{
    "system": "GoGuides Verified Text",
    "api_version": "verified-text-v1",
    "status": "ok",
    "response_type": "verified_text_record",
    "source_key": "britannica_1926",
    "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926)",
    "license_code": "public_domain",
    "attribution": null,
    "license_url": null,
    "chunk_id": "1926:currency:0b5381ef21ec",
    "title": "CURRENCY",
    "section": null,
    "hash_alg": "sha256",
    "hash_sha256": "6db4ae3b623b4cf237b3722bc80f7a3b77f564bee572d6fc66166f798cc1b22a",
    "normalizer": {
        "name": "ggnorm",
        "version": "1.0"
    },
    "verified_text": "currency means the media of payment. as usually understood, it includes money which is legal tender (7.e., by which a debt may legally be discharged), and also bank notes which, though they may not be legal tender, pass freely from hand to hand. in business affairs, the predomi- nant medium of payment is bank credit; a debt due from a banker is assigned from one creditor to another by a cheque or other instrument of transfer. a bank credit is not called cur- rency, though sometimes a cheque is. a bank note is itself an instrument for transferring a bank credit. the money of account is the unit in which debts (including bank credits) are measured. whatever is legal tender must be expressed in terms of the money of account, in order to deter- mine how great a debt it will pay. developments of monetary theory-——the quantity theory of money sets out to show how the value of the currency unit is determined. it used to be stated in the form that, other things being unchanged, the value of a unit of money is inversely pro- portional to the quantity of money in circulation. in other words the price level is directly proportional to the quantity of money in circulation. the theory is very often loosely stated in a fallacious form, omitting the condition ‘‘ other things being unchanged.”’ that condition can however be dispensed with if certain of the “ other things ” be introduced into the formula. the price level varies directly as the quantity of the means of payment and the rapidity of circulation, and inversely as the volume of transactions per unit of time. the means of payment of course include bank credit. it is very commonly argued that post-war experience with the depreciation of paper currencies has confirmed the quantity theory. but it should be understood that the quantity theory states not merely that when the quantity of money increases prices will rise, but that prices will rise i the same proportion (subject to the necessary allowances). when the quantity of money changes, that usually in itself induces a change in rapidity of circulation. once prices start rising, people spend their money more quickly; when prices are falling, they prefer to postpone their purchases. these tendencies accentuate the effects of either expansion or contraction in the supply of moncy and credit. the quantity theory, in a form involving factors so unascer- tainable as the volume of transactions and the rapidity of circu- lation, has little direct application to practical affairs. the price level is in fact governed by the amount that people spend per unit of time, whether on consumption or on investment (for money saved is spent on the production of capital goods). what they have to spend (the total, that is, of incomes) may be called the consumers’ income; what they do spend may be called the consumers’ outlay. the stock of money and credit, representing the purchasing power which people have, but have not used, may be called the unspent margin. an increase or decrease in the unspent margin permits of a discrepancy between the con- sumers’ outlay and the consumers’ income, but this can only be so for a moment of transition. the consumers’ outlay supplies the fund from which the greater part of the consumers’ income is derived. people who produce or sell get their incomes from those who buy. it is easy to see how responsive markets and prices are likely to be to a change in the unspent margin. ina country with a banking system such a change is effected through the lending operations of the banks. the regulation of credit by a central bank (especially through adjustments of the bank rate or rediscount rate) is described in the article banking. monctary movements and unemployment.—perhaps the most important development in currency theory in recent years has been the recognition of the intimate relation between monetary movements and unemployment. a contraction of credit, involv- ing a rise in the purchasing power of the currency unit, that is to say a general fall of prices, is invariably accompanied (in an industrial community) by unemployment. it deters dealers in commodities from adding to their stocks and from giving orders to producers. the severity of the unemployment corresponds approximately to the magnitude of the monetary movement. whenever credit is allowed to expand unduly, andl prices rise, the value of the currency unit can only be restored at the cost of a credit contraction and consequently of unemployment. it is to guard against this, that a policy of price stabilisation has been advocated. if measures are taken to check any general rise of prices in time, the need for a contraction of credit to bring about a fall is avoided. the application of such a policy is not free from difficulty (especially in the measurement of the price level) and it cannot be put in operation mechanically and without the exercise of considerable discretion. this policy received recognition at the genoa conference in 1922, in the form of a resolution in favour of international co-op- eration of the central banks of issue to regulate credit with a view to preventing undue fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold. something approaching to it has been put into practice by the federal reserve banks in the united states, since the influx of gold in 1922-4 made their reserve proportions inopcera- tive and threatened an inflationary rise of prices. prof. irving fisher has proposed a plan for stabilising the purchasing power of a currency by making the unit convertible into a variable amount of gold, to be increased as prices rise and decreased as prices fall (sce dot1ar stabilisation). mr. keynes has pro- posed a plan of stabilisation which would dispense with converti- bility into gold. i. the pre-war period the gold standard.—the years immediately preceding the crisis of 1914 saw the approaching completion of an evolution that had been in progress since 1872, the spread of the gold stand- ard. the essential meaning of the currency system called by that name is that the monetary unit is equated to the value of a prescribed weight of gold. since gold is a commodity with a world market, and its value at one place does not differ appre- ciably from its value at another, the currency unit of a country with a gold standard has a world value determined by its equiva- lent in gold (see exchange, foreicn). a gold standard may be maintained either (a) by the actual circulation of gold coin, the free coinage of gold and the free melting of gold coin, or (6) by the use of paper money convertible on demand into gold, or (¢) by what is called an exchange standard, that is to say, paper money or token coin exchangeable, through a central bank or some other agency, into credits in other countries where the gold standard is maintained by one of the other two methods. gold coin circulated in england, france and germany and in a few other countries, among which egypt may be mentioned. convertible paper money was the more prevalent plan, and it was often supplemented in practice by something very like an exchange standard. in austria-hungary, russia and greece the chief reliance was on the exchange standard. several coun- tries possessed token silver coins of unlimited legal tender (espe- cially the five-franc pieces in the countries of the latin union, france, italy, belgium, switzerland and greece, and the stand- ard dollars in the united states). these were a relic of the era of bimetallism, when there had been free coinage of both gold and silver. so long as the quantity of such coins in circulation curriency was limited, they did not disturb the functioning of the gold standard. in spain the coinage of five-peseta pieces (though no longer free) had not been restricted to the necessary extent, and the gold standard had never been established. united states —the united states had a currency system bearing traces of a complicated history. side by side with the legal tender united states notes, or “ greenbacks,’? and the bond-secured notes of the national banks, there circulated