CONVOY

the problem of mercantile convoy, the protection of groups of trading ships by naval escort, was fun- damentally different in the world war from what it had been in the days of sailing ships. merchant vessels in the 18th cen- tury made very few round voyages in the year, often only one. the length of each passage was uncertain, depending on wind and weather conditions and the delays caused by assembly, awaiting escort and sailing in groups, were comparatively unim- portant. the owners of fast sailing vessels might lose the profits to be gained by forestalling the market, but the nation suffered little. hence trade could be carried on in time of war by a com- paratively few convoys of great size. a homeward bound west indian convoy might comprise 100 or 150 vessels; there are records of baltic convoys during the napoleonic wars of over 500 sail. since those days, the greater frequency and certainty of voy- ages under steam had permitted the growth of massed industrial populations, depending for their very life, not merely on an im- mense volume of imported foodstufis and raw materials, but on its arrival in a steady, continuous stream of cargoes. through- out the world war the stocks of food, of munitions materials, and of materials for civil industries were small in comparison with annual requirements, and had to be continually renewed. the holding back of supplies for a few months, or even for a few weeks, might entail irremediable disaster. thus, if trade were to be run in convoy at all, it must be in numerous small convoys run to a regular schedule, not in a few large convoys at irregular intervals. the contrast may be illustrated by the fact that, during the first two years of the war of the austrian succession, 35 outward and 45 homeward convoys sufficed for the require- ments of the ocean trades; in the summer of 1918, 40 outward and 42 homeward convoys were run in the ocean trades alone every 32 days. in these circumstances convoy called for a greater allocation of force and a far more elaborate organisation than tn the past. at the best, too, it entailed very serious delays to the faster ships, owing to the wide discrepancies in speed between steamers even of similar type. neither to the commercial nor to the naval mind was convoy a matter lightly to be taken in hand. early part of the war—during the first two and a half years of war, the use of convoy was restricted to the protection of troop movements. as the submarine campaign increased in intensity, escort was frequently given, within the danger zone, to tankers and vessels with important government cargoes; but the introduction of organised mercantile convoy was delayed 719 until 1917. so long as the attack on commerce was carned on by surface warships, the total effect, despite the notoriety attained by the ‘‘ emden ” and other raiders, was comparatively trifling, and even the submarine campaign, in its earlier stages, produced an astonishingly small effect on the flow of commerce. towards the end of 1916, however, the losses of neutral as well as of british and allied shipping, became very serious, and the outbreak of unrestricted submarine warfare in feb. 1917 com- pelled a reconsideration of the whole problem of trade protection. at this time the general run of opinion at the british admiralty was strongly against convoy. it was condemned both as imprac- ticable and undesirable; impracticable because there were not enough cruisers, destroyers and patrol craft to provide escorts for the trade, and because accurate station keeping would be impos- sible in a group of steamers of varied type and speed; undesirable because of the delays involved, and because any protection derived from escort would be outweighed by the disadvantage of offering a large target to torpedo attack. organised convoys begin.—the delays caused by the holding up of shipping and by deviation to avoid danger areas were now, in fact, so serious as to discount one of the chief objections to convoy, and the losses suffered during the first three months of unrestricted warfare (see submarine campaigns) were so heavy as to threaten disastrous results to the supply system of the allies. for the three months feb.-april they amounted to over 1,200,000 tons of british and 800,000 tons of allied and neutral shipping. the existing methods of protection were clearly inadequate, and the advocates of convoy be- came insistent. in feb. 1917 the french coal trade was or- ganised in a system of controlled sailings which rapidly devel- oped into regular convoys, and in april a scandinavian convoy was introduced to protect the helpless, unarmed neutrals trading on allied account in the north sea. meanwhile, the application of convoy to the ocean trades was being persistently urged both within and without the anti-submarine division of the admi- ralty. a special committee was appointed at the admiralty dur- ing may to draw up a detailed scheme of convoys for the ocean trades, and during the same month two experimental convoys were sailed from gibraltar and ifampton roads respectively. both these experimental convoys arrived without loss, and the experience gained went far to dispose of the bogey of station- keeping. meanwhile, investigation had shown that the difficulty of providing escort had been magnified by an exaggeration of the number of voyages to be protected, and the arrival of united states destroyers at queenstown increased the available force. regular