{ "system": "GoGuides Verified Text", "api_version": "verified-text-v1", "status": "ok", "response_type": "verified_text_record", "source_key": "britannica_1926", "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926)", "license_code": "public_domain", "attribution": null, "license_url": null, "chunk_id": "1926:canning:cd3b4909c630", "title": "CANNING", "section": null, "hash_alg": "sha256", "hash_sha256": "ae2f96eea573620d9e30e4b87c4f096464127bcca1822b4520a8594667dc991e", "normalizer": { "name": "ggnorm", "version": "1.0" }, "verified_text": "several factors have tended to develop the food canning industry in various countries of the world dur- ing the period 1910~25, and although the united states main- tained the leading position, keen competition arose from other foreign countries, particularly from the british dominions. un- doubtedly the chief cause for the remarkable advance—quite 100% in many countrics—was the great disturbance in economic conditions occasioned by the world war, which gave rise to a range of new problems, not only in providing food for the various armies, but in supplying the needs of the pcople of the various belligerent nations. i. in the united states according to the u.s. census returns, the value of canned foods packed in the united states increased from $139,000,000 in 1909 to about $550,000,000 in 1923. after due allowance is made for changes in price levels, these figures show that the out- put of canned foods increased during that period about two and canning a half times. the quantity of canned fruits, vegetables and soups increased jrom 41,000,000 cases of 24 cans each in 1900, to 110,000,000 cases in 1923. corresponcling figures for fish, shell- fish and meat cannot be given, because quantitative statistics for the pack of 1909 are not available. canned foods have thus come to occupy 4 more important place in the diet, which is thereby broadened, and the consumption of seasonal foods 1s less and less confined to short periods of the year. this increased production was made possible by improvements in canning machinery. cans which were formerly made by hand were in 1925 made by machine at the rate of 12,000 per hour. machines developed for the various steps in canning have replaced hand labour, cheapened and speeded up production, and contributed to the sanitary condition of the plant, while the raw product, by means of motor-trucks, is brought long distances to the fac- tories without loss of quality. there has been a pronounced tendency to remove canning plants from large cities, in which the majority were formerly located, to smaller towns, and to establish them in areas producing products to be canned. this makes it possible to can the products within a shorter time after harvesting, and in that way to secure a higher quality. the method of canning is, briefly, as follows: the raw product, alter proper cleansing, pecling, trimming, etc., is placed in the can, usually with sufficient water, syrup or dilute brine to cover the product and facilitate penetration of heat. the raw product or the liquid surrounding it is usually preheated, or else the can is passed through a steam-box or vacuum chamber before sealing, in order that the contents may be heated sufficiently and the can eventually show a substantial vacuum. the can is then sealed and processed (sterilised) in steam or hot water. during the years 1910-25 funda- mental changes were made in the character of the cans employed. the soldered can, formerly used exclusively, was largely superseded by the open-top or sanitary can, which is scaled by crimping the ends to the body of the can, the scam being made tight by rubber com- position or paper gasket. with this type of can no solder is employed except on the side seam, which is soldered on the outside. the temperature required for sterilisation varies with the nature of the food to be canned. acid products, such as fruits, need be heated only for a short time in boiling water, so that all portions of the contents come to a temperature of at least 180° f. the acidity of the fruit suffices to prevent bacterial spores from germinating, and it isonly necessary to destroy the vegetative form of bacteria. sub- stances of lower acidity, such as meat, fish, shellfish and the ma- jority of vegetables, must be heated to a higher temperature in order to destroy bacterial spores. the length of time required for sterilisation depends on the rate at which the heat penctrates the product. such penetration is most rapid in foods containing a free liquor, and slowest in closely packed solids, and in products of a pasty consistency. the canning industry has led the way in the organisation of co- operative industrial research, having been the first in the united states to provide for research on such a bssis, laboratories estab- lished by the national canners’ association in 1913 have made fundamental contributions to the knowledge of sterilisation and other processes of manufacture. the bureau of raw_ products research, organised later, has been instrumental in greatly increas- ing the attention given by government and state investigators to the agricultural questions involved in raising crops utilised by the canning industry. in several universitics, also, investigations relating to food poisoning and the vitamin content of foods have been financed by the industry, the results of which have appeared in scientific literature. it had been assumed that the nutritive value was diminished by the canning operation, through destruction of the vitamins. these investigations, however, showed that the anti- scorbutic vitamin (vitamin c) is destroyed to a less extent by the canning operation than by cooking in an open vessel, as is customary in the home, canned foods are therefore richer in vitamin c than the same varieties of foods cooked by the ordinary kitchen methods, while retaining the same content of the other vitamins. broadly speaking, the nutritive value of canned foods is substantially the same as the nutritive value of the same foods cooked in the home from the raw product. (see milk.) (w. d.b,) ii. in the british empire the canning industry was of considerable importance in great britain during the pre-war period, and a large export trade in canned meats, fish and vegetables had been developed. war de- mands gave a great impetus to the industry, particularly in the production of canned “ rations,” hams, etc., for the british and belgian armies. the export trade, however, was greatly reduced, but it quickly revived after the end of the war. [ruit canning canteen developed rapidly in the post-war period, model plants being set up in various parts of the country. australia, new zealand, canada and south africa have made considerable progress in the canning industry, and during the post-war period trade has greatly increased. the indusiry has been in existence in australia since the last decade of the roth century, but the output was principally confined to home re- quirements to the end of the world war. asa result of the government scheme for the settlement of ex-soldiers, canning plays a very important part in the development of the soft fruits industry in the dominions. in several of the states, such, for instance, as queensland, new south wales and victoria, the respective governments have advanced large sums for the erec- tion of modern plants with which to deal with the produce of the orchards. considerable attention is paid to stemming, grading, weighing and packing, and the methods employed make any handling of the fruit unnecessary. war demands stimulated the exports of dried and preserved fruits, and the trade greatly in- creascd during the post-war period. the following table gives the values of exports of dried and preserved fruits for the years 1913, 1917-8 and 1923-4:-~ 1917-8 1923-4 dried fruits 31,000 | 265,000 | 1,238,000 preserved fruits 21,000 | 255,000 621,000 new zealand—in new zealand the process of manufacture is under careful supervision and is subject to the provisions of a strict law against adulteration. canned sheep tongue is an important item of export: other packs include ox-tongue, boiled mutton, boiled beef, corned mutton, corned beef and meat ex- tract. boiled mutton has a large sale, mainly for ships’ stores, but other lines had not been extensively developed by 1926. canada.