BAKU

the population in 1925 was about 250,000. baku changed hands repeatedly between 1917 and 1920. after the break-up of the federated republics of transcaucasia, azerbaijan, georgia and armenia, formed in 1917, azcrbaijan constituted itself an independent mohammedan republic early in 1918, claiming baku as its capital, but in march the russians and armenians ejected the tatar moslems. in july baku was occupied by a small british force from meso- potamia, but this was withdrawn in sept. owing to the ex- hausted condition of the armenian population and the arrival of turkish reinforcements. by the terms of the armistice in nov. 1918, however, the turks agreed to offer no objection to an allied occupation, and on nov. 17 a british force from persia, ‘with russians and armenians, reoccupied the town to preserve order. an azerbaijan govt. was established, but was wholly inexperienced, and the british military forces were forced to take over most of the work of civil administration. when the british troops were withdrawn in aug. to19, the order which they had brought to baku was rapidly changed to chaos. a russian force entered the town without opposition in april 1920, and, with the help of a rising of the local bolsheviks, the soviet socialist republic of azerbaijan, forming part of the transcaucasian socialist federal soviet republic, was pro- claimed with baku as its capital. the oil industry—in 1920 the oil wells in the baku area were nationalised by the soviet government. the refining machinery was repaired, new wells drilled and new refineries erected. in 1923-4, 191 new wells were being drilled and, in may 1924, 1,929 wells were reported to be active, as against 709 in 1920. in 1913 the yearly output of oil amounted to 9,438,000 tons; in 1923-4 it was 4,241,863 tons, valued at 88,625,000 roubles. the republic has granted large tracts of land for the enlargement of the industry, and a pipe-line to poti is projected. the town is connected with batum by a pipe-line, as well as the railway, and with krasnovodsk, across the caspian, by steam ferrics, and is only one day by stcamer from the north persian ports. the annual trade fair was revived in 1922. balakirev, mili alexeivich (1836-1910), russian composer (see 3.324), dicd at petrograd may 28 roto. balance of payments.—by the term international bal- ance of payments is meant in the first instance the statement of accounts or balance-sheet which could be compiled, were knowl- edge on this subject complete, referring to all those transactions between one country and others which involve monetary pay- ments or obligations. but a certain confusion is caused by the fact that the word balance is employed both for the balance-sheet itself and for any difference which may be shown between the total outgoings and the receipts. actually the two sides of this account must balance, for every transaction which should be included must involve cither a receipt, payment, credit or obligation. but the statements are frequently, indeed generally, drawn up in such a balance of payments way that a positive or negative balance may result. by positive balance is meant an excess of the apparent receipts over the apparent expenditure; by negative, the reverse. before the world war writers frequently excluded gold from the items composing the statement of accounts, and presumed that the net balance shown indicated the amount of gold which left or entered, or, but for short term borrowing, would have left or entered the country. since the war, however, the most approved practice has been to include all monetary transactions, with the exception of the arrangement of banking or other sim- ilar commercial floating credits. if it were possible, therefore, to draw up a complete statement for any country on this principle, the net balance would repre- sent the increase in the country’s floating credits or debits. but in practice a large number of items have to be estimated on an inadequate foundation of ascertained fact, so that the difference between the two sides of such an account is really composed of errors in estimation plus or minus changes in floating balances. in denmark, and more recently in norway and certain other countries, official statistics of bank balances are published an- nually, and the estimates can, therefore, be constructed using these statistics as the corner-stone of the whole structure of cal- culation and argumentation. for these countries, therefore, it is possible to obtain a more accurate estimate of one of the most interesting group of items brought out by the balance-sheet, namely capital movements, than it is for others. the fact should be emphasised that a statement of the bal- ance accounts of any country relates to monetary transactions only. gifts in kind and reparations in kind are, therefore, when possible omitted—but money gifts or reparations paid by draft included. in practice it may frequently prove impossible to effect these exclusions. the export of currency notes is equiva- lent to the opening of a special form of creclit. the chief headings.—the types of transaction which may give rise to international monetary obligations are almost infi- nite; but the main headings may be grouped as follows: inward or credit movements—exports of (1) merchandise; (2) gold bul- lion, gold and other specie and currency notes; (3) capital items, including receipts on account of amortisation of loans, existing and new domestic securities sold abroad, foreign securities sold abroad, domestic real estate and other capital values sold abroad; (4) interest and dividends from foreign loans and capital invested abroad; (5) shipping freights, charter money and other earnings of national ships from abroad; (6) transport and similar earnings from foreign goods in transit; (7) post, telegraph and telephone receipts from abroad; (8) funds brought in by immigrants and returned emigrants and emigrants’ remittances from abroad; (9) receipts from tourists; (10) receipts from foreign, diplomatic, consular and similar services; (11) commissions, insurance poli- cies and premiums, brokerage, etc.; (12) miscellaneous. the reciprocal debit items are obvious and need no capitulation. the compilation of such a statement in any country would entail special inquiry and a considerable element of conjecture. thus allowance would have to be made for the possible over- or under-valuation in the trade statistics of the recorded imports and exports, for contraband trade and other omissions. reliable statistics are seldom available for the so-called invisible items, e., all items other than merchandise, coin and bullion. and in each country different measures for estimating the value of each item, dependent on the organisation of business, have to be adopted. in spite of the practical differences which such estimates in- volve, the study of this question has received a remarkable amount of attention since the war. official estimates for the year 1923 or 1924 have been prepared by 15 governments, the most elaborate being those of the united states of america. for this country very detailed statements, official or non-official, have been compiled since 1919. these are summarised in the table in the next column. the final item represents in part errors and omissions, which in the last three years were estimated at —133, —115 and +4 million dollars. complete accuracy can never be attained. but 399 united states: balance of payments (millions of dollars) (credits +” debits —) exports of mer- chandise (net) | +4,016 exports+ and imports— of silver (net) © [ + exports+ and imports— of gold (net) iexport of u.s. currency (net) |} + gi} + interest on for- eign _invest- ments {(nct) . |-+ so) + 5o) + ocean freight payments (net). 