ETHICS

since ro1r little new or striking work has appeared on the subject of moral philosophy. the more original and prolific writers have devoted themselves mainly to meta- physics, or especially to the theory of knowledge. this was per- haps a natural result of the philosophical situation; but, while the consequent progress in these studies has been valuable, the loss has also been serious. the temporary neglect of ethics, the branch most attractive to the average educated reader, has tended to lessen popular interest in philosophy and to make the style as well as the subject of philosophical writers more technical. attention to the facts of the moral consciousness has value even for the special problems of epistemology. perhaps in revenge for the neglect of genuine philosophical reflection on morality, a large part of the work professedly upon the subject has not been strictly philosophical at all, but cither didactic or anthropological. there has certainly been no decrease in the output of books aiming at edification by attempting to deduce particular practices, political, social or religious, from arbitrarily selected principles. in other words, during this pe- riod, between the stools of metaphysic and didactic casuistry, moral philosophy has fallen to the ground. in english it. rash- dall’s work! still holds the field as the most adequate survey of the whole ground of ethical controversies, though the modified rationalist and altruistic utilitarianism of his own view would certainly not be universally accepted. 1 the theory of good and evii (oxford, 1907). 1029 english idealism.—the traditional doctrine of english ideal- ism, not yet affected by contemporary italian idealists or by the revival of realism, is well represented by j. h. muirhead.? the general character and difficulties of this view may be illustrated by a quotation: “ there is no such thing as determination by pure reason. apparent cases, as in the preference of duty to inclination, are cases of determination by a deeper inclination.” hlere the word “‘ deeper”? where, after “ preference’? we might have expected “ stronger,” seems ambiguous. ‘“ the humbiest plant is free in a sense denied to the heavens. a fortiori, all this is true of beings who not only live but can make their life an ob- ject—who to adjustment to environment and to determination from within can add determination by the idea of self.”” a man is more free according as he “lives more habitually and consis- tently in his deepest purposes.” he who sees what is reasonable must doit. ‘‘ the essence of moral judgment is distinction of value between different forms of momentary and individual sat- isfaction.” a similar view is elaborated in greater detail and with a full discussion of objections by g. c. field.2 for him also the only possible motive to action is desire; and on this point he contrasts aristotle favourably with kant. a wise man’s desires are directed towards an end which would fully and permanently satisfy him, and the only such end is love as embodied in kant’s kingdom of ends. right action then is action which tends to produce such a state, or expresses such a state, or removes hindrances to it. it is hard to see that such theories really give any account of obligation, and particularly any real account of the obligation to justice. the realists—the moral theory o_ a realist, s. alexander,‘ is not so different from that of idealists as might have been ex- pected. he describes goodness as being like truth and beauty, a “tertiary quality ” or value which exists “in a physical fact ” only ‘‘ for a contemplating mind.” ‘‘ good is the satisfaction of persons.”” but goodness is attributed to acts of will only when they possess ‘‘ coherence,” which is not their ‘‘ quality ” but a “ property ” belonging to them just “so far as the valuing sub- ject appreciates it.” “ the reality which we produce is good in so far as it satisfies coherently the persons who bring it about.”’ ‘* morality arises out of our human alfections and desires which we seek to satisfy. some of them are self-regarcding, others are natural affections for others. . ... we sympathise or dissym- pathise . with certain impulses or tendencies of others. ... the good wills are those which cohere with each other.”’ “the good act is approved as pleasing the collective wills.” “tn so far as the individual is good he represents the collective wills of the society. ilis approbations whether of himself or others coincide with theirs. so far as he is good he em- bodies the common judgment... he is the standardised man.” ‘self and others are claims which are antecedent to morality and are reconciled by the moral judgment itself. . . . niuch suffering and heartburning may be endured in the social adjustment of claims and exaltation of what is approved of them into rights, till the individual has learned the dificult lesson of finding more pleasure in following the right than he loses from the sacrilice of his desires.” idealisinv. realisin.