CALIPHATE

there has been much diversity of opinion in the moslem world on the subject of the caliphate since the rst century of the mahommedan era, but only one theory— that of sunni orthodoxy—has obtained more than temporary or local realisation (see mahommedan institutions, 17.411). this theory of the sunni caliphate grew out of the actual political facts connected with the establishment of the vast arab empire stretching from the shores of the atlantic to transoxiana; it assumed that all believers would always live under one moslem ruler, who would be of the tribe of quraish (to which the prophet himself had belonged), and for nearly nine centuries the caliph was actually a quraishite. but the empire remained undivided for little more than a century, and broke up into a number of independent states; so that by the roth century the authority of the caliph in baghdad hardly extended beyond the walls of that city, and he himself was a puppet in the hands of his turkish mercenaries. the theory, however, survived its failure to realise itself and even independent monarchs recognised the caliph as the source of all authority, and would apply to him for a diploma of investiture or a title of honour, in order that their position might be legitimatised and the tender consciences of their sub- jects satisfied. after the last abbasid caliph in baghdad was put 489 to death by the mongols in 1258, a shadowy continuation of the dynasty was set up in cairo under the protection of the mameluke sultans and, though the caliph was now powerless to exercise any influence on political affairs, he was still regarded in popular sentiment as the only legitimate source of authority, and re- quests still came for titles and diplomas from independent princes. on the other hand, particularly after the mongol conquests, a new theory of sovereignty was devised by the mahommedan legists, who began to represent the authority of the ruler as de- rived directly from god himself, ‘‘ who giveth the kingdom to whomsoever he wills, and raiseth whomsoever he wills to hon- our.”” no authorisation therefore from the caliph was any longer held to be necessary, and the legists impressed the duty to obedi- ence to any ruler who had established his position by force of arms. development from 13th century.—accordingly, from the latter part of the 13th century onwards, independent sultans—maghre- bins, indians, seljuqs and even turkomans and shaybanids— began to assume to themselves the title of caliph in addition to other high-sounding titles and this title, which in earlier ages had been considered to be the exclusive prerogative of one supreme sovereign, now came to be applied to any number of princes, some of whom were persons of quite insignificant status. the rising power of the ottoman sultans naturally fell in with the prevailing fashion, and we accordingly find that the title khalifah was applied as early as 1362 to murad i., and afterwards to each one of his descendants on the ottoman throne. there is, there- fore, no justification for the legend that the first of the ottoman sultans to assume this title was selim i., and still less historical evidence is there for the story that after his occupation of cairo in 1517 the dignity of the caliph was transferred to him by the last of the abbasid caliphs, mutawakkil. this legend was first put forward in 1787 by d’ohsson and passed unchallenged from one european history to another, and was adopted by turkish writers also, and in modern times it became a commonplace in the propagandist literature of the mahommedan world in support of the ottoman claim to the caliphate. as the ottoman con- quests extended the boundaries of their enormous empire, it became clear that the turkish sultan was the only mahommedan monarch possessing territories, power and wealth commensurate with the dignity of so exalted a title, and the same halo of glory gathered round constantinople asin former centuries had been associated with damascus and baghdad. the ottoman dipiomacy.—the ottoman sultans do not appear to have attached much importance to the title of khalifah until in the 18th and roth centuries turkish diplomatists found it con- venient in their relations with christian powers to make use of the false analogy current in europe between the caliph and the pope, and to claim for the sultan spiritual authority over moslems who were not actually his subjects. abdul hamid ii. (1876- 1908) especially emphasised this claim, and from the outset of his reign endeavoured to obtain recognition of himself as caliph by sending emissaries to egypt, tunis, india, afghanistan, java and china. his deposition in 1908 did not entail the abandon- ment of this policy, and in the treaties made between the new constitutional government in turkey and the states which be- tween 1908 and 1913 annexed territories formerly provinces of the turkish