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    "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1926)",
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    "chunk_id": "1926:baltimore:eace0575a0fd",
    "title": "BALTIMORE",
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    "verified_text": "the samuilatian of baltimore, the eighth city of the united states in number of inhabitants, in- creased in the decade 1910-20 from 558,485 to 733,826, of which number 108,390 in 1920 were negroes, as compared with 84,749 in 1910. the population in 1925 was estimated at 794,000. the taxable basis increased from $915,433,444 in 1918 to $1,543,064,- 51 in 1086; manufactures ——in 1919 the capital invested in manufactures was $434,243,740; the value of their output was $677,878,192, and the wage-earners in manufacturing plants numbered 97,814. in 1923 the wage-earners increased by 4,963 and the manufactur- ing capital by $15,992,500. this great increase may be attributed to differential freight rate on goods from the west, deep-water manufacturing sites, steamship connections, coastwise and for- eign, and abundance of jabour. baltimore is a popular city with labour because in normal times its markets are notably cheap, and the continuance in maryland ‘of the ground-rent system makes possible the purchase of homes by labouring men on easy terms. in 1923 permits were granted for the construction of 4,203 dwellings, and other building permits increased the total to 20,303. of 130,000 residences, 62% are owned by the occupants. in 1922 baltimore handled 4,326,000 tons of foreign merchandise and 1,103 vessels cleared for foreign ports. municipal improvements——the physical characteristics of baltimore have been much altered since 1910. by a paving loan of 1906, and by a special paving tax of 1912, funds were provided for the conversion of 210 m, of the cobblestone streets into mod- ern smooth-paved ones at a cost of $9,500,000. three concrete tubes were constructed in the bed of jones falls, which had be- come an unsightly open sewer, and into these the stream and an additional flow of storm-water sewage were directed and carried through the city for a mile and a half. on top of these tubes a highway was constructed, known as the fallsway, which relieved the congestion of north and south traffic between the water front and the uptown railway yards. at a cost of $23,500,000 the main work of installing a new sewerage system, begun in 1905, was completed in 1916. a dam at loch raven, with a capacity of 2,000,000,000 gal., and a filtration plant at montebello for im- pounding and purifying the gunpowder river water supply were constructed. a boulevard connects several of the parks. <a memorial hall, commemorating those who died in the world war, was dedicated in april 1925. legislation.—one of the most important changes was the passage in 1918 of an act of the maryland assembly by which, to the 32.19 sq. m. of baltimore territory, were added 51.83 sq.m. of land and 11.30 sq. m. of water, making the total area 95.32 sq. m. and adding about 100,000 persons to the population. at the november election in 1920, the people voted overwhelmingly in favour of four improvement loans, aggregating $31,750,000. finance.—fifty-three baltimore banks and trust companies, exclusive of private banking firms, showed on jan. 1 1925 aggre- gate resources of $601,934,355, and deposits of $500,079,982. in 1924 bank clearings reached a total of $5,025,334,741, a gain of 3-8% over the preceding year and of 121.7% over 1917. education—the johns hopkins university established a baltimoril—baluchistan school of public hygiene in 1920, and in 1925 it announced that it intended to discontinue its collegiate and undergraduate engineering dept., confining itself to higher education. loyola college has opened new buildings in the northern part of the city. a number of fine public schools have been built, and several high schools have either been constructed or are planned. the enoch pratt free library, constituting the public hbrary system of the city, has a central library building and 26 branches. the mayors of baltimore have been: from 1907-11, j. barry mahool (dem.); 1911-9, james h. preston (dem.); 1019-23, william f. broening (rep.); 1923-7, howard w. jackson (dem.). in 1923 the city council was reorganised so as to consist of one house instead of two. brrlriograppuy.—vu.s, census reports: manufacture (1914 and 1920); reltgzous bodies (1916). u.s. census bulletin: adstract of census of manufactures (1919); populations, maryland (1920), statistical abstract of the united states (1923); maryland almanack (1925); annual reports of commissioners of labour and statistics of mary land, and baltimore chamber of commerce. (by c.-82) baluchistan (see 3.291), a minor province of british india with agencies attached. the areca is 134,638 sq. m., the popu- lation 799,625 (1921). development.—the chief features in the history of baluchistan during the period 1910 to 1925 were her weathering of the storms set up by the world war and the afghan war that followed on its close, the increase to the railway system in the administered districts and the development of road communications in the vast areas that make up the frontier state of kalat. effect of world and afghan wars—the sandeman system, the essence of which is the administration of frontier tribes as far as may be on tribal lines according to tribal custom through tribal chicfs and headmen, stood the strain of the world war well. the only serious trouble that arose was among the marri baluch, a tribe whose depredations were a household word in the plains of sind before the days of sandeman, and whose natural unruliness had been encouraged by the weak personality of its last two chiefs. affected by pessimistic rumours of german victories and british defeats, and strengthened in their pessi- mism by a call for recruits for the army, the marris attacked the gumbaz post in feb. 1918. driven off with the loss of 125 killed, they looted and burnt the kohlu sub-tahsil, and with the help of the khetrans sacked barkhan and fort munro, and held up a train between sibi and harnai. retribution was swift. after severe chastisement from a punitive column the marri chief surrendered with the whole of his tribe early in the following april. the pathan portions of baluchistan, over which the world war passed without rousing much restiveness, were more seri- ously troubled by the afghan war. but this was due to external causes. the collapse of the militia in the north west frontier province, the abandonment-—-as many believed, needlessly—of the militia posts in the upper tochi, the consequently inevitable abandonment of wana in south waziristan and the gallant but tragic retreat of its garrison through north baluchistan, set up a conflagration throughout the greater part of the lower zhob. in fort sandeman and its tmmediate neighbourhood it was soon brought under control. but it smouldered on for some time in the more inaccessible areas, especially those abutting on the waziristan border. communications.—the world war was responsible for bring- ing into being two long-standing railway projects. the first of these was an extension from khanai on the sind-pishin railway to hindubagh. constructed in 1916-7 in order to speed up the transport of the hindubagh chromite deposits, then in urgent demand for munitions, it is almost bound to prove the first stage of a railway extension to fort sandeman, eventually perhaps to link up with the north west frontier strategic railway system. more dramatic was the extension of the nushki railway along the nushki-seistan trade route (with which the combined genius of lord curzon and colonel webb ware had bridged the chagai desert some 20 years before) first to dalbandin (118 m.) in jan. 1917, then to mirjawa (269 m.) on the perso-baluch border in banat—banking and credit feb. 1919, and finally to duzdab (52 m.) in the following april. it is hardly rash to hazard the prophecy that, given,the continued control of american financial advisers over the persian treasury, under the masterful rule of the new shah reza khan, railhead will not long remain at duzdab. kalat state—there have also been developments in many branches of the administration of the kalat state, but none more marked, perhaps none more needed, than in communica- tions; 600 m. of road have been driven through makran, 500 m. through jhalawan and 250 m. through the kachhi. formerly it took weeks, growing into months, to travel from the capital town of kalat to the outlying parts of this state which sprawls over more than 73,000 square miles. a motor-car can now cover the distance in as many days, and the effect on the general better- ment of the administration has been immediate and great. bibliography.—t. fi. holdich, the indian borderland (1901); j. j. mcleod innes, life and times of general sir james browne (1905); the administration report of the baluchistan a gency (annual); “ baluchistan,’’ census of india (1921) and the district gazetteers of baluchistan. banat: see rumania. bancroft, hubert howe (1832-1918), american historian (see 3.309), died at walnut creek, cal., march 2 1918. he published in 1909-10 the book of wealth and in 1912 retrospec- tion, political and personal, giving an account of his labours. bancroft, sir squire (1841-1926), british actor and man- ager (see 3.309), published in 1925 a further book of reminis- cences, easy chairs, and died in london april 19 1926. bandelier, adolph francis alphonse (1840-1014), american archaeologist (see 3.311), died in madrid march 19 1914. his last published works were the islands of titicaca and koati (1910) and the ruins of tiahuanaco in bolivia (1912). banerjea, sir surendranath (1848-1925), indian (brahmin) politician and journalist, was born nov. 10 1848 in calcutta. passing for the indian civil service at the open com- petition of 1870, he was retired after two years’ service, and then opened a small school in calcutta which soon expanded into the well-known ripon college. his work as a political reformer be- gan in 1876 when he founded the calcutta indian association and three years later he became editor of the bengalee newspaper. in subsequent years he became the centre of many stormy episodes. he was one of those who established the indian na- tional congress in 1883, and presided over the poona. session of 1895 and again at the mecting at ahmadabad in 1902. in 1893 banerjea was elected to represent the calcutta cor- poration on the bengal legislative council, and was twice re- turned to the central legislature as member for bengal. he gave evidence in 1897 before the royal commission on indian expendi- ture and frequently visited england in connection with deputa- tions and political missions. vehemently opposing the adminis- trative partition of bengal effected by lord curzon in 1905, he supported the boycott of foreign goods which arose from the up- heaval. he always exhibited, however, a preference for con- situtional agitation, and was among the first to welcome the montagu-chelmsford reforms. severing his association with the congress, which had passed under “extremist ” control, he formed an ‘ indian liberal ”’ organisation, and accepted office as minister for local government and sanitation in bengal. a knighthood was conferred upon him in jan. 1921, and in 1924 he retired into private life. shortly before his death on aug. 6 1925 at barrackpore, he published his autobiography, a nation in making. banffy, dezso, baron (1843-1911), hungarian statesman (see 3.315), died in budapest may 24 1911. bang, hermann joachim (1858-1912), danish author (see 3.315), died jan. 29 1912. in 1910 a volume of his essays appeared, afasker og mennesker, followed in 1911 by a volume of short stories, en dejlig dag. his collected works were published in six volumes in copenhagen and oslo (1912). see f. poppen- berg, nordische portrits— hermann bang (1904). bang, nina henriette wendeline (1866- ), danish politician, was born at copenhagen, where, in 1894, she gradu- 323 ated m.a. she married a politician, gustav bang, who died in the vear rg15. devoting herself to economic studies, she was ac- tive as a social democrat in politics and journalism, and in 1918 became a member of the landsthing (upper house). in 1924 she joined the first danish social democratic government under theodore stauning as minister of education, thus becoming the first woman cabinet minister in the world. with the support of danish and foreign scientific funds mrs. bang commenced, in 1906, the publication of a comprehensive work about the dues on the sound, tables of shipping and goods transport on the sound, 1497-1660 (1906-22). . bangkok (see 3.316), sinam.