—the expected issue between idealistic and realistic ethics is, however, clearly raised by g. i. moore? where he asks “ whether when we judge (either truly or falsely) that an action is a duty or a state of things good, u// that we are thinking about the ection or the state of things in question 1s simply and solely that (1) we ourselves or (2) others have or tend to have a certain feeling towards it when we contemplate or think of it.” this question he inclines to answer negatively, on the grounds that (1) where two people differ in a moral judg- ment we cannot think both are right, and (2) in making a moral judgment we do not mean to assert that others agree to it. 2 author of the elements of ethics (1910), in his article ‘ ethics ” in the encyclopaedia of religion and ethics, vol. 5 (london, 1912). 3 moral theory (1921). 4 space, time, and deity (1920). ‘the last essay of his philosophical studies (1922). 1030 elsewhere the same writer,! after expanding this view, argues that what makes an action right is its consequences. he does not make clear whether he would consider there would bea difference of conseauences if by my act an exacily similar satisfaction could be produced either in a stranger er in one to whom i was unde some obligation. to the question of freedom he suggests the an- swer that we are free to do an act if we could do it if we willed it; but he is not decided whether it is ever true that we can will or not will an act. ii, a. prichard? points out that nearly all moral philosophers from plato downwards have taken for their function to prove that we ought to do what we take to be our duties (or what they take to be our duties) as against a reflective scepticism arising from our disinclination to doit. they have tried to demonstrate the obligation either of current morality or of some version of it amended in their own sense. the only ways of doing this were either (1) to argue with the hedonists of all types that such alleged duties were really our interest—which after all does not prove them our duty; or (2) to argue with sidgwick and rashdall that the alleged duties were really duties because they led to some end rationally judged to be good; but this cannot always be shown of an act of secret (and therefore not exemplary) justice; or (3)to base the obligation to the alleged duties on the goocliess of the act itself. but in this last attempt “ good ” either means (a) right, and then we are only told that an act is right because it is right; or (0) moral, t.e., done from a sense of duty, and then we are told that acts are right which are done because they are thought right; or (c) virtuous, z.e., done from a good desire, and then we are told that acts are right if they spring from right desires; but to havea desire is not in our power. it would appear that there can be no such thing as moral philosophy if that means a proof of our im- mediate moral apprehensions. if these are subsequently ques- tioned (on any ground other than ignorance of matters of fact) the only remedy is to replace oneself imaginatively in the situa- tion and perform the moral judgment again. the only proper sphere of moral philosophy is to justify the immediacy of our moral judgments and so to defend them against the scepticism which may arise from the failure to find demonstration. influence of croce-—perhaps the strongest idealistic influence of an original character has been that of benedetto croce.? un- like rashdall, croce would deny that the rightness of an act depends upon its being directed to an end rationally judged to be good. for him a good is merely the object of a desire. all rules of conduct are merely empirical generalisations from past moral acts. every act has its utilitarian or, as he calls it, “‘ economic ” side; in order to be willed at all its doing must have satisfied the doer. moral acts have this economic side; they satisfy the agent; but they, and they only, have also another side which he de- scribes as “ universal.’’? they satisfy not merely the individual nature of the doer, but that universal spirit in which as an individual spirit he shares. to the question of freedom, whether it is in our power to choose to satisfy either the empirical in- dividual self only or the universal spirit, croce’s answer is ob- scure. he denies determinism as being “ the introduction of the methods of physical science into philosophy,” but he also denies what he calls “arbitrary choice.” on the whole, his view of free- dom would appear similar to that of h. bergson, whom he quotes with approval.4 the pratica, though brilliant in criticism, is too cursory and contemptuous in its treatment of difficult problems to be satisfactory. for instance, it is not clear whether the acts which are said to satisfy the universal spirit are right acts (perhaps not known to be so by the individual) or moral acts—i.e., acts done because thought (perhaps falsely) to be right by the individual. in spite of this, and of their very different starting-points, there are some remarkable points of agreement between croce and prichard, which, just because of that difference, may well be symptoms of the gencral trend of contemporary thought. 1 ethics (1912). 