—the canadian export trade in preserved foodstuffs greatly increased after 1910. packing and canning factories were established and close attention was given to grading and standardisation. the chief commodity is fish, although canned tongues, fruit, tomato soup, milk powder and other articles of food are making considerable progress. the total value of the fisheries production of canada in 1924 was approximately $45,- oc0,000. this totalrepresents the value of the product as market- ed, whether fresh, domestically prepared or factory made. ‘the fish includes salmon, halibut, cod and lobsters, a large proportion of which is canned. the first fish canning plant was established on the pacific coast in 1863, but the fruit canning and by-prod- ucts industry is of much later growth. during the period 1922-5 british columbia salmon canneries experienced severe compc- tition in the british market from japanese and sibes*an salmon, and have had to look to other markets, particularly france. in newfoundland the canning of fish products was only in the ini- tial stages in 1925, except in the case of lobsters. lobster canning was, however, owing to over-fishing, subjected in 1924 to a close season of three years. the canning of codfish, salmon, codfish tongues and halibut was developed during the post-war period, and in 1925 a small export trade was carried on in these products. south africa.—in 1910 the union of south africa imported an appreciable quantity of dried fruits of various kinds, but prog- ress in the canning and dried-food industry was so rapid and sustained that by 1925 not only were all local requirements met, but a considerable export trade had been developed. the govt. imposes certain regulations regarding grading, etc., with which all exporters must comply before their produce is permitted to leave the union. fruit canneries are established in many of the principal towns throughout the union, the chief centres of the industry being durban, port elizabeth and cape town, with the paarl and worcester districts of the cape province. the canning of crayfish is of great importance. the lobster occurs in abundance on the coast of south west africa, and four large factories were started in 1924 at liideritz bay. great advances were quickly made and an extensive export trade both to the united kingdom and the continent developed. s77 federated malay states —in the federated malay states the pineapple is extensively grown for canning purposes; the chief planted areas are in the neighbourhood of singapore where several large canneries engaged in the preserving of the fruit have been established. the local industry is very large, as will be seen from the following official figures, showing the exports from singapore:— quantittes value 191g cases 255,873 3,286,001 1920 cases 446,890 7,177,976 1921 cases 662,360 6,210,383 1924 tons 39,203 8,873,077 the rise in the value of exports in 1920 was due partly to the post-war revival of trade, and partly to the fact that supplies of tin plate, practically unobtainable during the war, were available. the principal country for export is the united king- dom, but canada, british india and the united states of america absorb fairly large quantities. til. in other countries in italy, where the canning industry is firmly established, the export of canned fruit and vegetables, particularly tomatoes and cherrics, has shown a steady increase, the general standardisation, packing and canning being most efficient. before the war, france also had many canning establishments and exported a large quantity of sardines, vegetables and preserved fruits. during the post-war period she began to re-establish her tradle and by 1925 was regaining a number of her lost markets. norway's canned fish and meat indus- try is of great importance to the country. from 1895 until the out- break of the world war, the fish-canning trade expanded at an ex- ceptionally rapid rate, and by 1925 norway was one of the leading exporters of canned fish, this expansion is clearly instanced in the exports of brisling sardines, the main product of the industry, which are about 22,000,000 kegs yearly. norway has over 200 canneries employing some 6,500 hands. the total weight of canned goods ex- ported during 1924 was 40,249 metric tons, of which 28,202 tons were smoked sardines, 5,061 tons unsmoked sardines and 5,389 tons kippers. canning machinery is exported from norway to other countries engaged in the industry. spain, portugal and siberia are all engaged in the canned sardine industry, while spain and portugal also devote considerable attention to canned fruits, the exports of which are increasing. in belgium the canning industry rapidly developed after 1910. the oldest and the most flourishing branch is that of canned vegetables. the manu- facture of canned fruits on a very large scale has been developed largely in co-operation with british firms, an industry which has made great strides is the manufacture of canned and crystallised fruit, in which 22 manufacturing firms were engaged in 1925 as against less than 10 before the war. the works engaged in the prepa- ration of canned and dried fish are located for the most part along the coast, and specialise in sprats and sardines and shellfish. japan, through the organisation of a large trust of canhed provision merchants, has become important in the canned crab and salmon trade. in 1923 she shipped to america and europe 220,000 cases of crab, but in 1924 the output somewhat decreased and the value fell from yen 50 to yen 40 per case. asa result of the influence of the trust, however, and also of improved packings, the industry in 1925 showcd signs of greater expansion. (a, f. w.) canteen.—the term is chiefly used for the bar or general shop attached to barracks, but it is also used for other places where food is provided, e.g., in connection with factories and workshops. canteens exist, too, in warships. in a less-known sense, a cantcen is the small tin utensil carried as part equipment in marching order for cooking, eating or drinking. service cantcens.—prior to 1914 canteens were generally work- ed in the british navy by a ship committee, and in barracks as a regimental institute, but with the rapid growth of new units after the outbreak of the world war, it was found desirable to have a central organisation to provide cantcens for barracks, hutments and for all the expeditionary forces. much experience in this direction had been gained in the south african war, where the canteens had done much for the comfort of the troops, and yet made tremendous profits, providing capital sums spent for the sailors’ and soldiers’ benefit on the union jack club, union jack hostel, ete. from tots onwards, the expeditionary force canteens be- came a vast organisation, providing right up to the front lines, for officers and men, good shopping facilities and rest and 518 recreation centres, and for officers excellent hotels. mention must be made of the auxiliary work of the ¥y.m.c.a. and the church army, which carried on similar work on a very large scale both at home and abroad. with the american army, the canteen work was largely carried out by the y.m.c.a. and by the u.s. red cross, already es- tablished in france, and to a certain extent by regimental institutions. in great britain, the outcome of the canteen organi- sation was the navy and army canteens board, which, since the war, has taken over nearly all the naval and other service can- teens. a few units particularly situated still manage their own canteens on the old lines. civilian canteens.