ANTHROPOLOGY

see also archaeology; colourr and race problems; folklore; htman geoc- raphy; man, evolution of; philology; races of mankind; social anthropology. the problem stated . anthropology is the science of man and of his culture at various levels of development. it includes the study of the human frame, of racial distinctions, of civilisation, of social structure and of man’s mental reactions to his environment. we confine our attention to the science of culture, and, since the study of liv- ing peoples uses methods and controls sources of information entirely different from those at the disposal of archaeology and 131 pre-history, we restrict our scope to the study of the modern living representatives of primitive mankind. toward the end of the roth century there was an increasing realisation of the specific nature of cultural process and of the complexity of culture. the vastness of the problems, the human interest and the dramatic beauty of anthropological facts were brought home to scholars and laymen alike by the monumental works of sir james frazer. at the same time, important scien- tific movements were developing on the continent (durkheim and wundt), and, most important of all, the man of science began to go out into the field himself and to study native races per* sonally by direct observation.! the events of iqio thus was gradually prepared the last period. at or about that date, a number of important anthropological events occurred. in 1910 sir james frazer published his treatise on totemism and exogamy, by which a lively and voluminous discussion of both sub- jects was started anew. inthe same year prof. seligman’s melanesians of british new guinea appeared—an admirable record of specialised scientific fieldwork, followed in 1911 by the monograph on the veddas, which embodies the joint research of himself and mrs. brenda z. seligman. from the african ficld, joyce and torday produced les bushongo (1910, eng. trans. 1925). on the continent of europe, van gennep issued la formation des legendes, followed on his rites de passage of a year earlier. levy-bruhl launched an interesting controversy regarding the mentality of primitive man. the same subject was discussed by prof. boas a year later. in 1911, dr. rivers, at the portsmouth meeting of the british assn., started in this country the conflict between diffusionism and evolutionism. ankermann and graebner had already opened a similar controversy among german anthropologists in 1905. in america a discussion of methods and aims was inaugurated as far back as 1896 by pro- fessor f. boas (“‘ the limitations of the comparative method in anthropology,’’ sezence, n.s. iv.). about i910, again, the results of one of the most important achievements in fieldwork were brought out in the works of prof. thurnwald. in 1912 prof. durkheim issued his book on elementary forms of the religious life (eng. trans. 1915), and in 1914 there ap- aes the two volumes of the /zistory of melanesian society by dr. xivers, prof. westermarck published his marriage ceremonies in aforocco and sir baldwin spencer his native tribes of the northern territory of australia completing the triad of excellent monographs by spencer and gillen. two important anthropological events close this period. in 1925 prof. r. thurnwald began to publish the zeitschrift fur volkerpsychologte und soztologie, a journal which sets out to give a comprehensive survey of anthropological facts and relevant socialogical theory. in the same year m. marcel mauss re- issued l’annee soctologique, which for 12 years (1900-12) had been one of the most important and valuable contributions to science, with its comprehensive interest in human culture and its attempt at unifying humanistic disciplines on the basis of anthropology. progress since iqio in spite of much fuller knowledge of primitive cultures, mod- ern anthropological theory presents great diversity, and the subject is dominated by a number of one-sided and incompatible tendencies. psychological interpretation of culture —continuing the direct tradition of german folk-psychologists, as well as of the british classical school, wundt, vierkandt, krueger and their collabo- rators attempt to explain systematically the phenomena of lan- guage, custom, belief and social organisation by reference to psychological processes. quite as exclusively psychological are the contributions of the psycho-analysts, who account for totemism, taboo, initiation ceremonies, in fact for the whole field of primitive cultures, by unconscious mental mechanisms. psychological interest is also predominant in the works of frazer, van gennep, crawley and westermarck. all these writers belong on the whole to the evolutionist school. the extreme representative of the diffusionist school, graeb- ner, maintains that all the regularities of cultural process are “laws of mental life ’ and that “ their scientific and methodical study is possible only from the psychological point of view ” (graebner, p. 582, 1923), while pater schmidt, wissler, lowie 1 cambridge expedition (a. c. haddon); spencer and gillen: jesup expedition (f. boas); the work organised by the german colonial office and the dutch govt, by the bureau of american ethnology, and the excellent museums and other institutions of north america. ¥ : . 132 and rivers constantly use psychological interpretations. thus, no anthropologist nowadays wishes completely to eliminate the study of mental processes, but both those who apply psychologi- cal explanations from the outset and those who want to use them after culture has been “ historically analysed ” forget that inter- pretation of culture in terms of individual psychology is as fruit- less as mere historical analysis; and that to dissociate the studies of mind, of socicty and of culture, is to foredoom the results. the distribution, contact and diffusion of culture-—as influ- ential and one-sided as the psychological trend is the interpreta- tion of similarities and analogies of culture by the principle of mechanical transmission. first vigorously propounded by rat- zel as the main problem of ethnology, the study of distribution and diffusion has been followed up by frobenius, ankermann, graebner, pater w. schmidt, pater koppers and subsequently by the late dr. rivers. whether the doctrines recently propounded by prof. elliot smith and mr. perry about the universal spread of culture from egypt will have to be classed with other discarded hypotheses or whether they contain a permanent contribution to the history of culture remains to be seen. their use of anthropological data is unsatisfactory! and their argument really belongs to archaeology, in which field their views have met with adverse criticism.” one or two competent anthropologists, however, have given these theories their vigorous support (rivers, c. e. fox). the merit of the moderate anthropological diffusionism lies in its geographical rather than in its historical contributions. as a survey of facts correlated to their geographical substratum, it is a valuable method of bringing out the influence of physical habitat as well as the possibilities of cultural transmission. the distributions mapped out for america by boas, spinden, lowie, wissler, kroeber, rivet and nordenskidld; the survey of mela- nesian cultures given by graebner; of australian provinces given by w. schmidt; of africa prepared by ankermann, will possess lasting value. the historical hypotheses of frobenius, rivers, schmidt and graebner, the sweeping identifications of ‘‘ culture complexes ”’ all over the globe, will not so easily pass muster. they suffer from a lifeless and inorganic view of culture and treat it as a thing which can be preserved in cold storage for centuries, trans- ported across oceans and continents, mechanically taken to pieces and recompounded. historical reconstructions within limited areas, such as have been done upon american material for instance, in so far as they are based on definite records or on archaeological evidence, give results which can be empirically verified, hence can be of scientific value. dr. b. laufer’s study on the potter’s wheel and certain contributions to the history of american culture (t. a. joyce, a. v. kidder, n. c. nelson, ii. j. spinden, l. spier) are methodologically acceptable, though they belong to archaeology rather than to the science of living races and cultures. such sound works must be clearly distin- guished from the productions in which a conjectural history is invented ad hoc in order to account for actual and observable fact, in which therefore the known and empirical is “ explained” by the imaginary and unknowable. sociological theories of culture-—robertson smith 1s undoubt- edly the spiritual father of this movement. he was the first to see that religion must be accounted for quite as much by its social nature, by what it does for tribal cohesion, as by its mean- ing and value for the individual. the great american anthro- pologists, powell and morgan, also contributed toward our understanding of clan solidarity in savage societies. durkheim, inspired by their work as well as that by bachofen, wilken and sir james frazer, developed a sociological theory of early culture. 1a. a. goldenweiser, early civilization, p. 311; r. h. lowie, amer. anthrop., pp. 86-90 (1924); b. malinowski, nature (march ii 1924). 