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    "source_key": "britannica_1926",
    "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926)",
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    "chunk_id": "1926:censorship:4d5106cdd4e4",
    "title": "CENSORSHIP",
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    "verified_text": "in practice the censorship may be generally defined as action taken by any governing authority to prevent the dissemination of false state- ments, inconvenient facts or displeasing opinions among the governed. i. general the outbreak of the world war in 1914 made censorships necessary in all belligerent countries from a purely military point of view. broadly speaking, they were then established with the following objects: (1) to prevent information of mili- tary value from reaching the enemy; (2) to obtain information as to the enemy’s strength, disposition, morale and intentions from the indiscretions of his press or his people; (3) to control the enemy’s channels of communication; (4) to prevent false statements, inconvenient facts or enemy-inspired propaganda from reaching the public. the methods of communication which lend themselves to censorship from such points of view are (1) postal communications; (2) telegrams and wireless communica- tions; (3) printed publications. postal censorships—the communications dealt with by such censorships were divided broadly into (uw) correspondence with the combatant forces, (b) private correspondence, (c) commer- cial correspondence, (d) printed publications arriving from abroad. in practically all the armies ficld censorships were established to deal with the correspondence of the combatant forces. the censoring was performed in the area of military operations by regimental officers, or if necessary at the base by staff officers specially appointed for the purpose. in great britain only such letters arriving from the area of military opera- tions as appeared to have escaped the eyes of the field censors were submitted by the post office for scrutiny to the censors in london. with regard to the other categories of communications, it will be convenient to describe the history and methods of the english censorship, which (partly owing to geographical cir- cumstances and partly owing to able organisation) became during the war more eflicient and comprehensive than those of most other countries. in great britain the censorship of postal communications, like that of cables, was placed at the beginning of the war on a mili- tary basis. the competent military authority for these purposes was a general oflicer responsible to the army council, and the officers of the censorship a&ed under his directions. non-postal communications to and from the united kingdom were pro- hibited by a regulation under the defence of the realm act, and a similar regulation allowed a search at the ports of persons embarking and disembarking in order that written communica- tions which were intended to escape or might escape the censor- ship might be discovered. the postal censorship officers were established in london, and in may 1915, nine months after the beginning of the war, the number of censors of all grades was 800. they then examined each week a ton of private corre- spondence and five tons of commercial correspondence. by the end of the war the censor’s staif numbered 4,608, and an aver- age of 375,517 letters were being scrutinised per day. the pro- cedure throughout the war was as follows: outgoing mails were examined, so far as legitimate correspondence was con- cerned, for any information (or misinformation) which might, if conveyed to the enemy through neutral channels, supply useful information or useful propaganda. all such passages were deleted and the correspondence was then allowed to go forward. correspondence, which from its origin or destination there was any reason to suspect as a channel of enemy communication, was specially examined, along with any suspicious correspond- ence, the derivation of which was not obvious. this part of the censorship’s activities was really a part of the contre-espionage, a service designed to defeat the enemy’s attempts to extract useful information from behind the lines. such services were general in all belligerent countries, and in- volved, so far as the censorship was concerned, a strict examina- tion of any suspect or suspicious documents which might pos- sibly convey, by the use of cipher, code, sympathetic ink or any other device, a message to the enemy. in the british, french 559 and german postal censorships special branches were organised to deal with these problems, and as a result messages were dis- covered through which enemy agents were apprehended and enemy channels of communication were closed. in great britain arrangements were made by which communications intended for enemy persons might be placed in open envelopes and en- closed in covers addressed to a neutral country. all such letters were of course submitted to careful examination. mails for neutral countries contiguous to the enemy were censored from the first, and as the area involved by the war extended to extra- european territory it became necessary to examine practically all outgoing mails, for information which might be of military value to the enemy and for statements which might damage great britain in the eyes of neutrals or raise the enemy’s morale. communications obtained from known enemy agents were in many cases altered in such a way as to convey false information and then allowed to proceed. incoming mails were examined for any information regarding the enemy’s strength, dispositions, plans and morale, and for any statements which could be used to discredit the enemy in the eyes of neutrals or to raise the morale at home. printed publications emanating from enemy sources and found in postal packets were dithcult to deal with. many of them were of a highly propagandist nature, and were therefore seized and condemned. others, less objectionable, were condemned because of the extreme case with which secret communications can be made (by code and derivation) through printed matter and the extreme difficulty of detecting such messages. certain neutral publications were placed on a “‘ black list’ and destroyed whenever found, either as being enemy- inspired or as being calculated to lower morale at home. pro- tests at the destruction or detention of printed books and periodicals were constantly made in parliament, but for the reasons enumerated they were disregarded. neutral protests.—during the early days of the war the censor- ship brought many protests from neutral countries, and earlyin 1915 it was actually suggested by a harassed government that the censorship of neutral mails should be abolished. the military au- thorities, however, were able to prove conclusively that suchastep would have been fatal. when the blockade was declared and enforced neutral protests redoubled, it then became necessary to examine all mails entering the area of the blockade for contra- band of war which, though addressed in postal packets to neutral countries, was suspected of enemy destination. mail- boats sailing to neutral ports within the blockade area were stopped by naval patrols. the so-called transit mails were landed in the north of scotland, sent to london, examined and then returned. this caused much unavoidable delay and consequently much neutral protest. it was quickly justified, however, by the finding of large quantities of contraband, rubber, cotton and even contraband metals concealed in these transit mails. ameri- ca in particular protested vigorously against the censorship delays. in the autumn of 1915 a test examination was made of the direct outgoing mails to the united states, and the results yielded were of such importance from the censorship point of view that it was decided to establish a special branch of the censorship at liverpool to deal with the american mails. this branch was established on jan. 1 1916 and disbanded exactly two years later. it was of great advantage in minimising delays. censorship was practically confined to trade letters and letters to suspect addresses. trade letters of enemy origin or destina- tion had been examined from the first in london and action taken to close down all enemy transactions abroad. it was early discovered that such letters were of the utmost importance, as they often containcd messages in code or sympathetic ink. there is not much of importance to be said of postal censor- ships in the other belligerent countries. the problems were the same as in the british censorship, though the methods adopted to meet them were sometimes more radical and based on the principle that no correspondence can be dangerous which the addressee never receives. when america came into the war an officer of the british censorship was sent to new york to assist in conducting a censorship on the london model. 560 inefficiency of russian censorship.—it was, from the allied point of view, important that there should be a strong censorship in russia, for it was early discovered that the enemy were com- municating freely by this route with asia and america. but the russian censorship was inefficient, and remained inefficient throughout the war. there was no attempt at field censorship, and the small staff in petrograd were entirely inadequate for any proper postal censorship duties. early in 1916 an officer of the british censorship was sent to russia to reorganise the cen- sorship, but found it impossible to put it on a sound basis. all that could be done of value was to stop cnemy commercial com- munications. no staff was available to deal with code or secret writing, and the censorship yielded very little information of value to the allies. | of the enemy postal censorships it will be enough to say that the german organisation, like the british under military con- trol, was efficient, though a good deal escaped the eye of the german—as indeed that of every other—censor. cable censorship.