—in great britain the need for providing canteens for industrial workers is widely recognised and an act of parliament of r916 empowered the home secretary to require employers to provide cantcens or messrooms when it appears that such are necessary for securing the welfare of the workers. the exact words are in section 7 of the police, factories (mis- cellaneous provisions) act, 1916: the occupier shall provide and maintain for the use of all persons employed m a factory and remaining on the premises during the meal intervals a suitable messroom, which shall be furnished with (2) sufficient tables and chairs or benches with back rests; (0) ade- quate means of warming food and boiling water; (c) suitable facil- ities for washing, comprising a sufficient supply of clean towels, soap and warm water. the messroom shall be sufficiently warmed for use during meal intervals. welfare pamphlet no. 2 issued in 1924, by the stationery office, london, gives advice on the provision of these accessories, the information being accompanied by plans of model canteens. cantigny, 2 small village in northeast france, west of mont- didicr and 18 m. south of amiens, was the scene of the first u.s. offensive in the world war. after the great german advance in march 1918, the rst div. of the american expeditionary force, under gen. bullard, relieved two french divisions in the picardy section of the allied front. the german line ran west of montdicdier, and, immediately facing the american front, formed a small salient of which cantigny was the nucleus. it was decided to reduce the salient, and for this task the 28th regt. with 150 men of the rst engineers were detailed, supported by french tanks. on may 28, at 6.45 a.m., after an hour’s artil- lery preparation, the u.s. infantry advanced on a front of 2,200 yd., and in 45 min. they had overcome the german defences, capturing 250 prisoners. ‘the germans made ficrce counter- attacks, extending over three days, but failed to retake the posi- tion. ‘the total casualties sustained by the american forces in this operation were 45 officers and 1,022 men, (sce german offensive). canton, china (see 5.218), suffered perhaps more damage as a result of the chinese internal wars of 1924 and 1925 than any other chinese city. under the governorship of dr. sun yat- sen (q.v.), heavy taxes were imposed for the upkeep of the army. these were naturally detrimental to the city’s trade, though the important silk exports were maintained. many merchants, however, gave up business here and transferred their opcra- tions to hongkong. since 1910 a new quarter has sprung up west of the river, and a bridge has been built between canton and honam. the popula- tion in 1925 was variously estimated between 500,000 and go9,000. the canton christian college, begun in 1905, sub- sequently expanded until it possessed about so buildings on a site of 350 acres. the women’s department was opened in 1973, the college of arts and sciences in r915 and that of agriculture inzg21. inror4 a board of conservancy works of kwangtung, appointed particularly to deal with flood prevention, was started by the chinese govt. the diificulties of canton as a port having become more and more obvious. thereafter a sluice was built on the north river and a floodgate on the east river, and about 18 m. of dikes were dug. plans for improving the harbour and ap- proach, and regulating the west and north rivers, were under consideration at the end of 1925, and several miles of quays had been constructed. the railway of hankow reached shihwan in 1919, but at the close of 1925 it was in a very bad state of cantigny—cape province repair, while the working of the line to kowloon, opened in ror1, was constantly interrupted for military purposes during the stormy days of 1924 and 1925. in 1924 there was a severe out- break of smallpox, and other diseases were brought by the troops, among whom they were rife. a health department which was started failed owing to the disturbed conditions and financial difficulties. disorder in the city.~—civil war was carried on in and around the city from 1921 onwards, and in 1924 there were conflicts between the troops of sun yat-sen, holding the city, and the cantonese merchant volunteers, who banded themselves to- gether to resist the orgy of taxation imposed to pay for the large numbers of troops, and declared a general strike, which spread all over the province, in may. in oct. the merchant volunteers were attacked by the government troops in the most crowded part of the city with artillery; over 400 houses were burnt and a number of noncombatants killed. the volunteers, who were greatly outnumbered, were dcfeated and disarmed. the com- munist element, in a loosely organised trades union, obtained control. during the fighting in the city some 50,000,000 dollars’ worth of damage was done. by the end of 1925 effective connec- tion with peking had been severed and a boycott on british shipping from hongkong had been declared, supplies being received from vladivostok. | capek, karel (1890- }, czech dramatist and novelist, was born at male svatonvice in bohemia (yugoslavia) jan. 9 1890. he is perhaps best known as the author of the successful play r.u.r. (1920; eng. trans. 1923), in which he satirises the mechanical tendencies of modern civilisation, and the life of the iusects (1921; eng. trans. 1923), a spectacular play written in collaboration with his brother josef, and satirising various phases of modern society. he also attracted much attention with the makropulos affair (1922), a play dealing with longevity. of his fiction the best is contained in painful tales, a collection of short stories which deserve comparison with maupassant, and in his two novels, the manufacture of the absolute (1923) and krakatit (1924, eng. trans. 1923). he achieved considerable success with his series of fcuilletons, letters from england (1924; eng. trans. 1925), letters from italy and concerning the nearest things (1926), all of which are distinguished by powerful imagi- nation and sparkling wit. capello, luigi (1859- ), italian soldier, was born on april 14 1859. his career until he became a general officer was passed in the infantry. during the world war he conducted in aug. 1916 the attack which led to the capture of gorizia, as commander of the gorizia zone it. (viii., vi. and ii. corps) he conducted the first phase of the italian offensive in may 1917. in june he was given command of the ii. army and in aug. he directed the attack on the bainsizza plateau, but his desire to continue the attack led to differences with cadorna, his com- mander-in-chief, who favoured a defensive disposition. it is probable that capello’s faith in his own method of meeting the enemy counter-attack prevented his wholehearted co-operation with cadorna. after his retirement in july 1918 he took some part in politics and supported fascism but later joined the opposition and, in nov. 1925, was arrested on a charge of com- plicity with zaniboni in the plot against the life of mussolini. cape province (see 5.225), the largest and most thinly populated of the provinces of the union of south africa, has an area of 276,966 sq. miles. population (1911) 2,564,965; (1921) 2,782,719. in 1921 the white inhabitants numbered 650,609, an increase of 68,232 since 1911, roughly 28,c00 males and 40,000 females. the discrepancy in the increase was due to a steady migration of men from the cape to other provinces of the union, chiefly the transvaal. of the 2,132,110 non-white inhabitants in 1921, asiatics numbered 7,696, bantus 1,640,162 and mixed or other races 484,252. the “ coloured persons,” as they are official- ly called, form a distinct and important element in the com- munity. of the bantus 938,990 lived in the transkei, a purely native area under special jurisdiction. many parts of the prov- ince are arid or semi-arid and, the transkei apart, the population is mainly in the fertile south and southeast coast regions. cape town—capital, export of administration.