standard silver dollars and gold. but gold coin was not popu- lar, and was little seen except on the pacific coast. in its place were used gold certificates. the gold certificate differs from a bank note in that it is not evidence of a debt, but a title to a specified amount of gold. the gold for which certificates are issued is held by the treasury in trust. that does not mean that the holder of a certificate is entitled to receive the particular pieces of gold for which it was issued, but the certificates are covered by gold, dollar for dollar, and cannot be made incon- vertible. silver certificates are likewise issued against silver dollars. all forms of currency in the united states other than gold and gold certificates were in one way or another limited itn amount. the expansion of the currency had to be provided for by imports of gold, and the stock of monetary gold in the country rose from $599,000,000 in 1896 to $1,890,000,000 in 1o14. in south america the abuses of paper money had been rife, but by 1914 the greater part of that continent was on the gold standard (in some countries after repeated devaluations). in the east silver remained the standard in china, but the indian rupee had become a token coin skilfully maintained at a fixed gold value of rs. 4d. by means of an exchange standard. the exchange standard had also been successfully applicd to the straits settlements, the philippine islands and siam. il. the war period the crisis of 1914.—the imminence and outbreak of the world war in july and aug. 1914 paralysed the investment markets, the foreign exchange markets and the money markets of the world. the most liquid assets were frozen up. the machinery of payment ceased to function. the system, usual in european countries, which made a central bank of issue the ultimate resort of everyone in need of credit, gave a monetary character to the crisis. what was needed was the means of payment, and that could be supplied by the bank which had power to issue legal tender notes. but it could only be supplied if the bank were relieved of legal limitations upon its power of issue. ilence these limitations were everywhere relaxed. all over the conti- nent the convertibility of notes into gold was suspended. reserve proportions and similar restrictions were removed or modified. where notes below a certain denomination were not allowed (as in france where the smallest notes had been of 50 fr.) small notes were legalised. in england there were no notes below £5, and currency notes for {1 and tos. were hastily provided. under the currency and bank notes act, passed on aug. 6, they were issued by the treasury, and were made legally current as if they were gold coins. they were not debts or “ promises to pay,” but a legal obligation was placed upon the bank of england on behalf of the treasury to exchange them on demand into gold coin. bank of england notes, being debts, became payable in currency notes, but as the latter were convertible into gold coin, specie payments were not suspended. the feared shortage of currency did not occur, but the currency notes were issued in rapidly increasing quantities. the gold they displaced from circulation was accumulated in the banks and became available for export to meet the insatiable needs of the government for payment for foreign supplies. war iiflation—so far as currency 1s concerned, the history of the war may be summed up in one word—inflation. fessen- tially what happened was that the belligerent governments found their liabilities outstripping the funds they could raise by taxation and by the borrowing of genuine investible savings. after exhausting every expedient, they were faced with the imperative necessity of payment, and rather than let their cur- tis rent liabilities get indefinitely into arrear, they practically printed paper money for the purpose of paying. in form the governments “ borrowed ” from the central banks of issue, and the central banks placed at their disposal in the first instance not actual legal tender bank notes, but a credit on current ac- count. in continental countries the credit would be quickly drawn out in notes. in england, where cheques are more {reely used, this would not necessarily be so, but deposits at the bank of england count as cash to the money market and the banks, in practically the same way as notes. credit expanded in proportion, and when notes were required they were issued. as the quantity of money in each of the belligerent countries grew, the value of its currency unit fell; in other words prices rose. the foreign exchanges likewise became adverse. in england the maintenance of gold payments threatened to become a sham. the exchanges were slipping below gold parity. had gold been free to move, enormous profits could have been made by exporting it, particularly to america, where the ex- change fell at the end of aug. 1915 to 4-50 (74°% below par). with insurance against war risks at sea wholly in the hands of the government, gold could not in practice be exported without the consent of the government. attempts to get round this form of control would be met by powerful moral dissuasion from the bank of england. the government indeed did not hoard the gold. large quan- tities were exported on government account, and france, russia and italy were required, as a condition of the financial assistance they received from the british govt., to export part of their cherished reserves. energetic measures were taken to provide resources both by borrowing in the american market, and by requisitioning american securities held by british investors and selling or pledging them in new york. by such means it was possible to support the exchange and maintain the pound at 4:76, or about 2% below parity. but that did not mean that inflation was avoided. it was less in extent than among the continental belligerents, but the flood of gold that was let loose upon the neutrals brought about a depreciation of gold itself in comparison with commodities. by april 1917, when the united states entered the war, the whole- sale index numbers showed that the price level in great britain was about double that of 1913. the rise in the united states was only 60% 5, but the exchange was still successfully pegged at 4:76.) although france had abandoned the gold standard, the i'rench exchange was also pegged, but at a level averaging about 10% below par, by advances from the british government. the financial strain of these arrangements, which threatened to become unbearable, was immediately relieved when the united states became a belligerent and placed liberal advances at the disposal of her associates. the pegging of the exchanges continued, and in 1918 was extended to include italy. but meanwhile the united states in turn resorted to inflationary finance. the reserve requirements of the federal reserve sys- tem were modified (june 1917). a substantial part of the gov- ernment’s financial needs was met by the creation of bank credits. the export of gol! was prohibited (sept. 1917). there ceased to be a world market in gold. there was even a partial demone- tisation of gold, the three scandinavian countries having sus- pended the laws providing for the free transformation of gold on demand into coin or credit. spain also bought gold at a discount. everywhere the forcign exchanges ceased to depend on move- ments of gold, and in comparison with some neutral currencies the dollar fell to a heavy discount (and with it of course the pegged exchanges). the russian exchange was never pegged. the financial and political weakness of the country was reflected in a lavish re- course to inflationary measures, and by the time of the revolu- tion of march 1917 the imperial bank had made advances to the state amounting to eight milliards of roubles. the rouble was quoted at 17 to {1 as compared with its par value of 9%. the depreciation of the exchange mattered comparatively little 1 for the relation of the foreign exchanges to prices, see exchanges, foreign, 774 currency to a country which was almost isolated from the world, but the economic and administrative confusion was seriously aggravated by the unsound monetary position. prices were three times as high as before the war, and such was the distrust of paper money that the peasants could not be induced to sell their produce. after the march revolution a complete monetary breakdown began. in the eight months which intervened before the com- munist revolution of nov. the note issue was doubled, and prices trebled. the country had already been entangled in that vicious circle of inflation, which has since become so painfully familiar to europe, before the early enthusiasm