—since 1910 new roads have been built, and a number of chinese banks have made the city their headquarters. trade is flourishing, having doubled since 1907; in 1923-4 the exports were worth £15,741,609 and the im- ports £12,511,801. over 85% of the trade of siam goes through bangkok, and 1925 was a record year for the export of rice, the chief product and article of export of the country (1,324,363 tons). there are about 80 rice-mills working in the city and neighbourhood. the naval arsenal dock has been reconstructed, and a dry dock built by the bangkok dock company. vessels of 13 ft. draught can cross the bar. a railway to penang, which shortens the journey to europe by three days, was opened in 1918; since 1922 express services have been run to penang and singapore. the line to the northeast was being extended to korat in 1926, and the building of a bridge across the menam chao bhraya river will link the northern and southern railway systems. in 1917 the chulalongkorn university was opened. banking and credit (sec 3.334).—although pre-war economic literature laid the foundations of modern theories of credit control, it was the disorganisation of the war period and the efforts since made to re-establish currencies on a firm basis which have given the control of credit its present practical and scientific interest. in order to classify the points at issue, it is desirable to start with the most general case, and to make cor- rections for the specific influences exerted by particular systems of currency standard and by the peculiarities of environment. i. the control of credit the theory starts from the assumption that the flow of pur- chasing power in an economic community is governed, in the last resort, by the activities of the central bank, for the central bank, under all circumstances, is the final source for the supply of media of payment. even when an economic community has not itself a central bank, its monetary phenomena are affected by the actions of the central banks of other communities, given a world economic order, so that, broadly, the monetary phenomena of the economic universe as a whole are functions of the activities of the central banks. given a central bank, then, the funds at the disposal of the community are subject to its control. for, if it pursues a policy of stringency it can, directly and indirectly, deprive the outer money market of funds and thus create a uni- versal stringency; if it pursues a policy of expansion, it can add to the resources of the outer money market and thus produce a state of universal fluidity. since the theory further postulates that the price-level is a function of the mass of media of payment in circulation, it fol- lows that the price-level is itself dominated by the monetary or credit policy of the central bank; in the last resort, it is governed by the conception of their responsibilities entertained by the leading functionaries of such a bank. it ts irrelevant whether the central bank emits purchasing power in the form of book- credits or of cash: first, because an expansion in the former will lead to an expansion in the latter; second, because the bank will govern its grant of credit in the first form by the power which it possesses of expanding the second form. hence, the generalised theory lays it down that it is not the volume of cash which gov- erns the volume of credit, but the volume of credit which governs the volume of cash in circulation, since, in its most general form, the power of the central bank to emit cash is unlimited. given that central banks possess the powers attributed to them by the theory, two groups of questions arise: (1) through 324 what mechanism does the impulsion to expand or contract credit affect the economic structure? (2) what are the appropriate devices by which these impulses can be regulated? varying views.—three groups of views may be distinguished, though there are elements common to all these views. (a) one group of writers lays great stress upon the influences exerted directly or indirectly by divergences in the movement of real and nominal interest rates, or by the differences between the money rate of interest and the rate of return on real capital (normal rate of interest), in periods of expansion or contraction. thus it is argued by irving fisher that if at a time when prices are rising, money rates of interest rise less rapidly, the real rate of interest may be falling, though the money rate charged may be rising. or, as is urged by wicksell, if the normal equilibrium rate of interest is given, any offer by bankers to lend at less than this rate will discourage lending to bankers and encourage bor- rowing from bankers; this will itself cause prices to rise, and unless bankers’ rates of interest are again equilibrated with real rates of return on capital, a constant pressure in the direction of fur- ther expansion will be felt. the converse is of course the case when nominal rates are above real rates or when money rates are above normal rates; both as regards a rise and a fall, diver- gences tend to be cumulative in their effects. it is to be noted that fisher’s theorem and wicksell’s are by no means identical. irving fisher’s “‘ real” rate of interest is based on the relation (in terms of goods) between the value of what is borrowed as compared with what is repaid, and is con- trasted with the rate per cent on the amount of money borrowed: wicksell’s “ normal ” rate is the price (in terms of money) which will just equilibrate demand for (real) capital with the supply of it. whatever the price-level, this rate itself may be undergoing a change which may increase or decrease the divergence between it and the money rate at which loans are being contracted: fisher’s conception essentially rests on changes in the price level not compensated by changes in the money rate of interest. (b) a second view, that of professor cassel, places most stress on the discrepancies that can occur between the reai supply of savings and the nominal supply of savings, i.e., the volume of purchasing power. if the supply of purchasing power is so great as to add to the current real savings of the community an arti- ficial supply, leading to additional demands on the available productive powers of the community, prices will inevitably be driven up. conversely, a fall in the price-level can be produced if the supply of purchasing power reduces the nominal volume of savings below the current real savings. (c) current british theories have borrowed from the views already mentioned, but lay stress also on the relationship between profit-margins, the supply of purchasing power and the rate of discount. thus, in mr. hawtrey’s treatment of the problem, an increase in the volume of purchasing power will be distributed as increased income, will induce traders to give larger orders and will result, since production is not absolutely elastic, in rising prices. the temptation to the trader is in part speculative, since stocks in his hands go up in value, but it arises in part from the relative lowness of interest rates, since this widens the margin between traders’ income and traders’ cost, in particular the cost of carrying stocks. the discount rate—whatever be the angle of approach, it js clear that the dominant theories lay great stress upon the rate of discount, which, as the price which is paid for the current use of purchasing power, appears to all groups alike as the legitimate instrument by which an excess or deficiency in the supply of purchasing power can be prevented. having thus outlined the dominant theory of credit control, it becomes advisable at this stage to refer to the limiting conditions and the qualifications which, in the opinion of the present writer, it is necessary to introduce. the influence of particular currency systems.—the general theory assumes that the central bank completely controls the supply of purchasing power. this is, however, only true in exceptional cases, when the country is not on a metallic standard basis (or if, being on such a basis, the central bank controls the banking and credit | entire output, the state refraining from issuing an independent currency of its own). when a community is on a metallic basis, the price-level is ultimately controlled by the output from the mints, so long as it effectively remains on that standard. for, if the central bank increases the supply of local purchasing power to such an extent as to lose parity with gold or other metal, the community is no longer on a metallic basis. if the central bank is given the power to refuse gold at will and the mints are not obliged to take gold and give coin at the request of other holders, the country is not on a true gold basis. but if the central bank attempts to maintain its local currency at least on a par with gold, and if the bank accepts gold freely, or in default of such acceptance gold can be turned into coin at will at the mint, then the power of the central bank to prevent the value of gold from falling (and with it the local currency) is limited by the degree to which it can withdraw alternative forms of currency from use. the practical condition is that the liabilities of the bank should remain constant, whilst its earning assets should be replaced by gold as it comes in, z.e., that the gold reserve should increase at the expense of other items on the assets side of the balance sheet. in this way, the effect of increased supplies of gold in influencing the value of currency can be delayed until the gold is equal to 100 % of the unaltered liabilities. after that point is reached, the central bank is powerless to prevent the value of the currency from falling. within this margin, laxity or stringency of credit- administration will still remain important elements, but as soon as a community is on the gold standard, it will be the gold supply which will ultimately dominate the situation; laxity, however, will drive the country off the gold standard and stringency— in the form of accumulating large reserves—will prevent a rela- tive upward swing of prices—relative, that is, to other gold- using areas. the second assumption of the theory is that the central bank only issues credit in response to a commercial demand. but this is certainly not always thecase;inparticular,it was not the case dur- ing the war, when the central banks made part of the machinery of war, issuing vast loans to the governments. to this aspect of the subject we return below. here it is only necessary to state that, even if the central banks had