—the affairs of the province are managed by a provincial council elected for three years and not subject to dissolution save by effluxion of time. the council elects its own chairman and an executive committee of four, not necessarily members of the council. it has powers of legislation on subjects specifically assigned to it; its enactments are called ordinances and are not valid if repugnant to any act of the union parlia- ment. there is no separate judiciary or police force or civil serv- ice, and harbours and railways are under the control of a separate department of state. the new cape railway from worcester to mossel bay, 209 m. long, the chief privately owned line in the union, was bought by the govt. in aug. 1925. the chief execu- tive officer, styled the administrator, is appointed by the union ministry. he holds offtce for five years and 1s irremovable. the union ministry also appoints the provincial auditor and an attorney-general as legal adviser. _, the first administrator was sir frederic de waal, who had been colonial secretary in the last ministry of cape colony. he was twice reappointed, being succeeded in 1926 by mr. adrian p. j. fourie, nationalist member of parliament for som- erset east. during the period r910-25 the province showed a progressive spirit, particularly as regards education. there arose, however, such an increase in provincial expenditure (not in the cape alone) that the union parliament passed an act in 1922 limiting the subsidy to be paid to not more than 3% over the amount due in the preceding year. in the schools the bilingual requirements gave rise to a little friction; in 1921 the council passed an ordinance providing that the medium of instruction up to standard iv. should be the “ home language ” of the scholar. in place of high dutch, the local form of the language, called afrikaans, is taught. education for all european children be- tween the ages of 7 and 16 is compulsory; primary education, since 1920, has been free up to and including standard vi. both primary and secondary education is provided for all races. in 1924 there were 137,000 white and 167,000 non-white pupils. there was, in the period 1910-25, considerable agricultural and industrial development, as well as a period of unhealthy inflation after the world war, followed by reaction. an event which caused a deep and lasting impression on the public mind was an epi- demic of influenza in 1918. it was estimated that a quarter of the inhabitants of the province suffered, and the deaths were very numerous. in 1925 much opposition was aroused by gen. hertzog’s proposal to withdraw the franchise from the natives, as it was in the cape only that natives had the right to vote. finance.—the revenue, apart from the subsidy, is derived mainly from transfer duties, licences (trade, liquor, motor, etc.) and a provincial property’ tax. the average revenue 1915-6 to igig-20 was £567,000; it had risen to £1,261,000 in 1922-3. the union govt. subsidy in 1915-9 averaged £1,085,000, and was {1,569,000 in 1922-3. the sudden rise in the figures was the re- flection of educational demands. the average expenditure on education in 1915-6 to 1919-20 was £1,224,000; in 1922~3 it was £2,514,000. see south africa. see also the following reports issued at pretoria by the union govt.: report of the provincial administration commission 1915 (1917); report of the provincial finances commission (1923). (f. r. c.) cape town (see 5.252b), capital of the cape province, and seat of the legislature of the union of south africa. in 1913 all the suburban municipalities except wynberg were incor- porated in the city, which extends for 17 m. across the cape peninsula, from table bay to false bay, and has an area of 59 square miles. the population, including suburbs, was 161,570 in ig1i and 207,404 in 1921 (of whom 113,202 were whites). the chief feature of the period since rg10 has been the development of the suburbs and the making more accessible the natural beauties of the peninsula, enterprises in which the municipality took the lead. cape town in the season (oct.—march) is the chief pleasure resort of south africa. in oct. 1918 iniluenza caused over 7,000 deaths in the city in three weeks. on the sea front at table bay a promenade pier (1,500 ft. long) and esplanade (1,000 yd.) were completed in 1914. the 519 pier replaces the old central jetty, and is in‘a line with adderley street and government avenge, the principal thoroughfares. to the houses of parliament, in government avenue, a new wing was added (1910). at the foot of the avenue is the national art gallery. the max michaelis collection of flemish and dutch masters——presented to the union in 1912 is in ‘* the old town iiouse,” in greenmarket square. the building, a fine example of colonial dutch 18th-century architecture, was transferred to the govt. in 1916. the castle has been cleared of disfiguring addi- tions and restored approximately to its 18th-century condition. rondebosch, five miles from the centre of the city, is the chief residential suburb. it contains groote schuur, formerly the property of cecil rhodes, since roro the official residence of the prime minister of the union. in 1918, on the incorporation of the south african college (founded in cape town in 1829) as the university of cape town, a site for new buildings was granted in the grounds of groote schuur. building operations began in 1921. in 1925 the prince of wales was installed as chancellor of the university. in 1912 a rhodes memorial was unveiled at groote schuur by earl grey. in front of the me- morial, a granite temple in the doric stvle approached by a flight of steps, is the equestrian statue of “ physical energy ” by g. ¥. watts. in the temple is a bust of rhodes. not far from rondebosch, at kirstenbosch, are the national botanical gardens, established 1913. since 1913 cape town has ranked second to durban as a sca- port in respect to cargo, but it retains first position for passenger traffic and, as the port whence the raw gold from the transvaal is shipped, its exports greatly exceed in value those of durban. long-needed improvements in table bay harbour were under- taken in 1924. in 1913 the tonnage of ships entering table bay was 3,965,000 (3,251,000 being british); in 1923 the figures were 4,007,000 (3,209,c00 british); in 1924 they were 3,964,000 (3,202,000 british). see juta’s directory af cupe town (cape town, 1926.) (ir. r. c.) cape town, university of.—the foundation dates from april 2 1918, when the council, created by act 14 of 1016, re- ceived a bequest from sir julius wernher of £250,000 and a dona- tion of £250,000 from mr. otto beit, who added {50,000 to a lapsed bequest by mr. alfred beit. by 1921 a special appeal for funds had raised about £280,000, inclusive of £50,000 for the jameson memorial hall. pending the erection of buildings on the site provided by the government at groote schuur, the university carries on its work in the buildings formerly occupied by the university of the cape of good hope, of which it is the successor. the university created in 1925 chairs in commerce, fine art and accounting. the faculty of law was strengthened by a third professorship and arrangements were made to take over classes in.architecture, hitherto conducted by the cape institute of architects and the school of art controlled by the education department. capital, export of.—this expression denotes investment of capital abroad by a country or its inhabitants. the term may be applied either broadly to the gross amount of capital so in- vested during a given period, or more narrowly to the net amount, represented by an excess of capital invested externally over capi- tal concurrently invested in the country from outside. export of capital is not an export in the ordinary sense, since it is rarely possible to indicate particular goods which represent the invest- ment of capital; it is to be regarded rather as an item in the inter- national trading balance sheet of a country. british investments abroad. british investments abroad were built up by an almost unintermittent export of capital between the end of the napoleonic wars and the outbreak of the great war. str george paish estimated that at the end of ro1r3 the amount of capital publicly invested by british citizens in the colonies and foreign countrics amounted to over £3,700,000,000, to which should be added a large amount invested privately, bringing the total to about £4,c00,000,000. of the amount pub- licly invested, sir george paish found that some £1,780,000,000 was invested in british dominions and possessions, some £754,- 000,000 in the united states, and some £764,000,000 in other 520 foreign countries on the american continent. a comparatively small amount (less than £200,009,000) was invested in european countries—mainly russia, spain and turkey. sir george paish estimated that no less than {£1,521,000,000 was invested in rail- ways; {959,000,000 in government securities; £273,000,000 in mines; {244,000,000 in land, investment and finance companies; £147,000,000 in municipal loans; and £145,000,000 in commercial and industrial securities. other european countries —several other european coun- tries emerged as exporters of capital during the roth century. apart from holland, which had established her position earlicr as an investing country, these included france, germany, bel- gium and switzerland. the amount of french capital invested externally was estimated in 1912 at some fr. 40,000,000,000 to fr. 42,000,000,000. french investors