours. this bill was not passed by the senate until the following winter. it came into force on april 1 1923. the eastern conflict and reparations —in aug. a fresh con- ference held in london failed to reconcile the english view that germany should be allowed a moratorium without corresponding compensation, and the french view that this should only be granted in return for a share of 60% in certain german indus- tries, the establishment of customs depets at the exits from the ruhr, the collection of taxes in the occupied territories and the exploitation of forests, and of the ruhr mines. at this moment an eastern tragedy broke in upon the situation. the reorganised turkish army, sct free on the syrian side, broke the exhausted and badly led greek army on the afiun qarahisar front on aug. 26, reconquered asia minor, took smyrna on sept. 8 and advanced on the straits, occupied at chanaq by anglo-french contingents. poincare, unwilling to expose the i'rench contingent to conflict with the turks, gave orders for it to cross to the european side—to the surprise and indignation of many t’rench- men. a sharp crisis with lloyd george ensucd; he had sympa- thized with the desire of greece to achieve a national destiny in the near east. lord curzon went to paris sept. 19 to smooth the trouble. on sept. 23 the lines of a new treaty of peace with turkey were agreed, with the participation of count sforza, and after a second visit to paris by lord curzon an armistice was signed at mudanya (oct. 11), when it was agreed that the plenipoten- tiaries authorised to settle the eastern question should mect at the end of november. but the diflerences of opinion between the cabinets of paris and london, both on the measures to be adopted with regard to turkey and on the subject of reparations, persisted in spite of the resignation of lloyd george and the advent of the bonar law cabinet at the end of october. french politics were at this time entirely dominated by the question of reparations, that is to say the execution of the “scale of payments ” fixed in london in may 1921. opinion became more and more irritated at seeing germany devote the sums which she was under obligation to pay to the reparations commission to the completion of her industrial equipment, the extension and improvement of her communications, and extrava- gant domestic expenditure. poincare’s protests were formally approved by the chamber (with nearly 500 votes) and by an almost unanimous senate. in london, on the contrary, the first consideration was that germany’s internal economy should not be disturbed. bonar law’s aititude towards france was more amicable than that of lloyd george, but the solutions which he proposed were hardly more favourable. in short, he france sought rather to pursuade poincare to renounce for an indefinite period his claim for payment than to force germany to pay. then again the old spirit of rivalry between the chancelleries persisted, diplomacy being untouched by the fraternity of arms. france’s efforts to secure the execution of the peace treaties were put down to imperialism. the london proposals were impreg- nated with distrust of france. thus, at the lausanne negotia- tions as in the paris meetings, friction continucd. the ruhir—on nov. 14 wirth, the german chancellor, announced germany’s inability to pay for an indefinite period, a declaration repeated by his successor dr. cuno. outrages were committed at stettin, passau and ingolstadt against allied officers. on dec. 9 bonar law, poincare, theunis and mussolini met in london to discuss a new note from cuno, while lloyd george, at the same moment, made a violent attack on france in the united press. unable to reach agreement, the conference broke up, and another meeting was arranged for jan. 2 in paris. poincare secured the approval of the chamber on dec. 15 by 562 votes against 76, and of the senate (carried unanimously) on dec. 21. on the 27th the reparations commission! took note of two intentional defaults by germany, and notified the powers concerned. the inter-allied conference opened at the quai d’orsay on jan. 2 1923 when bonar law submitted the following scheme: a four years’ moratorium; the reparations commission to be replaced by a foreign council for german finance, a german minister presiding; the reduction of deliveries in kind; reduction of the german debt to 30 milliard gold marks; com- pensation for inter-allied european debts by allotting to eng- land the milliard of french gold and the italian bonds held as a guarantee by great britain; the first series of german bonds to be allotted to france by priority. this somewhat complicated scheme deviated completely from those of france, belgium and italy. if it abolished inter-allied debts it did away with any serious expectation of payments except to great britain. on jan. 3 after a ministerial council and consultation with theunis and della torretta, poincare declared bonar law’s scheme to be quite unacceptable. the conference closed down on the 4th, in view of the impossibility of agreement. while refusing to subscribe to the french propositions, the british delegates declared that the friendly sentiments of the british govt. and people remained unchanged. on the gth the repara- tions commission, having heard the german delegates, made a statement (great britian dissenting) that germany had “‘de- liberately failed ” to deliver coke and coal. poincare then in- formed the german govt. (jan. 10) of the sanctions which he was going to apply, viz.: control of industrial production in the ruhr by french engineers under the protection of an adequate military force. president ebert protested, and the industrial workers in the ruhr refused to carry out the deliveries of coal by order of their government. the franco-belgian occupation was accordingly established from essen to bochum and dort- mund. on the german side passive resistance was organised. such were the facts, the consequences of which were to be felt throughout the year. in proportion as passive resistance became more stubborn french control became firmer and more extended. with poincare, everything else was subordinated to the success of the undertaking. disturbing incidents followed in quick succession. on jan. 18 for instance, the chamber passed a reso- lution by 371 votes against 143 for the suspension of parlia- mentary immunity for marcel cachin who had been charged before the high court with conspiring against the security of the state. but the senate declined on may 24, and the cabinet tendered its resignation to the president of the republic, who refused to accept it. on this occasion (june 14) poincare fur- nished explanations on his internal policy long awaited by the bloc national, who supported him consistently without having any share in the administration. ‘‘ leave the extreme parties isolated,” he said; ‘‘ republicans who wish to belong to the majority should not risk their alliances and their friendships among them.” his majority was only 376 against 207, neither radical-socialists nor socialists being included in it. poincare ' the british member dissenting (ed. £.b.), 93 did not change his methods, however, but relied on the right for his foreign and on the left for his home policy. he kept the chamber busy by devoting over 20 sittings to academical de- bates on teaching reforms, particularly on the reintroduction of compulsory latin. meanwhile the lausanne negotiations were concluded. to the great regret of many of their compatriots the french pleni- potentiaries missed the opportunity of joining hands with lord curzon on the eastern question. they showed considerable complaisance to the turks, and sacrificed the interests of chris- tian populations and of institutions under the traditional pro- tection of france. a portion of the paris press expressed dis- approval of the treaty, which was finally signed on july 24. in aug. a change took place in germany. in face of the slow but sure effect of the measures taken in the rhineland, the cuno cabinet had to resign and was replaced by a stresemann govt. more inclined to submission. on sept. 24 passive resistance came to an end, announced by president ebert in a proclamation which called the people to submit, while indulging in violent recriminations against france. at this point poincare, under the influence of the more extreme nationalists, took the serious step of acquiescing in, if not encouraging, a separatist move- ment in the rhineland, whereas he had, up till then, proclaimed himself in favour of pure autonomy. german opinion was once more exasperated. mr. baldwin, who had been assured of poincare’s moderate views when visiting paris on his way from aix-les-bains, was taken by surprise, and foreign opinion in general, at first favourably impressed by french success in the ruhr move, now turned against france. the franc fell, and the cost of living rose. poincare then withdrew his support from a movement palpably artificial; but the harm was done. the opportunity of exploiting the ruhr victory had been lost. the anger of the separatists, the disappointment of the public and the accusations of the extreme left disturbed opinion. poincare now accepted the idea of having a new scale of payments drawn up by outside experts in accordance with germany’s real capac- ity. on nov. 30 the reparations commission decided to send two committees of experts to seek means of balancing the budget, to decide upon the measures to be taken for stabilising german currency and to “‘ seek means of evaluating and bringing back exported capital.” the execution of the treaty of versailles had taken a new turning. the financial and internal crisis in vain did poincare defend his policy in impassioned speeches on all occasions—and particularly on sundays; public confidence was shaken, loans became impossible, the exploitation of the franc by speculators had to be countered by a mass manoeuvre in dollars, cost of living increased and the claims of wage- earners and officials grew in proportion. on jan. 6 1924 one- third of the senate was replaced, but without any serious change in the composition of that assembly. on the other hand, the elections in the chamber, fixed for may 11, became the focus of a fierce struggle. the government scheme for straightening out the financial situation so as to avert the fall of the franc met with decisive opposition from the left. the augmentation of taxes, particularly the double decime was passed with difficulty. the proposal to authorise the government to proceed by decree with administrative reforms estimated to save a milliard was only adopted by 333 votes against 205 in the chamber (feb. 7) and came near being thrown out by the senate which had ap- proved the general financial scheme by only 151 votes (march 18). the parliamentary horizon was overcast. on march 26 the cabinet was put in a minority in the chamber (271 against 264) on the question of pensions, and resigned. poincare was charged to re-form the ministry, which he did by giving francois-marsal finance, de selves the interior, loucheur commerce and henri de jouvenal public instruction. thus many radical ministers were replaced by moderates. the electoral law of to19 was slightly modified to do away with certain inconsistencies and to reduce the number of deputies to 584. on jan. 25 poincare had signed a franco-czechoslovakian alliance with dr. benee. 94 the election campaign was a heated one. millerand’s sensa- tional speech at evreux on oct. 14 had really been the starting- point. the president of the republic insisted on the necessity of confining legislative power to its proper function and of strengthening the prerogative of the head of the state. during april poincare made several important speeches in which he drew nearer to the bloc national. the radicals, radical-social- ists and socialists formed a cartel, taking as their motto oppo- sition to financial retrenchment and anti-poincareism. in several divisoins the cartel included the communists. when may 11 came, more than 9,000,000 voted out of 11,000,000 electors— a proportion never before attained. the results gave 277 seats to the cartel, 267 to the bloc national, 29 to the communists and rz to the candidates who belonged to no group. of the car- telist deputies 139 were radicals and radical-socialists, 36 republican-socialists and 102 unified socialists. taking the number of votes over the whole country, about half had gone to the bloc national; the republican entente group alone accounted for 3,200,000 voters while the whole cartel had only 3,100,000 to its credit. doumergue’s election—poincare handed in his resignation at once, but carried on with current affairs until the opening cf the new chamber. on june 2 the socialist congress came to the unanimous decision not to take part in the new government, though supporting the radical socialists. painleve was elected president by the chamber on june 4 by 296 votes against magi- not’s 209. on the sth millerand offered to put herriot in power, but herriot refused to form a cabinet so long as millerand re- mained president of the republic. he and his partisans could not forgive millerand for having opposed them under the last legislature. after turning in vain to friends such as steeg, mille- rand had at last to give in. he formed an interim cabinet on june 8, under francois-marsal, for the purpose of laying before parliament a memorandum in which he set forth his claim, to the effect that he had always respected the constitution and was still abiding by it in refusing to surrender his office without a definite vote from both houses. the senate refused to take action. the chamber flatly refused to enter into relations with a government “ which by reason of its composition, is the nega- tion of parliamentary rights.” on june 11 millerand therefore resigned. the cartel candidate for the presidency was painleve, but at a preliminary meeting of the congress 149 votes were given to doumergue, president of the senate, and it was he who was clected on june 13, by 515 votes against 309 for painleve. herriot’s minisiry—werriot now proceeded tc form the new ministry, which was complete by june 14. taking foreign affairs himself, he entrusted rene renoult with justice, cle- mente] with finance and filled the remaining departments with other radicals. the ministerial declaration marked a return to anticlericalism by announcing the suppression of the embassy to the vatican and the intention of bringing alsace and lorraine within the scheme of french legislation as soon as possible, in- cluding secular education. the chamber approved it by 313 votes against 234 (june 19); but on the same day the senate elected de selves as president, in place of doumergue, by 151 votes against 134 for bienvenu-martin, the cartel candidate. the two assemblies, both radical, were not of the same school. the new majority made a point of reversing the work of their predecessors in every point and expressed the intention to secure for their own party “ all the appointments, and that at once,” as their principal organ the quotidien phrased it. some measures have therefore a symbolic importance. gen. sarrail was recalled for service without age-limit; the review of july 14 at long- champs was cancelled; university reforms were dismissed with a stroke of the pen; the monopoly on matches was reinstituted; the economic and military evacuation of the ruhr was brought under consideration; the moscow govt. was recognised de jure (oct. 28) without any condition or guarantee for the russian debt; an amnesty was proposed to be applicable to fiscal offences, events connected with strikes, desertion, cases of intelligence with the enemy and cases of forfaiture—the last two named cate- gories including the cases of caillaux, malvy and the bonnet france rouge. not until the end of the year (dec. 16) did the senate pass this act of amnesty, voted by the chamber as early as july. the anti-clerical policy of the government produced consider- able agitation. a letter was sent to the president of the council from the french cardinals denouncing the lay laws as “ perse- cuting laws,” and a “ national catholic federation,” presided over by gen. castelnau, was formed, which had a large following in the west and also in alsace and lorraine, where church schools are traditional, whereas french law recognises only lay and neu- tral schools. a national republican league on parallel lines was formed by millerand on nov. 7 to combat ‘“ demagogy, revolution and anarchy.” the dawes plan —hlerriot’s attitude with regard to repa- rations was the reverse of poincare’s. instead of merely chang- ing methods of negotiation which were open to criticism, he aban- doned without resistance the positions held by his predecessors. on a visit to ramsay macdonald at *‘ chequers,” he associated together the three problems, reparations, inter-allied debts and security. asa result, macdonald felt authorised to issue a programme for the inter-allied conference which allowed for concessions, hitherto regarded as inadmissible, on the part of germany’s creditors, feeling ran so high in france that mr. macdonald hurried over to paris on july 8 in order to draw up a fresh programme. it was in fact a question of accepting and applying the dawes plan which had been put before the reparations commission on april 9. at the london conference of july 16-aug. 16, at which german delegates were present from aug. 5 onward, conditions —very favourable to germany—were adopted; attenuation of the debt; limitation of the reparations commissions powers; a loan of 800,000,000 gold marks; suppression of coercive meas- ures and of franco-belgian regie in the rhineland; a promise to evacuate the ruhr before aug. 15 1925; while mr. ramsay macdonald undertook to seek a solution of the inter-allied debt problem, bearing in mind all these points. on his return to paris herriot was vigorously criticised in parliament. in the chamber, after six sittings devoted to debate, he obtained a vote of confidence by 336 votes against 204 (aug. 23). in the senate, on the 26th, he secured 181 votes. his task was not made easier by ramsay macdonald’s rejection of the treaty of mutual assistance which had been elaborated in agreement with lord cecil by a commission appointed by the league of nations. at the fifth meeting of the league herriot succeeded, however, in regaining a portion of his prestige, by proposing the principles of ‘arbitration, security, disarmament,’? which became the basis of the geneva protocol. a few weeks later, on oct. 30, he was able to settle by arbitration the dispute over the free zones of savoy with switzerland (see switzerland). on the reopening of the parliament the radicals and socialists continued their policy of supporting the government, with the approval of their party congresses. the communists adopted a hostile attitude to the socialists. on nov. 23, when the ashes of jaures were transferred to the pantheon, they gave the cere- mony the appearance of a revue of communist forces in the streets of paris, entailing an accusation of weakness against the government. great difficulty attached also to the preparation and discussion of the budget in view of the promises made during the election period and the demands of the socialists. cle- mentel, who represented the moderate element in the cartel, had retained the taxes voted by his predecessors; but no sooner was the equilibrium within sight of accomplishment than it was upset by a new revision of the scale of officials’ salaries. irom the expected figure of 32,800 millions the budget rose to 36 mil- liards and the pound sterling, which stood at 70 francs during the elections, was now at or. the programme of the socialist con- ference at grenoble in feb. 1925, the communist strike (accom- panied by bloodshed) at