convoys from hampton roads were started in june; from sydney (cape breton), new york and gibraltar in july; in aug. the system was extended to the south atlantic trades and the outward traflic. | the system adopted for homeward convoys was for a group of steamers, collected at a port of assembly, to be escorted by a cruiser or armed merchant cruiser, giving protection against surface raiders, to a rendezvous outside the submarine danger zone, where the convoy was met and brought in by a destroyer escort. outward convoys, collected at assembly ports on the west and south coasts of england, were taken through the danger zone by a destroyer escort, to a point of dispersal outside the ordinary limits of submarine activity, whence the ships made their way individually to their ports of destination. in order to economise the forces used as destroyer escorts, which included destroyers, sloops and in some instances p-boats and trawlers, the escort, which had taken an outward convoy clear of the dan- ger zone, was required to steam from the point of dispersal to the rendezvous with a homeward convoy, which it then brought in. the whole system thus depended on an exact synchronisation of the outward and homeward programmes, which threw an immense strain on the convoy section at the admiralty, and on the commanders, officers and crews of the escorts themselves. work of the convoys.—at the height of the system two home- ward convoys sailed every 16 days from halifax; two from syd- ney, cape breton; four from new york; two from hampton roads; four from gibraltar; one from port said for the 720 “ through ” mediterranean traffic, with destroyer escort through- out the voyage; two from dakar; two from sierra leone; and two from rio de janeiro, combining with the dakar convoys at sea. during each similar period two outward convoys sailed from lamlash; seven from liverpool, including one “‘ through ” convoy to port said; four each from devonport and milford; two from falmouth and one from southend. in the french coal trade there were daily sailings on four different crossings; the scandinavian convoy, in its final form, sailed from methil to bergen and vice versa at five-day intervals; a small convoy ran about every six days to dutch ports; and there were local con- voys on the east coast of great britain and in the mediterranean. all these convoys, which included allied and neutral ships bound for british or northern french ports, were organised by the british admiralty, and the bulk of the escorts were prov idled by the british navy, although valuable assistance was given by united states cruisers and destroyers in the atlantic and by japanese destroyers in the mediterranean. the french navy also assisted in the ocean escort of a special convoy started dur- ing 1918 for american storeships to ports in the bay of biscay. the transport of united states troops to europe was carried out in part by special troop convoys, organised and escorted by the united states navy; but in the spring of 1918, when the great german offensive made it. necessary to speed up reinforcements, a large amount of british tonnage was allocated to the service, and special fast troop and cargo convoys were inaugurated from new york to liverpool and from halifax to liverpool and lon- don. thanks mainly to these convoys, well over 1,100,000 united states troops were carried in british ships, with a total loss, from war and marine perils, of 637. success of the system.—from the first the convoys proved a triumphant success, and conclusively refuted the arguments against the system. the grouping of the ships diminished the number of targets offered to the attack, and since the convoys themselves followed carefully chosen and carefully varied routes, and could be deflected, by wireless, from areas of known sub- marine activity, they proved as valuable in their power of evad- ing attack, as in the actual protection provided by the escort. when located by a submarine, they proved far less vulnerable than the opponents of the system had supposed. the threat of instant retaliation by the escort, and the menace presented to a submarine by a group of ships manoeuvring in concert on a broad front, hampered the movements of the assailant and even when the attack was successful, there was no such wholesale havoc as had been feared. in the north sea there were two serious disasters, both due to attacks by surface vessels; but in the ocean trades, even when a successful attack was made on a comparatively large convoy, it was rarely that the submarine claimed more than one, or at the most two victims. the total percentage of loss was as follows:— ships escorted safely in ocean convoy . 16,539 99-08% torpedoed in convoy ; tases 02 0-61 20 lost by marine peril. i a 16 0-09 70 lost after parting company, etc. i 36 0-22% total sailings . 16,693 100-:00% in the short sea convoys, seindinasian: dutch, british east coast, french coal trade and mediterranean local—there were over 80,000 sailings, with a loss of less than .5°%>. at the outset the advantages of convoy, more particularly in the north atlantic, were partly neutralised by the additional delays due to steaming to the port of assembly, awaiting the sailing date and adjusting speed to that of the slowest ship in the group. these delays, however, were greatly reduced, during 1918, by a more careful grouping of the ships, and by co-opera- tion between the admiralty, the ministry of shipping and the shipowners themselves. convoy committees of shipowners at liverpool, new york and london did yeoman service in the adjustment of sailings to the escort programmes, and the fast troop convoys, in particular, ran with almost the regularity of a railway time-table. in station keeping and manocuvring also there was improvement and i in me later conveys raere were few stragglers. cook, sir edward t.