empire, e.g., bosnia, hercegovina, libya, bulgaria and macedonia, it was stipulated (in regard to the first three) that the name of the sultan should continue to be mentioned in the public prayers as caliph, and that in all of them the appoint- ment of moslem ecclesiastics should be authorised by the shaikh ul islam in constantinople. when turkey entered into the war in 1914 a further attempt was made to make political use of the turkish claim to the cali- phate by the proclamation of a jihad in which all moslems were called upon to fight in defence of the khalifah and were threat- ened with the punishment of hell if they supported his enemies. the lack of response to this appeal revealed the unreality of this assumption of authority, but many moslems, especially in india, were undoubtedly distressed at the fact of hostilities between turkey and the governments under which they themselves lived, and after the armistice in 1918 much sympathy was aroused 490 for the caliphate, and fears were expressed lest the terms of peace should cripple the power of turkey. abolition of sultanate and caliphate-——in nov. 1922 the na- tional assembly declared a republic and abolished the sultanate; mahommed vi. was deposed and his cousin, abdul majid, elected khalifah of all the moslems, but the exact nature of his functions had not been clearly defined before he was sent into exile in march 1924 and the ottoman caliphate abolished alto- gether. a few days later king hussain of the hejaz was pro- claimed caliph in mecca and transjordan, and received some recognition in palestine and syria; but in the following oct. he abdicated, just before the victorious wahhabis entered mecca. strong protests against the action of the turkish govt. were made in egypt, india and java, and great consternation was aroused by the disappearance of an institution which for so many centuries had served as a rallying point for the ideal of the unity of the moslem world. many proposals have been put forward for dealing with this new situation; the most conservative body of opinion refuses to accept the action of the national assembly and still regards sultan mahommed vi. as the only legitimate caliph, maintaining that the sultanate and the caliphate are in- separable. some of his supporters who had organised on the model of one of the religious orders a movement for his restora- tion, were tried and condemned at angora in aug. 1925. future of the caliphate——caliph abdul majid has been able to retain the sympathy of only a small band of supporters, who wish the spiritual functions of this head of the community to be free from any contact with political organisation. others, whose opinions are most clearly voiced by the theologians of the great mahommedan university of al-azhar in cairo, hold that the post has now become vacant, and that representatives of all the moslem races and communities in the world should elect a new caliph; such a congress was proposed for march 1925, but it has been postponed for a year. they propose to revive the primitive practice of election as exemplificd in the appointment of abi bakr, the first successor of the prophet; for the legists have never abandoned the theory that the office of the caliph is elective and, though actually from the middle of the rst century of the ma- hommedan era, almost every caliph has nominated his succes- sor (except when a new dynasty has been instituted), the fiction of election has been preserved in the ceremony of bay ‘af, or pay- ing allegiance to the new caliph. these persons also cling to the orthodox sunni doctrine that the moslem world must always have an imam, or leader, who as head of the community can alone perform certain functions, such as the proclamation of a general jihad, and delegates to the qadis, or judges, his powers of execut- ing judicial and disciplinary functions, without which authorisa- tion their decisions and marriage contracts are held to be invalid. indian suggestions.—mecanwhile the field has been opened for fresh speculations on the subject, and an indian scholar named muhammad barakatullah has put forward a scheme for the election of a caliph whois to be merely the spiritual head of islam, having no concern with politics; he is to be president of a council of learned persons, elected by religious organisations throughout the moslem world, who are to be heads of departments, e.g., the ministry of religion (for the organisation of mosques, schools and religious foundations), the ministry of finance (with control of the religious taxes to be used for the maintenance of the caliphate and the support of charities), the ministry of education and research, and a department of propaganda and missionary or- ganisation. the future caliphs are to be elected from among the members of this council. contrary views.