douarnenez, the fracas on feb. 8 at marseilles, which resulted in the death of three and wounding of 20 people at the close of a catholic meeting—combined to bring discredit to the government. no less grave and significant was the quartier latin affair in march. an immense majority of the students protested against the nomination of an ill-qualified france candidate as lecturer in the faculty of law in paris. the dean of the faculty was suspended by the ministry for having refused to allow the police to enter the premises. the whole press rang with the consequent disturbances. the suppression of the embassy to the vatican and the threat of lay-teaching in alsace and lorraine threw those two provinces into a state of growing unrest. on april 2 clementel resigned on account of his bad reception by the senate. he was replaced by monzie, who demanded of herriot the retention of the em- bassy to the vatican; but this patching up could not save the cabinet, and on april ro the senate, exasperated by an infla- tion of four milliards concealed in the balance-sheet of the banque de france in despite of solemn promises, threw the gov- ernment out. in february, following on a german note suggest- ing a pact of security in the west, confidential negotiations were opened between the cabinets concerned. these were continued in semi-secrecy until autumn. the painleve ministry —tvhis particular crisis was difficult to solve, as the socialists refused to accept portfolios, but pain- leve finally succeeded on april 17 1925. he took war and the presidency of the council, giving foreign affairs to briand and finance to caillaux. this last appointment caused a great sensation, but as the public had, after all, faith in caillaux’s technical ability and desired principally to see the financial problem scttled, his war antecedents were overlooked. the ministerial declaration was manifestly designed to relieve the strained situation. it proclaimed the retention of the embassy at the vatican in a new form, and reassured alsace-lorraine against any too precipitate assimilation. the government had a majority of 304 against 217 votes. the agitation in the latin quarter was allayed by the reinstallation of the dean in the faculty of law. unfortunately, the communist agitation ended in the shooting of four partisans of the youthful patriots (jeunesses patriotes) intherue damremont at the close of a meeting. the prime minister and the minister of the interior attended their funeral at notre-dame. to prevent the recurrence of like incidents, may day processions in the open street were forbidden and may 1 therefore passed in perfect calm. the government likewise forbade all street processions on may 10, the fete of joan of arc, but the usual delegations made their pilgrimage to the statues of the saint, and the prime minister deposited a wreath in person. herriot had been re-elected president of the chamber by 266 votes only. on april 5 millerand was elected senator of the scine by 520 out of 1,025 votes. the municipal elections (may 3 and 10) showed a slight progress towards the left as compared with those of 1918, and at the same time a striking set-back for the communists. abroad the outlook was still uncertain. the conference of ambassadors had decided, in conformity with the versailles treaty, that the cologne zone should be evacuated only after germany had completed her disarmament. an _ inter-allied financial conference, that was held in paris on jan. 14, had settled the distribution of payments to be made under the dawes scheme and that of the prolits accruing from the occupation of the ruhr. the election of hindenburg to the presidency of the reich (april 26) on the sudden death of ebert had aroused great uneasiness among the allies. in may a considerable financial and military effort was entailed by ‘abdel-krim’s attack on the moroccan front. painleve flew over to morocco by aeroplane to review the situation. he then sent malvy to madrid to arrange a plan for collaborating with spain, and marshal petain to morocco to direct the military operations. in october, after the riffs had been thrown back on their old front, marshal lyautey was re- placed as resident-general by steeg. monzie became minister of justice and yvon delbos took the ministry of public instruc- tion. this first reconstitution of the ministry had no political significance, but this could not be said for the next. dislocation of the cartel—july 12 saw a rift in the cartel. for the first time, on the subject of the budget and the sales tax, the socialists, radical-socialists and a certain number of radicals voted against the ministry, which was saved by the votes of the opposition who were anxious above all to find a way out of od the financial predicament. the conseils generaux elections (july 19 and 26) showed a slight leaning to the left and the in- transigeance of the socialists became more marked. on aug. 15 the socialist congress in paris began by excluding deputy va- renne from the party because of his acceptance of the post of governor-general of indo-china. a motion was then passed (by 2,210 against 559) against blum’s proposal to censure any support of painleve’s cabinet but permitted the support of a ministry “ determined to bring about the reforms demanded by the proletariat.” inclusion in the ministry remained forbidden in any case. the ever-increasing financial difficulties intensified the dissension. caillaux failed to justify the hopes reposed in him. instead of holding fast to a general financial scheme he be- came involved in party politics. to clear up the situation by the settlement of inter-allied debts he left for the united states in september, but only to return in october empty-handed. the consolidated 4° gold loan, which he had launched during the summer and by which he hoped to realise some 20 milliards produced barely six. confidence was gone. at the end of oct. misunderstandings in the majority ranks found expression at the radical congress at nice, the speeches of herriot and caillaux revealed a fundamental difference, and painleve’s long speech rather served to add to the confusion. finally the con- gress, unable to decide between the levy on capital and the more practicable taxes, adopted a vague formula recommending a “special contribution payable on all kinds of income and capital.” the second painteve ministry.—the brief credit enjoyed by the government on the conclusion of the agreements signed on oct. 16 at locarno—for which briand had paved the way dur- ing the 6th meeting of the league of nations by agreement with chamberlain, benes and skrzynski—did not help them for long. for one thing, french opinion was by no means unanimous in its approval of the agreements which were designed to replace both the geneva protocol (never ratifted), the security pact of june 28 roro and certain guarantees of the versailles treaty. on returning from nice, caillaux was unable to sccure his col- leagues’ approval of his financial projects. to get rid of him painleve handed in the resignation of the cabinet collectively on the 28th, and formed a new ministry in which he took finance himself. but in the chamber he obtained a majority of only 221 votes against 189, owing to the abstention of the socialists. the socialist national council, for its part, voted against him by 1,431 against 1,228. at the same time gen. sarrail’s anti- clerical sectarianism, turkish sympathies, presumption and blunders in syria brought about sanguinary encounters in the jebel druz and later in damascus, which amounted to local disasters. painleve was at last obliged to recall him. when he put his financial schemes—badly conceived and co-ordinated— before the chamber, he was already discredited. on nov. 22 he was thrown out by 277 votes against 249. the treasury was so hard pressed that he had to pass an emergency vote for an advance of 1,500 million francs from the banque de france. another briand minisiry—entrusted with the construction of a new cabinet, briand failed at first through the non-collab- oration of the socialists. doumer, and after him herriot, met with no greater success. then, as the socialists were meditating a coup de force, briand yielded to the pressure of the president of the republic and tried once more. he succeeded on nov. 28, taking foreign affairs himself, sending painleve back to the war office and, in spite of his objections, gave finance to [.oucheur who imagined he could straighten out the situation. the min- istry was still cartellist, allhough georges leygues (navy) and francois jourdain (pensions) represented the moderate ele- ments. a change of policy was now perceptible, the develop- ments of which appeared in december. loucheur’s scheme, once published, proved so great a disappointment that the finance minister had to resign. after groping a while pursued by the clamour of the extreme left, briand replaced loucheur by dou- mer. several cartellist ministers talked of resigning, but briand unmoved stood by doumer and gained the approval of the en- tire cabinet for his schemes. the pound sterling oscillated at about 130 and the dollar at about 26 to 27 francs. 96 as soon as his ministry was formed briand went to london to sign the locarno agreements (dec. 1). by the end of the year foreign affairs looked more promising. the dawes scheme func- tioned accurately, and the cologne area was evacuated without incidents. in morocco the vanquished ‘abdel-krim saw himself abandoned by the tribes; in syria henry de jouvenel, appointed high commissioner, began to restore order and confidence; in central europe, poland and the little entente (q.v.) were follow- ing a policy parallel to that of france. relations with england were cordial. the one great remaining problem remained the settlement of inter-allied debts, the shadow of which darkened a financial horizon already heavy with clouds. (a. gn.) the locarno treaties were ratified by the french chamber on nov. 2 1925. the chief preoccupation of ministers in the new year was the financial crisis, the solution of which was rendered more difficult by the lack of an absolute majority in the chamber. the govt. made the tax on payments, m. doumer’s most important proposal, a matter of confidence. they were defeated by 274 votes to 221. their resignation (march 6) took place two days before the opening of the special session of the assembly called to arrange for the admission of germany to the league. the fail of m. briand was a calamity at this moment, and, after a fruitless invitation to m. herriot to forma cabinet, m. briand assem- bled a ministry, with m. raoul peret at the finance ministry. a finance bill, providing for new or increased taxation, was passed (april 29), but the franc still fell. at the end of april it stood at 147 to the pound. money was required for morocco, where the new offensive was begun early in may. on may 19, on m. peret’s return from london without having settled the debt, the franc fell to 171. in june m. peret resigned, and then the whole government. after a delay of a week, during which m. herriot had failed to forma ministry, m briand again took office, with m. caillaux at the ministry of finance, and the fatter was faced at once with the problem of protecting the franc. (ep. £.b.) biinliography.—e. bourgeois, afannel historique de la politique etrangere (paris 1892-1906); a. gauvain, l'europe avant la guerre (paris, 1917); and l’europe au jour le jour (paris, 1917, etc.); a. albert-petit, la france de la guerre, 3 vol. (paris, 1918-9); e. lavisse, ziistoire de france contemporaine, to vol. (paris, 1920-2); j. aulneau, le rhin et la france (paris, 1921); e. bourgeois and g. pages, les ortgines et les responsabilites de la grande guerre (paris, 1921); j. caillaux, mes prisons (paris, 1921); a. dumaine, la derniere ambassade de france en autriche (paris, 1921); g. h. stuart, french foreign policy from fashoda to sarajevo 1898-1014 (new york, 1921); a. tardieu, la paix (1921); a. breton, les commissions et la reforme de la procedure parlementaire, etc. (paris, 1922); r. poincare, les origines de la guerre (paris, 1921); r. h. sottau, french parties and politics (world of to-day serics, london, 1922); j. catrere and g. bourgin, manuel des partis politiques en france (paris, 1924); p. renouvier, les origines tmmediates de la guerre (paris, 1925). see also—les recueils diplomatiques; and the yellow, blue, red, orange, green and white books, published by the governments concerned since i914. ii. economic and social history in the course of the negotiations for the payment of frances debts to her allies it has been persistently said, in particular by americans, that france is the richest country in europe, or at least in continental europe. this opinion, very flattcring to the french, is in some respects well founded; for since the fall or the amputation of the great empires of central europe, irance 1s, after russia, the most extensive european country. her soil js fertile. she owns the richest iron deposits in europe, and, if her coal does not suffice for home consumption, she has by way of compensation more water power than any other european coun- try except norway. in addition she has a colonial empire, the second in the world and 20 times the size of the mother country. it is true that her population places her fifth in order of countries, but it is by her own choice that its increase is limited. but the formidable damages inflicted by the war are not taken sufficiently into account. the world still remembers france’s rapid recovery after the war of 1870-1, and supposes that this is a similar case. but the two situations are not in any real sense comparable. if the national wealth of france were evaluated in gold cur- rency or, to be exact, in the currency of 1914 (which is not the same thing, for we know that gold has lost a great deal of its value), we should arrive at a figure far below that of ro14. it is difficult to make a definite statement, but, speaking generally, france the accepted pre-war figure was 300 milliard gold fr. whereas the present figure would not, we believe, reach 200 milliards, in spite of the restoration of alsace-lorraine.! but leaving aside these gencral considerations let us examine, in tivo successive sections: (1) agriculture, mines, industry and commerce, with a comparison under each heading of the present situation with that of 1911-3; (2) the changes that have taken place in respect of workers’ legislation, the social movement and population. production a griculture—french agriculture suffered cruelly in the war; (a2) in consequence of the occupation and of the destruction of part of its area; for certain portions of the ground—the part since known as the red zone (about 30,000 hectares)—were laid waste by shell to such an extent that they could no longer be cultivated in any way; (6) in consequence of scarcity of labour, live stock and manure, which had the effect of bringing cultiva- tion to a standstill or of greatly impoverishing the crops for a long time after the war; (c) by the destruction of forests (several hundred thousand hectares) which must take 20 to 50 years or even longer, to grow again. the area under cultivation is smaller to-day, whether we take the absolute or the relative figures, than it was before the war. from 1904 to 1913 its extent was 23,000,000 hectares (cereals, fodder, leguminous crops, vines, etc.), which represented in re- lation to france’s total area of 52,952,000 hectares 47%. in 1923 it was only 20,432,000 hectares, although the area of france, aggrandised by alsace-lorraine, amounts to 54,400,000 hectares. the proportion is therefore now only 37°5%. this reduction of the cultivated areas is explained by the diminution and the high cost of agricultural labour, as the result of which landowners find it more profitable to convert their land into pasture. it may be argued that the decrease in the arcas matters little if there is a compensating increase in yield. unfortunately this is not the case. there is certainly a general improvement in the yield per hectare, but not enough to compensate for the decrease in area. the result is that production is decreasing in the case of almost all agricultural products. the following are the figures for certain products, taken from a paper by m. auge laribe in the revue d’ economie politigue, march-april 1925. 1904-13) 1923-4 cereals million quintals. : : . 88 76 potatoes million quintals . : : : 133 127 beetroot million quintals . : : ; 58 44 milk million litres . : ; ; wool it is only in the case of vines and fodder that production shows a small increase. the live stock of the country, greatly reduced by the war, is still below pre-war numbers. it is evident from the following figures (annuaire statistique de la france) that the deficit is still very con- siderable. million kilogrammes 1913 1924 2,859,000 14,025,000 10,172,000 5,802,000 horses, mules, donkeys oxen and cows . sheep and goats pigs : ; nevertheless, in some directions, progress has been made. manure is being more largely used, thanks to the work of the agricultural 3,222,000 14,788,000 16,131,000 7,036,000 syndicates, but france is still far behind other countries in this respect, although she possesses very abundant supplies of phosphates in northern africa and, since the restoration of alsace, a rich deposit of potash also. the employment of electric power, whether derived 1mr. harvey e. fisk of the bankers trust co., new york, con- cludes his exhaustive analysis of french public finance (1922) in - these terms: ‘‘we believe that, notwithstanding the losses occa- sioned by the war, the wealth of france today, estimated on a specie basis, closcly approximates or perhaps equals her pre-war wealth. this is partly due to the repatriation of alsace and lorraine, but it is also due to the fact that the war apparently served to intensify the normal saving habits of the people and thus enabled them to meet the burden which it brought without seriously impairing the pre-\war national fortune.” (ep, £2. b.) france from waterfalls or from coal, is beginning to spread in country dis- tricts owing to the formation of co-operative societies of consumers of power. the state has voted a credit of 600,000,000 fr. for this purpose. the shortage of labour is being compensated by the im- migration of foreign workers who are mainly italian and spanish in the south, polish and belgian in the north. the southern region which lies along the garonne had become a deserted country in con- sequence of the decrease in the local population, but is now being restored by the italians, who come not merely as jabourers, farmers or metayers, but also to buy land and settle on it. it is undoubtedly an anomaly, this colonisation of so ancient a country as france, and the results may be dangerous from a national point of view. but even if it be an evil, it is at the same time a remedy for that greater evil which has proved fatal to other countries, viz.: desertion of the land for lack of men to work it. the depreciation of the currency has been a blessing in so far as it has cnabled most small holders to pay off their mortgages and many farmers to buy their farms outright. afines and water-power.