of the soviet was directed to extirpating the use of money. because the cur- rency was utterly discredited, the government could not raise money either by tax or loan, and because it was driven to print notes to pay its expenses, the discredit was continually aggra- vated. there was no longer a market in foreign exchange, but prices leapt up. by the middle of 1918 they were 100 times the pre-war level, and were rising as rapidly as ever. in the rest of eastern and central europe the extremes of monetary collapse were warded off as long as the pressure of war enabled the governments to exercise rigourous control over every form of economic activity. upon germany and austria- hungary the war imposed an isolation which was eventually nearly as complete as that of russia, and the foreign exchange market was almost deprived of significance. by the end of 1918 the german note issue was 33 milliards of marks or more than five times the stock of currency, in paper and coin, that had been in use before the war. yet the mark was still worth 56% of its par value in terms of dollars. prices had not risen any- thing like proportionally to the circulation, for nearly all staple commodities were rationed at controlled prices. the position was similar in austria-hungary. hi. the collapse after the war the cessation of hostilities brought release from a tremendous tension. neither peoples nor statesmen were in the mood to deal with the abstruse technical problems of currency, however urgent the necessity. as a matter of fact the statesmen were as innocent as the peoples of any knowledge that such problems called for solution. they were too preoccupied with the over- whelming fact of victory or defeat (defeat in some cases compli- cated by revolution) to give much thought to anything else. they had been bewildered by the magnitude of the financial operations of the war, and the one conclusion established by experience appeared to be that everyone who had ever said that there was a limit to the amount of money that could be spent was wrong. in the first months after the armistice demobilisa- tion proved almost as costly as war. at the same time lavish public expenditure became the universal remedy for discontent. the high prices resulting from monetary inilation were attributed to every cause but the right one. the war-time expedients of rationing and controls broke down, for the discipline of war-time was no longer possible, and recourse was had to food subsidies. the subsidies, like all other increased expenditure, could only be provided by issues of paper money. during the war each side had striven to cut off the other from receiving supplies from overseas. there was an extreme shortage of stocks of all natural products throughout europe, and the new crops were short, owing to the insufficiency of labour and the scarcity of fertilisers. europe, overflowing with money, was in desperate need of everything else. the moment communications were opened with those countries in america and elsewhere which were in a position to supply products so urgently needed, the redundant money in europe began to be applied to buy these products. at once the weakness of the situation was revealed in a fall of the exchanges. exporters in america and elsewhere hardly realised what was happening. some were unwilling to remit home sums which they had received in depreciated currencies, and waited in the hope of an improve- ment. others were induced to sell goods just because they would receive an apparently enormous price in a depreciated currency, which they hoped later on to exchange at or near par. but amid all these illusions there were always enough sceptics who turned the proceeds of sale into sound dollars without delay, and the value of marks, crowns, francs, lire in the foreign exchange market steadily fell. that state of affairs lasted throughout 1919. in march of that year the pegging of the english, french and italian ex- changes had ceased. french and italian paper money had been inconvertible since 1914, and the exchanges on those countries were free to vary. english currency notes on the other hand were convertible into sovereigns at the bank of england, and, now that insurance against war risks was no longer required, there was nothing but moral pressure to prevent people from withdrawing gold from the bank for export, and gaining thereby a large profit on exchanges. despite the weighty recommenda- tions of the cunliffe committee (see great britain) the export of gold was prohibited. the melting of coin had been prohibited exchange rates 1920-5 (in u.s. cents) feb june nov par 1920 1920 1920 great britain 486-66 338-19 395-14 342-60 denmark 26°80 14°94 16-90 13:40 norway . ; 26-80 17-40 1761 13°37 sweden. 26-80 18-7 21°85 iq‘15 switzerland . 19°29 16°55 18-22 15°55 spain , 19-29 17°53 16°56 12-89 olland . ' 40-20 37°38 36-12 30°17 france. , 19°29 7:05 7°95 6:00 italy ; 19:29 5°51 5°94 3,60 belgium . 19:29 7:18 8-31 6:38 germany ; 23:82 1-05 2-58 1°32 austria. : 20:26 -369 -736 312 hungary 20-26 644 -216 poland . ; 23-82 “794 -630 ‘279 czechoslovakia 20-26 i-19 2°35 i-l4 yugoslavia. 1g-2 3°57 4:72 3:04 rumania 19-2 1:69 2:34 1-49 greece. : 19-29 12°22 12-06 9:03 bulgaria . : 19°29 1°75 i-75 i-22 finland . : 19:2 4-40 4°87 2:23 canada . : 10000 84-10 87-89 89-09 japan... 49°85 48-47 57°49 50°81 india ‘ ‘ be 47°28 40°82 29-68 china. ; a 161:00 106-05 78°83 argentina, 42-45 43°37 42-35 33°78 brazil. : 32°44 26-14 25-67 16:57 chile , : 21°75 20-80 14:06 may april feb. march feb dec. | 1921 1922 192 1924 192 192 397°85 441-49 469-08 429-06 477 °2: 484-98 18-00 21°23 19-09 15:68 17°81 24°86 15°72 18-67 13°57 13°57 15:2 20°31 23°41 26:07 26-61 26:30 26°94 26:79 17°86 19°45 18-80 17°29 19°25 19-30 13-42 15°54 15:67 12-7 14:22 14°18 35°60 37-94 39°53 37°06 40-17 40-19 8-38 9-2: 6-15 4-68 5:28 ac74 5°31 537 4°82 4°28 4cit 4°03 8-37 8-52 5°40 3°87 5°07 1-63 35 0038 22-0! 23-50! 23°81! 259 o13 ool 4 o01 4 14-06? i 4:06? 489 126 0381 ‘oo15 ooi4 0014 128 026 0025 ©) 19-18! 12-763 1°45 1-96 2:96 2:90 2-96 2-96 3-08 i-45 ‘97 i-24 1-62 1-77 1-72 73 \"48 \"52 jt 46 5:62 a-47 lf 1-63 1-61 1-29 1:31 69 “64 “74 73 73 2:19 1-94 2:61 2°53 2:52 2°52 89-71 97-89 98-91 97-06 99:86 99°96 48-46 47°50 48-44 42-90 39°08 43°19 26°73 28 66 32-28 30-19 35°73 36°64 68-27 73:94 71-82 70-00 75°26 75:68 31°75 36°53 37°23 33°88 39°75 41°45 13°67 13-81 11-57 11-60 11-27 14:17 12-03 11-85 12-27 10°12 10-84 12‘16 1 new marks, equal to 1,000,000,000,000 of the old. ? schillings equal to 10,000 kronen. 8109-8 cents to 1,000,000 polish marks. 4 zloty, equal to 1,800,000 polish marks. currency since 1916. the link between gold and money in the london market being thus broken, it became possible for the sterling exchange on gold-using countries to vary as freely as that of the franc or the lira. since sept. 1917 the export of gold from the united states had been prohibited, and at the armistice the dollar still stood at a small discount (something like 5%) in relation to the prin- cipal neutral currencics. i*reedom to import supplies urgent- ly needed quickly depressed the currencies of the european neutrals. by june 1org all of them except spain were be- low par. in that month the prohibition on the export of gold from the united states was removed. thus the gold standard was restored in the united states. the moment seemed a favourable one. inflationary govern- ment finance had ceased. the government securities held by the banks were being gradually disposed of to the public. nev- ertheless there was an element of weakness. the abnormal exports to europe were not being paid for, or were being paid for in depreciated currencies which the exporters hesitated to bring home. the gap in the american traders’ cash resources had to be made good by borrowing from their own banks. the resuliing stimulus to trade borrowing soon began to produce inflationary symptoms. prices rose. the bureau of labour index number, having fallen from 203 in nov. 1918 to 193 in feb. 1919, rose to 233 in jan. 1920. enormous quantities of gold were exported to the few countries still in a position to receive it. by the end of 1919 the net exports of gold amounted to $300,000,000, chiefly sent to south america and the east; in europe it went only to spain. but the countries which still bought gold as currency (spain, japan, argentina, uruguay) were inevitably contaminated with the american inflation, and followed not far behind. the crisis of 1920.