—there are other moslem thinkers who agree with the turks in holding that there is no longer any need for such an institution in the moslem world, although they do rot sympathise with the religious policy of the turkish republic. from the 2nd century of the mahommedan era there have been moslem teachers who have maintained that the caliphate lasted only 30 years, 7.e., up to the death of ali in a.d. 661, and that from that date there has only been the rule of temporal monarchs. this was the view of al-nasafi (eb. 1141), one of the greatest legists of the hanafi school, whose exposition of moslem doctrine calmette—cambrait, battle of used to be the accepted text-book in turkey, and thesame opinion was adopted by the turkish legist, ibrahim halabi (0b. 1549), who compiled the ottoman code of law which was authoritative up torecent times. jn india this doctrine has also found exponents. such persons deny the need of a caliph in the modern world, and their point of view has recently received emphatic expression in a work on zslam and the principles of government by one of the ‘ulama of egypt, shaykh ‘ali ‘abdur raziq. he maintains that the caliphate was based entirely upon force, and has no authori- sation either in the qur’din or the teaching of the prophet. ‘con- taining as it does a somewhat violent attack upon the whole body of the ‘ulama, this book has aroused much attention. there were in 1926 three caliphs in exile—sultan mahommed vi., ‘abdul majid and king hussain; the sharif of morocco is recognised as caliph by his subjects, and four petty chiefs in the malay archipelago enjoy the title. each of these has his own supporters, but a large part of the moslem world is indifferent to the claims of all of them. bibliography.—oriente moderno (rome 1921-5); revue du monde musulmen,t. lux. (paris, 1925);t. w. arnold, the caliphate (1924); mustafa sabri, al-nakir ‘ale munkiri 'l-ni*mat: mina 'l-dint wa'l-khildfati wa’'l-umma (beirut, 1924): ‘ali ‘abd al-raziq, a!-islam wa usil al-hukm (cairo, 1925). (t. w. a.*) calmette, gaston (1858-19014), french journalist and writer, was born at montpellier july 30 1858. in 1884 he joined the staff of le figaro, and in 1894 became editor at a time when the journal, which had started as an aggressive and half-frivolous periodical, was becoming the mouthpiece of the extreme right and of the party known as “les rallies’’. calmette helped to make le figaro an important political factor, without allowing it to slip back into its former pamphleteer style. he attracted much notice in 1913 and tor4 as the originator of the bitter attacks on the policy of m. caillaux; especially with regard to m. caillaux’s attitude in the rochette case of 1911, in which it was alleged by le figaro that the director of public prosecutions had been influenced by the ministry to delay the course of jus- tice. as a result of these newspaper attacks mme. caillaux called at the office of le figaro on march 16 1914 and shot m. calmette dead. see cairtaux, j. m. a. calorimeter: see gas, manufacture of, cambon, jules martin (1845- ), french statesman (see 5.85), when ambassador in berlin from roo7 till the outbreak of the war, was instrumental in signing, nov. 4 1911, with a. von kiderlen-waechter, the convention about morocco. dur- ing the years immediately preceding the war he was acutely apprehensive of the kaiser’s intentions, and sent repeated warnings to his government. in 1920 he was chosen president of the council of ambassadors. cambon, pierre paul (1843-1924), french diplomatist (sce 5.85), died in paris may 29 1924. cambrai, battle of.—in the history of the world war of 1914-8 this battle, fought in nov.—dec. 1917, stands out as a landmark in the history of warfare. on nov. 20 1917 the british ili. army launched an attack, based on a new method, with an initial success so striking that on the morrow the bells of london were rung in joyous acclaim of the “ victory.” little more than a week later, on nov. 30, after the hopes of exploiting the success had already faded, there came a german retort so full of menace that the public thereafter showed a strong distaste for premature celebrations. yet if the battle in itself was a tragedy of error and missed opportunities, its even- tual effect on the fortunes of the allics was beneficent—it pointed the way to the victorious method of 1918. origin of the batile—the question of the origin of the cam- brai operations is of primary historical importance, both because of the outcome, and because of the method of nov. 20. the initial source is to be found in the third battle of ypres, which opened on july 31 1017 and died away three months later in the swamps of passchendaele. the lesson of these operations was that the method of an overwhelming artillery bombard- ment stultified its own objects by rendering impassable the ground over which the advance was planned to follow. if the cambrai, battle of ultimate appreciation of this lesson by the high command paved the way for the cambrai