—the invaded regions were the very ones richest in mines. they produced half of france’s total out- put of coal and three-quarters of that of iron. the coal-mines were systematically destroyed by the germans; during the war 112 shafts and 1,910 kilometres of galleries were demolished or burnt out, and have had to be not mercly repaired, but entirely reconstructed. in 1925, by dint of immense efforts, production had been brought back to the pre-war figure, but the output of 12 whole years had been lost. it is true that, through the recovery of the lorraine mines, france—already a large producer of iron ores—has come into the front rank among european nations in that capacity. her production of coal, however, was always much below her con- sumption, and the restoration of alsace-lorraine has not altered this state of things. the figures of coal production and consumption are as follows :— year production | consumption tons tous iqii 39,280,000 59,500,000 40,844,000 64,800,000 44,955,000 76,900,000 at first sight there would seem to have been a considerable increase both in production and consumption, but this is an illu- sion. as regards production, of the 15,000,000 tons produced in 1924, more than 5,000,000 are from the restored lorraine region; deducting this amount, it will be seen that from the rest of france the output is slightly below the pre-war figure, so that there has been no progress at all in the 12 years. similarly, as regards coal consumption, alsace alone consumes 11,000,000 tons, so that in 1924 the consumption of france without that province was only 66,000,000, or about the same as in 1913. the deficit has in fact been augmented, for while in r9rz it amounted to . 20,000,000 tons only, in 1924 it had risen to 32,000,000 tons. tt is made up by the import of coal, which comes mainly from the saar, germany and england. if the saar basin were to be- come permanently french, it would go far in redressing the in- sufficiency of coal; but this question is to be settled by a plebi- scite in 1935, and it is probable that the decision will be in favour of germany. in that casc, hgwever, germany would have to pay trance the value of the saar mines, which has been fixed at 300,000,000 gold marks. there is, however, a real and considerable increase in the pro- duction of iron and its derivatives; production is in fact nearly doubled, as may be seen from the following figures:— iron ore pig iron tons 4,470,000 5,207,000 7,593,000 tons 16,600,000 22,000,000 29,000,000 consumption, however, lags far behind production; even be- fore the recovery of lorraine, france was unable to absorb all her production, and is less able to do so now. the reason is that she produces very little coke, and coke is indispensable in the production of pig-iron. she has, therefore, no alternative but to export her surplus of ore and of manufactured iron, and even this is a matter of difficulty as, since the war, the metallurgic 97 industry has been in a state of depression marked by underselling and falling prices. in the matter of her metallurgical wealth, therefore, france has less cause for satisfaction than is generally supposed. as to petroleum, france had formerly none at all, but with alsace she has now acquired a few small wells. an oil-field has just been found in the alediterranean region (department of herault) but it is not yet known what the yield will be. the insufficiency of coal-mines is to some extent counterbalanced by the abundance of waterfalls which can be used for motor power. with the pyrenees, the alps, and the mountains cf the centre, france is at least as well equipped as switzerland and norway. before the war the amount of power utilised was valued at no more than 480,000 kilowatts (640,000 h1.p.). in 1924 the figure was over 1,000,000 kilowatts. plans for the utilisation of 4,000,000 additional kilowatts are in progress, and the total utilisable energy is calculated at 8,000,000 or 10,000,000. the increase, however, though extremely rapid after the war, is now tending to diminish owing to the great rise in the cost of installation, so that coal-power once more becomes the cheaper of the two. neverthcless, france has already found in water-power a source of considerable wealth, for in addition to the amount employed for lighting and for running railways and tram- ways, a large number of industries, both metallurgical and chemical, have arisen as a consequence of this new motor power. industry. french industry was hit even more directly than agriculture by the war. those regions which were invaded, and in great part devastated, represented, it is true, only 5% of the total area of france, but they accounted for more than 10% of the popu- lation, 14% of the total number of industrial workers, 29% of the textile and 53° of the metallurgical production. they were in short the focus of the nation's industrial activity. reparation of the damage done has cost the state 84 milliard fr., and 20 milliards have still to be paid. from the financial standpoint the losses are irreparable. we are not, however, concerned here with the financial situation, but with the question of whether, from the industrial point of view, a compicte recovery has been made. the answer is yes, and no. in certain respects undoubtedly, french industry gained through the terrible experience of war. factories reconstructed in the dev- astated areas made good use of the enormous indemnities that thev received from the state. they are rcported to have had the use of extravagant sums, but they.justify their case by saying that the money was spent on installing the latest improvements and that those installations would probably not have been made but for the war. jn like manner factories have learnt to renew their stock of tools and to adapt themselves to new requirements by manufacturing at home articles for which france had formerly sent abroad, par- ticularly to germany; these included, for instance, chemical prod- ucts, dyes, magnetos for motors, diescl engines, electrical apparatus for wireless telegraphy, optical and photographic lenses and all the industrial requirements of aviation. the motor industry has made immense strides; the pre-war figure of about 100,000 cars in use has been increased to over 450,000 in 1925. even the clcest industries received a new impetus through the war. in the bakery trade, for instance, only half of the establishments used a mechanical kneader; and after the war it was used by 88". it must be said that the gen- cral adoption of the eight-hour day hastened the intreduction of mechanical contrivances but this itself was a result of the war. but while admitting these points, it is none the less true that french industry, taken as a whole, has not yet recovered from the shock of war. certainly, the losses among industrial workers (267,000 killed and about 130,000 disabled)—were less heavy than among agricultural labourers, because the greater number of skilled workmen were withdrawn from the front to work in munition factories. the deficit was more than covered, too, by the immigration of foreign workers. every year, since 1922 especially, there is a contingent of 200,000 to 300,000 of whom two-thirds are industrial and one-third agricultural workers. in the mines to-day, something like one-third of the personnel is made up of foreigners. but if there is no diminution in numbers, there is nevertheless diminution of output. not only does the foreigner, who is often inexperienced in his particular branch of employment, produce less than the frenchman of earlier days, but the frenchman him- self produces less than before the war. it is difficult to say whether this is the result of a limited working day or of discon- tent connected with socialistic ideas; in either case, the facts are incontrovertible. to take one example only, the quantity of coal produced per head in 1913 was about 660 kilogrammes; in 1925 itis 510 kilogrammes. the diminution is rather less if the calculation ts based upon the underground workers who extract the coal, but even in their case the quantity extracted shows a 98 diminution of 5%, the present figure being 568 kilogrammes as against the earlier 595. | then again, although the technical advance in industry has just been demonstrated, the total of horse-power used in indus- try, excluding transport, has not risen to any great extent (1911, 3,141,000 h.p.; 1913, 3,539,000 h.p.; 1922, 4,800,000 h.p.). but alsace-lorraine accounts for a large share in the last of these figures and, if we deduct that share, the augmentation for pre-war france remains inconsiderable. it is a different matter with water-power, but that we have already discussed. taking the principal! industries, we shall see that production has diminished, notwithstanding assertions to the contrary. the follow- ing are the figures for silk, which is pre-eminently a french in- dustry :— ; weight of | weight of | qalue of cocoons silk yarns ares eo kilos kilos francs iqii 5,109,000 | 411,000,000 | 414,000,000 1922 2,585,000 | 209,000,000 | 2,229,000,000 1923 : 4,180,000 i, 2,81 2,000,000 it is evident that production has greatly diminished, the quantity produced being almost halved. the third column figures, taken alone, show on the contrary a septuple augmentation; but on what does it rest? merely on the fact that the price of raw silk has been multiplied by 8, mounting from 35 fr. a kilo in i911 to 278 fr. in 1923. we have therefore only to divide this nominal figure of 2,812,000,000 by 8 and we have left 350,000,000 gold fr., that is, a figure smaller than that of 1911. in the case of sugar refineries the diminution amounts to one- third, as these figures show:— iqii-3.. average 671,000,000 kilogrammes 1922-4 . ; : average 446,000,000 kilogrammes lastly, there is the building industry, that industry which sup- ports so many others—as the french proverb has it: ‘‘ when building goes well, all goes well.” in the war years, it was practically non- existent; in 1924 and 1925 it was coming to life again, but only slow- ly. in paris in 1911 there were 1,792 applications for permits to build houses, in 1919 only 173—not even one-tenth! but in 1925 building was resumed on a considerable scale in the capital. commerce —internal commerce has suffered but little, even during the war; it recovered immediately after the war, gaining a fresh impetus from the rise in prices caused by the depreciation of the franc, and profiting also by the influx of foreigners at- tracted precisely by that depreciation, which set a premium on their dollars, pounds or florins as the case might be. we have an indication of the fluctuation of the internal commerce in the | special tax on sales. this tax brings in round figures 4 milhards of paper francs. as it is established at a fixed rate of 1-30%, it assumes an annual sales figure of 300 milliards—one might safely say, 400 to 500 milliards, 7.e., about 120 milliards of gold fr. on the basis of the exchange in 1924, for the declarations are assuredly much below the real figures. but unfortunately this tax did not exist before the war and we have therefore no basis of comparison. progress on the railways is, however, easier to assess; there is considerable increase in passenger traflic (35%) but less in goods (1370) = goods passengers iqii 3 , ‘ 184,000,000 tons 511,000,000 1923 208,000,000 tons 689,000,000 in spite of a large increase in gross receipts the railway com- panies are losing money at the rate of 1,000,000,000 fr. a year. this is because the french charges, though they have been fre- quently raised, are still (on a gold basis) lower than they are in other countries. the total length of the railway system has not been increased since the war (40,615 km. in igi1; 41,853 km. in 1923; but of these 1,250 were for alsace), because the cost of construction is so heavy that even the old tracks have to go unrepaired. the system is, however, practically large enough to meet requirements. in the mercantile marine, there has been a considerable increase: iqii, 1,413,000 tonnage net; 1913, 1,582,000 tonnage net; 1923, 2,145,000 tonnage net. sailing vessels account for only 386,000 of the total tonnage of 2,145,000. the increase since 1913 is therefore more than a third (35-6%). france lost nearly half of her merchant fleet during the france war (700,000 net tonnage), but germany was made to hand over to her an equivalent fleet. besides, the enormous rise in freights after the war (now a thing of the past) was a great incentive to construction. as regards international commerce, it is generally held that the position of france is excellent, better indeed than before the war. this is true, but only in part; the figures need more care- ful inspection. the following are the statistics of values and quantities:— imports exports value in weight in value in weight in millions of | millions of | millions of | millions of francs quintals francs quintals 1912 8,231 397 6,712 203 1913 8,421 442 6,880 221 192 40,132 565 41,454 294 192 43,980 474 45,413 302 it will be seen that a comparison of the mean of the years 1912 and 1913 with that of the years 1924 and 1925 shows an enormous in- crease in values, the imports being more than five times, the exports more than six times larger. at the mean rate of exchange in 1924 and 1925 the import figures would be 12 and 11 milliards of gold fr. respectively; the export figures 12-2 and 11-2 milliards respectively. the increase in quantities has been less: 24° on the imports, 40% on exports. it is not to be denied, moreover, that this increase is due to the depreciation of the franc to which we just now attributed the influx of foreign visitors, for this is why, despite the rise of prices in france, actual prices (gold prices), costs of production, and wages are lower in france than in foreign countries. but the greater increase in exports and the smaller increase in imports has in faet served to turn the trade balance in favour of france. for while in 1911 and 1913 the export figures remained lower by nearly 2 millards of fr. than the average import figures, in 1924 on the contrary they exceeded the import figures by more than i,300,000,000 (360,000,000 gold francs). it would seem, therefore, that this favourable balance ought to improve the exchange and bring about a rise in the france, all the more as the unknown, but considerable figure (probably more than 1 milliard gold fr.) of what are called invisible exports —that is, purchases made by passing visitors—may be added. on the other hand it must be remembered that france has al- most entirely lost her credits held abroad in the shape of shares, debentures and state loans. of this wealth, which amounted to 40 or 50 milliard gold fr., a large portion was diverted during the war. another part, comprising russian, austrian and turkish bonds, has practically melted away; and this magnificent hold- ing of foreign credits cannot unfortunately be restored, or at least can only be restored by secret methods, because an unin- iclligent fiscal policy prohibits or at least handicaps heavily all kinds of investments abroad. the figures of french commerce include those of the trade done between the mother country and her colonies and these can have no effect on the exchange, the currency being the same on both sides. it is not our intention to discuss the immense question of pro- tection. we will only say that the war, far from having shaken protectionism, has fortified it, not only because fiscal necessities call for the imposition of duties, but because fear of blockade leads each nation to think that she ought to be self-sufficing; and if, in those countries which appeared to be converted for good to free trade, suchas england, holland, denmark and switz- erland, protection is gaining ground, with how much more justi- fication will it become rooted in france? the only hope is that the breath of internationalism, which has created the league of nations, may also bring into being economic unions between several countries. no serious progress has yet been made with those economic understandings between france and ger- many which have many times been proposed on both sides of the rhine. social economy labour legislation.—during the war, social questions natu- rally lost their interest for the public. even the application of laws for the protection of men and women workers was set aside in the interests of national defence. workers mobilised in muni- france tion factories, worked day and night without protest, stimulated both by the incredibly enhanced rate of pay and by the fear of being sent to the front. even when the war was over, the opinion of business men and economists held that this intensive labour should continue, at least until the day when the ravages of war should have been repaired on the ground that the work of restoring the devas- tated areas was no less urgent than that of national defence. but the workers were deaf to this appeal; indeed they clamoured for the adoption of the eight-hour day awaited for 20 years, and celebrated in anticipation on each may day. parliament dared not resist this pressure, and the act of april 19 1919 estab- lished in principle the eight-hour day, leaving, however, the application of the law to be adapted to the special conditions of individual industries by technical commissions. this was a difficult task, not yet satisfactorily solved. so far the eight-hour day is only applied to some 5,000,000 workers distributed among 30 trades. the trades unions protest violently against these delays; but all business men and a fair number of economists persistently oppose the act, in which they see one of the principal factors in the rise of prices. its partisans argue that in the case of a number of industries productivity has been maintained and even augmented, notwithstanding the eight-hour day. several other laws, on the same lines as this general law, have been promulgated to secure the weckly holiday for trades- people by compulsory closing of the shops and to forbid night work in the bakeries. these laws meet with violent opposition on the part of small traders or small bakers who, as they employ no paid labour, claim the right to work themselves when and how they please. there is also a law of june ro 1915 ensuring a minimum wage to women working at home. ‘this is in imitation of the similar law in fngland. the insurance benefits against accidents, which had only been granted to industrial workers, were extended to agricultural labourers by a law of nov. 15 1922. another law of 1916 concerns economic life; it prohibits “illicit speculation,” that is, the extravagant raising of prices. this law was, it is true, repealed in 1922, but there is an agita- tion for its renewal. the question leads to passionate arguments, for it opposes the idea of equitable prices to the classic law of supply and demand. there are numerous laws by which loans on state funds are granted to co-operative societies, concerned with credits, consumption or production; also to societies of artisans employed in small industry and of agricultural workers for the acquisition of land, special advantage being given to dis- abled ex-soldiers. we may also mention the creation of a na- tional economic council composed of members elected by all the great national organisations. it has no legislative powers but aims at enlightening the government and preparing draft legislation. in addition there are numerous important measures uncer consideration, vigorously demanded by the confederation gene- rale du travail and by the socialist party. the following are the principal demands :— (a) the establishment of a general social insurance, covering all the risks in life: iliness, old age, disablement, unemployment, maternity, etc. this project likewise arouses lively opposition, on account of the enormous charge entailed on industry and on the national budget at a time when the financial situation is in itself critical. neither is it favourably regarded by the mutual insurance societies, corresponding to english friendly socicties, who depend on the voluntary contributions of their members and see themselves in danger of being climinated by a compulsory insurance scheme. nevertheless, it is certain that the bill will be passed, in a more or less modified form, for the radical socialist party has declared its intention to side with the socialist party in supporting it. (b) the establishment of a controle ouvrier which would authorise the workers—or rather the trades unions—in every factory to inter- vene in all questions of labour organisation, such as the workshop regulations, engagement, dismissals, discipline and so on. (c) the workers’ right to claim a certain number of days as holidays: this would give legal sanction to a custom which is becom- ing general to-day. (d) the right to receive a minimum wage, increased by allowances ponent to the number of children, hlere again it is a case of egal sanction for a custom of family allowances which, though of recent introduction, is already in use in many establishments. 