—the position of great britain gave her a most valuable control over enemy communications by cable. a cable censorship was established at the beginning of the war, and was placed on the same footing as the postal censorship, being conducted under a military chief responsible to the army council. the action taken by the cable censors, however, was based on the international telegraph convention of 1875. scrutiny of private messages was conducted on the same general principles as those adopted in the postal censorship, 7.e., to pre- vent information reaching the encmy and to prevent him from communicating with persons outside his lines. between 30,000 and 50,000 telegrams passed through the hands of the cable censors in the united kingdom every 24 hours. british cable stations elsewhere in the empire were also under central control so far as censorship was concerned. great importance was attached to the censorship of commer- cial cables. all cables. were stopped which showed evidence either by the text of the telegram or by the known facts as to the sender or addressee that they related to a transaction whether in contraband or non-contraband to which a resident in an enemy country was one of the partics. the principle adopted was purely to withhold, as far as british cables were concerned, all facilities for carrying on trade with an enemy country. at various times there was much neutral protest against the actions of the cable censors, but the british policy was upheld and shown to be in accordance with the international convention. trade cables were often found to contain military, and especially naval, information. censorship of printed publications —the censorship of the press in great britain is dealt with at length in the next section of the present article. here we need only refer to the german censorship of printed publications. in germany, as in other european countries, a political cen- sorship of the press existed in peace time. when war was declared all executive powers, including the control of the cen- sorship, were transferred to the military command under the fundamental law governing the state of siege. the censorship was administered from the headquarters of the army corps districts into which germany like most continental countries was divided. every two or three days instructions were issued to the press in every district as to (1) what they were definitely forbidden to publish, (2) the attitude they were to take up with regard to certain questions, (3) inspired articles—often taken from other newspapers—which they were requested and given permission to reproduce. at the beginning of the war there was much inequality in the working of the censorship in the various districts. statements, for instance, would appear in the saxon press regarding the food supply which would have been for- bidden in the brandenburg command. in oct. 1915 a war press bureau was established in berlin, one section of which was devoted to securing uniformity of censorship throughout the reich. it had, however, only advisory powers. it acted as a liaison between the press censorship authorities (1.e., the military authorities) and the various government departments. censorship in practice the political and economic censorship was exercised by the ministries of the interior and of foreign affairs through the military. the government was thus always sheltered in its political censorship by the higher command. there were two methods of exercising the press censorship: (1) editors were allowed to produce their papers without preliminary examina- tion of proofs. if they transgressed any regulations they could be prosecuted and their paper suspended or placed under “ pre- ventive censorship.” except where purely military subjects were involved, it was impossible for an editor to escape respon- sibility by submitting his copy to the censor by way of pre- caution. (2) ‘‘ preventive censorship ” involved the submission of all proofs before they are passed for press. the censor was thus in a position to strike out all matter to which he objected, whether it was actionable or not. the german censorship as a whole was undoubtedly severe. it was conducted on the general lines of allowing practically no discussion of doubtful topics, such as war news or the economic situation, no criticism of the government and above all no criticism of the higher command. all information which might be of military value to the enemy was excluded, though, in spite of the efforts of the censors, much military information was obtained by the british war office from the german yress. an organisation was created 1n london to scrutinise all enemy period- icals, and a similar institution existed at berlin. both organisa- tions were able to obtain much information from the indiscre- tions of the enemy press. a peculiar feature of the german censorship was the censors’ insistence that the published periodical should bear no obvious traces of censorship. this was not so in the allied countries, where most papers appeared daily either heavily caviare, as it was called in russia (i.e., with paragraphs blacked out), or with large numbers of blank spaces. in germany it was considered bad for morale that censorship should beso obvious. (w. e. b.*) il. the british press censorship the following note to newspaper editors, dated july 27 1914, was the first official intimation to the british press of the approach of war:— | at a meeting of the admiralty, war office and press committee, it was resolved that as, in view of the present situation, the authori- ties may have to take exceptional m@sures, the press should be asked to refrain from publishing any information relative to move- ments of british warships, troops and aircraft, or to war material, fortifications, and naval and military defences, without first com- municating with the admiralty and war office respectively in ac- cordance with the arrangement which was notified to you by me in january of last year. hlaving regard to the nature of the case it is found impossible further to indicate the character of the information the publication of which is undesirable in the national interests. the request does not affect the dissemination of news concerning ordinary routine movements or training on the part of the navy or the army: its object is to prevent the appearance of anything concerning steps of an exceptional kind which may be rendered necessary by the existing state of affairs. i may add that the authorities from time to time will continue to issue such information as may be made public. apart from the official secrets act, no legislation existed which enabled the authorities to suppress naval and military information. notwithstanding this, the newspapers loyally observed the request, followed by others of a more detailed character. the result was that british preparations were made with such secrecy that the germans subsequently admitted that on aug. 20 they knew neither when nor where the british troops were landed, nor their strength. the press bureau.—on aug. 11 the press bureau (the outward and visible sign of the censorship) was established. its objects were the censoring of (1) incoming and outgoing press cable- grams, (2) certain inland press messages, chiefly those passing through the general post office and (3) matter voluntarily submitted by the press. the bureau was also intended as the medium for the issue of official information. the censorship was, for the most part, carried out in accordance with the wishes of the government departments concerned. it was an open censorship secret that in some instances the directors of the bureau dis- agreed with the policy they were called upon to enforce. on aug. 8 1914 the defence of the realm act was passed, followed by a series of censorship regulations. they were amended from time to time and in their final form stood as follows:— reg. 18. no person shall, without jawful authority, collect, record, publish or communicate, or attempt to elicit, any informa- tion with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condi- tion or disposition of any of the forces, ships, or aircraft of his majesty or any of his majesty’s allies, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct, of any operations by any such forces, ships, or aircraft, or with respect to the supply, descrip- tion, condition, transport or manufacture, or storage, or place or intended place of manufacture or storage of war material, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defence of any place, or any information of such nature as is calculated to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, and if any person contravenes the provisions of this regulation, or without lawful authority or excuse has in his possession any document containing any such informa- pen as aforesaid, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regu- ations. ... no person shall, without lawful authority, publish or communi- cate any information relating to the passage of any ship along any part of the coast of the united kingdom. .. . | reg. 27. no person shall by word of mouth or in writing or in any newspaper, periodical, book, circular, or other printed publi- cation— : (a) spread false reports or make false statements; or (b) spread reports or make statements intended or likely to cause disaffection to his majesty, or to interfere with the success of his majesty’s forces or of the forces of any of his majesty’s allies by land or sea, or to prejudice his majesty's relations with foreign powers; or {c) spread reports or make statements intended or likely to preju- dice the recruiting of persons to serve in any of his majesty’s forces, or in any body ap persons enrolled for employment under the army council or air council or entered for service under the direction of the admiralty, or in any police force or fire brigade, or to preju- dice the training, discipline or administration of any such force, body, or brigade; or | (d) spread reports or make statements intended or likely to undermine public confidence in any bank or currency notes which are legal tender in the united kingdom or any part thereof, or to prejudice the success of any financial measures taken or arrange- ments made by his majesty’s government with a view to the prosc- cution of the war; ... the maximum penalty was imprisonment with or without hard labour for six months or a fine not exceeding {100, or both. the regulations gave the government power in certain cases to seize the plant of a newspaper which had offended, or in others to seize the type on suspicion that an offence was about to be committed. these regulations placed heavy shackles upon the press, but in the-main were accepted with patriotic equa- nimity. prosecutions were few. it will be seen that the bureau had no power to insist upon submission of matter for censorship. responsibility rested with the editor, who could publish what he thought fit, subject to complying with the regulations. if he erred he was liable to prosecution, and even if the matter were passed by the bureau he would not be relieved, although the fact might be pleaded in mitigation. from time to time secret instructions were issued for the information and guidance of editors. at the end of the war these numbered several hundred. . regulations at the front—messages from authorised british correspondents on the several fronts were primarily, and com- pulsorily, censored by military censors on the field, but were transmitted through the bureau, which occasionally exercised a further censorship. the methods adopted caused constant grumbling and discontent. in france almost from the first news- paper correspondents were not allowed to proceed beyond the fringe of the area of operations, and their movements were strictly controlled. in sept. 1914, owing to demands for more information, an official “ eye-witness” was appointed. he wrote according to order, and no question of censorship arose. the news supplied was meagre and inappropriate, and it did not take long for mischievous results to accrue. on march 12 1915 the following notice was issued by the bureau:— 561 _ the magnitude of the british task in this great war runs serious risk of being overlooked by reason of exaggerated accounts of suc- cesses printed daily in the press and especially by exhibiting posters framed to catch the eye and magnify comparatively unimportant actions into great victories. reported reverses to the enemy are proclaimed as crushing defeats, germany is represented as within measurable distance of starvation, bankruptcy and revolution, and only yesterday a poster was issued in london, declaring that half the hungarian army had been annihilated. all sense of just proportion is thus lost, and, with these daily, and often hourly, statements of great allied gains and immense enemy losses, the public can have no true