7 6. a s. crawford, edinburgh review, pp. 101-116 (1924); t. d. kendrick, axe age, p. 64 et seg. (1925); j. l. myres, geographical teacher, no. 71, pp. 3-38 (1925); presidential address, folk-lore, xxxvi, 1925, p. 15; flinders petrie, ancient egypt, pp. 78-84 (1923); tt, e. peet, journal of egyptian archaeology, vol. 10, p. 63 (1924); a. m. blackman, idid., pp. 201-209. | anthropology kohler and the school of comparative jurisprudence in germany, steinmetz in holland and later, rivers in england, also studied primitive society from the sociological point of view, over-emphasising perhaps the solidarity and the lack of differentiation within the early horde and clan. the doctrine jof primitive legal cohesion and of social structure by direct ‘solidarity given by durkheim, steinmetz and kohler; the subtle and stimulating interpretation of primitive magic, sacrifice and religion by durkheim, hubert and mauss; the recent analysis of contract and gift by mauss and davy, show an enormous advance upon any previous work in the greater precision of con- cepts, in the consistent application of the sociological method side by side with psychological interpretation, in the conscious attempt at following native classification, nomenclature and perspective. it is impossible to adopt these views unreservedly because they tend to lapse into metaphysical vagueness. in order to avoid the explanation of culture in terms of individual mental processes, yet fully aware that psychology cannot be excluded, these anthropologists compromise by introducing the conception of collective consciousness, which sociologists and anthropologists alike (ginsberg, macliver, radin) have shown to be untenable. the sociological school exaggerated the social nature of primitive man, the importance of the clan and the solidarity of kinship. they neglected the rele of individual initiative and variation, the part played by self-interest and the institution of the individual family. | theories of specific difference of primitive mentality »-grown on the soil of the sociological school, but laying more stress on the purely psychological side, other theories seek to account for savage belief and custom by the alleged specific character of mental structure in primitive man. basing their conclusions on a number of interesting but probably exaggerated and dis- torted statements by such observers as cushing and dennett, and on a mass of obviously immature and superficial accounts by missionaries and other amateurs, the writers of this school aver that the savage is prelogical and mystical, impervious to experience living in a world of “ dim participations ” (crawley, levy-bruhl, vierkandt, danzel, h. werner, graebner). these views have but limited currency among the theoretical anthro- pologists, whose position has been well expounded by carveth read. modern field-workers, equally competent to speak about the savage from first-hand knowledge and to deal with problems of comparative psychology and epistemology through training, have one and all criticised adversely these points of view (boas, rivers, radin, kroeber). none the less, by posing the problem of primitive knowledge and mentality, by stirring up opinion and forcing anthropologists to make up their minds, the writers of this school, above all m. levy-bruhl, have made a scrious and valuable contribution to science. the functional analysis of culture —this type of theory aims at the explanation of anthropological facts at all levels of development by their function, by the part which they play within the integral system of culture, by the manner in which they are related to each other within the system, and by the manner in which this system is related to the physical surround- ings. it aims at the understanding of the nature of culture, rather than at conjectural reconstructions of its evolution or of past historical events. two factors contribute toward the development of the func- tional point of view. the modern specialist field-worker soon recognises that in order to see the facts of savage life, it is neces- sary to understand the nature of the cultural process. descrip- tion cannot be separated from explanation, since in the words of a great physicist, “ explanation is nothing but condensed 33 description.” every observer should ruthlessly banish from his work conjecture, preconceived assumptions and hypothetical schemes, but not theory. modern field work thus regards a theory purely empirical, never going beyond inductive evidence, serving only to gain an insight into the mechanism of culture in its various phases: social organisation, belief and material outfit. the field-worker who lives among savages soon discards the antiquarian outlook. he anthropology sees every implement constanily used; every custom backed up by strong feeling and cogent ideas; every detail of social organi- sation active and effective. he perceives that culture, above all, provides primitive man with the means of satisfying his wants, and of mastering his surroundings. the functional view of culture insists therefore upon the principle that in every type of civilisation, every custom, material object, idea and belief fulfils some vital function, has some task to accomplish, repre- sents an indispensable part within a working whole. it keeps always in mind the biological basis of human civilisation, the correlation of culture to human wants, hence to human instincts and emotional dispositions. instincts, emotions and ideas cannot, however, be treated by biology alone but must be approached throne ch the stucly of cacntal process. psychology, therefore, is indispensable for due under- standing of culture. at the same time the functional view teaches that man in the very fact of culture transcends his biological outfit. in his imple- ments, weapons, clothes and ornaments he extends his anatomi- cal endowment, whether to protect his life, to charm his fellow- beings or to procure his nourishment. knowledge supplies man with responses which go far beyond anything implied in instinct. in dogmatic belief we have a new type of mental attitude not observed in animals. biology is therefore not enough to explain human adjustments through culture. psychology again is not sufficient, for man does all important business in common, while every individual contribution has to be translated into cultural fact, imprinted upon material objects and linked with social organisation. the other approach to the functional method is from the evolutionary point of view, nowadays generally dis- credited and discarded, yet fundamentally sound when correctly set forth. the development of culture consists in the gradual crystallisation of well-defined institutions out of mixed and non- specialised behaviour. the essential features of each institution remain permanent while the less relevant ones change con- siderably. in order to understand, however, what js essential and what is not, it is necessary to define each institution and custom by its function. again since the essence of evolution consists not in a sequence of different forms changing one into another, but in a better adaptation of an institution to its func- tion, the more precise way of posing the evolutionary problem leads inevitably to the functional point of view. the functional view of culture can be traced back to the in- choate but stimulating writings of a. bastian, to the suggestions of lazarus and steinthal, to the work of e. b. tylor and w. robertson smith. it is implied in the best achievements of modern field-work (notably of the american anthropologists, f. boas; j. w. fewkes; c. wissler; a. fletcher and la fleche; a. i. jenks; a. l. krocber; elsie c. parsons; j. r. swanton; p. e. goddard; j. o. and g. a. dorsey; r. 11. lowie; f. c. cole; p. radin; e. sapir; ruth benedict). it has been active in the work of the french school, where it is constantly gaining ground (compare the latest publications of mmm. davy, fauconnet, granet, mauss and rivet). functional interpretations will be found predominant among the soundest theories of the com- parative school (brinton; h. schurtz; w. wundt; j. g. frazer; h. webster; e. a. crawley; westermarck; van gennep; alar- ett). the comparative school however has allowed the evolu- tionary view to overshadow the functional method, while most american anthropologists have failed to disentangle the empiri- cal interpretation of culture in terms of function from reconstruc- tion in terms of conjectural history. they have thus lapsed into a type of explanation which at its best belongs to archaeology, and thus have greatly sterilised their otherwise splendid field- work and stimulating theory. recently, however, and among a small number of anthro- pologists only, the functional method has been applied system- atically and exclusively in ficld-work and theory (w. hoernle; b. malinowski; a. radcliffe-brown; richard thurnwald). the functional method, by showing what culture does for a primitive community, establishes its value and thus utters a warning against too hasty interference with native belief and 133 institution and too wasteful an exploitation of native labour and resaurces. by demonstrating how primitive custom and law work, it furnishes the administrator with practical hints of how to frame and administer native regulations. by inquiring into savage economic organisation, the functional method can teach how to manage indigenous labour and how to trade with the natives. by a sympathetic study of early belief and ritual, it cin instruct the missionary how to graft a new creed upon the old one without destroying what is good and sound in it. the functional method, concerned as it 1s with the actual working and mechanism of primitive culture, supplies the right theoretical foundation for the practical application of anthro- pology (see anthropology, applied), for which mere antiqua- rian reconstructions, whether historical or evolutionary, are irrelevant. the following analysis of concrete problems is carried out from a functional point of view. the cultural function of marriage and family this is perhaps the most debated and the most instructive of all anthropological problems. the institutions of marriage and family geni inductive comparison reveals one important indication: marriage and family are almost universal, and can be traced through all types