—thus, when european currencies depre- ciated headlong, it was in comparison with a standard which was itself depreciating. the climax came at the beginning of 1920. in jan. the federal reserve bank of new york raised its rediscount rate to 6%. in the same month the american banks began to call in advances made to traders who were hold- ing european currencies. the result was a convulsive collapse of the exchanges, which brought sterling for a moment down to 3°20, or 34% below par. the table on p. 774 shows the exchange value of the principal currencies, in terms of american currency, for certain months from feb. 1920 to dec. 1925. iv. great britain and the united states the process of deflation—the american currency system was in a state of transition at the time of the crisis of ro14. ‘the federal reserve act of 1913 established a central bank system. it created a new form of currency in the federal reserve notes, which are not legal tender but are convertible into gold and backed by a gold reserve of at least 4o per cent. in the united states, as in england, currency has long been altogether sub- sidiary to credit. the feceral reserve system set up an agency capable of exercising the same sort of control over credit as the bank of england. this system was for the first time brought seriously into action to check the inflation of 1920. the english authorities acted first. bank rate was raised to 6% in nov. 1919. in dec. a treasury minute (an administrative instrument with no legal force) put a limit on the currency note issue. in april 1920 bank rate went up to 7%. at the end of may the new york federal reserve bank raised its rediscount rate to 7%. there followed a precipitate fall of prices in both countries. the subsequent course of events is best shown in tabular form in the next column. the relation between the exchange and the relative price levels in the two countries illustrates the doctrine of purchasing power parity (see exchanges, foreign). essentially the fall in american prices signified a rise in the value of gold, which thus appreciated 79% between may 1920 and jan. 1922. the greater the value of gold, the greater the effort required to restore the 775 amer- ican price index eng- ex- | lish change} price index remarks date may 1920 . 3°85 | 325°5 | 247 climax of inflation. nov. 1920. | 3:43 | 286-9 | 196 autumnal pressure. jan. 1921 3:74 | 245-9 | 170 “ai ; july 1921 3°63 | 194-1 | 141 fall of prices practically ended in america. jan. 1922 4°22 | 164:0 | 138 fall of prices practically ended in england and rise started in america. march 1923 | 4-70 | 160-0] 159 renewed credit restriction started in america. june 1924 . | 4:32 | 162-6] 144-6 | credit expansion started in america. march 1925 | 4-78 | 166-3 | 161-0 june 1925 . | 4:86 | 157-6] 157-4 pound to its former gold value. the reduction of prices by 50% in two years in england was only effected by keeping bank rate at 7°% for 12 months (april 1920 to april 1921). it did not fall below 5% till feb. 1922. the result was an intense depression of trade, which threw nearly 2,000,000 work-people out of em- ployment. an equally severe depression appeared in america in the period of falling prices, but was dispelled by the expanding credit and rising prices of the period from jan. 1922 to march 1923. fluctuations in both countries in the following two years ended with the exchange close to par, with trade again active in america, and with 1,200,000 still unemployed in the united kingdom. restoration of gold standard in great britain.—on april 28 1925 the chancellor of the exchequer announced that the export of gold would be free, and at the beginning of may was passed the gold standard act, imposing on the bank of england the obligation to sell gold bullion (in bars of 400 oz. troy) at the par price of £4 4s.117°;d. per fine ounce (£3 17s. 103d. per standard ounce). the obligation to redeem currency notes in gold coin was repealed, and so was the free coinage of gold by the mint. thus the act provided for the free convertibility of pounds into gold in the form most convenient for the world market, but interposed a bar to the issue of gold coin for active circulation. currency notes remained the principal legal medium of exchange, and bank of england notes were convertible into currency notes. the substitution of bank of england notes of £1 and ros. for the currency notes, as recommended by the cunliffe committee, was contemplated at the end of 1925. in the united states after 1921 the enormous imports of gold made the reserve proportions prescribed by the federal reserve act quite inoperative, but the federal reserve banks prevented an inflation of the currency by holding idle a reserve some $1,500,000,000 in excess of the statutory requirements. the pre- war forms of currency remained in circulation. gold certificates, however, were made legal tender in 191g. v. the european neutrals norway, sweden, denmark, holland, spain and switzerland, being neutral in the world war, escaped the worst extremes of currency collapse. like england, they felt the stress of the exchange crisis in feb. 1920, and their exchange rates then recovered. like eng- land, they failed to keep pace with the violent appreciation of the dollar, but their exchanges improved from the middle of 1921 onwards. the improvement brought some of them to parity. sweden reached par in nov. 1922, and remained there, except for a slight lapse in the winter of 1923-4. the dutch florin touched par in dec. 1922, but when sterling depreciated in 1923-4, took up a position between the dollar and the pound. holland returned to the gold standard at the same time as england (april 1925). swuserland.—switzerland was at par from dec. i921 to may 1922, and was overwhelmed by a grave trade depression. by re- ducing bank rate to 33 % (march 1922) and then to 3°%%> (aug.} the swiss brought about an expansion of credit, which raised their price index from 162 (april 1922) to 187 (april 1923), lowered their exchange from 19:45 (april 1922) to 17°55 (july 1923), and reduced the number of unemployed from 99,541 (feb. 1922) to 22,722 (july 1923). the same depreciation of the dollar which raised ster- ling to 4-78 in the latter part of 1924 raised the swiss franc again to par, but with no burden of unemployment. spain.—spain was swamped with gold during the war and after- wards in 1919, despite half-hearted attempts to exclude it. notes of 776 course were issued against the gold, and, being redundant, depre- ciated. she found herself in 1920 burdened with a gold reserve of 2} milliards (£100,000,000) against a note issue of 4 milliards, although she had never pretended to have a gold standard. she did not attempt to maintain parity with gold, and, though prices fell in 1921, the fall was both smaller and more gradual than in england or america. she remains, as before the war, on a standard of paper and token silver, but with prices 90% above the level of 1913. the currency is about 25% below gold parity, but gold parity itself has no significance except in the gold contents of coins which do not circulate and of which there is no free coimage. scandinavian monetary union.—denmark and norway before the war belonged, with sweden, to a scandinavian monetary union (dating from 1873). the coins of each, both gold and silver, were legal tender in the others. during the war the danish and nor- wegian currencies had fallen below parity with the swedish, and the union had to be suspended. it was finally terminated in feb. 1924. the danish exchange rose from 13-40 cents in nov. 1920 to 21-54, or within 20% of par, in aug. 1922. this huge rise meant a terrific fall in prices and very severe clepression and unemployment. den- mark, like switzerland, escaped from this condition at the cost of a rise in prices and a declfne in the exchange. the price index rose from 176 in aug. 1922 to 233 in july 1924. the exchange fell cor- respondingly to 16:05. unemployment was by that time no more than normal. a 7° bank rate (imposed jan. 1924) stopped any further rise of prices, and the same american credit expansion which brought sterling within reach of parity raised the danish krone in jan. 1925 to 17°81. the government thereupon secured the adop- tion of a programme for the improvement of the currency aiming at a rate of 18-80 by jan. 1927. meanwhile the pressure of a 7% bank rate continued. prices came down with a run, the index for aug. 1925 was 168 or 28 °% below that for january. the exchange rose to 24-70. unemployment began to increase again. the movements in norway were somewhat similar but not quite so marked. the rise in prices did not begin till march 1923, and was both more gradual and jess in extent. the exchange, after rising from 16-68 in july 1922 to 18-67 at the beginning of 1923, was set back (partly by the stringency in america) to 13-51 in june 1924. credit expansion in america brought it up again to 15-27 in ees 1925. asin denmark, the pressure of 7 % reversed the rise of prices, and brought the exchange up to 20. vi. the european belligerents france.