2 mind (jan. 1912) “ does moral philosophy rest ona mistake?” * filosona della pratica, written in 1908 and translated into eng- lish in 1913. 4 les donnees immediates de la conscience (1889). ethics they agree (1) that, as against kant, we cannot think an act right unless we think it will originate some satisfaction; but vet (2) that, as against sidgwick and rashdall, the rightness of one of alternative acts cannot be determined by the greater satis- faction or greater good which it will originate; and indeed (3) that rightness cannot be determined by reference to any concept other than rightness itself. further, consequently, they agree (4) that “the formula of means and end is irrelevant in morality ” and (5) that what is called “ proving the rightness of an act 7” is either (a) giving fuller information about the situation, or (2) giving fuller information about the act itself, 7.c., what we are originating. croce’s “universal act” or satisfaction of the universal self would perhaps be described by prichard as origi- nating the satisfactions which we ought to originate or which we think we ought to originate. (the ambiguity is croce’s.) pragmatist theories.—tyheories of morality in a pragmatist sense have been mainly developed in america by j. dewey and others.5 much that 1s here insisted on would be accepted by moralists of other schools: that right conduct depends in part on a scientihe knowledge of the results of action; that all action has social effects; that there is no one ascertainable ‘‘ end of man ” to which all right actions are directed as means; that rules of morality are only generalisations from the judgments passed on particular acts in definite situations. but some of the conclusions would be regarded as paradoxical by moralists of any school out- side hedonism. for instance, along with other “ ends” dis- missed as fictitious, dewey classes the principle of “ obedience to rational consciousness of duty.”’ “ a remote goal of perfection, ideals that are contrary in a wholesale way to what is actual, a free will of arbitrary choice—all of these conceptions band them- selves together with that of a non-empirical authority of right and a non-empirical conscience which acknowledges it... . why indeed acknowledge the authority of right? that many persons do not acknowledge it in fact, in action, and that all per- sons ignore it at times, is assumed by the argument. just what is the significance ot an alleged recognition of a supremacy which is continually denied in fact? how much would be jost if it were dropped out and we were left face to face with actual facts? ... we live in a world where other persons live too. our acts affect them. they perceive these effects and react upon us in conse- quence, .. . they approve and condemn, not in abstract theory but in what they do to us. the answer to the question, * why not put your hand in the fire?’ is the answer of fact. if you do, your hand will be burnt. the answer to the question, ‘ why acknowledge the right?’ is of the same sort . . . it signifies the totality of social pressures exercised upon us.’? the con- clusion appears to be that the only meaning for “ thinking an act right ” is the doing it, from fear of punishment. the most interesting endeavour to demonstrate the rightness of some particular kind of conduct from philosophical principles is made by v. solovyof.§ it is the most interesting both because the emphasis on asceticism is somewhat strange to the western conscience and because of the psychological views involved. the basis of morality is said to be self-regarding, not social; 1t con- sists in the sense of shame, primarily sexual shame, peculiar to humanity, which is implicitly a sense of the duty to free our- selves from the dominion of “ the body ” and of its instinctive demands for racial or individual preservation. closely connected with the shame of sex (or of subjection to racial preservation) is shame of fear (or of subjection to selfish preservation). shame is developed by reason into conscience, which gradually extends its sphere of criticism from the self-regarding duties of chastity and courage (subjection of bodily impulses) to the social duty of pity for those similar but inferior to us and the religious duty of reverence for what is superior to us. these two duties are de- veloped, unlike shame, from impulses natural to animals as well as men, since they begin in parental and filial affection. from these three impulses the writer develops an elaborate system of personal, political and religious ethics. 5 creative intelligence (1917) and by j. dewey in reconstruction in philosophy (1921) and human nature and conduct (1922). | 0 the justification of the good, translated from the russian in 1918. ethyl chloride—eugenics brisltography.