and levels of culture. their universality can be accounted for by the functional analysis of these institutions. two functions of paramount importance are fulfilled by any institution which regulates mating and propagation; the maintenance of racial quality and the maintenance of the continuity of culture. soci- ological considerations prove that the individual family based on monogamous marriage provides the best opportunities for effective sexual selection. it also supplies the best training for the future cultural work and sociological orientation of the young individual (lowie, kroeber, e. c. parsons). the importance of the family as the early social and cultural pattern for later life has been independently established by anthropology and psy cho- analysis (a. radcliffe-brown, j. c. fliigel). the family is the link between instinctive endowment and the acquisition of cul- tural inheritance, in that it permits the biological bonds between parent and infant gradually to ripen into social ties. it also eliminates a number of dangers due to the disruptive factors of the sexual instinct. regulated licence—this phenomenon does not allow of a simple and satisfactory solution. as culture advances and larger numbers of men and women come into contact, the experimental component of the sexual instinct drives people to indiscriminate mating. [freedom in pre-nuptial intercourse, festive licence, religious prostitution, lewd marriage ceremonies are the rule in savage and barbarous communities, with the exception perhaps of those on the lowest level (schmidt and koppers). again, in some tribes the institution of marriage suffers temporary obliter- ation in the form of wife-lending or exchange, jus primae nectis, sexual over-rights of chiefs and magicians and similar relaxations of the matrimonial type. these customs have been explained as “survivals of primitive promiscuity.” that such an explana- tion is untenable has been convincingly shown by westermarck. there are two ways of regulating the intercourse between the sexes: either by suppressing all irregular mating, or by allowing a well-defined and limited licence. biology and psycho-analytic theory teach that stern repression and rigid sex morals are not a complete solution of the problems here involved. anthro- pology, moreover, shows that this problem is especially present at low levels of culture. according to some authorities, a regu- jated and limited licence should be considered as an imperfect but effective way of dealing with the disruptive forces of sex. such regulation, moreover, is in no savage tribe found to be subversive to the fundamental institutions of marriage and the family which exist in spite of it everywhere. at the same time, there is not one single tribe where sexual licence is found untrammelled, where anything approaching pro- miscuity obtains. two forms of regulation are found every where: 134 the strict prohibition of the wife’s adultery safeguards the bonds of marriage and js only now and then over-ruled by exccp- tional customs; the prohibition of incest within the house- hold safeguards the integrity of the family. this is very often extended to exogamy which embraces the whole clan. the clan.—the clan and the classificatory principle of kinship appear on a closer sociological analysis not to be substitutes for the family and household, but the outcome of more extended co-operation in matters other than sexual mating and the rearing of children (a. radcliffe-brown, a. l. kroeber, thurnwald). the clan functions principally in economic, legal, and above all, in ceremonial matters. it is also closely connected with age- grades, secret societies and men’s clubs wherever these exist; with the ceremonial distributions of wealth (the kaa, the potiatch or the hakari), with magical specialisation and co-operation. thus, in its functional definition, the clan represents the non-sexual and non-genetic extension of the kinship principle beyond the house- hold and above the natural function of the family. exogamy again appears as an additional bond of solidarity—a natural extension of the principle of incest running side by side with the extension of the kinship principle. as the link between the individual family and the wider groupings of local and political type, the clan is of special importance. the clan is always due to the over-emphasis of one side of kinship—an over-emphasis necessary to eliminate any ambiguity in the transmissions of heredity rights and obligations. this has been aptly summed up by dr. lowie in his terminology of bilat- eral and unilateral kinship. the clan appears therefore as the natural result of the two influences which come into the fore- ground as culture advances: the continuity of tradition on the one hand and the extension of co-operation on the other. the clan allows of the establishment of greater cohesion within each generation and across succeeding generations. the explanation here given accounts for the institution, neither by an accident nor by specific ideas, nor by a hypothetical primitive commu- nism in sexual matters, but by reference to certain deep-seated influences of cultura] progress working before our very eves. with all this, although the clan is of great benefit for society and culture, it never becomes an absolute necessity like the family. it is rather a symptom of advancing social differentiation than its inevitable effect. thus, although the family and marriage are found to be universal, there exist tribes without any sub- divisions into clans, moieties or matrimonial classes. further, since the clan is associated with the gencral scheme of develop- ment, it cannot be regarded as a fortuitous index of this or that culture. mother-right and father-righit—the correlated phenomenon of unilateral kinship also plays a very important part in diffusionist schemes. mother-right and father-right respectively have been taken by ankermann, graebner, rivers, w. schmidt and kop- pers as principal indices in their classification of cultures. but the question arises, is either mother-right or father-right an independent element, or are they both always correlated? it seems, however, that mother-right and father-right are never found in isolation, but always co-exist—one of them emphasised by the tribal law and the economic arrangements, the other, though subordinate, never completely absent. until the problem thus raised has been solved, until the proof is given that mother- right and father-right can exist as exclusive, sharply defined stages or sociological principles, their use as indices of culture, and evidence of its spread must remain meaningless. here again, functional analysis of the methods of reckoning descent leads to a clear definition of such concepts, indispensable for their use in any speculative constructions. problem of sex.—thus the family, the clan, sexual restric- tions, as well as sexual liberties, are not the stages of a trans- formation nor fortuitous indices of cultural type or cultural stratum, but correlated, component parts of one big institution: the institution which controls the mating of sexes, the procrea- tion of offspring and the education of the young, and fulfils the integral function of racial and cultural continuity. the nature of its component elements is explained by the part which they anthropology play within this integral scheme. the functional method might also be extended to all the other aspects of organisation—territo- rial, political, legal and economic. each js related to an essential need of human society and culture, distribution over its locality, defence, maintenance of order, and the production of necessaries and values. economic organisation until the researches of anthropologists in melanesia, in new zealand, in north-west america, in africa, and in micronesia revealed a wealth of material, and theoretical students laid stress on the cultural importance of primitive economics, there reigned in anthropology the simple, occupational view of primi- live husbandry. schemes of occupational stages or types, the collecting of food, hunting, fishing, the tending of herds, the rais- ing of crops and industrial production were set forward as the only subject matter of descriptive or analytical economics, as it is called. in all such views, primitive man is regarded as having but simple elementary needs, and proceeding reasonably and natu- rally to satisfy them. the little spare time he has left over he devotes to the casual production of superfluities, and to the satis- faction of his hobbies, which latter activities, however, are usu- ally placed outside the domain of economics. thus we read in an authoritative work, notes and queries in anthropology: ‘‘ the first essential of maintenance is a supply of food; and in many simple communities the actual food quest and operations arising from it... . occupy by far the greater part of the people’s time and energy, leaving little opportunity for the satisfaction of any lesser needs.’’ and again, we are told by another writer (buxton) that generally the savage “ has no means to acquire more wealth than he can carry about on his person or on the per- sons of his family.” the main questions cut short by such a priort assumptions are those of the incentives to production, of the organisation of labour and of the primitive forms of the apportionment of wealth. | the economic motive—is it true then that primitives work only to satisfy their primary needs? in the lowest stages of cul- ture people are ready to endure thirst and hunger, but bent upon stimulants or narcotics. we know of tribes without clothing, but of none without ornaments. there are natives without fixed habitations, yet keen on the display of such wealth as thev possess. at higher levels, under more favourable conditions, certain commodities are actually produced far in excess of actual needs. and this is not done “ in exchange for food or for the means of obtaining it,” as runs the usual opinion (noles and oueries). nor is it carried out through economic foresight. large quan- tities of accumulated food and wealth are employed instead for festive display, for ceremonial yet useless donations, some- times even for mere destruction, often on a gigantic scale. all such customs serve merely for the manifestation of the wealth of the owner, of his generosity, of his economic power. in the south seas, the accumulated food is employed for the production of objects of value by the feeding of artisans, who devote them- selves to the polishing of axe-blades, to carving, to the making of shell ornaments or of mats (thurnwald, miiller-wissmar). some of these early forms of valuable tokens of wealth have a distinctly religious character, serve in ritual ceremonies, are associated with belicf and possess elaborate mythical pedigrees (mauss). finally, there is one very important fact which contradicts the merely utilitarian view of primitive economic incentives: the products of savage industries in general, far from being made with the minimum of effort required for their utility, show a lavishness of artistic detail, of decoration and pedantic finish, which often put to shame any civilised artisan. the joy in the work, the satisfaction of perfect craftsmanship, the artistic passion for the general appearance of the finished product dominate savage industries and enterprise. | it is clear from this evidence that the “ first essentials of main- tenance,” the primary needs and the requirements of practical utility, do not exclusively control the economic effort of primi- tive man. nor is their aim always to achieve the utilitarian maximum of effect by the minimum of effort. to understand the anthropology driving forces of early production, it is, therefore, not sufficient to make reference to man’s animal needs. it is necessary to real- ise also the native ideas of value: their pleasure in the integral effect of their work in which artistic, sporting, social and even religious motives are mixed with those of pure utility. the character of early production —the well-known scheme of k. buecher, who would place the whole range of primitive husbandry within the limits of the ‘‘ individual search for food ”’ and of “ closed household economy ” is the clearest expression of the view that primitive man works for himself and his family alone, and that he knows no production on a wider, a communal or tribal scale. a fuller insight into the nature of primitive labour reveals the existence of organisation. even in the lowest cultures there are tasks which transcend the forces of one individual or of one fam- ive-hunting, the very collecting of food. at higher stages, such pursuits as communal hunting and fishing, the making of gardens, the construction of houses and canoes require some type of organised labour. this points to a definite specialisation, distribution and synchronisation in time, a division of functions, an integration of the individual contributions to the common end. if we enquire what are the elements of the eco- nomic organisation, it soon becomes clear that we must distin- guish between moral or persuasive, and social or coercive factors. k. buecher in a later work (arbdcti und rhivithmus) has drawn attention to the great importance of rhythm for successful work. many other stimulants and incentives could be mentioned, the most efficient of which is unquestionably work in company. con- versation, jokes, mutual assistance and interest relieve the tedium of solitary labour, while emulation, example and the satisfaction of pride are under primitive conditions possible only in communal work. the best worker is always recognised as such among savages, and his leadership is followed. much more important, however, is the moral prestige enjoyed by supernatural expert knowledge which, in the form of magic, always controls vital and difficult economic pursuits. marking the dates, inaugu- rating the successive stages, imposing periods of rest and setting the time limits, it acts as an organising, co-ordinating influence, social coercion is the other important force of economic organisation. as soon as distinctions of rank and power arise they are used as means of extorting labour, while, on the other hand, economic inequalities function as indices of social status. primitive ownership—this economic problem has been dis- cussed with some detail by anthropology. but while, on the one hand, the writers, who, like buecher, assume an atomised economic production, admit only of individual or personal own- ership, those following morgan, and influenced by a strong social- istic bent, engels, bebel, cunow, make the savage into a com- munist. as a matter of fact, property, which is but one form of legal relationship, 1s neither purely individualistic nor communal, but always mixed (cf. nature, supplement, feb. 1926, on “law and order’). the misuse of such conceptions as ‘f communism,” associated with an incorrect application of the concept of ‘‘ money ” may be exemplified on a scheme recently put forward by the late dr. rivers. dr. rivers designates certain forms of valuables found in melanesia, such as mats, arrows, pigs’ jawbones and, above all, shell discs, as ‘‘ money,” following the usage of white traders, missioners and planters. dr. rivers, to justify the use of this word, insists that these objects “are used for no other purpose ”’ and “‘have a very definite scale of value,” but he gives in other contexts a definite and concrete account of several ways in which these objects are used “‘ for other purposes,” and thus stultifies his first criterion. the second criterion is obviously insufficient for identifying a commodity as “ money.” all objects have in our economy “a very definite scale of value,” yet we do not apply the word moncy to a pair of slippers, a motor-car or a picture by raphael, nor use these thirgs as such. now the taking of terminological liberties with well-defined concepts has its dangers. ‘‘ money ”’ has no sooner been intro- duced into the argument than communism crops up and the two are related by a remarkable piece of reasoning: 135 the subject of communism in property is closely connected with that of money. a thoroughly communistic people can have no use for money among themselves. if they possess anything which can be regarded as currency, it can only be used in transactions with other peoples. the use of money should therefore be associated with the disappearance of communism; if tt can be shown that melanesian money is due to immigrant influence, and especially to that of the kava people, we shall have gone far to establish the conclusions already suggested. (ifistory of melanesian society, vol. 2, p. 385.) and again: a thoroughly communistic people would have no need for money, and any explanation of the communism of polynesia will therefore furnish afso the explanation of the absence of money (p. 392). and as an “ historical explanation ” of these facts: the explanation of the absence of money in polynesia and of the communism of its people is to be found in the special mode of settlement of the kava people (p. 393). | these passages furnish a conspicuous example of how ill- defined concepts lead to far-fetched schemes and unsound con- structions. summary.—to sum up briefly, it is incorrect to assume that man for a long time has lived in a semi-natural primitive stage of individual acquisition of food and primary utilities. equally untrue is the correlated assumption that he lifted himself out of this condition by the gradual application of the economic prin- ciple of maximum of effect for the minimum of effort. instead, from the outset, artificial, cultural, non-instinctive aims have been indispensable to him and his culture. early types of value and symbols of wealth have spurred him from the outset to economic effort. this effort is organised and standardised by tradition. the real problem, therefore, consists in gaining in- sight into the primitive forms of condensed wealth, into the mix- ture of motives and impulses which drive man; and in studying the manner in which these primitive incentives control organised effective effort. all the conclusions arrived at show that for the discussion of economic problems it is necessary to consider the relation of early wealth to religion and to magic as well as its function in primitive social structure. the borderland questions—the influence of economics on social structure; the problem of wealth as the foundation of rank, power and status; the rule of give-and-take in social obli- gations; ceremonial distribution of goods and its economic importance—are gradually coming into the forefront of anthro- pological interest, and open up entirely new horizons in theory and observances. they bring it into close contact with the dis- ciplines of economics, history and sociology (biicher, schwied- land, m. weber, k. lamprecht). the relation between the various larger supeets of culture opens a new type of problem. social organisation is largely dependent upon economic foundations, while economics cannot be studied without a knowledge of the various groups within the tribe. religion and magic are not independent, but are inti- mately associated with economic pursuits, with power and prestige, with domestic life and everyday necessities. the supernatural here the functional view is put to its acid test. ee can be the function of primitive belief and superstition, of animism con- sidered as valueless, crude and mistaken, of magic, regarded as a spurious and fallacious pseudo-science, of totemism, of bar- barous burial ceremonies and of cruel initiation rites? and yet the method here set forth stands and falls with the possibility of defining the whole of the supernatural. it is bound to show in what way belief and ritual work for social integration, tech- nical and economic efliciency, for culture as a whole—indirectly therefore for the biological and mental welfare of each individual member. | the current theories.