method, the initial impulse came from another source, where the lesson had been absorbed within three days. on aug. 3 1917 an alternative proposal was drawn up at tank corps headquarters by the chief general staff officer, col. fuller. the preface to it contained this significant example of prevision: “. . . from a tank point of view the third battle of vpres may be considered dead. to go on using tanks in the present condition will not only lead to good machines and better personnel being thrown away, but also to a loss of morale in the infantry and tank crews through constant failure. from an infantry point of view the third battle of ypres may.be consid- rie j rlez~cagnicourt to “6 cambrai y we moeuvres> . = ‘ umasnieres : sok crevecoeurs. battle of | cambrai english miles 1 2 3 kilometres main raitways | —_—- sritish line nov j9th, (‘947 _: 9s o- sst, os oe dec.6th, + ered comatose. it can only be continued at colossal loss and littlegain. .. 4.” then came the alternative proposal, to restore british pres- tige, before the winter set in, by a tank blow against st. quentin, as a strategical prelude to an advance towards valenciennes the following spring. discussion of this project brought out the objection that it required a combined british and french opera- tion, which might lack the simplicity and smooth working essential to a novel method. therefore, on aug. 4, a second project was framed, for a great tank raid south of cambrai. the word raid should be stressed, for, as originally conceived, the object was ‘‘ to destroy the enemy’s personnel and guns, to demoralise and disorganise him, and not to capture ground.” as the preliminary notes stated, ‘(the duration of the raid must be short—eight to twelve hours—so that little or no concentra- tion of the enemy may be effected for counter-attacks.”’ had this plan been followed there would have been no need to lament nov. 30. for the raid a force of six tank battalions supported by “ one, or better two,” divisions with extra artillery, was suggested, operating on an 8,000 yd. front. the object, as proposed, was “to raid the re-entrant formed by the l’escaut canal between ribecourt-crevecoeur-banteux.” the raiding force was to be divided into three groups, the main one to scour this canal-enclosed pocket, while the smaller groups formed offensive flanks on each side to protect the main operation. the detailed project, from which the foregoing are extracts, was taken to gen. byng, commander of the ili. army, on aug. 5. on aug. 6 byng went to g.h.q., saw the commander-in-chief and suggested an attack with tanks on sept. 20. sir douglas haig is understood to have been favourable to the idea, but counter arguments, for concentrating every possible man in the ypres area, seemed to have delayed its adoption. however, the continued lack of definite success at ypres lent emphasis to an 491 alternative, and on sept. 7, as a result of a consultation at iii. army headquarters, a letter was addressed by tank corps headquarters to g.h.q. asking that the tanks might be with- drawn from the ypres area, and suggesting two operations, one on the i. army front and one on the iii. on sept. 11 g.h.q. approved the withdrawal of the bulk of the tanks and gave instructions to the tank corps to recon- noitre the lens front (i. army). after a report and project had been submitted to g.h.q. the area was changed back to cam- brai, and on oct. 25 the first general conference on the cambrai operation was held. the date had been fixed for nov. 20. among the factors which induced the british command to approve the cambrai scheme were the need of disarranging the enemy’s plans of withdrawing troops from france to strengthen the austro-german thrust against italy, and the urgency of striking any such blow before the stream of german reinforce- ments released by the russian revolution could swell to its full strength. despite the heavy drain on british resources, caused by the ypres offensive, these arguments prevailed. the plan adopted.—the basis of the tactical plan was the use of a mass of tanks in a surprise onslaught, to replace the customary method of an intense preparatory bombardment by artillery. the historical interest of the cambrai scheme centres around two points, the general plan and the tank plan. the ii. army plan was (a) to break the german defensive system, the famous hindenburg line, in the neck of land between the canal de l’escaut and the canal du nord; () to seize cam- brai, bourlon wood and the passages over the river sensec; (c) to cut off the germans in the area south of the sensee and west of the canal du nord; and (d) to exploit the success towards valenciennes. the force allotted for this ambitious plan was the iii. and iv. army corps, comprising six divisions and part of another, the cavalry corps of two divisions, 381 fighting tanks and approximately 1,000 guns. they were to be employed on