practised a policy of extreme self-denial and had refused direct assistance to governments, it would not have altered the situation very much; for the gov- ernments could have issued currency of their own or, alterna- tively, have borrowed from the central banks indirectly. even had the banks attempted to apply business principles to these indirect loans and discounts, it would not have made the slight- est difference. the governments would have received the net proceeds (minus a further deduction representing commission to the borrower for undergoing the trouble involved), and would have profited from the taxation of the large profits of the central banks, so that loans plus tax would have resulted to the same thing, though loans might have been somewhat smaller and proceeds from the taxation of central banks might have been somewhat larger than was actually the case. , the third assumption of the dominant theory is that it is always possible for the central bank to control the credit situa- tion, t.e., that it is always either actually the lender, or can make itself the lender, whose loans are necessary to satisfy the (mar- ginal) effective demand in the market. this aspect of the theory is the more important in that it raises the whole question of the effectiveness of the discount-rate as the chosen instrument of credit control. experience has revealed that both on psychological and tech- nical grounds the efficacy of the discount rate is subject to qualification. it is clear that a given rate can only be effective if borrowing actually takes place at that rate. even in pre-war days, however, this was not always the case. there developed, therefore, on the part of the bank of england, the practice of selling securities for cash and their repurchase for account, with the intention of depriving the market of funds and therefore caus- ing a demand for accommodation at the bank, which, of course, meant that the bank rate became “ effective.” this is one aspect of a truth which can be expressed thus: that a central banking and credit bank can influence the money market not only by its discount policy, but also by its investment policy, that is to say, that so far as the effects on market rates are concerned, it makes, guan- tetatively, no difference whether a given volume of funds is added to market resources, or 1s withdrawn from the market, by means respectively of additional discounts or additional investments, or by reduced discounts or reduced investments. the difference between the two methods lies in the fact that the discretionary power of the central bank is greater in the one case than in the other; when a central bank attempts an exclusive control by means of variations in discounts, it may find that the willingness of the market to absorb funds may be less than it desires. this is in itself a confirmation of the view that the discount rate may not always be fully efhicacious in producing the desired effect, since there is a limit below which the rate cannot fall. on the other hand, when the central bank is selling securities and there- fore reducing the funds at the disposal of the market, it can enforce a given rate. a central bank, then, by expanding its hold- ings of investments may influence the market in the desired di- rection even though a reduction in discount rate has had no, or insufficient, effect; a reduction in investments need not be accom- panied by a rise in discount rate, though it will obviate the neces- sity for a reduction. the systematic exploitation of these facts constitutes the so-called “ open market ” policy of the federal reserve system, inaugurated on a systematic scale in 1923 and fully set forth in the roth annual report of the board. discrimination.—even in pre-war days it was the practice of central banks to supplement the discount rate by a gradually increasing stringency of discrimination in the choice of bills they would discount, whenever undue demands were being made by the market for accommodation. in post-war days, this embry- onic policy has developed into a fully conscious policy of ratien- ing on the part of certain central banks in those countries, which have just emerged—as namely, austria, hungary, germany —from a period of violent change in the value of the monetary standard. this points in itself to certain defects in the “ method of discount rate variations.”’ for, though it may be true that if a given volume of accommodation will be afforded by a central bank, it can make, ultimately, no difference whether this amount is distributed by fixing the quantity and apportioning it on given principles, or by fixing the price appropriate to a given quantity and allowing the market to determine those who will buy that quantity at the price fixed, yet there seem to be certain advan- tages in the method of rationing which cause it to be preferred. the central bank retains the power of discrimination between one borrower and another to a much greater extent in the case of rationing, but, apart altogether from this point,the determina- tion of what wii be the “ equilibrium price ” appropriate to a given quantity is purely experimental and may lie at such un- usual levels as to defy completely calculation or prevision. thus, even a 98% discount rate proved ineffective in germany before the cessation of inflation and, if rates of this order of magnitude have to be applied, it may be better to approach the problem of regulation from another angle, i.e., from the angle of pre-deter- mined limits of quantity. in other words, though there may always be a rate which, if enforced, will be deterrent, it may be more difficult to enforce that rate than to employ an alternative device. the argument that, if borrowers know that a rise in rates will be ruthlessly em- ployed, a considerable rise of rates will in fact be avoided, rests on a psychological premise which is not universally valid and upon economic grounds which are not always applicable. the argu- ment assumes in fact (a) that the cost of credit is a sufficiently large item of expense as to make an upward or downward move- ment in the cost of credit an appreciable element in the calcula- tion of profit or loss; (4) that, apart from the direct incidence of profit or loss, borrowers believe an alteration of discount rate to be a sufficiently accurate guide to the future conditions of busi- ness as to cause them to anticipate loss if they do not immediately begin to contract their commitments. the extent to which a belief of this sort prevails is not a fixed magnitude: it varies with individuals, times and nations. 7 325 whilst the modern theory of credit control undoubtedly con- tains elements of permanent scientific value, it cannot be said that unanimity prevails either as regards the logical structure of the theory or the practical value of its results. its elaboration is in the main the consequence of the currency chaos of the last decade. the reintroduction of the gold standard does not ab- solve central banks from the task of credit-regulation: the for- mula that a central bank must watch its reserves is merely a practical maxim which conceals the important scientific truth that the preservation of adequate reserves involves at all times supervision of credit conditions. in fact, central banks have always supervised credit conditions, unless diverted from their true object by erroneous theories or by the exigencies of govern- mental finance. modern research is likely to influence central bank practice by the provision of sensitive statistical and eco- nomic indices, which will throw light upon underlying economic conditions earlier than the movement in the reserve position could do—a development which is being forced upon the federal reserve system in the united states, for instance, by the inap- plicability of the reserve test under the present conditions of surplus gold reserves. il. the central banks and the war at the outbreak of the war the world was upon the gold stand- ard. european countries, the dutch east indies, japan, pos- sessed central banks, generally endowed with the monopoly of note issue: in the united states of america the federal reserve system was just beginning to operate. the absence of true cen- tral banks elsewhere, particularly within the british empire, was compensated by the maintenance of cash balances in london and in new york (on the part of canadian banks); these bal- ances, replenished by the rediscounting facilities available, espe- cially in london, enabled local banking systems to use the older money markets as central banks whenever the necessity for expansion was felt. in this way, the whole world credit structure turned on the gold reserves of the established financial centres. gold reserves —the central banks maintained gold reserves larger than were absolutely necessary, partly out of conserva- tism, partly because of the belief that large gold reserves would constitute an element of strength in times of war. these gold reserves they were enabled to accumulate the more easily be- cause (1) the world output of gold was expanding; (2) small notes in certain cases were allowed to circulate in order to divert gold to the central bank; (3) the note issue regulations were de- signed to prevent a too free expansion of the note issues, whilst the notes were kept at par with gold either by direct conversion into gold on demand or by conversion into assets which were at par with gold. , the note issues were limited either by (1) the requirement of a maximum limit without any specific reserve ratio (france) or (2) by the requirement of a percentual reserve without limit of issue (as in denmark, switzerland, holland); or (3) by a combination of a percentual reserve requirement (usually 333 or 40%) with a fixed “uncovered” issue (germany, austria). in certain cases, e.g., the united kingdom, russia, norway, the principle was maintained that above a certain limit the entire issue should be fully covered, though this is only a variant of (3) above. the “‘ uncovered ” issues had generally to be backed by specified securities, usually commercial bills of exchange with 3 or 2 sig- natures, thus linking the volume of notes with trade movements and giving elasticity to the whole system. . to avoid ihe danger of governmental exploitation of the note issue, treasury bills could not be included in “ eligible” dis- countable paper, or, alternatively, the amount which the gov- ernment could borrow was limited. in order to combine elas- ticity with the maintenance of gold parity, the constitution of certain central banks had instituted the principle of the taxation of excess issues, i.e., the reserve requirements could be tempora- rily suspended, provided that a tax was paid on the volume of notes in excess (germany, sweden, united states). the inten- tion was that the discount rate should be proportionately raised, but this by no means always happened in practice; the central] 326 banks refraining from raising the rate in order to avoid burden- ing industry and commerce with too heavy rates. the profits of the banks were generally divided between the shareholders and the governments, after provision had been made for re- serves, and the general relations between the bank and the gov- ernment usually enabled the latter—following the model of the bank of france—to appoint the chief executive officials and thus exercise considerable indirect influence. the war resulted in the central banks of the world being turned into currency manufacturing institutions. the notes of the banks were made inconvertible, or, where this was not the case, the free export of gold was prohibited. usually, both