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    "verified_text": "-in dealing with the general european situation during the years which intervened between 1909 and the outbreak of the world war, the historian is faced with the fact that the importance of this period lies in the conclusion. always there is before us the problem: was the war with which it terminated the inevitable outcome of deep-seated causes, or was it an avoidable result of demonstrable blunders and crimes? a consideration of this problem makes it necessary to revert briefly to previous events. much which in 1910 was obscure has been elucidated by later publications; much which was then a conjecture or hypothesis has been verified; and much which could then only be tentatively suggested can now be frankly said. © 1034 i. the origin of the war the triple alliance-—the chief characteristic of the first years of the 2oth century is the rivalry of the two political groups into which europe was divided. as we can now see, the establishment of the triple entente (england, france, russia) was a necessary and inevitable counterweight to the triple alli- ance (germany, austria and italy); for this latter alliance, so long as it stood alone, gave to germany a preponderance upon the continent of europe so great as to be a permanent check on the free diplomatic activities of other states, and possibly a dan- ger to their independence. it is true that the original alliance between germany and austria in 1879! had been a method of maintaining peace and securing the stafus quo. at that time germany under bismarck was, as he said, a “ satu- rated ” state; all that it required was time and peace for the de- velopment of its internal resources. in order to secure this he had built up a complicated system of alliances. we have first among these the austro-german alliance, which was repeatedly renewed and remained in force until the outbreak of the world war. this treaty, which was published in 1881 in an incomplete form, bound the two empires to help each other in case either was attacked by russia; if either was attacked by a third power, the other was to observe at least a benevolent neutrality, and if the attacking power was supported by russia, then to come to the assistance of its ally. side by side with this treaty of mutual defence against russia, in 1881 ger- many and austria entered into an alliance with russia, the chief point of which was a mutual engagement to act together in all balkan matters. this treaty was renewed in 1884 for three years.2 it lapsed in 1887, and for it was substituted the secret “reinsurance treaty’? between germany and russia alone® by which each party agreed to maintain benevolent neutral- ity towards the other in case of a war witha third power. this was not to apply in the case of a war against austria or france if this resulted from an attack against one of these latter powers by one of the parties to the treaty. in addition, germany rec- ognised the rights historically acquired by russia in the balkan peninsula, and particularly the legitimacy of her preponderant and decisive influence in bulgaria and in eastern rumelia. there was to be no modification of the territorial status gio in the balkans without previous agreement and the principle of the closing of the straits was reaffirmed. this elapsed in 18091; but just when a russian envoy came to berlin to arrange for a renewal, bismarck was dismissed. caprivi, on the advice of the foreign office, refused his consent; he is reported to have said that it was too complicated for him. in 1882, the triple alliance was arranged between austria, germany and italy‘ the essential point to which was that germany and austria were to come to the assistance of italy if attacked by france, and similarly, italy to come to the assistance of her allies if either of them was attacked or engaged in a war with two or more great powers; a special protocol stated that this treaty could not in any case be regarded as being directed against eng- land. in 1883 rumania, by a separate treaty® with austria, to which afterwards germany and italy acceded became attached to the group, the allies binding themselves to defend rumania if she was attacked. this treaty was kept strictly secret; it was a personal act of the king of rumania, and was communicated to no one except the prime minister. in 1887 the triple alliance was renewed and extended® and included an undertaking to support italy in any action that she might take to safeguard her position, even to war with france. in 1801 the third treaty of the triple alliance’ reasserted in a strengthened form the medi- terranean obligations to italy; a new clause (vii.) determined 1pribram, die politischen gehetnivertrige ovesterreich-ungarns 1879-1914, p. 6 (vienna and leipzig, 1920). 2pribram, op. cit., p. if. 3 die grosse politik der europdischen kabinette, 1871-1914. vol. 5, 253: cprbiant op, cit., pp. 24-8. 5 pribram, op. cil., p. 29. ®pribram, op. ctt., p. 42. 7pribram, op, cil., p. 64. ekurope that every advantage, territorial or other, obtained either by austria or by italy in the balkans should be based on the principle of reciprocal compensations. these four powers formed a coherent group, but to it other states were more loosely attached. in 1887, when there were cordial relations between the british and the german govts., lord salisbury, by an exchange of notes, came to an agrece- ment with italy and austria® to maintain the stafus guo in all the eastern waters of the mediterranean, while italy under- took to support great britain in egypt; great britain on her side expressing her intention to support the action of italy in north africa. lord rosebery in taking office in 1892 refused to recognise the existence of this agreement. there was also an agreement between italy and spain as to morocco, and at this time serbia also was attached by a separate treaty to austria. we see that this very elaborate structure of treaties and agreements was really approximating to a general european system into which in one form or another there were brought austria, italy, rumania, spain, serbia, great britain and even russia; the whole object was the isolation of france, and it served its purpose of securing to germany full and peaceful en- joyment of al! that she had gained by the war of 1870-1. the extension of this system to the mediterranean was advantageous to great britain in so far as it tended to strengthen her position in egypt. the pivot was germany and the centre of gravity was the german army; this it was which held the whole together. it was a system in which europe could acquiesce only so long as the policy of germany was passive; a reaction must inevitably arise if germany began a policy of active expansion. with the accession of a new emperor and the resignation of bismarck, the triple alliance, while unchanged in form, acquired a new mean- ing. the period of rest and recuperation in germany was over, and the new empire, conscious of its strength, began to stretch out with great ambitions towards the other quarters of the globe. the immense growth of german wealth, the skill with which the mineral and agricultural resources were developed, and the expansion of manufactures naturally led to an extension of foreign trade. german agents, supported by german bankers, were to be found in every part of the world; there was a great development of maritime shipping, and this naturally led to the acquisition of extra-european dependencies and the extension of political interests. the first years of the new emperor’s reign appear a tentative experiment; with the appointment of herr (afterwards count and then prince) von biilow, first as foreign secretary and afterwards as chancellor, the new tendencies be- came the deliberate and conscious policy of the german gov- ernment. it was inevitable, even with the best possible inten- tions, that numerous causes of friction should arise with other nations, and especially with great britain, for there was no part of the world in which the expansion of german influence did not touch british interests. franco-russian alliance-—germany could embark with full confidence on this great policy of expansion just because her essential security at home was so well guarded; hers was the only alliance on the continent. but ever since 1870 acute ob- servers had foreseen that, some day or another, france and russia would join together in order to redress the balance of the continent. this event took place in aug. 1891. the agreement (which was formulated in an exchange of notes) was based on ‘ the renewal of the triple alliance and the more or less probable adhesion of great britain to the political views of this alliance.’’® it contained two clauses: one that the two governments would agree together on any question of such a kind as to endanger the gencral peace; and the other that, in case either party was. menaced by an attack, they would agree together on the meas- ures to be taken. two years later, however, after long nego- {iations in which many difficulties were encountered, this was supplemented by a military convention (dec. 1893-jan. 1894): if either france or russia were attacked by germany, france or ®pribram, op. cit., pp. 52-6. 9 documents diplomatiques: l'alliance franco-russe (issued by ministere des affaires etrangeres, paris, 1918). europe russia respectively would apply all her forces to attack ger- many.! if the forces of the triple alliance, or one of the powers of which it consisted, were mobilised, france and russia would immediately mobilise. the number of troops to be employed was specified, and it was agreed that there should be joint action between the general staffs and interchange of all information relative to the armies of the triple alliance. but even after this there was little real cordiality in the rela- tions between russia and france. russia, moreover, was occu- pied with asiatic affairs, and had come to a friendly agreement with austria as to the balkans which was confirmed by an ex- change of notes on may 8 1807.2 the internal dissensions of france (it was the time of the dreyfus trial) weakened the in- fluence of that country abroad. france indeed was protected against the danger of a new attack from germany, but reccived little support from russia in the normal discussion of diplomatic matters. the essential change took place at the turn of the century. up to this period great britain had‘ held herself aloof from the continental system. the british occupation of egypt had resulted in a continued estrangement from france, and on the whole there was a tendency towards a close understanding with germany and the other members of the triple alliance. this understanding was now broken. the first serious differences arose out of south african affairs. the kriiger telegram of 1896 was a flash of lightning; no storm followed, but this and the intense animosity against great britain shown during the boer war were symptoms that could not be neglected. by a large party in germany the consolidation of british power in south africa was regarded as the loss of a sphere which they had marked out for german expansion. suggestions were made in berlin for a joint european action against england; these, how- ever, broke down, for germany made it a condition that there should be a mutual guarantee of european territory. the french govt. would in this way recognise and confirm the cession of alsace-lorraine. equally important was the altered attitude of germany towards the near east. the great and legitimate expansion of german commercial and economic interests was accompanied by a growing cordiality with the porte, and during his visit to damascus in 1897 the german emperor proclaimed himself the protector of all mahommedans throughout the world—an utter- ance which from anyone but him would have been justly regard- ed by france and great britain as an unparalleled provocation. there was also a serious conflict of interests in the far east. the evidence which came from many sources was sufficient to make it obvious to every british statesman that a continued political isolation was dangerous. england must have friends, and friends on whom she could rely. from 1898 to 1901 advances were repeatedly made to germany by great britain, and the project of a definite understanding, nay even of a defensive alliance, was ventilated. the sugges- tions were accompanied by warnings that ifan arrangement with germany was not reached, then recourse would be had to the opposed alliance. the offers were rejected; the warnings disre- garded. to the german foreign office, to prince biilow and to the emperor, it was an axiom that there could be no real friend- ship, as they said, “‘ between the whale and the bear.” they feared, or professed to fear, that an alliance with england would only mean that they would be used as a military advance post against russia; in the case of war the brunt of the fighting would fall upon them, while great britain would gather up the spoils in asia. “‘ the danger was imminent that if germany allied her- self with england she would have to undertake the rele against russia that japan assumed later single-handed.”” they be- lieved that they could do better business by playing off the rival empires against one another, by refusing to commit them- selves either to russia or to england, and by using the rivalry to extend their own influence and possessions. 'documents diplomatiques: l’alliance franco-russe (issued by ministere des affaires etrangeres, paris, 1918). ?pribram, op. cit., pp. 73-82. ®see dre grosse politik, vol. 17, chap. cix. 1035 the german navy.—but there was another influence at work. one of the chief tasks which the german govt. had set itself was the building of a great war fleet. it was the considered opinion of german statesmen that, if they were to come to a friendly diplomatic arrangement with england, this would inevitably compel them to limit their naval development; they affected to think that a fleet built by a germany friendly to england would be a fleet built under patronage and limited by the british insistence on superiority at sca. this they did not desire; they preferred, therefore, full freedom to build against england, trusting that it might be possible to avoid a serious conflict during what prince biilow calls the “ danger period of construction.” it was indeed the new naval ambitions, more even than the rejection of the british offer of an alliance, that conditioned the whole european situation. the building of the german fleet could only be compared to the similar work by which from 1857 onwards the prussian army, after a period of comparative stagnation and inefficiency, was brought up to the highest point of perfection, and we know how this great instru- ment of war, when perfected, was used to further prussian policy. there could be no doubt that the navy, when completed, would also be used for the same object, and in fact the responsible spokesmen of germany took care to leave no doubt on this point. they wanted the fleet to support their diplomacy. in the memo- randum which accompanied the great navy bill of 19004 this was clearly stated. the navy must be such that, “even for the greatest sea power, a war with it would involve such risks as to jeopardise its own supremacy.” it would be an error to suppose that the german govt. were deliberately looking forward to forcing a war with england. still more misleading to assume, as so many did in england, that the object was an invasion. the danger was of quite a different character, but it was none the less serious. the calculation was © that if there was a fundamental difference between british and german policy, the possession of a great fleet would enable ger- many to get her way, because england might be put in such a position that she would not dare to risk war. and what was the kind of point on which such a difference of policy might arise? it was the want of a fleet which, as he himself said, prevented the german emperor intervening during the boer war. it had be- come the avowed policy of the german emperor to use his friend- ship with the sultan as a means of winning the confidence of the mahommedan world, and this—we have his own words for it— was an instrument which might in necessity be used to render impossible the position of england in egypt or to arouse difficul- ties in mesopotamia, in persia, in india itself. it was the calcu- lation that if any such controversy arose, germany would not be alone; if she were allied to some other great power which pos- sessed a formidable navy—russia, france, japan or the united states—the predominance at sea, on which the very existence of the british empire depended, would be imperilled. this menace was one which had to be met. no child could suppose that it would not affect the whole trend of british policy. the germans themselves knew this well. what they feared was that england would attack while she still enjoyed her previous naval supremacy and before the german fleet had grown large enough to be dangerous. but this policy of a “ preventive ” war was never even seriously considered by responsible british states- men. their answer was the only possible one. in the first place the british fleet must be strengthened and its whole organisation altered. a fleet, like an army, must be found in the place where it is wanted. in the old days the north sea had been empty of ships; it was in the channel, in the mediterranean, in the atlantic, that the british fleet was placed. the centre of gravity was the straits of gibraltar. circumstances were now changed, and so a great reorganisation was effected. outlying stations were denuded of ships and the bulk of the fleet was in the north sea. the mediterranean had also, however, to be guarded. austria was increasing her fleet, and italy was an ally of germany. to meet this danger in 1912 it was agreed by england that france should concentrate the greater portion of her fleet in the medit- 4published by german government, 1036 erranean; in the event of a common war with germany it would fall to the british fleet to defend the northern and western coasts of france. in the same year a naval convention was concluded between france and russia;! with the building of the kiel canal the importance of the baltic in naval strategy had increased. in 1913 a further naval convention between the three powers of the triple alliance was made? and in may 1914 proposals were made for naval conversations between russia and great britain;# it is to be noted that at the end of june in the same year the en- largement of the kiel canal, by which the biggest ships could pass through it, was completed. all this was not enough. the german plan was based on the assumption that germany would be able to gain further allies in addition to those she already had. england also must have allies. now that germany was becoming the second naval power, england could no longer afford to regard with equanim- ity german military predominance upon the continent of europe. the success of the german schemes required one of two things,— either an alliance with other states against england, or such in- crease of german preponderance that they would become, for political purposes, subject to german will. it was necessary, for england to guard against either contingency, and she could do so only by entering into a firm understanding to join with them in resistance to any unprovoked act of german aggression. these considerations were so weighty that alone they are sufficient to explain and justify the action of the british govern- ment. the further information which has now become available completely substantiates them. we now know from the letters of the kaiser to the tsar* which were published after the russian revolution, that throughout the whole of the reign of nicholas ii. the german emperor had been using the strongest personal pressure upon him to bring about an alliance between germany and russia, the point of which was avowedly directed against great britain, an alliance into which france would be forced to come; whatever the subject of the diplomatic negotiations at the moment might be—whether it was armenia or crete or south africa or egypt, neutrality during the russo-japanese war, or morocco—always we see the same ambition. he hoped to create trouble in india by encouraging a russian move on afghanis‘an, and for this purpose to arouse the slumbering passions of islam: “ remember what you and i agreed upon at peterhof, never to forget that mahommedans were a tremendous card in our game in case you or j were suddenly confronted by a war with a cer- tain meddlesome power.”’ he encouraged russia to give support to turkey as against great britain in the persian gulf:— last but not feast, an excellent expedient to kill british inso- lence and overbearing would be to make some military demonstra- tions on the perso-afghan frontier .... even should the forces at your disposal not suffice for a real attack on india itself, they would do for persia. all this culminated when on july 24 1905 he persuaded the tsar to sign the treaty of bjerko,® a secret alliance against england which it was his hope would afterwards be joined by france. the treaty proved abortive, for the russian foreign minister pointed out that it was inconsistent with the terms of the french alliance, but it shows the method by which the kaiser professed to be guarding the peace of europe. the remark of king edward made to a danish diplomatist may be recalled: “tj will admit this, that with a man of so impulsive a tempera- ment as the german emperor at the head of the greatest power in europe, anything may happen.” this correspondence was secret, but in diplomacy there is no absolute secrecy, and the rumours of it must be taken into account if we are to understand the profound distrust felt for germany during these years. franco-british entente—these were the circumstances in which a great change of policy took place. the first step was the 1 l’alliance franco-russe: documents diplomatiques (issued by ministere des affaires etrangeres, paris, 1918). 2pribram, op. cit., pp. 308 seq. 3grey, twenty-five years, 1892-1916, vol. 1, pp. 283 seq. 4the kaiser's letters to the tsar—edited by n. f. grant (london, 1921}. a die grosse politik der europdischen kabinetie. europe british alliance with japan.® in this it had originally been con- templated that germany should be a partner. but germany did not accept the opportunity offered her, and, in addition, german action over the manchurian agreement seemed to show that no confidence could be placed in any german engagement. the alliance therefore was one between japan and great britain alone. in rg04 a colonial agreement was reached between england and france,? by which the numerous points of friction between the two countries were settled. the essence was that france recognised the british position in egypt. to do so was a bitter blow to most cherished french traditions and ambitions. in return for this great britain recognised the special position of france in morocco and gave up to france her claims and interests. this agreement in its original inception had, at any rate in england, no special point directed against germany. it was probably due chiefly to lord cromer, but his efforts were supported by lord lansdowne and king edward vii. the ob- ject was merely to clear away the outstanding causes of contro- versy with france, but it was destined to have far-reaching results, this agreement was quite unexpected and very unwelcome in berlin. the whole basis of german diplomacy was cut away. europe at once took on a new aspect. in the ordinary diplomatic negotiations germany must look forward to a situation in which she was confronted no longer by disunited and antagonistic states, but by great powers, acting in union and co-operation. even the triple alliance itself was shaken, for it was obvious that italy could not be depended upon in any serious conflict with both france and england. it must therefore be the chief object of german diplomacy to drive a wedge between england and france. for this reason, from this time onwards, every dip- lomatic incident, even of minor importance, at once reverberated throughout the whole of europe. this is illustrated by the mo- rocco affair, morocco was of great importance to france and spain; it was essential to england that no hostile power should be established on the northwestern coast of africa; apart from this, morocco was merely of trivial importance to the rest of the world, including germany. but morocco was made the test of the entente. germany, taking advantage of the temporary crippling of russia by her military and naval defeat in the far east and the internal disturbances which followed, brought the full weight of her military superiority to bear upon france, and thereby forced her into a conference and brought about the resig- nation of delcasse. this action defeated its own object. it ce- mented the union between france and great britain, and as soon as it became obvious that france, by entering into this union, exposed herself to the threat of war, it was inevitable that eng- land should take steps, if necessary, to protect her new friend. it was the threats by germany which gave a military side to what had at first been merely a diplomatic arrangement. no doubt the french handling of the whole matter was open to criticism, but there was a peculiarity about the arrangement of 1904, which placed great britain in a delicate position. eng- land, while she gained definite rights which france surrendered to her in egypt, gave in exchange only eventual rights in mo- rocco; france, in return for a definite surrender, got nothing but hopes; england acquired egypt, i'rance merely the prospect of acquiring morocco. in these circumstances there was obviously an obligation on great britain to see to it that her support of france in morocco should not be half-hearted; had this support been withdrawn simply because some of the subsequent details of french action were open to criticism, then the worst possible construction might have been placed on the good faith of the british govt.; it would have appeared that, after having secured themselves in egypt, they had seized on a subterfuge so as to avoid carrying out their side of the agreement. anglo-russian entente—not only did the german attempt to separate russia from france fail, but in 1907 an arrangement was made by which the outstanding points of difference between great britain and russia and tibet, afghanistan and persia were 6 state papers, vol. 95, pp. 83 seq. ? state papers, vol. 97, p. 39, 1903-4. europe settled.! the prime motive as in the agreement with france was a genuine desire to remove possible causes of war in asia, but though there was no definite agreement, it naturally brought about co-operation in europe. the approximation between the two empires, which had for so long been in a state of complete rivalry, was cemented by a mecting between king edward vii. and the tsar, which took place at reval in june 1908. the chief and almost only subject of discussion was the state of affairs in the balkans, and it was agreed that there should be common action for bringing about a reform in macedonia. the turkish revolution and ithe annexation crisis of 1908.— this meeting was immediately followed by, and perhaps precipi- tated the outbreak of revolution in turkey and the overthrow of abdul hamid by the young turks. this again was followed at the beginning of oct. by the declaration of independence of bulgaria and the annexation to austria of the provinces of bosnia and hercegovina, which she had administered since 1870. these events produced an acute crisis. the british govt. was estranged by the contrast between this action and the language used shortly before by aehrenthal, the austro-hungarian for- eign minister, and the austrian emperor. moreover, they fore- saw how dangerous would be the effect upon public opinion in turkey. above all, they protested against the claim of a single power to change the arrangements made by all the great powers in the treaty of berlin. it brought to a head the animosity between christians and moslems in the balkans, to which all the wars which followed were due. m. isvolsky, the russian foreign minister, was bitterly offended; negotiations were in progress by which he hoped as a recompense for his assent to the annexation, to receive important concessions regarding the opening of the straits, the main object of russian policy, but aehrenthal acted before he had had time to consult france and england. isvolsky felt, therefore, that he had been duped. it aroused also most intense animosity in serbia and the result was to ensure that henceforward the full support of russia would be given to serbia against austria and that the balkans would once more become the field for russian diplomacy. the annexation crisis is important, for in it is to be found the explanation of much which happened in 1914. just when it seemed as though the very prolonged and acrimonious contro- versy mizht be reaching a conclusion, count pourtales, the ger- man ambassador, delivered to m. isvolsky ‘‘ a peremptory de- mand ” that russia should without conditions agree to the abro- gation of article 25 of the treaty of berlin, that is, should rec- ognise the annexation; and it was intimated that if the answer was unfavourable, germany would “/ldecher v autriche sur la serbie.” it is important to understand what this threat—for it was a threat—implied. a war between austria and serbia would have placed russia in a most disadvantageous position; weak- ened as she was, she could not have come to the help of serbia, because under the system of alliances germany would, if neces- sary, come to the help of austria. before this, russian resistance collapsed; they agreed to the german demand without even con- sulting france and great britain. the success was a notable one, but it was dangerous. it was one which could not be repeated. russia had given way to threats once; she could not afford to do so a second time. it left an intense feeling of indignation in st. petersburg, which persisted, and became one of the most. danger- ous factors in the european situation. personally m. isvolsky, who soon resigned the post of foreign minister and went to paris as ambassador, henceforward became the active partisan of an anti-austrian policy, and was only anxious to revenge himself for the humiliation which had been placed upon him first by count aehrenthal and secondly by germany. agadir.—the annexation crisis had occurred at a moment when the relations between france and germany were com- paratively friendly; an attempt had been made at establishing economic and financial co-operation in morocco. an awkward episode (the german consul at casablanca was inducing soldiers of the foreign legion to desert and was arrested) was settled by arbitration. but this co-operation did not last long. the ambi- 1 state papers, vol. 100, p. 555. 1037 tions of the colonial party in germany could not be reconciled with the complete political control which france aimed at. a new and very serious crisis arose in rgtr. the french, in con- sequence of a civil war in morocco, followed by the abdication of the sultan, advanced to fez. this appeared to show a desire to disregard the obligations of the convention of algeciras. germany, in order to support her claim to be consulted, took a step which, as so often happened, could be interpreted as a threat. she sent a small ship of war to agadir. it was of course assumed, not only abroad but in germany itself, that this action meant that the german govt. proposed to claim part of the western coast of morocco and were even intending to land troops in order to enforce this claim. it seems probable that the german govt. themselves had not at the moment really made up their minds precisely what they wanted. the obvious answer to this german move would have been the dispatch of a french or british war- ship—a policy which was strongly pressed by some of the french. eventually separate conversations were begun between ger- many and france on the basis that germany would agree to disinterest herself in morocco completely, receiving in return territorial concessions in other parts of africa. there were many anxious moments, for some of the german demands were ex- cessive, but eventually an agreement was reached by which france surrendered to germany important parts of her posses- sions on the congo. as in the previous morocco discussions, the importance of the episode lay not so much in the immediate question at issue as in the attempt of germany to separate eng- land and france and to intimidate france. as before, this had the natural result of strengthening the union between france and england, and taking a stage further the military and naval accompaniments of this agreement. great britain and germany, to90g-14.—the final settlement of the moroccan question led to an improvement in the relations between great britain and germany. one of the first acts of bethmann-hollweg, who on the resignation of prince biilow be- came chancellor in 1909, had been to make proposals which might bring about an amelioration of the relations between ger- many and england, and for the next four years conversations with this object continued. the negotiations turned on two points: (r) a naval arrangement, the object of which would be to prevent the two countries continuing on an unlimited rivalry of armaments; (2) a general political understanding by which each country should be assured that the other would not join in attack- ing it in case of war. from 1909 to 1911 the discussions took the form of conversations of the ordinary diplomatic nature, inter- spersed with public speeches in the two parliaments. they were broken off in the summer of 1911 owing to the agadir diffi- culty, but after that had been surmounted, were resumed at the beginning of 1912, when on feb. g lord haldane was, in conse- quence of a suggestion from germany, sent on a special mission to berlin. on neither point did these negotiations lead to any definite result. as to the naval agreement it seems clear that bethmann hollweg would have welcomed it, but that his support was not strong enough against the opposition of tirpitz and the emperor. the proposals for a general political agreement, however, broke down because, as soon as a precise formula was put forward, it appeared that germany would not be satisfied with any arrange- ments except one which would be so worded as to imply that great britain would be debarred from coming to the assistance of france if she were attacked. anything of this nature was of course out of the question, for, as sir edward grey said on nov. 27 1911, “ one does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones.’’ none the less, the very fact that this at- tempt had been made, though it failed, left the relations between the two governments less unfriendly;even more important was the practical illustration afforded by the subsequent balkan troubles as to the importance of co-operation between them. everything tended to show that the peace of europe could be maintained if germany and great britain, while each maintain- ing full loyalty to its own associates, were willing, when any 2 state papers, 1911, vol. 104, pp. 948-964. 1038 difficulty arose, to communicate frankly and freely with one - another. by this means the two alliances might cease from their rivalry and gradually be merged in a general concert. this was a system which sir edward grey deliberately adopted; his whole handling of political difficulties was based upon this, and so long as germany acted in a similar spirit things went well. when the world war ultimately broke out, it was because germany, in a very grave crisis, ceased this co-operation and in profound secrecy made herself the associate of schemes the success of which would have been most detrimental to one of the partners in the triple entente. meanwhile, during 1913 and the first half of 1914, negotiations were begun and carried through to a successful issue by which the two chief outstanding points of controversy were in fact removed. a settlement was at last brought about with regard to the baghdad railway and the rever- sion of the portuguese colonies in africa. the situation in germany was, of course, the subject of the most careful study by those who were responsible for directing british policy. opinions were much divided in england; there was a belief, which was probably well founded, that neither herr von bethmann hollweg nor herr von jagow desired any- thing but the best relations. on the other hand, it must remain a matter of comparative indifference whether in any particular year the german administration then in office was well disposed, their position was at the best very precarious. all information, both from public and confidential sources, showed that a very large section of educated german public opinion was animated by feelings of intense animosity against england, and, although this party was at the moment in opposition to the government, at any time they might come into office, all the more because of the very unreliable character of the emperor, of whom the only thing that could be said with certainty was that no one could foresce what he would do. moreover, there was another factor to be kept steadily in mind. good relations between great britain and germany might possibly be valued, not for their own sake, but merely as a device for separating great britain from her associates. it was an obvious policy to encourage a spirit of conciliation, so that if there was a serious conflict with russia, english public opinion would refuse support to russia. to put it brutally, germany had no reasons to fear a war if england stood out; according to all instructed german expectations the crisis of any great euro- pean war would be over in the first two months. all that was nec- essary then was to secure that england should remain neutral during the first stage; if once the essential victory in france were secured, then nothing else really mattered. germany would quite well be able to acquiesce in an interference of great britain at a later stage, for, though this might be used to moderate the claims of the victors, it would not eliminate the fact of the victory. it was the consciousness of this which made it absolutely necessary that every advance to germany should be accompanied by the clearest and most public intimation that the union of the en- tente was not thereby weakened. so we get the key to british policy: the maintenance of the two alliances, but the frank and friendly discussion between great britain and germany on each point of difference as it arose. this was the state of things when a new and quite unforeseen evolution began in the balkans. (see serbia.) the balkan wars.