—most modern theories in fact come near to the posing of this problem and to its solution. it is im- plied in the whole structure of frazer’s golden bough, in the contributions of westermarck to the moral side of religion, in durkheim’s analysis of the integrative function of public cere- monial, in the additions of hubert and mauss to his theories, in marett’s analysis of magic, in crawley’s vitalistic view of religion, 136 above all, in the analysis of andaman belief and ceremonial by a. radcliffe-brown. but too often the functional view is still smothered by evolutionary or historical discussions—as_ to whether magic preceded religion, as to what was the primitive form of religion, and so on. afagic.—the great number of modern theories dealing with magic range between two apparently opposed views, which label inagic as primitive science or primitive stupidity (urdumamhezt) respectively. we must reject the implication of the first theory, that magic preceded science, and that it once did fulfil that function. it must be placed to the credit of this theory, how- ever, that it does full justice to the practical context of magic. the second theory emphasising the central conception of imper- sonal ubiquitous force—miana, orenda, wakan rightly appreciates the difference between belicf and knowledge; and brings out the mystical character of magic (marett, iiubert and mauss, preuss). the functional theory reconciles both points of view. let us start from the close association of magic with practical activities. first, every practical pursuit amongst savages is always pri- marily based upon knowledge and is never exclusively controlled by magic. there are in all savage cultures certain activities in which technical ability, guided by knowledge, completely suf- fices. in others, the help of magic is also invoked. what are the respective contributions of knowledge and of magic to such a mixed activity? in its essentials the division of function between the two is very simple: as far as his knowledge goes, as far as he can safely rely on experience, reason and technical ability, the native—whether in his gardening or fishing, in the building of craft, in warfare or sailing—does not use magic. no savage has ever been observed to select the tree for his dug-out by divina- tion, to bring forth seedlings by formulae without having planted them. only where, in spite of knowledge and effort, the results still turn unaccountably against him, only when forces completely beyond his mental grasp and practical control baffle him—in dealing with garden pests, with the supply of fish and animals, in securing wind or weather, in preventing disaster at sea or in war, above all, in dealing with bodily decay, disease or personal accidents—does the savage resort to supernatural means of fill- ing the lacunae in his practical power. the type of belief met in magic is always an affirmation of mah’s power to deal with the situation by a rite or spell. this belicf simply repeats in a standardised manner, what hope all the time has whispered within the individual’s own mind. again, the rite repeats in a fixed, definite form what the natural expression of emotions already contains, only, as a rite, it is car- ried out with a purpose and with the conviction that it is a means to an end. when we compare the forms of the fixed magical ritual, they are remarkably akin to the response of upset equilibrium occur- ring under similar conditions. black magic, which corresponds to the sentiment of hate, and which replaces the outbursts of impotent rage, contains in its most typical ritual of stabbing, pointing the bone, mimic destruction, in the text of its formulae, a reproduction of the various gestures, words and types of behav- iour, which we can watch in the natural vent of the emotions. exorcism of evil powers repeats in word and deed the reactions of fear. in all practical activities, the successful ends, which hope vividly brings before the mental vision at moments of uncer- tainty and suspense, are connected in such ritual, which bridges over the fateful moments. sir j. frazer’s apposite term of ‘imitative magic ” and his exhaustive illustrations of his point of view illustrate also the present theory. here it is only sug- gested that the association of “ ideas,’ designated by frazer as the cause of “imitative magic,’ can only be accounted for by our theory of imperfect biological adjustment induced by culture. baffled instinct arouses emotional tension as well as a conflict of ideas and an impasse in conduct. through magic, culture prescribes the adequate ideas, standardises the valuable emotional tone and establishes a line of conduct which carries man over the dangerous moment. this new type of explanation, based on the functional method, anthropology shows how cultural behaviour, in the very act of bestowing im- mense benefits and advantages on man, also opens up new prob- lems and creates new needs. to satisfy these a new type of be- haviour, ritual practices and a new mental adjustment, faith or mystical outlook, come into being, thus providing an answer to the question which is always essential: what actual benefit does magic confer upon man, what is its positive contribution to culture? it is a remedy for specific maladjustments and mental conflicts, which culture creates in allowing man to transcend his binlopieal equipment. social consequences.—in iis traditional aspect, magic leads to important social consequences. it is the essence of magical lore that every word of a formula must be spoken correctly without omission or alteration, every dctail of the rite performed. since magical knowledge can live only in man’s memory, the correct transmission, the legitimate fillation of magic are essential to man’s confidence in its efficiency. the inhcritance of magic is always one of the most important problems of descent and of the modes of reckoning kinship. as a rule, magic is handed on within the family circle. in this connection it is important to stress that all forms of magic usually perform an important social rele. no magic can be regarded as anti-social in the sense in which durkheim and his school attempt to define it. even sorcery or black magic functions as a legitimate though dangerous weapon, of which one of the main uses is in the enforcing of an established power and the biddings of law. the actual manner in which magic is con- nected with practical activities makes it, as we have seen, into the very skeleton of economic organisation. it supplies most of the co-ordinating and driving forces of labour, it develops the qualities of forethought, of order, of steadiness and punctuality, which are essential to all successful enterprise. thus magic ful- fils an indispensable function within culture. it satisfies a defi- nite need which cannot be satisfied by any other custo! of primi- tive civilisation. totemism.—totemism is a belief which affirms an intimate bond between a group of men and an animal or vegetable species, sometimes a class of objects. it raises therefore two problems, the first as to the nature of the belief, the second as to the social organisation with which it ts linked. most theories saw its origin in some small or accidental detail of social organisation or belicf, as in nicknames, guardian spirits, transmigration of souls and, recently, in the freudian theory of see to the functional theory the real problem, however, is: what is the function of a type of belicf which affirms the affinity between man and animal, is correlated with clan organ- isation and leads to moral and ritual rules associated with the multiplication, killing and eating of animals? man’s interest in his surroundings | is primarily practi ical. he has to collect food, construct his dwelling, roam about his dis- trict to hunt or fish. in the forefront of importance are the animals in his territory—those which feed him, those whose skins clothe him, whose feathers, teeth and claws supply him with ornaments and those which threaten his safety or comfort. yence the whole of animal life has an intense interest and signifi- cance for him. ! now in dealing with the animal kingdom, in obtaining the useful species to eat, in defending himself against the dangerous or repulsive oncs, primitive man, where his natural means fail him, has recourse to supernatural ones. the magical claims over any aspect of nature lead always to an assertion of a sort of affinity or kinship between the magician and the object controlled. indeed most magic implies mythological descent from animals or affiliation to them. thus we sce that the native’s practical interest in the animal or vegetable kingdom leads through magic directly to the assertion of a mutual bond. magic has a tendency to become specialised and departmental, exclusive and hereditary in a kinship group or clan. the sub- division of the tribe into totemic clans seems to be best explained, therefore, by the hypothesis that such clans were originally magical bocdlies engaged in controlling, through spell and rite, certain animal or vegetable species for the welfare of the tribe. anthropology thus is assigned to totemism a definite cultural function. selective interest in vitally relevant factors of the environment, man’s capacity to control it, are embodied in a system of belicfs which standardise, enhance and sacralise these culturally valu- able mental states. by endorsing man’s confidence and his hopes of effective control, by making these tendencies substantial in an explicit mythological dogma, totemism contributes to individ- ual happiness, to social cohesion and to the general efficiency of culture. sumumary.