—coolidge bratiocrarny.—c. e. fayle, ‘‘ seaborne trade,” history of ie great war, vol. 3 (1924); earl. jellicoe, the crisis of the naval wa (1920); admiral w. s. sims, the victory ai sea igen zu j. a salter, allied shipping control (1921). (c. e. f.) cook, sir edward tyas (1857-1919), british journalist, was born at brighton may 12 1857 and educated at winchester and new college, oxford. having settled in london, he was for a time associated with the university extension movement, afterwards becoming a contributor to the pall mail gazette, then under the editorship of john morley. he was later assistant editor, and editor 1890-2, resigning when the paper changed its politics. in 1893 he became first editor of the new liberal jour- nal, the westminster gazette. he resigned in 1896 and became editor of the daily news, holding this position until r901, when his refusal to denounce the south african war led to his resig- nation. from rgor to 1912 he was a leader writer on the daily chronicle. during the world war, conjointly with sir frank swettenham, he directed the official press bureau. the work by which he will be chiefly remembered is, however, his monu- mental edition of ruskin—a tribute difficult to parallel in mod- ern literature. he was knighted in 1912 and died at south stoke, goring, berkshire, oct. 1 1919. among cook's publications are studies in ruskin (1890); rights and wrongs of the transvaal war (1901); the life of john ruskin (1911); life of florence nightingale (191 3); delane of ‘' the times’ (1915); leterary recreations (1918); and more literary recreations (1919). tle also edited the works of ruskin (1903-7). cook, sir joseph (1860— ), australian politician, was born at silverdale, staffs., and at the age of nine started life in a coal-mine. in 1885 he went to australia and, six years later, entered the new south wales legislature, holding office as post- master-general 1894-8 and minister of mines and agriculture 1898-9. he was elected to the commonwealth parliament for parramatta as a free trader in rgo01 and became minister for defence under mr. deakin 1909-10. in 1913, after the defeat of the labour party, he became premier and retained office until just after the outbreak of the world war in aug. 1914, when, his party having lost the general election, he resigned. he did not take office again until 1917, when he was minister for the navy in mr. hughes’ second ministry. in 1921 he became high commissioner in london. in 1922 he was senior australian delegate to the third assembly of the league of nations and australian delegate to the international conference at genoa. cooking apparatus: sce household appliances. coolidge, calvin (1872- ), 30th president of the united states, was born at plymouth, vt., july 4 1872, the son of john c. coolidge and victoria j. moor. he was descended from a long line of typical new england farmers and store- keepers, living in puritan simplicity and taking a characteristic interest in local civic affairs. his father, hke others in the an- cestral line, was selectman and moderator of the town meeting; he held the office of town constable for many years, and became a member of each house of the state legislature. it is possible that much of the younger coolidge’s flair for practical politics was developed at an carly age as he listened to the conversation that passed in his father’s country store, where the yankee democracy settled political issues over the nail and cracker barrels. his early education was characteristic of the region; he was first sent to the rural schoolhouse, later to black river academy and to st. johnsbury academy, where he was prepared for amherst college, which he entered in 1891. there he displayed the qualitics which were to distinguish his later career, a dislike of ostentation, a capacity for hard work and clear thought, an ability to express his ideas in phrases that were frequently humorous and invariably terse. such qualities did not make him a leader in his class (1895), either as scholar, social light or athlete; they did capture the admiration of a small group of the stronger men, and finally led to his election as “ grove orator ’’ at commencement. his interest in history led him to prepare an essay on “ principles fought for in the war of the american revolution,” which was awarded the prize by the coolidge sons of the revolution in a national competition of college students. as lawyer and legislator —upon graduation, coolidge studied law with a northampton firm, hammond and field, and two years later, in 1897, began its practice. the members of the firm were interested in local politics, and he himself soon found opportunity to follow his natural inclination. he was elected a councilman of northampton in 1899, city solicitor in 1900, and was appointed clerk of the courts, a county office, in t904. he was a member of the republican city committee. in 1907 and 1908 he served as a member of the general court of massachu- setts, the legislative body of the state, winning the reputation of a hard-working committeeman; he returned