—it had been long agreed that to italy should fall the reversion of tripoli. the increasing disorder of the turkish empire, the obvious failure of the young turks to establish an orderly and civilised government, made it appear that the time for action had come. in sept. 1911, at the very crisis of the agadir incident, without previous warning the ital- ian govt. presented an ultimatum to turkey, and three days later, on sept. 29, declared war. on oct. 4 an italian force landed in tripoli, which, during the next months, was occupied with the very difficult task of subduing the resistance both of the arab population and of the turkish troops. the fighting which even- tually extended to the aegean raised among the balkan states hopes of finally expelling the turks from the peninsula. in feb. 1912 negotiations were begun under, the deepest europe secrecy, between serbia and bulgaria, and on march 13 there was signed a treaty of friendship and alliance (see serbia), by which the two kingdoms mutually guaranteed to one another their political independence and the integrity of their territory, and agreed to support one another with all their forces if either were attacked by one or more states. more than this, they agreed to support one another if any of the great powers attempted to occupy any part of the balkans which was at present under turkish dominion, a clause which was obviously directed against austria, this treaty was accompanied by a secret additional treaty and a military convention; the first of these was in fact in the nature of an offensive alliance against turkey and was fol- lowed by detailed arrangements as to the disposal of any turkish territory which might be acquired. the treaty was to be com- municated to russia, and all matters undetermined in the treaty were to be settled by the arbitrament of russia. the military convention determined precisely the nature and character of the help to be given in the case of a war with turkey or with austria or rumania. this treaty was in accordance with the agreement submitted to the russian govt., but they did not communicate it to their allies. it was followed in may by a similar treaty between greece and bulgaria, the initiative to which was to a large extent given by mr. j. d. bourchier, the well-known correspondent of the times. the action prefigured in the treaties was hastened by the con- clusion of the war between turkey and italy; negotiations were entered into during the month of august and were brought to a conclusion by the treaty of lausanne signed on oct. 18,' by which turkey surrendered tripoli to italy, the future of the aegean is. being reserved for later arbitration. it was necessary, if the attack on turkey were to be made, that it should take place at once so as not to leave time for preparation. on oct. 8 montenegro declared war; on the 13th the three other allied states presented an ultimatum demanding the immediate grant of autonomy to macedonia; on the 14th the population of crete declared themselves independent of turkey, and formally joined greece; and on the 17th the declaration of war was sent. during the next three months the turks were repeatedly defeated by the allics; they evacuated the whole of macedonia and southern albania, as well as adrianople. it remained for europe to determine its attitude towards these unexpected events. the danger was extreme that the balkan might become a european war. the austrian govt. was determined to put a barrier to serbian ambition. the arrangements with bulgaria were based on the assumption that serbia should gain her reward by the annexa- tion of the northern part of albania and should thereby obtain access to the adriatic. this austria would not permit. she did not wish to see a slavonic state having access to a sea which she looked upon as her own. in this matter she could depend upon italian support. austrian troops were mobilised; garrisons in hercegovina were placed upon a war footing, and the situation was aggravated by numerous personal incidents, as for instance by stories which were put about that the serbians had imprisoned and ill-treated an austrian consul. war between austria and serbia was imminent, but if it broke out serbia would be sup- ported by russia, and in answer to austrian military prepara- tions, russian troops on the southwestern frontier were placed on a war footing. a war between austria and russia would, in consequence of the complicated system of alliances, inevitably bring in germany and france, and thereby bring about the great struggle which everyone wished to avoid. the danger was averted by france, great bntain and germany, who worked together to bring about conciliation. it had been arranged that, side by side with the peace negotiations which were taking place in st. james’s palace, the ambassadors of the great powers in london should sit in conference under the presidency of sir ki.dward grey. it was agreed that france and great britain should give their support to austria, and that albania should be set up as an independent state. this removed the essential point tr. oi mowat, select treaties and documents (oxford pamphlets, 1914-5), europe of controversy, and in feb. the austrian emperor sent prince hohenlohe on a special mission with a letter to the tsar. it was agreed that the two powers should demobilise, and from this time the extreme friction began to diminish. but the re- fusal of serbian access to the adriatic was to have unexpected results. it cut away the basis on which the division of the spoil had been arranged between the balkan states. the serbian govt. therefore demanded a larger portion of macedonia than had been originally assigned to her. they based this claim also on the point that bulgaria had not provided her due share of forces to fight in the western area, while serbia had contributed more than she was bound in the struggle for adri- anople. under these circumstances an appeal to the tsar to arbi- trate was enjoined. but before he had even received the appeal, a catastrophe took place. the old animosity against bulgaria, which had been for so many hundreds of years traditional among the greeks and serbians, was again growing. the armies were in macedonia still in closely adjacent quarters. the bulgarian govt. determined on a sudden blow, and on june 29 an attack in form was delivered by the bulgarains against the serbian forces. immediately afterwards the greeks in salonika attacked the bulgarians. this new fratricidal war had scarcely begun when two new champions entered the field. the turks de- nounced the armistice and a fortnight later retook adrianople. on july 18 rumania, with a fresh army, entered the field, de- clared war on bulgaria, and occupied the dobruja. before this great superiority of force the bulgarians, who had lost so heavily in the war—the dead alone were 30,000 —had no course open but to capitulate. on the demand of rumania a conference was summoned to bucharest, which on july 30 arranged an armistice, and on aug. 10 the peace of bucharest was signed.'! by this bul- garia had to surrender to serbia the whole of macedonia, to greece a large part of the northern shore of the aegean, while to turkey she had to restore adrianople and to rumania to sur- render the dobruja. the situation left by the treaty of bucharest was very precarious. it was obvious that bulgaria would not willingly acquiesce in the loss of territory and prestige. the mutual ani- mosity between serbia and austria continued, and the prince of wied did not show himself capable of coping with the very serious difficulties in albania. there were acute differences between turkey and greece, and the renewal of war seemed im- minent. but these mere local complications could doubtless have been overcome so long as no one of the great powers inter- vened; separate action by any one of them must almost inevi- tably bring about the great trial of strength between the rival alli- ances. it was the object of every responsible statesman to pre- vent this arising. the immediate danger arose from austria and russia. austrian policy was inclined towards bulgaria and de- sired to see the treaty of bucharest overthrown. in the summer of 1913 they proposed an immediate attack on serbia; in this they did not have the support of berlin. the german govt. was clearly dissatisfied with the austrian handling of the serbian difh- culty, and also with the unnecessary harshness with which the hungarians treated the rumanians. they rightly saw that an amelioration of the position must be found in an internal reform of the dual monarchy. on the other hand, german ambitions were becoming a serious danger. count wangenheim, who had succeeded marshall von bicberstein as ambassador to the porte, was with great assurance strengthening the german control at constantinople. this was a development which russia could not regard with equanimity. a crisis was reached during the winter, when gen. liman von sanders was not only appointed to reorganise the turkish army, but was given actual control over the army corps stationed in constantinople. this led to a strong protest from russia, and was followed by very violent press polemics between germany and russia. it is clear that russia was becoming impatient. it looked as though germany, with the conclusion of the baghdad agreement, and in other ways, would gain complete control over turkey, military, political and economic. this, if achieved, 1r, b. mowat, select treattes and documents, p. 121. 1039 would be a formidable impediment to the ultimate realisation of what had for so long been the permanent object of russian policy—not only the opening of the straits but the control of constantinople. in feb., as we now know, the situation was reviewed; it was agreed that these hopes could only be achieved as the result of a european war, and that it was neces- sary to prepare the scheme for landing troops on the bosporus if the contingency arose. russia did not take her allies into her confidence. the most serious clement in the situation was that more and more, the old rivalry between austria and russia, which had always been found manageable, was giving place to a direct conflict of interests between russia and germany herself. moreover, the commercial treaty made between russia and germany in 1892 was running out; germany had succeeded in imposing upon russia conditions which subordinated russian interests to those of germany. any negotiations for the renewal of the treaty must certainly react on the political situation. ali- ready the anticipation of this had aroused all the strong national spirit in both empires. the russians in particular were deter- mined not to accept a renewal of the humiliating position in which they had so long been placed. meanwhile russia was actively strengthening her diplomatic position and was working to build up a new balkan alliance. the first step was to win over rumania from the central powers; in this she was largely successful, being helped by the popular sympathy in rumania for their fellow-countrymen in transyl- vania. but the prospect of a new balkan alliance necessarily aroused the greatest apprehension in austria; it could have no raison @etre except hostility towards her, for a reconciliation between bulgaria and serbia would only be possible if serbia relinquished part of the territory won in the late war and as a compensation was able to extend to the adriatic. her real ambitions were the annexation of bosnia and hercegovina and in the prospect of this she was encouraged by russia. moreover, the internal condition of the monarchy was becoming serious. apart from grave financial embarrassments the conflict of na- tionalities was growing. the german element, on the loyalty of which the very existence of the monarchy depended, was tend- ing to fall under the influence of the pan-german party in the empire; the chronic difficulties with the czechs had reached such a stage that from march onwards it was necessary to sus- pend the meetings of the reichsrat; there were constant disputes between the rumanians in transylvania and the magyar govt., and throughout the southern provinces the dissatisfaction of serbs and croats alike was growing; the gradually increased strength and reputation of serbia was beginning to act as a dangerous magnet. responsible statesmen in europe were beginning to realise that now that the turkish problem had been solved, they would soon be confronted by an austrian problem. this again affected the political situation of germany; she had now only one sure ally left; if there were to be a collapse of austria-hungary, she would be left alone. confronted by the growing strength of russia, her rulers began to look to the future with grave apprehension. the great danger to europe lay in the rivalry of armaments. brblioography.—the following are the most important sources for the diplomatic history: die grosse politik der europdischen kabinetie is7e=1 orf (deutsche verlagsgeselischaft fiir politik und geschichte, berlin); a. f. pribram, die polttischen gehctmvertrdge oesterreich- ungarns 1879-1914 (vienna and leipzig, 1920); siebert, diploma- tische aktenshiicke zur geschichte der fntentepolitik der vworkriegs- jahre (1921); f. stieve, der ditplomattsche schriftwechsel iswolsktis (ror11-14)—aus den geheimakien der russischen staatsarchive (1924)3 nearly identical with ux livre notr—preface par rene marchand (paris); the french official publications, documents diplomatiques, issucd by ministere des affaires etrangeres, l’amiance franco-russe (1918), affaires du maroc, 1901-12, 6 vol. (1905~12), les affaires balkaniques, 1912-4, 2 vol. (1914); n. f. grant, ed., the kaiser's letters to the tsar (1921). for british policy before the war: lord grey, twenty-five years 1892-1916 (1925); lord haldane, before the war (1920); a. w. ward and g. p. gooch, the cambridge his- tory of british foreign policy, vol. 3, 1866-1919 (1922, etc.). for gencral historical narrative, g. p. gooch, history of afodern europe 1878-1919 (1923); e. a. o. brandenburg, von bismarck sum weltkriege (1924). | 1040 among the memoirs and reminiscences the more important are: prince v. bilow, imperial germany (1914); grand admiral v. tir- pitz, afy afemoirs; warl hellferich, die vworgeschichie des tee krieges (1919); bethmann-hollweg, reflections on the world wa (1920); von jagow, ursachen und ausbruch des weltkrieges ee baron beyens, l’ allemagne avanila guerre (1915); dr. m. boghitsche- witsch, causes of the war, 1919; raymond poincare, the origins of the war (1922); baron v. eckhardstein, ten years at the court of st. jantes's, 1805-1005 (1921); otto hammann, der neue kurs, zur vi orgeschichte des weltkrieges, um den katser and der missv erstandene bismarck. for the growth of the german navy see archibald hurd, the command of the sea (1912); for austria-hungary: hh. wickham steed, the habsburg monarchy (4th ed., 1919); dr. scton-watson, the southern slav question and the tlabsburg afonarchy (191k); for morocco: pa agadir (1919); tardieu, la conference d’alge- ciras (1907); e. d. morel, morocco in diplomacy (1912); vepubiiched as. ten years of secret diplomacy, (1920). (j. w. h.-m.) ii. the outbreak of war the murder of the austrian archduke—the preceding pages of this article describe the state of europe when, on sunday, june 28, the archduke franz ferdinand, the heir to the austrian throne, and his wife, while on an official tour of inspection in bosnia and hercegovina, were murdered at serajevo, the capi- tal. the two assassins were young men of 20 years of age, na- tives of bosnia and therefore austrian subjects. such evidence as is available seems to show that the motive for the crime must be traced to the intense racial animosity which had existed in bosnia since the time of the annexation, increased as it was by the growing discontent in croatia, and by the rising tide of ag- gressive nationalism in serbia. but the preparations had been made under the auspices of a secret socicty in serbia known as the “ black hand,” the leader of which was demetrivich, an officer of the serbian genera] staff. the serbian govt. itself was in no way an accomplice in the act, which they deplored, for at the moment they desired pcace and recuperation after two wars. there is, however, evidence that they had some knowl- edge of what was intended and thcy were very remiss in not giving a warning to the austrian government. elsewhere, except among the comparatively few who really understood how precarious was the position in the balkans, it was the personal aspect of this event which attracted attention. the gencral fecling was one of deepest indignation, and of the warmest sympathy for austria and for the aged emperor, fran- cis joseph, whose life had already been so full of tragedy. in austria the crime, which was no isolated act, was looked on as a blow at the very existence of the monarchy. the relations with serbia had for long been the cause of grave disquiet, inter- nal as well as external. there had in fact just been drawn up a very important austrian memorandum for communication to the german govt.; in it the balkan situation was discussed, and stress was laid on the scheme attributed to russia of creating a new balkan league, which was to include rumania and be used as an offensive weapon against the triple alliance. in this scheme the disaffection in bosnia and croatia, fer- mented by the agitation from serbia, would be a dangerous instrument. against this it had been intended to propose a pro- austrian anti-serbian alliance with bulgaria and turkey, which could be used also to check the pro-russian influences in ru- mania. count berchtold and his colleagues now determined immediately to use this new opportunity so as to rid themselves once and for all of the menace to the monarchy caused by the yugoslav propaganda and at the same time to restore the wan- ing prestige of the monarchy. in this they were influenced by the advice of conrad von hitzendorf, chief of the general staff, who had long held the view that a successful war was the only means of stopping the disintegration at home and rehabilitating the empire abroad! for this purpose it was essential that there should be war with serbia; no diplomatic success would be sufi- cient and the war must end in the diminution of serbian terri- tory and in bringing the kingdom into such a condition of de- pendence upon austria that it would practically cease to be an independent state, or to exercise influence in the balkans. 1conrad, aus meiner dienstzeit, vol. 1 and 2 passim. europe austria could not take action of this kind unless assured before- hand of german support, for she would certainly be confronted by the opposition of russia. count hoyos was therefore dis- patched on a special mission to berlin, taking with him both the memorandum written before the murder and an autograph letter of the emperor in which the situation was explained. phe decision in berlin.—this letter was delivered personally by count szegyeny, the austrian ambassador, on july 5 to the german emperor, who was due to leave for his annual holiday in the north sea on july 7. it was then that the decision on which so much was to depend was made. it was one for which the kaiser was immediately and personally responsible. while explaining that he must, of course, consult the chancellor on a matter of serious european importance, the count was author- ised to inform the austrian emperor that in this question he could “ depend on the complete support of germany.” ‘ this especially applied to austrian action against serbia.”’ ‘‘ in the kaiser’s opinion there must be no delay. russia’s attitude would certainly be hostile, but he had for years past been prepared for this; if it was to come to a war between austria-hungary and russia she could be convinced that germany would stand at her side with her usual fidelity. moreover, russia, as matters stood, was in no way ready for war, and would certainly consider before appealing to arms.” the kaiser, after a bricf and informal committee with his naval and military advisers, left berlin for his visit to norway, as arranged, on july 7. the official german answer, though more’ guarded, was in accordance with his language. in it the chancellor explained that the view of the german govt. was that the relations between austria and serbia were a matter within the competence of austria alone; germany therefore did not propose to claim any right to interfere. what this, of course, meant was that austria received a free hand to couch her de- mands on serbia in such terms as she chose; germany already knew that they would be such as to make war very probable. but austria had already been assured that, if this action led to war with russia, germany would be at her side. it is noticeable that no advice or warning was given that the demands on serbia should be so modified as to avoid this danger. on the other hand great attention was given to the diplomatic preparation; every- thing was to be done to secure for a war with serbia the support or neutrality of the neighbouring states. with this object the kaiser, though strongly against his own personal inclination, agreed that the king of bulgaria should be asked to join the triple alliance, and, in view of the great german interests in turkey, negotiations with the same object should be entered into with the porte. what above all interested them was the position of rumania and italy. the situation in rumania caused much anxicty, for king charles let it be known that he would probably not be able to bring the country with him into a war with russia on the side of the germanic powers; all, however, was to be done to strengthen german iniluences in that country. as to italy, it was agreed that its government should not be informed be- forchand as to the blow which was impending against serbia, but germany pressed very strongly that austria should be pre- pared to offer to italy suitable compensation for any gain in ter- ritory or influence in the balkans which might accrue to her. analysis of the objects and motives of the german govt. is all the more difficult because, in its political composition, it had no powerful personality such as bismarck had once been, and 1ts actions were the result of many conilicting influences, while decisions were always liable to be deflected by the impulsive and vacillating character of the kaiser himself. there was in the first place genuine indignation at the crime of scrajevo, an indigna- tion which in the kaiser’s mind took the characteristic form that there must be co-operation between all monarchical states against elements of disorder. this motive was one which, no doubt, it was hoped when the time came he would use with effect upon the tsar. politically there had long been dissatisfaction at ber- lin with the conduct of affairs in austria; the force and decision which were needed in an ally were wanting. it was hoped, there- fore, that the opportunity would be used to remedy this defect. europe but there were further and greater objects which would follow automatically; if russia could be persuaded to stand aside while serbia was overrun by the austrian army, it would become evi- dent that russian protection was of no avail to serbia; serbia would be pushed out of the way, and thereby the germanic powers would gain in fact the control of the balkans and the road to the east. it was an essential part of the scheme that great britain and france should be urged to use their influence to keep russia quiet; if they did not do so then the responsibility for any exten- sion of the war which ensued would seem to attach to them; if they did then the internal harmony of the triple entente would be weakened; russia would feel that she had been deserted by her allies. it was hoped that these results might be obtained without a european war. if, however, russia was determined to meet the challenge and war resulted, it could be so arranged that the responsibility for the war should appear to fall on russia and the entente. the general condition of europe was very threatening; it seemed probable that under any circumstances the “ great war ”’ must ensue shortly; it was believed that russia would be ready in about two years. if there was to be a war the summer of rg14 seemed on the whole to be favourable to ger- many. the kiel canal had been enlarged; the army was at the height of efficiency; the diplomatic situation seemed favourable; there were very serious labour troubles in russia, serious par- liamentary disputes in france, and it appeared as if there might soon be open rebellion in ireland, with possibly something ap- proaching mutiny in the british army. it was indeed impossible to depend on italy; but if bulgaria and turkey could be won over this would counteract the uncertainty of rumania’s action. german support having been secured, the austrian govt. proceeded to prepare the text of the demands to be presented to serbia. the great point was that they should be so drafted that they would be unacceptable; the object was not a mere diplo- matic victory, but war; it was held that nothing would meet the situation and restore the authority and prestige of the monarchy short of an effective display of military strength. it was agreed, however, in consequence of the strong pressure used by count tisza, who alone was in opposition to the policy proposed, that the annexation of any part of serbia, apart from a rectification of the frontier, should be repudiated; on the other hand, as a result of a successful war, portions of serbia would be assigned to bulgaria and albania. on july 17, the final draft, having passed the council of state, received the approval of the emperor francis joseph, but it was determined to postpone its presenta- tion till july 23; it would be better to delay until m. poincare, the french president, who was to visit the northern courts, had jeft st. petersburg. these arrangements were conducted in the greatest secrecy. all that was known outside was that austria was contemplating some serious action against serbia; this was naturally sufficient io cause apprehension and anxiety, but, during the days of wait- ing, the austrian govt. used its influence to damp down the very violent denunciations of serbia in the viennese press, and in other ways tried to still the vigilance of the other powers. as late as july 19 they assured the russian ambassador in vienna that nothing dangerous to the peace of europe was being under- taken, and in consequence he went on a holiday. the british govt. and nation, whose attention was preoccupied at the moment with the irish problem, were inclined to regard the local dispute between serbia and austria as not being one in which they were vitally concerned. on july 16 the british am- bassador, sir maurice de bunsen, was able to give sir edward grey a warning which was corroborated from unofficial sources. none the less, the belief that there would be a real danger of european war was slow in maturing in great britain, in spite of the anxiety felt in a few well-informed quarters. this attitude was based on a belief that, after all, the german govt. would not support austria in any reckless policy. the austrian note-—the ultimatum was presented at 6 p.m. on thursday, july 23, by baron de giesl to dr. patchou, as m. vpasic, the serbian prime minister, was absent from bel- 1o41 grade. the note had been admirably drawn up to fulfil the avowed object that it should contain demands which could not possibly be complied with. it required that serbia should first of all officially publish on the front page of the official journal a condemnation of the serbian propaganda against austria- hungary, regret for the part taken by serbian officers and officials in this propaganda, and a promise of amendment in the future. there were in addition 10 requirements, which included, among others, the dissolution of narodna obrana, the suppression of any publication which incited to hatred and contempt of the monarchy, the elimination from public instruction in serbia (including the teaching body) of anything that served as propa- ganda against austria-hungary, the removal from the army and the administration of officers and officials guilty of such propaganda whose names might be communicated by the austro- hungarian govt., the collaboration in serbia of austro-hunga- rian representatives for the suppression of the movement against the territorial integrity of the monarchy, and that austro-hun- garian representatives should take part in judicial proceedings against all the accessories to the plot of june 28 on serbian territory. a reply was required by 6 o’clock on the evening of saturday, july 25. as was immediately pointed out by everyone who read this document, it would be impossible for the serbian govt. to accept all these demands; no such requirements had ever been directed to a fully sovereign state—in particular the requirement that unnamed officials should be dismissed on the request of the austro-hungarian govt., and that austro-hungarian officials should take part both in police and judicial proceedings on ser- bian soil, was clearly one impossible to be granted. there could be only one conclusion, that austria intended to force a war with serbia and that in doing this she had deliberately prepared to meet the opposition of russia. but it was clear that austria could not have taken this step without the previous consent of germany. it was therefore at once concluded that the two ger- manic powers had determined immediately to challenge russia, and with russia, france, to a great trial of strength. this view was supported by a note which on the following day was delivered at st. petersburg, paris and london, in which the german govt. announced that they considered the procedure and demands of the austrian govt. to be both equitable and moderate. (it is now known that these words had been written at a time when the german govt. did not precisely know what the demands of the austrian govt. would be. it did not occur to anyone outside that the government of a great state could be guilty of such unparalleled levity; it was naturally as- sumed that they had seen and approved the text of the austrian note beforehand, and all their disclaimers were received with in- credulity.) the german govt. also emphasised their opinion that the questions at issue between austria and serbia should be settled by these two states alone, and lastly they intimated that interference by any other power would be followed by incalculable consequences. this could obviously mean nothing except that germany was backing up austria, would support her even in a war with russia, and that a threat was intended to france and great britain that, unless they put themselves on the austrian side and brought pressure to bear upon russia to withdraw her support from serbia, a european war would result. the news reached st. petersburg just after m. poincare had left. the secrecy with which the ultimatum had been engendered, the misleading assurances, the absence of any warning to or consultation with other states, all seemed to point to a deep- laid plot. the reaction was precisely what was to be anticipated. the greatest indignation was expressed and the indignation was genuine. mm. sazonov at once asked for assurance that he should have the full support of france and great britain against this unparalleled act of aggression; the only method of avoiding war with germany was, he said, that germany should know that she would be confronted by the united forces of the entente. at the same time russian military preparations were at once begun; it was decided at a meeting of the russian council of state on july 25 that all preliminary steps should be taken and that sazo- 1042 nov should be authorised to give the signal for mobilisation as soon as it seemed to him necessary. meanwhile, a public com- munique was issued that russia could not remain indifferent to the fate of serbia. similar language was used in private and official interviews. from the beginning it was clear that russia intended to resist the austrian scheme, by war if necessary. in these circumstances much depended on the action of great britain. during these days france could do little, for the presi- dent and the foreign minister were at sea. russia and france both pressed sir edward grey to declare himself. the situation was a difficult one. he clearly could not, as the russians asked, give an unconditional promise to join with russia if war ensued; by doing so he would incur the danger of increasing the influence of the war party which undoubtedly existed at st. petersburg. moreover, he would not have the full support of the cabinet, nor apparently of the country. on the other hand, he could not give the promise of neutrality which germany asked for, nor could he even press russia too strongly to suspend her military preparations, for, by so doing, he would in fact be giving his support to an act of aggression against a state with which he was in the closest diplomatic agreement. he therefore saw from the beginning that the only possible means of avoiding a european war was to bring about some form of mediation or conciliation by which time would be gained; then some means might be found of settling the crisis in a peaceful way. for the next five days, supported by france, he pursued this path with energy and re- source. in accordance with the practice of the last years he depended on the co-operation of germany. to intervene directly between austria and serbia was out of the question; if russia became involved the only remedy would be joint action of great britain and germany. he knew that he had the support of prince lichnowsky, the german ambassador in london; he hoped for the co-operation of the german chancellor; he did not know how fundamental was the difference between the german ambassador and his government. his first suggestion was that austria should give serbia more time, and not, as was threatened, break off diplomatic relations if serbia did not accept all the requirements of the ultimatum by 6 o’clock on saturday, july 25. this proposal, which was sup- ported by russia, received no support in germany, and in fact reached vienna almost too late. it was at once rejected there. the serbian answer was actually delivered at the appointed hour on july 25. it was very conciliatory. it went to the fur- thest possible extreme in compliance; every demand was granted with the exception of two, the dismissal of unspecified officials and officers and the co-operation on serbian soil of austrian offi- cials. the austrian minister, however, at once, in accordance with his instructions, left belgrade. sir edward grey now began to press for mediation, not between austria and serbia, but between austria and russia, by the four powers, great britain, germany, france and italy. on july 26 he converted this into a firm proposal for submission of the points at issue be- tween austria and russia to a conference of the ambassadors in london. this proposal was rejected by the germans on the ground that they could not ask austria to submit to what would in fact be an areopagus of the powers. they also would prefer separate conversations between austria and russia, which sazo- nov had accepted. the text of the serbian answer to the austrian note was re- ceived in london on july 27. sir edward grey at once pointed out that this reply could surely be made the basis of negotiations, and pressed that, tf austria continued her intransigeant attitude, it would appear that she was deliberately aiming at war. these representations were fully reported to berlin by prince lichnow- sky, who warned the german govt. that, if they continued their negative attitude, they would no longer be able to depend upon the neutrality of great britain. they were without effect. the german govt. indeed on july 27 forwarded sir edward grey’s proposals to vienna, but at the same time they informed count szg6yeny, the austrian ambassador, that they did so merely because they did not wish to alienate great britain, and in no way associated themselves with the proposals, which they did not kurope wish to sce adopted. the negative attitude of berlin, the appar- ent refusal to do anything to restrain austria, inevitably pro- duced the conviction that germany was no longer working for peace. if this were so there then remained only one means of avoiding war, that great britain should give a formal warning that in the event of war she would be found on the side of russia and france. this was from the beginning strongly urged both at paris and st. petersburg; a first step in this direction was the order given to the british fleet (which had been assembled for manoeuvres) not to demobilise; this order was made public on july 28. flowever, on the morning of july 28, some change became ap- parent in the german attitude. the kaiser had returned to pots- dam from his north sea cruise on the afternoon of july 27. there was at once laid before him the text of the serbian answer, which, owing to very serious delay, for which the austrians were respon- sible, had not reached berlin until that day. he saw that it left to the austrians no defensible ground for a declaration of war. “a brilhant achievement; this is more than could have been expected. a great moral success for vienna, but with it every ground for war disappears, and giesl ought to have remained quietly at belgrade. i would never have ordered mobilisation.”’ he therefore, on the morning of july 28, caused to be sent to vienna a proposal that austria should be satisfied with the occu- pation of belgrade and a defined limit of territory, and should issue her demands from there. this would give to the military feeling of austria that satisfaction which they might reasonably demand. as was pointed out: “ if austria continues her refusal to all proposals for mediation or arbitration, the odium of being responsible for a world war will in the eyes of the german people fall on the german government. on such a basis, however, a successful war on three fronts cannot be started and carried through.” the weakness of this proposal was that it was based on the assumption that war with serbia would have begun; but as soon as war began, clearly russia must mobilise. no settle- ment could be successful unless it provided for a mutual under- standing as to the military measures to be taken on both sides. the emperor’s proposal assumed that while austria began a war with serbia, russia should cease all military meas- ures. this clearly was impossible. austrian declaration of war against serbia.——russian mobi- lisation was in fact becoming imminent. the preliminary work had proceeded rapidly; reports came to germany from all parts of the russian empire showing the activity of the preparations. the russian position never changed. they would not proceed to the next stage until austria took overt action either by a military advance or declaration of war. as soon as she took either of these steps, russia would mobilise part of her forces. this contingency was realised on tuesday, july 28. austria had issued an order for the mobilisation of eight army corps on july 26, and now sent a declaration of war against serbia in an open telegram to be)- grade. the austrian govt. had informed germany of their in- tention to do this the day before, but no warning or suggestion that some delay would be useful was given. germany in fact was now beginning to experience the results of the very ill-con- sidered language used three weeks before; the kaiser had insisted then on the necessity for rapid and vigorous action; to press now for moderation and delay would have exposed him to the charge of vacillation which on other occasions his actions had appeared to justify, and from which he had boasted that on this occasion he would be free. as soon as the news of the declaration of war reached st. petersburg it was decided that partial mobilisation must follow; the german and other governments were immediately informed. this decision was confirmed when on the same day the austrians broke off the separate conversations with russia which sazonov had suggested, giving as a reason the declaration of war with serbia, an act for which they themselves were entirely respon- sible. even now, however, there was a delay of 24 hours. the next morning news came that the austrians had begun to attack and were bombarding belgrade. further delay scemed impossi- ble. the military authorities, however, strongly urged that par- ekurope tial mobilisation against austria alone would have fatal effects. if there was to be war, russia would certainly have to meet germany as well as austria, but if partial mobilisation had once begun, the change to general mobilisation would for technical reasons produce a complete state of disorganisation. the tsar therefore apparently, on the morning of wednesday, july 28, signed two orders, one for partial and one for general mobilisation. it was still left open which should be used. about 7 o’clock that evening count pourtales called an sazonov, and under instruc- tions from the german chancellor warned him that any further military preparations or mobilisation would. involve german mobilisation, and that german mobilisation meant war. this message was so worded that it seemed to prohibit even partial mobilisation against austria. the german explanation is that it was meant as a friendly warning, but it was taken, not unnaturally, as something in the nature of an ultimatum. meanwhile there was great anxiety in berlin. the govern- ment were not well informed as to the intentions of austria, and answers to telegrams were long delayed. there was also a serious divergence between the political and military authorities. the general staff were becoming very nervous. if there was to be war it was essential that it must begin at once in order that they might gain the advantage which came from their higher stage of military preparation. every day that elapsed would have the result of enabling russia to enter the campaign sooner than had been anticipated. on the other hand, from the political point of view, especially having regard to the effect on public opinion in germany and in great britain, it was most important to avoid action which might appear provocative. matters must be so arranged that the appearance of aggression would fall upon rus- sia. the whole situation appears to have been discussed in a council which met at the palace at potsdam on the evening of july 29. there is no authentic record of the discussion, but it is clear that a demand was made by the general staff for immediate mobilisation, and was refused. it was, however, determined to make a strong effort to avoid the danger, which was becoming more apparent, of active british intervention in the war; with this object, that very evening between g and ro o’clock, the german chancellor sent for sir edward goschen, the british ambassador, and made him a strong offer for british neutrality. in return for this germany would be prepared to promise that in the event of a successful war no part of france would be annexed by germany. this suggestion was, of course, the next day indignantly refused. scarcely, however, was the interview over when a fresh telegram from prince lichnowsky was received, containing a friendly warning from sir edward grey that, if war resulted, england would probably not be able to keep out of it. this produced something like consternation. the negotiations with austria as to italy had not been proceeding favourably, and all the in- formation seemed to show that italian support would not be forthcoming. the very same night three additional telegrams were dispatched to vienna couched in the most pressing and urgent terms, exhorting the austrian govt. not to continue their refusal against all projects of mediation; if they did so they would be dragging germany into a european war, in which italy would not be on the side of the triple alliance and in which great britain would be among the enemies—a war, therefore, which would be fought under the most unfavourable conditions. russian and german mobilisation—among the numerous other telegrams sent out from berlin on this evening was one from the kaiser to the tsar, again impressing on him in the strongest terms the danger of mobilisation. in consequence the tsar, about 9 o’clock, countet-ordered general mobilisation sent out about midnight. (the statement made in 1917 that the tsar’s orders were disobeyed by general sukhomlinov, the minister of war, was untrue.) this decision caused the most serious anxiety in military circles and at a meeting held the next day, july 30, after a long discussion they succceded in persuading the tsar, against his will, to reconfirm the decision of the previous evening that general mobilisation was to be proceeded with. the notices were put up throughout the russian empire during the course of 1043 the night, and on the following morning the fact was public. there was, however, some delay in communicating it abroad; the news does not seem to have reached either paris or london until very late in the afternoon. it reached berlin shortly after midday. the kaiser at once left potsdam for berlin and ordered the proclamation of avriegszustand, the first step before mobilisa- tion; a telegram was also sent to pourtales that he should im- mediately call on sazonov and inform him that unless the order for general mobilisation was recalled within 24 hours germany would consider herself at war with russia. no answer was given; german mobilisation was proclaimed the next day, saturday, aug. 1, and war was declared at 5 o’clock in the afternoon. the russian order for general mobilisation seems on all grounds to have been ill-advised; from the military point of view delay was advantageous to russia. politically it provided the german govt. with the pretext which was essential to them: for the moment it appeared as if germany was defending herself against a russian invasion; the solidarity of the nation was se- cured and even the socialists ceased their criticism and opposi- tion. it was this which made the reichstag, which assembled on aug. 3, almost unanimous in its support of the war measures laid before it. it also destroyed any slender possibility of still avoiding war. the decision seems to have been duc not so much to any deliberate desire for war, as to the state of nervous panic which prevailed in the sinister situation by which russia was suddenly confronted, owing to the provocative and menacing action of austria and germany; there was no cool and balanced judgment or strong hand to exercise control. the extreme rapidity with which these events took place frustrated all the efforts at mediation which were in progress. sir edward grey had put forward a new plan, very similar to the german emperor’s proposal that austria should issue her terms from belgrade, but he had accompanied it by conditions which if accepted would have got over the mobilisation difficulty. this had been communicated by berlin to vienna, but no answer had been received when germany, by her ultimatum, broke through all the negotiations. none the less, even as late as saturday, aug. i, this and other suggestions continued to be the subject of an interchange of telegrams. they had, however, no practical importance. there is indeed no indication that, so far as austria was concerned, the postponement of the russian general mobili- sation would have had any effect upon the final issue. the order for general mobilisation was determined on the afternoon of july 30, and issued on july 31, before russian mobilisation was known. 7 france and germany.—in accordance with the terms of the franco-russian alliance, an aggressive war declared by ger- many against russia inevitably entailed war with france. the french president, m. poincare, and the premier, m. viviani, reached paris on the evening of july 29; they at once telegraphed to russia that france would fulfil the obligations of her alliance, while continuing her efforts to preserve peace. from the begin- ning of the crisis france had, like all other nations on the conti- nent of europe, immediately begun all the necessary military preparations. even the smaller states, such as holland, had from the beginning of the week been doing the same thing. the austrian ultimatum to serbia was an act of such a nature that, followed as it was by the rupture of diplomatic relations and the declaration of war, no responsible government could afford to lose a moment in carrying through every measure short of the final act of calling up the reserves, to which the name of “‘ mobi- lisation ” is generally given. suffice it to say that by july 3r the french and german covering troops on the frontier were both in position. the french, however, in order toavoid any untoward incident, took the precaution of keeping their troops to km. from the frontier. this was not imitated by the germans, and in fact could not be, for the great fortress of metz was actually on the frontier, and there seems no doubt that before july 31, on several occasions, german troops had crossed the french frontier. the russian mobilisation, the consequent german mobilisation, and the declaration of war against russia, made it imperatively necessary 1044 for the german govt. without any delay to settle the issue with france. the basis of their whole plan of operations was an instan- taneous invasion of france. they therefore could not allow a day to pass unused; if there was to be war with france, it must come at once. accordingly at 7 o’clock on july 31, herr von schoen, the german ambassador, called on m. viviani and announced that he would come again the next day to learn what the attitude of france would be in case of a war between germany and russia. he came in consequence on aug. 1, and was informed merely that “ france would do that which her interest dictated.” french general mobilisation was ordered on aug. 1, at almost exactly the same time as that of germany. it would have been natural that the actual declaration of war by germany should immediately have followed; it was, however, delayed for two days, partly in consequence apparently of a misunderstanding which arose in london. lichnowsky telegraphed that he had received an inquiry whether germany would stand out if england secured the neutrality of france. what seems to have been meant was an idea that both france and germany should remain neutral, leaving austria and russia alone at war; this was misinterpreted as a suggestion that france should remain neutral in a war between germany and russia. nothing could have been more favourable to germany than this, but subsequent revelations have shown that even french neutrality alone would not have been accepted by germany. herr von schoen was instructed, if france promised to remain neutral, to demand that she should hand over the fortified cities of toul and verdun to germany as a guarantee. that such a proposal should ever have been seriously entertained shows how abnormal was the men- tality of berlin. there was never the slightest doubt that france could not leave russia unprotected against a combined attack from both germany and austria. the situation at the end of the week was a very anxious one in paris. war with germany was now certain, and france might anticipate that within a few days the whole force of the german army would be thrown against the frontier. the future of france seemed to depend upon the action of great britain. but in london all seemed uncertain. the strongest representations were made by m. cambon to sir edward grey, and the president of the french republic addressed an autograph letter to king george urging the vital necessity for help from england. no promise could be given. the british cabinet were then divided. neither they nor, as was thought, the country would have approved of the interference of great britain in a continental war in which her interests and honour were not immediately involved. though great britain could not stand by and passively watch the defeat and dismemberment of france, this might be a reason for preparing to intervene if at any time it became necessary, but not for taking part as a principal from the beginning. there was indeed one point in which, admittedly, both british interests and british honour were closely concerned, viz.: the neutrality of belgium. great britain was bound by the treaties of 1839 to intervene if either party toa war violated that neutrality. following, there- fore, the precedent of 1870 sir edward grey, on july 30, addressed a message both to the french and the german governments, drawing their attention to this point and asking for assurance that belgian neutrality would be respected. the answer from france was quite satisfactory. the german govt., on the other hand, said that they were unable to give any answer to the ques- tion. on sunday, aug. 2, sir edward grey, on his own responsi- bility, without obtaining the consent of the cabinet, took another step. he informed the french that if a german fleet attacked france in the channel or the atlantic, great britain would immediately intervene with her fleet. apart from the belgian question, it would still have been possible for germany to keep great britain neutral by limiting the war against i'rance to land operations, and it would clearly have been in her interests to do so. all then seemed to depend on the belgian question. on monday, aug. 3, the german govt. formally declared war against france. the actual reasons given were statements that europe the french had violated german territory by dropping bombs from aeroplanes, and in other ways. the german govt. has since acknowledged that these statements were untrue. meanwhile it became known in london (aug. 2) that german forces had crossed the luxembourg frontier and occupied the grand duchy, the neutrality of which was guaranteed by the great powers, germany herself included; and also that the german minister at brussels (as sir e. grey told the house of commons on aug. 3) had delivered a note to the belgian govt. demanding free passage for their troops across belgian territory; if this was granted they undertook to leave belgium at the end of the war with her independence and territory unimpaired, and in fact held out hopes of increase of territory at the expense of france, either in europe or in the colonies. if the request was refused, belgium would be treated as an enemy. an answer was required within 12 hours. this action was excused by the statement that the german govt. had reliable information that french forces intended to enter belgium. but it is now known that the whole note, including this statement, had been drafted more than a week before by the general staff. after a midnight sitting of the belgian council of state, presided over by the king, a refusal was handed to herr von below. before this happened german troops had already crossed the frontier, and in consequence herr von below received his passport and was requested to leave the country immediately. these events were decisive for great britain. all the doubts by which the cabinet and large sections of the country had been assailed during the previous week were at once swept aside. on the afternoon of aug. 3, sir edward grey explained the menacing nature of the situation to the house of commons, and on the next day (after a further statement in parliament by the prime minister) an ultimatum was dispatched to berlin requiring the german govt. to respect belgian neutrality. this was presented by sir f.. goschen to herr von jagow; as the request was refused, he demanded his passport, and war between great britain and germany began at midnight (aug. 4-5). breliography.—the chief authority for the events dealt with above is the official correspondence published by the various goy- ernments. a translation of the full text of all documents published at the beginning of the war will be found in collected diplomatic documents relaiing to the outbreak of the exropean war, printed by the stationery office (1915). fuller publications have now been made by the british, german and austrian governments: he outbreak of war—foreign office documents (june 28-a tgust 4 1014), collected and arranged with introduction and notes by j. w. head- lam-morley; die deutschen dokumente zum kriegsausbruch, collected by karl kautsky (4 vol., berlin, 1919 seg.) english tr. '' oficial german documents relative to the world war\" (carnegie trust endowment, washington, 1923); diplomatische aktenstticke zur vorgeschichte des krieges 1914 (osterreichisch-ungarisches rotbuch); goos, das wiener kabineit und die itntstehung des weltkrieges (vienna, 1919); romberg, the falsifications of the russtan orange- book (english trans., london, 1923). in addition to the works referred to on pp. 1039-40, sce renouvin, les origtnes immedtates de la guerre (1925); montgelas, the case for the central powers (london, 1925); seton-watson, sarajevo, a study of the origins of the war (london, 1926), the very numerous works which appeared during the war are to a great extent superseded owing to the further information which is now available. w. h.-m.) iii. the war period the formation of the alliances ——a month after the declaration of war by austria-hungary on serbia (july 28 1914)—hostilities had already begun—tlrance, great britain, russia, serbia, montenegro and japan (since aug. 23) stood against germany and austria-hungary. on sept. 5 1914 the entente between france, britain and russia was transformed in london into a treaty by which the signatories undertook the obligation, amongst others, to conclude no peace with the enemy except in concert.) germany and austria-hungary were pledged to com- mon action by the treaty of oct. 7 1879, which was still in force at the outbreak of the war, and by the triple alliance, which had been renewed for the fourth time on dec. 7 1912.2 italy, t paritamentary papers, cd. 7737 ? for texts, see pribram, die pol iischen geheimvertrdge oesterreich- ungarns, 1879-1014 (vienna-leipzig, 1920), pp. 3-9, ioi-106, europe the third signatory to the latter treaty, replied to the request of the central powers for her co-operation that no casus foederis had arisen for her, since austria-hungary had taken the offensive against serbia. when the conflict between austria-hungary and serbia developed into the world war, the italian govt. promised benevolent neutrality, leaving the question open whether italy would not range herself on the side of her allies at some later date. italy made this support, however, contingent on conditions which the persons in charge of austro-hungarian policy de- clared utterly impossible. the negotiations of the central powers with their second ally, rumania, had been no more fortunate. the hopes which the emperor william, in particular, had entertained of king charles were disappointed. the ma- jority of influential rumanian politicians were too friendly to the entente, the old differences with the habsburg monarchy too deep, for king charles to be able to fulfil the obligations under- taken in the secret treaty of 1883 with the central powers, which had been renewed for the fourth time in feb. 1913.! francis joseph i. and william it. themselves brought their personal in- fluence to bear on king charles at the beginning of aug., and offered him, amongst other inducements, the acqusition of bessa- rabia after the successful termination of the war, in return for rumania’s active participation on the side of the central powers. it was in vain; the crown council of aug. 4 decided that no casus foederis had arisen for rumania, and she therefore preserved neutrality for the time. the central powers were rather more fortunate in their quest for new allies. on aug. 1 1914 the representatives of germany and turkey signed a treaty whereby the latter undertook to remain neutral should the conflict confine itself to one between austria-hungary and serbia, but to join the central powers as a belligerent should war break out between them and russia. soon after, when russia’s entry into the war was assured, the central powers increased their offers. they held out a promise to the sultan—not, indeed, in writing—that his participation in the war would be rewarded on its successful close by the abo- lition of the capitulations which were so unpopular in turkey, a favourable rectification of turkey’s frontier, and a proportionate share in any war indemnity obtained from the allies. meanwhile the representatives of the western powers in constantinople were making every effort to prevent turkey from joining their enemies. they were prepared to guarantee the sultan’s territory and to meet his wishes regarding the capitulations in return for his neutrality. the sultan and the grand vizier returned cour- teous answers to these offers, but decided finally for the central powers. at the end of oct. turkey commenced hostilities against russia; russia answered by declaring war; the western powers followed suit. the attitude of bulgaria proved a great disappointment to the central powers. austria-hlungary had long been engaged in negotiations with bulgaria, and these were so far advanced at the beginning of aug. 1914 that she confidently expected the treaty to be concluded almost immediately. in return for his active assistance in the war the central powers were prepared not merely to guarantee king ferdinand his existing territories, but also to satisfy his comprehensive ambition to establish bul- garia’s “ ethno-historical frontiers ’’ at the expense of such of the balkan states as did not ally themselves with the central powers. but king ferdinand and his government refused to enter on a war with serbia until they were sufficiently guaranteed by treaty that the opening of hostilities against serbia would not involve them in an attack from their neighbours, greece, ru- mania and turkey. the assurances offered by the entente for bulgaria’s alliance, or even her benevolent neutrality, contributed to this attitude. in aug. 1914, noel buxton, chairman of the balkan committee, had semi-officially sounded the bulgarian govt. as to whether it would accept a revision of the treaty of bucharest and a loan in return for armed neutrality. at the same time sazonov urged pasic, the serbian minister president, to make bulgaria territorial concessions in macedonia if this would induce her to take the field against the central powers. un- 1 pribram, op. cil., pp. io7-111. 1045 doubtedly, however, the hesitations of the ‘sofia govt. were largely due to the wish not to commit itself until one or the other group of combatants should have proved definitely superior in the field. meanwhile, the central powers had been disappointed in their hopes of bringing the war to a speedy end by force of arms. moreover, the consequences of the economic warfare to which the allies, particularly britain, had resorted were becoming felt. germany had lost a great part of her overseas possessions, and the central powers had suffered considerable economic losses of the most varied nature. the entry of turkey into the war afforded them a very re- spectable addition to their fighting forces, and something even more important. the hand which commanded the dardanelles controlled the sea route between the granaries of russia and the industrial states of the west. an enemy in mesopotamia and mount sinai could threaten britain in india, egypt and the suez canal. as suzerain of many indian mahommedans who revered the sultan as their spiritual head, britain, and france too, had to reckon with the solidarity and hostility of the pan- islamic movement. britain at once took the necessary measures of precaution. she declared that she would annex cyprus, pro- claimed a protectorate over egypt, declared the khedive abbas, who was the sultan’s partisan, deposed, and set the son of ismail on the throne of egypt in his stead. russia, unlike the western powers, found the idea of a war with turkey not disagreeable. a victory held out prospect of rich spoils; above all, constantinople and the dardanelles. and the western powers showed themselves prepared to fulfil russia’s wishes. during the negotiations which occupied the succeeding months, russia, encouraged by the success of her armies against those of austria-hungary, increased her demands. in a memo- randum which she presented at the beginning of march 1915 she claimed as reward for a successful war constantinople, the west coasts of the bosporus, of the sea of marmora and of the dar- danelles, thrace as far as the enos-midia line, the coast of asia minor between the bosporus and the river sakaria and the islands in the sea of marmora with imbros and tenedos. the british and french govts. demanded in return that constan- tinople be declared a free port for the transit of goods not origi- nating from or bound for russian ports, that free passage be guaranteed to their mercantile marine through the straits, that their territorial claims to districts in turkey in asia, to be exactly defined later, be recognised. the holy places were to be put under independent mahommedan rule, the north zone of persia to be in the british sphere of influence. russia agreed with all essential demands of the western powers, whereupon the latter gave their written consent on march 12 1915 to russia’s annexation of constantinople and the straits.? meanwhile hostilities had commenced bet ween the turks and their enemies, in which the former gave evidence of skill and endurance, but were hampered by shortage of arms and material of war. their allies in central europe would have helped them here, but it was not easy, as they had no secure land route to turkey; the countries in the way, especially rumania, were by no means willing to conform to the wishes which the central powers expressed in this matter. it was therefore the more urgently necessary for the latter to persuade rumania and bulgaria, or one of them at least, to enter the war on their side. negotiations to this effect had been in progress since the autumn of 1914, but remained without result as the reports which reached sofia and bucharest from the theatres of war ran unfavourably for the central powers. the representatives of the entente powers in rumania gained ground. on oct. 1 (sept. 18 o.s.) an agreement had been concluded between russia and rumania, whereby rumania pledged herself to benevolent neutrality towards russia in return for a guarantee of her exist- ing territory and the right to incorporate the rumanian-speak- ing districts lying within austro-hungarian territory. on sept. 23 the rumanian statesmen made a compact with those of italy to regulate their attitude to the belligerents in concert and unison 2for text of this constantinople agreement, see h. w. v. tem- perley, zzistory of the peace conference at paris, vol. 6, pp. 4-9. 1046 only. at the same time they had carried the negotiations with the central powers further, but had increased their territorial demands. to these the austro-hungarian govt. gave a firm refusal. so at the beginning of oct. 1914 rumania’s entry into the camp of the entente powers, who had been lavish with their promises seemed imminent. yet the fear of an attack from their neighbours, bulgaria and turkey, and the deathbed resistance of the old king, at last restrained the government from declaring for war against the central powers, and determined it to abide by its neutrality for the time. this attitude was preserved by ferdinand, who succeeded to the throne when king charles died on oct. 10, although his personal sympathies were with the. entente and the inilucnce of most of his ministers and of his wife pointed in the same direction. in the course of the winter 1ro14—-5 the negotiations with the central powers were continued, but the rumanian statesmen increased their demands, which now included, not merely the bukovina, but transylvania as well. in feb. 1915 the agreement of sept. with italy was renewed and expanded; the two powers now guaranteed each other mutual help in case of an unprovoked attack from austria-hungary. when the government in vienna rejected rumania’s comprehensive terri- torial demands, the outbreak of war seemed inevitable; but although italy declared war on may 23rd 1915, the military re- vival of the central powers in galicia just stopped rumania from following her example. as the prospects that the central powers would persuade rumania to enter the world war on their side diminished, so their anxiety grew to secure bulgaria as an ally. they needed her to secure a safe passage for the arms and materials of war which germany had promised turkey in the treaty of jan. 11 191s, to which austria-hungary had adhered on march 21; to keep rumania in check; and to take an active part in the coming campaign against serbia. throughout the spring austria- hungary: had refused to grant bulgaria’s steadily increasing demands. but in the summer the views of ferdinand and his advisers changed. they recognised the fact that the central pow- ers—not to speak of the great improvement in their military situation—had nothing to prevent them from gratifying bul- garia’s territorial ambitions, especially those relating to serb territory in macedonia, while the allies had always to fear that equal concessions on their part to bulgaria must deeply offend their faithful ally serbia. their representatives in sofia made the attempt all the same. as early as may, after the failure of the first attempts to force the dardanelles, they had told bulgaria that if she would attack turkey she might occupy and retain thrace up to the enos-midia line. furthermore, they pledged themselves to bring pressure to bear on greece to cede kavalla, promised financial assistance, and were prepared to guarantee bulgaria south macedonia on condition that she only occupied it after the conclusion of peace and after serbia had been pre- viously compensated by bosnia and hercegovina and on the adriatic coast. this point far more than all the others brought their plan to nought. under the pressure of the western powers, the skupt- china declared itself ready on aug. 16 1915 to cede macedonian territory 1o bulgaria, but insisted that it could only be handed over after serbia was already in possession of those parts of the habsburg monarchy which the allies had destined as compensa- tion for her, while even in june bulgaria had demanded from the entente powers that the macedonian districts in serbia’s possession be handed over to her immediately. so the balance in sofia inclined ever more towards the central powers. none the less, difficult negotiations were still to follow before the trea- ties were signed on sept. 6 1915 which ranged bulgaria definitely in the camp of the central powers and turkey. her reward was the guarantee of her independence and existing frontiers, a large loan and the assurance of the annexation of east serbia and the greater part of macedonia. in return she pledged herself to place at least four divisions at the service of the central powers in the offensive which was being planned against serbia. in addition, bulgaria was promised that if rumania or greece made kurope an unprovoked attack on her, the districts which she had ceded to these powers in 1913 by the treaty of bucharest should be restored to her. on the same day, the reconciliation between bulgaria and turkey, for which the central powers had worked so hard, was perfected, the sultan having consented toa rectifica- tion of the frontier on both sides of the maritsa in bulgaria’s favour. the line of communications between the central powers and turkey was now open and the campaign against serbia could commence. the acquisition of bulgaria was a success for the central powers, but could not compensate for the loss they had suffered some months previously when italy passed over to their enemies. while both groups of combatants had vied for italy’s support since the outbreak of war, her statesmen had at first adopted an attitude of reserve towards both alike. they had assured their allics of their intention to keep to the spirit and letter of the triple alliance, but at the same time they had nourished the hopes of the other side and meanwhile had armed busily. but the further their preparations for war had advanced, the larger were the demands which they made from both sides. from the habsburg monarchy they required territorial concessions which grew ever more extensive. they began with the trentino; but as the negotiations went on, as the reluctance of the austrian govt. to give up home soil was overcome by the unfavourable military situation and the ceaseless pressure from germany, italy’s claims grew enormous. at the same time she negotiated with the allies. they too, especially russia, found italy’s demands