appreciation of the facts or of the gigantic task and heavy sacrifices before them, _ the director appeals to all those who are responsible for the press to use their influence to bring about a better knowledge of the real situation, and rather to emphasise the efforts that will be necessary before the country can afford to regard the end for which we are striving as anything hike assured. the posters, more especially those of the evening papers, are very often preposterous as well as misleading, and, at such a time, those responsible may fairly be asked to exercise a reasonable restraint and help the nation to a just appreciation of the task it has undertaken and the necessity for unremitting effort to secure the only end that can be accepted. the newspapers did not receive this without protest. on march 26, through lord riddell, they sent the following letter to mr. asquith, the prime minister:— __ my council have had under consideration your memorandum of 12th march 1915, serial no. d 183, for which, in their opinion, there is no adequate justification. the press has dealt faithfully with the news furnished by the naval and military authorities, but it may well be that the public misunderstand the situation and that this misconception is producing serious results. if, however, the people are heing unduly soothed and elated the responsibility lies with the government and not with the press. in this connection my council desire to direct your attention to the optimistic state- ments of the prime minister, sir john french, ‘t eye-witness,”’ and other persons possessing official information. the press acts upon the news supplied. if this is inaccurate or incomplete, the govern- ment cannot blame the newspapers. my council desire to repre- sent that the methods now being adopted are fraught with grave public danger. ministers are continually referring to the importance of energy and self-sacrifice on the part of the industrial population, who cannot be expected to display these qualities unless, generally speaking, they are acquainted with the facts. in dealing with the news, the naval and military authorities should consider not only our enemies and the army in the field, but the commercial and industrial classes at home, upon whom so much depends. it is futile to endeavour to disregard the long-established habits and customs of the people. as you know, i am writing on behalf of the london press only, but my council are confident that their views are shared by the provincial newspapers. the result of this letter was that mr. asquith invited the press to appoint a representative who would interview lord kitchener and mr. churchill, then first lord of the admiralty, each week with the object of receiving private information for circulation to editors. as a result of further urgent representa- tions by the association, correspondents on the french front were authorised in may rors. at the beginning, regulations for their guidance were prescribed, but for the most part they were allowed to write as they wished. before long, however, the regulations were rigidly enforced, and an attempt was subse- quently made to strengthen them. the severe restrictions on the liberty of the correspondents led to continual complaints by the association. notwithstanding these, no marked 1mprove- ment took place until july 1917. from that date onwards the stringency of the censorship was gradually relaxed, and the army eventually set up an organisation to supply correspondents with information. by the exercise of tact, discretion and good faith, the correspondents gradually won the confidence of the army, so that towards the end of the war officers of all ranks were keen to have the correspondents with their troops and to give every facility permitted by official regulations. thus a great victory was achieved and a great service rendered by the correspondents to the country. _ until nov. 1917 the censorship was controlled by the intelli- gence department at g.h.q. at that date it was transferred to a department known as “staff duties.” the difficulties were accentuated by the lack of association between the correspond- ents and the real head of the censorship at g.h.q. the man 562 who gave the orders did not censor the “ copy,” and was not in continuous and direct touch with those who did. the censors worked under great pressure, and complaints were due chiefly not to their decisions, but to principles laid down by those in command at g.h.q. at other military fronts the system adopted was similar. the navy had its own censorship. generally the policy was to suppress all information, and in particular to suppress in- formation of unfavourable events. little was published con- cerning mercantile tonnage sunk by the enemy. there was, however, much to be said for suppressing these figures, publica- tion of which would have put fresh heart into the enemy and given valuable information as to the submarine campaign. in many instances german submarine crews were unaware of the effect of their operations. domestic news.—within the british isles a rigid censorship was exercised concerning publication of information as to pro- duction of munitions, measures of defence, bombardments, air raids, arrests, trials and executions of spies, etc. books, maga- zines, etc., were subject to censorship on the same principles as newspapers. in many cases the authorities refused permission to reproduce matter which had already appeared in american and other publications, the contention being that publication in great britain would tend to confirm and increase belief in the statements macle. as a method of suppression the censorship may be regarded as a complete success. the vast task was efficiently done, but the authorities displayed little imagination, and during the first two and a half years failed to realise that the war was a con- flict between nations, not armies. they did not appreciate that the united effort of all classes was essential to victory, and that such effort could be secured only by telling the people the facts and letting them know that the war was a matter of life or death to the nation. experience showed that in dark days the country always rose to the occasion. the authorities also failed to appre- ciate the necessity for telling other peoples, and in particular the overseas dominions and america, what great britain was doing. the rule prohibiting correspondents, except in rare cases, from describing the achievements of the different units, who were thus robbed of the glory to which they were entitled, had most unfortunate results. the australian, canadian and new zealand censorships adopted a different system, so that the exploits of these troops were well known throughout the world. this led to the circulation of malicious stories to the effect that great britain was not doing her share, and was pre- serving her soldiers at the expense of those from overseas. ref- erence to the weekly casualty lists would at once prove the falsity of this statement. the truth is that, so far as the british effort was concerned, the main burden was borne by troops fur- nished from great britain. the policy of secrecy was not confined to naval and military operations. it was only after continued protests that publicity was given to the achievements of the ministry of munitions, and of the manufacturers and millions of workers associated with it. nothing was published about the working of the railways, one of the most remarkable feats in history. the admiralty was a great offender. it was stated officially that “ the navy did not wish for publicity.” the result was that the british seamen, including the mercantile marine, mine-sweepers and fishermen, did not receive adequate recognition of their services. after continued representations by the newspapers, more publicity was given to their doings in the later stages of the war. censor- ship bristled with difficulties, therefore the authorities may be excused for their inability in the early days to grasp essential facts, but they laid themselves open to severe criticism for delay in realising the necessity for a change of policy. ’ bibliography.—government papers, cd. 7679 and cd. 7680 (1915); sir edward cook, the press in wartime (1920); sir philip gibbs, realities of war (1920); neville lytton, the press and the general staff (1921); maj.-gen. callwell, the experiences of a dug- out (1920); sir douglas brownrigg, the indiscretions of a naral censor (1919), (i1.) clinsorship iii. censorship in the united states censorship.—the theory of censorship implies a stratified society with the right of the uppermost stratum to control those below. the controlling power may be the church, using it to suppress heresy. it may be the state, using it to check sedition. it may be the representatives of the nation, using it to enforce an artificial patriotism. but whatever the authority putting censorship into effect, there seems substantial agreement that censorship is necessary. the united states, however, prior to 1914, had not accepted this theory, and censorship was con- sidered outworn in practice. trials for heresy were rare, sedition was unknown, and universal patriotism was assumed. the war brought a rude awakening. while technical censor- ship was not instituted, every form of censorship was virtually established, though under different names. preventive censor- ship was known as ‘ voluntary censorship.” punitive censor- ship was enforced against the foreign language press and against the american press suspected of radical or even liberal tenden- cies. regulation of the press appeared in the restrictions put on second-class mail maiter. direct control of the press was estab- lished under a committee cuphemistically called a ‘* committee on public information.” the result was a censorship described as “a web which caught small flies but which big ones broke through.” the effect was an excessive irritation on the part of the press, but it must be said that this opposition did not always extend to protesting against the censorship of the foreign lan- guage press and the radical press. censorship and patriotism.