—the following are among the more interesting relevant hooks of the period in addition to thuse cited above: [. dealing mainly with ethics: j. ward, 7he realn af ends (cam- bridge, 1911); r. eucken, present day jd:thics, translated by al. von legdewitz (1913); e.g. holt, she freadian wish aud its place in ethics (1915); w. gc. everett, aforal vulues (1920); f. adler, an [ethical phiiosaphy of life (1918); b. bosanquct, some suggestions in fthics (1918); w. te. hocking, ziman nature and its remaking (1918); w. r. sorley, aforal values and the idea of god (cam- bridge, 1918); a. nk. rogers, the theory of ethics (1922); w. me- dougall, athics and some alodern world problems (1924). ii. deal- ing with ethics as incidental to a philosophic system: 3b. bosanquet, the principle of individuality and value (1912), the value and destiny of the individual (1913). (del ce oey) ethyl chloride (c:iiscl) (see 9.851), prepared from hydrochloric acid and ethyl alcohol, is a gas at room temperature, but is stored and sold under pressure in glass bottles fitted with trigger-controlled spray nozzles, as a colourless, mobile liquid with a characteristic ethereal smell and swect, burning taste, which boils at 12:5°c. the vapour burns with a green flame. chloryl and kelene are trade names. anestile is a mixture of ethyl and methyl chlorides. uses.—it is used (a) as a local anaesthetic for small incisions, tooth extractions and needle punctures, by spraying it on the surface of the skin or mucous membrane in a fine stream. its rapid evaporation causes local freezing (— 35°c. can be obtained). this method is unsatisfactory for many reasons. only a very small area can be frozen at one time, it is difficult to puncture or cut the hard-frozen tissues, the freezing is very transitory, the thawing afterward is exceedingly painful, the frozen zone is so superficial that the smallest incision penetrates beyond it ancl is felt by the paticnt, and lastly it is not good treatment to produce acute frost-bite in living tissues. (b) as a gencral anaesthetic, it is usually given in doses of 3-5 cubic centimetres inaclosed inhaler. an ordinary ether inhaler will do perfectly well. as regards safety it is probably interme- diate between nitrous oxide and ether. at one dental hospital it has been given nearly 100,000 times without mishap. short administrations produce an anacsthesia similar in type to that of nitrous oxide with an equally rapid loss of consciousness, a quick recovery and slight after-effects. like gas, it can be safely givenin the sitting position. it is more convenient than gas, as the apparatus required is less bulky; it is more powerful and more reliable, gives a longer period of anaesthesia for dental work (go seconds instead of 30), and docs not cause cyanosis. muscular relaxation cannot be guaranteed, especially in adult males, but it is as a rule more satisfactory than with gas. longer administrations approximate more to the ether type of anaesthesia, ethyl chloride being, like chloroform and ether and unlike gas, a lipoid solvent. for cases lasting more than a few minutes ether is preferable and cheaper. ethyl chloride may also be used to precede ether anaesthesia by the open or closed meth- ods and is more humane as quicker, less irritating with a less un- pleasant smell. clinically its effect on the circulatory and respiratory systems is slightly stimulating, causing flushing of the face, acceleration of the pulse rate by 10-20 beats per minute and a rise in systolic blood pressure of 10 to 20 millimetres, together with deeper and more rapid breathing. (see anaestiiftics.) (wess. ethylene (sce 9.851), when inhaled is a general anaesthetic and was first used as such by luckhardt and carter in 10923. it is still in the experimental stage, however. like nitrous oxide it is not a hpoid solvent. it is given with oxygen, of which 7-12°% is needed. caution is necessary because of the explosive nature of the mixture. its efficiency is between that of gas oxygen and ether. ether may have to be used with it to deepen the anaes- thesia. (see anaestiletics.) | piv. 's.. 55) eugenics (see 9.885), 4 name for any plan to improve the inborn qualities of the human races. the idea that such im- provement might be made by deliberate selection of parents in accordance with the practices of animal husbandry, has doubt- less often occurred to man from the earliest times to the present. the earliest extant expression of it in literature is probably found in plato’s republic, written about 375 b.c. plato recom- 1031 mended that, for the improvement of the quality of the citizens, mitings should be arranged by the magistrates between the best of both sexes. toward the close of the roth century sir frances galton, from studies described in nature! titheritance (t889) and hereditary genius (1869) concluded that improvement of the human stock was not only conceivable but practicable. at his death he arranged for the continued study of the subject at the univer- sity of london, where karl pearson has since directed the work of the galton laboratory of national eugenics. an important series of its publications deals with human heredity. (see herepity.) interest in that subject was further stimulated in 1900 by the rediscovery of mendel's laws (see mendelism), now rezarded as the fundamental laws of heredity in animals and plants as well as in man, though the laws were