difficult of fulfilment, and saw that to grant them must lead in the future to complica- cations with other allies, especially with serbia. but the resis- tance of the entente diplomats grew less as the course of the campaign showed ever more clearly that they could not dispense with italy’s help if the war was to be brought, as they hoped, to a speedy and successful conclusion. and as the italian statesmen saw more and more hope that their demands, which were exactly formulated at the beginning of march 1915, would be accepted by the allies, they increased their pretensions to austrian terri- tory. in april r915 they demanded from the court at vienna as the price of their neutrality for the duration of the war— there was no more talk of active participation on the side of the central powers—not only south tirol, gorizia and gradisca, a number of the most important adriatic islands, complete sover- eignty for italy over valona, austria-hungary’s “ desinteresse- ment ” in atbania and the proclamation of trieste and its sur- roundings as a territory independent of austria-hungary, but also the immediate occupation by italy of the austrian districts. the last-named demand was definately refused by the vienna cabinet, but in view of the dangerous military situation of the moment, and at the urgent request of the german statesmen and generals, who were even reinforced for the time by conrad von edtzendorf, then austria-hungary’s leading military authority, the cabinet continued the negotiations and made one concession after another. but the italian govt., strongly pressed by the representatives of the allies, who finally agreed to all italy’s demands, but insisted on a quick decision, dragged on the negotiations with the central powers, and finally, on april 26, signed the treaty of london, by which italy pledged herself to enter the war on the side of the allies within a month. her reward was to include the trentino, south tirol up to the bren- ner, gorizia and gradisca, istria, the town and district of trieste, north dalmatia, numerous islands off the adriatic coast, valona, the twelve islands off the coast of asia minor, the protection of her interests in the mediterranean and possibly the annexation of adalia, the extension of her possessions in eritrea, somaliland and libya; a loan of {50,000,000 on easy terms; in case of a successful end to the war a due proportion of the war indemnity and the promise that the pope should have no say at the conclusion of peace or in any other question affect- ing the war.! after the conclusion of this treaty, italy continued her ne- 1 for full text see temperley, op. cit., vol. 5, pp. 384-393. see also below, evrore: interallied diplomacy. kurope gotiations with the central powers. burian, who had succeeded berchtold as austro-hungarian foreign minister in jan. 1915, in vain increased his offers in the attempt to change the attitude of the italian government. on may 3 italy denounced her treaty with austria-hungary; three weeks later, on may 23, she declared war. germany broke off diplomatic relations with italy, but war was not formally declared between these two powers, since a few days before italy’s declaration of war on austria-hungary they had made agreements directed to the maintenance of certain economic relations. italy only declared war on germany on aug. 27 1916, the day of rumania’s entry into the camp of the allies. after the conclusion of their treaty with bulgaria on sept. 6 r915, the central powers reopened their campaign against serbia, whose situation now became most difficult. the state of affairs was such that the western powers, although prepared to send help to their ally, could do so only through the greek aegean port of salonika. the attitude of greece was therefore all-important. ‘the minister president in athens, venisclos, since the outbreak of war, had worked tirclessly to make greece side with the western powers. king constantine, however, un- der the influence of his wife, who was william ii.’s sister, refused most firmly to adopt his minister president’s policy, and dis- missed him in march rg1s5. but the new elections in the summer of 1915 brought a majority for the friends of the allies; the king was obliged once more to entrust the new ministry to the leader- ship of veniselos, who made every effort to force constantine to join the enemies of the central powers unreservedly. the king, fortified by the loyalty of his military party, succeeded in main- taining his policy of neutrality. venisclos resigned a second time. but meanwhile, he had conducted the negotiations with the allies so far that the first troops from the dardanelles force could land at salonika on oct. 5 1915, although greece made a formal protest. but they came too late. the campaign which the central powers and bulgaria had conducted against serbia ended in their complete victory, despite heroic resistance. be- fore the end of 1915 the whole of serbia was in their occupation. soon after the austro-hungarian troops conqucred montenegro and northern albania. ‘the central powers had further great victories to report on other theatres of war, especially against russia; at the end of 1915 they had occupied congress poland, lithuania and courland. yet they had won no victory which could determine the issue of the war, and both sides made the most extensive preparations to resume hostilities in 1916. great britain succeeded in bringing about a breach between portugal and the central powers in feb. 1916; but all the efforts of the central powers failed to persuade rumania to abandon her neutrality in 1915, since tisza’s attitude made territorial con- cessions as a price impossible; although such concessions were urged by the german govt. and supreme command and also by conrad von hetzendorf. in june 1916 the great success of the russians over the austro- hungarian troops at luck and okna had a deep effect on the rumanian government. ‘the friends of the allies now pre- ponderated. the negotiations with the representatives of the allies were resumed, and led, especially after france had suc- ceeded in smoothing over certain hesitations felt by russia, to the conclusion of the treaty of aug. 17 1916. rumania was promised the acquisition of the bukovina, transylva- nia, the eastern banat and a number of other hungarian comitates. a military convention was concluded on the same day between the entente powers and rumania. ten days later rumania declared war on austria-hungary, and opened up hos- tilities immediately. the central powers took up the challenge with such complete success that by the end of 1916 a very great part of the country was in their hands. this was only one of the many successes gained by their troops in 1916; but the situation of the quadruple alliance de- veloped less favourably in the non-european theatres of war, notably turkey in asia and german east africa. even more serious to the central powers were the growing economic privations, the consequences of which grew ever more apparent 1047 in the course of 1916. shut off as they were from the world mar- ket, they began to feel the shortage of raw materials, which they needed urgently for rationing their armies and civilian popula- tions, and procuring the necessary requisites of war. the short- age of foodstuffs, which was especially felt in the large towns, provoked discontent among those circles of the population which were most deeply affected. internal difficulties found expression in germany in conilicts between the politically and socially dix vided parties, while in the habsburg monarchy in additicn they added strength to the national movements which endangered the unity of the state. the first peace offers: the u.s.a. as a neutral —these internal troubles were an important factor in the decision of the central powers to join with their allies at the end of 1916 in laying an offer of peace before the enemy. the first step was taken by baron burian. he brought his proposal forward while francis joseph still lived. francis joseph had spoken in favour of a peace by understanding shortly after the outbreak of war, and had listened attentively to all pro- posals in this direction, but had never tolerated the idea of a separate peace. on oct. 16 1916 burian was at the german headquarters in pless, and there propounded his plan. bethmann hollweg and the majority of german statesmen approved it, but demanded postponement till the close of the campaign against rumania, and refused to communicate their conditions of peace at once. after negotiations, which countinued until after the death of francis joseph on nov. 21 1916 and the fall of bucharest it was agreed to proclaim the quadruple alliance’s readiness for peace and to propose to the enemy a peace conference in the course of which the conditions of the quadruple alliance should be communicated. but it was soon apparent that the leading statesmen of the allies had no intention of sitting down to confer with the quadruple alliance. negotiations had been in progress between the western powers and russia which led in march 1917 to an agreement whereby the “zones of influence and territorial acquisitions ” of the three powers on a possible dis- memberment of turkish possessions in asia had been defined. britain was to receive southern mesopotamia, with baghdad and two ports in syria; france, syria, the vilayet of adana and western kurdistan; russia, amongst other prizes, trebizond, ikrzerum, van and districts in southern kurdistan, alexandretta was to become a free port, palestine with the holy places to be taken away from turkey and placed under a “‘ special regime,” the nature of which was to be determined by agreement between france, russia and britain.} these plans by themselves, combined with the promises which had been held out by the entente to italy, serbia and rumania, could have afforded the quadruple alliance no fitting basis for negotiations, as they would have imposed the greatest sacrifices on three of its members, austria-hungary, bulgaria and turkey. germany also would have had to submit to exceedingly hard conditions. after the “ miracle on the marne ”’ it had become an article of faith among the people of france that alsace-lorraine must be restored to france. but the plans of france’s leading statesmen went further. in the negotiations with russia, which were already far advanced at the end of 1916 and led to the con- clusion of a treaty on feb. 12 1917, that power not only recog- nised the claims of france to alsace-lorraine, the saar district and syria; she pledged herself further to support france’s plan of erecting a buffer state on the left bank of the rhine. this state was indeed to be neutral, but was to stand under french protection. italy demanded a share in any territorial extensions in asia. at the end of nov. 1915 she had adhered, according to article 16 of the treaty of april 26 1915, to the treaty of sept. 4 1914 against a separate peace. at that time and throughout 1916 she had made it quite plain to her allies that she would in no circumstances allow a peace to be concluded which involved her renunciation of any part of the territorial acquisitions prom- ised her in the treaty of london. in britain, too, both the home political situation and the 1 for text of this agreement (sykes-picot), see temperley, op. ctt., vol. 6, p. 16. see also below, europe: interallied diplomacy. 1048 attitude of the colonies showed the greatest determination. the chicf mouthpiece of the “ will to win ” was lloyd george, who had become first secretary of state for war, then prime minister. in dec. 1916 he proclaimed the ‘“‘ knock-out blow ” as the resolve not only of himself but also of the british cabinet, their military adviscrs and their allics. among the jast-named he included russia where, since the fall of stiirmer and protopopov, who would ‘probably not have been averse from a separate peace with the quadruple alliance in nov. 1916, the war party, vigorously supported by the ambassadors of great britain and france, had gained the upper hand. at the end of 1916, trepov, stiirmer’s successor, declared the tsar’s fixed resolution to continue the war at the side of the allies and to abide by his resolve to in- corporate constantinople in his empire. at the same time a promise was issued to establish an autonomous great poland under the guarantee of the whole entente. this was done to neutralise the effect which the central powers had caused by the “ polish manifesto ’ of nov. 5 1916. as, however, the latter could not agree over the fate of congress poland, although they had been deliberating the subject since the fall of warsaw on aug. 5 rgt5, they had decided to postpone the final solution of the polish question. to allay the anxiety of the poles about their future, and to induce them to render effective military assistance, a proclamation had been issued on nov. § 1916 promising the restoration of an independent congress poland, which should yet be closcly connected with the central powers as a constitutional monarchy. the effect of this step was, how- ever, neutralised by the above-mentioned declaration by russia and the western powers; the hopes which the central powers had entertained of vigorous support from the poles were not fulfilled. the poles continued to negotiate with both sides, always keeping in view their aim of erecting an independent state to embrace all polish territory. the western powers were less successful in their efforts to persuade their ally outside europe, japan, to render them active assistance. after taking tsingtao, japan thought it unnecessary to carry on further active hostilitics. she now contented herself with supplying*her allics with material of war, and in the case of russia with artillery instructors, taking advantage meanwhile of the favourable opportunity to extend her sphere of influence in che far east. in fact, china, weakened by internal unrest, con- cluded a treaty on jan. 2 1915 whereby she recognised the po- litical and economic suzerainty of japan in parts of the chinese empire, and something over a year jater, in july 1916, there fol- lowed a separate treaty between russia and japan which left the latter almost a free hand in the far east. this expansion of the japanese power was not welcome to the western powers, but they accepted it, although unwillingly. japan had adhered in oct. 191§ to the pact of london against a separate peace, but this did not weigh heavily on her, nor prevent the japanese govt. from entrusting its minister in stockholm with the charge of negotiations with the german minister there, aiming at the conclusion of a peace to include russia. this was the situation when the central powers made their peace offer in the middle of dec. 1916. it was to be expected that it would meet with no friendly reception from the other side. the lack of any closer details regarding the conditions of peace and the somewhat disingenuous estimate of the military situa- tion were factors which must weaken the impression of this peace pronouncement. in these circumstances nothing but strong pressure from a neutral quarter could have persuaded the allicd statesmen to enter on negotiations with the enemy. of the neutrals the president of the united states alone could hope that his intercession would be powerful enough to give matters a turn in favour of a peace by agreement. his position was very difficult. by far the greater part of the population of the u.s. had sympathised strongly from the beginning with great britain. france, too, was more popular there than germany. wilson certainly never thought cf ranging himself with the cuadruple alliance. but it long remained his intention to keep neutral, and then play the part of peace intermediary when the moment arrived. soon after the outbreak of war he had called kurope on the belligerent powers to respect the declaration of london, and had replied to reservations made by britain that he wished to see the rights and duties of the u.s. respected “‘ in accordance with the accepted principles of international law and treaty obligations.”? the british blockade of the north sea (nov. 3 ro14) had evoked a protest from the government in washington and led to negotiations, the course of which proved that wilson fas anxious to maintain the freedom of the seas. the question of submarine warfare and the use of floating mines and attacks on merchantmen again showed a wide difference of opinion be- tween britain and america. even after a german submarine had torpedoed the *‘ lusitania ’” on may 7 (915, causing 124 amer- ican citizens to lose their lives, wilson made every endeavour in face of the immense excitement prevailing among his country- men to prevent the outbreak of war against germany, and for a time was successful. hepromised that if germany would abandon submarine warfare he would use every means of intervention with her enemies to have the hunger blockade raised, but made it clear at the same time that he would have to declare war on germany if citizens of the u.s. lost their lives in this fashion. germany had pleaded as justification that the ‘ lusitania ’’ had been armed with guns and was carrying materials of war for the allies. when the british passenger boat “ arabic’ was torpedoed in aug. and two americans lost their lives, the german govt. expressed its regret in washington, and count bernstorff, its ambassador there, declared that the german submarines had already received orders not to attack passenger ships in the future. in spite of all this, the “ sussex ’’ was torpedoed in march 1916, and several citizens of the u.s. perished with her. the u.s. now sent an ultimatum to the german government. the latter gave a public declaration that merchant vessels should be sunk only in the future after warning given and after the crews had been saved. it demanded in return that the govt. of the u.s. should intervene in london and make england “ recognise the laws of humanity’; which wilson refused to do. the declaration of london which followed on july 7 1916 did not satisfy the german govt.; nevertheless throughout 1916 it observed the assurances which it had given the united states.' thanks to this attitude, although the news of german tor- pedo attacks, the transportation of belgian workmen into ger- many and the anti-german propaganda of the western powers directed public opinion in america ever more towards active intervention against germany, wilson resolved to persevere in his pacific efforts. after his re-election as president in nov. 1916 he approached the belligerents on dec. 18 with an open offer of mediation. he called on them to publish their peace terms, giving expression at the same time to his favourite hope of secur- ing lasting peace for the world by the formation of a league of nations.2 this pronouncement, although it followed only a few days after the offer of the quadruple alliance of dec. 12, had been prepared long before and was not influenced by it. the german answer came quickly. it ran: “* germany considered that a last- ing peace would be best attained through direct negotiations between the belligerent powers in a neutral country. after the close of the present war germany would gladly co-operate with the u.s. to prevent wars in the future.”’ before germany’s answer had reached wilson, the entente powers had published their reply, curtly declining the proposals of the central powers in favour of peace by agreement. briand, the french minister of foreign affairs, described the offer of the quadruple alliance as a war manoeuvre which must not be taken seriously. pokrovsky, the russian, declared that it must be rejected “ with indignation ’’; sonnino conjured his country- men to stand solid with italy’s allies in their altitude towards this “‘ treacherous step ’; and lloyd george gave his opinion that to enter into a conference at germany’s invitation, and with germany proclaiming herself victorious, and without any notion of the proposals she has to make, is “ to put our heads into a 'for further information, see c. e. seymour, the intimate papers of colonel house, 2 vol., 1926. 2 parliameniary papers, cad. 8431 for text. europe noose.” these verbal declarations by the leading statesmen of the four great powers were followed on dec. 30 by the written answer of the allies. in this it was pointed out, not unjustly, that the enemy had based their estimate of the military situa- tion exclusively on the european theatres of war. their offer was devoid of “ all substance or precision.”” the central powers were described as the sole authors of the world war; expiation was demanded from them and their allies for the crimes which they had committed and full reparation for all destruction caused by the war.! the meaning of this phrase was shown most clearly by the answer which its authors gave to the president of the u.s. on jan. 10 1917 in reply to his declaration of dec. 18 1916. germany was to suffer considerable territorial curtail- ments in the east and the west, the habsburg monarchy to be dismembered by the ‘ liberation of the italians, slavs, ruma- nians, czechs and serbs from foreign rule,” turkey banished from europe, the peoples smarting under her yoke to be delivered from her tyrannies. the poles were promised full autonomy in accordance with the tsar’s manifesto. the allies declared themselves as agreeing “ whole-heartedly with wilson’s ideal, “ the league of nations.’”? the negative answer returned by germany, which wilson found too indefinite, contrasted with the approval shown by the allies of his favourite idea; and their definite proposals could not but impress him and inevitably strengthen the influence of those circles in his entourage which were working tirelessly to bring the u.s. into the war on the side of the allies. none the less, wilson did not yet abandon his plan of mediation. he negoti- ated further with the german govt. and asked it to define its peace terms exucth:— moreover, he declared himself prepared to carry on confidential conversations. germany gave no official answer to these offers. bernstorff was empowered to state in washington that germany was gladly prepared to enter into discussions aiming at preventing the outbreak of wars in the future. at the present moment, however, germany could not welcome wilson’s official mediation, as this must give the allies the impression that the peace offer of the quadruple alliance had been dictated by fear of the future. germany’s peace con- ditions, washington was informed, were very moderate. she did not wish to annex belgium, but allowed no discussion what- ever on alsace-lorraine. these declarations impressed wilson favourably, and he persevered in his efforts to advocate a peace by understanding. on jan. 22 1917 he spoke in the senate against a peace dictated by the victory of either group of bellig- erents, as this could not bring lasting peace. ‘‘ only peace between equals can last.” he demanded freedom for the op- pressed peoples, freedom of the seas, reduction of armaments. the u.s. would be ready to “ join in guaranteeing the perma- nence of a peace based on such foundations.’ on the following day wilson’s confidant, col. house, who had already held conversations on the possibility of peace with the leaders of both groups during journeys to europe in 1915 and 1916—although indeed without success—asked bernstorff to recommend his government to communicate its peace terms to the president, either publicly or confidentially, whereupon the latter would propose a peace conference. soon after, wil- son repeated his offer in person. bernstorff urged his govern- ment strongly to fall in with wilson’s wishes. but he had al- ready been informed by his government that germany had determined to start unrestricted submarine warfare on [eb.1 1917. this resolution, the outcome in the main of the ever- increasing influence which the supreme military and naval authorities were gaining over the leading german statesmen and the emperor william ii., had in fact been taken on jan. 9 1917 in a crown council at pless. the objections which had been raised in particular by the german chancellor bethmann hollweg, including the consideration of the almost certain entry of the u.s. into the war, had been met by the statement of the 1¥for text, see, parliamentary papers, cd. 8467. 2for text see parliamentary papers, cd. 8468. 3 see g. lowes dickinson, documents relating to peace proposals and war aims (dec. 1916-nov. i918), pp. 24-30. 1049 german admiralty that britain would be forced to come to terms within five months of the commencement of the unre- stricted submarine warfare, and by that of the army command that it could only guarantee the safety of the western front if the unrestricted submarine warfare were introduced. a hard struggle was still necessary to win the consent of the government in vienna. the young empcror charles, who had only ascended the throne a few weeks previously, did not share the high expectations which the german supreme command based upon the unrestricted submarine warfare. the new min- ister for foreign affairs, count czernin, shared the emperor’s views. both declared that the direct result of the unrestricted submarine warfare would be the declaration of war by the u.s. and therefore the beginning of an unlucky end. fully convinced that a victorious peace was now impossible for the quadruple alliance, they were working for a peace by agreement, and wished accordingly to avoid everything which would multiply their enemies and strengthen their determination. but their resistance was silenced by the increasing pressure from germany and by the statements of conrad von hetzendorf and admiral haus that the introduction of unrestricted submarine warfare was necessary and promised good results.4 the u.s.a. as belligerent: weakening of austria- hungary.— on jan. 3x 1917 bernstorff informed wilson that germany would begin the unrestricted submarine warfare on feb. 1. this determined wilson’s attitude. on feb. 3 the u.s. broke off diplomatic relations with germany. two months later, on april 6 t917~—she had learnt meanwhile that germany had offered the mexican govt. an alliance in case of a german- american war—she declared war on germany; but on austria- hungary not till dec. 4 1917. the other american states (ex- cept mexico, colombia, venezuela, paraguay, the argentine and chile) followed the example of the u.s.a. but did not go beyond giving the allies their economic support. britain had already succeeded in feb. 1917 in overcoming japan’s resistance to china’s joining the war against the quadruple alliance, and had induced japan herself to furnish a squadron to protect british interests, especially in the mediterranean. in return the british govt. recognised japan’s claim to germany’s former rights in shantung, and agreed that the former german south sea islands north of the equator should be allotted to japan, while those south of the equator should go to australia. france adhered to this agreement at the beginning of march. china broke off diplomatic relations with germany on march 14; her formal declaration of war on the central powers only followed on aug. 14 1917, shortly before siam, too, had resolved to join the allies. european neutrals, however, preserved their attitude. the sympathies of denmark and norway had always been with the allies; in sweden they moved in this direction under the influence of branting, especially after the u.s. had entered the war. holland was largely dependent, commercially, on britain. even in spain, where the king favoured the central powers for family reasons and dato’s conservative govt. had supported this attitude, there was a period during 1916 and early 1917, while romanones’ liberal govt. was in power, when spain might have joined the allies but for the king’s determined opposition. switzerland remained strictly neutral. only greece grew ever more dependent on the western powers, although king con- stantine resisted their encroachments with all vigour. in order to guard the rear of their army of the orient, the western powers forced greece to disarm her army in oct. 1916, and soon after to hand over her ficet. veniselos, who had been working for them tirelessly, proclaimed a revolutionary counter-govern- ment in salonika and forced constantine, whose life appeared in danger, to call on the representatives of the central powers on nov. 11 to leave athens. under the circumstances greece’s entry into the allied camp seemed only a question of time.* 4 for further information, see czernin, in the world war, passim; conrad von hetzendorf, aus meiner dienstsett, vol. 4, passim. 6 for greek negotiations with both the central and the enteute powers, see frangulis, la grece et la crise mondiale, vol. i. io50 in order to increase the determination of the porte, which was groaning under its increased war burden, the german govt. had promised it on sept. 28 1916 to conclude no separate peace with the common enemy, and to admit turkey to a share in the con- quered territory proportionate to her military efforts. soon afterwards, on jan. 11 1917, these two powers arrived at a further agreement, in which the abolition of the oppressive “capitulations ” was granted. the provisions of these two treaties were expanded in a manner favourable to turkey on nov. 27 1917. the government in vienna gave its adherence to these treaties, although only after long hesitation. the allies had planned a general offensive in the west, east and south of europe for 1917, with further campaigns in the theatres of war outside europe. various circumstances delayed the opening of hostilities. meanwhile something happened which gravely disturbed their plans. the russian dynasty was over- thrown. on march rs nicholas ii. was forced to abdicate. miljukov, the minister of foreign affairs of the first revolu- tionary govt., assured his allies that russia would remain loyal to them; but it was soon obvious that there could be no hope of effective co-operation by the russian armies in the proposed general offensive. germany was therefore enabled to employ a considerable number of her troops from the east to strengthen her western front, and thus successfully to resist the violent offensive of the western powers which began in april. this fact and the comparatively great successes gained by germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare in its first months had a certain reaction on opinion in britain and france. many french soldiers gave vent to their discontent and war weariness in grave excesses and mutinies. in england too the fear of food shortage grew with the increasing success of the german sub- marines. in april and may there were days when the men in authority in paris and london reckoned with the possibility that the war would take a final turn in favour of the quadruple alliance. now, if ever, was the moment when a decisive success for the enemy in any theatre of war whatever could have brought the entente to open up negotiations for a peace by understand- ing. but the central powers did not achieve this decisive vic- tory, and the leading french and british statesmen were soon able to take severe measures against the malcontents, to stimu- late patriotic passions and to imbue their armies and civilian population with fresh confidence in ultimate victory. not only were they able to point out how the entry of the u.s.a. into the war increased their strength, how russia had resumed the battle against the enemy, but their masterly propaganda had its effect on friend and foe alike in many ways. indeed, this propaganda fostered the old internal conflicts within the central powers.! it grew ever more apparent how widely the views of the differ- ent parties inside and outside the german reichstag differed on the ultimate goal of the war. on the one side was the will to dictate a peace through victory and to stand staunch by the old form of the state; on the other the cry for a peace by agreement and more influence for the reichstag on home and foreign policy. in the habsburg monarchy all these social differences were aggravated by national feuds. the enemies at home of the dualist system and of the hegemony of the germans in austria and the magyars in hungary pointed out with ever-increasing vehemence that the victory of the central powers could only bring the slavs and latins of the monarchy the continuance in aggravated form of their present oppression. the emigres, led by the czech masaryk, worked from abroad with the same argu- ments. the emperor charles and his foreign minister czernin had ample occasion to convince themselves of the growing war- weariness of the soldiers and of those circles of the austrian civilian population which were especially hard hit by the hunger blockade. these considerations, as well as the increasing direct- ness with which the slav and latin irredentas aimed at destroy- ing the unity of the monarchy, necessarily confirmed charles and czernin in the resolution to abide by the idea enunciated in the peace offer of dec. 12 1916. ‘for further information as to the entente propaganda, see sir campbell stuart, the secrets of crewe house. hurope both thought that it was easier for them than for their allies to pave the way towards a peace by understanding; both believed that the western powers were not aiming at that time at the complete destruction of the ilabsburg monarchy. they were at one, too, in the conviction that there was no time to be lost. they did not believe that the german u-boat warfare would bring a decisive success, and feared that once the united states had entered the war actively the western powers would refuse any proposal for a peace by understanding. they were resolved to aim at an universal peace, but they believed that this could not be achieved without strong pressure on the german emperor and his chancellor. and indeed william ii., who was unduly influenced by his army command, still envisaged peace terms which could only have been achieved after a complete victory of the quadruple alliance. charles and his minister, on the other hand, thought that the general situation imperatively required germany to make a territorial sacrifice in alsace-lor- raine, if peace negotiations with the enemy were to be conducted with any prospect of success. in order to reconcile his allies to this sacrifice, czernin had suggested to the chancellor, when he visited vienna in march 1917, that germany might take congress poland as compensa- tion for territorial sacrifices on her western frontier. yet the pacifist feeling at the vienna court did not awaken the expected echo in berlin. czernin accordingly prepared a memorandum for the emperor charles on april 12, and had it communicated to william ii.? in this the internal situation of the habsburg monarchy was painted in the blackest colours, and its collapse, involving a revolution and the downfall of the dynasty, was rep- resented as imminent. a few days before, czernin renewed in authoritative quarters in germany his offer to compensate the german empire for eventual losses in alsace-lorraine by the permanent acquisition of congress poland enlarged by the addi- tion of galicia. the habsburg monarchy should compensate herself at the expense of rumania for this loss of territory. but this attempt too met with failure. at first, indeed, the german chancellor showed himself not entirely averse on prin- ciple from accepting czernin’s proposals; gradually, however, the plans of the army command prevailed, as expressed in the agreements made in kreuznach on may 17 and 18. here ger- many proposed to annex the coal basins of bricy and longwy, and to establish economic and military unity between belgium and herself. there was no further mention of the cession of parts of alsace-lorraine, but austria-itungary stipulated, not only that her integrity should be guaranteed, but that she should receive some accessions of territory in the balkans. germany furthermore agreed, in the event of her being able to carry out ‘‘ the territorial incorporation (angliederung) of courland and lithuania together with the dependence (anlehnung) of poland contemplated on the german side, that rumania so far as occu- pied, with the exception of the dobruja (frontier anterior to 1913) and a border strip to the south of the cerna-voda-con- stanta railway, falls as a separate state into the austro-hun- garian sphere of interests, subject to a guarantee for germany’s economic interests in rumania.’’ on fulfilment of these condi- tions austria-hungary consented to renounce her condominium in poland, and promised to declare her “‘ desinteressement,” political and military, in that country. on june 9 1917 william if. and charles signed an agreement as to poland’s military forces, by which their organisation was placed entirely in the hands of germany. the attitude of the emperor charles and czernin towards their ally is only comprehensible in conjunction with the nego- tiations which they had been conducting with the western powers since eb. 1917 in the hope of attaining a peace by understand- ing. when bethmann hollweg visited vienna in the middle of march t91r7, czernin had informed him that it looked as though france would not be averse from conversations; he stated at the same time that italy had made an overture for peace. beth- mann-hollweg pointed out in his answer that france would undoubtedly demand the cession of alsace-lorraine as a condi- 2 for the text, see czernin, in the world war, pp. 146-150. europe tio sine qua non, and this he could neither propose to his em- peror nor justify before the german people. he also doubted the wisdom of evacuating the districts which germany had occupied in france and belgium before the conclusion of the negotiations, ‘‘ since this was the only means of forcing england to give back the conquered german colonies.” yet he agreed in principle to the peace conversations proposed by austria, but insisted that the austrian intermediary must adopt a passive attitude; he might only hint cautiously that an understanding between france and germany seemed possible on the basis of an exchange of territory in europe, a general colonial agreement and economic compensation; at the same time he was to ask the french what britain’s attitude to such an agreement would be. as for the east, negotiations had been opened up from a russian quarter, shortly before the tsar’s abdication, in favour of a sepa- rate peace with the central powers; but these had now become irrelevant. bethmann hollweg therefore thought that the cen- tral powers should not evacuate the territories in their occupa- tion in russia and the balkans before the enemy had retired from the occupied territory of austria-hungary. the proposed new acquisitions for germany and austria-hungary should be partitioned on as fair a scale as possible. the german chancellor was not informed that charles and czernin had already opened up negotiations with france through the emperor’s brother-in-law, prince sixtus of parma, on a quite different basis. since, however, bethmann hollweg had con- sented on principle to open up these negotiations with the enemy, charles and czernin considered themselves justified in pursuing the course which they had adopted. a few days after the german chancellor had left vienna prince sixtus arrived there. he proffered proposals on the lines of his letter of march 16 to the emperor charles which were certainly irreconcilable with the treaty obligations of the monarchy. czernin treated the prince coolly, but had not the energy to shake him off. so it came that his proposal for the imperial answer to be given to prince six- tus’ declarations was disregarded. instead, a letter in the emperor’s own hand was given sixtus on march 24 without czer- nin’s knowledge. this letter made, indeed, no mention of a separate armistice or of a separate peace, but contained an assur- ance to poincare of the emperor’s readiness to support “ the just claims of france to alsace lorraine ” in berlin, and to work for the restoration of belgium and serbia as sovereign states. belgium was to receive suitable compensation for the losses she had incurred, serbia to receive a natural outlet in the adriatic and far-reaching economic concessions. in return for the concessions made to serbia, the emperor demanded a dec- laration from her, given under the guarantee of the entente powers, that she would abstain from and suppress any future political agitation against the habsburg monarchy.! but the prince’s communications had not the effect for which charles hoped. the enemy saw in them only a proof of the weak- ness of the central powers and of the incipient decay of the german-austrian alliance, and hoped in this way to impose a peace favourable to themselves on germany, or to checkmate germany through a separate peace with austria-hungary. charles’ letter to sixtus made no mention of territorial conces- sions by the habsburg monarchy to italy; on the contrary, it emphasised the fixed determination of all peoples of the mon- archy ‘‘ to defend the integrity of the monarchy, be it at the cost of the severest sacrifices.’’ this point, more than any other, doomed charles and sixtus to failure. when ribot and lloyd george met sonnino, the italian foreign minister, at st. jean de maurienne on april 19 1917, and tried to persuade him to accept smyrna in return for renouncing the acquisition of trieste, sonnino declared that he could not even allow a discussion on the italian aspirations as recognised in the treaty of london. french attempts to persuade sonnino to change his views remained fruitless; the plan of the emperor charles and his brother-in- law had failed. in germany, meanwhile, the adherents of the circles which 1 the texts of charles’ letters and sixtus’ memoranda to the allied powers are in manteycr's atsiria’s peace offer (1921). io5i considered a peace by victory unattainable grew ever more nu- merous. especially when it became clear that the hopes which the military and naval authorities had based on the unrestricted submarine warfare would probably not be justihed, the cry that the government should openly declare its war aims grew louder. on july 19 1917 the majority of the reichstag voted, indeed, for a motion brought forward by erzberger, the leader of the centre, in favour of a peace by understanding, without forcible territorial acquisitions or political, financial or economic violation. “‘ the freedom of the seas must be made secure. so long, however, as the enemy governments threaten germany and her allies with conquests and oppression, the german nation will fight till its own and its allies’ right to life and development is secured.”? on the day on which this resolution was adopted by the reichstag by a considerable majority, bethmann hollweg was no longer chancellor. his successor michaelis, who had been elected by agreement with the supreme command, immediately modified the effect of the reichstag’s resolution by declaring that his aims, including the inviolability of german territory and a guarantee against economic barriers, were attainable within the limits of the resolution ‘‘ as i understand it.’’? the consequence was that the western powers continued to doubt the good faith of the german govt., to propose negotia- tions on a basis agreeable to themselves, and to see in the differ- ences apparent inside and outside the reichstag signs of weakness which confirmed them in their resolution to gather all their forces to carry the war to a victorious end. under these circum- stances, the efforts in which czernin was fertile, even after the failure of prince sixtus’ mission, to achieve a compromise with the enemy acceptable to both sides were unavailing. in aug. {wo meetings were arranged in switzerland, on the initiative of the french govt., between the austro-hungarian diplomat count revertera and his relative, the french general staff major, count armand. the negotiations broke down over the severity of the conditions which germany was required to accept.3 the hopes of the central powers to find a compromise with russia met also with disappointment. the provisional govt. in st. petersburg was too deeply under the influence of the western powers to listen to the overtures which the central powers made for a separate peace. efforts to stimulate the desire for peace among the war-weary russian troops by direct propaganda across no man’s land increased, indeed, the demoralisation among the russian troops, but had.no further result, since the com- manders of the russian army refused to conclude a formal armis- tice. equally unsuccessful were the attempts of international socialist circles to find a satisfactory solution of the peace ques- tion at a world congress at stockholm,’ and the effort made in aug. by pope benedict xv. in accordance with the terms of the treaty of london, france, italy and great britain sent no reply to his invitation; president wilson sent a formal refusal for himself, which was really intended to answer for his associ- ates. at the same time britain declared that any conversations must be preceded by an unequivocal declaration by the german govt. that she would give up belgium after the end of the war. the german govt., however, refused to give such a declaration, especially since ludendorff had spoken against it most decidedly in the potsdam crown council of sept. 14 1917. germany answered the pope without mentioning belgium. so this at- tempt to bring about a rapprochement between the two groups of powers broke down like the rest. the same fate attended efforts to pave the way towards peace conversations between france and germany made by lancken and coppee—where briand was also active—~and between germany and britain by way of brussels and madrid.* the allied offensives in 1917 again brought no decisive vic- tory, nor were the hopes of the allies fulfilled in the balkans. 2 on this subject see erzberger, eriebnisse; ludendorff, the general staff, vol. 2. 3 see czernin, op. cit., pp. 164 and 169. am below, eurovre: interallied diplomacy (section iv. of this articie}. 6see mermeix, les negociations secretes et les quatre armistices (chaps. vii. and xili.), 1052 king constantine and his eldest son were forced to leave greece, and the new ruler, alexander, was obliged to appoint venitselos, the champion of the western powers, minister president. under veniselos’ influence greece broke off diplomatic relations with the quadruple alliance, and greek troops joined the army of the orient which was awaiting battle in macedonia. greece was promised, as reward, thrace and smyrna. but the allies were disappointed of the victory for which they looked. they were more successful outside europe. turkey lost jerusalem, ger- many east africa. yet the military situation in the late autumn of r917 was such that the german military authorities were con- vinced of their ability to carry on a fresh successful campaign in 1918, so long as their allies did not leave them in the lurch. this danger was, however, imminent, since war-weariness grew ever more apparent in austria-hungary, and reports to a similar effect reached germany from sofia and constantinople. then came an event calculated to revive the courage of the quadruple alliance. the prospect was revealed to them of con- cluding a favourable peace with their enemies in the east which would enable them to fall with their full strength upon their en- emies in the west. early in nov. 1917, the second period of the russian revolution, the ‘ social revolutionary ”’ phase, led by kerensky, who had come ever more under the influence of the representatives of the western powers,! was succeeded by the third, that of the “ bolsheviks,” under lenin and ‘trotsky. as early as the end of nov. the new government called on all the belligerent powers to conclude an immediate armistice and begin negotiations for the conclusion of a general peace, which should assure to every nation freedom of economic and cultural develop- ment. when the entente powers refused to comply with this summons, the russians on dec. 3 entered on a suspension of hostilities with germany and her allies, to last till dec. 17 1917. on dec. 15 the suspension of hostilities was succeeded by an armistice, to last till jan. 14 1918, and then to be continued with the right to denounce it on seven days’ notice. rumania adhered to this armistice, albeit unwillingly. peace negotiations began on dec. 22 at brest-litovsk. they were conducted in public. it was not easy for the representatives of the quadruple alliance to accept the conditions of the russian peace programme. if the german and bulgarian delegates found a peace “‘ without annexations or indemnities ”’ to involve great sacrifices, considering the general situation, the “right of self- determination ” which the russian delegates demanded for all nations endangered the future existence of the habsburg mon- archy and turkey. the upshot was that on dec. 25 the quad- ruple alliance accepted the russian proposals for the conclusion of a peace without annexations or indemnities as the basis of a general peace. this was, however, contingent on the acceptance of this basis by the allies also. at the suggestion of the russian delegates the negotiations were suspended for 10 days, and a request was addressed to the other enemies of the quadruple alliance that they should take part in further deliberations on the basis of the resolutions adopted on dec. 25. but the entente powers refused. thereupon negotiations began on jan. 9 1918 for a separate peace between russia and the quadruple alliance. but they did not run so smoothly as the german and austro- hungarian politicians hoped. trotsky, now the chief of the russian delegation, demanded full freedom for the plebiscites to be held in the russian provinces occupied by the central powers, and with this object proposed that their troops should evacuate them. when the german and austro-hungarian delegates re- jected this suggestion, trotsky protracted the negotiations in order meanwhile to introduce bolshevik ideas into the territory of the quadruple alliance. the progress of the negotiations was impeded by quarrels among the russians and by the appearance at brest-litovsk of an ukrainian delegation which pressed for the establishment of a russian federal republic. since no agreement could be reached on this question, the representatives of the ukraine announced the complete inde- 1 on the subject of entente relations with russia both before and after the revolution, see sir g. buchanan, my mission to russia, ete., 2 vol.; m. paleologue, la russie pendant la grande guerre, 3 vol. kurope pendence of the ukrainian people’s republic on jan. 24, and on feb. 9 concluded a separate peace with the quadruple alliance. the ukraine was promised the province of cholm, which had been a bone of contention between her and poland for centuries; further, austro-hungary undertook in a secret clause to make a separate crownland out of east galicia, where the population was predominantly ukrainian (ruthenian). in return, the repre- sentatives of the ukraine promised to deliver at least 1,000,000 tons of cereals to the central powers by aug. 1 1918, a promise which, however, could not be fulfilled, since the reda in power in the ukraine at the time was overthrown immediately after by the bolsheviks, who disregarded the obligations into which their predecessors had entered. the troops of the central powers thereupon occupied the ukraine, and divided it into a german and an austro-iiungarian administrative district. thev were now able, although with difficulty, to secure a portion of the cereals, which were indispensable, especially for austria. but as a result of the concessions to the ukrainians a cabinet crisis broke out in congress poland; those circles which had hitherto favoured austria changed round; some of the polish legions stationed in east galicia went over to russia, whence they were brought to france under the command of general haller to be united with the polish legion which had existed there since the summer of 1or7. | meanwhile, the negotiations with russia had gone on. czer- nin, zealously seconded by the emperor charles, pressed for a conclusion, but met with determined opposition from the ger- man negotiators. on feb. 10 1918 trotsky declared that russia renounced a formal treaty of peace, but regarded the state of war against the quadruple alliance as ended, and would reduce her troops to a peace footing on all fronts. but since this solu- tion did not meet with the whole-hearted consent of the central powers, germany resumed the struggle. the russians, defeated by germany in the field, now changed their tactics and made ready to conclude a formal peace, which was signed on march 3 1918 at brest-litovsk. russia pledged herself to surrender courland, lithuania and poland entirely to the influence of the central powers, to evac- uate the occupied turkish territories, to grant freedom to fin- land, estonia, livland and the ukraine, and to the caucasian districts of ardahan, kars and batum. the undeniable contra- diction between the basis of peace which the central powers had at first accepted, if with reservations, and the terms of the treaty of brest-litovsk was most skilfully exploited by the statesmen of the entente and their press to brand germany’s insatiability.2 the peace with russia was succeeded by that with rumania, but the necessary negotiations had been long and difticult. a quick conclusion was rendered impossible, not only by the refusal of the rumanian govt. to accept the terms of the victors, but also—perhans even more—by the lack of unanimity among the quadruple alliance as to how the booty should be divided. the resistance of the rumanians was overcome by an ultimatum; on march 3 the averescu ministry signed the preliminary peace of buftea. soon after this ministry was replaced by the germano- phil marghiloman ministry, which concluded the definite peace with the quadruple alliance on may 7 1918 in bucharest. this peace was never ratified. austria-hungary received a favourable strategic frontier in the carpathians and the promise of the immediate evacuation of the provinces of the habsburg mon- archy still occupied by rumania. the whole of the dobruja was left to the victors. the southern half was allotted to bul- garia on the spot; the northern half was to be taken over and administered by the quadruple alliance in concert until the differences between turkey and bulgaria should have been com- posed. as compensation rumania was promised the succession to bessarabia, which had broken off from russia in feb. 1917 by arrangement with rumania.* * for the brest-litovsk negotiations, see czernin, op. cif., pp. 211- 257; gratz and schiller, die cleussere wirtschaftspolitik oesterreich- lingarns, pp. 115-169 (1925). *see czernin, op. cit., pp. 258-270; gratz and schiiller, op. cit., pp. 177-255. europe the appeal for peace which the russian govt. issued to all belligerent nations had given new voice to the old wish for an end to the war cherished among the peoples of the quadruple alliance, especially those of austria-hungary. it was intensi- fied at the beginning of 1918, when wilson published his four- teen points (g. v.) as the basis for the future world peace. these included, indeed, many conditions which imposed heavy sacrifices on the powers of the quadruple alliance. the evacuation and restoration of belgium, northern france and the russian border states, the cession of alsace-lorraine, the establishment of an independent poland embracing all districts undoubtedly inhab- ited by the poles—these were demands to which the german govt., and especially the german supreme command, was un- willing to consent in the then military situation. the austro- hungarian statesmen, too, would find difficulty in allowing the frontier between austria-hungary and italy to be drawn “on clearly recognisable national lines,’? rumania, serbia and mon- tenegro to be evacuated and restored, a free outlet for serbia to the sea to be granted unconditionally—quite apart from the fact that wilson’s solution of the polish question would have meant the loss of galicia to the habsburg monarchy. but the chief danger in the eyes of the vienna govt. was wil- son’s demand for autonomy for the peoples of austria-hungary. it held its realisation—rightly, as later events proved—to mean the beginning of the end of the habsburg monarchy. equally great were the sacrifices which wilson thought to impose on turkey by his demand for autonomy for her christian peoples and inter- nationalisation of the straits. even so, wilson’s territorial demands lagged far behind those to which his allies had pledged themselves in secret treaties, some of them unknown to him offically. a favourable impression was made on the peoples of the quadruple alliance, especially those of the central powers, by the fact that wilson had included in his programme the abolition of secret diplomacy, the freedom of the seas and of economic hfe, reduction of armaments, impartial settlement of colonial pre- tensions and the welding of the nations into a league of nations, which should prevent future wars. wilson’s peace programme— which, indeed, imposed the brunt of the sacrifices exclusively on the states of the quadruple alliance—was, however, most skil- fully exploited by the statesmen of the western powers against the central powers to strengthen, not only the peace parties, but also the subversive elements there. disturbances broke out on a large scale in the most important industrial districts of ger- many and austria-hungary, the forerunners of the social up- heavals which were to convulse both states in the course of 1918. differences in germany were accentuated by the weak atti- tude of count hertling, the leader of the bavarian centre, who had become chancellor of the reich in nov. 1917. on principle he was not against a peace by understanding, but was not strong enough to carry his plans through in the teeth of the parties of the right, which had been strongly reinforced by the vater- fandspartei founded by admiral tirpitz in sept. 1917. so it came about that the supreme command, of which ludendorff was becoming ever more truly the ruling spirit, gained the upper hand when the decision was taken on the question “‘ peace by compromise or continuation of the war.”” the emperor william at heart was ready for peace, and inclined to make concessions in internal politics—general suffrage in prussia and extension of the competencies of the parliament had been demanded—yet he yielded to the advice of his military commanders and the pressure of the parties of the right, and he decided for the continuation of the war. _ matters lay somewhat otherwise in the habsburg monarchy. here the emperor charles and his foreign minister czernin had never lost sight of their aim, a peace which should make the further existence of the monarchy possible, even if at the cost of heavy sacrifices at home and abroad. this ideal seemed ever more desirable as the dangers loomed more clearly which threat- ened the monarchy in its present form; the increasing war-weari- ness of the soldiers and the ever franker separatism of the different peoples of this polyglot state. czechs, southern slavs and poles grew ever more sweeping in their demands for unlimited auton- to53 omy. but a similar feeling had now infected the magyars also. despite the close connection between their fate and that of the other half of the realm, despite the predominating influence which they exercised on the general policy of the monarchy, many circles worked for full independence. in addition to all this, the german-austrian social democrats began to believe that the disintegration of the monarchy could be only advantageous to the german-austrian proletariat, since, if the monarchy fell into its component parts, its german-speaking districts would naturally become a part of germany. under these circumstances, charles and czernin were anxious to miss no opportunity of resuming seriously the contact with the governments of the western powers, which they had never quite given up. there was nothing to be done at this moment in france, since clemenceau had taken over the government after the fall of ribot and painleve; his programme was ‘‘ war, nothing but war,” and he had taken strong measures against the “ de- featists ’? and al] advocates of a peace by understanding; so that it was improbable that he would listen to overtures. on the other hand, the viennese govt. imagined feeling in england, as expressed by lord lansdowne’s letter to the daily telegraph at the end of nov. 1917, to be such that negotiations here might have a chance of success. lansdowne had, indeed, stated plainly that the aims of the allies would be victorious in the long run. but he had pointed out at the same time that the continuation of the struggle must lead to the ruin of the civilised world, and had advocated a revision of the allied war aims, in the hope of thus strengthening the peace party in germany. in dec. 1917 conversations took place between gen. smuts and count mens- dorff. as the latter was authorised to work for a general peace between the belligerents while smuts refused mensdorff’s pro- posal to discuss an agreement with germany, and was only pre- pared to conduct negotiations aiming at a separate peace with austria-hungary, the conversations led to no result. soon after, at the beginning of 1918, lloyd george communi- cated the conditions which he considered a basis for possible peace negotiations. they were much more moderate than those which the allies had laid down a year previously. britain, he declared, did not want the destruction or disruption of ger- many and would not fight merely to alter or destroy the imperial constitution; yet military autocracy was a dangerous anachron- ism. the adoption of a really democratic constitution would be the most convincing evidence that the old spirit of military domination had died, and would make it easier to conclude a broad democratic peace. among the conditions on which he was prepared to commence peace negotiations he mentioned the com- plete restoration, security and indemnification of belgium for the losses and damage which she had suffered; the restoration of serbia, montenegro and the occupied parts of france, italy and rumania. as regards alsace-lorraine, nothing was said of an integral restoration of the provinces; only: ‘‘ we mean to stand by the french democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871.” britain would only safeguard russia’s interests if the present rulers of the republic remained joyal to their allies. ‘‘ we believe, however, that an independent poland comprising all those genuinely polish elements who desire to form part of it 1s an urgent neces- sity for the stability of eastern europe.” as for the habsburg monarchy, lloyd george declared: ‘‘ the break-up of austria-hungary is no part of our war aims; but genuine self-government must be granted to those austro-hun- garian nationalities which have long desired it.” only in the case of the italians of the monarchy he regarded as vital “ the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the italians for union with | those of their own race and tongue.” these demands were a great deal more modest than the previous ones, and could not be reconciled with the promises which had been made in the course of the war to the italians, the serbs and the slav emigres.! this moderation was even more marked in the conditions laid ‘of rumanians in the dual monarchy the premier said, '' we also mean to press that justice be done to men of rumanian blood and speech in these legitimate aspirations.”’ 1054 down for turkey. ‘‘ we are not fighting ” they ran now, “ to deprive turkey of her capital nor of the rich and renowned lands of asia minor or thrace, which are predominantly turkish by race.” only the straits were to be internationalised and neu- tralised—arabia, armenia, mesopotamia, syria and palestine— were entitled to a recognition of separate national condi- tions. for wilson’s benefit came the declaration: ‘ finally, a great attempt must be made to establish by some international organisation an alternative to war as a means of settling inter- national disputes.”” three conditions were essential to perma- nent peace: “‘ the re-establishment of the sanctity of treaties, territorial settlement based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed, and the creation of some interna- tional organisation to limit the burden of armaments and dimin- ish the probability of war.’”! nevertheless, the german chancellor found the ete situa- tion so favourable that he declared himself unable to open up peace negotiations on the basis proposed by lloyd georgeand de- manded a fresh revision of the enemy proposals. as he let it be understood at the same time that germany entertained no idea of giving up either the whole or parts of alsace-lorraine, the supreme council in versailles declared on feb. 4 1918 that a suitable basis for making peace was not given. the war must, therefore, continue till its pressure should have brought about a change of temper in the enemy governments and peoples. the vienna govt. endeavoured indeed to bring about another meet- ing between revertera and armand in feb. 1918, to pave the way for ofhcial conversations with the french government. but it at once encountered insuperable difficulties. when revertera asked whether france would be inclined to renounce the re- acquisition of alsace-lorraine, clemenceau answered at the begin- ning of march 1918 with a curt negative. this doomed to failure the attempt which the emperor charles had been making mean- while to work for a peace by understanding by an appeal to wil- son through spain; efforts which from the outset had had little chance of success. disintegration of the central powers —once again the decision lay with arms. the germans achieved great successes in the first months; but the allied troops in the west were now brought under a single command,? and were effectively reinforced from america. moreover the hope of the central powers that the relief of their eastern front would enable them to concentrate their entire forces in the west and southwest had been only partly fulfilled. the state of war in the east appeared, indeed, to be at an end after the conclusion of the treaties of brest- litovsk and bucharest, and after finland too had concluded peace with each of the powers of the quadruple alliance sep- arately between march and may 1918. as, however, the german army command and the civilian circles which worked in concert with it were aiming at extending germany’s frontiers and her political, military and economic sphere of influence in the east, not all the troops hitherto employed in the east could be transferred to the west. and this all the less since the western powers, in view of the great interests which they too had in the eastern question, made every effort to thwart ger- many’s plans. they had military detachments in various parts of russia, and a strong reinforcement in the czechoslovak legions, which had been raised with the greatest energy. these forces assisted the counter-revolutionaries in the numerous bloody battles in which they engaged the armics of the soviet government. the danger thus presented to germany induced the berlin govt. to approach that of sovict russia, although their tend- _encies were completely opposite and the bolsheviks never relaxed their efforts to introduce their revolutionary ideas into the german ranks. the german govt. refused the re- quest of the soviet govt. to grant them support, if only unofficially, against the enemy in the murmansk district and onthe don. but they signed a supplementary treaty to the ! for text see lowes dickinson, op. cie., pp. 108-115. 2 by the decision taken at doullens on march 26 1918 to place the oversight of the allied armies in the hands of marshal foch. kurope peace of brest-litovsk on aug. 27 1918, whereby they promised neither to initiate nor assist the formation of any further in- dependent states on the territory of soviet russia, nor to support the operations conducted against the bolsheviks in the caucasus and to prevent the attack which turkey was plan- ning on baku. in return, russia was to allow livland and estonia to be assigned, as courland and lithuania had already been, entirely to the german sphere of influence and to pay a large indemnity. the advantageous results of this agreement for soviet russia were soon apparent. the red army was able to aclvance success- fully against the enemy; a number of districts were conquered; its authority in its own territory strengthened. but this agree- ment, which germany had concluded without the co-operation of her allies, had evil consequences for her. her allies had long been discontented with the selfish attitude, as they saw it, of the german govt., and this discontent was voiced ever more plainly when instead of the victory which ludendorff had promised in the west, the allied troops under foch opened a most successful counter-offensive. a conference of the leading statesmen and generals was held at general headquarters in spa on aug. 14 under the emperor william’s presidency, to adopt a policy to meet the altered military situation. luden- dorff stated that the chances of victory were now gone, but he hoped to put up a successful defence which would increase the enemy’s inclination for peace. hintze, the new german secre- tary of state for foreign affairs, strongly urged the opening up of peace negotiations, and carried his point. the army com- mand agreed. one of the chief factors which contributed to this decision were the statements of the emperor charles and burian, who had arrived in spa the same day and declared that austria was unequal to a fifth winter campaign. the governments in sofia and constantinople reported to the same effect. furthermore, the relations between germany and her allies had become ever more strained during 1918. the bulgarians complained that berlin had paid too little attention to their requests for military assistance; the turks that germany wanted to stop them from taking advantage of the favourable opportunity to extend their frontiers in the caucasus. but the worst effect was produced by the increasing resent- ment felt by the emperor charles and his government at germany’s attitude. for as their need of peace grew ever stronger, they felt more bitterly the refusal of the german govt., which had become increasingly dependent on the military command, to make: a general peace possible by sacrificing territory in the west of germany. their loyalty to the idea of a general peace and their rejection of their enemies’ proposals for a separate peace had already involved them in great dangers. the ministry of propaganda, which had been formed in london, and was under lord northcliffe’s direction had declared openly in feb. 1918 that it was ‘‘ impossible to renounce the liberation of the peoples oppressed by the house of habsburg.” ‘the congress, which met in rome in the second week of april 1918, and was attended by emigrants from the czechoslovak, polish, yugoslav, italian and rumanian-speaking districts of the habs- burg monarchy, had shown how far the separatist ambitions of these circles had already advanced. at this congress the ital- ians agreed to settle their territorial disputes by amicable ar- rangement with the southern slavs, who had already smoothed over ditferences in their own camp by the j’act of corfu, july 20 1917. a joint commission consisting of representatives of italy, great britain and france, was established at italian head- quarters, which became the centre of the national propaganda directed against the dual monarchy, and increased the danger which threatened that state. in order to enlighten the world on the difficulties which stood in the way of his efforts for a general peace, count czernin had slated in a public speech at the beginning of april 1918 that clemenceau’s refusal to renounce the restoration of alsace- lorraine to france was the decisive reason of the non-success of the peace idea advocated by the vienna govt.; and had been europe rash enough to refer here to the conversations of feb. 1918 be- tween revertera and armand, which had hitherto been kept secret. clemenceau answered by publishing the emperor’s letter of march 24 1917, which had only recently come to his knowledge. czernin, who did not wish to cover the emperor— and could hardly have done so—fell. in germany the contents of the imperial letter and charles’ attitude in the polemic which followed its publication aroused most violent and universal indignation. the affair was described as an act of treachery against an ally at whose expense charles had wished to ‘buy a separate peace on terms favourable to him- self. in order to allay this excitement, charles, accompanied by his new foreign minister, burian, travelled to spa, where he concluded an agreement on may 12 1918 which arranged for the closest possible connection between the two empires in all political, economic and military matters both during and after the war. had this come into force, it would certainly have meant a great increase in the predominance of the stronger partner over the government and peoples of the habsburg monarchy. the emperor charles had, indeed, made this agreement contingent on the condition that the polish question be first settled on the austro-polish lines, a solution which had, however, little chance of realisation in view of the general opposition to it in authorita- tive circles in germany. the enemies of the central powers, however, saw in the meeting at spa a step further along the road towards the dreaded “ mittel-europa ” on which much had been written and spoken in germany and austria and whose best-known exponent was fricdrich naumann. one of the consequences of this view was that the idea of thwarting these plans by dismembering austria-hungary gained more and more adherents in paris and london. this considera- tion, together with the valuable help which the czech legions in the east were rendering to the entente powers, induced the french govt. on june 28 1918 to confirm the rights of the czechs to independence and to recognise the czechoslovak national council in paris as their supreme organ, the forerunner of a future czechoslovak government. these concessions were at once approved by france’s allies and extended by the declara- tions made by britain on aug. 