—the explanation is found in the rapid development during the war and subsequent to it of an intense, fierce and aggressive patriotism. with no clear concep- tion of the meaning of the term, no appreciation of the protean forms it had assumed, and no knowledge of the history of the sentiment, many individuals and self-constituted committees harried the public into hounding weak and defenceless news- papers because they did not conform to the standards arbitrarily and suddenly erected. it seems probable that freedom of thought, speech and press suffered quite as much from the super- patriots as from recognised legislative authority. censorship had been begun to maintain the integrity of the government but the result was a progressive indirect censorship that even since the war has looked askance at freedom of thought. in the state it has passed from a formal official repression to a positive unofficial insistence on a defiant patriotism that seeks to protect the public from the contamination of foreign thought. for this an ignorant public rather than the government has been responsible. the habit of censorship once formed, extension to other fields has naturally followed. literature, the drama and the moving picture have all come under suspicion. but censorship in these ficlds has had a different basis from that of censorship of the press. great diversity in standards of taste and morals has led to efforts to protect the public from crude art, drama and litera- ture. [ut since criticism of taste is specially offensive to those criticised, the censorship desired has been preferably referred to the effect of low standards on morals. thus far legislative cen- sorship in these fields seems to have been averted and to have been exercised by special unofficial committees. since the war, official censorship of the press has rapidly declined, and discussion concerning it is now confined to the desirability of the press itself voluntarily limiting the publication of news of crime and scandal. the occasion has been the crime wave and lowering standards of morality usually regarded as an aftermath of the war. the objection to censorship of the press has been to the idea of censorship itself: that comparatively few newspapers have suffered from it seems. apart from the question. censorship of thought is applied by one wi ng of the church to insistence on a forced orthodoxy of belicf. it is desired by one class in society to protect the weak and the ignorant from low mental and moral standards. these applications of censorship are not universally accepted, but they find a good deal of sup- port in various quarters. census of production—ceramics note.—these necessarily general statements are subject to many exceptions. the conclusions reached are based on about 10,000 clippings collected by the writer during the war with the object of discovering how far it affected the press and the general subject of censorship. the collection is now in vassar college a li m.s. census of production: see production, census of. central american union.—the idea of a central ameri- can union dates back to 1821, when the old spanish viceroyalty of guatemala proclaimed its independence (see central america, 5.676). the year 1840 saw the complete breakdown of the first federal system, and between that date and 1907 five important attempts were made to re-establish the federation:— i. 1842: delegates from salvador, honduras and nicaragua made a treaty providing for a confederation. 2. 1849: a treaty was signed by the central republics providing for common action in foreign affairs and a union for defence. 3. 1852: further efforts were made along the same lincs, 4. 1885: rufino barrios, president of guatemala, made a forceful attempt to restore the old federation and failed. 5. 1895: representatives of the three central republics met at amapala and drafted a treaty establishing a diet to elaborate a plan for closer permanent union. a weak federation, under the name of the greater republic of central america, was formed, and a con- stitution drafted, but, owing to faction differences and activities, the whole scheme had to be abandoned. in 1907 president zelaya of nicaragua overthrew the govt. of bonilla in honduras and attacked salvador. this war was brought to an end by the mediation of president roosevelt of the united states and porfirio diaz of mexico. a conference of the central american countries followed at washington, which resulted in recommendations for a unification of com- munications, fiscal systems, customs and coasting trade; pro- vision was made for the formation of a court of compulsory arbi- tration and for the holding of conferences to discuss federation. a treaty embodying these recommendations was signed. the conferences held from time to time after the 1907 treaty came to a head in dec. 1920, when the five republics made a further attempt at unification. agreement was reached, guatemala, honduras and salvador signed a pact, costa rica assented and nicaragua refused; but when president herrera of guatemala was overthrown by a coup d’etat on dec. 6 1921 the project was again abandoned. meeting at washington—on dec. 4 1922 representatives of the five republics met at washington, d.c. <a conference, lasting until feb. 7 1923 was held under the chairmanship of mr. charles e. hughes, the united states secretary of state, with the object of negotiating a treaty to make eflective the provisions of the treaty of 1907. as a result of this conference a gencral treaty of peace and friendship, 11 conventions and three pro- tocols were approved for signature. of these the treaty was the most important: it contained those parts of the 1907 treaty which it was considered would be practicable in maintaining peace among the five nations. provision was made for measures to help in checking revolutionary movements, civil war and violent alterations of constitutions; on each government was imposed an obligation not to intervene in the internal political afiairs of the other four countries, and no secret treaties were to be entered into by any of the five republics. the other docu- ments signed provided for the diplomatic settlement of con- troversies, arbitration, limitation of armies and control of arms, commissions to simplify and unify financial systems of the five parties and the establishment of an international cen- tral american tribunal, to which 15 united states citizens may be appointed if necessary. the 1923 agrcements are by far the most important step towards central american union that has been taken since 1840. the republics themselves thoroughly recognise the necessity for a unified system, and the 1923 general treaty of peace and friendship should go a long way towards removing the faction differences that have always been the chief obstacle to union. biplrograrhy.—a. gomez carillo, compendio de la historia de la america central (1906); a. r. pefia, conferencias centroameri- canas (1916); d. g. munro, the five republics of central america (1918). see also the report of the central american peace con- 563 ference 1907 (state department, washington), ed. w. i. buchanan (1908); u.s. a. foreign relations 1907 ii. (u.s.a. official publica- tion), and the annual jafemorias de relaciones exteriores of the five republics. (co du.) ceramics (sce 5.703).—the progress made in the study of chinese ceramics since 1910 almost amounts to a revolution. it is revealed in a mass of fresh ceramic literature of which quite a large proportion is of serious interest, the outcome of scientific methods and industrious research; and it has resulted in a much more accurate classification of the known wares and in the identification of many new types, as well as in the correction of innumerable minor inaccuracies. in fact at least 30% of the labels in every ceramic collection must have needed revision. fruitful excavations have been made on many ancient sites in asia and the countries bordering on the mediterranean, and much interesting, if fragmentary, pottery has been found; but this belongs rather to the domain of archaeology and can hardly be included in the present brief survey. we may, however, allow ourselves reference to one type of primitive pottery which seems to haye been common to the whole of western asia and parts of eastern europe in the late neolithic and bronze ages. it is a comparatively fine pottery of buff, red or grey colour with painted decoration, mostly geometri- cal designs, in black or red slips. the latest finds in northern china have included a ware of very similar appearance, though rather more advanced in technique and more elaborate in decoration, which belongs to the third, perhaps the fourth millennium b.c. these finds not only open up a new vista in chinese ceramics, but also raise important questions as to the origin of chinese civilisation. chinese ceramics.—passing from the primitive periods, it is in chinese ceramic history again that the most remarkable de- velopments have taken place in the last decade and a half. not merely a few pages, but whole new chapters have been written, and a quantity of entirely fresh material has been found to illustrate them. thus, much has been learnt about the glazed and unglazed tomb wares of the han dynasty (206 b.c. to 226 a.d.) which were first studied by dr. laufer in 1909. the period of the six dynasties (220-589 a.d.), so long regarded as a no- man’s land, has been peopled with the charming wei figures, with artistically pigmented vases and with the so-called proto- porcelain. the t’ang dynasty (618-9064.d.), barely mentioned by the older writers, has been proved as great in its pottery as in the other arts; and even the tomb wares show that the t’ang potter was little behind the mature craftsman of the 18th century in technical knowledge, and not a whit behind him in artistic perception. a fresh study of the chinese texts in the light of the new material which has reached us, has made it possible seriously to attempt the classification of the beautiful sung wares (960-1279 a.p.). before trqto we had barely learnt to distinguish the sea- green celadon of lung-ch’iian, the cream-white ting chou porcelain, the mottled black tea-bowls of chien-an and the brilliant chiin chou flower bowls. these are now quite familiar; and we have gone on to identify the rare ju type in the yg ch’ing (misty blue) porcelain, a translucent white ware with thick soft-looking glaze of pale duck-green or blue, of which many beautiful specimens have recently arrived in europe. the chien-an tea-bowls have expanded into a large group of stoae- ware and semi-porcelain with ‘‘ temmoku” glazes, black and brown, including the kiangsi temmoku and the multifarious honan temmoku which doubtless include the wares of other northern provinces besides honan. another and even larger group of stoneware, with black and brown painted designs on a cream glaze or with bold graffiato decoration (both capable of many variations in colour and technique), is almost entirely new to us. these wares are generally labelled tz’ chou, though tz’t chou was doubtless only one of many centres which pro- duced them in northern china. cream-glazed stoneware painted in enamels of the muffle-kiln—green, yellow and iron-red—has now been traced back to the sung dynasty; and there is little doubt, though circumstantial proofs are still wanting, that 564 some blue and white porcelain should be assigned a similar date. as to the actual origin of porcelain, conjecture now dates it somewhere in the period of the six dynasties, and we have concrete proof in the excavations at samarra on the tigris that it was not only made in china in the oth century but that it was already an article ofexport. the fragments found at samarra include white and cream-white porcelain and two kinds of grecn celadon. meanwhile the later chinese porcelains have not been neglected, and some new light has been thrown on korean ceramics. excavations to near east——after china the near east has produced the most important additions to ceramic knowledge. excavation has brought to light the earlier types of persian pottery, the so-called gabri ware with its bold graffiato designs covered with green and yellow glazes, the lead-glazed and tin- glazed pottery with lustre decoration or painting in blue, and the splashed and mottled wares which were obviously made in imitation of the t’ang pottery of the chinese. very early dates have been claimed for all these types, especially the graffiate, but without much justification. the excavations at samarra are our only sure guide and from them we learn definitely that the splashed and mottled, the blue and white and the various kinds of lustred wares were made in the oth century, as also a ware with incised designs under splashed glaze but diflering widely from the bold graffiaio of the northern gabri. the mesopotamian ware is distinguished by a soft, close-grained body, usually pale buff, sometimes buff red and not unlike that of our european faience. lustred ware resembling the meso- potamian has been found at fostat in egypt and in the ruins of medina azzahra in spain, linking up the lustre of the near east with the hispano-moresque. no major work has appeared on italian majolica, though it and european faience asa whole have been skilfully treated in at least one large general work (hannover). a detailed study has been made of the numerous german faience factories; and much has been learnt of the early history of dutch faience and of the antwerp ware, which preceded the celebrated delft, and of its connections with italy. in continental porcelains, some excellent studies have been made of the german figures; and the work of several individual modellers has been identified, notably that of bustclli of nymphenburg who was perhaps the most accom- plished of the german porcelain sculptors. english ceramics.