tended to concentrate their investments in europe, egypt and the french african colonics; and showed a marked preference for government bonds including russian government issues which were held very extensively. they also held considerable investments in south america, mexico and the transvaal. the amount of german investments was variously estimated at {£1,000,000,000 to £{1,250,000,000 before the world war: a large part was represented by russian bonds, railway and indus- trial securities; and german investors had large interests in austria-hungary, italy, rumania and the balkans. ‘they also had substantial interests farther afield, in the united states and canada, south america and the far east. the position then before the world war was that great brit- ain, and to a smaller extent france, germany and some other european countries, had built up substantial external invest- ments and were in the habit of adding to them year by year through the export of capital. apart from these no other coun- tries exported capital on balance, though some capital importing countries also invested capital abroad. united states —among these countries was the united states, which, during the two decades before the war, had invested con- sidcrable sums in the development of industries in canada, in mexico and cuba; and had also repurchased from europe con- siderable amounts of american railway securities. the flow of capital, however, continued, on balance, to be into the united states, at the outbreak of the war in 1914 european holdings of american securities were probably between $1,500,000,000 and $5,000,000,000.. american external investments probably did not exceed one-third of this amount. changes due to the var—the war wrought cnormous changes in the sphere of international indebtedness, changes, the extent of which cannot even now be precisely gauged. ‘the initial shock to the credit system at the outbreak of war caused an immediate stoppage in the normal flow of capital from lending to borrowing countries and gave rise to demands on the part of the former for the repayment of maturing obligations. the borrowing coun- tries experienced at first great difliculty in making remittances, as was indicated by the position of the exchanges. later, as purchases of war supplies by the belligerents in- creased, this difficulty disappeared and the exchanges turned in favour of the borrowing countries. from that time the euro- pean belligerent countries were confronted with an increasingly serious problem of financing their purchases abroad. it was a problem much more serious for the allies than for the central powers, because the latter were largely cut. off from the possi- bility of importing from countrics out of europe; but it applied to the central powers in connection with their purchases from european neutrals. great britain bore a large part of the burden of financing the external purchases of the allies prior to the entry of the united states into the war, and an account of the arrangements made forms part of the history of british war finance (see great britain). so far as purchases could not be paid for out of ordi- nary credit items in the trade account they were met out of money obtained (a) byselling abroad holdings of foreign securities (b) by borrowing abroad on the market or (c) by borrowing from foreign or dominion governments. each method was adopted capital, export of so far as practicable, the last becoming commoner as more coun- tries joined the allies. in view of the magnitude of british investments overseas it might have appeared that vast sums could be raised abroad by the sale of securities if not by borrowing. the extent to which investments could be realised was, however, in fact comparatively small. only exceptionally did it prove possible to sell any of the sterling securities which represented the bulk of british holdings, and sales were for the most part limited to securities expressed in (or convertible into) foreign currencies—particularly american dollar securities. the sale of these securities proceeded to some extent in response to ordinary economic motives, and subsequent- ly the british government itself organised the acquisition, by purchase or on loan, of suitable dollar and other securities which could either be sold abroad or used as collateral for advances. in the course of its operations the so-called american dollar securities committee purchased american and canadian dollar securities to the value of £184,266,540, and obtained the deposit on loan of others valued at £100,290,052. more important in amount than the sale of american and other securities was the direct borrowing by the floating of loans abroad and by arrange- ments with foreign bankers or with governments. the aggregate external debt of the british government amounted at march 31 1919 to £1,364,850,000 at par of exchange. of this £840,822,000 represented debt owing to the united states government, for1,- 808,000 was owing to the canadian government and £113,500~ 000 represented loans from certain allied governments, which could be regarded as available to be set off against debts owed by the same governments to great britain. britain, france and germany as creditor nations.—while dol- lar securities were being sold abroad and money was being bor- rowed, advances were being made to european allies and to certain of the dominions, the aggregate nominal amount of these advances being undoubtedly in excess of the amount raised abroad by selling securities and by borrowing. regarded as a commercial asset, however, these advances are by no means equivalent in value to the amount realised by the sales of dollar securities and by external borrowings. their commercial value cannot even yet be exactly estimated. on the whole, it is clear that the creditor position of great britain at the end of the war was considerably, though certainly not fundamentally, impaired. the effects of the war upon the creditor position of france were more lo ! es fart 3 on bans ear | py am. fas a lf 7 spp, an veep borca® ne a pca alz gen \\ ar oie be tb 3 3 =p vetr ny ainifie2zo,, “nee oy) ey, ais : i ee a tonia cal aa valoegoll sy z *: oe jat ~ fe any ox il da \\ z pa ne ainsidza prag wt iatente%e~ h middle of sept. it became necessary to decide for the attack on italy in order to prevent the collapse of austria-itungary.” there was a clear difference of opinion on the italian side as to the best way of meeting the forthcoming attack. cadorna felt he must stand on the defensive. capello, who commanded the ii. army, was anxious to anticipate the enemy’s move by an attack northeast from his positions on the bainsizza plateau. his army was in the main aligned for attack, for a continuation of the offensive which had been broken off in sept. and he judged it impossible, given the difficulty of communications and the risk of imminent attack, to take up the positions best adapted for defence. in this idea he had the support of more than one of his corps commanders, but cadorna did not think that he could throw in the forces necessary for such an attack when he was uncertain as to the direction of the forthcoming blow. i. the austro-german attack disposition of italian forces-—cadorna had received satis- factory reports concerning the morale of his troops. he had enough men, though a number of his units were below strength; and he had enough guns, in spite of the withdrawal of the allied bat- teries, though he would have been glad of more heavy artillery. between monte rombone and monte san gabriele, capello had some 2,200 guns and nearly 800 trench mortars. north of tol- mino the line on the left bank of the isonzo was held by cava- ciocchi’s iv. corps, whose left wing held the plezzo basin and was in contact with the carnia force on monte rombone. next came badoglio’s nxvii. corps, whose left wing, the roth div., raised to the strength of an army corps, held the lines opposite tolmino. the other three divisions which completed the xx vii. corps were across the river south of the lom plateau. behind cavaciocchi’s right and the roth div., on the mountains west of the isonzo, lay the vii. corps, newly reconstituted with units from other corps, and commanded by general buongiovannt. on the right of the xxvili., holding the line as far as monte santo, were caviglia’s xxiv. corps and albricci’s ii. corps. the weak point of the italian line was the tolmino sector; the weakest part of this sector was at the junction of the xxvii. corps (roth div.) with the lv. (46th div.), and the weakest position of all was that held by the right of the 46th div., which was clinging to the slopes of sleme and mrzlivrh completely dominated by the enemy, and badly off for communications with its neighbours. the volmino sector was chosen for the main enemy attack, and here, owing to a complex of circumstances, the austro-german forces won a success that led to a great italian disaster.” the italian preparations were much handicapped by the illness of capello. the attack launched.