a front extending from gonnelieu to havrincourt wood. the german defences opposing them consisted of the hindenburg line system, and behind this the hindenburg reserve hne and the unfinished beaurevoir-masnieres line. thus of the original project there remained only the fundamental idea—the massed tank surprise, the tank method and the locality. in the alterations to the original plan lay the germ of disaster. the raid had been transformed into a large-scale offensive, with far-reaching aims. instead of scouring a pocket and withdraw- ing, an organised advance was to be made up a narrow lane bounded by two canals. as protection toa raid, these became a danger to such an attack, circumscribing the action of the tanks and preventing the formation of tank offensive flanks. other- wise the ground was good, and ideally chosen indeed for the original purpose, being mostly rolling downland, excellent for tank movement. it was marked by two features, the flesquieres- havrincourt ridge and bourlon hill. the fundamental weakness of the plan was not topographical, but the almost complete lack of reserves. to undertake such an important operation in such a condition was surely a viola- tion of one of the cardinal axioms of war. there were local re- serves, naturally, in most divisions, but there was no gencral reserve, unless the two cavalry divisions can be considered such— and, apart from their limited strength, the futility of so regarding them was amply shown in their fresh inability, in face of modern weipons, to influence the action. the six divisions employed in the initial attack were all that the iii. army commander had at his disposal, for a plan that visualised a penetration beyond cambrai towards valenciennes. it is difficult to understand what was in mind as to the future, for without reserves complete success could only mean the crea- tion of an excessively decp and narrow salient, requiring many divisions to hold it. it is true that the guards and one or two other divisions could be made available, and were ultimately brought to the scene, but they were too far awav for prompt intervention. the situation indeed had some reminder of loos, the french also moved a special force forward in readiness to co-operate, but their aid was not called upon. 492 | tf the excuse be that the third battle of ypres had drained the british of reserves, then it surely reflects on the choice of that swamp-like area and the failure to try earlier the method that at cambrai unlocked the doors to decisive success. on the other hand, it may be urged that g.h.q. put an initial time-limit of 48 hours on the operation. to this the reply is that if the lack of resources was appreciated, the objectives were exccssively ambitious, and that the powerful raid originally proposed was far more in accordance with the principle of security than an ofiensive involving occupation of newly consolidated positions. turning now to the tank plan, the problems were to gain sur- prise, to cross the wide and deep obstacle of the ilindenburg line and to ensure co-operation between the infantry and tanks for their common security. careful organisation and the ab- sence of a preliminary bombardment contributed to the accom- plishment of the first object. the difficulty presented by the hindenburg line was overcome by devising super-fascine, huge bundles of brush wood, which were carried on the nose of each tank and released on reaching the edge of the jiindenburg trenches; the tanks, working in sections of three, had thus the power to cross three such successive obstacles. thirdly, a strictly drill attack was worked out and practised, by which in each section an advanced guard tank moved about roo yd. ahead of the two main body tanks, keeping down the enemy’s fire and protecting the main body tanks as they led the infantry forward. the infantry, moving in flexible file formations, followed imme- diately behind the main body tanks. while the tanks cleared a way for them through the deep belts of enemy wire and subdued the hostile machine-gun fire, the infantry acted as “ moppers- up ” to the tanks and were also ready to protect them from the enemy’s guns at close quarters. the one fault of the tank plan was that, against expert advice, the tanks attacked on the whole frontage instead of against sclected tactical points, with the result that no tank reserve was kept for use in the later stages. the batile—the preparations for the battle were made with great skill and secrecy, while to mislead the enemy as to the scale and frontage of the attack, gas and smoke attacks, dummy attacks with dummy tanks, raids and feints, were carried out on a wide front both north and south of the real sector of attack. at 6:20 a.m. on nov. 20 the tanks and infantry moved forward to the attack on roughly a six-mile front, achieving complete surprise and a demoralising initial success at all points, save