-—the french franc recovered somewhat after the ex- change crisis of feb. 1920 and, like other currencics, followed the lead of the dollar during 1921 at the cost of a precipitate fall of prices. its fluctuations have otherwise been mainly due to political causes. when there was a prospect of a workable plan for securing payment of reparations, the franc rose; when friction developed with germany or when german finances seemed in a worse tangle than usual, the franc fell. serious weakness developed with the occupa- tion of the ruhr in jan. 1923. the franc fell in dec. 1923 to § cents, or well below the lowest level touched tin 1920. in jan. 1924, for the first time since the war, a loan was a failure, an ominous portent. did not the fall of the assignats start with the failure of a loan? despite the favourable prospect of reparations, the franc fell rapidly and reached 33 cents in march 1924. credits were hastily arranged in new york and london on the security of the gold in the bank of france, and used to support the franc. it was forced up to 6-72 cents, and then ict down again to § cents, a new internal loan in the autumn was a very equivocal success, though issued at a price to yield 83%. difficulty was found in getting the floating debt (bills of three to 12 months) held. for a country which still had to find very large sums for the reconstitution of the devastated area, the situation was serious. financial weakness was soon made painfully apparent by the increase in the advances from the bank of france to the government (an increase which infringed the law, and was desperately and vainly concealed for some months). the crisis was brought to a head by heavy maturities in july, sept. and dec. 1925. one finance minister after another failed to carry his measures, and the crisis was still acute in the first half of 1926. belgium.—vhe belgian france was till the autumn of 1925 closely linked with the french, partly through the intimate connection of the banking system of the two countrics, partly through the similar- ity of their political interests in regard to reparations. in oct. 1925 measures were taken to stabilise the belgian franc at its then gold value (about 43 cents), but this broke down in march 1926. ttaly.—the italian currency has likewise followed the french franc, but less closely than the belgian. the fall of prices in italy in 1920-1 was less severe, the recovery of the exchange in 1921-2 less marked. the lira was for a time dragged down by the french cur- rency crisis of 1925, but after nov. of that year was approaching stability at a value of about 4 cents. germany.—germany was till 1924 the principal storm centre of european currency disturbances. the collapse which brought the mark down to i cent in feb. 1920 was followed by a recovery. in may, after the evacuation. of frankfurt by the french, it rose to 2-95 cents, and the average for june was 2-56. in 1919 the govern- ment had been almost without resources. revenue was a mere frac- currency cit had to be covered by issues of paper money. but in dec. ir919 and april 1920 erzberger's new taxes came into operation, and for the moment german finances were on a relatively sound footing. the mark, it is true, fell steadily, and in july 1921 was worth only 1-30 cents. but it was the dollar that was rising, not the mark that was falling. the american price index fell from 247 in may 1920 to 141 in july 1921, while the german index fell from 1510 to 1430. the mark was a more stable unit than the dollar, the erzberger reforms practically balanced the ordinary budget, though time was still required to realise their full productivity. reparation payments had not begun, but heavy payments for the armies of occupation threatened the equilibrium, the note issue rose from 50 milliards in may 1920 to 72 milliardsin may rg2t. but, if only confidence in the currency could be maintained, 72 milliards (equivalent to $1,200,000,000) was not an excessive supply of cur- rency. the spring of 1921 brought the first demands for cash on account of reparations. a schedule of payments was agreed (after some friction) in may. the collapse started by that milliard was to bring the mark down to levels which strained the very language of arithmetic. germany was required to make payments when the necessary funds had not been collected anc could not be collected in time by tax or loan. the only resource was inflation, and the headlong depreciation of the currency destroyed the yield of the heavy direct taxes which were the corner-stone of the budget. for a year and a half this treatment was applied, and by jan. 1923, when the french and belgians occupied the ruhr, a million marks were worth less than $150. rep- aration payments being suspended, an attempt was made to stabilise the mark at a rate of $48 toa million or g¢y,5 of par, but it broke down in april and the final collapse ensued. by aug. 18 a mil- lion marks were worth 24 cents, the par value of one mark. three months later, in nov., this was the value of a bi//ion marks. the value of incomes or long contracts fixed in money had long before evaporated practically to nothing. the problem was to ac- commodate the ordinary day-to-day transactions (especially the payment of wages) to a medium which lost on an average 24 of its value every week. in the final phase people reckoned in gold marks and stipulated for payment in paper marks at the exchange of the day. public authorities and private employers began to issue irregu- lar ‘‘ emergency money,” in the form of promises to pay, clenominated in gold marks, this competition of the gold mark as a money of account was the final undoing of the paper mark. when liabilities were not fixed in paper money, there was no longer any motive for kecping paper marks on hand. credit, in the form of ‘‘ emergency ” tender, had thus prevailed over legal tender. so long as there was a basis for a money of account in which a debt could be calculated, credit could exist. i{ere was the way out of chaos. by decree was established on oct. 15 a new bank of issue, the rentenbank, the notes of which, expressed in ‘ rentenmarks ’’ were not legal tender, but were con- vertible into interest-bearing bonds of the bank expressed in gold. ‘the new bank was provided with capital by means of a forced loan from industry and agriculture (the capital was not paid up, but was a mere guarantee). vhe mere absorption of a new fiduciary currency provided re- sources which tided the government over the critical period before the revenue began to yield on a gold basis. in the early months of 1924 the currency threatened to start falling again. this was not due to government borrowings but to demands for credit for trade. dr. schacht, the new governor of the reichsbank, drastically re- stricted credit and saved the situation. it was soon found that the tax system in force was more than adequate to mect requirements, when the currency was in working order. the year 1924 saw the settlement of reparations by the dawes plan. the reichsbank was reorganised. the billion-mark notes, that had been circulating along- side the rentenmarks, were replaced by the new reichsmark notes at the ratio of one to a billion. the greatest currency collapse in history had become a thing of the past. measures have been taken to mitigate the ruin of the rentier class, in some directions, by a valorisation measure, securing them a fraction of the gold value of former mortgages and debentures. austria and the succession states —three states, austria, hun- gary and czechoslovakia, had the old austro-itungarian crown as their sole medium of exchange in 1919. it circulated also in parts of rumania, yugoslavia and poland. the first step was to put a stop to a state of affairs in which the austro-hungarian bank was financing governments in vienna and budapest by inflating the currency in all the other states. in feb. 1919 czechoslovakia and yugoslavia closed their fronticrs to the importation of bank notes, and required all those on their territory to be stamped with dis- tinguishing marks. thereafter only stamped notes were legal tender. other states followed the same plan (elungary not till march 1920). in the period following the exchange crisis of feb. 1920 the countrics of central and eastern europe were greatly affected by german currency conditions. they had long been financially and commercially dependent upon germany. the collapse of 1921 played havoc with all of them. the first to emancipate itself was czechoslovakia. it was the most industrially