steps were enforced. the governments financed themselves by dis- counting treasury bills or other obligations; apart from this direct borrowing, indirect inflation was practised by the banks granting loans at lower rates of interest against war loans or other government securities. even amongst the neutrals, mobi- lisation charges and subsidies and other extraordinary expendi- ture worked in the direction of depriving the central banks of free power of control; in their case also, gold imports from the belligerents produced “ gold inflation,’ and even where, as in the case of the scandinavian central banks, the right to refuse gold was granted (1916), errors in banking administration were made. it was probably inevitable that the central banks should lend themselves to the financial exigencies of their governments, but apart from this, throughout the war, the central banks were guilty of absurd delusions as to the value of gold reserves at a time when their notes were inconvertible and gold reserves could do nothing to maintain their value. finally, bank administra- tions generally inverted cause and effect and attempted to justify their enormous issues of currency by arguing that higher prices required more currency, so adding intellectual confusion to economic disorganisation. to this belief and to the persistent idea that it is safe to lend “‘ so long as the security is good ’’ must be ascribed some of the orgy of inflation which was the part cause of the post-war “boom ” of 1919-20, after the worst of the gov- ernmental pressure had been removed (see currency). the net effect in europe was that between 1913 and 1919 the total gold in banks and in circulation fell from $3,764,000,000 to $3,240,000,000: the neutrals (scandinavia, switzerland, holland and spain) gaining $720,000,000, the belligerents losing $1,247, 000,000. the relative importance of loans to government and on government securities before and after the war to the totality of all productive operations of the chief european central banks is brought out in the following table. the absence of sweden is due to the transference of government loans from the central to the commercial banks before the end of the inflationist period, t.e., roughly before the end of 1920. 7 percentage of total earning assets of central banks (represented by claims on governments and advances on government securities) iqi3; 1918} 1920 a re ef ee portugal 74177 | 74 4 netherlands 64.23\" | fs france 43 | 86 | 867 finland . . 1} 53] 54 belgium 12 | 88 | 87 | japan... > ee sad ap bulgaria 47 | 84] 81 | switzerland . | .. | 44] 51 serbia . 61 | 53 | 85 | spain : pe ey. a ec 9 ae greece, 31 | 17) 75 | unitedkingdom!) 38 |} 49 ] 59 rumania . 31 | 69 | 86 | italy... pa ba | 69:50 denmark . 2 | 34.) 25 united states. | .. | 10 | 9 germany . 21 | 98 | 98 | il. central banking since the war new central banks.—since the end of the war two main developments are to be noted: firstly, a considerable extension in the number of central banks, and, secondly, a considerable degree of reorganisation in the central banks of certain countries, such as germany and russia, already possessing such institu- tions. both these developments are to a large extent the com- mon result of a single cause, viz., currency disorganisation, but the extension in the number of central banks is also due to the emergence of new states. thus the separation of the baltic banking and criedit states from russia has led to the creation of the banks of estonia (1919), lithuania (1922) and latvia (1923): the re-cre- ation of poland led, first, to the state loan office and, after currency chaos, to the polish national bank (1924); the splitting up of austria-itungary and the liquidation of the old austro- hungarian bank has resulted in the formation of the banking office of the czechoslovakian republic (though legislation in 1920 and 1925 has prepared the way for a new central bank), in the formation of the austrian national bank in 1922 and the national bank of hungary in 1924. currency disorganisation in russia led to the new state bank of the u.s.s.r. in 1921. currency chaos in germany led in oct.-nov. 1924, first to the creation of the rentenbank (now in liquidation) and, under the aegis of the dawes commis- sioners, to the reorganisation of the reichsbank in 1924. danzig was provided with a central bank in 1924. in south and cen- tral america, the first steps towards a new central bank were taken in mexico in 1923: colombia erected a bank in the same year: peru had founded a reserve bank in 1922 and chile one in 1925. in the british empire, the first steps towards central banking in india were taken by the absorption of the three presi- dency banks into the imperial bank of india in 1920: in aus- tralia the commonwealth bank act of 1924 has reorganised the bank (formerly a purely commercial institution) on the lines of a central bank: in south africa a reserve bank was created in 1920, and under canadian legislation of 1923 (supplementing emer- gency legislation of 1914), the ministry of finance has been given certain of the powers of a central bank. one may envisage this movement under three heads: (1) the general intellectual forces which have shaped it, (2) the agencies which have furthered it, (3) the technical aspects of the new institutions. (1) brussels and genoa conferences —the underlying theory has already been previously explained, but it was at the two inter- national conferences of brussels (1920) and genoa (1922) that the theory was prominently expounded. at brussels attention was mainly fixed upon the cessation of inflation, but the confer- ence called for the establishment of new central banks in coun- tries where they did not already exist. it was at genoa that a broad programme was laid down. the second commission of the conference, acting upon the report and draft resolutions of the committee of experts, called for the universal establishment of central banks and the inauguration of the policy “ of continuous co-operation among credit banks of issue, or banks regulating credit policy in the several countries.” such ‘ co-operation . « would provide opportunities of co-ordinating their policy, without hampering the freedom of the several banks.”’ by reso- lution r2 it was left to the bank of england “ to call a meeting of such banks as soon as possible,” in order to elaborate an inter- national convention regulating the reserve policy of the banks in order to avoid, what was feared might result from the return to the gold standard, “a struggle for gold,”’ and hence consid- erable fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold. (2) co-operation between central banks—the international conference thus proposed has not taken place, but there 1s never- theless a considerable degree of informal co-operation at the present time. the governors of the bank of england and of the federal reserve bank of new york are in frequent personal touch with one another and the actual policy of certain euro- pean central banks has been greatly influenced by the advice which has been tendered to them, as well as by the assistance afforded them, by the bank of england. thus the pegging of the hungarian crown in terms of sterling was made one of the conditions of an advance of {4,000,000 in rg24: the austrian crisis of 1924 was accompanied by movements in the austrian bank rate instigated by the bank, whilst the recent credit policy of the national bank of belgium has also been influenced by the attitude of the british authorities. actual developments have also been powerfully affected by the prestige of the federal reserve system and by the influence which the league of nations has been able to bring to bear. the economic pre-eminence of the u.s.a. has resulted in the banking and credit federal reserve system becoming the model which has been followed in latin america and in south africa (especially as regards the ownership of shares in the reserve bank by outside banks and in the framing of rules governing “ eligible ” paper) and has also left its mark on europe, a result which is, of course, due in part to the selection of american economists and experts (notably prof. kemmerer, of princeton) to guide the reorganisa- tion of banking and currency conditions. the finance com- mittee of the league of nations influenced the form taken by the national bank of austria and the new national bank of hungary. experience gained in the erection of these banks served as a basis for reform in germany. (3) technical aspects of central banks—so far as the tech- nical aspects of the newer institutions are concerned, the follow- ing points may be noted:— (a) the tendency to assimilate sight deposits or demand liabilities and notes in circulation for reserve purposes. thus demand liabili- tics have cither to be specifically protected, as in the case of deru, south africa and the reichsbank (where a 40% reserve in the shape of immediately available bank balances and short bills must be held), or demand liabilities and notes are added together for the purposes of calculating the reserve ratio, as in austria, hungary, czecho- slovakia, colombia. (b) vyhe tendency for permission to hold part of the “ cash’”’ reserve not in actual gold coin or bullion, but in the shape of foreign bank balances and foreign bills. in germany 25 ° of the cash reserve may be in foreign exchange assets; in most of the newer bank con- stitutions no distinction is drawn between actual gold in vault or held in the shape of gold assets. the actual cash ratio also varies considcrably—20% in the case of austria, hungary and czecho- slovakia (in all these cases provision is mace for a progressive rise in the minimum ratio in the course of time); 25 °% in the case of russia, 30-333 yo in the case of poland, lithuania and danzig; 40° in the case of germany and south africa; 50°, in the case of peru, esthonia and yugoslavia; 60 °% in the case of colombia. (c) a third tendency is for the introduction of the principle of the taxation of excess issues, or, as it may also be put, the taxation of deficiency reserves, and to insist that at a time when these rates of taxation are being enforced, the discount rate must be at a given level, so as to cause the borrower to bear the burden. thus, in the case of the new reichsbank the bank rate must be at least 5% if the reserve is less than 40% for more than one week, and the discount rate, when an excess tax is being imposed, must be raised not only by the amount of the tax, but by one-third more. (d) a fourth feature is the tendency to limit very closely the bor- rowing powers of the governments at the central bank. in the case of austria and hungary such loans are forbidden altogether; in czechoslovakia loans are only allowed to the state against customs and tax warrants and the products of state industries (article 129 of act of 1920); loans to the german govt. by the reichsbank are limited (apart from fixed amounts which may be loaned to the posts and railways) to 100,000,000 marks for a maximum period of three months (article 25 of bank act). it must not be overlooked that most of the new european central banks start with vast sums owing them by the state, in consequence of notes issued during the inflation period, and provision for the gradual reduction of these debts, usually out of the share of the profits falling to the state, has had to be made. 4 so far, in most of the countries where a central banking reor- ganisation has taken place as part of, or in connection with, currency reform, the central bank has been successful in main- taining the international value of the new currency unit, though poland is so far an exception. the task of stabilising the values of these currencies in terms of gold was made easier by the fact that they were usually very much undervalued abroad, so that it was possible to peg the foreign exchange value and yet allow of a very considerable degree of internal currency expansion. but the experience of austria in 1924 and of germany in 1925 shows that the point must ultimately come when an almost brutal use of restrictive powers must be made in order to safeguard the stabilised currencies from a new decline. thus the central banks of europe have so far hardly even considered the problems which the newer theories of credit control have raised, viz., the stabilisa- tion of the whole field of business in the interests of stable price- levels. some of them, particularly the bank of france, are still struggling with the problems presented by government finance; but in general it may be said that in the field of central banking in 1926 the worst is definitely over and that a new era has definitely begun. 