4° 93) 93) =f governmental expenditure abroad . — 2,375, — immigrants’ re- mittances, charity and tourist expen- diture (net) . ) — foreign loans paid o 255 sales of securities to foreigners ies es + 48 repayment of principal of debts to u.s. govt. ‘ . foreign invest- ment of amer- ican capital . | — excess of credits + and debits —on all trans- actions + 2,950 i§2)}+ 26/— 11/- 8j;— 2 + 160)~— 50] — 103} — 80] +3517] - ast fo =8 re 38 305} — 50)—- 16/— ig} —- § -~760 4°23 +412 —70o a 7s +216 571) + 31) + 91] + 23 —1,445] —1,092| —963 | —417 | —909 +1,082' +1,143| — 226 —118 mineludes interest received by u.s. govt. ments. the statement renders clear the manner in which the enormous net exports of the earlier years, largely to europe, were covered by long-term loans and short-term credits, how the floating credits are being gradually liquidated, and how the export sur- plus itself sank from over $4,000,000,000 1n 1919 to $389,000,000 in 1923. the increase of this surplus in 1924 was coincident with the revival of capital export. a\though the interest earned by the united states of america on her foreign investments rose from about $50,000,000 in 1919, to over $460,000,000 in 1924, it was still less than 50% of the receipts of the united kingdom on this account. but, according to the estimates of the board of trade the net receipts of the united kingdom estimated in 1913 at £210,000,000 were despite changes in the purchasing power of money only {220,000,000 in 1924. in 1926 very considerable revisions were made in the more recent estimates of the british balance of payments. the united figures for 1924 and the preliminary estimate for 1925 are as follows:— united kingdom: balance of payments (in millions of pounds) — 508 —2i2 from foreign govern- excess of imports of merchandise and bullion payments made excess of overseas . total net income from overseas investments net national shipping income . foreign ships disbursements in british ports commissions . . ; other services government total invisible exports on balance . available for investment abroad new overseas issues on london market in year . : 310 the relative importance of the visible and invisible items in individual balances of international accounts varies cnormously from country to country and from year to year. in the years immediately succeeding the war, most european countries showed a heavy visible negative, and most of the important extra-european countries a large visible positive balance of trade, the differences being accounted for mainly by short-term borrowings. (see trane, international.) of the countries for which estimates have been made, the united states, the united kingdom, france, austria, the neth- erlands, switzerland and sweden, all obtained a net income from foreign investments in 1923. switzerland and italy earn a very considerable net income from tourists, estimated at somewhat over $27,000,000 for the former in 1924 and $119,000,000 for the latter in 1922. a number of european countries further acquire an important addition to their foreign purchas‘ng power from the remittances sent by emigrants, the largest sums being re- ceived by italy about $126,000,c00 in 1923; greece, about $25,000,000 in 1923 and $40,000,000 in 1924; poland, $25,000,- 000-$30,000,000 in both 1923 and 10924; the irish free state roughly estimated at about $20,000,000 in 1924. the united states state dept. reckons that remittances to germany in 1924 from america alone were in the neighbourhood of $80,000,000. the greater part of the emigrants’ remittances received by europe, but by no means the whole, is derived from the united states of america, whose outgoings on this account in 1923 and 1924 are given at $350,000,000. the net expenditure of her tourists and travellers is also enormously greater than that of any other country, amounting in 1923 to nearly $300,000,000 or more than half of the foreign earnings of british shipping in that year. (a. ly.) baldwin, james mark (1861-— ), american philosopher (see 3.247). leaving johns hopkins university in 1909, he oc- cupied a chair at the national university of mexico until 1913. in 1915-6 he lectured at oxford university and the french pro- vincial universities. he was made a professor at the ecole des hautes etudes sociales, paris, in rg19. his later writings include the individual and society (1911), history of psychology (2 vol., 1913), genetic theory of reality (1915) and the super-state (1916). baldwin, stanley (1867- ), british politician, was born at bewdley aug. 3 1867, the only son of alfred baldwin, chair- man of the great western railway and for 16 years m.p. for the bewdley division of worcestershire. descended from a family, long small landowners in shropshire, baldwin’s great- grandfather, toward the end of the 18th century, migrated into worcestershire and established at bewdley an iron foundry which expanded with the passage of time into the great combination of iron and steel manufactories and collieries known as baldwin’s, ltd. the development of this concern contributed to the making of stanley baldwin; for, deeply as he was rooted in the rich soil of the english midlands, his economic and social outlook was the result of close personal experience of the evolution of modern industry. besides the territorial and the industrial there was a third strain in baldwin’s character which came to him from his father’s and his mother’s people. it was that of puritanism. both his parents were of puritan stock; both indeed were brought up as wesleyan methodists. his mother, who lived to see her son twice prime minister, was louise, one of the five remarkable daughters of the rev. g. b. macdonald, a wesleyan minister. of mrs. baldwin’s sisters, one became the wife of sir edward burne- jones; a second of sir edward poynter, p.r.a., and a third of j. l. kipling. stanley baldwin is thus a first cousin of mr. rudyard kipling. mrs. baldwin was a great favourite with rossetti and william morris, and it was in this circle and from his close and constant association with his gifted relations that baldwin derived an abiding taste for the best things in art and literature. his forma] education was that given to young men of his class. in 1881 he went to harrow and in 1885 to trinity college, cambridge, where he took his b.a. in 1888. after leaving cambridge baldwin went into his father’s baldwin, j. m.—baldwin, stanley business; and when his father entered parliament in 1892 stanley baldwin became virtually the head of the concern. for nearly 20 years the business was the central interest of his life. he became a county magistrate and a county councillor, and lived the life of a country gentleman, with scholarly tastes and large and expanding business interests. in 1892 he had married lucy, the eldest daughter of e. l. j. risdale of rottingdean, by whom he had two sons and four daughters. in 1906 he served his apprenticeship to politics by unsuccessfully contesting kidder- minster in the conservative interest. two years later his father died, and stanley baldwin succeeded to the chairmanship of the business, now converted into a joint stock company, to a seat on the board of the great western railway and to the representation of the bewdley division of worcestershire. on march 3 1908, the future prime minister took his seat in the house of commons, and on june 22 made his maiden speech. it was a characteristically modest and sensible contribution to a debate on a subject of which he had intimate knowledge. he spoke in opposition to the coal mines (fight hours) bill from the point of view of the class which he and his family had repre- sented for four or five generations. in the session of 1909 he had the chance of making a private member’s motion. he chose as his theme the investment of british capital abroad, and in the course of his speech revealed himself as an ardent protectionist. but, although the house listened to him respectfully on the several occasions on which he spoke, he gave no special promise of future distinction. for nine years he did his work as a private member, quietly, effectively, simply and