in the left centre in front of flesqui¢res. the cause of this one serious check appears to have been that the 51st div. here adopted formations of its own instead, of conforming to those devised by the tank corps and adopted in all the other divisions. what- ever the reason, the result was that the infantry fell too far behind the tanks, lost the gaps in the wire and were stopped by machine-gun fire. this loss of touch lay also at the root of the losses which befell the tanks when they came over the ridge and under the close fire of several german batteries, for infantry accompanying them could have picked off the gunners. but the effect of this battlefield incident has been unduly magnified. on the right the 12th, zoth and 6th divs. secured their objectives rapidly, though the 12th had severe fighting at lateau wood. the 29th div. passed through and captured masnieres and marcoing, securing the passage of the canal at both and even the bridge intact at the latter. on the left the stst and 62nd divs. made a brilliant advance, advancing by nightfall as far as anneux, over 2 m. in rear of flesquicres. the flesquieres resistance was thus only an islet, cut off and over- lapped by the waves which swept round its flanks and on to marcoing, anneux and even to the edge of bourlon w ood. a penetration of 5 m. had been made—the equivalent of months of heavy fighting and heavier losses on the somme and at the third battle at ypres. decisive success was within the grasp of the british forces, the enemy’s main defence systems had been overrun, only a half-finished line and the open country lay be- yond. but the original divisions and the tank crews were ex- ~hausted, and apart from one squadron of the canadian fort garry horse the two cavalry divisions could contribute nothing toward fulfilling their rele of exploitation. cambridge, england on nov. 21 local reserves made some further progress. the village of flesqui¢res fell at 8a.m., and the srst and 62nd divs. pressed rapidly on, clearing the german salient formed by this resistance on the first day and carrying the tide of the british advance as far as fontaine-notre-dame, 13 m. beyond the high- water mark of nov. 20. but on the right, little ground was gained—a relieving german division had arrived just in time to occupy the rear defence. the high command’s time-limit of 48 hours had expired, but owing to the menace of the uncaptured bourlon hill, to the new british position, as well as to the hope of an enemy withdrawal and the desire to relieve the encmy pressure on italy, the commander-in-chief decided to continue the offensive, placing a few fresh divisions at the disposal of the ill. army. but the tank corps, the essential cause of the carly success, was tired out, men and machines—all had been staked on the first throw. ‘the fresh attacks met with more failure than success against an enemy now braced to meet the danger. the german counter-aittack—on nov. 22 the germans recap- tured fontaine-notre-dame; on the 23rd, the goth div. with tanks captured the whole of bourlon wood, but the attempts on bourlon village and fontaine-notre-dame failed. bitter and fluctuating fighting followed; bourlon and fontaine-notre- dame were won and lost again, and meanwhile there were signs of a strong german counter-thrust. in the early morning of nov. 30 the blow fell, the german army commander, won der marwitz, making a convergent attack against the northern and southern flanks of the salient which the british advance had created. in the north, round bourlon wood, the attack was stopped after bitter fighting, but in the south, where the blow fell on the joint of the salient and also on the weakly held front to the south, it broke right through. this was a finely planned surprise assault, unheralded by any preliminary bombardment, and made more effective by the cloud of gas and smoke shells. villers guislain and gonnelieu soon fell and the thrust pene- trated deeply behind the old british front line as far as gouzeau- court, overrunning gun positions and headquarters. disaster was only averted by the superb counter-attack of the guards div., which recaptured gouzeaucourt, and later of the 2nd tank bde., which brought out the value of this arm for defence. fresh attacks on bourlon and masnicres failed, but further german progress was made towards villers plouich. the british position in the masnieres-bourlon salient was thus rendered so precarious that on the night of dec. 4-5 most of the salient was evacuated and the line drawn back roughly to the flesqui¢res ridge. although the result left the british with a slight gain of ground on balance, and better still had a helpful influence on the italian campaign, cambrai would be remembered mainly as a tragedy of mistaken aims and lost opportunities, were it not for its revelation of a new key to victory, turned to effect in 1918. bibliograpiiy.—lt.