327 bibliography.—g. cassel, mfoney and foreign exchange since ror4 (1922); k. wicksell, vorlesungen tiber nationalokonomie, vol. 2 (jena, 1922); r.g. hawtrey, currency and credit (1923); e, hantos, das geldproblem in muitteleuropa (jena, 1925); z. s. katzenellen- baum, russian currency and banking 1914-24 (1925). see also cmd. 1667 of 1922, papers relating to international economic con- jerence, genoa; league of nations, memorandum on currency and central banks 1913-24 (geneva 1925); u.s. senate, comntission of gold and silver inquiry, european currency and finance, 2 vol., washington (1925). ls eg.) iv. banking in the united states the panic of 1907 and the recovery which followed it formed only a temporary interlude in the general development of the united states banking system; immediately afterwards the country entered upon a period of prosperity which continued practically unbroken until 1914. lessons learned during the panic, however, convinced the community of the necessity of making some change in the note-issue system. the aldrich- vreeland law of 1908, while providing for so-called emergency currency, also established the national monetary commission, which was directed to inquire into the general situation of the banking and currency problem with a view to formulating a broader and more comprchensive statute. this commission presented in 1910, a general bill covering the whole field of banking reform, but political changes caused delay. the preliminary drafts of a new measure were prepared under the direction of a sub-committee of the banking and cur- rency committee of the house of representatives, and the bill so formulated became the federal reserve act, entered in the statutes on dec. 23 1913. it was undoubtedly the most impor- tant measure relating to banking or currency in the united states since the civil war, and it made possible the important financial services rendered by the united states during the world war, the federal reserve system necessarily accepted the existing national banking system as a basis, building upon a foundation already firmly established in american finance. the national banking system (see 3.345) had proved inade- quate, partly because in time of stress there was no recognised means of relieving hard-pressed banks, and partly because the currency was inelastic, being limited by the amount of bonds available, besides being slow in issue and redemption. agitation after the panic of 1893 for the issue of emergency currency as a means of checking the development of acute panics ultimately grew into a demand for a currency not purely of emergency nature, but elastic, as required by business needs, and therefore including issues of ordinary bank notes protected by the joint guarantee of the banks. the only practical outcome of the agi- tation was seen in certain of the sections of the gold standard act of 1900. the federal reserve system.—the federal reserve act was the outgrowth of a gradual movement in the direction of central banking. it sought to provide elastic currency, not by changing existing law but by adding a new type of institution, the federal reserve banks, whose membership (stockholders) was to consist of national banks, compulsorily included, while institutions organised under state law (banks and trust companies) might at will also become members. each member bank was required to contribute to the capital of its local reserve bank a sum equal to 3°% of its capital and surplus, and to become hable for an addi- tional 3° in case of necessity. the directing mechanism of the system was the federal reserve board, consisting of five members (later raised to six) chosen by the president of the united states, with the secretary of the treasury and the comp- troller of the currency as ex officio members. the essential requirement of the act was the compulsory transfer of the re- serves of member banks to the federal reserve banks, the reserve provisions requiring a 6% minimum of vault cash, and a 7% minimum of balances on the books of the reserve banks, while the remaining 5% of the reserve required in central reserve cities might be either in vault or in the reserve bank. this was the so- called divided reserve. each reserve bank was authorised to issue currency against commercial, industrial or agricultural paper, 328 with a maximum maturity of six months except when of agricul- tural origin, in which case the maximum maturity was 180 days. deposits of notes ready for issue were to be made with an officer known as the federal reserve agent, there being one such officer at every federal reserve bank. each federal reserve bank was governed by a board of directors, six of whose members (three bankers and three business men) were chosen by constitu- ent member banks voting in three separate groups according to size of capital, while three (including the federal reserve agent, who was also the chairman) were chosen by the federal reserve board. the board was given the function of passing on, and establishing, rates of discount, such rates, however, being origi- nally named by the boards of directors of the several federal reserve banks. in the following table, compiled from reports obtained by the comptroller of the currency, the advance in the number of organ- ised banks, including national, state, savings and private banks, loan and trust companies between 19ro and 1925 is shown:— resources in millions of dollars pum cf rm frre tgp | i i ie loans agere- number and invest- mi ue |cash on! gate of dis- ments bank iland re- banks | counts on sources 1910 23,095 | 12,495 aj723°\\'--25393 1,42 22,450 1913 25,993 | 14,568 5.407 | 2,776 1,560 | 25,712 1914 26,765 15,288 5,584 2,872 1,639 26,971 i9i5 27,0602) .| -1§;722 5,381 3,233 1,457 | 27,804 1920 30,139 | 31,208 | 11,387 | 5,833 1,076 53,079 1921 30,812 | 28,932 | 11,381 | 4,974 946 | 49,671 1922 30,389 | 27,860 | 12,547 | 5,414 82 50,425 30,178 | 30,416 | 13,672 5,597 797 while state banks and trust companies included the bulk of the investment institutions of the nation, the commer- cial banking assets were predominantly held by national banks. on june 30 1925, these numbered 8,072 with deposits totalling $19,909,669,000 and total resources, including redis- counts, reported at $24,350,863,000. since 1890 there had been a rapid development of trust companies in many parts of the united states, while savings banks had also expanded rapidly both in the number of depositors and in assets; depositors in- creased from 6,107,083 in 1900 to 13,971,703 in 1924, and deposits from $2,449,547,885 in 1900 to $8,439,855,000 in 1924. the corresponding increase in trust companies was from 1,564 in 1914 to 1,680 in 1925, with a growth in aggregate resources from $5,489,500,000 in 1914 to $11,563,540,000 in the later year. effect of the world war.—the sudden advent of war in europe necessarily subjected the banks to a very severe shock and pushed into the background the immediate questions of competition between different classes of institutions. specie payment was suspended, and a severe drain of gold out of the country was caused by england’s effort to supply herself with funds. there was also some fear that american foreign trade might be wholly or largely cut off. german war vessels, however, were soon driven from the north atlantic, and the movement of products from the united states to europe was resumed upon a limited scale. the banks, which had begun the issue of clearing-house certifi- cates on aug. 3 1914, were able to retire their obligations on dec. 1 of the same year, although the stock exchange (which had been closed on july 31) was not reopened until later. as the requirements of european countries for goods became heavier, and as export shipments from the united states increased, the banks entered upon a period of unusual prosperity. credit be- came comparatively safe, not only because of the upward move- ment of prices but because of the fact that the large purchases of goods made for european account were in most cases practically guaranteed by the european governments. the number of banks increased steadily, and both savings and commercial deposits advanced. there was little need to call upon federal banking and credit reserve banks for rediscount accommodation, and they prac- tically remained inactive. after the united states entered the war a paper basis was established, and much of the enormous increase in the gold hold- ings of the united states was impounded. congress passed an act (june 21 1917) changing two fundamental ideas in the fed- eral reserve act. the maximum reserve requirement was re- duced from 18% to 13% in central reserve cities, with the pro- viso that the entire amount should be carried in reserve banks, and the issue of notes directly against gold was permitted. the act also extended to state institutions more liberal conditions for entry into and withdrawal from the system. membership increased rapidly from 1917 onward, and by the close of 1925 (after some post-war reaction) the total number of member state institutions was 1,441, the national bank members being 8,048 in number. the war effected far-reaching changes in the portfolios of paper holdings of the banks of the country. the public were en- liabilities in millions of dollars un- divided ae ere national] capital] surplus | profits | due to pes ee bank stock fund less banks d mar | tates | circula- ex- eposits| deposits fic penses 1,879 1547 404 2,225 15,283 54 675 2,096 1,676 573 2,584 17,475 49 722 2,132 1,714 562 2,705 18,517 66 722 2,162 1,732 639 2,783 19,135 49 722 2,702 | 2,410 976 3,708 | 37,315 175 688 2,903 | 2,542 910 2,809 | 34,844 390 704 2,943 2,697 933 3.244 | 37,194 128 725 3,052 2,799 954 3,610 | 40,034 238 720 3. 42,954 5 46.763 couraged to save and to use their savings in the purchase of liberty bonds, but large assistance had to be extended to bond- buyers to enable them-to make their payments. the govern- ment also became a heavy purchaser of all classes of commodities, and paid for them largely by issues of treasury certificates. thus the investments of the banks and their portfolios of paper came to consist largely of government obligations or of notes collater- alled by such obligations. many of the states, moreover, had, in imitation of the terms of the reserve act, modified their local laws so as to permit state institutions to take on fiduciary func- tions previously confined to trust companies. the national banks were also assuming savings-deposits functions. hence the growth of the so-called department store type of bank, characteristic of the post-war period. while the growth of a discount market had been restricted by war conditions, the i’ederal reserve act had laid the foundations of it, particularly through its authorisa- tion of the creation of bankers’ acceptances and the provision for foreign branch banks. there was a mushroom growth of foreign branches established by american institutions during the years 1914-20, while acceptance paper also developed, at first tenta- tively, but later to an average amount aggregating about $750,- 000,000. the effort to introduce the trade acceptance or com- mercial bill was not very successful in displacing the single-name paper made under the open account system, which had become the staple in american banking. working of the federal reserve system.