modestly. official career —lord edmund talbot, later viscount fitzalan and then chief whip, noted baldwin’s ability and advised bonar law to make him his parliamentary private secretary. this was done in dec. 1916, and from that moment baldwin’s advancement was astonishingly rapid. in jan. 1017, he became a junior lord of the treasury, but instead of going into the whip’s office, he was kept busy “ on the bench,” deputising for the financial secretary who had no seat in the house. in june he became joint financial secretary to the treasury and in that capacity gave valuable assistance in debate to mr. bonar law and mr. austen chamberlain—successively chancel- lors of the exchequer. accustomed to control the policy of a great business concern, baldwin was not perhaps well fitted for a subordinate place in the official hierarchy, but his efficient work in parliament was rewarded by admission to the privy council in 1920 and to the cabinet when, in 1921, he became president of the board of trade. it was there that he first gave proof of the stuff that was in him; but in party politics he was still almost an unknown factor. his chance, however, came in 1922. the coalition formed by mr. lloyd george in dec. 1916, and cemented by the gen- eral election of 1918, was by that time manifestly breaking. many liberals, and still more conservatives, found that the coalition imposed too great a strain on their political consciences. mr. lloyd george and his personal followers were anxious to appeal again to the electors as a coalition. the majority of the conservatives were opposed to them. the crisis camein oct. 1922, when, in fear of a coup d’etat by the coalition ministers, a meeting of the conservative m.p.s was called at the carlton club on oct. 19. mr. austen chamberlain presided, and his weight, with that of almost all his colleagues in the cabinet, was thrown into the scale of the coalition. but they did not prevail with the rank and file of the party, who decided, there and then, by 187 votes to 87 to cut themselves adrift from mr. lloyd george and the liberal wing of the coalition, and to appeal to the country as conservatives sais phrase. that meeting was the turning point in the history of modern conservatism; it was the turning point in the career of stanley baldwin. the result was due, apart from the determination of the rank and file, pre-eminently to two men: bonar law and baldwin. the former emerged from retirement, to rescue his party from the coalition. his action was heroic; the hand of death was already on him, and nothing but a high sense of duty induced him to essay a task manifestly beyond his strength. but baldwin's was balfour the greater courage. only recently admitted to cabinet rank, yet plainly destined to a high place in politics; just approaching the zenith of his powers, physical and intellectual; with every- thing to lose politically by a false step, he took his courage in both hands and did simply what he believed to be right. his speech was characteristically brief and direct. he went at once to the “ root of the whole difficulty—the position of the prime minister,” and expressed his conviction that if the “ present association * were continued, the disintegrating process in the conservative ranks, already far advanced, would “ go on in- evitably until the old conservative party was smashed to atoms and lost in ruins.” accordingly he declared himself ‘ prepared to go into the wilderness if he should be compelled” by the dynamic force of mr. lloyd george to “ stay with him.” the die was cast. the mecting voted with bonar law and baldwin; mr. austen chamberlain and other unionist leaders went into the wilderness—temporarily—with mr. llovd george; bonar law became prime minister—the first conservative to hold the office in sixteen years; baldwin became chancellor of the exchequer and principal lieutenant in the commons; lord curzon of kedleston remained foreign secretary and leader in the house of lords. the electors endorsed the verdict of the carlton club mecting; 344 conscrvatives were returned, a clear though small majority over al] other parties; but the premicr was a stricken man and after a few months in office resigned. length and distinction of service, no less than intellectual pre-eminence, pointed to lord curzon as his successor; but the king was persuaded that, since the labour party had become the official opposition, a peer- premier was no longer practicable. accordingly baldwin was invited to form a ministry, and, assured of the loyal support of his colleagues, consented. the ministry was easily reformed under the new premier, but some of the ablest and most ex- perienced conservatives still remained outside the ministry and the loss of bonar law was severely felt. baldwin’s first ministry was short-lived. in nov. 1923, despite the fact that his parliamentary majority was intact, he decided to ask the electors for a vote of confidence in himself and in the policy which he believed could alone cure trade depres- sion and relieve unemployment—protcction for native industries. the country refused its assent. out of the three partics none commanded an absolute majority in the new parhament. con- sequently the baldwin ministry, with 259 supporters, met parliament. the liberals, however, coalesced with the labour men and turned out the conservatives. mr. ramsay mac- donald, thereupon, became the head of a labour govt. and re- mained for nine months in office, until a hostile vote in the house of commons compelled him to appeal to the country, with the result that baldwin found himself at the head of a solid phalanx of 444 conservatives. commissioned to form a ministry he not only invited mr. austen chamberlain and other conservative exiles to rejoin the cabinet, but entrusted the chancellorship of the exchequer to mr. winston churchill. growing steadily in political stature, having won an clcctoral victory almost without parallel in recent history, he refused to exploit a party triumph. personality and character.—the career thus outlined is one of the most remarkable in english political history. to what qual- ities or endowments may baldwin’s metcoric rise to ascribed. fortune has undoubtedly been kind to him, though in politics fortune rarely smiles except on those whom she suspects to be worthy of her favours. baldwin has still to win a place in the select company of great statesmen, but fate has given him an opportunity and he himself has given promise that he can take advantage of it. he starts with several initial advantages. the first, and not the least, is that his countrymen know him to be, like pitt, pecuniarily disinterested. pitt was a poor man, but his refusal of the clerkship of the polls proved that he counted money as dross compared with the public repute. baldwin, a rich man, proved his public spirit when in june 1919 he pre- sented to the exchequer for cancellation {150,000 of the new war loan, a sum representing approximately 20° of his total fortune. he hoped, in this way, to sct an example of personal ie sacrifice. he clearly perceived that the country was in grave dan- ger of “ being submerged in a wave of luxury and materialism,” and he believed that “a fool's paradise is only the ante-room to a fool's hell.” with the ideals of a patriot baldwin combines the instincts of a puritan. ile appeals, therefore, if not like gladstone to the nonconformist conscience, to the best feelings of all good men, whatever their creed. “i stick all through to what i believe to be right.”” so baldwin said at the carlton club meeting, and his countrymen instinctively recognized that he spoke with sincerity and simplicity. there is no pose about baldwin, though his briar pipe comes (thanks to the photographers) perioulsy near one. simple, sincere, disinterested, he is also shrewd. brilliant he is not; and indeed all that makes for brilliance he almost osten- tatiously disdains. he is slow of specch and