unknown to galton himself, who formulated a different generalised law of heredity (galton’s law), a less accurate generalisation than mendel’s, as is now recognised. eugenics record office—in the united states, the eugenics record office was founded in 1910 by dr. c. b. davenport, at cold spring harbour, n. y., for collecting for study all data obtainable about family histories, with special reference to the inheritance of traits physical or mental. the public is invited to deposit at the eugenics record office family records, whose privacy is guaranteed. by co-operation with the authorities, family histories are also obtained relating to the patients or in- mates of institutions for the insane, epileptic and feeble-minded. based on the study of such data, bulletins are from time to time published concerning the inheritance of traits such as insanity, epilepsy, feeble-mindedness, hair-colour, skin-colour, stature, body-build and hair-form. since the rediscovery of mendelism occasioned the founding of the eugenics record office, it is natural that results coming from this institution should have been formulated as far as possi- ble in terms of mendel’s laws. ‘thus in certain of its early bulle- tins fecble-mindedness, insanity and epilepsy are described as recessive characters, while huntington’s chorea, fragility of bones associated with blue choroid of the eye, and violent tem- per are described as dominant characters. possibly some of these and other results published by the eugenics record office have been put into too simple and too rigid categories, and a strictly mendelian statement of results has been adopted oftener than is justified by present knowledge of genetics. karl pearson and his associates of the galton laboratory in london have gone to an opposite extreme in ignoring mendelism in the interpretation of heredity. both schools agree that in- sanity, for example, occurs oftener in some families than in others, and that the differences are too great to be due to chance. a predisposition to insanity must accordingly be an inherited character, but its manifestations in successive generations are too varied and erratic to be described as a case of simple men- delian inheritance. developments in various countries—the study of human heredity is being actively pursued at present in most countries where the genetics of other animals and of plants are being in- vestigated. britain, germany, sweden, holland and the united states have journals, devoted to a greater or less extent, to publishing the results of studies of human heredity. a con- siderable portion of the published material is probably of small value, since it is uncontrolled by experiment and is based largely on uncritical data; nevertheless substantial progress is being made in our knowledge of human heredity. there is an in- herited basis for differences between individuals, families, and races, as regards (a) colour of skin, hair and eves; (4) stature; and (c) head-form; what a geneticist would call multiple factor differences, dependent upon more than one inheritance unit, as the results of racial crosses show. cases of inheritance due to ene-factor differences (simple mendelian cases) are limited chiefly to physical abnormalities or peculiarities such as albinism, night-blindness, brachydactyly, syndactyly, and other digital malformations, colour-blindness, spontaneous bleeding or haemophilia, and alkaptonuria. few of these are seriously 1032 harmful characters or recur with alarming frequency in a nor- mally exogamous population. mental traitts—lit is generally believed that differences in intelligence are inherited, that the children of highly intelligent parents are more intelligent than the children of low-grade parents. but as the intellectual capacity of the child is deter- mined only in part by inheritance and in part by the environ- ment, it is difficult to devise intelligence tests (¢.v.) which will discriminate between effecis of the two agencies. also not all the children of highly intelligent parents are of the same char- acter. nor are all children of exceptional intelligence born of highly intelligent parents. | clearly then, neither high intelligence nor mediocre intelli- gence breeds true. while this will be generally admitted, some hold that the lowest grades of human intelligence do breed true, in the sense that feeble-minded parents have only feeble-minded offspring. such in general is the finding of h. h. goddard, who made a study of the families of pupils in the vineland, n. j., training school for the feeble-minded. to this it has been objected that the class feeble-minded cannot be clearly defined, since there are all grades of human intelligence between the low- est and the highest. individuals of the very lowest grade (idiots) do not become parents, and it is only the ‘ feeble-minded ” of a fair amount of intelligence (comparable with that of anthropoid apes) who do leave offspring. whether, when both parents are feeble-minded, the children are all as low in intelligence as their parents cannot be stated with any certainty until more