—in recent work (frazer, crawley, van gennep, miss jane harrison) much stress has been laid upon the associa- tion of religion with the crises of life. in fact in most religions, savage or civilised, the main phases of human life history—con- ception and pregnancy, birth and puberty, marriage and death— are associated with belief, ritual and mythological stories. re- ligion therefore fulfils at vital crises an indispensable function in the scheme of human culture. culture entails a transformation of direct instinctive response into a mode of behaviour governed by purposive ends, that is, by cultural values. the super-instinctive type of behav- iour leads man into impasses and difficulties out of which he can be extricated only by rules of thought and of behaviour which also have to be supplied by culture. in practical pur- suits magic helps man over the difficulties. the rele of re- ligion consists in the establishment of spiritual ends, dogmatic realities and moral rules of conduct. in totemism, which sacra- lises important factors of the environment; in the belief in immor- tality and in the associated ideas about communion with spirits and their influence on human fate; in the consecration of food and of indispensable elements of culture, such as fire, standard 1m- plements, tokens of wealth; in surrounding tribal tradition and order by the halo of sanctity, religion is the source of social and cultural values. primitive knowledge reason, the capacity to know, to invent and to evolve the- orics, has been regarded as the distinctive mark of man, dividing homo sapiens from other living beings. perhaps over-confident exaggcration of this has led to the recent reaction which denies to the primitive mind any power of reasoning and of observation. but had primitive technique been studied not as a sclf- contained object, but in its functional dependence upon knowl- edge on the one hand and magic on the other, the theory of a primitive mystical and prelogical mentality could never have been erected. primitive man shows a rational behaviour, an unimpeachable logic and a definite power of empirical observa- tion, not only in his technology, but also in his major economic pursuits and in his sociological behaviour. language-——this subject has been so far but imperfectly studied by anthropologists, and its cultural theory js as yet hardly outlined. the study of dead languages by grammarians and philologists has caused speech to be regarded as a self- contained phenomenon governed by special laws of its own. it was a considerable step forward when, some time ago, the study of language was taken up by psychologists, who began to treat it in correlation with thought and other phenomena (lazarus, steinthal, wundt). the structural features of language were explained as an adequate expression of reasoning, of emotional states, of aesthetic needs and of the characteristics of the human will. even this, however, is not sufficient. recent devclopments in linguistics, as well as in the philosophy of language, have set forth the view that language cannot at any stage of development be regarded as an adequate expression of logical, metaphysical, aesthetic or scientific categories (j. dewey, jespersen, ogden and richards). language, in all socictig¢s and at all stages of development, is an essential part of human action (dewey). communication by spoken word is indispensable for any concerted activity and enters into all as- pects of culture as a working element. (see prilolocy.) from the functional point of view, a word which designates an implement 1 is as much an essential manner of using that imple- ment as is any type of bodily skill required to handle it. the 137 master of a craft, however primitive, must be able to give his orders in case of emergency in a technically adequate and theo- retically correct manner, and the bodily reactions of his vocal apparatus are as essential to the practical issue as the manual dexterity of his crew. language plays a similar part in warfare, in cconomic pursuits, in ceremonial activities. in religious and magical ritual, the anoken word is conceived and felt by man to be a creative act which produces a definite practical effect. but if speech, in its primitive forms, is an indispensable instrument of cultural behaviour, its structure must be corre- lated to pragmatic needs and to the requirements of action rather than to logical, reflective or oratorical necessitics. hence the categories of primitive speech must be a compromise between logical and rational conditions, sociological and practical needs, and certain limitations imposed by material culture. the problem of meaning cannot be treated by the study of language, torn out of its cultural context. the classical philolo- gist has already summoned the archaeologist to his assistance. the study of living languages of the primitive type, helped out by the study of living cultures, would, no doubt, reveal to us infinitely more than can be reached by the study of dead speech. a word is as sterile without the knowledge of how it is used in live context, as behaviour remains mystcrious without its accompany- ing flow of speech. lifeis neither mere verbiage nor a pantomime. speech has been given man for action, and as mere loquacity it is a disease of culture. (see phtlo.ocy.) mythology as printtive sctence.—in order to ccm the autonomy of knowledge within primitive culture, it is still neces- sary to deal with the view that, at low levels of culture, myth is a substitute for science. we fendi in an authoritative handbook :—~- myths are stories which, however marvellous and improbable to us, are nevertheless related in all good faith, because they are in- tended, or believed by the teller, to explain by means of something cone rete ancl intelligible, an abstract idea, or such vague and difficul: conceptions as creation, death, distinctions of race or animal spccies, the different occupations of men and women; the origins of rites and customs, or striking natural obiects or prehistoric monuments; the ncunene ‘of the namesof persons or places. such storics are sometimes described. as aetiological, because their purpose is to explain why something exists or happens (notes and queries, pp. 210 and 211). we are thus told that primitive man evolves storics and believes in them, in order to explain abstract ideas. as a matter of fact myih is not a form of primitive science, but an aspect of religion, magic and morality; its function is not to explain queries nor {vo jiluminate abstract or obscure points, but to strengthen be- licf, to substantiate morals and to enhance tradition, in short to bring home to primitive man all that has to be believed, obeyed and accepted. to establish our point, we have to place myth within the scheme of primitive culiure and to show its pragmatic function. myth is a part of folklore in the narrower sense of the word, that is, of oral tradition. man in all ages and all climes possesses a body of concrete stories which can ready be div ilded into several classes. of these, the first serves predominantly for amusement and recreation. stories of this class describe more or less dramatic or funny adventures of men and animals, ogres and hobgoblins, all of which are not regarded as real. such tales, when studied within their cultural context and regarded from the native point of view are found to play an important part in native life, in that they enhance sociability, fill out seasons of enforced idleness or make up the substance of amicable gathcrings. another class of stories, tuken more seriously, refer to impor- tant exploits and heroic deeds of past generations and are con- sidered to be true. the sociological function of such stories is that they develop family pride, knit the kinship bonds and serve to increase communal or tribal solidarity. there are finally stories which are regarded as sacred and con- nected in a specific manner with magical and religious cult, with social organisation and with the body of tribal custom and moral rules. these and these only could be regarded as “‘ explanatory ” stories, in that, among other subjects, they account for the origins of the world, give the reasons for death, furnish revelations of 138 future existence, and promise immortality, narrate the begin- nings of magic, and soon. the explanatory character, however, is prominent only as long as the story is considered without its cultural context. in all cases where the associated ideas and fecl- ings have been observed; where we know the conditions under which the myth is recited or enacted; above all where the prac- tical influence of the myth has been studied—we are able to as- sign a definite cultural function to it. thus, in connection with magic, we find stories which are not intended to explain the ritual or the phenomenon governed by magic, but are meant to substantiate the belief in magical efficiency. all such stories give us an account of an extremely successful, miraculous prece- dent. around the various religious rites and ceremonies, there cluster stories which vouch for the efficiency of the religious acts in obtaining the desired effect. again, we have a class of myths which confirm the existence of privileges, give the antecedents of rank and power, or enforce duties and which, in general, strengthen traditional law and order. wherever myth, that is a sacred story, has been studied in connection with the sources of its sanctity as well as with its sacralising results, it can be shown that it has served to strengthen faith by reference to an original golden age, to miraculous precedents in the dim past. the study of myth in conjunction with ritual and institution has been carried out only in limited areas, for instance in the andaman is, (a. radcliffe-brown), in central australia (spencer and gillen), in melanesia (b. mal- inowski), in northwestern america (boas and others), in poly- nesia (elsdon best). all the facts we know, however, prove that myth is in no way comparable to primitive science, but that instead it functions as a religious warrant, vouching for the truth of belief, the efficacy of ritual, and the fitness and justice of moral or social duty. the identification of culture the functional method seems at first sight to be of especially easy application to artifacts, to material objects fashioned by man for his cultural uses. food stuffs ready for consumption, man’s equipment in protective shelter and clothing, his tools and his weapons, are all obviously means to an end. lhe place of artifacts in culture—but this very facility has its dangers. the purposive character of most artifacts has made the implement into the typical representative of material ob- jects: hence, all these have generally been regarded as represent- ing the technique of culture. it is deemed sufficient to state how these objects are made and how they are handled. in notes and queries one-third of the space is devoted to “ technology,” the description of manual production and of the handling of arti- facts. in the handbook of folklore, this study is defined as an anthropology with technological considerations cut out. all this is incorrect, since ‘‘ material culture ” is not an autonomous, self-contained province of culture, such as religion, law or eco- nomics, each of which fulfils a specific function. material cul- ture is an indispensable accessory of every single aspect, every pursuit and institution and thus fulfils a general function. on the other hand, the bald technological treatment is not sufficient to do justice to any class of artifacts. the objects of immediate consumption or use, as well as tools and implements, are essentially correlated to economics and must be studied with- in its context. the same applies to a weapon, the proper analy- sis of which immediately leads to the description of the manner in which it is wielded, thus to the methods of warfare and war magic and, finally, to the political organisation of the tribe. there is no single type of human activity without its material accessories. there is not one artifact, however practical or sim- ple, which could be properly understood without its context of living culture, including belief as well as technique, social organ- isation and traditional knowledge. any general theories of culture or of progress which ascribe all driving power to either the material or the moral aspect of culture alone are guilty of one-sided exaggerations. philosophy of history without a scientific basis is of little value. functional anthropology on the other hand finds great help in the conception of culture as a form of biological adaptation on a gigantic scale, which empirically anthropology analyses the concepts of progress and of cultural reality and seeks to place the study of culture within the scheme of other sciences. nlodern empirical philosophy has also been in turn greatly intluenced by anthropological work, above all, by the theories about primitive knowledge, its relation to faith and to practical activities (w. wundt, l. t. hobhouse, k. lamprecht, m. weber; above all, j. dewey and the columbia school of culture philosophy). the criteria of cultural identity —the other danger which the study of material culture harbours for the anthropologist is the fallacy of fixed form. the strict determination of shape imposed upon many artifacts, especially tools, by their use, has made many objects appear perfectly defined by their form. an axe- blade, a knife, a bow and arrow, a spoon, a walking stick, “ will be, as a rule, recognised at once as such ” (graebner, p. 56). again we are told that the concepts and means of identification “are so much matters of everyday use to the ethnologist that the activity of the intellect, as it compares the objects, remains be- low the threshold of consciousness”’ (p. 57). these statements contain a very serious fallacy, obvious when it is remembered that nothing of any scientific value can be achieved by the study of isolated aspects, or, worse still, of isolated objects. and any definition by form treats an object as a self-contained isolated entity. as soon as an object is defined by relation and by func- tion it has to be considered as a part of a jarger whole, and it is the form of the whole which becomes the relevant factor in our definition. 7 the criteria of form and of quantity, as defined by ratzel, graebner, schmidt and others constitute the foundation of the historical method. when studying the problem of the identifica- tion of cultural objects and the complexes of such objects, writers of this school seek to show to what extent similarities and ideas found in different parts of the world can be explained by diffusion, by the hypothesis that they “‘ have been developed at a single culture centre in the far distant past and have been disseminated thence over the whole world ” (kroeber, anthro- pology, p. 200). they have thus not only to prove the identity of two objects, but to prove it so that their genealogical kinship, their identical birth in a parent culture, is established. in order to do that, the “ infallible and objective criteria ” of form and quantity have been elaborated. we are told that two things belonging to two different cultures can be regarded as the same, “ when identities appear, which are not founded in the essence of the object or, speaking of material goods, in its material’ (graebner, p. 98; 1d7d., 5. 108; schmidt and koppers, p. 68; kroeber, p. 199). a classical example is the identification of west african and melanesian bows, made by ratzel on account of the similarity of their section, means of attachment of the cord and the material (lawyer cane) of which the cord is made. not one of these features, we are told, can be explained by its function or by the limitations imposed through material or purpose. , on this example, we may also observe the second criterion, that of quantity. the bow in the two regions shows not one, but a number of features apparently not related to each other. if a trait is composed of several elements which stand in no necessary relation to each other, and these several elements recur among distinct or remote peoples in the same combination . . . one can be reasonably sure of the real identity of common origin of the complex trait, | says kroeber summarising the diffusionist point of view (a nthro- pology, pp. 199-200). | the “quantity” criterion applies not only to details found on one object, but to objects, customs and institutions, provided these are not related to one another. such an exscmbie is then usually called “ a cultural complex,” such as the cultural com- plex consisting of the bow already mentioned as well as shields, houses, masks, drums and clothing. this, frobenius believes, forms a really identical stratum of culture both in west africa and melanesia. | when the two criteria are carefully examined, the functional anthropologist perceives that the assumption of wide occurrence | of meaningless and irrelevant objects and unrelated complexes rests primarily upon a mere deficiency of knowledge. an object, or a detail of it, appears to us ‘‘ inessential,” “ arbitrary,”’ anthropology “ devoid of function ” only as long as we do not understand the function of that detailed feature or object. since the study at first hand of savage races has been conducted mostly in an ama- teurish manner, and our collections are crammed with unla- belled, undefined, misunderstood specimens, the argument from irrelevance, 1t.e., from our ignorance, has no value in anthropol- ogy. the fact is that the more we know about the culture of a region, the fewer features appear to us ‘extrinsic’ or “ arbi- trary,’ the more all is revealed correlated, determined, provided with a function. and this brings us to the crux of the argument: form without function is an empty concept in the science of culture. a pointed stick can be used as a spear in war or in the hunt, as a digging or punting pole, as a ceremonial staff or magical wand, as well as for many other purposes. the details of its form are adapted to the function and defined by it. and this holds good with regard to every item of material culture. once we begin to define form by function, both criteria, that of meaningless form and of fortuitous coincidence, break down completely. an object can be defined and identified only by its use, the study of use leads us again to connect the object with the pursuit, the institution, the aspect. the real identities of culture appear to lie in the organic connection of its parts, in the function which a detail fulfils within its scheme, in the rela- tion between the scheme, the environment and the human needs. meaningless details disappear, shape becomes alive with mean- ing and with function, and a testimony of irrelevant form falls away as worthless. the method of formal treatment breaks down even more completely in the study of primitive sociology, economics and supernaturalism than in that of material culture. and this entails a partial qualification of the criticism of the historical method. first of all, many students in mapping out distributions apply functional identifications of culture in- stead of formal ones (especially wissler, kroeber and lowie). in the second, it is always possible to profess a bad method and to use a good one. the coincidence of details in an object or simultaneous appearance of objects is an important fact, whether we try to find out its organic relations or rest satis- fied with denying them. the distribution of such objects or complexes does raise a problem. the objection is that in the opinion of the upholders of the historical doctrine, the problem is solved. for to them a distribution of such stmilar traits or complexes is a proof of common origin, a proof just because they affirm the absence of any inner relation or function. to the functional school, on the other hand, who cannot rest satisfied with dogmatically abiding by a gap in our knowledge, distribu- tion raises a series of problems. in the first place how far we can regard the complex as an organic unity; secondly, what is the function of this coherent whole; thirdly, in view of this function, have we to assume independent development along similar lines, convergence along dissimilar lines or mechanical transmission? the real explanation, however, underlying any of these hypothe- ses, lies in the discovery of correlations and of permanence through function. summary.