developed and was free from war burdens. the tion of expenditure, a loan for a modest total was a failure; the defi- ' finance minister, dr, rasin, had alrcady imposed heavy taxes, and currie in 1922 was able to raise loans in london and new york. that made possible a restriction of the note issue, which forced up the exchange value of the czech crown from i cent in nov. 1921 to 33 cents in aug. 1922. the price index fell from 1675 in dec. 1921 to 1003 in dec. 1922. the result, as in the countries which had accom- plished deflation on a similar scale in 1920-1, was extreme trade depression and unemployment, the number of unemploycd rising to 436,000 at the end of 1922. but the effort once accomplished, a slight relaxation became possible. the exchange was stabilised at approximately 3 cents, the unemployed were gradually absorbed, and by 1925 business and currency conditions were normal. austria was unable to recover by her own unaided efforts, the col- lapse of 1921 was intensified in 1922. the economic position of the country, a financial and commercial centre politically severed from the region it had been accustomed to serve, was precarious. vague but onerous reparation liabilities were imposed upon it. at last the league of nations intervened, and a scheme of financial reconstruc- tion was adopted in oct. 1922. reparation liabilities were suspended and postponed. a loan was raised with an international guarantee, and a certain amount of financial control was imposed through a representative of the league. the crown was stabilised at a value qresa of the former gold crown, the new currency unit being the schilling, equal to 10,000 paper crowns (about 7d.). developments in hungary were somewhat similar. a courageous attempt by dr. hegediis to restore the finances in 1921 failed for lack of parliamentary support. a league of nations reconstruction scheme was adopted in april 1924. hungary had more financial strength than austria, and by the aid of the support and control of the league was able to raise her reconstruction loan on her own credit without any guarantee. the hungarian crown was stabilised at the same gold ratio as the austrian. the new unit (jan. 1926) is the penge of 12,500 paper crowns (85¢d.). rumania and yugoslavia.—rumania and yugoslavia escaped from the extremities of currency collapse, but have not as yet stabilised their currencies. in the austro-hungarian provinces of yugoslavia the stamped notes of the austro-hungarian bank were replaced at the ratio of one dinar to four crowns. [n rumania it was necessary to replace not only crowns in transylvania and other parts but roubles in bessarabia. the change was effected in 1920, two crowns being taken as equivalent to one leu. the rumanian leu (formerly the equivalent of a franc) remained comparatively steady after the beginning of 1923 at about 7y of its par value. the serbian dinar, after falling in jan. and feb. 1923 below one cent, gradually recovered to about 13 cents, or 7; of par, and in 1926 showed signs of being stabilised at that valuc. poland.— poland came into existence as a state with a bewildering variety of currencies. in congress poland (the old russian poland) an issue of polish marks had appeared during the german occupa- tion. to it were added german provinces with german marks, galicia with austro-ilungarian crowns, russian provinces with all varieties of russian roubles. ultimately these were all replaced by polish marks. poland was involved during 1919 and 1920 in war with russia, with no resources to mect the overwhelming burden of war budgets. the lavish issue of paper money caused a wild and rapid depreciation. by 1924 polish marks were worth no more than rt cents a million. asin germany, a moncy of account based on gold (the zloty or franc) had already come into use, and in may 1924 a scheme of stabilisation was introduced with the issue of cloty notes by a bank of poland (one s/oiyv was the equivalent of 1,800,000 polish marks). it was not found possible to maintain the s/ofy currency at par, and by march 1926 it had fallen to about two-thirds of its nominal old value. other european states—the baltic states, finland, estonia, latvia and lithuania, ali succecded in the post-war period in placing their currencies on a gold standard. finland retained the finnish mark, reduced in value from 19-30 cents to 23. estonia and latvia evolved stable currencies from an amazing complication of different kinds of roubles and marks. lithuania used the german mark till the collapse of 1923. bulgaria, greece, portugal and turkey have heavily depreciated currencies, but by the beginning of 1926 had not adopted definite measures of stabilisation. russia.—in 1918 there ceased to be a foreign exchange market in russia, and, up to the introduction of the new economic policy in 1921, the policy of the soviet was to dispense with money altogether as soon as practicable. nevertheless, the issuc of paper money in ever-growing quantities to meet the daily expenses of crovernment continued, and, when the return to a general use of money was de- cided on in the autunin of 1921, the depreciation was such that prices were 80,000 times the level of 1913. that far transcended any price index recorded up to that time elsewhere in europe. a new “rouble of 1922’ was introduced cqual to 10,000 of the existing soviet roubles, but this was a mere change of nomenclature, adopted for the convenience of shortening the figures. the process of deprecia- tion continued unabated, and a new money of account was insti- tuted in the form of a “ goods rouble.’” its value in paper roubles was officially fixed, at first from month to month and then at shorter intervals, according to the index number of prices, so as to represent the quantity of wealth which a rouble would buy in 1913. wages and other obligations were fixed in goods roubles and paid in paper roubles at the prescribed value. = = 9 lid the use of a stable unit of account was followed up towards the end of 1922 by the issue of a stable paper money. bank notes ex- pressed in tchervontzi (a tchervonetz being 10 gold roubles) were -issued by the state bank. these notes were neither convertible nor legal tender, but they were accepted by the state and came into use for payments in terms of the goods rouble, which was renamed gold rouble. the reference to gold was really a fiction. there was no market in gold, and the standard of value still depended on the index of prices. the tchervontzi were in practice convertible into sovict roubles at the appropriate rate. transactions in foreign cur- rencies gradually grew up, but in view of the government monopoly of foreign trade they were on an entirely artificial basis. in march 1924 the system of concurrent circulation of two forms of paper money was terminated, and the tchervontzi became the sole currency. a soviet rouble of 1923, equal to 100 roubles of 1922 and therefore to 1,000,000 of the earlicr issues, had been introduced, and when the sovict roubles were finally withdrawn 50,000 of these were exchanged for one rouble of the bank notes (,45 of a tchervonetz). the ultimate depreciation was therefore in the ratio of 1 to 50 mil- liards. the tchervontzi therefore were the russian currency at the end of 1925. vii. japan, china, india, etc. japan.—japan succeeded in maintaining gold parity in the critical year 1920. in fact a financial crisis in the spring of that year produced an acute stringency, which put the yen for a time at a substantial premium over the american dollar, and the consequent imports of over $90,000,000 in gold contributed to the monetary stringency in the united states in the autumn. in the succeeding years the yen was allowed to lapse a little. the earthquake of sept. 1923, coming at a time when prices in america were falling, intensified the decline. at the end of 1924 the yen was 23 % below par, but during 1925 the discount siminilicd to 10%. china.—chinese currency has remained throughout the storms and stresses of the war and post-war period securcly based on silver. the apparent vagaries of the exchange were mainly due to fluctuations in the value of the european units in which they are calculated. when silver rose ta 89} d. per standard ounce in 1920, or about three times its pre-war price, that was less than the rise of other commodities. the subsequent fall in silver, and therefore in (chinese currency, was greater in proportion than the fall of prices generally. that was due, partly at any rate, to the displacement of a very large amount of silver coinage from europe. in many coun- tries the depreciation of the currency has been such that the current value of the subsidiary silver coin fell below the bullion value. much was therefore privately melted, to be sold as bullion. e:xten- sive recoinage schemes were also set on foot. the value of silver was lowered by the release of these fresh supplies. india.