99 but these allowances are at present paid actually by the employers, and the trades unions will not accept this, seeing in it a means of binding the worker on the pretext of assisting him. they claim family allowances, but on a compulsory basis. the social movement.—as long as the war lasted we had, if not social peace, at least a truce from social strife as from political strife. the middle class and the working class had fraternised in the same trenches. but this truce did not last. the working classes returned from the war disappointed and _ irritated. they had been laden with laurels for saving their country, prom- ised a new world, and when they had to go into harness again, life seemed harder and the wage system more intolerable than ever. the rise in prices, due to a factor of which for years the public remained ignorant, viz.: depreciation of the currency, increased that irritation. undoubtedly a rise in wages followed the rise in prices; in the first years of the war it anticipated it indeed, but after the war, the advance in wages fell behind the advance in prices, and adjustment was frequently obtained only through fighting and strikes. the index number of wages which had (almost) caught up with the index number of prices, again lagged behind on account of the fall in the value of the franc at the end of 10925. the two columns below show the index numbers of retail prices and those of wages at corresponding dates. the parallel- ism of the two ascending lines would be still clearer if shown in a graph. it should be remembered, however, that index numbers of wages are far more difficult to determine than those of prices. instead of taking more or less arbitrary averages, we have chosen to take wages in a single industry, that for which the most definite statistics are obtainable, namely the coal-mining industry (tak- ing underground and surface workers together) as indicative of the wage movement in general. retail prices wages 423 the same parallel movement is found in the salaries of minor employees and officials, but not at all in the case of higher officials whose salaries have often not even been doubled. it must be admitted that when the worker docs obtain wages proportionate to the rise in prices, he is not satisfied, for he docs not see why, with his wages quadrupled, he cannot satisfy his requirements better than before the war. ile feels that he is being duped and it irritates him. then, too, the worker’s re- quirements—particularly those of the agricultural worker—are much greater since the war. this is due to the lavish distribu- tion of meat, coffce, tobacco and alcohol to the soldiers, the taste for which has survived and the desire for which is stimu- lated by the spectacle of the scandalous fortunes that are ac- guired through the rise in prices and through speculation. the people’s saving-banks have had their deposits greatly aug- mented, but not in proportion to the rise in prices, as the following figures show: — national | municipal savings savings total bank banks fr. fr, rr 1913 1,818,000,000 | 4,011,000,000 | 5,829,000,000 1,904,000,000 | 3,909,000,000 | 5,813,000,000 3,306,000,000 | 8,814,000,000 | 12,120,000,000 if we convert the actual total (12 milliards) to pre-war francs on the basis of the mean exchange in 1924 it becomes less than 3 milliard fr., that is, toa figure below that of 1911. the savings-bank deposits are influenced by the degree of confidence inspired by the national credit at any given time. this applies even to the municipal or private banks, for these also put nearly all their deposits into state funds. among the lower classes confidence is greatly shaken by the fall in value of state bonds. it might be supposed that, given the discontent prevailing amon the working class, trade unionism would show a great increase, aa a study of the official statistics appcars to confirm that supposition: i9ii, 1,029,000 trade unionists; 1925, 1,846,000 trade unionists. too but these figures are of little value because most of the trade unionists figure only on paper, and also, since the moscow revo- lution, trade unionism has been disorganised. actuzlly it is rep- resented by three organisations more or less hostile to each other. i. the oldest of all (dating from 1895) --the confederation gene- rale du travail, the famous c.¢s.t., whose secretary jouhaux is well known. its effective membership rose from 1,000,000 before the war to nearly 2,000,000 in 1920. as the result of an attempted general strike provoked by unemployment, of which the c.g.t, did not approve, although it dare not disavow it, and especially of the withdrawal of the communists in 1921 which was inspired from moscow, the number of its members fell to 400,000. it has recovered since then, mainly through the adhesion of intellectual workers and officials (among whom are i10,000 teachers) and is said to have 700,000 membcrs at the present time. although it was declared illegal by a legal decision, never put into execution, its programme is reformist rather than revolutionary. 2. in consequence of the schism just mentioned, another con- federation generale du travail was formed which qualified its title by the additional word wnitaire, a strange term for dissentients. its programme is that of moscow: the dictatorship of the proletariat. this organisation is known as the c.g.t.u. it has not succeeded in rallying more than 200,000 to 300,000 members and will probably return before long to the older organisation. 3. finally there is the federation des syndicats catholiques which is not much in the public eye, but is said to be growing since the war. the co-operative movement, more favourably situated, has grown steadily since the war in france, as indeed in all coun- tries, particularly as regards consumers’ co-operation. the rea- son for this lics not only in the rise in prices, which has forced the middle class as well as the working class to scek means of reducing the cost of living; there is also a psychological reason— reaction against the existing economic organisation. the classic laws of political economy are no longer accepted, and there is therefore a sympathetic public for a new doctrine such as this, which claims to replace competition by co-operation, the law of supply and demand by fair prices, production for profit by production for service, thus abolishing the profitecer. the following figures show the progress that has been made:— number of members number of societies sales figures fr, 317,000,000 1,747,000,000 3,250 4.200 865,000 2,330,000 it will be seen that the increase in the sales is much less than it appears, for in 1922 the frane had already fallen to 0-27; the 1,747,000,000 therefore represent only 576,000,000 of 1913 francs. but the progress of the movement is shown above all in the develop- ment of central organisations and in the growing part which co- operatives play in national and international economic life. the importance of the movement received official acknowledgment at the end of the war in 1918 when the conseil superieur de la co- operation was created and its advice asked on all questions of interest not only to co-opcratives, but to consumers generally, just as the conseil superieur du travail is called in to advise on questions which concern workers. agricultural co-operative societies for mutual credit, have also been greatly multiplicd:— i9ii . 3,946 societies 185,000 members 1923 ,212 societies 284,000 members but their development is to a large extent artificial, being due as it is principally to the loans granted by the state (about 600,000,000 (150,000,000 gold fr.) up to date in 1924). these funds are not taken from the budget, but from the immense profits which the state draws from its partnership in the banque de france. as to the industrial producers’ societies, the oldest and most typical of all co-operation in france, they comprise within a small ring some 500 societies in all with 30,000 members. the most cele- brated, and one which has been visited by co-operators from all countries isthe familistere de guise. the friendly societies, which in their day were the elementary schools of social solidarity, are now rather out of date. their field of activity, hedged in on the one hand by employers’ institutions, on the other by the extension of com- pulsory state insurance, is becoming more and more limited. population _ the demographical position of france was already bad before the war, and was bound to be aggravated by a war which robbed the country of the flower of its population. in 1911 the population was 39,605,000; in 1921 it was 39,240,000. thus the population has diminished in the course of these 10 france years, but the diminution is even greater than it scems; for al- sace and lorraine, which did not figure in the 1911 returns, are included in the census of 1921. now these provinces account for 1,719,000 inhabitants, and if we deduct these from the figure of 39,200,518 we are left with a population of 37,521,000 for france as it was before the war. there is therefore a diminution of more than 2,000,000 and this diminution is only too easily explained:—(1) by the number of men killed in the war (1,400,- 000) and (2) by the fall of the birth-rate during the war. the sudden rise in the number of births immediately after the war—a familiar phenomenon—was succeeded by a quick drop to the pre-war figure. fortunately, the death-rate has sensibly diminished, with the result that the annual excess o births over deaths is greater than before the war:— _ 3 excess of births over deaths 22,000 79,000 births deaths 1911-3 (3 years average) , 1922-4 (3 years average). 746,000 758,000 724,000 679,000 it is clear that even could this natural increase be maintained over a period, it would take 26 years to replace the 2,000,000 dead or the unborn of the war. the state endeavours to stimu- late the birth-rate by grants to families in proportion to the number of children. but it is hard to believe that these pre- miums will cause many children to be born; they are only a means of giving material aid to the parents of large families. happily foreign immigration goes far towards restoring the balance, for the number of immigrants is now far greater than the number of births in excess of deaths. the annual number of immigrants, taking the average over the three years 1922, 1923, 1924 18 290,000, we may suppose then that the coming census of 1926 will give france a population of 40,600,000 inhabitants. this places her fifth among the great european powers. but she has also a population—black, yellow and white—of 50,000,000 to 60,000,000 in her colonies. brbltograpny.—annual official publications; especially, staiis- tique agricole annuelle; tableau general du commerce de la france; annuaire statistique de la france; also c. gide, ed. effects of the war upon french economic life; collection of 5 monographs (carnegie endowment, oxford, 1923); la revne d’ economie publique. (c. g.*) fi. national. finance on the eve of the world war the public finances of france were in a relatively poor condition, a circumstance which has influenced the whole evolution of french finance since aug. 1914, and was due solely to the indifferent way in which the finances had been handled. the budgetary deficiat—for the three years 1908-10 the national budget showed a total deficit of 147,000,000 francs. in ror, it is true, there was a surplus of 141,000,000 fr., but in the following year the deficit reappeared. although the accounts of the year 1912 show an apparent surplus of 112,500,000 fr., this was only obtained by including 153,000,000 fr. which were extraordinary resources of the treasury arising from the ‘‘ compte provisionnel.” in reality this apparent surplus masked a defi- cit of 40,500,000 francs. for 1913 the budget showed the fol- lowing results:— fr. receipts . ; ; : , ‘ : 5,066,900,000 expenditure. ; ; ‘ : ‘ ; 5,038, 100,000 surplus. . 28,800,000 but the receipts included 172,000,000 fr. again coming for the compte provisionnel,”’ so that the real deficit on the budget was 143,000,000 francs. when the budget for 1914 was under discussion the deficit was estimated at 800,000,000 francs. in reality these deficits were even larger, as a number of items of expenditure which should have been included were withdrawn from the budget by accounting devices. a bad example had been set by the law of feb. 17 1898, which instituted the special treasury account for the improvement of military equipment. franci: on jan. 1 1914 there were still 173,000,000 fr. of short-term bonds issued in virtue of this law, of which 11,000,000 fell due in iq14, 124,000,000 in 1915 and 38,000,000 in 1916. a subsequent law of march 30 1912 created the account for the improvement of naval equipment and, although annual sums were allotted from the budget for this purpose, the expenditure over the five years 1912-6 exceeded the allocation by 139,293,000 francs. these extra-budget expenditures, which had become to some extent both regular and normal, were not the only ones. ‘the diplomatic tension at the time of the agadir incident in 1911 had drawn the attention of the l'rench govt. to the inadequacy of the military equipment of france, and caused it.to embark on very considerable expenditure without the formal authorisa- tion of parliament. in 1912, 22,000,000 fr. were spent in this way but in 1913, owing to the passing of the three-year military service law, the figures rose to 300,000,000 fr., and in rort4, 488,- 000,000 fr. extra-budget credits were estimated for the army and 128,000,000 for the navy. the * compte provistonnel.”’—in order to hide, at least in part, the deficit, the ‘‘ compte provisionnel ’”’ was created by the law of feb. 20 1912. this was a treasury device which enabled any surplus to be carried over from one financial year to the next, thus violating the fundamental rule of an annual budget. dur- ing the first year, in 1912, 2 sum of 159,000,000 fr. was paid into the “ compte provisionnel,” arising from the anticipated repay- ment by the compagnie des chemins de fer de l’est of advances made to it by the state as a guarantee of interest. in the follow- ing year it was credited with 141,000,000 fr., the surplus of the financial year 1911 and with a further 31,000,000 fr. from non- recurring sources. in ror4 it received 112,500,000 fr., the surplus of the financial year 1912. the reform of the tax system.—treasury expedients of this type, besides being inadequate, did not provide a solution, which it is clear could only be found by voting the necessary taxes, as was demanded by m. poincare when minister of finance tn 1906. there were two obstacles in the way of this solution: firstly, the usual unwillingness of all politicians to impose new burdens on their electors—an unwillingness which from 1904 to 1914 prevented the french parhament from voting more than 236,000,000 fr. of new taxes as against additional expenditure of 1,777,000,000 fr.; secondly, the political battle which raged round the question of reform of direct taxation. after prolonged con- troversy, which dated from the reform proposals of m. caillaux in 1907, the law of march 29 1914 was passed, which provided for the reorganisation of the tax on property not built over and for the increase of the tax on income from securities. but this did not bring in any additional revenue, because at the same time the former tax was lowered by an amount equivalent to the yield of the new taxes on securities. on the eve of the declara- tion of war, however, a decisive step towards fiscal reform was taken by the creation of the general income tax. this was a slightly progressive supplementary tax on incomes levied on that part of the total income in excess of 5,000 francs. this new tax only came into force in 1915, and therefore could not help to meet the deficit at the moment it was voted. the treasury and the loan of july 1914.—the whole of the current and accumulated deficits were covered by an increase of the floating debt, which amounted to about 2,100,000,000 fr. on dec. 31 1913. while the necessity of issuing a loan to fund part of the floating debt was realised as early as 1913, the measure was delayed by a controversy over the question whether or no the interest on the new rente should be exempt from taxation. finally, in june 1914, a law was passed authorising the issue of a loan of 805,000,000 fr. of 33° redeemable rente subject to taxation and issued at 182 fr. for each 7 fr. of rente. the sub- scribers were only required to pay down 20 fr. on allotment of a nominal 200 fr. of loan, the balance being payable in three sub- sequent instalments. as a result of this mode of subscription the loan was chiefly subscribed by the banks, who hoped later to dispose of the shares at a profit to the public. to sum up, the following was the financial situation in july 1914, on the eve of the war: a considerable budget deficit; a relatively large ioi floating debt; a loan recently issued and taken up by the banks but not placed with the public and involving a heavy burden on all credit institutions on the declaration of war. french finance during the war (1914-8) the declaration of war and the credit crisis——the outbreak of war brought with it a very grave credit crisis, of which the first manifestation was a panic on the stock exchange in the last days of july torg. the settlement of future transactions was suspended for the time being, and on sept. 3 the bourse was closed. ilence the funds advanced to speculators to support their forward transactions were locked up, and ceased to be available for industry and com- merce. the banks were forced to rediscount bills with the bank of france, whose holdings of commercial bills rose from 1,554.000,000 fr. on july 25 to 4,000,000,000 fr. on aug. 4. the bank of france raised its discount rate from 3}°% to 6%, and its rate for advances from 43° to 7%. on july 31 the settlement of all commercial liabilities was postponed, and on aug. i a moratorium was pro- claimed for the deposits of the banks except for small sums not exceeding 250 francs. the bank of france never refused to redis- count bills; therefore it seems questionable whether the moratorium was really unavoidable for the other banks. the crisis, though very acute during the first weeks of the war, was not of long duration. the bourse was reopened on sept. 27 for spot transactions, and, with the aid of a loan of 200,000,000 fr. from the bank of france, it proved possible by sept. 30 1915 to liquidate all commitments carried over during the moratorium, including the loan of 805,000,000 fr. of july 1914. the commercial moratorium was of longer duration. most of the bills of exchange, etc., maturity of which had been pro- longed were taken up by the bank of france, whose hoklings of these securities reached their maximum of 3,977,000,000 fr. on dec. 24 1914. many of these bills were rclatively quickly absorbed, and their total fell to 1,938,000,000 fr. by the end of 1915. owing to this credit crisis it was necessary to wait till the end of 1915 before the first big consolidated loan could be issued. war expenditure.