—the operations of the federal reserve system as such from 1914 to 1925 may be divided into four periods: the first from nov. 2 to14 to the dec- laration of war by the united states, april 6 1917; the second from the latter date to about nov. 4 1919; the third from nov. 4 1919 to the beginning of the year 1921; and the fourth from the latter period until the end of r925. in the first period the federal reserve banks were organised, obtaining the collabora- tion of the financial community, and introducing new standards of commercial paper through a system of regulations and the installation of a national and district clearance and collection system. the federal reserve act had authorised the board to banking and credit act as a clearing-house for the several reserve banks, and early in 1915 the so-called gold settlement fund at washington was created, and eventually a daily system of telegraphic clearing between reserve banks was developed. supplemented by an inter-district plan which laid the basis for an extensive plan of ‘ par ” collection within the several districts, this new enterprise helped to eliminate excessive internal rates of exchange and to establish a uniform condition of remittance throughout the united states. this work had been fairly successfully inaugurated by 1917, and in anticipation of war a large supply of federal reserve note currency had been printed. during the second period the system seconded the treasury department in paying for the war and in financing european nations compelled to rely upon american aid. the armistice found the country with an inflated price level and a somewhat undermined banking situation. it would have been well had the reserve system set itself at once to reduce inflation, but, as usual, political consideration intervened. the fifth liberty loan was not floated until the spring of r919, and heavy advances aggregating about $2,500,000,000 were made to european na- tions after the armistice. the reserve system found the pres- sure too strong, and permitted inflation to continue during rgrgand early 1920. reaction set in during the spring of 1920 and became serious at the end of that year, the close of the year and the be- ginning of 1921 being a period almost of panic. rectification had become necessary, and the reserve system had raised its rate of discount fairly steadily during the year 1920. deflation had been brought about in some measure through changes of rate, but probably in much larger degree through the efforts of the banks and business men of the country to restore normal con- ditions. the opening of the fourth period in 1921 found the sys- tem working for the first time under approximately normal cir- cumstances. during the years 1921-5, therefore, the operations of the reserve banks were more closely adjusted to the general banking situation, and it was possible to judge the general results of the new law. expansion of reserve banks.—the great expansion resulting from the fiscal transactions of the treasury coincided with the upward swing of business taking place soon after the complete establishment of the collection system. greater efliciency was se- cured through the opening of new. branch offices at strategic points, in all 22 branches were created, certain of them acting primarily as collection agencies, while others added very considerable powers in the rediscounting of paper and the holding of reserves. early in the war the system entered into agency relationships with the bank of england, whereby that institution was to hold funds in trust for the federal reserve banks jointly, while they in turn were to undertake similar duties for the bank of england. it was understood at the time that the agency relationship would not, until after the war at least, lead to the performance of func- tions involving the buying and selling of bills or operations in the discount market. similar relationships were later concluded with the bank of france, the bank of japan and various other central foreign institutions, but the relationship was on a restricted basis, and did not result in the undertaking of international discount operations. the position of the reserve banks on oct. 28 1925 was as follows:— assets gold with federal reserve agents . gold redemption fund with u.s. treasury gold held exclusively against federal reserve $1,377,127,000 47,770,000 notes : ' i : ‘ : : . 1,424,897,000 gold settlement fund with federal reserve board . ; ‘ . , : ; : gold and gold certificates held by banks . total gold reserves. d . _ reserves other than gold total reserves non-reserve cash bills discounted :— | secured by u.s. government obligations other bills discounted —_. d ; , total bills discounted 716,589,000 641,063,000 2,782,549,000 110,511,000 . 2,893,060,000 52,932,000 293,285,000 : 296,709,000 589,994,000 329 bills bought in open market 328,717,000 u.s. government securities :— bonds . 56,020,000 treasury notes . certificates of indebtedness 20,260,000 total u.s. government securities . 324,757,000 other securities 3,220,000 foreign loans on gold 3,399,000 total bills and securities . . _1,250,087,000 due from foreign banks 640,000 uncollected items . bank premises all other resources 684,027,000 61,557,000 18,120,000 total resources . . $4,960,423,000 liabilities federal reserve notes in actual circulation $1 694,771,000 deposits :— member bank—reserve account 2,227,212,000 government ; 38,670,000 foreign bank 12,071,000 other deposits 19,311,000 2,297,264,000 617,350,000 116,602,000 217,837,000 16,599,000 total deposits deferred availability items . capital paid in : surplus. all other liabilities total liabilities . . $4,960,423,000 ratio of total reserves to deposit and federal reserve note liabilities combined... 7205 contingent liability on bills purchased for foreign correspondents a $36,849,000 the experience of american banks after the ‘silent panic of 1920-1’? was somewhat chequered. there was a steady and sub- stantial growth in assets and in turnover, the banks getting back more than they had lost through shrinkages resulting from the panic. but the results of the inflation which had led to the condt- tions of 1920-1 could not be avoided. in many cases, after the im- mediate effects of the shrinkage of prices had been overcome, banks found themselves in a weakened and unsatisfactory condition. in the case of not a few of the larger institutions this necessitated compulsory contributions by directors or additional subscriptions to stocks by stockholders, in order to make up the shortage resulting from losses. in other cases, however, there was an inevitable break- down, asa result the years 1924 and 1925 saw a marked shrinkage in the number of banking institutions in existence, partly due to the constantly increasing number of mergers necessitated in many cases as a means of avoiding failure, and partly to the great num- ber of actual failures, which in 1924 amounted to 777 and in 1925 to a total of 612. in some measure this unfortunate record was the result of over- speculation during and after the war. in the middle-west and south-west, for example, where the bulk of the failures took place, extraordinary and unreasonable loans had been freely made by the banks upon farm land or live stock or both, while large advances upon inadequate security, oftentimes unsold produce, were com- mon, the oversight of banking had been inadequate and limited; and the general supervision exerted by state banking authorities, in view of the greatly increased number of institutions, grew steadily more and more inadequate. the national banking system also suffered from insufficient and careless oversight of its members, and had too readily and too hastily granted bank charters in favour of institutions that had but slight hope of success. the banks themselves had been inclined to engage in undesirable operations. although the federal reserve system was expected to diminish the volume of speculation, it had not done so, events both during and after the war showing that the country banks were more inclined than ever to pour their money into the speculative market, while funds were withdrawn from the slow and steady development of legitimate business in the interior of the country. other factors in post-war banking were a return to almost exclusive interest in domes- tic operations, and a tendency for the smaller american banks to invest heavily in bonds of long maturity. the general tendency has, therefore, been rather towards a diminution in the degree of liquid- ity. meantime there has been a marked growth of branch banking legislation and practice. under the administrative rulings of the comptroller of the currency, many national banks have created branches within their own cities, while state banks and bank- ers have proceeded along similar lines. in general the states have come to be divided into three groups: one possessing positive laws permitting branch banking; a second having no definite law on the subject, but permitting branches more or less restricted by adminis- trative ruling; and a third carrying on its statute books definite legislation opposed to branch banking. altogether more than 2,000 330 fair proportion of them being branches of national banks located in the same city as the parent office. | in spite of adverse conditions the federal reserve system succeeded in unifying and consolidating the legitimate interests of the banks, and tended to eliminate many of the doubtful and unsatisfactory methods which had prevailed before its organisa- tion. the fact that the system was not successful in accomplish- ing some of its chief objects did not in any way detract from its successes, especially that of strengthening the condition of the city banks in many very important particulars. it seems fair to conclude that the federal reserve system did not function very successfully in the country districts; its chief success was apparently found in connection with city institutional lending and in the initiation of broad general improvements of method, such, for example, as those that relate to the clearance and collec- tion system. authorities.—reports of secretary of the treasury, comptroller of the currency and federal reserve board, 1914-25, inclu- sive; i*ederal reserve bulletins, 1915-26, inclusive. (li. p. w.) banting, frederick grant (18o91- ), canadian scientist, was born in canada and educated at the university of toronto. he served in the world war and then practised medicine in london, ontario, until may ro21, when he com- menced research on the internal secretion of the pancreas at the university of toronto. in 1922 it was announced that he, with prof. macleod and others, had succeeded in preparing insulin, a specific cure for diabetes. he was appointed professor of medical research at the university of toronto in 1923 and to- gether with prof. macleod received the nobel prize for medicine in the same year. see insulin; therapeutics. baptists (sce 3.370).