9 and the united states on sept. 3 —this was largely due to masaryk, who had been in that country since may 1918—by which the status of an allied army was con- ceded to the czech troops in siberia and their legions in france and italy, and the national council in paris was allowed the rights of an allied government. meanwhile the failures of the austro-hungarian troops in italy and the germans in the west had reacted on internal con- ditions in the dual monarchy. the new austrian minister, president hussareck, had produced a plan for a revision of the constitution on federalist lines, but with little effect. the resolu- tions of the congress of laibach of aug. 18 1918 showed that the non-german peoples of the western half of the monarchy were working for the establishment of independent states, and the central authority was no longer strong enough to check these endeavours, especially as the magyars refused to release croatia- slavonia from the hungarian body politic. charles and his foreign minister, burian, thought an immediate offer of peace the only way to save what was still to be saved. the resolutions of the congress of spa showed burian the way to fresh conversa- tions with germany. he encountered no more absolute resistance. yet great differences presented themselves during the negotia- tions as to the course to be adopted. the germans wanted to wait till the military situation in the west improved and then begin negotiations with the enemy through a neutral power— ifolland or spain—while burian advocated an immediate and open appeal to all the belligerent powers. at the beginning of sept. 1918 hintze spent some time in vienna in the endeavour to arrive at a concerted course of action. when, however, lud- endorfi’s promise of a successful military defensive was not ful- filled; when, on the contrary the german troops were forced to retire on to the “ siegfried lines,” burian, seeing no prospect of an agreement with germany, decided on sept. 14 to disregard her opposition and to issue an appeal to all belligerent states to open 1055 peace negotiations. this step was not attended by the success for which burian had hoped. president wilson answered, after a few days’ interval, that he had repeatedly and in the plainest terms made known the conditions upon which he was prepared to consider the conclusion of peace; hence the government of the united states could not and would not accept a proposal for a conference concerning a matter on which it had already clearly made known its attitude and aims. the cabinets of london and paris were equally cold. the sole result of burian’s new effort for peace was to tn- crease the entente’s confidence of victory. on sept. 15 ensued a violent attack against the bulgarian army, in the ranks of which war-weariness had for some time made serious inroads. the bul- garian troops offered but little resistance; great bodies of them laid down their arms and returned to their homes. the sofia govt., at the head of which malinov, who was friendly to the entente, had succeeded radoslavov some months previously, resolved, since its appeals to the central powers had met with practically no response, to propose an armistice. this was granted on sept. 29 upon conditions which, for the central powers, spelled the loss of the balkans. king ferdinand abdi- cated in favour of his son boris. these events and the great successes of the british troops in palestine produced their effect upon turkey. at the beginning of oct. enver and talat, the chief advocates of the policy of the central powers in constantinople, fell from power, and thus the way towards a separate peace lay open here also. the entente concluded an armistice with turkey on oct. 31 which brought the dardanelles and the bosporus under its control, and pledged the turks to break off all relations with the central powers. meanwhile the position of the central powers had likewise be- come untenable. under the effect of the crushing defeat of the turkish and bulgarian troops and the new, most violent assault of the entente troops on the “ siegfried line,’ ludendorff de- manded at the end of sept. that an immediate request be ad- dressed to wilson for an armistice and the opening of peace negotiations. prince max of baden, the new german chancellor, agreed with the ideas of the supreme command, but advised that the first step should only concern the peace offer, which he too thought inevitable, while the request for an immediate armistice should be postponed, since the enemy would only look upon and utilise this as an indisputable proof of the complete breakdown of the german army. ludendorff, however, stood by his demand and forced it through. on oct. 5 the govts. of germany, austria-hungary and turkey appealed to wil- son for an armistice, to be followed by peace negotiations. wilson answered that he could not consult his allies about an armistice until the central powers had admitted defeat by evacuating the allied territory still in their occupation. he refused to admit any discussion of his fourteen points; at the most he would allow conversations on the details of their appli- cation. furthermore, he asked whether the german chancellor still spoke in the name “ of the persons responsible for the war.” a week later he produced further demands. he called for aban- donment of the u-boat warfare and guarantees for the mainte- nance of the military supcriority of the entente powers. ina third note (oct. 23) he defined the last-named demand as follows —that ‘“ he and his allies, before granting an armistice, must have the assurance that they could at any time impose the con- ditions of peace.”” at the same time he declared that he must demand “ not peace negotiations but surrender ” if he had to continue in the future to negotiate “ with the military rulers and monarchist autocrats of germany.” the severity of these conditions of armistice evoked the most lively excitement in german military and civilian circles. in both the opinions were violently divided. ludendortf demanded the breakoltf of the negotiations, the continuance of the war and an appeal to the german people for a /evee en masse to defend the fatherland. other military jeadcrs, on the other hand, declared it useless to continue the war, since the superiority of the encmy became more obvious every week, while war-weariness among the german troops had much increased under the strong influence 1056. of extreme socialist and enemy propaganda. the new german govt. pronounced on the same lines. it called for, and carried, subjection to the commands of the enemy. li-dendorff resigned (oct. 27). meanwhile the catastrophe had taken place in austria~-hun- gary. encouraged by president wilson’s repeated pronouncements as to the right of nations to self-determination, the separatist ideas of those peoples of the monarchy which did not acknowl- edge german or magyar nationality had become ever more articulate. there were disturbances in various parts of the empire, and these disruptive influences had made it month by month increasingly difficult to keep the army efficient for war. the viennese govt., although recognising the dangers of the experiment, resolved to reorganise the monarchy on a new basis, in accordance with the roth of wilson’s fourteen points. on oct. 16 the emperor charles issued a manifesto in which he pro- claimed that austria, in accordance with the will of her peoples, was to be created into a federal state in which every race would be free to establish its own form of body politic on the territory occupied by it. this was not, however, to anticipate the union of the austrian poles with an independent polish state. the imperial manifesto was to apply to austria only. for hungary, where forces were already at work for a personal union and for a complete separation from austria, the manifesto affirmed the unity of the kingdom of hungary. it thus became clear to the southern slavs that they must no jonger hope for a realisation of their national aspirations within the bounds of the monarchy. but the emperor’s hope of conciliating opinion among the aus- trian slavs with this manifesto was disappointed; the more so, as wilson had informed vienna that the united states had already recognised czechoslovakia as a belligerent power and the czechoslovak national council asa belligerent government, and had also recognised the justice of the national aspirations of the southern slavs; these peoples had therefore to decide for them- selves which of the resolutions of the austrian govt. were accept- ible to them. in the last days of oct. independent governments or other national authorities formed themselves in prague, agram, laibach, sarajevo, cracow, lemberg and trieste. these internal movements led to the collapse of the armies; the governments of the several countries constituting the monarchy, hungary leading the way, summoned their co-nationals to the defence of their particular frontiers or called them back home. the emperor charles now attempted to achieve a separate peace; but his intermediaries hardly gained a hearing. at the end of oct., after the revolution in hungary, and after increasing numbers of the troops in italy had started for home, the austro- hungarian army command asked an armistice from the ital- ians, who were advancing without mecting resistance. this was granted on nov. 3 on conditions of pitiless severity. the ne- gotiations for a separate peace were carried on even now, but without any result. the process of dissolution ran its course in the dual monarchy. on nov. 11 1918 the emperor charles renounced all share in the business of government in austria, on nov. 13 in hungary; he did not, however, renounce his crown. on nov. 12 the austrian national assembly proclaimed a republic, which was at first intended to form a component part of the new german republic. on nov. 16 hungary inaugu- rated the republican form of government. the ancient austro- hungarian monarchy ceased to exist. the armistices with bul- garia, turkey and austria-hungary were granted on terms of unconditional surrender, and gave none of these powers the legal right to claim seli-determination on the fourteen points. wilson’s offer to the fresh demand of germany for definition of the conditions of an armistice and peace was different. it is stated in his communication of nov. 5. all the entente great powers agreed to the basis of the fourteen points, and addresses of president wilson in 1916, being applied to germany; but all reference to her allies was excluded. the entente powers ‘‘ reserve to themselves complete freedom ”’ (point 2 relating to freedom of the seas) on this subject when they entered the peace conference. further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his europe address to congress of jan. 8 1918, the president had declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, “and the allied govts. feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies.” by it they understood “‘ that compensation will be made by germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the allies and their property by the aggression of germany by land, by sea and from the air.” marshal foch was empowered to communicate the conditions of armistice to suitable accredited military representatives. on nov. 8 the german delegation met marshal foch in the forest of compiegne. the conditions communicated to it were even harder than events in bulgaria, turkey and austria-hungary had led germany to expect. a violent difference of opinion arose once more in germany whether these conditions should be accepted or rejected and the struggle continued. in reality, there could be no doubt as to the course which must be adopted. for the enemy troops had been advancing unceasingly, and the ‘“ home front ” had been broken by the revolution, which had begun with the mutiny of the sailors in kiel and had quickly extended over wide districts of germany. on nov. 4 soldiers’ and workmen’s councils were formed on the russian model. the cry that william ii. should abdicate grew ever louder; but he hesitated to obey it. thereupon prince max of baden, the german chancellor, under the continuous pressure of the social democrats and in view of the threatening attitude of the masses, proclaimed the abdication of william it. and his eldest son, with- out waiting for their consent (nov. 9). his hope to save the mon- archy by this means was disappointed. a few hours later the republic was proclaimed. the emperor william abandoned his resistance in the face of the accomplished fact and fled to holland. the other german monarchs shared his fall. the new government declared itself prepared to accept the armistice, which was signed for germany by erzberger, the leader of the centre, and three others, with hindenburg’s approval, on nov. 11 1918. thus ended the four years and more of the war. it had led to the fall of three empires, to the complete dismemberment of the habsburg monarchy, to the formation of a number of in- dependent states on the territory of the dual monarchy and of the former empire of the tsar, who had met with a violent end in 1918. the further fate of the conquered peoples depended on the decision of the victorious states, whose leading personal- itics immediately began to occupy themselves with the re-mak- ing of europe. binliography.—catalogues: list of publications tssued by hm: stationery office (1914, etc.); h. h. b. meyer and others, a check list of the literature and other matertal in the library of congress at washington on the european war (washington, 1918); j. l. kunz, bibliographie der kriegsliteratur (1920); g. w. prothero, a select analytical list of books concerning the great war (1923). documents: w. v. massow, dokumente zur geschichte des krieges, 4 vol. (1914, etc.); sozialistische dokumente zum weltkrieg, § vol. (1915-6); documents diplomatigues concernant les rapporis entre u autriche-tongrie etla roumante, july 22 1914-aug. 27 1916 (1916); t. niemeyer and k. strupp, die v6lkerrechtlichen urkunden des weltkrieges, 8 vol., in jahrbuch des volkerrechts (1916, etc.); british and foreign state papers (1917-8); e. s. cocks, the secret treaties and understandings (1918); j. b. scott, diplomatic correspondence between the u.s.a. and germany, 1914-7 (1918); betlagen zu den stenographischen berichten tiber die dffentlichen verhandlungen des untersuchungsausschusses der verfassunggebenden deutschen national- rersammiung (1919-20); berichte, stenographische, tiber die offent- lichen verhandlungen des untersuchungsausschusses (1919-20); g. lowes dickinson, documents and statements relating to peace pro- posals and war aims, dec. 1916-nov. 1918 (1919); das deutsche weissbuch tiber die schuld am kriege (1919); e. laloy, les documents secrets des archives du ministere des affatres etrangeres de russie (1919); e. ludendorff, urkunden der obersien iteeresleitung tiber ihre tatigkeit, r910-8 (1921); also kriegsfiihrung und politik, 1914-8 (1919); recueil des documents officiels dapres les livres rouges ukrat- niens (1922): official german documents relating to the world war, 2 vol., trans. under the supervision of the carnegie fund (1923); urkunden, dmiliche, zur vorgeschichte des waffenstilistandes, 2nd ed. (1924.) sd memories: t. g. masaryk, the problem of small nations in the european crists (1916); j. w. gerard, afy four years 1n germany (1917); o. czernin, im weltkriege (1919); k. helfferich, die friedens- europe bedingungen im weltkrieg (1919); k. von hertling, ein jahr in der reichskanslet (1919); p. von hindenburg, aus meinem leben (1919); t. von bethmann hollweg, betrachtungen zunt weltkriege, 2 vol. {191g and 1924); t. jonescu, some personal impressions (1919); a. von tirpitz, erinnerungen (1919), english trans. (1919); h. j. bernstorff, deutschland und america (1920); m. erzberger, erleb- nisse im \\velikriege (1920); l. von sanders, funf jahre ttirkei (1920): p. scheidemann, der zusammenbruch (1921); also, papst, naiser, sostaldenokratie in ihren friedensbemtihungen wn sommer 1017 (1921); g. giolitti, afemorie della mia vita, vol. 2 (1922); a. jamal pasha, afemorzes of a turkish statesman, 1903-10 (1922); g. michae- lis, fir staat und volk (1922); m. paleologue, la russie des tsars pendant la grande guerre, 3 vol. (1922); r. rosen, forty fears of diplomacy (1922); william ii., ereignisse und gestalten aus den jahren 1878-1018 (1922); frederick william, ex-crown prince of germany, erinnerungen, ed. by k. rosner (1922); g. w. buchanan, afy mission to russia and other diplomatic mentoirs, 2 vol. (1923); s. burian, drei jahre aus der zeit meiner amtsfrihrung im kriege (1923); f. conrad von hoetzendorf, aus meiner dienstzeit ro06-18, vol. 4 and 5 (1923-5); v. radoslawoff, bulgarien und die w'eltkrise (1923); the diary of lord bertie of thame, 1914-8, ed. by lady a. g. lennox, 2 vol. (1924); f. von musulin, das haus am bail- platz (1924); lord grey of fallodon, twenty-five years, 1892-1916 (1925); frederick william, fx-crown prince of germany, ich suche die wahrheit (1925); c. seymour, the intimate papers of colonel house (1926). general accounts: g. f. abbott, turkey, greece and the great powers (1916); d. alazard, z.’ftalie et le conflit europeen 1914-6 (1916); documentary fhistory of the war, milttary, naval, dipio- matic, the times, 11 vol. (1917-20); o. hoctzsch, der krieg und die grosse politik, 3 vol. (1917); ee. miiller-meiningen, d1plomatie und weltkrieg, 2 vol. (1917); m. passaris, l’hntente et la grece (1917); g. v. seldes, the united states and the war (1917); h. delbriick, krieg und politik, rg1r4-6, 3 vol. (1918-9); l. trotsky, the bolsheviki and world peace (1918); noel buxton and c. l. leese, balkan problems and european peace (1919); g. deville, l'entente, la grece et la bulgarie (1919); c. f. nowak, der weg zur katastrophe (1919); m. spahn, dre pepstliche friedensvermittiung (1919); a. v. tuirkova (later williams), from liberty te bresi- litovsk (1919); e. lavisse, fistotre de france contemporaine, 10 vol. (1920-2); g. de manteyer, l'’offre de patx separee de l’autriche (1920); c. seymour, woodrow wilson and the world war (1920); kk. j. bourgeois and g. pages, les origtnes et les responsabilites de la grande guerre (1921); n. japihse, die stellung hollands im welt- kriege (1921); mermeix, pseud. of g. terrail, les negoctations secretes et les quatre armistices (1921); ik. nabokov, the ordeal of a diplo- matist (1921); c. f. nowak, der sturz der mittelmdchte (1921), english tr. the collapse of central europe (1924); a. tardieu, la paix (1921); v. valentin, deutschiands aussenpolitik von bismarcks absang bis zum ende des weltkrieges (1921); m. l. v. h. corda, la guerre mondiale 1914-8 (1922); b. j. hendrick, life and letters of walter 1, page, 3 vol. (1922-5); a. niemann, dre entscheidenden ereignisse 1m grossen tlaupiquartier (1922); m. schwarte, der grosse krieg 1914-8 (1922, etc.); r. s. baker, woodrow wilson and world setilement, 3 vol. (1923); l. bissolati, la polttica estera dell’ ttulia dal 1897 al 1920 (1923); winston churchill, the world crisis (1923); g. p. gooch, history of modern europe, 1878-1919 (1923); a. f. pribram, austrian foreign policy, 1908-18 (london, 1923); f. v. a, aulard, histoire politique de la grande guerre, 1914-& (1924) a. fabre-luce, la vietotre (1924); g. salvemini, dal patio dt londra alla pace dt roma (1925). (a. f. pr.) iv. inter-allied diplomacy pact of london.—the legal consecration and the basis for the further development of the co-operation of the allied and associated powers is to be found in the pact of london! (sept. 5 1914), in which great britain, france and russia mutually engaged ‘ not to conclude peace separately ”’ and that no one of them should “ demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of the other allies. ” the treaty of london.—by the treaty of london? (april 26 ‘for text see parliamentary papers, cd. 7737. *for full text sec temperley, izistory of the peace conference, vol. 5, pp. 384-93. the terms were, in brief, as follows: italy promised to assist the entente with her “ entire resources.” military and naval conventions were to be drawn up to establish the assistance to be given to italy by the russian army and the british and french fleets. under the treaty of peace, italy was to receive ‘“ the trentino, cis-alpine tirol with tts geographical and natural frontier (the brenner frontier), as well as trieste, the counties of gradisca and gorizia, all istria as far as the quarnero,” with the istrian islands. also ‘* dalmatia within its present administrative boun- daries '’ down to cape planka, with the adjacent islands. southern dalmatia down to the montenegrin frontier, to be neutralised. southern istria, ‘ all the coast of croatia with the port of fiume \"’ and some small islands, and the neutralised strip of southern dal- matia, were to be assigned to ‘‘ croatia, serbia and montenegro.” 1057 1915) italy pledged her military assistance to the entente in return for the realisation of her political and territorial ambi- tions at the close of the war. as recorded in the treaty of london, the price paid by the entente to italy was a heavy one. the entente was committed to the assignment of part of the territory of the austro-hungarian empire to italy. italy’s aspirations in the adriatic were to be satisfied, and, still more important in view of subsequent controversies between the allies, her position as a factor in the mediterranean balance of power was acknowledged. her interests in the near east were to be safeguarded in the event of either a partition or a retention of the turkish empire. although the treaty contains no hint of it, france and great britain had already made up their minds to a partition of turkey. the constantinople agreement—in march they had signed with russia an agreement, the so-called ‘‘ constantinople ” agreement? (march 18 1915), by which they promised her constantinople and all european turkey east of the enos- midia line; italy became a party to this agreement after her signature of the london treaty. the accession of italy to the entente opened up a new theatre of war, and revealed more than ever the need for co-ordination of military effort. hitherto ordinary diplomatic channels had been made use of by the allies in their communications with one another; but in a short time these were proved to be hope- lessly inadequate. early in 1915 the visits of m. millerand to london and of mr. asquith to sir john french’s military headquarters, where he met m. millerand and generals joffre and foch, revealed the need for, and inaugurated, the long succession of inter-allied conferences that took place during the next three years,4 of which only those of outstanding political importance can be mentioned here. (for certain conferences not here mentioned see control, inter-allied.) inter-allied conferences july 19%5~march 1916.—in july 1915 there met at calais the first inter-allied conference to be attended by the heads of the british and trench governments. in addition to the french and british prime ministers, there were present lord kitchener, lord crewe, mr. balfour and mm. millecrand, albert thomas, delcasse and augagneur. at this conference certain decisions affecting war strategy were taken, and its success was demonstrated when matters that had been awaiting decision for wecks were dealt with in a single day. so successful was it that only a few weeks elapsed before an even more important one was held at paris (nov. 17 1915) italy received valona, and the foreign representation of albania, but consented to a partition of northern and southern albania between montenegro, serbia and greece, should her allies desire it. she received full sovereignty over the islands of the dodecanese. it was recognised that italy was “ interested in the balance of power in the mediterranean,”’ and in the event of a “ partial partition of turkey in asia '’ she was to receive a “ just share’ to be delimited later, in the mediterranean region adjacent to adalia. all rights and privileges of the sultan in libya were transferred to italy. she was to receive a proportionate share of any war indemnity. she agreed that arabia and the moslem holy places should be left under an independ- ent moslem power. if france and great britain increased their african colonies at germany's expense, italy was to receive ** some equitable compensation,” particularly on the frontiers of ‘“ the italian colonies of eritrea, somaliland and libya.” great britain undertook “‘ to facilitate the immediate conclusion, under equitable conditions, of a loan of at least £50,000,000.”\" ifer allies would sup- port her in opposing the introduction of a representative of the holy see in the peace negotiations, etc. 3for text sce temperley, op. cit., vol. 6, pp. 4-9. the main points were: russia was to receive ‘‘ the town of constantinople, the western coast of the bosporus, the sea of marmara and the dar- danelles; southern thrace as far as the enos- midia line; the coast of asia minor between the bosporus and the river sakaria and a point on the gulf of ismid to be defined later; the islands in the sea of marmara and the islands of imbros and tenedos.”’ constantinople was to be recognised as a free port for transit of goods not coming from nor proceeding to russia. the sacred mahommedan places to be protected and arabia to be under an independent mahommedan rule. the neutral zone in persia established under the anglo- russian agreement of 1907 to be “ included in the english sphere of influence.” a sir m. a. p. hankey, diplomacy by conference, p. 6. 5 [bid, 1058 between the british and french prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, war, marine, etc.1. here matters of the great- est importance were discussed and decisions taken upon them: the position of greece, serbia (including the question of salonika) and the gallipoli expeditionary force; the general problem of the co-ordination of military efforts; the determination of reinforcements to be sent to salonika. most important of all, a decision was taken in principle to set up a committee to co- ordinate the action of the allies in regard to the war, the task of making proposals for this purpose being placed in mr. asquith’s hands. in this decision lies the germ of the organ- isation of the subsequent inter-allied conferences. salonika and gallipoli loomed large at this conference, for events in those theatres of war had not favoured the allies. indeed, tn sept. a conference between the french and british war ministers, commanders-in-chief, chiefs of the general staffs and other technical experts had been held at calais to discuss the question of reinforcements for gallipoli and the possibility of effecting a landing on the asiatic side of the straits. at a meeting between m. briand and mr. asquith in london (jan. 19 r916),2 the constitution and rules for the proposed committee were agreed upon. in brief, it was to be an advisory body subject as to its conclusions to the approval of the govern- ments. its membership consisted of the allicd prime ministers and other such members of the allied govts. and their tech- nical advisers as might be summoned to attend it. under- lying its creation was the idea of keeping the control of the military power in civil hands, for the meetings of the committee were to be preceded by mectings between the general staffs of the allies, and it would be for the committee to decide upon the recommendations of the staffs in regard to naval, military and economic policy. all inter-allied conferences held after 1915 at which the heads of the allied govts. were present were in real- ity meetings of this committec. its first meeting was the representative conference held in paris on march 26 1916, at which were present the british, french, belgian, italian and serbian prime ministers, the russian and japanese ambassadors and the portuguese minister to the french republic. as agreed, the conference was preceded by a meeting of the allied general staffs, whose recommenda- tions were subsequently reported to the conference by marshal joffre. upon these the conference gave its decision; and upon certain economic and shipping questions, including that of the establishment of an allied maritime transport council in london opportunity was taken of the presence of so many members of ihe alliance both to draft and pass a declaration of the unity of their aims in military, economic and diplomatic affairs, and to _ renew the decision contained in the pact of london not sepa- rately to conclude peace. in formal conference the allied statesmen were preoccupicd with the effectual prosecution of the war, yet speculation, even negotiation, as to the nature of the political settlement to follow an allied victory was never far from their minds. when brought together, as by the conference in paris, they informally canvassed one another as to the bases of a possible peace. the knowledge that “‘ conversations ”’ were taking place contributed to the reaffirmation of the pact of london. though bound not to negotiate peace separately, the great powers saw no reason why they should not predetermine among themselves the de- tails of peace; and it was with the territorial settlement of the near east that their minds were chiefly occupied in the early summer of 1916. the sykes-picot agreement.—anxious to obtain arab assist- ance against the turks, great britain in 1915 had come to a secret and loosely defined arrangement with the sherif of mecca by which, in return for the armed assistance of the arabs, she promised her support for the sherif’s plan for the creation of an independent arab kingdom. ‘the french, however, had for well-nigh a century entertained ambitions in regard to syria and cuilicia—ambitions conflicting directly with those of the 1see sir m. a. p. hankey, diplomacy by conference, p. 7. * 1tds p79: bkurope sherif. the reconcilement was effected by the late sir mark sykes and m. georges picot, without the knowledge of the sherif of mecca, in an agreement that has come to bear their names. as the sykes-picot agreement affected certain vital russian interests in the middle east, it was communicated to the russian govt., who assented to it in may 1916; but its provisions and even its existence were carefully concealed from italy, with whose interests it might be expected to con- flict. the full importance of this agreement in the history of inter-allied relations became apparent in 1917 at the conference at st. jean de maurienne. it serves here to illustrate both the rifts that existed within the outward harmony of the alliance, and the fact that not a few of the many subsequent disputes between the allies had their origin in similar instances, where immediate military aid was purchased by promises, given by one or the other of the powers, irreconcilable with the ambitions of some other member of the alliance. negotiations with bulgaria and greece.—by winning italy to their side the entente had attacked the triple alliance in its achilles-heel. the next step was to seek to place a barrier in the balkans between the central empires and their turkish ally. geographically and politically, bulgaria was obviously designed to act as barrier. her ultimate refusal to do so, after protracted negotiations, was due as much to the inability of the western powers to induce serbia to make concessions to bulgarian aspirations in macedonia as to the germarophil feeling of her coburg king. when bulgaria finally threw in her lot with the central powers and invaded serbia in oct. 1915, the allies turned to serbia’s ally, greece, for help. greece, too, was ruled by a germanophil king and, despite the efforts of veniselos and the bait of the possession of cyprus held out by the british govt., she proclaimed herself neutral in the conflict between serbia and bulgaria. political discussion remained in abeyance during the summer of 1916, until it was clear that the allied offensive on the somme would bring no decisive results; the attention of france and great britain, in particular, was again turned to wider problems. at a conference at boulogne on oct. 20 the british and french prime ministers, ministers for foreign affairs, war, marine, commanders-in-chief, chiefs-of-staffs, etc., discussed the question of greek military co-operation against bulgaria. in the pre- vious aug. rumania had joined the alhes at a price which it had taken much negotiation to arrange, her demands conflicting dangerously with serbian ideals. now, after a few weeks’ fighting, the total collapse of rumania was imminent. the boulogne conference found itself face to face with complete german domination in the balkans; not only was bulgaria an ally of the central powers, but belgrade was, and bucharest was about to become a german possession. alone of the balkan states greece had not yet intervened in the struggle. at the end of aug. an internecine struggle had broken out there between the king and his pro-german advisers and the pro-ally veniselos. when the boulogne conference was assembling veniselos had set up a provisional government at salonika and declared war upon bulgaria; but his government depended solely for its support upon the greek islands. the mainland remained loyal to constantine, whose deposition, desired by france and great britain, was opposed by the tsar and by italy. at boulogne the french and british ministers found themselves called upon to arrange financial support for veniselos, 3 for text see temperley, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 16. the main terms were: russia obtains ‘‘ the provinces of erzcrum, trebizond, van and bitlis’? and part of southern kurdistan. trance obtains “the coastal strip of syria, the vilayet of adana and the territory bounded on the south by a line aintab-mardin to the future russian frontier, and on the north by a line ala dagh, kaisariya, ak-dagh, sildiz-dagh, zara and egin, kharput.” great britain obtains southern mesopotamia with baghdad and haita and akka in syria. the zone between the french and british territories forms an inde- pendent arab state or states. alexandretta becomes a free port. the holy places are put under a special regime. 1por valuable information as to the relations between greece and the entente powers, see a. f. frangulis, za grece et la crise mondiale, vol. i (1926). europe military co-operation with his forces against bulgaria, transport of allied troops to salonika, the constitution of these troops, and, lastly, whether or not portuguese regiments should be included in their ranks. conferences on russian situation—in the meantime, the situation in russia was growing more serious from day to day, and at a conference in paris on nov. 15 russia formed the chief subject for discussion. in reality there were two confer- ences held on this day: the first, in the morning, was an anglo- french conference; in the afternoon a second was held to which representatives of russia and italy were admitted. at the anglo-french conference a frank interchange of views took place between mr. asquith and mr. lloyd george, representing great britain, and m. briand and admiral la caze, the french representatives, on the subject of russia and a political and military inter-allied conference it was proposed to hold at petrograd. it was agreed that, in addition to france, great britain and russia, italy should also take part, and that the conference should be composed solely of statesmen of the first rank with eminent soldiers and technical experts from each of the participating powers. in these circumstances mr. lloyd george attached so great importance to the results likely to be obtained that he himself offered to be the british delegate. poland, in whose future france had a deep concern, and greece, were also discussed; agreement was reached upon all these subjects. great britain and france having thus arranged matters between themselves admitted italy and russia to the afternoon discussion. russia was represented by her ambassador at paris, m. isvolsky; italy by signori tittoni and carcano and the italian ambas- sador at paris. the decisions arrived at in the morning were again dcbated, as well as the relations between the various governments and general staffs in regard to the conduct of the war. already that need for unity of direction that was ultt- mately to result in the creation of the supreme war council was making itself felt. the discussion proving too long to be con- cluded the same day, the conference was resumed on nov. 16. as regards russia the work of this conference proved fruitless. the inter-allied conference held at st. petersburg (leningrad) in the following jan. found that, in the rapidity of their occur- rence, eventsin russia had outstripped human power to control them. the peace proposals of the central powers, dec. 12 1916.— british statesmen had frequently declared that the war could be terminated for either side only by a ‘“ knock-out blow.” shortly before he resigned the premiership in dec. 1916 mr. asquith defined the objects of the allics as “adequate” reparation for the past and adequate security for the future.’’? three days after the boulogne conference sir edward grey delivered a speech (oct. 23) in which he expressed his conviction that the world must look to some league of nations as the pre- ventive of future wars.