reliable tests of intelligence have been devised than now exist. effect of infection—another element of uncertainty is the part played by infection, especially with syphilis, in the pro- duction of feeble-mindedness and other nervous disorders. admittedly it is considerable; its exact extent is unknown. a true-breeding feeble-minded strain may in some cases be only a fully infected syphilitic strain. a great majority of the feeble- minded are produced by matings in which one or both parents are not feeble minded, and a certain percentage of these cases are admittedly non-genetic, being due to accidents or infections occurring before, at, or subsequent to birth. but when more than one case occurs in the same family history, a genctic agency is at once suspected, though perhaps quite unjustly. since, in the case of the higher grades and of average grades of intelli- gence, it is evident that differences, when genctic, are due to multiple factors, it is doubtful whether a low grade of intelh- gence is in general inherited as a unit-character either dominant or recessive, though in a particular isolated and inbred family group, this may well be true. heredity and eugenics—luman heredity forms the only rational basis of a programme of eugenics. such programmes have been outlined and are being advocated by national socic- ties in england, germany, france, italy, sweden, norway, the united states and several other countries. two international congresses on eugenics have been held, the first in london, the second in new york in 1921. a permanent international com- mittee on eugenics has been formed. a state-supported eugenic institute has been established in sweden. the foundations—the philosophy or logical foundation on which eugenic programmes explicitly or implicitly rest may be stated as follows:— 1. the present stratification of society is in part duc to differences in ability between its constituent strata. the abter individuals rise to positions of influence and authority, enter the learned or profes- sional classes, or become captains of industry and acquire wealth. the less able work with their hands rather than their heads, since the latter are inferior, and must content themsclves with lesser economic rewards. 2. each grade of ability has a fendency to breed true, though there are numerous exceptions. thus the average ability of children pro- duced by the professional classes and wealthier industrial and business classes 1s greater than the average for children of the poor and labouring classes. a 3. in all civilised countries at the present time the professional and wealthy classes are producing fewer children per family than the poor and the labouring classes (see birth control). (this ditfer- ential fertility of the classes appears to be a modern development; e.g., in britain it only originated shortly before 1850.) eugenie—-eupen and malmedy 4. asa consequence of 2 and 3 the average grade of intelligence of the populations in all civilised countries is at present declining, and this decline will continue until the differential character of the birth- rate is abolished or reversed. 5. in addition, it has been maintained that physical and mental defects are increasing in all classes. measures proposed—the practical measures proposed by eugenists to correct the supposed declining quality of the popu- lation are of two sorts. 1. measures designed to discourage, decrease or prevent reproduction by the inferior elements of the population—nega- tive eugenics. 2. measures designed to encourage or increase reproduction by the superior elements of the population—positive eugenics. negative eugenic measures include (1) the dissemination of information (popular education) concerning the racial consc- quences of unfit matings, which will result in voluntary absten- tion from marriage, or birth control, on the part of those likely to transmit bad physical or mental traits; (2) legal prohibition of marriage to persons unfit to be parents—for example, mem- bers of families with a hereditary taint of insanity, epilepsy, fecble-mindedness or the like; (3) segregation during the repro- ductive period, or sterilisation of mentally defective or other- wise seriously unfit persons. measures of the first-mentioned sort are the aim in part of publications such as the hugenics review (london), eugenicul news (cold spring harbor, n.y.) and of the published proceedings of congresses and conferences on eugenics. laws which fall into classes (2) and (3) have been enacted in certain of the united states, but most of these have been rendered ineffective by court decisions. in support of positive eugenics, proposals have been made to offer economic inducements to fit parents to have large families, but the prac- tical clifficulty of determining who are “ fit ” or of putting into effect class legislation for their benefit has hitherto prevented such suggestions from taking concrete form. criticisms.