—the following table summarises the growth of french expenditure for the war:— expenditure (millions of francs) recover- able special expen- |accounts diture civil services public debt military charges ‘ the item ‘recoverable expenditure ’’ covers that expenditure for which germany was rendered liable by the treaty of versailles. the item “ special accounts '’ comprises the deficits of the special | services of the treasury which were created during the war, and which include extra-budget expenditure, advances to allied govern- ments, cession of material to foreign governments, feeding of the civilian population, ctc. taxation.— the budget revenue raised during the war amounted to 26,200 million fr., or about 15° of the total expenditure. when france is reproached with not having made a more considerable fiscal effort it must be remembered that she was deprived by inwa- sion of about one-fifth of her tax revenue. mobilisation caused the greater part of her labour to be called up, and withdrew many of the financial officials. further, it is untrue to say that fresh taxes were nut voted during the war; the general income tax was increased on three occasions, in 1916, 1917 and 1918, and carried from 2% to 20 "5; in 1917 the okl direct taxes were replaced by the new system of income-tax schedules; taxes on succession, stamp duties and taxes on insurance were increased; finally, in 1916, an extraordinary tax on exceptional war profits was imposed. additional taxation brought in about 2,800 million fr. during the war, and tax revenue rose from 4,100 million fr. in 1915 to 6,800 million fr. in 1918. advances of the bank of france-—the following table shows the total of advances authorised to be made by the bank of france and of advances actually given :— total total advances advances authorised made (000,000 omitted) | (000,000 omitted) it: fr. dec. 31 19t4 6,000 3,900 dec. 31 1915 9,000 5,000 dec. 31 1916 9,000 7,{00 15,000 12,500 21,000 17,150 t02 to this total 3,750 million fr. must be added for loans granted by the french govt. to foreign governments. the french exchange and foreign loans.—prior to aug. 1915 the french exchange, in spite of a deficit in the balance of trade amounting for eight months to 1,600 million fr., was kept at or very near par, thanks to the falling due of foreign coupons, to the export of small quantities of gold, to the placing of {12,000,000 of treasury bills on the london market, and to an american advance of $10,000,000. between april 1915 and april 1917 the total deficit of the french balance of trade rose to 27,000 million francs. this deficit was covered partly by expenditure incurred by the british expeditionary force in france, partly by the sale of a portion of the french holdings of foreign securities, but chiefly by british and american credits. france sent gold to london to the value of 2,840 million fr. and obtained credits in exchange to the value of 9,000 million francs. at the same time she procured credits amount- ing to $650,500,000 from the united states. by these means the depreciation of the franc was kept within reasonable limits. on march 31 1917 the franc was 11° below par in relation to the dol- lar, 13-5 °% in relation to the swiss franc, and 21 °% in relation to the peseta and the swedish krone. in april 1917 the united states entered the war, and from then onwards its financial assistance was very great. between april 1 1917 and dec. 31 1918 the french balance of trade showed a deficit of 32,000 million fr. which was mainly covered by credit operations; £290,000,000 were placed at the disposal of france by the british treasury, and $2,500 million by the american treasury. smaller loans were also contracted in other countries, ¢.g., 100,000,000 gold pesos in argentina, 350,000,000 pesetas in spain, 100,000,000 yen in japan, ete. asa result of this assistance the french exchange at its worst never fell more than 44-7 ° below par in relation to the swedish kroner and 39:1°% > in relation to the pescta, while on dec. 31 i918 the depreciation was not more than 9-5° and 7% respectively. internal loans —the principal medium for the transfer of funds to the govt. for war purposes was the national defence bills devised by m. ribot and issued in virtue of the decree of sept. 13 1914. these bills were treasury securities with a currency of one year, six months, three months and even one month after april 1918. they were repayable at par, and could be discounted at the bank of france within three months of maturity. they could be crossed like cheques. in fact, they acted as deposits with the treasury which could very easily be mobilised. in view of their convenience and elasticity they quickly proved a great success, and the treasury suc- ceeded by this means in mobilising a considerable part of the avail- able funds of the nation for its requirements. the national defence bills had, however, one danger—the abnormal expansion of the floating debt. to retard the increase of the floating debt the french treasury made successive issues of national defence bonds with a currency of 10, 6 and § years. finally, when the credit crisis referred to above had been over- come, the state decided to issue a scries of irredeemable loans—the 5% loan of 1915 (real rate 5-73°); the 5° loan of 1916 (real rate 5°71 %); the 4% loan of 1917 (real rate 5-83 %); and the 4° loan of 118 (real rate 5-68 %4). table showing loans raised by france (in millions of francs) iqi4 1916 1918 i9t5 iqt7 irredeemable loans yield) short term loans . : national defence bills and bonds ; . ; funds deposited at the ‘treasury total (net 6,265; 5.425) 5,174] 7,246 465 ee - 22 of 1,858 | 10,487] 12,955] 13,054] 16,611 18,588} 24,293 french finances from i9i9 to 1926 at the end of the war france was faced with three very grave financial problems—the liquidation of the war; the reconstruction of the devastated regions; and the reorganisation of her fiscal system on an entirely new basis. the liquidation of the war involved heavy outgoings in respect of unexpired contracts, extraordinary civil expenditure, the progressive liquidation of the special accounts of the treasury, etc., which were not completed till the end of 1921, and may be estimated at about 36 or 37,000 million francs. the reconstruction of the devastated regions was regulated by the law of april 17 1919. this law, which was voted at a time when everyone believed that germany would make good the whole of the damage in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of versailles, was conceived in a very liberal spirit. it laid down that all those who had suffered loss were entitled to an indemnity fixed by a special ad hoc body, and equivalent to the pre-war value of the property. if, further, the victim undertook to reconstruct his destroyed property he had a right to the refund of additional expenses caused by the france rise in prices. the total cost of reparation thus calculated is esti- mated at 82,000 million francs. in addition to this there must be added the permanent increase in expenditure resulting from high prices and salaries and the service of the debt. the story of the french financial effort since 1918 falls naturally into four periods: (1) the year 1919; (2) 1920-1; (3) 1922-june 1924; (4) june 1924-jan. 1926. 1919 and the period of inflation.—the events of the year 1919 weigh heavily on the financial destiny of france. at the end of dec. 1918 the english pound stood at 29-97 fr. and the dollar at 5-45 francs. at the end of dec. rg1g the pound sterling was valued at 41-48 fr. and the dollar at 11 francs. this fall was due to the persistent deficit in the balance of trade (24,000 million fr. in 1919). the deficit was again mct in part, as in previous years, by forcign credits. but on jan. 3 1919 the british treasury announced that it would make no further advances to the french treasury, and in dec. the american treasury followed suit. nevertheless, the exter- nal debt of france increased in 1919 by about 11,000 million francs. the expenditure of the state, swollen by the accompanying inflaticn, amounted to 54,200 million fr. scarcely less than in the last year of the war. this total included 15,500 million fr. of ‘‘ recoverable expenditure,’ comprising costs of reconstruction and war pensions. budget revenue, on the other hand only amounted to 11,600 million francs. the chamber of deputies elected in 1914 could not make up its mind to impose new and heavy taxes on the eve of a new election. asa result the floating debt increased in 12 months by 27,653 million francs. the credit national, created specially for the finance of the devastated regions, raised a joan at the end of 1919 which brought in 3,960 million francs. finally the treasury borrowed 8,370 million fr. from the bank of france—a larger sum than in any year of the war. [t was this wholesale inflation which put the scal on the de- preciation of the franc. during the year 1919, which could and should have been the first year of financial reconstruction, the financial methods of the war were mercly perpetuated, under the direction of the finance minister, m. iklotz. financially the war did not finish till the end of 1919. jn six years the treasury had spent 224,000 million fr., which were raised in the following way:— fr. 38,000,000,000 112,000,000,000 : ; : 44,000,000,000 advances from the bank of france 20,000,000,000 total . 224,000,000,000 deflation (r920-1).—during 1920 and 1921, when mm. francois marsal and doumer were at the ministry of finance, there was an effective reaction against the methods of the preceding years. on jan. 13 1920 the estimates for the current year were laid before the newly elected chamber. the estimates provided for 17,861 million fr. of ordinary and 7,568 million fr. of extraordinary expenditure: the former was only covered by normal revenue to the extent of 9,368 million fr. and the latter to the extent of 3,c00 million fr. yielded by the sale of war stocks. to this budget deficit of 13,000 million fr. must be added the final deficits of the special accounts of the treasury (which in 1920 amounted to §,092 million fr.) and a further 22,000 million fr. of credits for ‘‘ recoverable expenditure," which after july 1920 appeared under the heading “‘ special budget of recoverable expenditure,”’ and continued till 1925. in actual fact the expenditure was greater than had been anticipated, and amounted to 58,100 million francs. in june 1920 additional taxes to bring in 7,752 million fr. were voted to balance the ordinary budget, the normal revenue being thereby increased to 20,100 million francs. there still remained, however, a deficit of 38,000 million fr. which was covered by loans. a 5% long-term loan was issued in feb.-march 1920, and a6°% loan in oct.-november. the total subscriptions to these two loans were 43,000 million fr., of which more than 18,000 million fr. were new money, the rest consist- ing of conversions of former loans or of floating debt. in rg2r the financial situation was further improved. the total expenditure was reduced from 58,100 million fr. in 1920 to 51,000 million fr., and revenue rose to 23,100 million francs. the deficit fell to 28,000 million francs. the following table summarises the treasury operations during these two years:— taxation internal loans foreign loans i. expenditure (in miltions of francs) expenditure special accounts refunds to bank wy 2) on m4 <n] ae oe) & <8] = = ms civil service recoverable 11,700 11,100 11,400 | 22,300 9.900 | 21,400 5,100 ae 2,700 | 2,100 | 53,200 france ii. receipts (in millions of francs) advances from the bank of lrance budget | internal loans revenue 20,100 23,100 29,700 in the years 1920and 1921, despite the very large deficit, the finan- cial situation was easier. it proved possible not merely to stop in- flation, but to inaugurate a systematic policy of deflation. the chief author of this courageous policy was m. francois marsal, who was minister of finance in 1920, and who in june 1920 carried through the imposition of 8,000 million fr. of new taxation: in addition he consolidated more than 12,000 million fr. of floating debt, and in dec. made the agreement with the bank of france by which the state undertook to repay 2,000 million fr. annually. the ex- change also benefited by this policy. the dollar, which had risen to 17 francs in 1920, fell to 12-50 francs in june 1921, and even as low as 11 francs in april 1922. wholesale prices fell more than 40% as compared with the spring of 1920. the budget deficit and the exchange crisis of 1924 (jan. 1922- may 1924).—throughout 1922 and 1923 the franc depreciated in value, and at the end of 1923 the dollar was worth more than 19 francs. this was due to several causes, and undoubtedly questions of foreign policy—the discords amongst the allies on the subject of reparations and the franco-belgian occupation of the ruhr—played their part. but the basic reason is to be sought above all in the financial situation of france herself. state expenditure, which, though slowly decreasing, remained very large, was divided into three big groups—the general budget, to be met out of taxation; the special budget of ‘‘ recoverable expenditure ’’ (pensions and interest on reparations debt), which in theory should be met by germany; - and the costs of reconstruction, which quite properly were covered by loans. the results are shown by the tollowing figures:— special budget (in millions of francs) general budget (in millions of francs) 24,688 | 24,163 | 9,905 10,382 23,382 | 24,202 160 109 expenditure : revenue, : p ‘ balance . =~ lo 27 3 — 1,306 hence the total budget deficit amounted tn 1922 to 11,051 million fr. and in 1923 to 10,234 million francs. these deficits were covered by loan operations, and the state was even able to reduce the total of the advances from the bank of france from 24,150 million fr. to 23,100 millionfrancs. it was, however, becoming increasingly difficult to raise long-term loans. the credit national was alone in being able to place a loan with the public of 5,000 million francs. the rest of the expenditure was covered by an increase in the floating and short term debt. this situation was soon reficcted in the movement of the foreign exchanges. there was a violent crisis at the beginning of 1924, and the pound sterling rose from 85 fr. to 117 fr. and the dollar from 19-60 fr. to 27:20 fr.on march 11. this crisis was the result of intensive speculative selling which developed in continental centres such as vienna, berlin, milan, basle and amsterdam, and was ina large measure artificial. none the less it revealed how precarious was the financial situation of france. under the energetic direction of m. poincare, the prime minister, a great effort was made to retrieve the position. the govt. asked parliament to vote 6,000 million fr. of taxes in order to cover the expenditure of the special as well as of the gencral budget, and it asked for powers to cut down expenditure by 1,000 million fr. by administrative decree. these measures were voted by the end of march 1924. at the same time exchange credits were raised in london and new york, and on april 20 the pound had fallen to 65 fr. and the dollar to 14-80 francs. the elections of may 11 1924 and the return of inflation.—the new elections resulted in the victory of the parties of the left, which had refused to vote the last fiscal measures proposed by m. poincare. the socialist party had a good deal of influence in the new govt., and its revolutionary programme disquieted the propertied classes of the country. the budgetary equilibrium which had only just been restored was again destroyed, for the new chamber voted 1,700 million fr, of supplementary credits, and suspended the realisation of the 1,000 million fr. of economics adopted by the preceding chamber. there was thus a deficit of 3,000 million fr. on the budget of 1924. this deficit was enhanced in 1925 by the increase of 1,405 million fr.in war pensions, by the increase of the salaries of officials, and by expenditure in morocco and syria. the situation was aggravated by the falling due of quantities of bills and short-term bonds, of which about 8,000 million fr. had to be paid off in 1925. to this figure must be added the deficit in the subscriptions to the national 103 defence bills, the amount of which reached 9,000 million francs. to meet these liabilities the treasury issued, in nov.-dec. 1924, 5 % treasury bills at 150 repayable in ro years (effective rate 9-20 °4), and in july-oct. 1925 an irredeemable 4°% joan with an exchange guarantee. these two loans brought into the treasury a nominal sum of £1,000 million fr., but in fact very much less, because the greater part of the subscriptions only represented the consolidation of the floating debt. it was under these conditions that france returned in 1925 to the regime of inflation, for the first time since 1919. in april 1925 the state asked the bank of france for 4,000 million fr. of new advances, in june for a further 6,000 million fr., in nov. for 1,500 million fr., and in dec. 1925 for 6,000 million francs. all these credits were not in fact exhausted. nevertheless, at the beginning of 1926 the advances from the bank to the state had risen from 22,000 to 36,000 million fr., and the total of notes in circulation from 40,500 to 52,000 million francs. parallel with this the french exchange continued to fall, and the pound sterling, which was worth 88 fr. in dec. 1924, exceeded 130 fr. in dec. 1925. at the beginning of 1926 the position was as follows. the budget, with a total expenditure of 37,200 million fr. (the general budget and the special budget were amalgamated in 1925), shows a deficit of 4,500 million francs, part of this deficit was covered by 3,000 million fr. of new exceptional revenue voted on dec. 41925. all parties were agreed as to the neces- sity of creating a sinking fund to consolidate the floating debt. suc- cessive ministers of finance, m. doumer and m. raoul peret, pro- posecdl new taxes amounting to nearly 5,000 million francs.1 the french debt and the work of reconstruction.—to have a sound understanding of the financial situation and its handling since 1918 it is desirable to relate the debt to the effort made for the recon- struction of the devastated regions. the two following tables show— (1) the situation of the french internal debt on april 30 1925; (2) the expenses devoted to the reparation of war damage to dec. 31 1924. i. french internal debt annual charge] capital debt 7,451,232,802 2,692,869,140 2,762,584,000 155,252,268,681 44,274,769,000 86,646,656, 500 perpetual and long-term debt short-term debt fe floating debt .. total 12,906,685,942 | 286,173,694,181 ii, expenses resulting from reparation of war damage (in millions of francs) railways, public property, and costs i of adminis- tration interest on loans con- tracted interest paid on odemni- ties damage to persons private property 59,283 12,760 36,436 2,594 | 19,000 130,073 in conclusion, 45% of the internal debt of france comes from’ expenditure for the reparation of war damage, and one-sixth of the french budget was devoted in 1926 to the service of this debt. bibliography.