to northampton to become mayor for two terms in 1910 and ro11. at the close of his second term he secured the republican nomination for state senator, which in his district was tantamount to election. from that time his political career in the state progressed by regular steps. in 1914 and 1915 he was chosen president of the senate; he was elected lieutenant-governor of massachusetts for three terms, 1916, 1917, 1918, and governor of massachusetts for two terms, 1919 and 1920. in each case of re-election he was returned to office by an increased majority. his success was not achieved by conventional electoral methods, for he avoided ostentatious advertising and was re- garded personally as a poor “ mixer,” shy, taciturn and appar- ently cold. coolidge himself expressed in a characteristic phrase his conviction that electoral success ought to depend upon the candidate’s devotion to official duty. “‘ let men in public office,”’ he said, “‘ substitute the light that comes from the midnight oil for the limelight.”’ and again, ‘‘ we need more of the office desk and less of the show window in politics.” he translated his epi- gram into action, and the success he achieved as mayor of nor- thampton and as governor of massachusetts, in securing both _ economy and efficiency, explains much of his consequent recog- nition at the polls. at all times he displayed a political shrewd- ness which saved him from mistakes, and a dry common-sense, skilfully expressed in trenchant phrases that caught the imagina- tion of his auditors. governor of massachusetts —coolidge, as governor of massa- chusetts, proved himself an expert administrator; he was the first governor of the state to submit an executive budget for legislation and he pushed through various laws providing for the reduction in the number of administrative agencies in the state. but it is likely that his name would not have become nationally prominent if it had not been for his handling of the strike of the boston policemen. the boston charter provided that the police department should be under the direction of a commissioner appointed by the governor (in this case the com- missioner had been chosen by coolidge’s predecessor); the mayor of boston, however, may in certain contingencies take control of the police, and in “ case of tumult, riot or mob,” may call out such part of the state guard as is within the city of boston; if the situation passes beyond his control he may call upon the governor to mobilise the remaining state militia. the bosion police—during the first week of sept. 1919, the boston police threatened to go on strike because of the refusal of the commissioner to permit affiliation with the american federation of labor; the commissioner was steadily supported in his position by gov. coolidge. on the afternoon of sept. 9, about three-fourths of the policemen left their posts; disorder in the streets commenced during the night, which became riotous the following morning. the mayor, who had been previously informed by the commissioner that he did not need the state guard, on the morning of sept. ro called out the state guard in boston and requested the governor to send at least three regiments of infantry. coolidge immediately issued the order. it is possible that, thus reinforced and with the aid of young college graduates, the local authorities might have handled the situation successfully. in view, however, of a threatened general strike calculated to disorganise transportation and business activities, as well as the danger of continued rioting, coolidge called out the entire state guard, and on sept. 11 took charge of | 721 the police department. the strike was broken and order re- stored. coolidge steadfastly supported the commissioner in his refusal to reinstate the striking policemen, and in a public reply to an appeal of samuel gompers clarified the issues involved: “ the right of the police of boston to affiliate has always been questioned, never granted, is now prohibited. . . . there is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, at any time.’”’ warned that labour would prevent his election to any office in the future, he replied, “ it does not matter.” as vice-president.—the action and words of coolidge in this crisis were eminently characteristic. he took no step until it seemed necessary, but then he took it decisively. the effect upon the popular mind was impressive. in the election of nov. 1919, standing for re-election as governor, he received a ma- jority of 125,000. his name was at once included in the list of possible presidential nominces for the following year. already mentioned in 1916 by a few supporters, he might have received the nomination in 1920 if he had been given the solid backing of politicians from his own state. but at the national republican convention, where the senatorial group in control did not approve him, the massachusetts delegation was divided and he did not have the support of the senior senator, henry cabot lodge. he failed thus to profit by the deadlock, which was fi- nally broken in favour of warren g. harding. but when it came to a call for vice-presidential nominees, a wave of enthusiasm for coolidge caught the convention which, with 6743 votes, nominated him on the first ballot. he was elected vice-president of the united states in the following nov., receiving with senator harding 404 electoral votes. as vice-president, coolidge was the first who attended meet- ings of the cabinet, but he made no attempt to enlarge the functions of his office. he attended faithfully to the routine duties that went with the presidency of the senate, consistently supported the policies of the harding administration, and did nothing to bring himself before the public eye. early in the morning of aug. 3 1923, in his father’s house at plymouth, vt., he learned of the death of president harding. the oath of office was administered by his father, a justice of the peace, and he immediately left for washington. becomes president.