a curious working of the face and puckcring of the brows gives the impression that his thoughts are, like his speech, laboured. ‘ my mind moves slowly,” he wrote of himself. his speeches reveal a fund of dry and rather caustic humour, but in verbal wit he does not excel, though his judgments on men and things are expressed, especially in private, with pungent force and directness. rhetoric he profoundly mistrusts; oratory he regards with froude as “ the harlot of the arts.’’ yet he has a keen appreciation of style in literature, and though he is im- patient of the intrusion of the intellectual into politics or industry, few men have a higher sense of the value of real education. less of the scholar, in the narrower sense, than gladstone or peel, he belongs like them to the commercial aristocracy. he loves good art and good literature, but above all he loves nature, and his joy in the sights and sounds and smells of the english countryside is drawn from that quict worship which is the basis of all true poctry. no one who was not at once patriot and poet could have made the speech which he made on st. george’s day, 1924.1 (see conservative party.) (j. a. r. m.) 1¥n 1926 he published on england, a volume of his best non-political addresses, and by his calm and humane demeanour during the gen- eral strike his reputation at home and abroad was raised. balfour, arthur james balfour, rst ear_ of (1848- ), british statesman (sce 3.250). mr. balfour (as he then was) was confronted, as conservative leader, after the general election of jan. 1910, with an embarrassing situation. while endeavouring to save the eficctive authority of a second cham- ber and to avert irish home rule, with his supporters still sore over the tariff reform controversy, he was faced by a liberal ministry dominated once more by a body of 80 irish nationalists, who held the balance of power in the house of commons and insisted on a forward policy. he advocated the reform of the house of lords as an alternative to the ministerial veto resolutions, which he denounced as irrational. in the lull in the party fight which followed the death of king edward, he welcomed the suggestion of a conference between the partics to endeavour to arrange a compromise, and was one of the eight leaclers who met on 21 occasions between june and nov. without coming to an agreement. when the conferences failed and ministers announced another dissolution, he did his best to rouse the country to the dangers which, in his opinion, threatened it. when the second general election of 1910 con- firmed the verdict of the first, dissatisfaction with his leader- ship, which had been long entertained by a considerable section of the unionists, began to spread. it was pointed out that he had now led the party to three electoral defcats in succession: in 1906, jan. 1910 and dec. 1gto. the course of the session of rorr intensified this dissatisfac- tion. mr. balfour did indeed fight the parliament bill, in its passage through the house of commons, with courage, per- sistency, acuteness and passion. in committee he strove hard, but in vain, to get fundamental laws exempted from its opera- tion. but he shrank from encouraging the house of lords to persist in opposition, when ministers announced that they had obtained the king’s consent to the creation of sufficient peers to make its passage certain. he did indeed move a vote of censure imputing to ministers a gross abuse of the constitution in the 312 advice they had given to the crown; but he declared that he would stand or fall with lord lansdowne in that statesman’s recom- mendation to the unionist peers to abstain from further resist- ance as being no longer free agents. this attitude was passionately resented by a large group of “ diehards,” who organised themselves under lord halsbury. mr. balfour’s counsel prevailed, and the bill was allowed to pass; but his authority as leader had been seriously shaken, and in nov. he decided that the time had come for him to resign. in announcing his decision to a meeting of the conservative assn. of the city of london on nov. 8 he said that he desired to abandon his heavy responsibility before he could be suspected of suffering from a sort of petrifaction in old courses and inability to deal with new problems; and that he felt he had not the vigour, at his time of life, again to conduct a ministry. the announce- ment, in spite of the signs of discontent, came as a great shock to the party and the country. mr. balfour was then only 63, and his powers as a parlia- mentarian were really at their height. although he proceeded to devote more time to his manifold other interests in life—philos- ophy, science, literature and the fine arts—he still took at inter- vals a prominent part in debate, giving throughout a loyal sup- port to his successor in the house of commons, mr. bonar law. the renewed controversy on wome rule afforded him a great opportunity; and the powerful series of speeches which he de- livered, at westminster and elsewhere, in the course of the next three years, did much to awaken great britain to the im- minent danger of civil war in ireland, and to force ministers into the policy of excluding ulster, in some form or other, from the operation of their bill. when the world war broke out, he cordially accepted the policy of the unionist leaders to sink all political differences in support of the national government. speaking at the guildhall, london, on nov. rr 1914, he said that the allies were fighting for civilisation and the cause of small states, and, whether the war was short or long, they would triumph. in this spirit he joined the first coalition ministry in may 1915, becoming virst lord of the admiralty under mr. asquith. he speedily restored the harmony of the board of admiralty, which had been distracted by a quarrel between mr. churchill and lord fisher. he also. reversed mr. churchill’s policy of differentiating between prisoners from submarines as compared with other german prisoners. perhaps the best work which he did at the admiralty was the issue, at intervals, of some cogent papers, mainly for the benefit of the americans, indicating the great work of the british navy in the war and exposing the fallacies involved in the captivating phrase, “ the freedom of the seas.”’ the chief naval battle of the conflict, the battle of jutland, was fought during his term of office; and he incurred widespread criticism by the manner in which the news was officially com- municated to the public, the great losses in ships being dwelt on to such an extent as to suggest that, instead of being a victory, if an imperfect one, the action was a defeat. in nov. 1916 mr. balfour brought sir john jellicoe into the admiralty as first sea lord, sir david beatty becoming naval commander-in- chief. on the king’s birthday, june 3 1916, mr. balfour’s eminence and his patriotic readiness to resume in wartime, in spite of advancing years, official labours in a secondary position, were suitably recognised by the grant of the order of merit. when mr. lloyd george formed his coalition ministry in dec. 1916, the foreign office, on the retirement of lord grey of fallodon, was pressed upon mr. balfour, as it was essen- tial to have there a man of experience and weight. he took up his new duties only a few weeks before germany instituted the unrestricted submarine warfare which brought the united states into the war; and in april 1917, he headed a british mission which visited america in order to arrange for regular co-operation between the two countries. his attractive personality greatly impressed his hosts, and he received the compliment of being invited to address the house of representatives on may 5. he proceeded subsequently to canada, and there addressed the two houses of parliament. the baline concentration of power in the hands of the war cabinet and the great personal ascendancy which mr. lloyd george, as prime