—reports of the rapporteurs of the finance comuunittces of the chambre des deputes and of the senat, published as supplements to the journal officiel; reports on the economic and industral condiitons in france (annual, stationery office, london). effect of the war upon french economic life, ed. c. gide, (carnegie endowment for international peace, 1923). (fe. mr.) 1 the crisis in the franc was due to a loss of confidence, which showed itself in a reluctance on the part of the public to invest in the floating debt. m.loucheur, while minister of finance in dec. 1925, obtained a measure imposing a special additional income tax (non- recurrent), and steps were taken to hasten the collection of the or- dinary income tax. the “ heavy revenue collections ’’ thus obtained were sufficient to mect all needsin the opening months of 1926, the at last, m. raoul peret, procured the passage of a budget which balanced at 373 milliards, with a surplus of 250 millions, additional taxation to the amount of 4} milliards being imposed. but meanwhile the exceptional revenue receipts of dec. and jan. could not continue, and a further block of three milliards of maturing bonds had to be met early in may. the exchange began to give way and rose above 140. “phe outbreak of the general strike in england at the beginning of may was the sigrtal for something like an ex- change panic, and after wild fluctuations, in the course of which the exchange reached 176, the french govt. intervened with support, and brought it back for the moment almost to 140. at the begin- ning of june m. peret appointed a committee ot french financial experts to make recommendations for the future. (ed. £.b.) 104 iv. defence national defence in france underwent some material modi- fications after the world war. the reforms were based on the somewhat conflicting demands of national economy and of na- tional sccurity against aggression. in practice they resolved themselves as follows:— (1) army and navy, in time of peace, to be limited strictly to the scale necessary for covering national mobilisation in case of aggres- sion and allowing that mobilisation to be carricd out at a speed compatible with that of the said aggression; the colonies and the communications with overseas possessions to be safeguarded; and (2) the general organisation of the nation in war time to be minutely worked out. conscripltion.—compulsory personal service was therefore maintained, but the duration was reduced to 18 months (act of april t 1923). the following tables show the effectives and the budgets of 1925 compared with those of the preceding years:— aug. 15 aug. 1 igt4 pre-war i9gi4 after mobhilisa- effectives (french and colonial) _ | 947,000 | 3,850,000 | 4,200,000] 695,000 inf. divs . : 44 87 il2 32 cav. divs : 10 190 6 9 field guns ; : 2,800 4,044 5,000 1,350 heavy guns. 250 308 5,100 1,000 air force number of aeroplanes 120 120 4,700 1,850 navy effectives . : . 69,000 100,000| 174,000} 56,000 battleships 26 26 10 9 cruisers . .. 31 31 15 18 aeroplane-carriers - se e i destroyers a, = a 2 8 torpedo-boats 83 83 51 63 submarines : , 72 72 33 66 national defence budgets (including gendarmeriey military, naval and colonial aviation, and certain expenses connected with public works undertaken in the interests of the army) :— in millions ef gold francs colonies total general organisation of national defence.—the lessons of the war showed the necessity of a general organisation of the nation in readiness for war-time, the object of which should be to prepare in advance the mobilisation of civil and military forces alike to organise the nation’s entire economic and indus- trial resources, etc. a bill to this effect was laid before parlia- ment on july 7 1925. the general direction of a war devolves upon the government. to assist the govt. in their task, consultative and research bodies are placed at their disposal in war-time and also, for the purpose of advising upon the necessary precautions to be taken in peace- time. these are: the conseil supericur de la defense nationale, composed of the appropriate ministers; the commisston d etudes of that council (composed of the highest functionaries of the various ministries), and the general permanent secretariat. the actual conduct of operations remains the exclusive province of the commanders-in-chief of the military and naval forces. the army the army proper is formed by calling up the reserves. the permanent army is but the nucleus; its functions are: to train contingents as they are called up; to protect overseas possessions; to prepare for mobilisation and, in case of aggression, to protect the frontier while mobilisation is proceeding. the recruiting act of april 1 1923 provides for:— (1) an active army, formed by:— france the calling-up of recruits, all young men who have reached the age of 20 being obliged to serve for 18 months; half of the contingent is called up in may, half in november; voluntary enlistment (engagements, re-engagements, commis- sions) by which lower professional cadres, necessary both in peace and in war, are formed; and auxiliary or reserve cadres, (2) a first reinforcement (disponibilite) in which the citizen is reckoned for a period of two years following his term of active service; in case of need he is liable to be recalled; (3) a first reserve, for use also on active service in which the citizen serves 16% years, and a second reserve to which he is posted for 8 years; this reserve is designed for local services and work in industrial mobilisation. the duration of service is reduced to one year for eldest sons of large families (minimum of 5 children). special advantages are accorded to prospective reserve officers who have followed the military training course with success. the 695,000 men of the fighting troops (france, countries of occupation, colonies) which constitute the army are thus dis- tributed:— french (13 contingents of conscripts and professional soldiers) 457,000 foreign legion 14,000 north-african natives 97,000 native colonials ; : 82,000 irregulars and auxiliaries . . 16,000 gendarmerie and republican guard 29,000 695,000 out of this total of 695,000 men, only 395,000 are serving in france; the remainder—some 300,000 men—are engaged on the rhine, in algeria, morocco, the levant and the various colonies. organisation of the army.—the act dealing with the constitu- tion of cadres and strengths which had passed the chamber of deputies but has not, at the end of 1925, been discussed by the senate, distributed these effectives between the various arms and services. pending the final passing of the act, the minister of war was authorised to proceed with re-groupings by which the army was reconstituted as follows:— large units, 32 divisions of infantry of which 5 are on the rhine; 5 divisions of cavalry of which 1 is on the rhine. redistribution of troops—the following table gives the pro- portionate distribution between the various arms on mobilisa- tion in ror4, at the armistice, and in the army of today:-— arms and services aug. r 1914; nov. 1918 1925 ,o jo fo infantry. 65:6 43-7 53:8 tanks . : ‘o 0:6 1-8 cavalry 9-0 3°5 8-0 artillery 16:1 274 16:6 engineers 3:0 8-0 5:2 air force 0:3 os rl ‘transport 1-3 7-7 3°4 administrative serv- ices . ; 5:2 3:0 gendarmeric 0-6 4el this table shows the extent to which those arms employing principally mechanical weapons (tanks, artillery) have de- veloped. in accordance with the experience gained from the war, the armv is being organised and trained on the basis of an increase in all arms of fire-power. the navy during the wuar.—wwhile hostilities were proceeding, the french navy underwent a considerable reduction, both on account of war losses and of the obligation under which it stood to devote the greater number of its arsenals and private workshops to satis- fying the needs of the army. the tonnage of ror4 and that of rorg are as follows: 1914, 816,000; t9q19, 590,000. the falling-off is therefore considerable and it becomes more striking if the heavy wear of the ships still in service—particu- larly the small vessels—be taken into account. france since the war.—from the end of the war up to 1921 the french navy has had to pay for a great many special expenses of its own, inevitably arising out of war-time necessities. thus bur- dened, its budget rose to 1,962,000,000 gold francs in 1919 as against 515,000,000 in 1914 and a yearly average of 813,000,000 during the war. as it was impossible to put any further strain on the exchequer, the reconstruction of the fleet, which continued to decline in tonnage (falling, in 1924, to 394,000), had to be delaved. at washington, in 1922, france consented to the pro- posed reductions, according to which the total tonnage of her capital ships might not exceed 175,000 tons. the building of battleships was postponed. with a view to protecting the country’s vital communications, particularly in the mediterranean and the north atlantic, the french navv turned its attention to the use of submarines, aeroplanes and light vessels with protected bases. light cruisers and submarines were laid down as follows: in 1922, 3 cruisers of 8,000 tons, 6 destroyers, 12 torpedo-boats, 12 submarines, 1 aeroplane-carrier (these units are nearly ready); in 1923, 9 submarines; in 1924, 2 cruisers of 10,000 tons, 6 torpedo-boats, 2 submarines; 1 cruiser of 10,000 tons, 3 destroyers, 4 torpedo-boats, g submarines (of which two are mine-layers), 1 surface mine-layer and 1 aircraft transport are to be proceeded with at once. this represents an extremely modest effort; the naval budget has not exceeded a total of 330,000,000 gold francs on an average, from 1921 fo 1925. the f'uture—the schemes for the future of the french navy have been dealt with in three bills which are still (1926) under consideration. the high-seas fleet, exclusive of special vessels, would consist of: battleships up to 175,000 tonnage, acroplanc- carrying vesscls up to 60,000 tonnage, in conformity with the washington treaty; inaddition, 360,000 tons of light vessels (cruisers, destroyers and torpedo-boats) and go,oc0 tons of sub- marines. age-limit: battleships and acroplane-carricrs 20 years; cruisers 17 years; destroyers and torpcdo-boats 15 years; sub- marines 12 years. the naval air force would be composed of 50 flights of aeroplanes, of which 35 are fully equipped and aircraft of various kinds (dirigibles, captive balloons, etc.) varying in number. tor coast defence there would be coast flotillas of submarines, coast patrols, mine-sweepers, minc-layers, etc.; artillery, obstacles, detection systems, aeroplane service and, finally, troops and other means, controlled by the war office, which will be placed at the disposal of the navy. although no term has been fixed for the execution of this programme, the dept. of marine intends to have it completed within 20 years. the air force there is in france no organisation analogous to the british air ministry. a certain amount of centralisation has been achieved however as regards technical research, which is under the authority of the under-secretary of state, who is also respon- sible for preparing the mobilisation of aircraft industries. a comparison of the numbers in 1914 and in 1918 shows the evolution of the atr force, 1914-25 aug. i z nov. 1918 1925 aeronautic tot4 ingen es | = section : ses army|navy army navarms navy ae paes aviation no. of flights 231 0 322] oo 130] 11 3 no. — of machines | 120 | 8 | 3,430] 1,264) 1,500] 389 | 30 | joo! balloon service no. of cap- tive bal- loons. 12 oo 771 190 18] 21 no. of clir- igibles . 8 oo oo bali ave i 1200 are for training purposes. 105 effort that was made in the war. during the 4 years 40,000 new aeroplanes and 92,000 engines were constructed. the increase in the total of the four budgets (military, naval. colonial and civil), which rises from 367,000,000 fr. in 1920 tc 791,000,000 fr. in 1925, may be put down to the necessity for replacing materiel! (some of which dates back to the war) and above all to the expenses connected with building and preparation of the aerodromes and landing grounds. this budget would, if expressed in pounds (at 120 francs) amount to £6,600,000. organisation of military air force-—the 130 squadrons of the military air force are distributed in 14 regiments and five autonomous groups. two regiments of the balloon service deal with captive balloons. nine of those regiments are formed in division and constitute the two air divisions. organisation of the naval air force-—the naval air force, a war creation, is undergoing reorganisation. its final status is defined by a bill which was still under consideration at the end of 1925. the 11 squaclrons of the naval air force were at that time distributed between different centres (cherbourg, brest, saint-raphael, ctc.). france was spending, in 1925, 44%! less on national defence than in ror4. vhe national defence budget, in which certain expenses figure, which in many countries fall upon budgets other than those of the army and navy, represented in 10914 44% of the general budget; in 1925 it represented only 17%, of it. in her deep desire for peace france reduced her military expenses to the utmost extent and only hopes to effect still greater ri duc- tions. in that spirit she has made every effort to assure safety by putting into practice the pact of the league of nations and furthering the development of arbitration and ideas of inter- national solidarity. see armaments year book (league of nations, 19626) where the references to decrees on national defence are given. (b.s.) v. invaded regions in 19t7 and 1918 when french ministers visited the front they often wondered if it would ever prove possible to repair the dreadful ruin accumulated under their eves. at lens, for instance, the magnitude of the disaster was overwhelming. not a house standing, 1or great pithead super-structures overthrown, their iron carcasses lying twisted on the ground, everywhere a terrible confusion of bricks, tiles, remnants of furniture—in one word, chaos. in the coal-mines, all the galleries flooded, the apparatus removed, the efforts of three generations completely annihilated. to-day there is hardly a trace of ruin, lens is a city of wide streets and comfortable houses, the new arrangements of its mines are excellent; and the production of coal is equal to and even greater than that before the war. how could all this be brought about? extent of the losses.—first, a few figures. when the damage was catalogued at the time of the armistice, it was discovered that 289,c00 houses had been completely destroyed and over 400,000 more or less damaged. nearly 2,000,000 hectares of land had to be restored for cultivation. more than 6,000 fac- tories had been destroyed or emptied of their machinery. the monetary value of these losses was about {13 milliard; to recon- struct them (assuming the work to cost 3 times as much as be- fore the war) r1o milliard gold francs would be required. im- mediately after hostilities had ceased, m. clemenceau abolished the ministry of munitions, replacing it by the ministry of re- construction, of which the present writer was in charge. the new ministry first dealt as quickly as possible with those factories where the buildings and part of the machinery still remained and hastened to equip them to employ the industrial population. there were 500,000 unemployed; a year later unemployment had practically disappeared; the workmen had restored the fac- tories, which had been hurriedly got going and were clearing away ruins and beginning reconstruction. the industrial dis- tricts thus received the first attention. this is one of the matters for which the government has been most severely criticised; but it was the logical course, and as events showed, the right one. 1 this figure ts based on the changed value of the franc. 106 in restoring the soil itself, in rebuilding the farms and enabling those fertile lands to resume the production of the wheat ur- gently required by the rest of france, the inhabitants them- selves assisted in an amazing degree. the trench peasant is deeply attached to the soil; he returned to it as soon as he could. he found it covered with shells, with strands of barbed wire, with block-houses. he found his home and farm buildings in ruins. not for a moment did he lose heart. ile set to work at once, surrounded by difficulties which would have daunted many a brave heart, even by grave dangers; so many unexploded shells remained that between 1919-24 more than one person a day, on an average, was killed in unearthing them. nothing could stop the french peasant. the state helped by granting him little by little, as needed, financial assistance—the sums necessary to re- build his dwelling and his farm buildings—and found him labour to clear his fields. a year later, some 90° of the departement du nord had been restored to cultivation, and in 1925 france’s production of wheat had reached its pre-war tigures, and of sugar very nearly so. the industrialists too, faced with empty or ruined factories, went bravely to work; but the farmers whose efforts saved france were even more admirable. to-day at least 90° % of the farms have been reconstructed. everywhere, thanks to the good harvests of recent years, prosperity has returned, and the zones where the havoc has so far defied restoration are growing daily smalicr, and we may hope that, with rare exceptions, they will disappear altogether. some reservation is necessary: the sur- roundings of verdun are a frightful example of what is meant. as minister of the liberated regions the present writer had to sign the act recording the final disappearance off the map of france of 11 villages of which nothing, hardly a heap of stones, remained. on every square metre there were so many fragments of shells that the whole of this territory might really have been exploited as an iron-mine, but it was useless to think of putting it under the plough. the signature of the act consecrated to death beyond repeal these villages where so many generations had lived, in whose defence so many good men had died. building reconstruction —the rebuilding of dwellings was a much longer task. dr. rathenau, with whom the reparations question was discussed at wiesbaden, was surprised that the ministry had not decided to rebuild the towns, not on the old sites, but near by, on virgin fields, constructing regular rows of houses and laying out the plans in the american style. dr. rathenau displayed ignorance of the french spirit in supposing that frenchmen, with their profound individualism, could have adapted themselves to such a system. each man has chosen the site of his house, he wishes to keep it, to rebuild it in its old place, different in size and shape from that of his neighbours, on his own plan, in his own style. to-day the city of rheims, which was so completely ruined, is almost entirely restored. it has retained the mark of its old architecture, the houses are on the same spots as before. some districts, however, of the devastated regions wanted to follow the ideas explained by dr..rathenau. the experiment was unsuccessful. thus there are some large villages with roads which are too straight and too broad, which have not re-assumed their pre-war life. it 1s a grievous error to attempt to do violence to the psychology of a nation. the re- construction of landed property is far advanced. in each village so-called ‘‘ reconstruction co-operative societies” have been established, through which a few devoted men have set them- selves to restore the homes of their fellow-citizens. they have jacked means, the parsimony of the last three annual budgets has complicated their task, but little by little, assisted by local loans, their efforts have made headway. finance of reconstruction.—how has all this been paid for? from 1919-22 by loans from the state; but after 1922, finan- cial difficulties grew more pressing and the sufferers from the devastation have been paid to a large extent by state loans re- deemable in 10 years, which they have had to get taken up as they could; this has resulted in a serious fall of these bonds. to-day, since the dawes plan has come into force, it has been possible to spread out the effort over three or four years, and france should be about completed by the end of 1928. in 1926 a sum equal to about £100,000,000 still remained to be spent. the sum was not large in comparison with what had been spent up to date, but it represented a great effort. such are the broad outlines of the work of reconstruction of the liberated districts. it was successful, thanks above all to the united cffort of french citizens and thanks to the fact that for several years the whole of i’rance consented to burden her- self in order to pav unassisted for the restoration of her ruins, for it must be admitted with regret—except in a few individual instances, france and france alone has had to shoulder her expenditure. the writer does not forget the assistance granted by various british municipalities. in many french villages and towns one may see public rooms or fountains paid for by the generosity of british towns. (iy. os) brniiogrrariy.