-col. c. h. rowcroft, the oth hodson's iforse at cambrat, ror7 (1917); maj.-gen. t. t. pitman, the part played by the british cat valry in the surprise ailack on cambrat, 1917 (1923); col. w. h. f. weber, a field artillery group in baitle (1923). (beh le) cambridge, england (see 5.90).—the architectural ameni- ties of the town, as distinct from the university, were increased by the erection of the county hall in hobson street (1913), a wes- leyan church at the corner of king street and short street (1913), and a handsome gate-house to the leys school (1914). an in- stitute of agricultural botany on the huntingdon road was inaugurated in 1922.. the university.—in spite of the incidence of the world war, the period r910 to 1925 must rank as one of great activity in the university. on constitutional proposals of more than ordinary moment, such as those of conferring greater legislative power on resident university and college teachers with the partial dis- franchisement of the senate and the electoral roll (1910 and 1920), or the admission of women to degrees, but not to full member- ship of the body academic (1923), the university maintained a conservative attitude, but in matters secondary only to these in importance it followed a policy of continuous reform. the courses of study for honours, and more especially for pass cam bridge—cameroons men, underwent considerable revision. after prolonged de- liberations, greek, as a compulsory subject, was drupped from, and other noteworthy changes were effected in, the previous examination (1919); the regulations governing the pass degree were entirely remodelled (1920); several of the honours examina- tions, notably the classical tripos and the oriental languages tripos, were reconstituted with a division into two parts, the first of which does not normally carry the b.a. degree with it. new triposes were cstablished in anthropology (1913) and geography (1919), while the medieval and modern languages tripos, greatly enlarged in scope, was split into the modern and medieval languages tripos and the english tripos (1917). the university further recognised the value of graduate studies by establishing the degrees of ph.d. (1919) and of m.litt. and m.sc. (1920). a series of enactments (1912-4) made several changes in the mode of procedure to the degree of d.d. and threw it open to others than those in holy orders of the church of england. the increasing diversity of studies resulted also in the es- tablishment of new professorships, readerships, and boards of studies: professorships of english literature (1910), genetics (1912), italian (1919), naval history (1919), french (1919), physics (1919), aeronautical engineering (1919), physical chemistry (1920), biochemistry (1921), and animal pathology (1923); read- erships in spanish, modern history, geography, agriculture, agricultural physiology, physiology, morphology of vertebrates, petrology, pharmacology, electrical engineering, geodesy, bio- chemistry, preventive medicine and experimental psychology. aids to learning and research of a more material nature were provided by the erection and augmentation of numerous insti- tutes. the engineering laboratory on the north side of downing street was twice enlarged and finally removed to a completely new site behind scroope terrace, trumpington road (1920-1). part of the buildings thereby vacated, as well as new buildings erected close to them, were taken over by the neighbouring chem- ical laboratories. on the south side of downing street sites were found for the school of agriculture (1910), the museum of archaeology and ethnology (1910-5), the psychological labora- tory (1913), the physiological laboratory (1914), the forestry school (1914), the molteno institute of animal parasitology (1921), a low temperature station for research in biochemistry and biophysics (1922), and the sir william dunn school of bio- chemistry (1924). the arts school, off benet street, a fine brick building faced with stone, designed by g. hubbard, which contains a number of lecture-rooms and also houses several de- partmental libraries, was opened in rg1r. in that year the uni- versity accepted the government’s proposal to take charge of the solar physics observatory, then at south kensington, and the necessary accommodation, in close proximity to the existing observatory on the madingley road, was completed in 1913. field laboratories in connection with the agricultural and other departments on the milton road came into use in rgto-1. emmanuel, queens’, sidney sussex, and clare colleges added to their fabric and the chapels of sidney sussex and corpus christi colleges were enlarged and redecorated. wesley house, a post- graduate theological college for the training of accepted candi- dates for the ministry of the wesleyan methodist church, was opened in 1925; and cheshunt college, a theological semi- nary which was removed from cheshunt to cambridge in 1905, found permanent quarters at the end of bateman street (1915). effects of the war.