—those who decry or look with disfavour on the modern eugenic movement suggest that the philosophy of eugenics is faulty, in that (@) the basic assumption that social status is in any degree due to inborn qualities of the individual, not to accidents of environment or opportunity, requires proof; (b) that the supposed greater average ability of the children of the professional and wealihier industrial classes is another un- proved assumption, and that their superior attainments, if real, my be due to superior advantages made possible by greater economic resources or by the smaller number of children in the family; that (¢) unless both assumptions (a) and (6) are estab- lished, there is no reason to think that the differential birth-rate is dvsgenic; and (¢d) that such negative eugenic measures as refusing a marriage license to a person on the basis of his pedi- grec, or subjecting him to bodily mutilation against his will, are uawarranted interferences with his liberty and personal rights; that (e) the eugenists are wrong not only in the basic assumptions of their philosophy but also in their general conclusion that the human race is declining in ability, since at no time within the historic period has mankind been progressing faster than within the past century in physical, mental and moral achievements. bintiocraruy.—p. b. popenoe and r. h. johnson <a pplied eugenics (n.y., 1918); e. baur, f. fischer and f. lenz, grundriss der menschtichen. ferbtichkeitslehre ete.; (munich, 1921), ‘ eugenics, genetics and the family ” in the scientific papers of the second in- ternational eugenics congress (baltimore, 1923); r. r. gates, hleredity and eueenics (1923); s. |. holmes, a bibliography of eugenics (berkeley, cal., 1924); h. s. jennings, prometheus or biology and the advancement of afan (1925); yt. ul. morgan, chapter on“ human inheritance ’ in freiztion and genetics (1925); r. pearl, the biolagy of population growth (1925). (aw. elc.) eugenie (1826-1920), sometime empress of the french (see 9.885), died in madrid july 11 1920. eupen and malmedy (sce 9.892), two districts acquired by belgium from rhenish prussia in ro19, with the small district of moresnet. the latter, by an oversight in the treaty of vienna in 1815, was not assigned to either belgium or prussia, and part of it therefore remained neutral territory between the two countries. it comprised little over 3,000 inhabitants (census of 1910). eurhy thmics—europe eupen and malmedy comprise 60,924 persons, of whom less than one-sixth are walloon and french-speaking, and five-sixths german. it was contended, however, at the peace conference that these inhabitants had been systematically prussianised since 1815. it seems true that the majority spoke french before that date, and were, in origin, walloons. the peace conference in 1919 therefore declined to sanction a plebiscite, but the in- habitants were permitted to express their opinions in registers for six months after the ratification of the treaty jan. 10 1920. the league, to whom the case was referred ultimately assigned the areas to belgium. the allied powers (reply to the german observations on the draft treaty, june 16 1919) based the fate of these areas on grounds other than those of self-determination. eupen and malmedy had been made a basis for german militarism, and had a close economic connection with belgium. moresnet, which had valuable woods, was assigned to belgium ‘‘ in partial compensation for the destruction of belgian forests.” bibliography.—h. w. v. temperley, ed. jitstory of the peace conference (1920). tie we vie dd eurhythmics is the term applied generally to the use of harmonious bodily movement as a form of artistic expression, and specifically to dalcroze’s system of musical education, which is founded on a rhythmical discipline of bodily movements for the expression of time values. the present article is restricted to the latter sense. (see dancing.) history —emile jaques-dalcroze (b. 1865) studied music at the geneva conservatoire and under delibes in paris and bruckner and fuchs in vienna. in 1892 he was appointed professor of harmony at geneva conservatoire. his experience as a teacher suggested to him that the conventional professional training of musicians was radically wrong in that it ignored the relation of technical training to the inner consciousness of the student. it was found that pupils, technically far advanced, after many years of study were unable to deal with the simplest problems in rhythm; that their sense of pitch, relative or ab- solute, was extremely defective; and that, while able to read accurately and to play pieces memorised, they had not the slight- est power of spontaneous musical expression. dalcroze, starting from the position that technique is but a means to art, argued that the student should begin, not by specialising on any instru- ment, but by developing his musical faculties as a basis for specialised study. such a training could only be secured by awakening the sense—natural, though often latent—of the ultimate bases of music, viz.: tone and rhythm. as the sense of tone can be developed only through the ear, dalcroze gave special attention to vocal work; and then, notic- ing that when the students themselves beat time to