—the knowledge of english ceramics has been sensibly increased by research and excavation. ‘the site of a pot works in lord street, liverpool, yielded fragments of delft and saltglaze, besides an artificial porcelain decorated in blue in the lowestoft style. the site of whieldon’s pottery at little fenton, staffordshire, yielded a great variety of wares, including saltglaze and the astbury types as well as the typical clouded whieldon glazes. excavations at brislington, bristol and win- canton have shown that large quantities of delft were made in the western counties from the middle of the 17th century and that bristol produced the well-known “ blue-dash ”’ dishes among numerous other types. a large number of the moulds used at the chelsea factory have been found, and identification of chel- sea figures has been made from them. a serious attempt has been made, with no little success, to segregate the early derby figures, and analysis of the paste has led to the recognition of a few rare worcester figures. similarly the porcelain made at loudin’s short-lived bristol factory has been separated from the mass of early english blue and white and enamelled wares; and it has been clearly established that loudin’s plant was taken over by the men who founded the worcester factory in 1751. minor discoveries of this kind going on all over europe, have helped to swell the volume of ceramic knowledge and, though there is no space to discuss them here, the attached bibliography will show where records of them are to be found. bibliography.—p. w. l. adams, a iistory of the adams family of norih staffordshire, etc. (london, 1914); j. g. andersson, prelint- inary report on archaeological research in kansu, geol. survey of china (peking, 1925); t. j. arne, painted stone age pottery from cereals—cey lon the province of honan, china; palaeontologia sinica (peking, 1925); k. berling, festive publication, the 200th jubilee of the china factory, meissen (dresden, 19tt); ed. r. blunt, the cheyne book of chelsea china and pottery (london, 1924); w. bode, die anfdnge der majoltkakunst in toscana (berlin, 1912); d. r. velasquez bosco, medina—assahra y alamiria (madrid, 1912); count de casa, itistorta de la ceramica de alcora (madrid, 1919); c. damiron, la faience artistique de moustiers (lyons, 1919); g. dansaert, les anciennes faiences de bruxelles (brussels, 1922); h. eccles and b. kackham, lnalysed specimens of english porcelain (london, 1922); i. falkner, the wood fanitly of burslem (london, 1912); j. folch 1 torres, noticja sobre la ceramica de paterna (barcelona, 1921); h. e. van gelder, catalogus van de verzameling haagsch porcelein (the hague, 1916); c. ginori, afanifatiura ginort, efc. (milan, 1921); e. hannover, pottery and porcelain—a handbook fer collectors, trans. from the danish and edited b. rackham, 3 vol. (london, 1924); a. l. hetherington, the early ceramic wares of china, abridged edition (london, 1924); e. heusel, porzellan von strassburg und frankenthal (neustadt-anoder-haart, 1922); r. l. hobson, chinese pottery and porcelain, 2 vol. (london, 1915); ibid., the wares of the ming dynasty (london, 1923); tbid., the later ceramic wares of china (london, 1925); ibid., the george eumorfepoulos collection (london, 1925 and 1926); fr. i]. hofmann, frankenthaler porzelian 2 vol. (munich, 1911); w. king, chelsea porcelain (london, 1922); b. laufer, the beginnings of porcelain in china (chicago, 1917); e. neurdenburg, old dutch pottery and tiles, trans. and edited by b. rackham (london, 1923); m. pezard, la ceramigque archaique de ’islam et ses ortgines (1920); w. j. pountney, old bristol potteries (bristol, 1920}; b. rackham, pretoria and albert afuseum. catalogue of the schreiber collection, vol. 1, porcelain (london, 1915); ibid., catalogue of the le blond collection of corean pottery (london, 1918); b. rackham and ii. read, english pottery (london, 1924); o. riesebieter, die deutsche fayencen des 17 und 18 jahrhunderts (leip- zig, 1921); o. riicker-embden, chinesische fruhkeramik (leipzig, 1922); f. sarro, die keramik von samarra (berlin, 1925); m. sauer- landt, deutsche porsellanfiguren des 18 jahrhunderts (cologne, 1923); ].. schnorr von carolsfeld, porsellan der europaischen fabriken des 18 jahrhunderts (berlin, 1919); e. zimmermann, chinesisches porsellan, 2 vol. (leipzig, 1923). r, lee.* cereals: see food supply; grain. ceylon (see 5.778), a british crown colony in the indian ocean, its area is 25,332 sq. m. and its population, according to the census of 1921, 4,504,549. constitution.—the elective principle of representation was first introduced in ro1o in the legislative council which was formerly on a nominated basis. in tg12 sinhalese and tamil representation was increased and the legislative council was com- posed of 11 official and to unofhcial members, of whom four were elected. in 1920 the constitution was again altered, and for the first time provided for an unofficial majority, the council being composed of 14 official and 23 unofficial members, 16 of whom were elected; 11 of the elected members were for terri- torial constituencies. in 1923 another change was made; the unofficial majority was further increased, while for the first time provision was made for an elected majority under the order in council of dec. 19 1923. the legislative council was to consist of 12 official and 37 un- official members, of whom 34 were to be elected; 23 of the clected members were to represent territorial divisions. the executive council is purely advisory to the governor, who may accept or reject its opinions. until 1921 it consisted of a few of the highest officials only, but in that year its composition was changed so as to include four official and three unofficial nominated members -~a european, a sinhalese and a tamil being appointed. the letters patent constituting the executive council do not limit its membership, and beyond three ex-officio members the gov- ernor may appoint as many persons as he likes, either official or unofficial. local government.—the big towns—colombo, kandy, galle— are administered by municipal councils, half the councillors being elected, and half nominated by the governor. of lesser importance are local boards and boards of health, supplemented by provincial and district road committees and village tribunals and committees. the local government ordinance, 1920, was intended to develop self-governing institutions which would be guided, assisted and controlled by a central local government board composed of official and unofficial members in equal num» bers. wherever there is a clear demand by the people of a dis: trict, the governor may order a district council to be constituted illustrations plattee i, lung-ch’iian yao, or “celadon,” vase, probably made by the younger chang, who lived during the southern sung dynasty (1127-1279), of white porcelain biscuit covered on exterior, interior and under foot with brilliant, unctuous green glaze, clouded slightly with olive green on two sides, running unevenly over surface, in places so thinly as to allow the biscuit to show through, and again inside of mouth forming thick blobs. the shape is that of the jade tubes, huang ts’ung, or symbols of earth, with the typical tsu or tooth decoration, set off in eight rec- tangles on the corners. southern sung dynasty (1127-1279). height, 163 inches. warren e. cox collection. plate ji. pair of beaker-shaped chiin yao flower pots, marked with the chinese numeral “1,” probably indicating that they are of the largest size, from the imperial palace in mukden. of a greyish white porcelainous stoneware, covered with a thick plum-coloured and pale-blue glaze, in the depths of which are bubbles, streaks and mottlings, including the small “ch’un ying wen,” or earthworm marks, which rarely appear except on the finer types. sung dynasty (960-1279). height, ro} inches. parish-watson collection. pirate iti, figure of bactrian horse, excavated at kai feng fu, in honan province, modelled in buff- coloured biscuit, the body of which is covered with a warm aubergine or brown-black lead glaze very rarely used for this purpose. this type of large horse was unknown in china until the han dynasty (206 b.c.-220 a.d.), when it was introduced from the west and interested the artists of the country because of its size and noble proportions. t’ang dynasty (618-906). height, 333 inches. yamanaka collection. pract fc. incense burner of buff grey biscuit with wash of white slip and transparent cream white glaze with stops inside of mouth, decorated on each side, when originally made, with a free and beautiful painting, in the typical sung feeling, of a lotus, in red (of copper, reduced with iron oxide), and outlined in the same colour, surrounded with foliage, in yellow and green enamels, outlined with black. it is impossible that these enamels could have been applied later, as undoubtedly was the case with most of the specimens of this character, as the crazing in several places extends clearly up through them and shows no trace under the glass of their having sunk intoit. tz’u chou (?) sung dynasty (960-1279). height, 7 inches. warren e. cox collection. plate iii. figure of pony, of buff biscuit with wash of white slip and transparent cream white glaze, finely crackled, extending down to just below body, leaving base and part of the legs exposed in the biscuit. decorated with green and muddy yellow enamel, dulled and frosted over by burial, on crudely drawn saddle, top of mane and two harness ornaments at head. faint pinkish traces outlining the harness and decorating the mane would seem to indicate that a red, similar to that used on the incense burner, had been applied and had almost entirely worn off. a com- parison of this modelling with that of the noble t’ang dynasty specimen on the same page shows the typical gentle humour of the artist of china. tz’a chou (?) sung dynasty (g60-1279). height, 53 inches. warren e. cox collection. plate iii. tz’u chou vase, excavated at lo yang, honan province, of dark buff grey stoneware, covered with white slip and transparent, clouded brown glaze. on the body of the vase are the four characters: hsueh (snow), yueh (moon), feng (wind), and hua (flower), incised in the slip, allowing the biscuit to show through the glaze. around the shoulder is a superbly direct and vigorous painting, in thick, dark olive glaze, of lotus blossoms, each petal of which is executed with a single brush stroke. sung dynasty (960-1279). height, 15 inches. yamanaka collection. ceramics : soe or or eer ee ee — — it . nt al ceramics pirate ii. puate iii, ceramics chaffee—chaliapin under the village communities ordinance the inhabitants of a village may hold a meeting, presided over by an official, and elect a committee to manage village affairs. this committee is a minor court of law, free from all formalities and where no lawyer may plead, deciding petty, civil and criminal cases, sub- ject to appeal to the government agent. guiding and assisting all these urban, rural and general district councils, village com- mittees and tribunals, is the government officer, sometimes him- self presiding, but often unseen, training and helping the people to be self reliant and self governing. justice.