—from 1898 to 1917 the indian rupee was successfully maintained by means of an exchange standard at a value in sterling of 1s. 4d. but when the price of silver rose above 43d. a standard ounce, the rupee became worth more than is. 4d. as silver. this price was reached in 1917 and it became impossible for the indian government to undertake to supply rupees at is. 4d. the exchange was raised to is. 5d. and then is. 6c., and for a time a further rise was staved off because the united states undertook to supply silver at $1 a fine ounce (47d. per standard ounce) by withdrawing silver certificates and melting down the reserves of standard dollars (pittman act). but in 1919 and 1920, this resource being withdrawn silver soared, and the rupee rose at one time to 2s. &cdl. its value in geld was about 48 cents (2s. at par). an attempt to fix it permanently at that value broke down in face of the apprecia- tion of gold in terms of commodities, the powerful credit apparatus by which prices can be forced down in england or america does not exist in india. vhe rupee fell to 24 cents in 1921, and recovered as american prices rose, to 32 cents in march 1923. after a reaction the renewed expansion in america in 1924-5 brought it up to 36 cents, or about is. 6d. a commission of inquiry was appointed in 1925 to consider the future of the indian currency. south america.—those of the south american states which were still on a gold standard in 1920 were quickly shaken off it by the fall of prices in the united states. argentina saw her gold peso turn into another kind of paper peso in the fixed ratio of 100 to 44 to the old paper peso. bibliography.—r. g. hawtrey, currency and credit (1919) and monetary reconstruction (1923); g. cassel, money and foreign f¢x- change after 1974 (1922); j. m. keynes, monetary reform (1923); j. r. bellerby, control ef credit as a remedy for unemployment and monetary stability (1925); s. s. katzenecherbaum, russian currency and banking, 1914-24 (1925); league of nations, afemoranda on currency and central banks (1925); j. p. young, furopean cur- rency and finance, 2 vol (u.s. senate: gold and silver inquiry, 1928); l. n. yurovsky, currency problems and policy of the sovvet union (1925). (r. g. h.) currie, sir arthur william (1875- }, canadian soldier and administrator, was born at napperton, ont., dec. 5 187s and for some time was engaged in business in british columbia. on the outbreak of the world war his natural bent for military affairs quickly brought him into prominence. he 778 commanded the 1st canadian div., 1914-7, and the canadian corps in france 1917-9. he gained the confidence of the english military authorities, and when sir julian byng resigned his command of the canadian troops sir arthur currie was appointed in his stead. the manner in which he carried out his command marked him a military leader of unusual distinction. currie was given the c.b. in 1915, k.c.m.g. 1917, k.c.b. 1918 and g.c.m.g. 1919; he was awarded the french legion of honour and the croix de guerre both of france and of belgium, and was created grand officer of the belgian ordre de la cou- ronne. in 1920, after sir auckland geddes (g.z.) had finally decided not to take up the principalship of mcgill university, montreal, on his appointment as british ambassador to wash- ington, sir arthur currie was elected to the post. (see canada.) curtis, charles gordon (1860- ), american inven- tor, was born at boston, mass., april 29 1860. he was educated at columbia university (c.e., 1881; ll.b., 1883; m.s., 1907), and practised as a patent lawyer for eight years. he organised the c. & c. electric motor co., and also the curtis electric manufacturing co., of which he was president. he invented a steam turbine of higher efficiency than the parsons type with a new method of controlling speed, the land rights of which he sold to the general electric co. this corporation spent $3,000,- ooo in developing the patent, with the result that the curtis steam turbine is widely employed both in electric power-plants and marine propulsion, being used in the u.s. and british navies. curtis, cyrus hermann kotzschmar (18s0- ), american publisher, was born at portland, me., june 18 1850. he sold newspapers when a boy, and in 1870 joined a boston paper as advertising canvasser. in 1876 he went to philadelphia and became publisher of the tribune and farmer, a weckly paper. in 1883 he established the ladics’ home journal and in 1891 organised the curtis publishing co. in 1897 he purchased the saturday evening post, which was a direct continuation of the pennsyloania gazette, founded in 1728 by benjamin frank- lin, and in torr he bought the country gentleman. the ladies’ home journal and the saturday evening post attained a circu- lation of 2,000,000 each and probably carried more paid advertis- ing than any other publications in the world. for this reason, although the cost of producing a copy of the saturday evening post was many times its selling price to the public (5 cents), this magazine was highly profitable to the publisher. in 1913 he purchased the philadelphia public ledger and in 1923 acquired the new york evening post. see e. w. bok, a man from maine (1923), and the boy who followed ben franklin (1924). curtius, ernst robert (1886- ), german scholar, was born at thann, alsace, april 4 1886. from 1913-9 he taught at the university of bonn, from 1920-4 at marburg, and in 1924 was appointed professor of french history and romance philology at heidelberg. in 1914 he published ferdinand bru- neliere, ein bettrag zur geschichte der franzesischen kritik. wis work die literarischen wegbereiter des neuen frankreichs (19109) is of importance in filling the large gap which the world war has made in the knowledge of the intellectual development of present day france. among his other works are afaurice barres und die geistigen grundlagen des franzesischen nationalismus; der syndikalismus der geisbesarbetter in frankreich (1921); balzac (1923); franzdsischer geist int neuen europa (1925). curzon of kedleston, george nathaniel curzon, ist marquess (1859-1925), british statesman (see 7.665), re- ceived an earldom, along with the viscountcy of scarsdale and the barony of ravensdale, as a coronation honour in rg11. he was conspicuous in that year first by his strong denunciation of the parliament bill and of the liberal attack on the house of lords, and then by the leading share he took, in the final stage, in persuading the bulk of the conservative peers to abstain from voting in the crucial division and so to permit the bill to pass rather than have their house swamped by hundreds of creations. during the vehement party contlicts of the next two or there years before the world war he established his position as the curtis, c. g—curzon of kedleston chief lieutenant of lord lansdowne in the lords. but much of his time and attention during the period of opposition was given to the affairs of oxford university, of which he had been elected chancellor; and he promoted the cause of reform there by per- sonal effort and by publishing a detailed memorandum on the subject. he had, moreover, a scholarly love for antiquities, and bought and carefully preserved from further ruin the ancient castles of tattershall in lincolnshire and bodiam in sussex, and eventually presented them to the nation. with other conservative leaders he joined mr. asquith’s coali- tion cabinet in the summer of 1915, as lord privy seal; and in that capacity he introduced the bill constituting the new ministry of munitions under mr. lloyd george, and took charge in the lords of the munitions of war bill which was to furnish that ministry with its weapons. in these and other ways he gave proof of a determination to prosecute the war with zeal and energy. he accepted the presidency of the air board in may 1916 and in july became a permanent member of the war committee of the cabinet. when mr. lloyd george formed his ministry in dec., he was called to a still more prominent position. lord lansdowne and lord crewe—the two leaders of parties in the lords—both retired from office, and lord curzon became the leader of the house with the office of lord president. he was chosen also to be one of the four ministers (the others being the prime minis- ter, lord milner and mr. henderson) who constituted the war cabinet, and were charged with the permanent daily conduct of the war. after the paris conference he took over the foreign office from