—the immediate efiect of the world war on cambridge university, 16,000 alumni of which were engaged on active service, was to reduce enormously the numbers of teach- ers and students. the place of those who had gone was, spatially, taken by cadet battalions and officers attending staff courses. the absorption of many university teachers by government departments and the first-hand acquaintance with academic training gained by a still larger number of servants of the crown greatly advanced the co-operation between university and state, which had already begun practically with government grants to the schools of agriculture and forestry and to the departments concerned with instruction of medical students (1914). the cessation of hostilities did not effect any weakening of 493 this tie; the admiralty, the air ministry, and the war office organised temporary and permanent training schemes in cam- bridge for oflicers. when the university, confronted with a serious decline in the value of money and an abnormal increase in the number of students, was left with the unpleasant alter- natives of a serious financial deficit, or an equally serious diminu- tion of its educational efficacy, the govt. accorded it, in 1919, a temporary annual grant of £30,000, which was raised to one of £85,000 in 1925. at the same time, it appointed a royal com- mission, which reported in 1922, and whose recommendations a statutory commission was, in 1925, still engaged in putting into practice. the two principal aims are the creation of a regent house of resident instructors and other officers of the university and colleges, with powers almost as great as those of the present senate; and the concentration of all formal teaching in the uni- versity, which will exercise this function through newly erected faculties and derive the necessary funds from increased taxation of the colleges and permanent government grants. (b. w. d.) cambridge, mass., u.s.a. (see 5.96), increased in population only 4-6% in the 10 years after 1910, reaching 109,694 1n 1920 (o1-6 males to 100 females); but more rapidly in the next five years, to 120,053 in 1925. the foreign-born numbered 33,296 in 1920, a decrease from 1910; about half of them were from ireland and canada. manufactures increased much more than the population, whether measured by value of products or by number of wage-earners. the value was $44,227,000 in 1909; $127,865,000 in 1919; $185,524,463 in 1923. the number of factory employees rose from 15,260 in 1909 to 22,500 in 191g and to 25,674 1n 1923. with the transfer of the packing industry to the middle west, slaughtering and meat-packing, formerly the leading industry, almost disappeared. at the top of the list in 1919 were confection- ery and ice cream, bread and other bakery products, electrical machinery, printing and publishing (book and job), foundry and machine-shop products. a city-planning board was created by ordinance in 1913. in 1915 the massachusetts institute of technology moved from the site in boston, which it had occupied for 50 years, to a tract of 50 ac. on the cambridge side of the charles river. (see jiarvard university.) camden, n.j., u.s.a. (see 5.101), had 323 industrial plants in 1925, with a varied output including steel] pens, soups, talking- machines and battleships. during the world war the new york shipbuilding corp. delivered more ships than any other yard in the country, and made the world’s record for rapid construction in the collier ‘* tuckahoe,” which was launched on the 27th day after work was begun on the laying of her keel. the population in 1920 was 116,309, of whom 8,500 were negroes and 20,354 forcign-born; in 1925 it was 128,642, according to the official estimate. the value of the factory output was $49,138,000 in 1909; $218,165,000 in 1919; $180,766,319 in 1923. enrolment in the public schools increased during the 10 years 1914-24 nearly twice as fast as the population. camden’s water supply comes from 136 artesian wells. trolley and ’bus service are co-ordinated in a unified system. the com- mission form of government was adopted in 1923. in 1925 the hotel walt whitman, a community enterprise, was opened, a large convention hall was under construction, a civic centre was being developed as part of a comprehensive city plan, the first municipal picr had been built, a movement was under way to make camden a world airport and a new bridge across the delaware to philadelphia, the longest, broadest, highest and heaviest suspension bridge in the world, was nearing completion. walt whitman’s grave is in harley cemetery and his home in mickle street is kept as it was during the last years of his life. cameron, james donald (1833-1918), american politician (see 5.109), died at his country home, lancaster county, pa., aug. 30 1918.