—the main attack came in the direction anticipated, between monte rombone and south of tolmino, and was conducted by a mixed german and austrian army under general otto von below. the army, which was known as the xiv. army, consisted of nine austrian divisions and seven ger- man, in four groups. the northern group of four divisions (three austrian and one german jiiger) was commanded by krauss, who had been called back from the bukovina. next came a group of three divisions (one austrian and two german) under the german von stein, and a group of two german divisions un- der the german von berrer. south of these two central groups was a mixed group (one austrian and two german) under the austrian von scotti. east of tolmino lay four divisions in re- serve. boroevic had 20 divisions in his two isonzo armies between auzza and the sea. below and henriquez (2nd isonzo army) had some 2,500 guns and 500 trench mortars. the bombardment began at 2 o’clock on the morning of oct. 24 in wild autumn ,weather. there was a drizzle of snow on the high ridges, rain below, and mist everywhere. towards dawn the fire died down, and it was thought on some parts of the defending front that the bad weather hacl counselled a delay in the attack. but the attackers were to make skilful use of the weather conditions, and only on monte rombone, on krauss’s extreme right, an attack in conjunction with the icft wing of krobatin’s x. army had to be given up owing to the snow. 332 krauss’s main attack was a straight drive through the italian lines in the plezzo basin, his first objective the saga defile. but he meant to reach without delay the ridge of the stol (6,467 ft.), which stood athwart a further direct advance. for this attack he detailed the 22nd schiitzen div., followed by a kaiserjiger and a kaiserschiitzen battalion, which were to go straight for the stol, and by six battalions of the 3rd (edelweiss) div., which were to make for the val fella by way of the wal d’uccena. krauss’s left wing, the 55th (bosnian) div., attacked the vreic- vrata ridge, with the object of breaking through to the isonzo and caporetto. krauss’s drive, after hard fighting, broke through the three front lines held by the italian soth div., but the attacking troops were checked at the saga defile. when evening fell, this position was still in the hands of the italians, but the battle had gone badly for the defenders farther south, and a retreat 1o the stol became necessary. krauss’s bosnians had met with no success against the left wing of the italian 43rd div., but stein’s group had carried all before it. stein opened his attack with his right wing, the austrian soth div., at 7:30 a.m., attacking the italian 46th div. between monte nero and vodil. a little later the bavarian alpenkorps, advancing from tolmino, attacked the ridges east of the passo di zogradan, while berrer and scotti attacked farther south, success of the silestans.—when both stein’s initial attacks were under way, the 12th silesian div., under gen. von lequis, was sent in between them. lequis attacked in two columns, one on each side of the river, making for caporetto, where it was hoped he would join with krauss’s bosnians. both columns were com- pletely successful. the right-hand column, aided by the strong attacks of the austrian soth div., pierced the extreme right of the italian 46th div., and pushed northwest with all speed. across the river, where the alpenkorps was making good head- way on’ the slopes above the road, lequis’s left-hand column quickly reached the italian second line, where the valley narrows below the hamlet of foni. this line had been held until the eve of the battle by a brigade of the iv. corps, but at the last mo- ment the sector was transferred to the nn vii. corps, and the napoli brigade was given to badoglio to hold this important point. only one battalion, however, was placed near the river. the rest of this regiment (the 76th) lay at the zogradan [pass high on the ridge to the southwest, and the other regiment of the brigade (the 75th), together with the brigade command, was nearly 3 m. away, on the western slopes below zogradan. the single battalion, of which only a platoon was on the road, seems to have been taken completely by surprise. it was*run over by the silesians, who proceeded on their way up the valley practically unmolested. meanwhile, the alpenkorps, berrer’s two divisions and scotti’s right wing were breaking up badoglio’s left, while the latter’s right, across the river, and caviglia’s corps were being strongly attacked by scotti’s left and henriquez’s right. the attack from tolmino had been carried out with skill, speed and resolution, and by a capital error which has never been satisfac- torily explained the italian guns remained silent until too late. definite orders had been given both by cadorna and by capello that immediately upon the opening of the enemy’s bombardment the italian artillery should open fire on the enemy’s trenches and zones of concentration and that they should lay down a heavy barrage as soon as there were signs of movement. these orders were not carried out and, owing to great destruction of telephone wires, when the guns finally began, their fire was fitful and uncertain. and they were too late: the enemy’s attack had al- ready developed. taken by surprise, puzzled by the comparative silence of their own guns and blinded by mist, the troops of the roth div. opposed only a weak resistance to the austro-german attack. henriquez’s attack on the bainsizza plateau, although it met with some initial success, was readily repulsed. badoglio had hoped to hold the enemy attack from tolmino and turn the scale by a counter-attack on the lom plateau with his three divisions on the left bank of the isonzo. but he was not afforded the caporetto, battle of chance of attempting any such manoeuvre. it was long before he received any news of how the day was going on the front of the 19th div., and from the beginning of the action he was unable to communicate with his divisions across the river. in a message sent to army headquarters at 4 p.m. he reported the enemy success south of jeza, but said that he had no news from the com- mands of the rgth div. and the 1y. corps, and that he was unable to communicate with anyone. by 4 p.m. lequis’s silesians were approaching caporetto. the left-hand column was unmolested on its march. the right-hand column, which had cut in behind the italian 43rd div., was making the task of the austrian 50th comparatively casy and brushing aside the spasmodic opposition of such small detach- ments as came in its way. cavaciocchi had filled his front lines too full, and sent practically all his reserves across the river, in immediate support of the 43rd and 46th divisions. iy. the italian retreat by evening the situation was very favourable to the attacking forces. stein was pouring troops through the breach made by the silesians and was making good headway with the austrian seth div. on their right, while the alpenkorps, berrer and scotti, had in several places gained the high ridges dominating the head of the judrio valley. krauss was still held up at saga and polounik and his bosnians had gained no more ground. but the break- through between tolmino and caporetto had made the italian positions untenable. at cividale, where capello had his headquarters, and at the comando supremo in uline, the first news that came from the iv. corps and the absence of news from the xxnvii. made a grave impression. capello sent up the army reserves by the valley roads and dispatched montuori to direct the “‘ left wing ”’ (the lv. and vii. corps). by evening it was clear that the enemy had won a big success, though it was not