minister, rapidly acquired, tended to reduce the importance of the foreign secretary during mr. balfour’s tenure of the post. it was, however, he, as foreign secretary, who in nov. 1917 gave a promise on behalf of the british govt. to provide a ‘“‘ national home ”’ for the jews in palestine after the war. he went to the paris conference in 1919 as the second british pleni- potentiary, and appended his signature to the treaty of ver- sailles and to the abortive treaty of guarantee to france against german aggression. when the conference was over, mr. balfour relinquished the secretary of state’s seals to lord curzon, but remained in mr. lloyd george’s cabinet as lord president of the council. he was appointed chief representative of the british govt. at the first assembly of the league of nations in 1920 and also at the international conference at washington, d.c., in the winter of 1921-2. at washington he was, after the secretary of state, mr. hughes, the leading figure of the conference; and his prompt and cordial acceptance of mr. hughes’s proposals for the scrapping of capital ships and their future strict limitation greatly impressed the american public. the conference not only secured the limitation of navies, but also merged the anglo-japanese alliance into the four-power pacific treaty, the other two powers being the united states and france. on his return in 1922 from this mission mr. balfour was created, in march, a knight of the garter, though still a commoner, and in april, an earl. | during this year the question of inter-allied debts was pres- singly raised by america, a purely creditor state; and lord bal- four addressed the so-called balfour note, on behalf of the british govt., to the french ambassador and the representatives of other european powers. he pointed out that, while great britain, though more a lender than a borrower, was in favour of a general cancellation of inter-allied debts, she could not agree to the cancellation of european debts due to her, independently of the question of the british debt to the united states. lord balfour had no sympathy with the feeling of hostility which was growing in the conservative party throughout 1921-2 toward the continuance of a coalition ministry, and spoke in that sense at the carlton club meeting on oct. 19 1922, which broke up the coalition. he resigned office along with the other unionist coalition ministers and did not join either mr. bonar law’s or mr. baldwin’s conservative ministry in 1922-3. but he maintained a friendly attitude, and, after the fall of the govt., he moved, in a party meeting on feb. 11 1924, a vote of con- fidence in the ex-premier which was carried by acclamation. lord balfour was elected in 1919 chancellor of his old uni- versity, cambridge. in 1923 he published a further philosophical work, theism and thought, a study in familiar beliefs. he be- came president of the british academy, and was constant in his attendance at its meetings. he became president also of the na- tional institute of industrial psychology. early in 1925 he paid a visit to palestine, and was received with enthusiasm by the jewish population which had accepted his invitation of 1917 to establish there a national home. no open arab hostility was shown to him in palestine; but in syria, which he proceeded to visit, it flamed out in immediate menace and the french ad- ministration had to escort him hurriedly out of the country. on his return to england he accepted an invitation from mr. baldwin, on lord curzon’s death, to join the govt. as lord president of the council; and he was immediately detailed for the congenial task of presiding over a civil research committee instituted by the cabinet. (see conservative party; english history.) (g. e. b.) baline, israel (1888- ), american song writer, known as irving berlin, was born in russia may 11 1888, and was brought to the united states in 1892. early poverty curtailed his schooling, and he left home at 14 to earn his living, finding -employment as a singing waiter in various chinatown and bowery cabarets. there he began to write song lyrics and com- pose melodies. the increasing popularity of his songs enabled balkan wars him in rg1g to open a music publishing business. in 1920, in partnership with sam harris, he built the music box theatre in new york city, for which he wrote a number of highly suc- cessful revues. “ alexander’s ragtime band ” {1911), ‘‘ every- body’s doin’ it ” (1911) and several other compositions gave him international popularity as the pioneer of ragtime music. its subsequent evolution into jazz owes much to his later work, such as ‘‘ pack up your sins ” (1922) and “‘ everybody step ” (1921) characterised by complex rhythms and intricate meee see alexander woollcott'’s the story of irving berlin (1925). discussion of his work will be found in gilbert seldes’ the eee lively arts (1924). balkan wars, 1912-13.—this article gives an account of the campaigns of bulgaria, serbia, greece and montenegro, as allies, against turkey, in ro12 and 1913, and also of the brief struggle that followed between the former allies, with turkey -and rumania intervening, in the summer of 1913. when war broke out, all macedonia, albania and epirus still formed part of the ottoman empire. this also included much of the hill country between macedonia and thrace, as well as kosovo polje and regions on the borders of serbia and montenegro, as the frontiers then existed, together with the tongue of territory forming the sanjak of novi-pazar that jutted up to the confines of the austro-hungarian empire. the balkan league.—military alliances, directed against turkey, had been adjusted between bulgaria and serbia, and between bulgaria and greece during the early part of 1912; and the state of macedonia, under ottoman rule, served as an excuse for them to order mobilisation on sept. 30 and oct. 1. war was declared as soon as their armies were on their war footing, and active operations then at once commenced, montenegro, which had no formal agreement with the others, actually starting the hostilities. the turkish regular forces in europe at the time comprised 12 divisions of very weak establishment in thrace, and 12 similar divisions stationed at various points in the extensive . wy, berkovitsa y oe cao 313 ottoman territories further to the west; organisation of a sort also existed for about doubling the number of divisions on mobilisation; but it would not appear that the actual numbers available during the opening and decisive weeks of the struggle exceeded about 100,000 combatants in thrace and about 140,000 in the western theatres. large military forces, it is true, existed in turkey in asia; but, owing to the activities of the greek fleet, these could not be transferred to any part of european t arkey other than thrace. against this, bulgaria possessed nine very strong regular divisions, numbering about 180,000 combatants, with two strong reserve divisions formed after mobilisation. serbia promptly placed five somewhat weaker regular divisions in the field, mak- ing up a total of about 80,000 combatants, with five well- organised reserve divisions ready to follow. greece could muster four regular divisions of somewhat weak establishment, the com- batants at the start numbering perhaps 50,000, with four reserve divisions to be set up on mobilisation. the montenegrin army on the other hand was wholly on a militia basis and was but ill-suited for fighting, except among its own mountains or immediately outside its own frontiers. thus the allies, at the outset, enjoyed rather the advantage in respect of numbers; and, thanks to their reserve formations being much the better organ- ised, they retained and indeed increased this advantage during the weeks of hostilities that followed. i. the three theatres of war owing to the geographical situation, there were bound to be three practically distinct main theatres of war when the struggle