—the judicial system was established in 1833. ro- man-dutch law—a relic of the dutch occupation—is the com- mon law of the maritime provinces, whilst in the kandyan provinces the old kandyan or sinhalese laws prevail; but where- ever possible the tendency is to apply the roman-dutch law. the administration of justice is complicated by the influence of tesawalamai or tamil custom in the north and the mukkuvar law in the east, of mohammedan or buddhist (religious) laws, and of english commercial law. the supreme court has a full bench of five—a chief justice and four puisne judges—and is the final criminal court of appeal, while appeal to the privy council is permitted in civil cases involving over rs. 5,000. the island is divided into four circuits for holding assizes, and each circuit into several judicial districts where district courts have a limited criminal jurisdiction. below the district courts are courts of requests and police courts, and below these are the village tri- bunals already referred to. population.—the census of 1921 showed the population as 4,504,549 composed of low country sinhalese 43°, kandyan sinhalese 24%, tamils 25°, mohammedans 6%, europeans 2%. the birth rate for all races is 38-g per thousand (vary- ing from 22 for europeans to 40 for sinhalese), while the death rate is 30 per thousand (varying from 1o-9 for europeans to 34-9 for malays). of the whole population 61:6% are bud- dhists, including some g1 % of the low country sinhalese and kandyans. christianity was introduced by the portuguese, and in consequence 368,499 out of the 443,000 christians of all races in the island are roman catholics, only 44,730 belonging to the church of england, while 31,000 are christians of other denom- inations. followers of the hindu faith form 21-8% of the popu- lation, the bulk being tamils. the country is divided into nine provinces. the largest of these is the north central with an area of 4,008 sq. m., but the most populous is the western with a population of 1,246,847. apart from the university, medical and law colleges, education is controlled by the government director of education. in addi- tion to over 1,000 government schools there were, in 1925, some 2,000 missionary and private schools receiving a government grant-in-aid. pupils in attendance numbercd nearly 10% of the entire population, and government expenditure on education equalled 7°% of the entire revenue. finances.—government revenue in rg1o—1 was rs. 4,70,00,000; by 1924-5 it had risen to rs. 10,20,00,000 of which 40% was from import and export duties and port dues. only 2% of revenue is expended on military forces. the financial position is very sound, for while the public debt is only about rs. 16,00,00,000, less than two years’ revenue, assets show an excess over liabilities of over rs. 2,00,00,000 in cash, gilt edged securities and stores. in addition the government owns the railways, ‘ posts, telegraphs, telephones and many public works and build- ings. a railway extension to trincomalee was completed in 1925 and extensions to batticaloa and puttalam were under construc- tion. there are over 4,000 m. of excellent metailed roads in the island. government ownership of the port of colombo brings in a revenue of about rs. 50,00,000 annually, while railway gross revenue amounts to some rs. 2,45,00,000. production.—situated near the equator, with cultivation from sea level to 7,000 ft. (the highest peak in ceylon is 8,200 it. elevation), annual rainfall from 34 in. (in the north) to 3fo in. (in the southwest centre), and shade temperatures varying from 27°f. (nuwara eliya) to 103° f. (trincomalee), ceylon offers scope for the production of a variety of products. its 565 prosperity rests upon agriculture, and the development of the plantation industry in the island makes a romantic story. the coffee crop, formerly the staple crop of the island, was destroyed by disease, and by 1924 exports had fallen to only 15 hundred- weight. faced with disaster the planter had sought to make good his losses by planting cinchona and tea, but the consequent fails in price, owing to the supply exceeding the demand, made cinchona production hardly a profitable business and restricted the extension of tea cultivation. tea, however, was definitely established as the principal planting product of the island by 1900. yet again the planter sought for some other product for prof- itable enterprise, and the planting of rubber on a large scale was begun. in 1901 there were only 2,500 acres under rubber: by 1906 the area had grown to 100,000 acres, by 1912 to 217,000 acres, by 1919 to 385,000 acres and in 1925 it was roughly 435, ooo acres. from 41,798 lb. in 1903, rubber exports rose to 45,000 tons in rorg. but yet again production outstripped consump- tion, and the industry in ceylon and malaya was therefore as- sisted by a temporary restriction scheme which, after two years operation, enabled the industry to rest again on a profitable basis (see rubber). exports in 1924 were 37,351 tons. tea was still the principal product in 1925; its production employed more jabour than any other industry, and the value of its exports exceeded that of any other product. the area under coconuts in 1925 was about 800,000 acres; the nut is used very extensively in the island as a necessary article of food, yet the exports of the fresh and desiccated nut, copra oil and fibre amounted to over rs. 7,00,00,000 in value in 1924. in the same year the value of tea exported was rs. 21,50,00,000, and of rub- ber rs. 6,30,00,000. the production of cocoa, cinnamon, pepper, vanilla and cardamoms leaves a surplus for export, but, unfor- tunately, though there are 850,000 acres under paddy, the island is not self supporting in rice and annually imports 13,000,000 bu. worth £6,000,000. plumbago is the chief mineral product; the export reached 703,666 cwt. in 1906, but in 1924 it was only 193,017 hundredweight. rubies, sapphires and other precious stones are found. . trade.—the development and prosperity of the island can be judged from the trade returns. between 1910 and 1924 trade more than doubled in value. in the latter year the total value of imports (exclusive of bullion and specie) was rs. 30,23,72,926 while domestic exports (exclusive of bullion and specie but in- cluding the value of stores supplied to vessels) were valued at rs. 37,66,70,299. the principal imports are cotton, linen and silk piece goods, grain, coal, tobacco, hardware, sugar, tea and rubber chests, motor cars, manure, oil fuel, kerosene oil, cement and spirits. the chief exports are tea, rubber, coconut products, plumbago, cocoa, cardamom, cinnamon and citronella oil. some 70% of the total tradeis with the british empire. in 1924 23-06% of imports came from the united kingdom and 53-76% from other parts of the british empire. of exports 44-72% went to the united kingdom and 18-20% to other parts of the british empire. the number of vessels entering ceylon ports in 1924 was 3,858 and their tonnage 10,649,557 tons: over 60% was british. bistrogrrapiy.—l. j. b. turner, handbook of coneniercial and general information for ceylon (1922); the official iiandbook for ceylon (1924); ceylon: trade and commerce, issued under the authority of the ceylon committee for the brit. empire exhib. (1924). see also the following annual publications, colonial reports (h. m. stationery office), reports of the ceylon chamber of commerce, administration reports of the ceylon government and the colonial office list. qe cael ano chaffee, adna romanza (1842~1914), american soldier (see 5.800), died in los angeles, cal., nov. 1 1914. chaliapin, feodor ivanovich (1873- ), also spelt shalyapin, russian singer, was born at kazan on the volga, feb. 1s 1873. his early career was a varied and adventurous one, and after being by turns porter, shoemaker, hunter and street sweeper, he became a singer and dancer and obtained engage- ments at the tiflis opera house in 1892 and in 1804 at the sum- mer theatre, leningrad (st. petersburg), and later at the im- perial opera house. after visiting milan he took important 566 & parts in the mamantof opera company, and at a private opera house in moscow in 1896. in 1913, during the brilliant russian opera season organised by sir thomas beecham at the drury lane theatre, london, he appeared in boris, ivan the terrible and la khovantchina. his superb bass voice and remarkable dramatic powers took his audience by storm and he had a similar success in prince igor. ilis seasons in new york were brilliant and among his reles were ivan the terrible in rimsky-korsa- kov’s maid of pskof; salieri in the same composer’s afozart and salieri; leporello in mozart’s don giovanni and don basilio in rossini’s burher of seville. chamberlain, arthur neville (1860- ), british politician, was born march 18 1860, the son of joseph chamberlain by his second wife. educated at rugby and mason college, birmingham, in rgrt he entered the birmingham city council, became chairman of its town planning committee and was lord mayor in 1915-6. during the early part of the world war he was an active member of the central board of control of the liquor traffic under the munitions act, and in dec. 1916 was appointed by mr. lloyd george director of national service. his schemes for co-ordinating military and civil employment met with much opposition, and in 1917 he resigned. at the general election of the following year he entered parliament as member for the ladywood division of birmingham, and was postmaster-general from oct. 1922 to march 1923, and minister of health in 1923. in the latter capacity he was responsible for the housing and rent restriction acts of 1923. he was appointed chancellor of the exchequer by mr. baldwin in aug. 1923, but the government fell before he could present a budget. again he became health minister in nov. 1924, when the conservative government returned to power. chamberlain, joseph (1836-1914), british statesman (see 5.813), died at highbury, birmingham, july 2 1914, having taken little part in public life for some years. in 1916 mr. chamberlain’s widow married canon w. h. carnegie, rector of st. margaret’s, westminster, and chaplain to the house of commons. chamberlain, sir joseph austen (1863- j, the eldest son of joseph chamberlain (see 5.813) and of his first wife, harriet kenrick, was born at birmingham oct. 16 1863. he was educated at rugby and trinity college, cambridge, and afterwards studied in paris and berlin. during the early stages of the home rule controversy he acted as his father’s private secretary, and in 1892 entered the iiouse of commons unopposed as m.p. for east worcestershire. this seat he retained until 1914 when, on his father’s death he succeeded him as member for west birmingham. “i was born in birmingham,” he said when he was given the freedom of that city in 1926. ‘i was bred in birmingham; birmingham ts in my blood and in my bones, and wherever i go and whatever i am, i shall remain a birmingham man.” his maiden speech drew from mr. gladstone the famous compliment, uttered in his father’s presence, that it was one which must have been ‘ dear and refreshing to a father’s heart.” after a short apprenticeship as a private member, he was a civil lord of the admiralty (1895-1900), financial secretary to the treasury (1900-2) and postmaster-general (1902). this rapid promotion was due rather to the towering influence of his father, during the days of his great colonial secretaryship, than to his own abilities, which were of a solid rather than of a showy order, while as a speaker he lacked the paternal dash and fire. in 1903 he was promoted to the chancellorship of the exchequer. he ardently espoused his father’s fiscal policy of tariff reform, nor did he slacken in its advocacy when joseph chamberlain left the balfour administration in order to prosecute, with less embarrassment to the prime minister, his unofficial campaign. unfriendly critics suggested at the time that the son’s promotion to the second post in the government was made in the hope of continuing his father’s activities within reasonable bounds and preventing the threatened rupture in the party. austen cham- berlain remained at the exchequer till the conservative debacle at the polls in 1906 and there acquired the reputation of being a chamberlain, a. n.