—r, gouge, les ftats generanx des regions devastees (1920); e. michel, “ta reconstitution des regions liberies et les dommages de guerre,”’ journal de la societe de statistique de paris (dec. 1921): w. macdonald, reconstruction in france (1922), vi. the colonial empire description —the french colonial domain appears at first sight extremely various and scattered, since there is no continent in which france cannot count her colonies. in fact, it consists of two very different parts. first the remains of the old colonies, saint pierre and miquelon, on the canadian coast; martinique and gaudeloupe in the west indies, near new orleans; guiana in south america; five enclaves in british east india, pondi- cherry being the most important; reunion i. in the indian ocean near mauritius, a relic of the match between bougainville and cook; a series of islands, of which the most important are new caledonia, tahiti and the new hebrides, held in common with great britain. these are, if one likes to call them so, the aristo- cratic colonies. the american and indian colonies and reunion have their deputies and senators in the french j'arliament. they are united with france by old bonds of affection. they have given her scholars, administrators and great men of let- ters. in certain cases they derive special importance from their situation on the great international routes, or their great re- sources. but, above all, their value for france is sentimental and historic; they are the outline of the first empire lost in the 18th century. the colonies of the 19th century on the other hand, form a homogeneous system. they are divided into two groups, african and asiatic, both closely concentrated—with the exception in africa of jibuti and madagascar. the following table shows the respective importance of the three groups:— population census 1920-1 area in ory sq. km. i. america and australasia (group 652,300 35,919,405 22,250,333 58,822,038 40,000,000 129,491 ii oe 879,355 12,525,070 550,985 of old colonics). it. african group il. asiatic group france (for comparison) the african group consists of northern africa (algeria, tunisia, morocco); french west africa (senegal, guinea, the ivory coast, dahomey, niger); french central africa, which stretches from the congo to lake chad and the nile basin; madagascar, the third largest island in the world; and the french somali coast, at the mouth of the red sea. in addition, france has mandates in togo and cameroons. this group, by its proximity, seems specially destined to act as an extension of the mother-country. it is naturally commanded by northern africa, which is only 750 km. distant from france, 20 hours’ journey by sea, or six hours by air. from northern africa the railroads and aerial routes spread out towards the tropical and equatorial territories; it links the mother-country and the other african colonies. algeria, lying as it does between morocco and tunisia, is the pivot of this system, and is rightly considered france the key position, whether judged by the number of french which inhabit it (600,000 out of 800,c00 europeans, against 5,000,000 natives) or by the loyalty of its population and their ready acceptance of french culture. owing to its mediterranean situation, syria, administered by france under mandate, may also be included in this group, although lying in asia. the governor of algeria and the residents-general in morocco and tunisia meet every year in conference in one of the three capitals in northern africa alternately. in 1926, for the first time, the governor of french west africa attended this meeting. the asiatic group consists of french indo-china, or the indo- chinese union, including six colonies or protectorates—cochin- china, cambodia, annam, tongking, laos and the territory of kwangchow. this union was organised in 1887. a scrics of treaties with siam (the most recent dated 1926) and with china have now regularised its relations with all its neighbours. indo- china has become the base of french policy in the far east. administration.—the administrative ties which unite these french colonies with the mother-country are very various. there is no central colonial body in paris. the conscil su- perieur des colonies, which consists of a number of persons dis- tinguished in politics, commerce and the arts who are competent to speak on colonial affairs, is merely an advisory body. plans for uniting under the control of a single body all the different colonies of north africa, or of indo-china and the australasian possessions, have not been realised. algeria is administered by the ministry of the interior; it is divided into departments administered by prefects and sub-prefects appointed by this ministry and belonging to the home civil service. the protec- torates of tunisia and morocco and the mandated territory of syria are under the ministry of foreign affairs, which appoints to them sub-agents from the diplomatic or consular lists, or from a service special to these three countries. the colonial ministry is in charge of the other colonies, and the ecole col- oniale in paris furnishes their administrators and colonial govern- ors. in fact, even the countries directly subordinate to the colonial ministry enjoy a degree of autonomy, and the govern- ors have very full discretionary powers. the reason for this liberal system of administration lies as much in the conditions under which the french colonial empire grew up as in the french temperament. at the moment when explorers or soldiers con- quered these domains for france, france did not need them. she had no surplus population requiring an outlet. agricul- turally, she was self-sufficing; industrially, her commerce, which was principally one of luxury articles, found its market in the more highly developed countries. the colonies were therefore subjected to no exploitation, and were often administered by soldiers—that is to say, by the class of ruler who is least inter- ested in economic production. the relations between the ad- ministration and the natives were consequently marked by a particularly liberal character. moreover, the colonies were granted financial autonomy as early as possible. the french colonial estimates have always been meagre—in 1925 only 270,000,000 francs. the financial administration of the colonics did not, therefore, concern french political life, which is essen- tially parliamentary. nor was there any rivalry between the careers of the frenchman—as soldier, official or great landowner or merchant—and the native. things were different, for ex- ample, in tunis, where the italian and the native compete with one another. the colonial governors, apt, like all frenchmen, to apply parliamentary formulae to life, and often themselves parliamentarians, were anxious to develop local councils and local assemblies, even with the power of voting taxes, in the countries which they were charged to administer. finally, the frenchman has little race or colour prejudice. all this con- tributes to give french colonisation the aspect of a friendly collaboration not dissimilar from the method of mandates. french emigration is not due to the need for economic expan- sion or to divert a surplus population, but to the need of moral expansion. missionaries, professors and soldiers form the largest contingent of emigrants. the colonies replace for them fields 107 of action closed to them in europe or america. whether in india, china, madagascar, tunisia or morocco, even in the sudan, the effort of the french administrator has awakened national sentiment in these countries, after putting an end to the civil wars with which they were all torn. certain races— for example, those of cambodia—have been saved from a fatal torpor. archaeologists, painters, and men of letters constitute a relatively high proportion of the french element, and in indo- china and morocco, for example, the artistic and intellectual regeneration of the colonised people cannot but strengthen their vitality. the colonial exhibition at marseilles in 1922 illus- trated this method. these considerations explain why france has sometimes been reproached with not having thoroughly exploited her colonial possessions. resources in men and weailth.—the war led french statesmen to take account of colonial resources in men and material wealth. first, it supported the theories of those who considered that france’s military expenses might be reduced by enlisting native troops. the colonies contributed 545,000 combatant soldiers to the french army. the strength (about 180,000) of the colonial army in 1925 rested mainly on native recruiting. the colonics are also a reservoir for the manual labour in which france is deficient. many of the 183,928 colonial workmen brought to france during the war re- mained, and this immigration continues. the various plans for exploiting colonial resources, the most com: plete being that put forward in the chamber of deputies by m. albert sarraut in 1921, have been inspired by a desire to lessen the dependence by france on foreign countries for raw materials. the french colonies are especially rich in minerals (phosphates, iron, coal). the production of phosphates in north africa reached 2,600,000 tons in 1922; that of iron ore 1,800,000; indo-china sup- plied southern china with coal (900,000 tons); new caledonia is the greatest producer of nickel after canada, and her deposits of chrome are second only to those of rhodesia. as regards agriculture, the production of cereals in northern africa in 1922 was 19,400,000 quintals of wheat, 19,200,000 quintals of barley; the production of wine was 10,900,000 hectolitres. there are 28,000,000 olive trees in algeria and ‘tunisia alone; the exportation of fruits exceeded 300,000 quintals in 1922; that of carly vegetables, 400,000 quintals. the live stock includes 17,650,000 sheep and 475,000 horses. french west africa exported 153,000,000 fr. worth of ground nuts in 1922, indo-china is the second exporting country in the world in rice— 1,440,000 tons in 1922. the live stock comprises 4,000,000 oxen and bultaloes. the total area of colonial forests is 600,000,000 hectares, that is, about twice the total surface of france. the private capital invested by france in colonial enterprises, exclusive of banks and railways, and of the milllards of francs spent by the state to pacify, organise and protect the colonies, exceeded 2,000 million fr. in 1924. the trade which france did with her- colonics was 9,366 million fr. out of a total trade of 81,600 million francs. the public debt of the colonies is only three milliards. the colonies contribute a share to the central budget; in 1925 they paid 33,000,000 fr. as a contribution to military expenses, upkeep of the ecole coloniale, the institute of colonial agriculture, the gencral agency of the colonies and the colonial air service. this share is very small, but shows the assistance which they can render france. such are the general characteristics of this colonial domain, the possession of which has had its effect on the traditional aspect of french policy. the french colonies have 15,086 km. of railways, 49,968 km. of roads, which are excellent in northern africa and indo-china; and, although the empire has not yet found its kipling, french imagination has succumbed to that rosary of names, so exot- ically appealing to the tourists, tunis, algeria, fez, marrakesh, damas, angkor or timgad, which envelop with a magnetic circle the central core of france. the french mercantile marine has found its true base in the colonies. the quickest routes between south america and europe, will eventually lie across french africa. this is mainly due to the railway between algeria and dakar, which has already been traced, and the air routes or motor roads already in use. french statesmen, thanks to this fact and also to the fact that many of them have already occupied high posts as governors in africa or asia, are gradually recovering the habit of thinking not merely nationally but geographically, and while the first place in their watchful eye is always the security of france, they have been led to play a practical part in world problems, where their predeces- sors confined themselves to theory. bibliograpity.—r. doucet, notre domaine colonial (1921, etc.); r. delacourt, les relations economiques de la france avec ses colonies au lendemain de la guerre (1922); w. m. sloane, greater france in africa (1924). ci) g,*) vii. railways {in 1911 the french railways consisted of five great private-owned and onc state-owned line, with a combined mileage open to public trafic of 40,615 km. and a capital value of about 17 milliard francs. after the war acquisition of the alsace-lorraine lines, with mileage 108 of 2,255 km., brought the total mileage up to 42,870 km., while owing to this increase and the large amount of reconstruction effected after the war on the nord and est lines, their total capital value rose to about 39 milliard francs. in 1911 the french railways carried 511,000,000 passengers, in 1924, 776,000,000; the mean annual increase has risen from 3° to 6%. in 1911 184,000,000 tons were carried by goods train; in 1924, 265,000,000, an increase of 37% in three years. the commercial development of the railways was arrested by the war; not so their technical activity. between 1914-8 they bore 41 % more traffic than in peace time —the lines near the front, 200 %o. 15,400 trains were used during the period of mobilisation and con- centration; between sept. 1914 and nov. 1918 about 100,000 troop trains carried some 6,000,000 men; besides returning empties, rations trains, munitions trains, leave trains, ambulances and a daily average of 200 trains carrying engineering material. between march 21 and nov. 11 1918, when traffic was densest, 50,000 mili- tary trains of all sorts were moved; counting rcturning emoties, the traffic on the nord system reached about 900 trains in 24 hours. most of this traffic fell on those parts of the nord and fst lines not in enemy occupation; here important works had to be carried out during the campaigns. in sept. 1914 bridges, etc., destroyed during the retreat from belgium were reconstructed and lines and st:tions adapted to permit the extension of the allicd front to the belgian coast, an operation which required 2,169 trains for the movement of troops alone. during the subsequent period of stationary wartare, single lines were doubled, railheads constructed, engineers and munitions dumps formed, whole new lines built; 13,500 km. of line were built, nearly 6,000 being behind the british front, and 23,000,000 cu. m. of embankment erected. these works, serving purely military purposes, were generally dismantled after the war. the german army in its retreat «destroye:l 2,047 km. of line (about half being double line), 600 stations, 1,100 bridges, 24 tunnels and all workshops and watering stations in its area. when these lines were reconstructed, the opportunity was seized to enlarge and improve the stations, lay the permanent way more rationally and introduce the latest electric, pneumatic or hydraulic points and signals. especial attention was paid to the great goods yards in view of their importance for the reconstruction of the devastated arens. lille-deelivrance station, for example, which dominates the goods traffic of northern france, was constructed to clear 4,500 trucks daily. its tracks are so arranged that it functions by the force of gravity, and requires only a small staff; it acts like a filter, all traffic, being passed in the same direction. locomotives and rolling-stock have increased in numbers and ower, especially on the nord and est systems. there were 20,383 ocomotives in 1924, compared with 13,434 in 1911; the load of the fastest passenger trains rose from 400 tons to 550 tons. between 1920-4 the number of passenger carriages increased by 11%, of goo:ls trucks by 20°; they are also much stronger and of increased capacity. the new all-stcel one-piece carriages on the nord line deserve especial mention. examples of the carriages used on other ‘jines were shown at the exhibition of modern decorative arts in 1925. lost goods trucks before the war carried a maximum load of 10 tons, few of over 20 tons. in 1925, of 525,000 goods trucks, 254,500 carried 10-20 tons; 227,000, 20-30 tons; 41,000, 30-40 tons; 2,500, 40 tons or over. the average carrying capacity of trains, especially on the main lines, has greatly increased. many take 80 trucks, and 1,500 tons. in the devastated areas, the railways were reconstructed earlier than the dwellings; so that the companies had to provide accommo- dation for their workmen on a large scale. the nord built 11,141 houses of modern types, sometimes constructing regular towns, besides providing their employees with 6,300 other dwellings. the problem of electrification only became urgent after the war when the altered economic conditions compelled irance to utilise all her natural resources. a scheme was drawn up involving an expendi- ture of five milliard francs on the construction of power stations and the electrification of about 9,000 km., including 3,350 km., or nearly half, of the paris-orleans line; 2,300 km., or a quarter, of the p.ll.m. line, and 3,200, or over three-quarters, of the midi line. an agreement between the state and the railway companies, made on june 28 1921, established a close financial and technical connec- tion between the state lines of the etat and alsace-lorraine and the group of the five great private companies. after satisfaction of the claims of shareholders and personnel, all proceeds are pooled; a deficit on one line is thus compensated by a surplus on another, the tariffs are fixed high enough to avoid a general deficit. tariffs are uniform and common throughout france; rolling-stock is pooled; important purchases, as those of rails, sleepers, etc., are made in comnion; common are all arrangements regarding pay, promotion, employment, etc., of the 500,000 employees. all important ques- tions of management are discussed in a committee composed of the presidents and directors of the seven lines; all matters affecting the employees or national interests are discussed in the conseil superieur des chemins de fer, in which the above committee is reinforced by elected representatives of all grades of the personnel, the presidents of chambers of commerce and representatives of the principal national industries and of the state. the workings of this innovation franchet d’esperey—francis ferdinand have proved most satisfactory. see statistiques des chemins de fer francais (annuel), p franchet d’esperey, louis (1856- ), french soldier, was born at mostaganem in algeria may 25 1856. commis- sioned to the infantry in 1876, he early saw active service in tunisia, tongking and n. china. in 1908 he became general of brigade, and the same year a tour of the balkans and his published studies thereon worked the beginning of an interest in that region which was to have important results. in 1913, as general of division, he carried out a vigorous carpaign in morocco, after which he was appointed to the ]. army corps at lille. this corps he commanded during the battle of the i ron- tiers, aug. ror4, and on the eve of the battle of the . arne he succeeded gen. lanrezac as commander of the v. anry. in march 