yet clear to what an extent the whole italian left was crumbling. there seemed good reason to hope that the advance might be blocked in the narrow valleys west of the isonzo. but by nightfall both the iv. corps and the roth div. were practically broken in pieces. the vii. corps was beginning to be attacked at luico, and its right was uncovered by the destruction of most of the roth division. the right wing of the roth was still holding on globocak and down to the river, and troops were being brought back from the left bank to strengthen this line. but it was obvious that the positions on the bainsizza could not be obtained, and orders were given to caviglia, who had taken over badoglio’s troops beyond the river, to prepare for a retreat across the isonzo. at the moment the most dangerous point appeared to be the extreme left wing, where it was clear that krauss would try and push through the val «d’uccea, the shortest way to the taglia- mento. two alpine groups had been dispatched to this sector the day before, and cadorna gave orders that the val d'uccea must be blocked at all costs. he sent out orders for resistance on three successive lines, all radiating from monte maggiore, which was the key position, but at the same time, as a precaution, he directed that plans and orders should be drawn up for a general retreat to the tagliamenta. the news on the morning of oct. 25 was increasingly grave. krauss was pressing upon the stol, and finding a weak resistance; no stand was being made at creda; monte matajur had fallen, practically undefended. other positions were seriously threat- ened, and there was no confidence that they would be held, for it was now known in cividale and udine that the behaviour of some of the troops in the line had been very unsatisfactory, and that this unexpected lack of spirit was communicating itself to some of the reserves. these had a difficult task in getting to the scene of action, for as they marched up the narrow mountain © roads they were met by ever-increasing masses of fugitives, the bulk of whom belonged to the non-combatant services. this un- fortunate state of affairs undoubtedly hastened the break-up of capello’s whole left wing. preparations for retreat.-—on the afternoon of oct. 25 capello, who could fight no more against his illness, and had been told by caporetto, battle of the chief medical officer of the army that he must resign his command, proposed an immediate retreat to the tagliamento, arguing that it was useless to send more reserves into the chaos among the hills west of the isonzo. cadorna felt that unless he could delay the enemy advance down the natisone and judrio valleys he ran the risk of having his centre and right cut off. montuori, who now succeeded capello in command of the i. army, thought that he could hold on a line from monte mag- giore to monte carnizza and thence across the valleys to monte korada. cadorna decided to attempt a further stand while warning tassoni (carnia force), di robilant (iv. army) and the duke of aosta to hold themselves in readiness for retreat, but at midnight on oct. 26 he was wakened to hear that monte maggiore had fallen. he at once drew up the orders for a general retreat beyond the tagliamento and his plans were already matured for the longer retreat across the piave which he foresaw would be necessary in order to get to a shorter line. the retreat began on oct. 27, and two days later provisional orders and plans were issued for the further retirement to the piave. fortunately for italy, and for the cause of the entente, the germans and austrians were outrunning their transport. krauss complained that only he and krafft von delmensingen, below’s chief-of-staff, had been inspired by adequate ambitions for the attack. the objective had been cividale, or at best the taglia- mento. krafit thought they should have had the adige in view. krauss expressed the opinion that the real objective should have been lyons. it must be remembcred, however, that the trans- port difficulties were very great. germany could not spare troops or material for an unlimited effort here and the unex- pectedly weak resistance of the italian it. army could hardly have entered into the calculations of those who were bound not to take too many risks. krauss admits that if cavaciocchi had held the stol in force his own move would have been frustrated. the critical days for the italians were oct. 30 and 31, when the pressure from north and east threatened the flank and rear of the iii. army, whose task had been made more difficult by the pre- mature blowing up, owing to a false alarm, of the permanent bridges at casarsa and by the fact that the tagliamento had come down in sudden and violent flood. but by the evening of nov. 1 the last of the duke of aosta’s troops had been success- fully withdrawn across the river. . cadorna’s weakest point was the stretch of the river west of tarcento, for which krauss and stein were making with all speed. two divisions under di giorgio had been dispatched to hold this line, but their march athwart the line of the retreat had been very difficult. stein’s troops were repulsed with heavy loss, but on the evening of nov. 2 krauss’s bosnians succeeded! in cross- ing at cornino and the following morning di giorgio was strongly attacked at pinzana. two days later his left was pushed back still farther, endangering the line of retreat for the carnia force and once more threatening the whole italian line with envelop- ment from the north. on the morning of nov. 4 cadorna ordered the retreat to the piave and that night the troops holding the line of the taglia- mento resumed their march westward. the iv. army in cadore was now in a difficult position but di giorgio and the other cover- ing troops of the worn-out ii. army slowed down the enemy’s acvance and gave time for most of di robilant’s troops to get away from cadore and come into line between the i. and iii. armies. but the greater part of tassoni’s carnia force was caught between krauss’s troops and krobatin’s x. army. il. the recovery on the piave new iialian positions —by nov. 8 the bulk of the iv. army was in line. on nov. 9 and 10 the last covering troops of the li. and iii. armies crossed the piave from pederobba to the sea. the line chosen to defend the fortunes of italy implied a with- drawal of the right wing of the i. army. pecori-giraldt retired from asiago and gallio and based his right on the fortified lines of the meletta group, giving up the xviii. corps to di robilant, who held the line from the brenta to the piave and the short stretch of the river as far as the montello. 533 reserves were coming in fast from the depots, including the young class of 1899. french and british divisions were already in italy and others were on the way. but diaz, who took over the command from cadorna on nov. 9, had to face a situation that seemed almost desperate. the italian armies had lost some 320,000 men in killed, wounded and missing, the number of prisoners being estimated at 265,000. the bulk of the ii. army had to be counted out altogether and the total number of troops to be reorganised and refitted was over 300,000. more than 3,000 guns had been lost and over 1,700 trench mortars. it seemed very doubtful whether these greatly weakened forces could resist the renewed attacks of the victorious armies which had followed so closely on their heels. fortunately, the plans for defence had been well and truly laid by cadorna in the limited time that was available and still more fortunately, as a result of the danger in 1916, he had caused elaborate preparations to be made in the grappa sector. it was due to this forethought that resistance on the line now chosen was possible. diaz had little breathing space, though some days elapsed be- fore the enemy could prepare for an attack in force on the new line, for conrad, on the trentino front, saw a chance and, though he was short of troops, struck at once while calling for reinforcements. he attacked pecori’s troops on nov. 10 as they were preparing to come back to the line already indicated and continued his attack on the new positions. but 10 days’ fighting brought heavy losses and no success. meanwhile, boroevie had tested the river defences. he got troops across in two places but failed to make further progress, and on nov. 16 an attack in force failed completely, the