—chamberlain, sir austen departmentalist of the best victorian type—safe, cautious, hard- working and loyal to his official advisers and subordinates. during the long liberal domination from 1906 to the world war austen chamberlain consolidated his position as a con- — servative leader and gained the high esteem of all parties. he suffered, however, a great disappointment when mr. balfour, dispirited by failure in the two general elections of 1g10, and weary of the intrigues against his authority, resigned his leadership of the conservative party in 1911. austen chamber- lain aspired to the succession and had the support of a consider- able section of the party. buta slightly stronger section favoured the claims of walter long, and as neither would vield to the other, both honourably agreed to the election of mr. bonar law, who became joint leader with the marquis of lansdowne. austen chamberlain did not allow his natural disappointment to affect his relations cither to the party or to its new leader, and steered a straight course as a resolute anti-lhome-ruler and a convinced taritf-reformer. when the first coalition govt. was formed in tors, austen chamberlain entered mr. asquith’s cabinet as secretary of state for india, and held this post until 1917, when he resigned in consequence of the government’s decision to submit to a judicial investigation the charges and criticisms embodied in the report of the mesopotamia commission. in his view the public interest and his personal honour alike required his resignation, though not one of the charges referred to him. the official re- sponsibilities for the “ horrible break-down ” of the hospital arrangements during the first advance on baghdad were in- curred without his personal knowledge. but he did not long remain out of office. in april 1918 he became a member of the war cabinet and after the armistice returned to the chancellor- ship of the exchequer in succession to mr. bonar law. his guiding principle during the next two years was to strengthen british credit and pay off debt, and to that end he called upon the taxpayer to make unprecedentedly heavy sacrifices, especially in respect of income tax, super-tax and excess profits duty. in 1921 mr. bonar law’s failing health caused his withdrawal from active politics. austen chamberlain stepped into the vacant jeadership of the house of commons amid general acclamation. the post carried with it the virtual promise of the leadership of the conservative party and thus a laudable am- bition, frustrated in 1911, seemed certain of fulfilment ten years later. but the restraints and compromises of coalition had al- ready begun to be irksome to many conservatives, who dis- trusted the direction in which the liberal prime minister of the coalition was leading them. austen chamberlain, as lord privy seal and leader of the house, soon found that his staunch loyalty to his chief was bringing him into disfavour with many of the conservative rank and file. the complaint was that he did not stand up to mr. lloyd george with sufficient firmness and that he sacrificed too many conservative principles to the expediency of keeping the coalition together. this feeling was sharply intensified when it was found that austen chamberlain had taken a leading part in the “‘ surrender to murder ’’—as the die-hards described it—in connection with the signing of the irish treaty dec. 6 1921. he had been, indeed, the first to suggest to the prime minister that a choice had to be made be- tween negotiations with the rebels and a thorough reconquest of ireland. | the conservative party accepted the treaty with reluctance - and with forebodings, and party confidence in austen chamber- lain was weakened still more by his steady refusal to listen to those who suggested that fidelity to conservative principles required him to lead his party out of coalition bondage into party independence and freedom. his view, and it was shared by his principal conservative colleagues in the lloyd george adminis- tration, was that coalition was still necessary to deal with the difficult problems of the post-war period and not less to obviate | the «<langers of a socialist govt., which, without co-operation _ between the two older parties, could not in their view long be averted. when, therefcre, the discontented conserva- tives carried their revolt to a successful issue and at the carlton chamberlain, j. l—champagne, battles in club meeting on oct. 19 1922 offered the leadership to mr. bonar law-~who accepted it—austen chamberlain once more saw the ruin of his legitimate hopes. he and those of his col- leagues who shared his views and quitted office with mr. lloyd george, naturally had no place in mr. bonar law’s cabinet, though austen chamberlain gave the new government loyal support and uttered no word of recrimination. he remained a private member during mr. baldwin’s first administration and during the short period of the succeeding labour government. the dissensions in the conservative party were gradually healed and when mr. baldwin formed his second administration, at the end of 1924, the post of foreign secretary was offered to and accepted by austen chamberlain. | he entered on his duties at a singularly favourable moment. the settlement of the intricate problem of reparations by the acceptance of the dawes plan had prepared the way for the settlement of the other great european problem of security. the plan of the geneva protocol being unacceptable to the british and dominion govts., austen chamberlain revived the plan of a guarantee pact between certain western powers, which by dint of his skill in conciliation he succeeded in getting adopted by germany, belgium, france, great britain and italy. the conclusion of the pact of locarno and the spirit of general good-will in which the conference had been conducted created great hopes that at last the post-war era had closed and the na- tions of europe no longer regarded one another exclusively as allied or ex-enemy powers. austen chamberlain’s work was highly eulogised at home and abroad, and the order of the garter was bestowed upon him by the king. the sequel to the locarno pact, together with a detailed examination of the pact itself, is dealt with under the article security. cf icbed) chamberlain, joshua lawrence (1828~1914), american soldier (see 5.819), died at brunswick, me., feb. 24 rorq. champagne, battles in.—under this title ‘appear critical accounts of the offensive that was launched by the french on the champagne front in sept. 1915, and of the one undertaken early in 1917. british forces co-operated in the latter; but although important results were obtained in 1917, neither opera- tion can fairly be said to have fulfilled the hopes of the allied commanders. i. the september offensive all through the summer of rors local attacks had been pro- ceeded with in the vosges and argonne area, while at the same time preparations were being made for operations in champagne on a larger scale than the preceding ones and for a powerful diversion in artois, the objective in champagne was the rup- ture of the german front from bazancourt to challerange, so as to outflank their positions to the north of rheims and in the argonne. it was hoped thus to sweep up the eastern front. attacks were to be made between the heights of moronvilliers and the aisne. at the beginning of sept. the germans had 70 battalions of the iit. army (von einem) in champagne. during the artillery preparations which preceded the french attacks they reinforced these by 29 battalions and later by 93 others. their strength in champagne was thus raised to 192 battalions, but the mix-up of units was calculated to make their command difficult. on the side of the allies, the arrival in the albert region of the british iii. army, and the extension northwards of the french vi. army, had permitted the transfer of the it. army (petain) from artois to champagne. under the direction of gen. de cas- telnau, this ii. army with the night of the iv. (de langle de cary) and the left of the iii. (humbert) represented a total of 35 divisions or at least 420 battalions, more than double the enemy forces engaged. however, the secret of the future offen- sive was so badly kept that as early as aug. 15 a german order had foreseen it. the artillery preparation commenced on the morning of sept. 22 and continued with great effect for three days and nights. on sept. 22 and 23 the weather was favour- able, but the 24th was cloudy. rain fell from 9 a.m. on the 25th and continued for several days—an important factor. 