* bethmann hollweg, the german chancellor, scized upon this reference as opening the way to a possible peace negotiation, and dispatched (dec. 12) a vaguely worded note to the allies in which he voiced his conviction that proposals germany and her allies were prepared to bring for- ward ‘‘ would be such as to serve as a basis for the restoration of a lasting peace.”4 the reception accorded this note by the allies showed that there was as yet noscrious rift in the entente, nor any weakening of the common determination to prosecute the war toa victorious termination. allied statesmen denounced the note as an endeavour to create discord within § their ranks,* while on dec. 26 the heads of the french and british govts. confcrred in london over a reply to the german note. in replying, the alhes rejected the german proposal as a manocuvre, and reaffirmed their determination to carry on the war until assured of a peace that would secure “‘ reparation of 1 hankey, op. cif., p. 9. *speech on oct. i. *speech to foreign press association, oct. 23. 4 parliamentary papers, cd. 8,406, 5on this subject generally, see cambridge history of british foreign policy, vol. 3. 1059 violated rights and liberties, recognition of the principle of nationalities and of the free existence of small states.” § president wuson’s peace proposats —the reply to the german note was only one among many subjects discussed and decided at this anglo-french conference. another peace proposal— that of the american president—received a fuller reply. defer- ring to the president’s request for more detailed information as to the terms upon which the allies were prepared to conclude a peace,’ the french and british statesmen drafted in this con- ference the famous reply that was returned to the president in the name of the allied powers on jan. ro 1917. the entente powers committed themselves and their allies to a peace programme that embraced the “ reorganisation of europe, ’’ including, as it did, “the liberation of the italians, as also of the slavs, rumanians and czechoslovaks from foreign domination . the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the turks; and the turning out of europe of the ottoman empire as decidedly foreign to western civilisation,”® inspir- ing these phrases, unknown to the public and perhaps to certain of the statesmen agreeing to them, were the secret treaties and agreements, the treaty of london and the constantinople and sykes-picot agreements. this conference also busied itself with the strategical problems in palestine, with the balkans and with the extension of the brilish front in france. greece was again discussed, and russia and the holding of the proposed conference at st. petersburg. arrangements were made for holding an anglo-french-italian conference in rome at the new year. diplomacy by conference was again justified by its results: all these important matters were discussed and decided upon within three days. conference of rome.—the conference at rome on jan. 5 was more representative, and occupied itself with matters no less important, than its predecessor in london. italy and russia were represented, as well as france and great britain. this was the second conference mr. lloyd george attended as prime minister (he had succeeded mr.asquith in that office in dec.), and he had the french and italian prime ministers as neighbours at the conference table, in addition to the chiefs of the staffs of the allies, with a great number of technical advisers.? the proposed confcrence in petrograd was again discussed, as also the possibility of aflording some measure of military and economic assistance to russia. co-ordination had so justified itself by results in other departments of the war that a resolu- tion was taken to hold a naval and shipping conference in london at an early date to take counsel regarding the submarine menace, maritime transport and other cognate matters. so grave was the menace that a new line of communication with salonika and the allied forces in macedonia was agreed up- on by which, as it passed through italy, a great shortening of the sea journey would be eflected. those forces were menaced by another danger; the opposition of king constantine to the policy of the allies. fence the conference was led to decide what policy should be adopted towards the royal greek govt., and what instructions should be given to general sarrail, the commandcr-in-chief of the allied forces at salonika for his guidance in his relations with that government and with the general officers commanding the allied armies in the balkans. greece and russia were not the only causes for anxiety to the allies; the military situation in italy, as mr. lloyd george told the conference in a memorandum he circulated amongst its members, left much to be desired. convinced that the collapse of russia was imminent and inevitable, the prime minister believed that it would set free enemy forces sufficient to render an intensive attack upon the italian front a feasible and probable operation on the part of the central empires. he therefore urged the desirability of preparation on the part of the allies, so that in the event of the need arising large reinforcements could 6 parliamentary papers, cd. 8,467. 7 parliamentary papers, cd. 8,431. 4 parliamentary papers, cu. 8,468. °f or information as to this conference, sce hankey, ep. cit., pp. 10-11; sir w. robertson, from private to field- marshai; tem- perley, op, cit., among others. 1060 at once be dispatched to the italian front. the italian debacle at caporetto ro months later demonstrated the truth of his warning; the fact that that debacle was stayed in time is tes- timony to the efficiency of the plans worked out by the conference in rome. conference of st. jean de maurienne —while the rome con- ference was sitting another of some importance was taking place in london between mr. balfour, the french and italian ambassadors and the russian charge d’affaires. the british govt. again found themselves called upon to reconcile conflicting ambitions with regard to the post-war territorial settlement in the near east. the sykes-picot agreement had been kept secret from italy and the sherif of mecca, but the fact of its existence and its terms, if not an actual copy of the agreement itself, had come into possession of the italian government. at once that government sought from its allies a very definite and binding interpretation of the admission in principle of italian claims in asia minor contained in article 9 of the treaty of london. when these claims came to be discussed in conference in lon- don, their irreconcilability with those of russia, france and great britain became embarrassingly apparent. a way had to be found out of this tangle of diplomatic promises; but after some wecks of negotiation and discussion the conference failed to secure com- plete unanimity. italy continued tobe insistent in her demands, and, as she was mistress of the new route to the salonika front and any defection on her part from the alliance would have en- tailed the most serious consequences, the french and british prime ministers met the italian prime minister and foreign ministers at st. jean de maurienne on april 17 and achieved an agreement. the terms of this agreement have never been pub- lished; but it was intended that it should be a corollary to the sykes-picot agreement. one fact alone is certain: that the italian prime minister received a promise of smyrna in answer to his demand for that town.! ' events in greece were now steadily leading up to the crisis which culminated with mr. jonnart’s mission and the deposition of king constantine. the allies, especially great britain, wished to reconcile the veniselist and royal factions, and when that be- came impossible to side with whichever party was most likely to further the allied cause in the war. by april 1917 constan- tine was the sole obstacle in the way of a greek declaration of war on the central empires; therefore, at st. jean de maurienne, m. ribot proposed that the allies should demand his abdication. this proposal, if not unwelcome to the british prime minister, met with heated opposition from baron sonnino for the same reason that italy in the previous year had refused to demand constantine’s deposition—that to place veniselos in power would be to endanger italy’s near eastern and mediterranean inter- ests by rendering possible the creation of a greater greece. the conference rejected m. ribot’s proposal, and decided to post- pone any demand for the king’s abdication until popular move- ments or other causes at athens should render it inevitable.” when that occurred the crown should pass to constantine’s eldest son. the conference resolved in the meantime to take certain measures that would virtually make them the masters of greece. the sixtus letters —a final question still remained for deci- sion. the emperor charles of austria had transmitted a peace proposal to the allies through his brother-in-law, prince sixtus of bourbon-parma. the emperor consented to the restoration and indemnification of belgium; to the restoration of serbia with an outlet to the sea [through albania]; and promised to support ‘the just claims of france to alsace-lorraine.” he did not mention italy.4 when lloyd george and ribot, being inclined to treat with austria, raised the question at st. jean de mauri- enne, sonnino refused scornfully to listen to it. italy, said son- nino, could not conclude a ‘‘ white peace ”’; her demands as stated and agreed to in the treaty of london must be fulfilled 1for information as to this conference see g. p. gooch, afodern bhrapes frangulis, op, cit. 2 frangulis, op. cit., vol. i, p. 519. ’see manteyer, 7. he austrian peace offer. kurope to the letter.4 subsequently the emperor agreed to certain minor concessions to italy; but sonnino’s refusal at st. jean de mau- rienne had dealt the movement its deathblow. the greek question: the stockholm conference.-—the allied prime ministers had no sooner returned to their capitals than greek affairs once more claimed their attention. at an anglo- ' french conference, that met in london on may 28, it was re- solved to address a demand to the greek govt. for the abdication of king constantine, and within a fortnight that monarch had abdicated in favour of his second son alexander. the salonika front again came up for discussion, as also did a new subject at in- tor-allied conferences—socialism. the outbreak of revolution in russia had inspired the dutch socialist, troclstra, to propose a labour conference in stockholm to discuss the possibilities of peace. this idea was strongly supported by the kerensky govt. in russia and by mr. henderson, the british labour leader and cabinet minister, who had ben on a mission to russia with vandervelde and albert thomas; more important still, it was favoured by mr. lloyd george.5 the conference, however, de- cided against the allied powers being in any way represented at the proposed labour conference, and even went so far as to agree that the allied govts. should refuse passports to their sub- jects desiring to attend its deliberations. a few months later the allics were confronted with the com- plete military collapse of russia and her disappearance from among their ranks. in order to make arrangements for meeting the military, economic and political consequences of russia’s defection, a great inter-allied conference assembled in paris on july 25. at the first sessicn great britain, france, italy, russia, greece, rumania and serbia were represented, while at the final session on july 26 representatives cf belgium, japan, montenegro and portugal were alzo invited to be present. the deposition of king constantine had rendered it poss:ble for ven- iselos to bring greece into the alliance; but one of the chief prob- lems before the conference was that of providing the financial sinews of war for the new ally. the situation at salonika gave rise to a discussion that finally embraced the general balkan policy of the allies. this conference also discussed the establishment of an allied base at corfu, the italians in epirus, the formation of an arab legion, and the holding of a conference in london to effect co-ordination of transport arrangements. the russian collapse was speedily followed on the italian front by the very consequence mr. lloyd george had foretold at the rome conference in january. at the end of oct. the austro- german armies gained a great victory at caporetto. at a con- ference at rapallo on nov. 7 the british, french and italian trime ministers and chicfs of staff took measures that proved effective in stemming and eventually repulsing the danger. al- ways an advocate of unity of action and purpose among the allies, mr. lloyd george found at rapallo the strongest possible arzument in the caporetto disaster for urging upon them the establishment of some central directing organisation. his argu- ments prevailed, and resulted in the establishment of the su- preme war council, composed of the prime minister and another representative of each of the great powers.® the supreme war council.—at a great inter-allied conference that met in paris on nov. 29 the decisions come to at rapallo were endorsed; on dec. 1 the supreme war council held its open- ing meeting. with its inception this record of inter-allied con- ferences comes to a close. the supreme war council was indeed in one sense an inter-allied conference en permanence in that it was a deliberative body composed primarily of the heads of the allied governments. but in another sense it was something less than a full inter-allied conference, inasmuch as it was an advisory body whose recommendations coulk| be put into practice only after they had been assented to by the allied governments. certain it is that at times 1t tended to take on the aspect of a full inter- 4 see gooch, op. cit., pp. 627-9. ’ gooch, op. cit., p. 623. ‘see on this conference hankey, op. cit., pp. 12-3; war cabinet report, 1917 (cd. 9,005); p. wright, the supreme war council; robertson, op. tit., among others, kurope allied conference, as when, in addition to representatives of the british colonies and of the indian empire, a great many of the allied states were also represented. for the most part secrecy has been successfully maintained as to the actual proceedings at the meetings of the supreme war council. from a few of these meetings, however, the veil has been lifted—the meeting at versailles from jan. 30 to feb. 2 1918, at which the ‘ creation of a general reserve for the whole of the armies on the western, italian and balkan fronts ” was decided upon, and the task of creation assigned “ to an executive, com- posed of the permanent military representatives of great britain, italy and the united states of america, with marshal foch for france.’ consequent upon the german offensive on march 21 a mecting was held at doullens on march 26 at which the decision was taken to place the task of co-ordination of the british and i'rench armies in the hands of marshal foch; following the re- pulse of the german offensive a meeting was held in abbeville on may 1 at which it was decided to dissolve the military execu- tive appointed the previous jan., and a few days later the title of commander-in-chief of the allied armies was conferred upon marshal foch?; finally, from oct. 31 to nov. 4 a session was held at paris at which were present the british, french and italian prime ministers and foreign ministers, and at which two mat- ters preliminary to thetermination of the war were dealt with—th- austro-german request for an armistice, and the conditions of armistice to be granted to turkey. at this conference man-powcr and that recurring subject on the azenda of inter-allied con- ferences, military operations in the balkans, were also discussed. bis.iograpuy.—official publications: reports of the war cabinet for 19017 and 1918 (cd. 9,005 of 1918), and cmd. 325 of 1919); officzal [fistory of the war: list of principal events, t914-8, compiled by h. t. skinner, etc., ii. m. stationery office (1922). the most important and informative single publication on the subject is sir maurice hankey's *‘ diplomacy by conference,” the round table, vol. 11 (london, 1920-1); apart from this information as to war- time conferences generally may be obtained from h. w. v. temper- ley, [zzstory of the peace conference at paris, 6 vol. (london, 1920-4); g. p. gooch, the ifistory of modern europe, 1878-1919 (lon«lon, 1923); and cambridge history of british foreign policy, vol. 3 (london, 1922, etc.). for information a3 to special conferences th> following are useful: field-marshal sir w. robertson, from privaiz to field~-marshal (london, 1921); for the rome conference; peter wright, de the supreme war conncil (london, 1921); for rapallo and after: g. de manteyer, austria's peace offer (london, 1921); for st. jean de maurienne: a. f. frangulis, la grece et la crise mondiale, vol. 1 (vol. 2 not yet (1926) published), for st. jean de maurienne and for the relations between greece and both parties to the war. (if. dy ss) v. europe after the war the object of the following article is to give an account of the political condition of europe during the six years from jan. 1920 to the beginning of 1926. it does not include a formal narrative of the events which took place during this period; for that, reference must be made to the various special articles included in these volumes; the aim is to concentrate attention on those matters which affected the continent as a whole and to point out the main characteristics in the general political development. the chief of these can be at once indicated for it gives a unity to the whole. the period is one of transition, a transition from the state of war to a state of peace. it begins with the ratification of the treaty of versailles, followed shortly by that of the treaties of st. germain, trianon and neuilly, by which the formal state of war on the continent of europe ceased. but even after the treaties had come into force it required some years to liquidate the immediate effect of the war and to restore a normal political condition. the most important step in this direction was the adoption in 1924 of the dawes scheme for the payment of reparation, by which what had been the chief cause both of economic and political trouble in europe was to a great extent removed. this was followed in the autumn of 10925 by the treaties of locarno, but it was an essential part of these treaties that germany should be admitted to the league of nations. this, owing to unforeseen obstacles, was not realised : hs cabinet report, 1918, cmd. 325. id, ; : 1061 in the spring of 1926 and in consequence the political situation still remained obscure and unsatisfactory. the new europe.—the settlement arranged in the peace con- ference of paris had produced changes equal to if not greater in importance than those embodied in the former similar settle- ments, the ‘treaty of westphalia, the peace of utrecht and the congress of vienna. ‘the war, short as it had been, compared with the thirty years war—the war of the spanish succession or the revolutionary and napoleonic wars—had in fact com- pletely upset the existing political system. in the west indeed the changes were few and of minor importance. the iberian penin- sula, holland, switzerland and the scandinavian states, retained their old position and their old possessions almost unaltered, though belgium was freed from the limitations on her full sov- ereignty implied in the guarantee of permanent neutrality. france had regained the provinces of alsace and lorraine which she had lost in 1870 and, at the same time, come back into the position of the first of the european nations which had so long been hers. in central europe it was very different. there the three great monarchies, which since the days of catherine, fred- erick the great and maria theresa, had dominated so large a part of the continent, had disappeared. in petrograd, berlin and vienna, the old centres of monarchical authority, the court had made way for republican government and the great armies by which europe had been overawed had ceased to exist. but the character of the change in each case was very different. ger- many had not only jost the military and political predominance which she had held since 1871, but she had been deprived of con- silerable territories: alsace-lorraine had been ceded to france; tos denmark the northern part of slesvig; to poland the greater pirt of the provinces of posen and west prussia, and, in addi- tion, the heart of the great mining district of upper silesia; while the city of danziz, commanding the mouth of the vistula, was created a separate state in close association with poland. perhaps even more important than the loss of territory, were the econemic and financial disabilitics imposed by the peace settle- ment, and the state of internal instability caused by the revolu- tion. at the same time germany was effectually crippled by the disarmament enforced on her, the establishment of control, and the occupation of the rhineland. the general effect was that for the moment germany was unable to take any active part in european politics; she had become a passive element in the con- tinental system. the utmost she could do was to concentrate on the slow and arduous task of internal reconstruction, which at the best must take many years. none the less, she had come out of the war a united state. subsequent projects for disruption, for instance in the rhine provinces, bavaria or east prussia, failed, and she was still in population the largest country, except russia, on the continent of europe. it could be foreseen that sooncr or later the time must come when she would be restored, not indeed to the old position of predominance, but to that of a great power. russia.—very different was the change which had taken place in the relations of russia to europe. from the time of peter the great it had been the object of the tsars to introduce european civilisation into their country and at the same time, by the west- ern extension of the empire, to establish themselves as one of the european powers. in this they had been successful, and ever since the congress of vienna they had taken an important and often a leading part in all the conferences, and intervened even in matters which primarily concerned western europe alone, such as the establishment of the kingdom of the belgians. by the defeat of russia in the war, followed as it was by the bol- shevik revolution, all this was chanzed. russia lost the border territories from finland to bessarabia, and was now confined to the semi-asiatic areas which had never come under the direct in- fluence of european culture and the western church. she had in fact once more become not a european but an asiatic power. >this may appear to be so if we look at territory alone, but the vast bulk of the russian population speaks a great european language, possesses a great european literature and belongs mainly, in every way, to the european family system.—ed. £, b. 1062 more than this, the religious fervour with which her self-imposed governors adopted the principles of militant communism, set her in pronounced opposition to the whole established system of western europe. she became therefore, instead of an integral part of europe, an alien state threatening europe.! during i9g1g—20 the soviet govt. entertained hopes of imposing on the european states the new system which they had themselves adopted. the first serious success was the establishment of a commu- nist govt. in hungary; there were hopes, which were not fulfilled, that this would be followed by a similar revolution in germany. the crisis came in the summer of 1920. in the war which had broken out between poland and russia, the russian troops ad- vanced to the gates of warsaw. the attempt failed; they were defeated and driven back in disorder, and this was quickly fol- lowed by treaties of peace in which the soviet govt. recognised the independence not only of poland but also of the baltic states and finland. by this the immediate danger of europe was stayed, but none the less the estrangement continued. the ill-advised attempts, which had been made in 1918 and rorg to overthrow the soviet govt. by force of arms and the help of the russian whites, had failed. the policy of the soviet govt. indeed gradually changed. urged largely by the necessity of foreign capital for internal reconstruction, they aimed at negotiating treaties, both political and commercial, with individual states. their first success was the treaty of rapallo with germany, signed during the confer- ence of genoa in april 1922, but it was not until the spring that formal de jure recognition was awarded by the british la- bour govt. under mr. ramsay macdonald; this step was quickly followed by italy, france and other states. from this time rus- sia has had diplomatic representation in the most important european capitals. but her efforts at closer relationship have in general not been successful, and her decisive refusal up to 1926 even to consider an application for admission to the league of nations showed her unchanged opposition to the general prin- ciples by which the european states were governed. mean- while, in accordance with the old traditions of the tsarist govts., the new russia aimed at extending her influence and author- ity on the continent of asia. it was there—in persia, in afghan- istan and in the far east—that her power was most felt, and here the old rivalry between england and russia reasserted itself. the succession stautes——germany was then temporarily in eclipse. russia was alienated from europe, but the third and oldest of the great powers—the one formerly though inac- curately known as the ‘‘ austrian empire ’’—had been shattered never to rise again. the great habsburg monarchy, which since the days of charles v. had played so important a part, had disap- peared from the map of europe. this is an event for which there is no parallel in modern european history. it is the first time that one of the great powers has, not by a slow and long delay, but by a sudden collapse, ceased to exist. it was not the result of any definite decision; the dissolution of the empire had never been one of the avowed war-aims of the allies: it was the spon- taneous act of the population, an act which the allies had not the power, even had they the will, to prevent. as a consequence of these events the number of states com- prising the european family of nations had been greatly increased. the new states were finland, estonia, latvia, lithuania, poland, czechoslovakia and yugoslavia, and among them may also be included the republics of austria and hungary. of these the majority, though new from the point of view of the politician and the lawyer, to the historian were familiar. they were the recreation of states which had been absorbed in the two great monarchies of the habsburgs and the romanoffs. the polish nation had regained the independence which it had lost in the partitions; czechoslovakia, though with different frontiers, was really an incarnation of the ancient kingdom of bohemia; the 1 historically it is very important to note that lenin and his colleagues believed themselves, however wrongly, to be the most european of russians, the executors of the latest and best european ideas and the true spokesmen of the industrial masses through- out europe, (see russia.)—ed. e. b. europe new austria and the new hungary were parts of the hereditary dominions of the heuse of habsburg and of the hungarian king- dom which, after a union of some four centuries, had now separated and regained the position, which they had had in the 15th century, of separate states. serbia and rumania had asa result of the series of wars increased in size. the fall of the aus- trian empire had in fact had results similar to those involved in the decay of the turkish empire: there too, the recognition as independent european states of serbia, bulgaria and ru- mania, meant the restoration to independent life of nationalitics which had for a time been submerged under the ottoman conquest. this comparison struck all observers and it led to the use of a phrase, the ‘f balkanisation of europe,” which formed a con- venient catchword. in truth it might easily become dangerous and misleading. what had really happened was that the prin- ciple of the compact national state which after centuries of war had established itself in western europe, in the case, for instance, of holland, belgium, denmark, norway and sweden, had now asserted itself in the more backward territories of central europe. that had been attained which had for 100 years been the ideal and the dream of liberal thought. curiously enough it was just those parties who before the war had been most vociferous in the proclamation of the ideals of nationality and liberty who showed themselves after the war most ready to criticise the re- sults when these ideals had been realised.2 there was indeed legitimate cause for apprehension. these new states were con- fronted by the task of building up the whole of their national institutions and creating afresh a centre of authority. at the best this is not easy. it was made more difficult in that it had to be undertaken at a time when economic resources had been wasted and destroyed by four years of war, and, in addition, by the fact that every one of these states made for itself a con- stitution in which were adopted the most extreme principles of democracy. it could only be expected that numerous mistakes would be made and that long years would be required before a fully satisfactory system of government had been established. moreover, in most of these states there were inevitably incor- porated very considerable minorities of population who were alien in language and religion or in nationality. of the twenty millions of whom the new republic of poland consisted, there were two million germans, four or five million jews, and an unde- termined number—ukrainians and white russians—who were more closely attached to the russian than to the polish branch of the slavonic peoples. in czechoslovakia there were some 3,500,000 germans who felt their new position of inferiority all the more keenly, that up to rg14 they had belonged to the ruling caste of the empire. in rumania were incorporated large slav, magyar and german minorities. with wise foresight the allies, when determining the new frontiers of europe, had imposed on these states in the east of europe special treaties by which they bound themselves, under international guarantee, to give to these subject and unwilling populations full rights of citizenship and complete equality be- fore the law, as well as the right of recognition of their own lan- guage and religion in the schools anc courts of law. the enforce- ment of these stipulations was necessarily attended with much difficulty. in one case, at any rate, the proposal of the polish govt. to dispossess german farmers in the grand duchy of posen, was prevented, and thereby a threatened act of injustice, which would have caused national enmity, was averted. it was of the highest importance that the new system of europe should recognise the obligation to provide an international guarantee of justice and protection against the unjust administration of the laws in these new states. it was to the league of nations that was entrusted by treaty the responsibility of watching over the execution of these new treaties. in fact, they only perpetu- ated a principle which by the treaties of berlin had already 2 much of the criticism, however, was deeply reflective and guided by historical and ethnographical study. the new system was far from being animated by a pure principle of national liberty. poland, czechoslovakia and rumania contain a mixture of peoples, with a dominant race, and corresponding minority problems.—ed. £, b, c 5° d 0° iam __ europe ee ae seale 100 200 english statute miles 100 200 300 55 — kilometres capitals thus: © railways bornholm “ (den.) 2 (wilne) oc lida : . * ot ——~ l, a 2 cf: . \\ . ; 3 / 50 a, co) we , ge \"ra, ge en\\ ee va : ~ posen warsaw js # aon . a. : oo . < - ' p datade an) (poznan) (warszawa ) kaliszo {lodz ali * ¢ q southamptoy ty 1 sa phase at esse . > ») piotrokow/’ | radom” oa > a i ve y 4 ( kielee . 1 czestochowa 3 45° “4ontlugon “acon 5 = ermon limogas 0° a! constants 4 ravenna © op pago(pagiqn rimini “y ne trnova as m us: sliven, 2/arazza (braga >\\ 7 @ wsoxr esas sere shy co “y\" ragds ° 40° / tagurs t as str. of bonifacio s porto d’ anz l ; ‘ _ sy “ a / e . ‘ g terranova 7? . . — _konitsa sardinia & / = ¢.olympus z ( tt.) cas '. @ o ; 5 nina ~*~ ; s\\% oristang) ff taranto : > xa 3 ariage wa iws se trikkala we , mitybels 5 : lied ' a i= ty, c.colonne f ' c.st. —_—— i —| \\ . , | / catanzaro lewaasy a vinceny faro ~kalosy | ~ oo\" . aot d ° e, ) wee at lonian \\ \\ ‘ lonia - ; e ae - +e’ | ‘ 2 1 i si , aegadean is. * a } sy 2) a < ai — j —_ cc ; 4 \\ : , o; es ; - , , irgenti “| » < as s \\ ss a 5 — ft y sp. 5 licata if nese !5- . | @ pamrellaria a dod to italy) ’ a. | ~. ; d p ‘\\% q a - | linos ) ‘5 s _ 3 cc 5° longitude west dpd 0° e longitude east 6° of greenwich f 10° g @ = vv ae | h 20° | 25 j 30 k the whitney-graham co.,inc. copyright. in the united states of america, 1926, by the encyclopaedia britannica, inc. kurope been adopted when the great powers of europe had recognised the new independence of rumania and serbia. the principal allied powers.