began, viz.: on the turko-bulgarian frontier of thrace, on the frontier between macedonia and the allied powers, bulgaria and serbia, and on the frontier between greece and turkey. under a military understanding between bulgaria and serbia, six of the nine bulgarian regular divisions were to have been allot- ted to the eastern theatre of war, while the remaining three z rurgil giurgiu se mov it sf plevna st wag ae ye ue 1 tee 45; ee tao" ite hy als ot we ea una # = sag et reriy 1 ih famatl uy ws olla, : wal k in aay palankax a 2 se lui orin r 8 y ~ aardjik stana zaople ed ‘pe, ick igi 650 cbuitar| (sar. viza g bulg ono cons stan : ag (1912-13) english miles 50 kilometres ee 0 50 100 railways : a : 7; a a | rn, se ee ee a ee 314 co-operated with the serbian army in operations directed against macedonia. but bulgaria altered this arrangement at the last moment, retaining eight divisions for the east and employing only the remaining one in the western theatre, and this, more- over, as it turned out, moved independently toward salonika. it was, from the purely military point of view, a sound decision, as the turks could not be reinforced in macedonia from ana- tolia, whereas they could be so reinforced in thrace; but the action of bulgaria in the matter tended to cause somewhat strained relations between that kingdom and serbia at the very start. campaign in thrace—it will be convenient to take the campaign in thrace first. the bulgarian staff organised its eight regular divisions, destined for thrace, with the two newly formed reserve divisions, as three armies, the ij. army on the right of the maritsa, prepared to move on adrianople, the 1. army in the centre more to the east, and the iii. army on the left about yambol, prepared to move on kirk kilisse. on the declaration of war, on oct. 17, the three armies advanced and they passed the frontier on the 18th and 1oth to the northwest and north of adrianople, and on the 22nd to the northwest and north of kirk kilisse. adrianople was a great entrenched camp, composed of many forts and works, fairly well armed; kirk kilisse was also provided with some works, but they were not of an efficient character. the ii. army advanced against adrianople and to the west of it, with a view to investment, while the i. army followed a line more to the east and from the 22nd to the 24th was engaged with the enemy about seliolu, the battle ending in its complete vic- tory. on that same day the iii. army entered kirk kilisse, after some severe fighting, capturing an immense booty. the turkish field forces had originally been formed up about the ergene; but they had been ordered north to take the offensive, and had thus brought on the encounter battles at seliolu and kirk kilisse, in which they were heavily defeated. they re- treated in confusion to the line lule burgas—bunar hisar, the victorious bulgarians, owing to having outrun supplies, losing touch with them and therefore giving them time to reorganise to some extent. on discovering the direction of their opponents’ retreat, the bulgarian i. and iit. armies found themselves, in the first in- stance, called upon to make a wheel to the left. severe fighting took place on the 28th, 29th, and 3oth in the country between lule burgas and viza in which both sides suffered heavily and which ended in the turkish right near viza becoming seriously endangered; nazim pasha, the ottoman commander-in-chief, thereupon ordered a general retreat, and his troops fell back to the chatalja lines, covering constantinople. the victors were too exhausted to pursue, so that all touch with the defeated army was lost for the moment. in the meantime, the bulgarian it. army had invested adrianople, and some troops were pushed on to dimotika and to dedeagach on the aegean sea. after a few days, the i. and iii. bulgarian armies, being rein- forced and having their lines of communications in working order, advanced towards the chatalja lines and after a brief pause delivered an assault upon them on nov. 17. the attack was repulsed at all points with heavy loss, and the bulgarian command, sobered by this untoward experience, refrained from making a second attempt. the remains of the ottoman feld forces in the country to the west of the lower maritsa had in the meantime been surrounded and compelled to surrender at ferejik. operations in thrace now came to a standstill for a fortnight, and then, on dec. 3, an armistice was signed between bulgaria, serbia and montenegro on the one hand, and turkey on the other, greece being no party to it for reasons which will appear later. the bulgarian campaign in thrace had been bril- liantly successful, although adrianople remained tn ottoman hands; but the operations of the allies in the west had been no less triumphant. macedonia and the west.—the serbian authorities had been very happy in their mobilisation arrangements, and by the time that war was declared, they were already in a position to con- balkan wars centrate their five reserve divisions, as well as their five regular divisions close to the turkish frontier. their i. army, of five divisions, was about vranje; their iii. army, of four divisions, was further to the west, north of pristina; their ii. army, of one division, with the bulgarian 7th div., was about kyustendil in bulgaria. the plan was for the i. and iii. armies to advance southward into kosovo polje and on uskiib, while the ii. army came in from the east and from kyustendil, ready to operate against the right flank of the turkish forces known to be assem- bled at uskiib and to the north of it. the action of the bulgarian staff in only sending the one division to this theatre, instead of three divisions as previously agrged upon, necessarily weakened the effect of the threat of the ii. army against the ottoman communications, and the 7th bulgarian div. in fact afforded practically no help at all, being bent on an eccentric march on salonika via the struma valley. all three serbian armies crossed the ottoman frontier on oct. 19 and 20 through the mountains, meeting with slight resistance. the turkish forces were necessarily much dispersed in view of the vast area of the territory to be guarded; but an army of five weak divisions in the vardar valley had been moving northwards towards the serbian frontier, and most of it reached kumanovo on the 22nd. the head of the serbian i. army had arrived within a few miles of that place on the same day and had taken up a position, where it was attacked by the turks on the following day but succeeded in holding its ground. the remainder of the i. army came up on the 24th and a general action ensued in which the ottoman troops were signally defeated. they fled southwards, evacuating uskiib and withdrawing the detachments posted further to the northwest which had been opposing the advance of the iii. serbian army from about pristina. the victors, however, hardly realised how complete had been their success and, hampered as they were by the difficulties of the country and the delays in bringing up their impedimenta from beyond the frontier, they failed to take full advantage of it. it was not till the 29th that their three armies had joined hands and were prepared for further advance. the disorganised turks had for the most part withdrawn partly down the vardar, and partly from veles by prilep towards monastir; and on becoming aware of this the serbian staff made an entirely new disposition of available forces. the ii. army was sent off eastwards to aid the bulgarians before adrianople; part of the iii. army moved westwards into albania; the i. army, reinforced, moved southwards to co-operate with the greeks in disposing of the turks known to be gathered about salonika and monastir. the sanjak of novi-pazar had in the meantime been occupied by serbian and montenegrin detach- ments, and montenegrin forces had advanced against scutari, but they had failed to make any impression on its defences. al- though some unimportant ottoman detachments were still to be found in northern albania, the whole of that portion of turkey in europe lying north of a line stretching from about stip on the east, to just north of scutari on the west, was by the end of october, for all practical purposes, in the hands of the allies, while the 7th bulgarian div. was moving down the struma val- ley and approaching demir hisar. greece and salonika.