their singing the work became much more real, he wrote a series of “ gesture songs, ’? which were performed by his pupils with surprising ease. this suggested the idea, which is the essence of the dalcroze method, viz.: the training of the body in such a way as to make movement not merely an accompaniment of music but a means of expressing it. at first only the conventional arm movements of the conductor had been employed. the next step was to devise a series of arm movements that should clearly mark all tempi from two beats in one bar to 12 beats, including such forms as 7 { 3? ¢, and a system of movements of the body and lower limbs to represent note values from any number of notes to the beat up to notes of 12 beats. about 1903 dalcroze began to consider the possibility of applying his method not only to the special education of musi- cians but as part of the general elementary education of children. accordingly he worked out a system of pedagogic eurhythmics which has been widely adopted in schools throughout europe and america. in 1906 the first training courses for teachers were started at geneva, but in 1910, on the invitation of the brothers wolf and harald dohrn, dalcroze removed to dresden, where a college for rhythmic training was established in the garden suburb of hellerau. the college made rapid progress and did educational work of great value. its activities, however, were abruptly terminated by the outbreak of the world war, and since 1915 its place as the head-centre of eurhythmics has 1033 been taken by the institut jaques-dalcroze at geneva. central schools were founded in london in 1913 and in paris in 1924. ouzline of the method——the dalcroze method consists of three parts: (@) rhythmic movement, (d) ear training and (c) improvisation (practical harmony). of these the first is the essence of the dalcroze method and is fundamentally new. the second is closely linked with the first and necessary to the pupil. the third is necessary to the teacher, who must have the power of free expression on some musical instrument, preferably the piano. in the system of exercises upon which the method is based fime is shown by movements of the arms, and eime-duration, 1.e., note-values, by movements of the feet and body. in the early stages of the training this principle is clearly observed; later it may be varied in many ingenious ways—for instance, in what is known as plastic counterpoint the actual notes may be represented by movements of the arms, while the counterpoint in crotchets, quavers or semiquavers is given by the feet. the system of beating time with the arms provides for all tempi from 2 to }? including eee in the series of movements to represent note-valucs the crotchet is taken as the unit—this is represented by a step; higher values, from the minim to the note of 12 beats, are represented by a step with one foot and a movement or movements with the other foot or with the body, but without progression, e.g., a minim by one step and a knee bend, a dotted minim by a step and two movements without progression, a note of 12 beats by a step and 11 movements. ‘thus for each note in the music there is one step, one progression in space, while at the same time the note, if of greater length than acrotchet, is analysed into crotchets. notes of shorter duration than the crotchet, 7.e., quavers, triplets, etc., are expressed also by simple steps. when the movements corresponding to the notes from the crotchet to the whole note of 12 beats have, with all their details, become a habit, the pupil need only make them mentally, con- tenting himself with one step forward. this step will have the time-duration of the note, which will be mentally analysed into its elements. the latter are not individually performed by the body, but their images in thought replace the movements. the whole training aims at developing the power of rapid physical reaction to mental impressions. ‘these latter are more commonly obtained through the ear, chiefly from the music played; naturally, however, the teacher needs at times to give commands during an exercise. for this purpose he generally uses the word ‘‘ hopp, ”’ chosen for its clear incisiveness. before each exercise it is clearly stated what the word is to represent in that particular case, e.g., omit one beat, omit one bar, beat time twice as fast with the arms, etc.; often the word will be used in series in an exercise, each “ hopp ” meaning some additional change. as the command generally falls on the second half of the beat preceding the one in which the change is to be made, very rapid intellectual and physical response is necessary, especially if the music be at all quick. exercises of this class soon give the power of rapid muscular innervation and inhibition, and are of extraordinary value in education, quite apart from their purely rhythmic side. the educational value of dalcroze’s method of eurhythmics is becoming widely recog- nised. there exist many centres in great britain and europe, and trained teachers are working in america, south africa, australia and new zealand. cp..b. 1)