austrians losing some 1,s00 killed and nearly as many prisoners. conrad and boroevie were making no headway, but a very dangerous attack was being conducted by krauss, between the brenta and the piave. attempts to break through by the valley roads were quickly frustrated and persistent efforts to capture the all-important ridge of monte tomba-monfenera, which runs down from the grappa massif to the piave, failed to pierce the thin italian lines. ‘the struggle at this point lasted for five days, nov. 18-22, and the italian ix. corps, under ruggeri laderchi, fought a great fight. the critical day was nov. 22, when krauss’s bosnians and german jager made a final effort to break through. the attacking columns reached the crest of monte tomba, but their bolt was shot. in the evening, ruggeri laderchi counter-attacked and drove the enemy off the ridge, except at one point. next day reserves arrived and the line was firmly established. meanwhile, in the grappa sector, krauss had attacked on nov. 21 with his centre and right, but after a week’s fighting, in spite of reinforcements drawn from stein and krobatin, he had tocallahalt. a fresh attack was preparing when the situation was eased by the arrival of the british and french divisions which had hitherto been waiting in reserve. on dec. 2 three british divisions under gen. the earl of cavan, took over the montello sector and a similar french force under gen. duchesne relieved the ix. corps in the monte tomba region, it was ex- pected that both these points would be the object of early attack, but as it turned out they were both left unmolested. conrad and krauss continued their attempts on the mountain front, but krauss confined his efforts to the grappa sector. krauss could not immediately renew his attack, but on dec. 3 conrad, rein- forced but still complaining that he was starved for means of attack, opened a heavy bombardment on the curve of the italian front from monte sisemol to east of monte badenecche. next day he pinched up the meletta-badenecche salient and took monte fior and castelgomberto in the rear and the day following he pushed down towards foza. the position was critical, but the italians succeeded in establishing a new line farther south, covering valstagna and the mouth of the frenzela valley. on dec. 23 after careful preparation, conrad launched a new attack on the lines between monte sisemol and the frenzela vajley. he gained a big initial success, taking both col dell ‘orso and monte melago and cutting off a large number of prisoners. the next day the italians counter-attacked and retook both the 334 hills. they established themselves firmly in their reserve lines and repulsed another attack, the last, on christmas day. krauss’s final effort—meanwhile, between conrad’s two efforts, krauss had made a determined attempt to drive the ital- ians off monte grappa. his command had been increased to 10 divisions, six austro-hungarian and four german and he did not spare his troops. he opened his attack on dec. 11 by a push on each wing; from the brenta valley and monte pertica against col della berretta, and against both sides of the col dell ’orso-solaro- lo salient. on the left, in spite of repeated attacks that lasted 10 days, his german divisions made little headway, but on the right, at the end of four days’ hard fighting, he had taken col caprile and col della berretta. four days more and he was in possession of monte asolone, which looks down the valle di santa felicita to the longed-for haven of the plain. this was the term of the austrian advance. on dec. 20 the italians counter- attacked and won back a good deal of the lost ground, the last move in the long struggle. krauss accepted failure for the mo- ment, hoping for an early spring offensive farther west. five days later the snow came, the heavy winter fall that was a month late. the invaders had been favoured by the tardy coming of winter, which greatly prolonged the strain on the sorely-tried armies of italy. but it gave also to the defending troops the chance to remake at once a shaken reputation. they took the chance and their recovery was a remarkable feat of courage. concluston.—the narrative has indicated briefly the causes which led to the italian disaster. the defending troops were subjected to a very severe trial; but it would seem clear that failure and disaster might have been largely averted if the prepa- rations against the austro-german attack and the actual conduct of the defence had been different. to sum up, there were too many troops in the front lines and too few in the “ battle posi- tions.” cadorna had not succeeded in making all his subordinates grasp the principles of defence in depth or of “ elastic ” defence. and, given the erroneous dispositions of the defensive lines, the reserves were too far back. the italian armies on the julian front had been constantly on the offensive. they had had no recent practice in meeting an attack on the grand scale. it was this lack of practice, no doubt and a false confidence based on obsolete experience, which led to the belief that even if the opening phases of the battle were unfavourable to the defence, there would be ample time to restore the situation. when retreat became inevitable, the prospects might well have seemed desperate to those who had to organise it. for the army, long used to the war of positions that had been the rule for 28 months, was in no condition to move. the retreat, with all its confusion, its mistakes and its tragedies, remains an astonishing achievement. the resistance which followed it, when the retiring armies turned and stood at bay on the mountains and on the piave, was the greatest of italian victories. braiiograpny.—w. ortel, vormarsch in oberitalien, vom isonzo zur piave (1917) (1918); v. coda, dalla bainsisca al piave (oct.-now. fot7) {19o19); ly, cadorna, la guerra alla fronte italiana (1921). see also world war: bibliography. (w. k. mcc.) capps, edward (1866- ), american classical scholar, was born at jacksonville, [ll., dec. 21 1866. he was educated at illinois college, where he took the degree of a.b. in 1887, and at yale university, where he received that of ph.d. in 1891. in 1890 he was appointed tutor at yale. he was professor of greek language and literature at the university of chicago from 1892 to 1907. in 1903 he was special lecturer at ilarvard, and during the next two years studied at athens, and halle, germany. during 1906-7 he was managing editor of classical philology and in 1907 was called to princeton university as professor of classics. in 1914 he was president of the american philological assn. and in 1917 was turnbull lecturer on poetry at johns hopkins university. in 1918 he was appointed head of the american red cross commission to greece, and became also chairman of the managing committee of the american school of classical studies at athens. in 1920 he was appointed minis- ter to greece, resigning in march 1921, and returning to prince- ton. he is a leading authority on the greek theatre. capps—carbon, syntheses of his works include: the greek stage according to the extant dramas (1891); #rom homer to theocritus (1901); the introduction of comedy anito the city dionysia; a chronological study in greek literary history (1903); and four plays of menander (1910). he was editor- in-chief of the university of chicago decennial publications, 2 vol., and became the american editor of the loeb classical library. capus, alfred (1858~10922), french author (see 5.296), produced his last play, l’viastitut de beante, in 1913 and was elected a member of the academie francaise inthe following year. he dicd in paris nov. 1 1922.", "source_url": "https://archive.org/details/encyclopaedia-britannica-encyclopaedia-britannica.-3-encyclopaedia-britannica-inc.-1926", "observed_at": "2026-05-17 11:59:27", "integrity": { "hash_check": "match", "hash_scope": "full_normalized_text", "computed_sha256": "ae2f96eea573620d9e30e4b87c4f096464127bcca1822b4520a8594667dc991e" }, "machine_use": { "read": true, "cite": true, "decision": "verified_public_domain_text" }, "goguides_data_license": "https://www.goguides.com/data-license", "goguides_data_license_version": "2.0", "documentation": { "white_paper_url": "https://www.goguides.com/white-paper.php", "pdf_url": "https://www.goguides.com/whitepapers/goguides-ai-source-clearance-white-paper.pdf" } }