567 at 9:15 a.m. on sept. 25 the assault took place along the whole front and generally speaking succeeded brilliantly. nearly everywhere there was a gain of from 2,000 to 4,000 yd. in depth, reaching even the second position in one sector. a break through seemed certain, but the french front was very irregular, some parts were facing east, some west and the rest north. in the region of perthes-souain, sept. 26 and 27 were devoted to rein- forcing the line and pushing it as far as the second position. on deus es re ies ea english miles me) a a 4 x f oo, 20 kilometres f ' rr) 20 ep ishntate 2 ig mm & sa main roads the 28th the reconquered territory between auberive and the western part of the valley of souain measured about 20,000 sq. yd. and 3,000 prisoners and 44 guns had been captured. progress in the east had also been made on the 27th in the neighbourhood of tahure; a counter-attack retook maisons de champagne on the 26th and the attack on la main de mas- siges only progressed with difficulty. on the 28th, contact had been made with the second position on a front of about 9 m. to the south of st. souplet and of somme-py, but auberive remained in the hands of the germans as well as the hill of le mesnil and the woods to the east. these positions, however, were menaced on their flanks. on sept. 28 and 29 a part of the second position was carried to the west of le mesnil and navarin farm and a break through was made in a narrow section, but the enemy was able to re- establish his front. the french cavalry corps had to retire on the 28th to the rear lines without having been engaged. on the 3zoth a general order announced the end of the operations with the capture of 25,000 prisoners and 150 guns. nevertheless, abortive attacks continued until oct. 8. the champagne offen- sive cost the french 80,000 killed and missing and 100,000 sick and wounded. the results were not in due proportion to this sacrifice, mainly because the attacks had lacked the characteris- tics of surprise, rapidity and continuity, and had been con- tinued over a longer period than was necessary. (8: e. p.) if. french offensive on the aisne the plan of campaign of the allies for 1917 was made out ina conference at chantilly, nov. 18 1916, between the commander- in-chief, joffre, and haig, together with the british, italian, russian, belgian, serbian and rumanian military representa- tives. the formation of new german divisions argued a second offensive in the spring, probably on the western front. it was decided to forestall this. the allies held themselves ready to make a general offensive move with all their available strength about the first fortnight in feb. 1917. on the aisne, the french offensive was to extend from vailly to rheims. gen. petain, consulted by nivelle on the proposed action, criticised it freely and refused the leadership, which was entrusted to gen. miche- let. the v. army (masel) which had held this front since 1914, closed on its right to make room for the vi. (mangin), while the xx. army (duchesne) was in reserve. nivelle’s plan of attack—nivelle had decided on a sharp attack, aiming at carrying the positions and all the artillery zone at the first assault. this was in accordance with joffre’s scheme of dec. and resembled the method twice employed at 568 verdun. no one raised any serious objection, but nivelle fore- told an immediate exploitation of the success by the x. army, which should carry it as far to the north as possible. michelet estimated that the whole operation might be accomplished the first day, or at latest on the morning of the second. he indicated as objectives the foot of the heights to the north of the ailette, the plain of laon, and the east of brimont fort. the only objection was raised by mangin, who called attention particu- larly to the importance of good atmospheric conditions. this did not modify nivelle’s wishes, and michelet exaggerated them by giving such detailed orders that no initiative was left to the army commanders. the preparation for the offensive was in full swing when, on march 14, the german retreat to the hindenburg line com- menced, and on the 1oth it extended to the front between the oise and the aisne. these well prepared movements, cleverly carried out, were very successful. the spoils captured by the allies were relatively unimportant and the evacuated country had been systematically devastated. nivelle’s plan had to be modified by this retreat, the oise-somme attack lost all in- terest and that upon the aisne alone remained. mangin called attention to the fact that the retirement had left a right-angled salient about the laffaux mill and that an attack to the north would be able to take the chemin des dames in reverse. the commander-in-chief admitted this and two divisions were devoted to this local operation, in addition it was decided that the iv. army (anthoine) should attack the massif de moron- villiers, east of rheims. two other events entirely modified the general situation—the entry of the united states into the war and the russian revo- lution. on top of this a political incident led to the retirement of gen. lyautey, minister of war. he was replaced by m. painleve, who was hostile to nivelle’s plans. this weakened the confidence of the commander-in-chief’s subordinates, and niv- elle went so far as to offer his resignation, which was refused. the anglo-french advance-—the offensive commenced on april 9 before arras, and continued up to the 14th with con- siderable success. there was no break through, but 14,000 prisoners and 104 guns were taken by the british. on april 14, franchet d’ esperey’s group of armies came up to the hinden- burg line in the neighbourhood of st. quentin, but franchet d’esperey decided that with the means at handa successful attack was impossible. the operations on the aisne should have com- menced on april 12, but were put off, first to the 14th, then to the 16th on account of the bad weather. the front of attack measured 25 miles. the vi. army (mangin) operated on nearly 10 m. with 17 divisions plus a cavalry division and a territorial division, 1,669 guns, of which 823 were heavy or large; the v. army (masel) had a nearly similar strength but with 1,967 guns {1,107 heavy or large). the artillery preparation commenced on april 5 and continued until the 15th on account of the post- ponement of the attack. it sufficed, but its duration permitted the germans to make suitable dispositions and there was no surprise. on the morning of april 16 the allies carried the first german line on the whole front. the right and centre of the v. army gained a depth of 13 to 2 m., but on the left a tank attack, badly conducted, failed with heavy losses and the infantry rapidly came to a standstill on the plateau of craonne. the tight of the vi. army took the position of hurtebise and pushed as far as the ailette, but further east the fighting was desperate and the gain insignificant. in the centre progress was more satis- factory, though difficult. on the left, the commencement was good, but the advance quickly became wild, and at certain points it was practically negligible. results obtained —to sum up, slehoweh some good results had been obtained the hoped for success had not been won. badly informed, nivelle imagined that on the 17th he ought to stop the northern advance of the vi. army and push the v. army towards the northeast. this order became delayed, so on the 17th mangin continued his attacks, notably in the centre, ‘where he made a marked advance on the front braye en laon- nois-ostel. the situation having changed, mangin ordered a chanci—chang tso-lin vigorous pursuit, in spite of the stopping order. the fort of conde was occupied and a slow push was made towards the chemin des dames. on the same date (17th), the iv. army (anthoine) had made good progress in the massif de moron- villiers. between the 16th and 2oth, they had captured 21,000 prisoners and 183 guns, progressed some 5 m. on the aisne front of 74 m., seized a dozen villages, the fort of conde, and all the observation posts which overlooked the aisne; in the front line the morale was good, particularly in the vi. army. of the 52 german divisions in reserve available on april 1, only 16 re- mained unengaged. this result was less than had been hoped, but it was nevertheless appreciable and certainly superior to those of preceding offensives. unhappily the morale behind the front line was rapidly declining, the losses being greatly exaggerated. nevertheless nivelle continued his operations. the x. army took up its position on the plateau de craonne, between the v. and vi. armies, but on april 27 michelet wrote that he had not strength enough for a general offensive toward the north and that he pro- posed to limit himself to local attacks. nivelle accepted this solution. it was sought to carry brimont, to enlarge the posi- tion on the massif de moronvilliers and to complete the con- quest of the chemin des dames. these operations, rendered more difficult by the unfortunate intervention of politicians, produced very poor results. altitude of the british -—the british govt. and sir douglas haig saw with regret the arrest of the french operations. haig was called to paris on april 26 to confer with ribot and pain- leve, who pointed out the french losses, deducing from them the necessity of stopping the offensive. haig held to his opinion and appeared to have won, a result confirmed by two inter-allied con- ferences at paris. mr. lloyd george vigorously seconded haig’s view. the french govt. seemed to be convinced and made promises which were not carried out. the british offensive con- tinued on the scarpe and that of the french iv. army on the massif de moronvilliers and on the plateau of craonne, the latter being captured on may 4. laffaux mill was carried on the sth, together with the neighbouring positions. for several months, however, the x. army could only with difficulty hold on to the crest of the chemin des dames. the franco-british attack of april 1917, resulted eventually in the capture of 62,000 prisoners and 446 guns. the irench had lost from april 16 to 25, 15,000 dead, 60,000 wounded, and 20,500 missing. on the whole 50 m. front of attack the enemy had been obliged to construct new lines of defence. he had lost the vimy crest, laffaux mill, conde fort, the chemin des dames and the massif de moronvilliers. important lines of railway were under fire from the allies. all the 52 reserve ger- man divisions of april 1 had been employed by may 4, and quiet sectors had been robbed to reinforce the aisne line. on may 25, gg divisions had already appeared on the front attacked, of which 11 had appeared twice. this expenditure was triple that before verdun in 10 months. the germans could not stand this long, for they had only 150 divisions on the western front against the allies’ 178, and it was easier for the allies to repair their losses, for they had adequate reserves. bibliography.—von santen, die champagne herbstschlacht (1915); j. reinach, la guerre sur le front occidental (1916); j. m. tissier, guerre en champagne, sept. 19%4- —sept. 1915 (1916); german staff reports, ‘‘ kampfe in der champagne ” in der grosse krieg in einzeldarstellungen (1919). (b.b.ps cc. mb. smd chance: sce probability. chang tso-lin, chinese general, was born about 187 5 and little is known of his early life. he first came into prominence as a leader of bandits in northern manchuria. after the russo- japanese war of 1904-5, in which he fought for the japanese, he joined the regular army, and in iqii was appointed military governor of fengticn. as the central. govt. weakened chang tso-lin became more and more independent, and in 1922 a clash occurred which resulted in his defeat. but the chihli army did not pursue him to his stronghold at mukden, and in 1924 he de- cisively defeated the opposing forces. fighting recurred in 1925, channel islands—-character and he again defeated the chihli army under wu pei-fu, but was robbed of the fruits of victory by the treachery of his ally feng yu-hsiang, who seized peking. as the year 1925 drew to a close, the struggle for mastery entered on a new phase. wu pei-fu was for a time eliminated, chang tso-lin subdued a revolution in manchuria, ere feng yu-hsiang entered tientsin after a big battle. in the spring of 1926 feng was overthrown and fled to mongolia in consequence of a powerful alliance between the old enemies, chang and wu. regarding the control of peking and national policy as a whole, his rclations with wu were unccrtain, but chang seemed firmly master of his old ground in the north. (see china.) (g. c. d.)",
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