mr. balfour, retaining his leadership of the party in the house of lords. as leader, though not able to claim the sympathetic touch and close familiarity with their lordships’ idiosyncrasies pos- sessed by some of his predecessors, he exhibited remarkable intellectual powers and oratorical capacity, and gradually established his ascendancy in the house. in the foreign of- fice he found a specially congenial sphere, as he had through- out his life made a study of the external relations of the country, and had travelled extensively. but foreign affairs in the years immediately following the war were still dominated by the prime minister and the supreme council; and it was at mectings of the latter, which mr. lloyd george attended—at paris, san remo, spa, lympne and london—that a settle- ment, or at least a temporary salve, was found for recurrent difficulties. when the coalition fell in oct. 1922, lord curzon remained at the foreign office in mr. bonar law’s and mr. baldwin's administrations, and on nov. 8 he announced that it’ had been decided that the department should, as in former days, do its own work, subject only to the control of the cabinet and the general supervision of the prime minister. during the ensuing 15 months he had to deal with several thorny problems, in which only moderate success was possible, and his treatment of them subjected him to repeated, if not always justifiable, criticism. he had first to straighten out british relations with the nation- alist turks, who disregarding the treaty of sevres had driven the greeks out of thrace and asia minor by force of arms; and he spent the winter of 1922-3 presiding over a european con- ference at lausanne, and employing all his resources of knowl- edge, skill, patience and courtesy in the vain endeavour to win turkish consent to a satisfactory settlement. ultimately, as renewed fighting was abhorrent to england and europe, turkey was allowed to retain all she had regained, with the addition of constantinople. with russian relations, lord curzon’s second difficulty, he had more success. by sharp remonstrances in the spring and summer of 1923, based on the stipulations of the trade agreement of 1921, he obtained from the russian govt. the suspension of their open anti-british action and propaganda, and the removal of their incriminated officials at cabul and teheran. but lord curzon’s principal preoccupation was the relations of england, france and germany. m. poincare, the french prime minister, in spite of serious british protests, embarked cushing—cyanamides in the winter of 1922-3 on the ruhr expedition to exact repara- tions from germany; and he continued and intensified the pres- sure throughout the year, accompanying it with the policy of encouraging separatist movements in the rhineland. lord curzon, who had begun by merely dissociating britain from french action, while protesting that british policy was based on the entente, gradually took up a position of decided antagonism; and finally in aug. issued a note of severe condemnation, asserting the total illegality of the french movement. no remonstrances had any effect on m. poincare; but meanwhile lord curzon had encouraged germany to make, in regard to reparation, offers of her own, which at first were so small as to provoke immediate rejection, but which eventually became sufficient to afford a basis for negotiation. finally before he left office he had secured the consent of france and belgium to an advisory committee of experts (in which the united states had decided to co-opcrate) to be appointed by the reparations commission. this developed under mr. ramsay macdonald into the dawes committee, from whose report dated the improvement of european relations. lord curzon had two serious disappointments in his last years, both of which he bore with dignity and in silence. the first was when, on mr. law’s resignation from illness in may 1923, mr. baldwin, who had decidedly less experience and political eminence than himself, became prime minister, mainly because it was only in the house of commons that the real opposition, the labour party, could be encountered. the other was when mr. baldwin formed his second cabinet in the autumn of 1924, and passed over lord curzon’s claims to return to the foreign office, placing there instead mr. austen chamberlain, who, as a previous leader of the whole party, was bound to re- ceive special consideration. on the first occasion, lord curzon consented to take the chair at the party meeting which elected mr. baldwin to the leadership; on the second, he accepted the presidency of the council, retaining of course the leadership in the lords. | lord curzon’s first wife, by whom he had three daughters, died in 1906, and in 1917 he married, as his second wife, grace elvina, widow of alfred duggan, of buenos aires, ancl daughter of j. munroe hinds, u.s. minister in brazil. he succeeded to the barony of scarsdale on his father’s death in 1916 and became a k.g. in the same year. he was created a marquess on the king’s birthday in 1921. never a strong man, he had forced himself throughout life by sheer will-power, in spite of serious physical disabilities, to do day by day more than a strong man’s work; and in the early spring of 1925, his health suddenly broke down, and after a fortnight’s illness he died in london on march 20. the first part of the funeral service was held in westminster abbey, where an immense congregation, including the foremost people of the country, gathered; the actual burial was at ked- leston, the family seat in derbyshire. as he left no son, the marquessate and earldom became extinct; the viscountcy and barony of scarsdale passed, with kedleston, to his nephew, and his eldest daughter, lady irene curzon, inherited the barony of ravensdale. after lord curzon’s death two volumes by him were pub- lished, british government in india, on the proofs of which he was engaged during his last illness. (gl tb.) cushing, harvey (1869- ), american surgeon, was born at cleveland, o., april 8 1869. he graduated from yale university in 1891 and from the harvard medical school in 1895. after four years at the johns hopkins hospital he studied abroad under kocher at berne, and sherrington at liverpool. on his return to baltimore he held various positions in the de- partment of surgery at johns hopkins university, becoming an associate professor in charge of cases of surgery of the central nervous system. he wrote numerous monographs on the surgery of the brain and developed the method of operating with local anaesthesia. his work on the pituitary body gave him a euro- pean reputation. he also made important contributions to the study of blood pressure in surgery. in 10911 he was appointed professor of surgery in the harvard medical school and surgeon- 779 in-chief at the peter bent brigham hospital in boston. from 1917-9 he was director of united states base hospital no. 5 attached to the british expeditionary force in france. in 1918 he was made senior consultant in neurological surgery for the american expeditionary force and held the rank of colonel in the medical corps at the close of the war. he wrote a life of sir wrlliam osler (1925). cuypers, petrus josephus hubertus (1827-10921), dutch architect, was born may 16 1827 at roermond, holland. he studied under viollet-le-duc, and was inspired both by the gothic and the netherland styleof the 16th century in building the rijks museum at amsterdam (1877-85) and in restoring and rebuilding many roman catholic churches, town halls and other buildings. his chief merit however was that he awakened the interest of his countrymen in architecture and the decorative arts, and so prepared the way for berlage, de bazel and others who created the modern dutch style of architecture. cuypers received honorary degrees from the universities of utrecht and delft. he died march 3 1921.",
    "source_url": "https://archive.org/details/encyclopaedia-britannica-encyclopaedia-britannica.-3-encyclopaedia-britannica-inc.-1926",
    "observed_at": "2026-05-17 11:59:28",
    "integrity": {
        "hash_check": "match",
        "hash_scope": "full_normalized_text",
        "computed_sha256": "6db4ae3b623b4cf237b3722bc80f7a3b77f564bee572d6fc66166f798cc1b22a"
    },
    "machine_use": {
        "read": true,
        "cite": true,
        "decision": "verified_public_domain_text"
    },
    "goguides_data_license": "https://www.goguides.com/data-license",
    "goguides_data_license_version": "2.0",
    "documentation": {
        "white_paper_url": "https://www.goguides.com/white-paper.php",
        "pdf_url": "https://www.goguides.com/whitepapers/goguides-ai-source-clearance-white-paper.pdf"
    }
}