—these political and territorial changes had radically altered the political balance of the conti- nent. for the last 100 years, by common consent, the five—later six—-great powers had exercised a general control and supervi- sion over all european matters, and had in particular claimed the right of intervening when any important territorial change was proposed. this system, which at the best had only worked intermittently and had often failed owing to dissensions among the great powers, had now broken down. the three eastern monarchies were eliminated, and there remained only great britain, france and italy. it was these three states, who, to- gether with the united states of america and japan, acting as the principal allied and associated powers, had determined the conditions of peace, and there naturally fell to them the responsibility of enforcing their observance. the united states, by their refusal to ratify the treaty of versailles, fell out. in regard to european matters, japan had no direct interest and claimed none; on these the three european powers in effect acted alone; to them fell also, as the only organised centre of authority in europe, a general prerogative of control. it soon appeared, however, that their real powers were very limited. notwithstanding the victory which they had achieved in the war, they were so exhausted by the effort that they had not the effective military power nor the financial resources to impose their will throughout the great expanse of central or eastern europe. their position was very different from that of the allied monarchs who, after 1814, were in military occupation of large parts of the continent and were able, almost without resistance, to carry into effect any resolution on which they jointly agreed. in 1919 the allies found difficulty in exercising any effective con- trol over the steps by which the new states, such as poland and czechoslovakia, came into existence, and they encountered seri- ous obstacles when they attempied to supervise and limit the large extensions of territory demanded by poland, yugoslavia and rumania. none the less, it was necessary for them to set up machinery for dealing with the very numerous and sometimes important problems arising out of the treaties which could be dealt with by them alone. almost every chapter of the treaties left important points, including the right of interpretation, to the principal allied and associated powers. some of these, e.g., reparation and the control of the occupied areas in germany, were referred to special commissions. matters of outstanding importance were dealt with by periodical mectings of the allied statesmen who continued, under the title of the supreme council, the work done by the council of fourat paris. these meetings varied from long and formal conferences, such as those of spa in july 1920 or of london in feb. 1921, to brief and transitory conversa- tions between the prime ministers of great britain and france, hastily summoned to deal with some special point or special emergency. they were similar in character and object to the conference of aix-la~-chapelle and other conferences which fol- lowed on the conclusion of the napoleonic wars. matters of less importance were referred to the conference of ambassadors, a body created in 1920, which sat in paris. to it there reported, for instance, the territorial commissions which had been set up to mark the new frontiers; it had to frame the de- cisions arrived at after the various plebiscites ordained by the peace treaties, had been held. much of the work which came before it was of an extremely subordinate character. it is a mis- take, which is not uncommon, to speak of the conference of am- bassadors as a body with its own independent rights and duties. in itself it had no power or authority; it was merely a clearing house established to avoid the long delay involved in dealing with questions by the ordinary diplomatic channels. the mem- bers of the conference were each directly responsible to the government by which he was appointed. its functions were also strictly limited to questions which arose out of the execution or interpretation of the treaties; there does not seem any case in which it transcended them. as the years went on, the points 1063 referred to it, which at first had been very numerous and some- times of considerable importance, naturally diminished. the league of nations —of greater importance was the insti- tution of the league of nations. this differed fundamentally from the older system of meetings of the great powers and, in fact was something quite new in the machinery of dealing with international affairs. the first point to be noted in its organisa- tion was that it was a permanent body with a standing secreta- riat and regular meetings. by this alone it showed a great ad- vance. matters of a political nature could be referred to it and dealt with immediately before they had had time to become politically dangerous. when any local dispute arose, it was no longer necessary to create special machinery for dealing with it or to resort to the cumbrous method of calling a special confer- ence; the machinery was there ready and able to get to work without delay. moreover, it was found that an appreciable ad- vantage was gained by transferring discussions from the more electric atmosphere prevailing in cities such as paris, london or rome, to the more neutral and impartial surroundings of geneva. almost as important as the creation of the league itself was that of the court of international justice, which was set up in the year 1920-1 at the hague; the settlement of international disputes was much facilitated by the existence of a permanent organ to which all questions of a judicial nature were automati- cally referred. again, in the constitution of the league there was found a solution of a long-standing difficulty. the dominance of the great powers had during the 19th century been pushed so far as seriously to threaten the sovereignty and independence of the smaller states. in the assembly of the league, however, every european state, except germany and russia, had a seat, and | in the council (which was for most purposes the executive organ) side by side with the permanent members, the great powers, there was an actual majority of elected representatives of the other states. all this gave to the smaller states an influence and importance of which they had long been deprived. of this op- portunity they were quick to avail themselves. many of the representatives, for instance mr. branting of sweden, m. hy- mans of belgium, m. benes of czechoslovakia, m. politis of greece, m. quinones of spain, quickly won a high position in public esteem; they showed eloquence in debate and wisdom in counsel. it soon became apparent that in dealing with political matters one of the chief weapons of the league was publicity. the open discussion in the assembly and the council had a great effect in creating a general public opinion which no state could afford to ignore. | naturally time was required before the league could under- take its political duties. it was fortunate that the major ques- tions which were agitating europe at this time, especially the continued conflicts between the allies and germany, did not fall within its sphere. they, like all other questions concerning the interpretation and enforcement of the treaties, had in the first place to be dealt with by the allies. it was an important stage when, owing to continued differences of opinion in the confer- ence of ambassadors as to the partition of upper silesia after the plebiscite, this question was referred to the league for decision. they were asked to adjudicate on the difference of opinion between great britain, france and italy, all three powers, having agreed beforehand to accept their verdict. the decision when given was at once adopted and enforced, and though the justice of it has often been criticised, the very fact that a de- cision was obtained in this manner was a good omen for the fu- ture. other matters arising out of the treaties were by them definitely referred to the league and not to the allies, as for instance the control of the saar valley, the adjudication between poland and danzig of disputed points which arose in great num- ber owing to the anomalous position in which the free city of danzig had been placed. these, and the working of the minority treaties, which also belonged to the league, gave valuable expe- rience and materially helped to solidify the new institution. in some cases it was not so successful. the league failed, as did the allies, to bring about a satisfac- tory solution of the controversy which arose between poland 1064 and lithuania after the lawless seizure of vilna by general zeligowski. when a similar problem arose out of a raid by the lithuanians on the town of memel, outstanding points were eventually referred to the league by the conference of ambas- sadors; here again a solution was arrived at, though in this case the terms of settlement were such that grave apprehension might be felt as to the feasibility of enforcing them. the most marked success which the league achieved was the settlement in june 1921 of the dispute between sweden and finland regarding the ownership of the aaland islands. but they also intervened effectively to determine awkward fronticr questions between albania and yugoslavia, and they averted what would probably have been an outbreak of war between greece and bulgaria in 1925 over a serious frontier incident. in another sphere the league proved itself of great use, when its assistance was called upon to create a scheme for the financial rehabilitation of aus- tria, and, this having been done, in a similar way to bring about an international agreement for the restoration of hungarian finances. great britain and france—ultimately the peaceful progress of the continent depended upon the mutual relations between the three great powers, great britain, france and italy, and particularly on those between great britain and france. not only in the more informal diplomatic discussions, but in the meetings of the supreme council, the conference of ambassa- dors, the reparation commission, and also the council of the league of nations, no satisfactory conclusion could be obtained unless an agreement had been arrived at between france and great britain. this agreement was often difficult. even during the war there was constant evidence that the close understand- ing which had been temporarily brought about owing to the in- sistent pressure of the german danger, was fragile and uncertain. from the moment that this danger was over, divergence of policy began. it was present throughout all the discussions in paris and increased after the peace treatics had been signed. ‘there were many matters on which the two states were by their inter- ests and traditions disposed to take conflicting views. the french govt. and people, naturally intent on future secur- ity desired to protect themselves by a new system of defen- sive alliances, in which the military superiority of the allies should be made permanent. great britain, owing to her world- wide interests and the fact that her representatives had to speak not only for these islands but also for the dominions, was forced to take a more detached view of purely european problems, and in particular, public opinion was very averse from any formal commitments which might force her on some future occasion to take part in a new european war. while the french aimed at a common guarantce for the maintenance of the new system among the states adjacent to germany, especially with poland and czechoslovakia, the british wished to pursue a policy rather of reconciliation, and were very opposed to anything that would bind them to a formal guarantee of the new frontiers in the east of europe. throughout the long negotiations with germany on military control, on reparation, on the occupation of the rhine- land, the british representatives always tended to take a more lenient view than the french; these differences led to something like an open conflict of policies, especially during the period when m. poincare held office as french minister president. there was, for instance, definite british opposition to the occupation of the ruhr and to the french attitude towards the separatist movement in the palatinate and the rhine provinces. the diplomatic situation created was cften difficult, for how- ever great the difference of opinion might be, no one could doubt the supreme importance of maintaining the closest touch between the two countries. any definite severance or diplomatic opposition would necessarily have had the grav- est consequences. europe was full of inflammable material; there were many places where at any moment a conflagration might break out. if in any of these questions, as for instance the attempts of the emperor charles to recover his throne and the consequent mobilisation of the forces of the little entente, the constant causes of friction between yugoslavia on the one ekurope hand, italy, greece and bulgaria on the other, the two great powers, instead of using their common influence to damp down the growing excitement and enmity, had taken sides, each sup- porting one of the antagonists, there would have been, instead of a brief and unimportant local controversy, a formal division of interests which would have affected the whole continent. this period of strained relations came to an end in the spring of 1924, when the fall of m. poincare followed shortly after the establishment of the labour ministry in this country. from this time there took place a remarkable change in french policy. they had, as we have seen, concentrated their endeavours on procuring by alliances a permanent military superiority on the continent; they now became keenly interested in the rival policy of producing security by disarmament. french representatives took a leading part in the drafting of the treaty for mutual secur- ity and also in advocating the adoption of the geneva protocol. in both matters the british gevt. was less accommodating. there was a curious change of position. the english representa- tives now found that they were quickly losing the position which they had hitherto occupied, of being the principal supporters of the methods of avoiding war, with which the league was espe- cially associated. asa result it seemed for the time that the french would step into this position, and there is no doubt that thereby they would greatly increase the influence, alwavs important, which they had exercised at geneva. italy.—in this association of the allies during the first years after the war, italy, under successive weak and embarrassed govts., hampered as she was by internal dissensions, took no permanent part and pursued on the whole a pacifist rele. a great change ensued when in oct. 1922, after the march on rome, signor mussolini, with a firm hand, took over the control. there was some apprehension that as a consequence of the strong na- tionalist element in the fascist movement, the government might adopt an ambitious and aggressive policy. support for this was given by the very vigorous action of mussolini when, in consequence of the murder of italian officers occupied in the de- limitation of the greco-albanian frontiers, an italian fleet was sent to corfu and attacked and occupied thetown. confronted, however, by the strong expression of opinion at a meeting of the league of nations, the italian govt. accepted the intervention and agreed to abide by the decisions of the conference of am- bassadors, and what seemed for a moment a dangerous episode passed over (see corfru; league of nations). in other mat- ters, as for instance the settlement of the prolonged fiume con- troversy and the general amelioration of relations with yugo- slavia, the new italian govt., while effectively protecting the interests of its own country, showed a considerable amount of diplomatic skill and discretion. the little entente —in no part of europe did it seem that the danger of continued unrest, both political and social, and then the outbreak of a fresh war, was so imminent as in the southeast. the disappearance of the austro-hungarian monarchy had brought about a state of things which is often referred to as the balkanisation of europe. instead of one of the great powers, which with all its faults and internal weaknesses, had maintained for many centurics settled order, there were a number of small states of which some had to start the work of government from the very beginning. it was feared by many that they would be unequal to the task, that they would fail in maintaining internal order and cohesion, and that consequently fresh wars might break out between them. | it was under these circumstances that the ‘‘ succession states ” arranged with one another a network of defensive alliances. this new system, commonly known as the little entente is un- doubtedly one of the most remarkable diplomatic and political developments in europe since the war. among other things it shows a determination on the part of these states boldly and vigorously to take their place in europe; they refused to accept a position, which perhaps some had anticipated they would hold, as clients to the great powers; they appear indeed to have acted without consulting, and perhaps to some extent contrary to the wishes of the principal allied and associated powers. it europe was a significant and not unwholesome reminder that the smaller states of europe preposed to make the fullest use of the posilion which they had won, and it was the fitting outcome of a war in which the cause of small nations played so large a part. a ger-~ man victory would certainly have implied complete german pre- dominance over the whole of central europe; the allied victory had brought into existence new states of the second rank, but these were animated by the strongest assertion of their sovereign rights and influenced by a keen sense of national independence. in this the lead throughout was taken by dr. bene, the forcign secretary of the czechoslovak republic. the beginning of this system (see little entente) is to be found in a treaty between czechoslovakia and yugoslavia of aug. 1920; this is in form a defensive alliance against an unpro- voked attack from hungary. in april 1921 a similar treaty was concluded between czechoslovakia and rumania: this, unlike the first, provided for a separate military convention to be even- tually concluded. in june 1921 an identical treaty was signed between rumania and yugoslavia. it was the alliances between these three states by which the nucleus of the little entente was formed, and the basis of the alliance was mutual protection against the possibility of attack by hungary. the reason of this is obvious; the territories of cach of these states included large areas which had formerly belonged to hungary, part of which were inhabited by a considerable magyar population. the hun- garians, though they had been forced to sign the treaty of tria- non, consistently refused to recognise the moral justice of the new frontiers, and it was the policy of the national parties to work for the restoration, at any rate of large parts of the territory which they had lost. subsequently on march 3 1921 poland concluded a treaty with rumania in which, for obvious reasons, there was no specific mention of hungary. it is an alliance for the defence of their existing frontiers. it becomes, therefore, a defensive alliance against russia. in dec. of the same year a treaty by which the two states mutually guaranteed each other’s ter- ritories, was concluded between czechoslovakia and austria. this is of importance because it is the first case in which one of the states defeated in the war entered into a treaty of this nature with one of the victors, and thereby the austrians formally gave up the claim which they had made in rorg to those parts of czechoslovakia in which there was a predominantly german population. while the british govt., though maintaining the most friendly relations with the different states concerned, and particularly with czechoslovakia, held aloof from these arrangements, the french govt., without any formal treaty, kept in close touch with the government of czechoslovakia and throughout assisted them by advice and the maintenance of a military mission, in building up their new army. with poland, in feb. 1921, they entered into a treaty by which the two governments bound themselves to discuss together all questions of foreign policy in which they were mutually interested, and agreed, if necessary, to take steps for the mutual defence of their territory and the safeguarding of their legitimate interests. by an exchange of notes in 1921 the italian and czechoslovak ministers declared that there was a complete identity between the views and aims of the two countries in the sphere of international politics, especi- ally as regards the application of the treaties of peace and the policy to be followed towards the successor states of the austro- hungarian monarchy. by the end of 10921, therefore, the new group of states had come into effective existence, and it was cemented by repeated meetings on each other’s territory of the leading ministers. it acquired additional strength in 1924, when the prolonged diffh- culties between italy and yugoslavia, arising out of the fiume question, had at length been settled, and in consequence a treaty of alliance was signed at rome on jan. 27 1924. in the same year a formal treaty of alliance was made by czechoslovakia with both italy and france. it must be noted that in all these treaties it is expressly stated that they were in accordance with the covenant of the league of nations, and were, of course, as required by the covenant, published and deposited at geneva. 1065 in this way they differ from previous systems, such as that of the triple alliance, which were to a large extent secret. this, however, does not apply to the military conventions by which some of the treatics were accompanicd. politically the general result of these treaties seems to have been to maintain peace and security. hungary, disarmed as she was and with her greatly reduced territory, was not in a position to take the offensive. that the treaties were effective and that action would be taken in accordance with them was shown on more than one occasion, especially when the ex-emperor charles, in oct. 1921 suddenly appeared in hungary with the object of regaining the throne which he had lost. on this occasion the czechoslovak army was mobilised and it was probably only the intervention of the great powers which prevented the occupa- tion of hungarian territory. the problems and difficulties caused by the peace settlemen! were, however, not only political. the economic and financial results were equally important. the empire had formed a unit, with a common railway system and common customs frontier, (austria and hungary, though technically distinct, had entered into a customs agreement) the financial centre being placed in vienna, which was the headquarters of the great banks by which capital was distributed throughout the territories. from the moment of clissolution each of the successor states claimed and exercised the right to complete control of its own economic and financial policy. animated by an intense spirit of nationality, they were above all anxious to assert their full sovereignty, and refused to consent to efforts which were made during 1g1g to maintain in some form or another financial, if not political unity. they were just as frightened of the maintenance of the economic superiority of vienna as they were of its political control. each of these states was animated by the desire to make itself eco- nomically sufficient, and with this object, set to work to impose very high tariffs in order to foster its own industries. the result was a sudden and complete severance of long standing commer- cial ties. trade and industry were disorganised; moreover, pending the liquidation of the great railway companies and rail. way material, the whole system of communication was thrown out of joint, as was the trade on the danube, which was in the hands of several competing states, who created new impedi- ments to its commercial use. the results were especially dis- astrous for the city of vienna, which had largely depended on the trade in articles of luxury to the less highly developed parts of the empire, and also to the balkans, but it seriously interfered with the prosperity of all the countries concerned. under these circumstances many still maintained the hope of restoring in some form the old economic unity. immediately after the war there were indications that some similar system of mutual guarantee between the smaller states might be formed among the countries bordering on the baltic, in particular, among the states which had been separated from russia. it was perhaps hoped that the three scandinavian states would be willing to lend their support to such an alliance. if so, the hopes were disappointed. sweden, norway and den- mark, which had established and maintained during the war co-operation on matters of common interest, preferred, when the immediate danger was over, to revert to their older condition of isolation. they were prepared to rest their security on the general guarantee given by the league of nations. in the sum- mer of 1921 a conference was held at warsaw, which was at- tended by representatives of finland and the three baltic states, with a view to a defensive alliance, which in effect would have been one against russia. the people of finland, however, were not unnaturally alarmed by the prospect of being entangled in a war with russia arising out of questions connected with the polish frontier. at that time the relations between russia and poland were still very strained. in consequence, holsti, the prime minister, finding that he could not get support for his policy, had to resign, and from this time these larger schemes fell to the ground. all, therefore, that was achieved was an alliance between the two small states of latvia and estonia, the political and commercial interests of which were almost identical. from 1066 this alliance, lithuania, chiefly occupied by her perennial struggle with poland, and therefore to some extent tending to depend on russian support, held aloof. guarantee treatics—it was the strength, but also the weak- ness of the leaguc of nations, that as its members were recruited from all continents, so also in its formal constitution it gave no recognition of, or method of dealing with, those matters which concerned peculiarly the continent of europe. this was shown by the treatment of the whole question of disarmament in con- nection especially with the different schemes for treaties of mutual guarantee and disarmament, and for the further proposals con- tained in the geneva protocol of 1924. quite apart from the fact that by the preamble to the disarmament clauses of the treaty, the allies had formally bound themselves to the principle of disarmament, there was a general agreement that a great reduc- tion of armaments was essential to the future peace and prog- ress of the continent. whatever view might be held about the particular degree of responsibility for the war of 1914 which at- tached to each power or each group of powers, on one matter all were agreed—that the chief predisposing cause of the outbreak of war was the intense rivalry of armaments which had continued and increased ever since the war of 1870. it was a natural deduc- tion that if this rivalry in armaments was to continue, tt would at some future period almost inevitably result in a new outbreak. it could probably be foreseen that whatever the terms of the treaty were, it would not be possible permanently to maintain the system by which germany was compelled to almost com- plete disarmament if, after she had become a member of the league of nations, other nations of europe, by which she was surrounded, especially france and poland, recognised no restric- tion of the preparations which they might make for war, there was also ground for legitimate apprehension that if the newly constituted states of southeastern europe devoted a large part of their energies and other resources to the building up of general armaments, sooner or later temptation might become irresistible to use these armies, not necessarily against their old enemies, ifungary and bulgaria, but in some quarrel between themselves. there were, for instance, causes of iriction between yugoslavia on the one side, italy and greece on the other. it was obviously very undesirable that in a time of gencral financial depression and economic embarrassment, the countries of europe should squander an undue part of their resources in military preparation. for this reason, various schemes were projected, the general object of which was to work out a system in which the nations should mutually bind themselves each to reduce its army and navy to a specified strength, while at the same time, by a gen- eral mutual guarantee, they should undertake to protect one another against aggression. as soon, however, as any attempt was made to reduce these schemes to a precise form, difficulties arose from the fact that if they were to be made generally binding on all the states, members of the league of nations, the mutual guarantee would apply both to european, and to asiatic and american states. this affected more particularly the british dominions, which, while they acted as independent members of the league, were united in their refusal to enter into any bind- ing engagement agiin to intervene in matters of purely local european importance. in truth, the problem of disarmament as it existed in europe, owing to historical reasons, did not apply elsewhere. in south america there was no such great military tradition. in the pacific the rivalry of armaments was naval rather than military, and it therefore was quite properly dealt with, not at geneva, but al a special conference summoned for this purpose at washington in nov. 1921, a conference which was attended only by great britain and france among the european states, and in which a major part was taken by the united states of america, japan and great britain, in her capacity as a power specially interested in the affairs of the far east. what was wanted, however, was some special arrangement between the european states themselves; as m. briand said: “pour assurer la paix, c’est veurope qu’il s’agit d’organiser.’’! this became more evident in the discussions on the treaty of t journal officiel, feb. 27 1926. rurope mutual assurance and the geneva protocol. it could not be expected that the south american republics would be ready to co-operate in enforcing sanctions arising out of a purely european conflict. this point of view was also expressed by the british dominions; everything seemed to point to the necessity for some arrangement for special treatment of the affairs of each continent, but the more the matter was investigated, the clearer did it become that the european problem was too varied and too com- plex to allow the whole of it to be dealt with in a single instru- ment. this was the view put forward authoritatively by mr. austen chamberlain when expounding the reasons why great britain was unable to accept the proposals of the geneva proto- col; as he explained, it would be wiser to approach the question not from a general, but from a local, agreement. on the continent of europe there were three areas from which danger could be anticipated:—the rhineland, which had so often been the cause of war between france and germany during the last thousand years; the eastern frontiers of germany, where, as we have seen, the germans refused to accept as a permanent solution the frontiers laid down in the treaty of versailles; and the southeast of europe. of these at the moment the i’ranco- german problem presented the smallest difficulty. no one really anticipated that the germans, if they attempted at any future time to recover by force the position which they had lost, would begin upon the rhine; there, they knew, the opposition theywould have to meet would be strongest; the french army was the larg- est in europe, and though the draft treaties of mutual assurance by which great britain and the united states had in rorg offered their help to france against a renewed war of aggression from germany, had not come into force, the germans would still fear that anything in the nature of an unprovoked attack on france would recreate the coalition by which they had been defeated. they were not likely in the future to hazard a new war against the combination of france and england. lecarno.—from 1922 onwards constant discussions and nego- tiations had taken place with the object of bringing into existence some new treaty by which the security of france against invasion would be guaranteed. none of the proposals made had been suc- cessful. the chief reason for this was that the french now asked, what they had not asked in 1919, that any such treaty should apply not only to the western, but to all the frontiers of ger- many. this the british govt. was unable to accept. there was, moreover, a strong fecling in this country against continental commitments in general, and particularly against any treaty which would seem designed to perpetuate the division of europe into victors and vanquished. but a solution was eventually found in a proposal which, in march 1925 was put forward by the german govt.; they suggested a mutual pact of non-aggres- sion between germany on the one side, france, belgium and great britain on the other. this was a very notable proposal because in effect it implied that germany would voluntarily bind herself not to attempt by arms to recover a)sace-lorraine. she relinquished the idea of a war of revenge. it was first made confidentially to the british govt., and afterwards embodied in a formal note to france, and was made the basis of discussions which took place at locarno during the month of oct. 1925. the agreement arrived at was embodied in a series of treaties, all of which were signed in london on dec. 1, of that year. the essential points in these treaties were that germany on the one side, france and belgium on the other, agreed mutually to refrain from any act of aggression, to respect and keep invio- late the frontiers arranged in rg1g: and, in addition to this, to submit all causes of dispute which might arise, to arbitration. ‘these basic agreements were supplemented in the main treaty of locarno by a mutual guarantee, in which great britain and italy also joined. the result was that every cause of dispute was to be submitted to arbitration, and that if any one of the states violated this undertaking, all the other signatory powers, includ- ing this country, would be compelled, if necessary, to come to the help in arms of the state whose territory had been attacked. it was a condition, moreover, that germany should immediately apply for admission to the league of nations. after some delay, evans—everest, mount owing to the internal weakness of the german govt., formal per- mission was given by the reichstag, and the application was presented at geneva on feb. 11 1926. in addition to the treaties dealing with the western frontier of germany, general arbitration treaties were concluded between germany on the one side, poland and czechoslovakia on the other, and by a separate instrument france undertook in this case a unilateral obligation to poland and czechoslovakia to guarantee this treaty. . as soon as the treaties had been signed, the allies, in accord- ance with the promise already made, hastened to carry out the evacuation of the northern part of the occupied rhenish area which, by the treaty of versailles, was to have been concluded in jan. 1925, and numerous other concessions were made to ger- many in regard both to the number of troops maintained in the occupied area, and the exceptional measures introduced at the time of the occupation of the ruhr were withdrawn. outstand- ing points concerning the disarmament of germany, and in par- ticular aerial control, were also settled. these two events mean that germany signed the treaties of locarno as an equal power, on the same status as the allies. by the fact that the british guarantee was given equally to her and to france, and by her prospective admission to the league of na- tions, she regained her position as an equal member of the european family of nations. it was an act similar to that by which, at the congress of aix-la-chapelle in 1818, france was welcomed into the concert of europe, which hitherto had been an association of the allies against france. on the other hand, on some points the change was not complete. germany was, and would remain, in an inferior position so long as part of her territory was still occupied by allicd troops, and so long as, in respect of her naval, military and aerial forces, she was subject to restrictions which did not apply to the other european states. moreover, at the last moment an unexpected difficulty prevented the final con- clusion of the arrangements made at locarno. it was an essen- tial part of the settlement that germany should apply for and be admitted to the league of nations, and should on admission to the league be granted the status of a permanent member of the council, the position held by all the other great powers. in march 1926 a special meeting of the council and assembly was summoned; unfortunately proposals were put forward that the opportunity should be used for far-reaching changes in the constitution of the council, and in particular that poland, spain and brazil should, at the same time as germany,.one or all of them, be made permanent members. even more unfortunately it was publicly suggested that some step of this kind would be a protection to europe against german influence. inevitably, therefore, the german govt. let it be known that she could not enter the league if any changes in the constitution of the coun- cil were made prior to her admission. before and after the mect- ing of the assembly, prolonged negotiations took place; it ap- peared that they had reached a satisfactory conclusion, but eventually brazil intimated that unless a permanent seat was accorded to her, she would refuse to vote for germany’s admis- sion. as unanimity was required among members of the council, her single veto would be effective. there was nothing left to be done but to postpone the consideration of the matter until the next regular mecting of the assembly in sept. 1926. the result was most unsatisfactory. germany was condemned to wait for nearly a year before she could be admitted to the league, and it was quite natural that in order to strengthen her own political position she should enter into a fresh treaty with the soviet govt. which in political inportance went very far beyond the treaty of rapallo. the text of the treaty raised serious questions of interpretation which might be used to pre- vent her admission to the league. in the spring of 1926 the whole situation was therefore most obscure and unsatisfactory. see a. j. toynbee, survey of international affairs 1920-3, and 1924 (1925-6). issued by oxford univ. press under the auspices of the british institute of international affairs. ‘‘ post-war political alignments’ in world peace foundation pamphlet. league of nations vol. vi. no. 2. (world peace foundation 1923). see also the articles 1067 on individual european states: france; germany; great britain; italy; russia; etc.; also league of nations, and the special articles on the subjects referred to in the second part of that article on the work of the league during the first six years of its existence. evans, sir arthur john (1851- ), british archaeol- ogist was born at nash mills, herts, july 8 1851, the eldest son of sir john evans, k.c.b. (see 10.2). educated at harrow, brasenose college, oxford and gottingen, he was elected fellow of brasenose, and in 1884 keeper of the ashmolean museum at oxford, holding this post till 1908. he travelled in finland and lapland in 1873-4, and in 1875 made a special study of archae- ology and ethnology in the balkan states. in 1893 he began his investigations in crete, which have resulted in discoveries of the utmost importance concerning the early history of greece and the eastern mediterranean (see 1.246, 7.421 and archae- ology: crete). in 1911 he was knighted. his chief publications are: cretan pictographs and prae-phoenician script (1896); further discoveries of cretan and aegean script (1898); the afycenaean tree and pillar cult (1901); scripta afinoa (1909); palace of minos i. (1922); and reports on the excavations at ixnossos. he also edited, e. a. freeman’s history of sicily, vol. iv. |",
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