—the baptist world alliance, formed in 1905, has drawn together the baptists of all lands, and has facilitated a systematic survey and more systematic work. international congresses have been held in london, berlin, stockholm, philadelphia; another is due at toronto in 1928. similar meetings have been held in the southern hemisphere. an executive is appointed every five years, whose european office is at 4, southampton row, london. j. in the olid world the troubles of continental baptists during the world war called forth abundant sympathy and practical help from their brethren. a conference at london in 1920 resulted in linking each national group on the continent with one of the stronger groups elsewhere, in fostering theological seminaries within cach country, and in the most promising students receiving further training in germany, sweden, england and america. a con- ference in chicago in 1925 planned for professors from sweden, england, canada and the united states to visit certain countries of central europe for aiding the national seminaries and con- ducting special short-term schools. great britain.—britain has seen a great strengthening of the baptist union, from whose memory the old distinctions of “general” and “ particular”? have faded away. important financial measures are raising the standard of sustentation and superannuation, and linking the churches in closer fellowship. much attention is given to the training of lay preachers, whose real importance had been somewhat overlooked. the problem of training and settling ministers is being viewed as a whole, and after careful thought two great changes have been adopted. there is a strong tendency to fix a term for the period of service in any one post, often five years, with the possibility of re- newal. then, to facilitate interchanges and to bring the churches into closer rclations with the union, a 17th-century office has been revived and modified. general superintendents work in large areas, one for the english-speaking churches in wales, one for scotland, one for london and eight for the rest of england. these ministers confer monthly. development in russia—on the continent of europe, the most remarkable development has been in russia, where the in- crease has been phenomenal. no trustworthy figures have been banting—baptists branches in all existed at the end of 1925, in the various states, a | published by the soviet govt. but from many quarters reports are sent of untiring evangelists increasing the membership by 30° a year. whereas the highest figure mentioned in 1911 was 100,000, the lowest mentioned in 1925 is 1,000,000; one re- sponsible leader claims 2,000,000 in his section, and a prominent statesman speaks of 3,500,000. growth has outstripped organi- sation, but two groups are fairly well knit. the older radiated from titlis and kiev, and flourishes among the peasantry; the younger radiated from petrograd and embraces a large number of more cultured people. ‘these are now re-arranging themselves on geographical lines; already there is a ukrainian baptist union, and careful attempts are being made to evolve one all- russizn union on lines congenial to the slavic genius, as also to establish one or more theological seminarics. in south america, the initiative is still largely with missionaries from north america and europe. africa.—in africa, too, progress depends on the guidance of foreigners. under the french, belgian and portuguese flags work must be conducted in native languages, or french or portuguese. there is no sign of such wholesale adoption of christianity as has taken place among africans in america; these distant relations however recognise their special obligations and discharge them in the west and south. developments in asia.—in asia the feature of recent years is the growth of strong native missions in india and china, which are grateful for past help from europe and america but which are taking tentative steps of their own. one conference passed a resolution that it now understands the need of the churches, and will indicate to foreigners the kind of help and helpers de- sired. baptists of south china have assumed all responsibility for planning and administering the work in all phases, and their decision is hailed with deep satisfaction by the missionaries and the foreign boards. the christian literature society for china has a majority of chinese as authors, editors and managers. the christian universities in both lands are still largely influenced by foreigners. (w. t. w.) if. in the new world the baptists of america were in 1925 organised in r4 national, or approximately national, bodies. of these, the northern baptists convention had at that date, a membership of 1,419,791; the southern baptist convention 3,574,531; and various negro conventions 3,044,528. after allowance has been made for dupli- cations, the total membership of the baptist churches in the united states was 8,025,348. the total value in 1925 of church property of american baptists was $343,540,300, and the amount raised for missions and various other beneficences was $18,493,717 with a total amount of annual contributions of $74,504,611. these large figures indicate a rapid development. the northern baptist convention—prior to 1907 the baptist churches of the northern states had no central body to which they could send delegates. there existed a number of societies en- gaged in foreign and home missions and publication, but these were not strictly representative bodies. in 1907 there was a tentative organisation of a northern baptist convention which was subsequently developed into a permanent body, composed of delegates from local churches and 37 afliliating organisations, including state conventions. this body has no authority, but has very great influence. perhaps its most important operation was its adoption of a five-year programme for the purpose of stimu- lating the evangelistic and benevolent activities of the churches. during the world war, the convention co-operated patriot- ically with national activity, but found that the finances of the socicties were in danger oi serious deficit. there was, therefore, organised a campaign to raise $100,000,000 during a period of five years. the convention also entered into the federal council of the churches of christ in america and the inter-church world movement. asa result of the situation in which the nation then was, the northern baptists found themselves obligated for large sums to the inter-church world movement at the very time they were engaged in raising the vast sum voted. these obligations were met, but the total amount raised in the campaign was ap- barany—barclay proximately only 60% of the total amount desired. the cost of operating foreign missions rose more rapidly than the income, and there has been a need of some limitation of missionary ex- pansion. in 1925 the northern baptists had in the foreign field 805 missionaries; 2,154 churches with 8,321 native workers, 3,645 schools of all grades, with 136,178 pupils; and 84 hospitals and dispensaries. ‘the northern baptists at the same time main- tained 14 seminaries, three training schools, 23 universities and colleges, five junior colleges and 18 academies. they furnish a large number of leaders in theological thinking and scholarship. the denomination has suffered considerable inner disturbance because of the efforts of certain conservative elements in the denomination to get control of the convention and adopt a con- fession or creed for the churches. this move was so thoroughly opposed to the baptist policy that it was rejected overwhelm- ingly when finally the vote was taken uponit. at the same time, the agitation has been continued by persons, several of whom are not members of the northern baptist convention, who have founded the baptist bible union for the purpose of maintaining what seems to them to be fundamental baptist positions. the southern baplist convention.—this body is vigorously expressing itself in various forms of denominational activity in the south. southern baptists have declined to enter the federal council of the churches of christ in america and the inter- church world movement. in 1919, however, they instituted a drive for $75,000,000 and pledged $90,000,000, which has been approximately 65% successful. the southern baptists are organised somewhat differently from their northern brethren, having boards rather than societies. they have a large number of churches, many of which are in rural districts. theologically, the southern baptists are conservative and especially insistent upon immersion as the mode of baptism. their development in wealth and prestige, especially noteworthy in texas, is attested by their support of two theological seminaries, three training schools, 32 universities and colleges and 28 junior colleges. they have established a large number of hospitals, several ‘of which have a large income. they also maintain a number of orphan- ages. they are making, especially through the faculty of the southern baptist theological seminary at louisville, distin- guished contributions to theological scholarship. the negro baptists have organised a number of national, or semi-national bodies, the two largest of which are the national baptist convention and the national baptist convention of america. these bodies maintain various missionary societies and publication societies with costly buildings; they are well organised and efficiently led. they maintain several theological seminaries and are active in educating the youth of their churches. foreign-s peaking bapiists.—yor a number of years, there has been work carried on by baptists among foreign-speaking immi- grants in the united states, and these efforts have resulted in the establishment of a number of baptist conventions and other organisations in the various nationalities. the largest of these bodies are the german and sweclish conventions, which repre- sent a total membership of something like 65,000. in addition smaller bodies of danish, norwegian, czechoslovak, polish, hungarian, finnish, italian, french, portuguese, rumanian and russian bodies have also been organised. there are also a large number of unorganised, foreign-speaking baptists. in fact, it is common for such foreign-speaking citizens of america, who have broken with their state churches, to organise under the simple forms of baptist denominations. the exact number of all the foreign-speaking baptist bodies, so far as can be discovered, is approximately 82,000. these foreign-speaking groups have been of very great value in the process of americanisation, for, as a rule, the second generation either speaks english or joins english- speaking churches. | , (s. m.) bibliography.