1916 he was advanced to command the eastern group of armies, and later the northern group. cn the recall of cuil- laumat in june 1918, franchet d’esperey was sert cut to replace hin as commander-in-chief at salonika. accptirg and cevel- oping his predecessor’s plan for an offensive in the pallans, franchet d’esperey ensured the success of his lreak-through by the skill with which he denuded the rest of the frcrt to concen- trate an overwhelming preponderence on the narrow sokol- dobropolye sector, west of the vardar. success leyond antici- pation crowne:l the stroke; with their reserves pirned down by vizorous pressure elsewiere the bulgarians were unable to repair the breach, andl as the serbian spearhead drove in ceerer, the whole bulgarian front collapsed, and on sept. 29 bulgaria ca- pitulated the first defection among the central towers. if he owed much to his predecessor, to franchet d’psperey was the glory of execution and realisation. exploiting this victory, he cleared serbia of the austrian troops and later, on jan. 5 1919 took prisoner the german marshal von mackensen, in i ungary. ife afterwards commanded the allied forces in turkey until nov. 1920 and was created a marshal of france on } eb. 21 1921. francis ferdinand (1863-1914), archduke of austria, was born at graz dec. 18 1863. the eldest son of the archduke charles louis and a nephew of the emperor francis joseph, he became, after the death of the crown prince rudolrh, the heir to the austro-hungarian monarchy. in 1875 he took the title of archduke of austria-este, as heir to his uncle the duke of modena, with whose death the male line of this branch of the house became extinct, and to his possessions in austria-hungary and italy. until the death on jan. 30 1889 of the crown prince rudolph, francis ferdinand was only known in limited circles and even then he was not invited by the emperor francis joseph to take part in state affairs, although the empcror frequently commis- sioned him to represent him abroad. on july 1 1900 he married countess sophie choteck (1868-1914), after having overcome, by tenacious persistence, the obstacle due to the fact that the lady was not of royal family, and renounced a few days kefore the ceremony the succession rights of any children of the union. this renunciation was not only inscribed in the records of the imperial family, but ratified in the austrian and hungarian parliaments and sanctioned by a law of dec. 4 1go00. after that time the emperor gradually allotted to him respon- sibilities of his own, not only in military matters but occasionally in questions of domestic politics. the difference of outlook of the two men, however, became more and more marked; for with advancing age francis joseph was less and less willing to consider far-reaching reforms, was anxious to avoid any conflict with the nationalities, and preferred advisers who knew how to untie a knot gently instead of hacking through it. francis ferdinand was convinced that the magyar preponderance in the affairs of the dual monarchy must be broken in the interests of the mon- archy and the dynasty. for some time he held that federalism was the best solution. at another period he inclined to “ trial- ism.” later, influenced by the iiungarian minister kristoffy, he inclined to strengthen unity by changing the delegations into a central parliament and attaching the annexed provinces bosnia and hercegovina, with a state organisation of their own, to the empire. the opposition which he met on all sides from the ruling francis joseph i. party in hungary strengthened his conviction that here lay the essential obstacle to the healthy recovery of the monarchy. in the severe contlicts between the magyars and the crown from the beginning of the 2oth century onwards he, therefore, maintained the opinion that no concession must be made, and that there should be no shrinking even from the use of armed force for the defence of the rights of the monarchy and the dynasty. the zeal with which he sought the solution of domestic politi- cal problems by strengthening the central power is explained by his firm conviction that this was the indispensable condition of the monarchy as a great power, which he desired to maintain and to increase. francis ferdinand was not an unconditional adherent of the group which thought his aim would only be at- tained by force of arms. but he was firmly determined to tread this path if it was the only one by which the goal could be reached. he considered that friendly relations with great britain were desirable, but towards france, and still more towards italy, his attitude was cool and negative. he was convinced that there must inevitably be a day of reckoning between the monarchy and italy. he never adopted an anti-slav policy. he wished to avoid conflicts with the principal representatives of the slav nationalities, and recognised in the tsar of russia the strongest support against revolutionary movements in monarchical states. at the same time he expressed the decided opinion that the en- croachments of the greater serbia movement of austro-itun- garian soil should be resisted with all the forces of the monarchy. he stood by germany, yet was determined that the monarchy should not fall into dependence on her powerful ally. francis ferdinand was a man of more than average ability. he would immediately recognise the essential point in any busi- ness in which he was engaged. what he lacked was knowledge of men and calmness and constancy in his relations with the men who had been placed in high offices of state by his influence. he asked from the citizens of the monarchy not affection, but sub- mission to the will of the ruler. to him the state was identified with the divinely appointed person of the monarch. he was shot june 28 1914, with his wife, by bosnians of serbian nationality at serajevo. (see evrore.) bibliography.—some account of francis ferdinand's life is con- tained in his tagebuch meiner reise um de erde (vienna, 1895); theodor von sosnosky, ‘ franz ferdinand,” in deutsches biograph- isches jahrbuch (1916); franz conrad von hoetzendorf, aus afeiner diensizeit (vienna, 1921); m. auffenberg-komarow, aus osterreichs itohe und niedergang (munich, 1921); s. stanojevi¢, die ermordung des erchersogs franz ferdinand (1923); e. glaise von horstenau, nene osterretchiste biographie, vol. 3 (1926); p. nikisch-boulles, vor dem sturm. erinnerungen an erzherzog franz ferdinand (1925). francis joseph i. (1830-1916), emperor of austria and king of hungary (see 10.942)—in the last years of his reign francis joseph continucd to strive to preserve peace for his realm, while maintaining the prestige of austria-hungary and her position as a great power. perceiving that this aim was threat- ened by the confusion reigning in the balkans, he agreed to the plan of his foreign minister, aehrenthal, to take advantage of the young turk movement to annex the territories of bosnia and hercegovina occupied in 1878, and to embody them per- manently in the monarchy. during the serious crisis following on the annexation francis joseph backed achrenthal with the whole weight of his influence, and subsequently supported him in his endeavours to restore friendly relations with the great powers which had been signally disturbed by the annexation, and to put an end to the risk of international conflicts. by his personal intervention he in fact repeatedly succeeded during the years 1908 to 1914 in averting dangers threatening the peace of europe. when in 1912 the balkan wars, which he had untiringly but unsuccessfully striven to avert, began, he thought they were the gale before the hurricane, and when, in aug. 1013, the peace of bucharest provided a provisional settlement he expressed the opinion that this peace was only the breathing space before a fresh war. the behaviour of the serbs filled him with the greatest anxiety. when the murder of the heir to the throne, the arch- duke francis ferdinand (june 28 1914), led the vienna govt. to 109 take energetic measures against serbia, francis joseph hesitated to follow, and it was with a heavy heart that he gave his consent to the dispatch of the severe ultimatum to serbia, and, after its rejection, to the declaration of war. he did not believe that the war could be localised, as he would have wished it to be, and was pessimistic about the chances of a world war. even then he was of the opinion that ‘‘ war is beyond our strength,” and said he would be glad if the monarchy escaped ‘‘ with a black eye.” the attitude of the rulers of italy and rumania offended him deeply, and strengthened his doubt of a favourable outcome of a war against an ever-increasing number of adversaries. francis joseph stood immovably by the alliance with germany, to whose ruler he was bound by a friendship based on reciprocal liking; it never occurred to him to separate from his ally. he would never have agreed to a separate peace; yet he favoured and supported every endeavour to put an end to the war by a peace which should safeguard the interests of all his allies and the position of austria-hungary as a great power. in all questions affecting the constitution of the monarchy, and in particular the relations between austria and hungary, francis joseph continued in the later years of his reign to stand by the principles of the ausgleich of 1867. he would not con- sider the federalisation of the empire, but stood unmoved on the basis of dualism. he went a long way to meet the efforts of the hungarian govt. for independence, but refused energetical- ly during this period demands tending towards the severing of the remaining bonds between the two halves of the monarchy, especially that of the united army. in the increasingly violent contlicts between the different nationalities inhabiting the cis- leithan territories francis joseph stood above party. this was all the easier for him on account of his indifference towards all the nationalities of his vast realm, even towards the germans, although to the end of his life he felt himself to be a german prince. as in the earlier part of his reign, so in the last decade, the separate nationalities were favoured or neglected, but always played off one against the other. the meaning of viribus yiitis for francis joseph was to use all in the interests of the dynasty. but national consciousness had grown so strong that this policy had no success. the concessions which he granted in the years just before the war to the slav peoples increased their self- confidence, and led them to make ever greater demands, the non-fulflment of which caused a weakening of their sentiment forthe dynasty. as the differences between the national parties represented in the austrian parliament became in the course of years so great that there was no prospect of effective co-operation, francis joseph ignored parliamentary activity from 1914 on- wards. experience of the world war led the old emperor to recognise that he had done the austrian-germans an injustice; but isolated attempts to alter the trend of affairs had no lasting effect, and in the end he let things take their course. when he died, severe inroads had been made on the affection of the austrian peoples; what remained was only just sufficient to dis- guise the disappearance of loyalty to the dynasty. as years went on the emperor became more and more lonely. his son had committed suicide in 1889, his wife had been mur- dered in 1898; of his brothers only the youngest was still alive, and he resided at a distance and in the strictest seclusion. there had never been any cordial relationship with the heir to the throne, francis ferdinand; and with the years, especially after francis ferdinand had married countess sophie chotek, the estrangement between the two men increased, so that personal intercourse became rare. among the remaining members of the imperial house francis joseph only cared to frequent the circles of his two daughters, gisela and marie valerie, and their children. he was bound by ties of true friendship to katharina schratt, formerly an actress at the burgtheater, and in her society he spent his sparingly measured hours of recreation. the summer he usually spent at the watering place of ischl, and there he devoted himself to the chase, the only pleasure fer which he cared passionately to the end of his life. the emperor had long enjoyed excellent health. it was not until he had passed his 75th year that disease of the respiratory iio organs began. in 1911 this became so serious that a catastrophe was feared. all the preparations for francis ferdinand’s accession were made. but the old emperor recovered; and his physical as well as his mental energy improved from year to year, so that he was able in the first two years of the world war to transact fully all the business of government. it was only in the year 1916 that his faculties began to fail. he died peacefully of a fresh attack of his old malady on nov. 21 1916. francis joseph was not one of those of whom contemporaries, especially those at a distance, form any definite impression. the reserve which he observed even towards the great majority of his advisers made it more difficult to penetrate his real nature. he had a deep sense of his exalted position as a ruler. to the end of his days he remained profoundly convinced that the empire over which he ruled was #is empire, and the peoples /is peoples. this conception of the majesty of the office bestowed on him by god found expression in his bearing. he always maintained a regal attitude. he showed kindliness and winning courtesy to everyone. nothing was farther from him than posing, and no one ever heard him utter sonorous phrases; but he avoided any kind of intimacy even in his intercourse with members of the imperial house, and, even with them, knew how to maintain his distance. his intellectual gifts were not remarkable, but he possessed sound common sense and wit. he had a strikingly good memory for persons and events. asa ruler he was a model of the sense of duty. from early morning to evening he attended to business with clocklike regularity, and dealt with all the docu- ments laid before him with the greatest punctuality. this industry and his exact memory made him one of the best authorities in all government affairs. he sometimes startled his ministers by his intimate knowledge of the details of the business in hand, and occasionally embarrassed them. but he went no further than details, and lacked the power of surveying the whole. the emperor also lacked, especially in his later years, the abil- ity to take the initiative in important questions, to form independ- ent resolutions and to carry them to their logical conclusions. in an ever-increasing degree he left the decision to his responsible ministers. he was not without skill in the choice of his advisers, but had an instinctive dislike for men whom he felt to be his in- tellectual superiors. he also disliked people of proud and upright character, and even within the family circle he preferred those who were more subservient. he was essentially cold in temperament, with great self-control increased by practice. among the european rulers he enjoyed, during the last decades of his reign, great respect, which he owed to his age, experience, personal amiability, blameless conduct, and above all the fact that his word could always be relied upon. he was a faithful son of the catholic church, and looked up with reverence to the holy father; but, quite in the spirit of the traditions of his house, he guarded the rights of the dynasty and of the state with the utmost tenacity, even against the pope. he took no interest in the arts and sciences, being in this respect more of a lorrainer than a habsburg; but whenever he expressed an opinion on these subjects, he showed a decided aversion from the modern tendencies. cie2ps de) bibliography.—bretholz, “kaiser franz joseph,” zeitschrift des deutschen vereins fiir geschichte miihrens und schlestens (1917); h. friedjung, “kaiser franz josef 1," historische aufsdize, p. 493 ff. (1919); schneider, kaiser franz josef und sein ilof (1921); % a. v. margutti, vom alten kaiser (1921) new edition (1925); oswald redlich, ‘kaiser franz josef,” biographie, band i, (1923). frankfort-on-main, germany (sce 11.17), has changed little outwardly since 1910, though the area of the city is now 33,277 ac., and the population according to the census of i9iq is 433,002. the life of the place still centres in the ancient and picturesque city, though in recent years blocks of old build- ings round the cathedral have been swept away, and garden cities have arisen on the outskirts. frankfort is now an important inland port; heavy barges can navigate the main as far as aschaffenburg, and canalisation is being carried as far as wiirzburg. the rhine-main-danube canal is under construction, and a scheme has been prepared for a waterway to the weser, which will link frankfort with bremen. neue oesterretchische frankfort-on-main—freemasonry considering the difficulties of the process, the famous banking houses weathered the period of intlation well, and have led the way to the restoration of germany’s economic position in the world. the metal, chemical and electrical industries of the district are improving, and the old trade fair was revived in 1919. in 1914 a university was founded, and in connection with it is an academy of labour, designed to provide a new class of leaders for the labour movement. during the world war frank- fort was several times bombed, and it was occupied for a short time by the french in 1920 during the invasion of the ruhr area by german militarists. : fraser, alexander campbell (1819-1914), british philosopher (see 11.38), died at edinburgh, dec. 2 1914. fraser, claud lovat (1890-1921), british artist and de- signer, was born in london, may 15 1890, and was educated at brighton and charterhouse. he began to follow his father’s profession as a solicitor in 1908, but abandoned this three years later for art. after working with walter sickert for a time, he exhibited in 1913, being responsible in the same year for the decoration of the flyt#g fame chapbooks and broadsheets. he served in france with the durham light infantry during 1915-6, but was gassecl and invalided home. his gift for spirited design and lively colour, based to a great extent on 18th century con- ventions, developed rapidly, and he not only illustrated success- fully many books, but exercised a rejuvenating influence on eng- lish stage designs by his production of the beggar’s opera (1920), as you like it (1920) and if (1921). a career of great promise was cut short by his death, june 18 1921, at sandgate, kent. see john drinkwater and albert rutherston, claud lovat fraser (1923). frazer, sir james george (185.4-~ ), british anthro- pologist, was born at glasgow, jan. 11854. educated at helens- burgh, glasgow university and trinity college, cambridge, he was elected a fellow of the latter college in 1879 and called to the bar in the same year. he was knighted in 1914, received the o.m. in 1925 and became commander of the legion of honour in 1926. a prolific writer, he is famous as the author of the golden bough, first published in 1890 and re-issued in 12 volumes under seven titles between 1907 and 1915. in 1922 appeared an abridged edition under the original title. this work is an elabo- rate study of ancient cults and folk lore and covers a vast field of anthropological research. in 1926 he issued vol. 1 of the worship of nature, dealing with the worship of the sky and of the earth. among his many other publications are: tolemism (1887); adonis, alits, osiris, studies in the history of oriental religion (1906, 2nd ed. 1907, 3rd ed. 1914); totemism and exogamy (1910). frederick viii. (1843-1912), king of denmark (see 11.52), died at hamburg may 14 1912.