—characteristically, president coolidge’s first interest was to assure the efficiency of the public adminis- tration, his second not to weaken his future position by any false step. following four months’ silence, his first presidential message, in dec. 1923, commanded universal attention. it was brief and categorical. in it he made plain his opinion on the major problems before the country. he approved the main- tenance of the tariff without frequent revision, a reduction of taxes; he disproved the soldiers’ bonus as well as any complicated scheme of government relief for the farmers. as regards foreign policy, he advocated co-operation without entanglement, op- posing entrance into the league of nations, but approving adherence to the world court. the message was courageous in its lack of equivocation and attractive in its emphasis upon economic common-sense. with its delivery coolidge caught the admiration and con- fidence of the ordinary citizen of the united states as a whole, as he had previously in massachusetts. none the less, he faced a difficult situation in washington. the republican party in congress was broken into blocs, disinclined to accept his leader- ship, torn by factional struggles to secure advantage in the coming national convention. congress sustained the veto of coolidge of the postal salaries bill by only one vote, and passed the bonus bill over his veto. in the spring the disclosures of the teapot dome leases threatened to involve his cabinet and dis- credit the republican party. the president met the demands for wholesale purification of the administration with discretion and restraint; he immediately appointed special counsel to prosecute an investigation, but refused to satisfy popular clam- our by hasty dismissal of accused officials: “ i do not propose to sacrifice any innocent man for my own welfare, nor do i propose to maintain in office any unfit man for my own welfare.” opin- ion finally accepted the president’s judgment as decisive. at the 722 republican convention, largely because of popular feeling in his favour, his control was unthreatened and he was nominated with ease; the vote of the convention was in many cases an un- willing tribute by the party leaders to the overwhelming power of public opinion ‘ back home.” coolidge did not take an active part in the campaign, remain- ing for the most part in washington and dealing with current problems of administration. in the few speeches which he made he reiterated the basic principles which he had already stated: economy in public affairs, efficiency of public service, abstention from the league of nations, adherence to the world court. he made slight effort to answer the bitter criticism passed on the republican party for the scandals and its reactionary attitude, by the democratic and third party nominees; he relied upon the increasing prosperity of the country under his administra- tion and the widespread feeling that he embodied a shrewd common-sense in which the nation might trust. he was vin- dicated by the result of the election, which gave him 382 elec- toral votes against 136 for davis and 13 for la follette. the popular vote was 15,700,000 for coolidge, 8,400,000 for davis, 4,800,000 for la follette. on march 4 1925 coolidge was inaugurated president by virtue of election. flis position in the country and the party was strong. he still met difficulties with the old congress, for the insurgent senators combined with the democrats to refuse confirmation of his nominee for attorney-general. but the back of the insurgent-radical movement seemed broken, and_ his control of the new congress was solidified. he made plain in his presidential messages of dec. 1924 and dec. 1925, that he did not plan to use his increased political strength for far-reach- ing legislative reform. but he insisted, with success, upon his plans for tax reduction and administrative economy. as regards foreign policy, he pushed irresistibly the demand for adherence to the world court. by his willingness to co-operate in a dis- armament conference to be held under the auspices of the league of nations, he displayed a sincere desire to assist in solving the problem of the world peace despite the prejudices of the irreconcilables. under his direction an arrangement of the foreign debt question was reached with belgium and italy, although negotiations with france broke down temporarily. after two years as president, coolidge appeared as a skilled administrator, shrewd in his judgments, an idealist, but, like his puritan forefathers, eminently practical, determined to make sure of his footing before taking any step in advance. on oct. 4 1905 he married grace anna goodhue, of burling- ton, vermont. two sons, john and calvin, were born on sept. 7 1906 and april 13 1908, respectively. the younger died on july 7 1924, as a result of blood poisoning. 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