—the baptist world alliance, second congress (philadelphia, 1911); the baptist world alliance, third congress (london, 1923); s. pearce carey, william carey, d.d. (london, 1923); j. h. rushbrooke, the baptist movement tn the continent of europe (london, 1923); w. t. whitley, a history of british bap- tists (london, 1923); sir james marchant, dr. john clifford (lon- don, 1924). ; 13 | 331 barany, robert (1876- —_—+), austrian physician, was born in vienna april 22 1876, and became a lecturer on diseases of the ear at the university there in 1909. in 1915, when he was a mili- tary doctor at przemysl, he was taken prisoner by the russians, but after some time he was released as an invalid. in 1917 he was invited to uppsala university as assistant professor for ear and throat diseases and thus gained the title of professor. in 1914 he won the nobel prize for medicine for his investigations in physiology and the methods of diagnosis, of great significance in the development of internal surgery. baerany alzo carried out important investigations in the physiology and pathology of the cerebellum, and worked out a method for the objective diagnosis of one-sided deafness. hlis works include physiologie und patho- logie des bogengang - apparats beim mezsciten (1907). barbadoes: see west indies, british. barbusse, henri (1874- ), french man of letters, was born in paris may 17 1874. educated at the college rollin, he became a journalist. in 1910 he was editing the periodical je sais tout, but found time to write novels, of which les sup- pliants (1903) and, in particular, l’ enfer (1908), an intense trag- edy tinged with melodrama, won considerable success. he is known chiefly for a brutal piece of realism, le fez (1916), which won the prix goncourt in 1917 and remains one of the most un- forgettable pictures of modern war. later he became a corre- spondent of the socialist journal l’ humanite and devoted his time to preaching against war. among his other works are clarle (1919); lalueur dans l’abime (1920); and quelques coins du coeur (1921). barcelona, spain (sce 3.391), has continued to increase in size and population during recent years. in dec. 1923 the popu- lation was 760,572 and it is now the largest town of spain. the war brought great prosperity to barcelona, which supplied large quantities of war materials and manufactured goods, and this is shown in the appearance of the place. broad avenues have been driven through the old quarter and the slopes of montjuich con- verted into a fine park with terraced gardens, an open air theatre and a stadium. at the foot of the hill are the buildings for the exhibition of 1926. the pedralbes palace was presented to king alfonso on the occasion of his visit to barcelona in may 1924, by loyal catalonians. the aim of the donors was to improve rela- tions between castile and catalonia by providing a home in a pleasant climate which should be visited regularly by royalty. the palace, which was completely furnished by the donors and embellished with much marble, bronze and gi.ding, stands in the suburb of sarria on the lower slope of the hills and has fine views; everything in it is said to be of catalan origin. a tube railway was opened in dec. 1924 and a line of the metropolitan railway, linking up the northwestern suburbs of gracia and san gervasio, in dec. 1925; a new dry dock has been constructed in the harbour. barcelona, fulfilling its old reputation as the centre of revolu- tionary ferments, was in 1916 the headquarters of the system of infantry committees of defence, which led to a conflict, and had serious political effects. in 1921 a conference on communications and transport was held under the auspices of the league of nations and led to the formation of an international body, the technical and advisory commission on traflic problems. after the war barcelona suffered, like other places, from the crisis in trade; the spanish commercial treaties have also been a severe blow to the metal industries. in 1923 there was a general strike, with conflicts between the police and syndicalists. under a law pro- mulgated in 1924, many suggestions made by the barcelona municipality have been adopted. the alcalde or mayor is now elected by popular vote, and the number of electors is much greater. the municipality, in common with others in catalonia, has been given wider administrative powers. in sept. 1925 there was a military revolt in catalonia and martial law was enforced for a short time. . , | | barclay, sir thomas (1853- ), english lawyer, was born in dunfermline, scotland, and after studying at the uni- versities of london, paris and jena, went to paris as a corre- spondent of the times in 1876. he was called to the bar (1881) and in 1882 resigned from the times in order to study french 332 law practice. from 1900 onwards he was constant in his advo- cation of cordial franco-british relations. in 1903 and 1904 he visited the united states and agitated for an anglo-american treaty of arbitration and conciliation, and in feb. 1905 visited berlin, at the invitation of the associated chambers of ger- many with a view to promoting improved relations with that country. he was elected to parliament as liberal member for blackburn in 1910. amongst his numerous publications on international law and relations may be mentioned: problems of international practice and diplomacy (1907); international law and practice (1917); new methods for adjustment of international disputes (1918); le president wilson et l'evolution dela politique etrangere des etats-unis (1918). baring-gould, sabine (1833-1924), british novelist (see 3.401), published the fvangelical revival (1920) and early reminiscences (1923). he died at lew trenchard, cornwall, jan. 2 1924. barker, sir herbert atkinson (1860- ), british manipulative surgeon, was born in southport, lancs., april 21 1869. educated with a view to following the legal profession, at an early age he showed an aptitude for manipulative surgery and in 1889 was placed under the tutorship of mr. j. atkinson. on the latter’s death in 1904, barker took over the practice and in the following years he acquired a wide international reputa- tion. he specialised particularly in the correction of abnormal- ities of the joints by manipulation, and the cure of derangements of knee cartilages and flat-foot. although sir herbert per- formed an extraordinarily large number of successful operations, his methods never met with the formal approval of the medical profession, who steadily refused to admit him officially to their ranks. he was knighted, however, in 1922, as the result of a memorial to the prime minister signed by several of the most distinguished surgeons of his day. his written works consist principally of articles in various periodicals urging the medical profession to study more closely his own methods of bloodless surgery. see manipulative surgery. barkla, charles glover (1877- ), british scientist, was born june 7 1877, the son of john martin barkla, secre- tary of the atlas chemical co., widnes, lancashire. he was edu- cated at liverpool institute; university college, liverpool; and trinity and king’s colleges, cambridge. in 1902 he became oliver lodge fellow of liverpool university, and demonstrator and assistant lecturer in physics, rgos. in 1907 he was lecturer in advanced electricity, and from 1909-13 wheatstone professor of physics in the university of london (king’s college). he was then appointed professor of natural philosophy at the univer- sity of edinburgh. he became bakerian lecturer at the royal society 1916, and hughes medallist of the same society in the following year. in tot7 he was awarded the nobel prize for physics. he has written numerous papers on electric waves, x-rays, etc., for various scientific journals. barlach, ernst (1870- ), german artist and poet, was born at wedel, holstein, on jan. 2 1870. after distinguishing himself as a sculptor he attracted public notice with his dramatic works, der tote tag (1912), der arme vetter (1918), die echten sedemunds (1920), der findling (1922) and die siindflut (1924). he received the kleist prize for the last named drama in 1924. he illustrated the majority of his pieces with woodcuts. he is an expressionist and his philosophical dramas represent the mythi- cal struggles of mankind with the powers of darkness. notwith- standing the massiveness of his forms, his drawing and sculpture reflect a delicate and sensitive understanding. barnard, george grey (1863- ), american sculptor, (see 3.410), completed his two great groups of 31 statues for the pennsylvania capitol at harrisburg in 1912. his bronze statue of lincoln, heroic in size, was unveiled in lytle park, cin- cinnati, in 1917. this statue aroused considerable public dis- cussion, prominent art critics denouncing it as devoid of any artistic qualities. on the other hand many admirers of lincoln, including miss tarbell, his biographer, and theodore roosevelt warmly praised the work, but-his son, mr. robert t. lincoln, objected to placing replicas in london and paris, and the council baring-gould—barracks of the national academy of design issued a formal protest. among mr. barnard’s more noticeable later works were ‘ ris- ing woman,” in marble (1918), and ‘‘ adam and eve,” marble group (1923), both purchased by j. d. rockefeller, jr.; “a monument to democracy ” (1920), containing 400 figures in plaster; and “ let there be light,” a bronze statue of heroic size, for louisville, ky. (1925). barnard, j. e. (1870- ), british physicist, was born in london and achieved considerable success in the science of microscopy. he carried out very valuable work at the national institute for medical research, hampstead, london, where he was in charge of the department of applied optics, by co-oper- ating with dr. gye in the demonstration in 1925 of the existence of the cancer virus. he held in addition the post of lecturer at king’s college, london, and was president and honorary sec- retary of the royal microscopical society, london. he was elected f.r.s. in 1924. barnes, ernest william (1874- ), british divine, was born on april 1 1874 and was educated at king edward’s school, birmingham and at trinity college, cambridge, where he had a brilliant career, being bracketed second wrangler in 1896 and elected in 1898 to a fellowship of his college. ordained deacon in 1902 and priest in 1903, he held various appointments at trinity college, cambridge, becoming tutor in 1908. he wrote many valuable papers on mathematics and in 1909 was elected f.r.s. in 1915 he was appointed master of the temple and in 1918 canon of westminster. he rapidly acquired a reputation as a vigorous and broad-minded preacher and in his sermons discussed either evolution and science, or the more homely aspects of christianity, with equal candour and individuality. in 1924 on the recommendation of mr. ramsay macdonald, canon barnes was appointed bishop of birmingham. in this capacity his “ advanced ” views, and in particular his refusal to sanction the practice of the reservation of the sacrament which he considered contrary to the spirit of the prayer book and likely to foster superstition, led to sharp controversy with the anglo-catholic elements of his diocese and attracted wide public notice in england. barnett, john francis (1837-10916), british composer (see 3.414), died in london nov. 24 1916. barnett, samuel augustus (1844-1913), british divine and social reformer (see 3.414, dicd at hove, sussex, june 17 1913. see henrietta barnett, canon barnett: his life, work and friends (1918). barotseland (see 3.424), the southwest division of north- ern rhodesia and a native reserve. except for the substitution, in 1924, of direct imperial control for that of the chartered com- pany no change was made tn the political status of barotseland. europeans, other than officials, missionaries and traders ap- proved by the paramount chief, are not allowed to settle in the country. the barotse have shown keen interest in education, and large numbers profess christianity. lewanika (see 16.519), who had placed barotseland under british protection, died in 1916, and was succeeded as paramount chief by his eldest son, litia, who took the name of yeta iii. the chief is aided by a ngambella (prime minister) and a kodla (council); he has no jurisdiction over europeans. see d. w. stirke, barotseland. eight years among the barotse 1922).",
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