—in the meantime, the greek military forces had not been idle. the main army, under command of crown prince constantine, had been concentrated in northern thessaly when war was declared. a smaller force was assembling near the gulf of arta, destined for offensive operations in epirus. the ottoman military authorities had only told otf four weak divisions, partly regular and partly reserve, to guard against hostile invasion in this southern theatre of war, and the task of the greek troops in the region immediately north of thessaly, at the outset, proved a simple one. the crown prince crossed the frontier on oct. 18, occupied elasson next day, and on the 23rd routed the turks a little further to the north, his left occupying kozani on the 25th. his right advanced at the same time, and on the 28th occupied katerina on the shores of the gulf of sa- lonika, where an advanced maritime base was established. the turkish forces defeated near elasson had for the most balkan wars part retired on monastir, where there was a considerable con- centration of troops, owing to the army which had been defeated by the serbs at kumanovo having for the most part fallen back over the mountains towards this town. but constantine, aware that the bulgarians were on the move for salonika, and deter- mined for political reasons to get to that city first, merely pushed out one division north-westwards to guard his left flank, while with the bulk of his troops he advanced to vodena. his position there was not wholly comfortable, for the serbian forces were still a long way from monastir and a turkish army of three or four divisions had taken up position at yenije vardar so as to cover salonika against hostile advance from the west. he attacked this position on nov. 2 and 3, but was repulsed, and his flank guard was at the same time defeated at banitsa and kastoria by ottoman troops that had been pushed south from monastir. two days later, however, a fresh attack upon yenije vardar proved successful, whereupon the turks opposed to him there retired into salonika, which he occupied on nov. g, 29,000 of the enemy laying down their arms. on the following day the bulgarian 7th div. arrived and claimed the city for bulgaria; but an agreement on the subject was patched up and the crown prince now divided his army in two, half remaining east of the vardar, and the remainder mov- ing westwards to co-operate with the serbian forces in dealing with the enemy forces gathered about monastir. ii. the turkish collapse part of the serbian i. army had advanced to prilep on nov. 5 and had then halted for the remainder to come up in line, for prince alexander, who was in command, hoped to fight a de- cisive battle before monastir with the whole of the troops that could be made available. the turks had taken up a strong posi- tion north of the town and there they proposed to stand their ground. in the circumstances, prince alexander, whose impedi- menta took time to cross the hills out of the vardar valley, was not prepared to commit his army to the attack before the 14th. the date was subsequently deferred to the 18th, his plan being to deliver a frontal assault, while at the same time turning both of the enemy’s flanks. as it happened, however, the isolated serbian division told off to operate against the ottoman left delivered a premature night attack on the 15th, and had then to resist resolute turkish - counter-attacks during the succeeding two days, unsupported; but it managed to keep the enemy at bay, and when the battle was finally launched on the 18th, the serbians were completely successful. the turkish army broke up. half of it was killed, wounded, or captured; the other half made its way, in units or small parties, to the only friendly stronghold now left open— yannina, in epirus (scutari was closely invested by this time). the victory of monastir proved to be decisive, and all that remained for the allies to do in the western theatre of war was to march through albania to the sea, occupying various points for police purposes, to reduce the two fortresses of yannina and scutari, and to take steps to meet the possibility of austro- hungarian intervention. serbia and montenegro therefore joined in the armistice that was signed on dec. 3, as already mentioned, between bulgaria and turkey. the greek govt., anxious to complete the occupation of epirus and the capture of yannina, were not parties to this suspension of hostilities. the operations north of the gull of arta, in difficult country, had made somewhat slow progress at first; but on nov. 10 greek troops had arrived near yannina, and within a few days a loose blockade had been established, which had not, however, prevented some of the turkish fugitive detach- ments from entering the place after the battle of monastir. a great part of the hellenic field army was brought round by sea from salonika during the winter, so as to ensure the fall of the fortress as soon as the weather should again become favourable for active operations. adrianople-—negotiations between the belligerents were sct on foot in london shortly after the armistice; but these were abruptly terminated on news arriving of a military coup d’etat 315 having been carried out on jan. 23 at constantinople, in which the existing govt. was overthrown and nazim pasha, the com- mander-in-chief, was murdered. the military govt. that had been set up denounced the armistice within a few days, and hostilities were resumed on feb. 3, although ottoman field armies had ceased to exist in europe except within the chatalja lines and the gallipoli peninsula. the story of the second phase of this war is merely the final instalment of the sieges of adrianople, yannina, and scutari. an effort was, it is true, made by the turkish field forces in thrace to debouch from the lines of chatalja and bulair with a view to relieving adrianople, and this led to heavy fighting locally; but the bulgarians held their own on both fronts, so adrianople was perforce left to its fate by the ottoman military authorities. the terms of the armistice had not admitted of the revictual- ling of this extensive stronghold, which remained blockaded during the truce, and by the time that hostilities came to be resumed the garrison was already finding itself short of certain supplies. the investing forces at this time were composed of the bulgarian if. army, which had taken up the duty in the first instance, and of the serbian ii. army, which had been trans- ferred from the western theatre of war after the victory of kumanovo. but although it soon became evident from attempts at sorties and increased desertion that the garrison was weak- ening, lack of transport and of artillery delayed preparations for an assault till the middle of march, and by that time the besiegers had been reinforced by three bulgarian divisions which it was found possible to transfer from their former position before the chatalja lines. the fortifications around the city of adrianople consisted of a number of substantial, but very conspicuous, forts, with a girdle of infantry redoubts further out, the whole forming an extensive perimeter; but the only really modern works were a certain number of batteries, distributed in the intervals. the infantry redoubts, moreover, were open at the gorge—a serious source of weakness. the garrison at the time of the assault numbered about 50,000, and the allies chose the eastern side of the fortress for attack. a preliminary intensive bombardment of the works was carried out on march 24, and that night the whole of the advanced line on the eastern side was stormed. on the following night an assault was delivered upon the main position; but this was brought to a standstill by the turkish wire, except at a point where one of the forts was captured by a single regiment. although the commander of the regiment found himself at dawn to be isolated, he promptly struck out right and left against the rear of the works on either hand, and he thus cleared the way for unit after unit that had been held up by the frontal wire, so that within a few hours the whole line of eastern defences was in bulgarian hands. attacks were also betng delivered at other points, and about mid-day on the 26th, the turkish com- mandant surrendered unconditionally. the assault had cost the allies about 9,500 casualties. scutart.—yannina had fallen three weeks earlier to a suc- cessful general assault delivered by the greck troops under the crown prince. this took place on march 5 and the turkish garrison, numbering about 30,0c00 wounded and unwounded, surrendered next day; at the end of march only scutari remained to be taken. the turkish commandant of this latter fortress had refused to recognise the armistice because its terms did not provide for his revictualling; but little actual fighting took place during the months of dec. and jan. on feb. 7, however, a determined assault on important defences on the castern side of the stronghold, which was only partially success- ful, was made by the montenegrins; another was delivered next day, which made no progress. but on the oth, the trenches were carried after a fierce combat, and the besiegers thereby gained a footing within the ottoman line of defence. they, however, found that they could advance no further at this point. a serbian contingent had arrived shortly before this to take part in the siege, and the activities of the allies were now trans- ferred to the south-western side of the fortress—its western side rested on lake scutari. not until march 31 and april 1, 216 however, was an assault attempted in this quarter, and then the undertaking failed. the serbian general took over the chief command after this rebuff, but jealousies, military and political, speedily arose, and on april 16 he and his forces took their de- parture. the montenegrins had now to take over the whole of the besieging line, and the stronghold seemed safe from further assaults in consequence, but it nevertheless suddenly capitulated on april 22. the great powers had, however, decided that the place was to belong to the new state of albania, and, under pressure from them, the victors were obliged on may 6 to evacuate it. ill. the second balkan war negotiations with a view to bringing the contest to an end had by this time been in progress for some weeks, and peace was signed in london on may 30. under its terms, turkey in europe was, with the exception of the country lying close to constantinople and to the gallipoli peninsula, partitioned between the victors, bulgaria acquiring the lion’s share. but the balkan league was on the point of explosion, the great powers were trying to establish an independent albania, rumania in alarm at bulgaria’s aggrandisement was preparing to intervene, and a portion of northern macedonia and kosovo polje remained in dispute between that kingdom and serbia. bulgaria also coveted salonika, and had during april and may transferred her military forces from thrace to the vicinity of the old serbian frontier and of the borders of macedonia, in preparation for making good her claims in the west. a state of tension con- sequently existed throughout the month of june, and at last, on the 3oth, without warning or declaration of war, bulgaria assumed the offensive against both serbia and greece. the bulgarian staff had arranged their forces as five armies, the i. army facing the serbian frontier between vidin and berkovitsa, the v. army on its left, the iii. army about kyus- tendil, the iv. army about koeani and radoviste, and the it. army between strumitsa and seres facing the greeks. the serbian forces were disposed in three armies, the ii. army guarding the old serbo-bulgarian frontier, the i. army in the centre about kumanovo and kriva palanka, and the iii. army on its right about the bregalnica; the greek forces were holding a front between gjevgjelija on the lower vardar and the mouth of the river struma. the bulgarian offensive, benefiting by surprise, was in the first instance successful. their iv. army broke in between the allies, reached the vardar at krivolak, and with the aid of the iii. army thrust back the serbian front for some distance between that point and kriva palanka; their it. army at the same time drove the greek advanced troops in all along the front. but the allies were disposed in considerable depth, the bulgarian soldiery had little heart for fighting once it became apparent that their antagonists meant to resist, by the night of july 1 the offensive had already died down, and it was then the turn for the serbian and greek troops to counter-attack. pressing forward on july 2, the serbian i. army drove a wedge through the bulgarian line in the direction of kyustendil, and on the two following days hustled the defenders in a south- easterly direction; the serbian iii. army was in the meantime effectually checking any further advance on the part of the enemy about the upper bregalnica. the greek army had brought up its reserves, and on the 3rd and 4th it counter- attacked, forced the bulgarian ij. army back all along the line, and by the 7th had effectually outflanked the enemy’s left. the result of these operations in the south was that the bul- garian ii. army found itself obliged to retreat northwards up the narrow struma valley; running the risk of being cut off by serbian forces should these, advancing from koeani and kriva palanka, succeed in occupying jum‘a-i-bala. so, in view of the critical position of affairs, the bulgarians made a desperate effort to retrieve the situation by initiating a fresh offensive. their i. and v. armies moved forward by several routes to threaten old serbia, only to be repulsed at all points by the serbian ii. and ij. armies. the bulgarian iii. and iv. armies at ball—ballet the same time advanced against the serbian iii. army in the direction of the upper bregalnica, and this latter effort achieved some measure of success; but it also had been definitely checked by july 10. a brief pause ensued. then, on the rsth, both serbians and greeks began pressing slowly forward. bulgaria was by this time in a sorry plight, for rumania had declared war and had begun an unopposed march on sofia, while the turks had issued from chatalja and bulair and had reoccupied adrianople. by transferring their i. army from the north to the hills east of jum’a-i-bala, and attacking the greeks in the struma valley with this and their ii. army, the bulgarian staff made a final attempt to stem the pressure. but the venture came to nothing, and on july 31 the aggressors in this second campaign, sur- rounded by hostile columns that were converging on their capital from every quarter, sued for peace. ‘this was signed at bucharest on aug. ro. bibliography.—p. howell, the campaign in thrace (1912); the balkan war drama (1913), by a special correspondent; french kapports et documents, la guerre d'orient et les atrocites des etats baikaniques (1913); h. barby, les vwictotres serbes (1913) and bregainttsa (1914); f. immanucl, la guerre des balkans de 1912-13 (1913); h. wagner, with the victorious bulgarians (1913); j. r. l. rankin, inner history of the balkan war (1914); j. g. schur- man, the balkan wars, r19r2-13 (1914); french ministere des affaires etrangeres, documents diplomaiiques: les affaires bulkan- tques, iqi2-14 (1922). (c. e.c.) ball, thomas (1819-1911), american sculptor (see 3.263), died at montclair, n.j., dec..11 1o1tr.