—the outer framework of material culture is cor- related in a clear and direct manner to the satisfaction of man’s biological needs. it constitutes the mi/icu which man evolves to interpose between himself and the rigours, dangers and insufli- ciencies of his physical surroundings. but this material apparatus has to be operated by men collectively, organised and controlled by the body of tradition, scientific as well as religious and magi- cal. thus indirectly most elements of social cohesion as well as certain beliefs and ideas can be correlated with man’s primary needs, and explained by the biological function which they fulhl and the survival value which they possess. but this is not suffi- cient, and here an extremely important addition has to be made: the facts of social organisation impose certain conditions upon human behaviour, imply restrictions and create new wants, which again call forth specific cultural arrangements. thus, higher forms of organised labour need some compulsion, supplied by political inequalities, and some moral framework, supplied by certain forms of magic. 139 mental development running side by side with higher tech- nical ability brings about fear, thought and reflection which make man anticipate his destiny and probe into the past and future of his world. the beliefs of primitive man about future life, the beginnings of the world and spiritual powers have to be correlated with his increasing mental outlook as well as with the widening social horizon and the development of cultural values. social cohesion requires some means of enforcing the various rules imposed upon the individual for the common good, and this brings about the sanctions and inducements, which constitute the essence of primitive law. in all this the functional view avoids the error of attributing any priority to one or the other aspect of culture. material objects, social grouping, traditional and moral values, as well as knowledge, are all welded into a functional system. to explain any item of culture, material or moral, means to indicate its functional place within an institu- tion, which has to be thus explained with reference to its aspect and this again has to be placed within the system of culture. finally, anthropology hopes, with the help of her sister sct- ences, to state the place of culture in the scheme of organic evolution; to show how it is correlated to the instinctive animal equipment of the human species; to demonstrate how it has allowed man to rise above the brute level, to control his sur- roundings, to develop his knowledge, his faith and his conscience. bipliography.—-f. boas, the afind of primitive man (1911) and numerous other books and articles; l. h. d. buxton, primitive labour (1924); g. davy, la fot juree (1922); t. w. danzel, kultur und religion des primttiven menschen (stuttgart, 1924); e. durk- heim, les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse (1912); j. c. fliigel, the psycho-analytic study of the famely (1921); j. g. frazer, the golden bough, 3rd ed. (1907-15); totemtsm and exogamy (1910); br. freire-marreco, ‘* tewa winship terms from pueblo of hano,”’ american anthropologist, vol. 16 (1914); s. freud, votem and taboo (1919); a. van gennep, l’ietat actuel du probleme totemique (1920); e. w. gifford, “ californian kinship terminologies,” univ. of calif. pub. in ethnol., vol. 18 (1922); m. ginsberg, the psychology of society (1921); a. a. goldenweiser, early civilisation (1923); f. graebner, afethode der ethnologie (heidelberg, 1911); “° e-thnologie ” in gv. schwalbe and e. fischer, anthropologie, teil 2, ab. § (1923); a. c. haddon (and others), reports of the cambridge expedition to torres straits; l. t. hobhouse, morals t2 evolution (agts§); w. hocrnle, articles in the south african jour. of science, anierican anthropologist and varia africana; it. hubert et m. mauss, j/e- lunges de l'llistoire des religions (1910); w. koppers, “ethno- logische wirtschaftsforschung,” anthropos (1915-6); a. l. kroeber in univ. of calif. pub. ethnology, vol. 11-13, 16 and 17 (1911-7, i9i9g and 1920); anthropology (1924); f. krueger, “ ueber entwick- lungspsychologie ” (1915); l. levy-bruhl, les fonctions mentales des socittes inferieures (1910); r. lf. lowie, primitive saciety (1920); primitive religion (1924); r. m. maclver, community (1920); b. malinowski, “ the economic aspect of the intichiuma ceremonies,” in festskrifi tilldgnad edw. westermarck (1912); the faniily aniong the australian aborigines (1913); ‘“‘ natives of mailu,” trans. roy. soc. s, australia, vol. 39 (1915); ‘ baloma,” jour. roy. anth, inst., vol. 44 (1916); ' primitive economics of the trobriand islanders,” economic journal (1921); argonauts of the western pacific (1922); “the problem of meaning in primitive languages,” in c. k. ogden and i. a. richards, the meaning of meaning (1923); ‘‘ magic, religion, and science” in n. j. t. m. needham, sczence, religion, and reality (1925); crime and custom tn primitive society (1926); sex and represston (1926); ‘' myth ” (1926); r. r. marett, anthropology (1912); threshold of religion, 2nd ed. (1914); m. mauss, “‘ essai sur le don,” l’ annee sociologigue (1925); w. miiller-wismar, e£rged- nisse der stidsee-expedition, 1g08-ro (1917-8); miss m, a. murray, witch cult in western furope (1921); j. l. myres, ed., nofes and oueries in anthropology, 4th ed. (1913); e. v. nordenskjeld, con- parative fethnographical sindies (trans. 1919); w. i linders petrie, soctal life in ancient egypt (1923); a. radclifie-brown, ‘ three tribes of w. australia,” in jour. roy. anth. inst. (1913); andaman islanders (1922); ‘‘ the methods of ethnology,” in s. african jour. of sc. (1923); ‘' the mother's brother,” zd7d., 1924; p. radin, “ the winncbago tribe,” bur. amer. ethn, ann. rep., no. 37 (1923)3 “ social organisation of the winnebago indians,” canadian geol. sur, amfus. buil., no. 10 (1915); c. read, afaiw and eis superstitions (1925); w. tl. r. rivers, presidential address, section hi, british association (1911); ilistery of afelanesitun society, 2 vol. (1914); kinship and social organisation (1914); soctal organtsation (1924); e. sapir, time perspective in aboriginal american culture (1916); “ social organisation of nars river indians,” canadian geol. sur, afus. bull. no. 19, anthrop. ser. 7 (1915); lunguage (1922); w. schmidt, die stellung der pymdenvelker in der entwicklunesgeschichte des menschen (1910); w. schmidt and w. koppers, der afensch aller zeiten (1924); e. schwiedland, volkswirtschaftslehre, 3 vol. i40 (1922 -3); b. z. seligman, ‘‘ marital gerontocracy in africa,”’ jour. roy. anth. inst, (1924); c. g. seligman, melanesians of british new guinea (1910); c. g. and b. z. seligman, the veddas (1911); w. b. spencer, native tribes of the northern territory of -lustralia (1914); w. b. spencer and f. j. gillen, native tribes of central australia (1899); northern tribes of central australia (1905); r. thurnwald, das rechstleben der eingeborenen der deuischen stidseeinseln (1910); forschungen auf den salomoinseln u. dem bismarckarchipel (1912); “ psychologie des primitiven menschen,” izandbuch d. vgl. psy- chologie (1922); die gemeinde der banaro (1921); “ die gestaltung der wirtschaftsentwicklung aus ihren anfangen heraus,” in erinner- ungsgabe fiir max weber, vol. 1 (1923); m. weber, gesammieliie aufsdtze sur sosiologie und sosialpolitik (1924); e. westermarck, origin and development of the moral ideas (1912, 2nd ed. 1917); ‘marriage ceremontes in morocco (1914); itstory of ituman marriage, sth ed. (1921); c. wissler, the american indian, 2nd ed. (1922); }wutton webster, rest days (1916). (b. ma.) anthropology, applied.—public recognition of the ad- vantages to be gained by the practical application of anthro- pological knowledge had scarcely begun before the war, and naturally suffered a severe setback from which it only slowly recovered. there were administrators who recognised the native point of view, and were even prepared to study the sociology of their charges, and in a few cases, recorded the results of their observations; yet nowhere was there any general official recogni- tion that the acquisition of such knowledge should be part of an administrative officer’s duties, and adequacy in native affairs was not generally regarded as necessary for promotion. never- theless a healthy spirit is abroad even if performance at times lags behind the demands of both theory and common sense. divisions —applied anthropology has two main aspects:— (1) cultural (or in the broader sense psychological). (2) phy- sical, embracing especially the great problems of racial char- acters both physical and mental, miscegenation, immunity and so forth. _ both aspects are of the greatest importance to humanity as a whole, for both are compact of the basic factors which must be considered in the solution of some of the most urgent world problems of the present day. here no gencral consideration of the philosophical or ethical questions concerned ts possible, but a reasonably kindly attitude of the dominant race toward the weaker peoples, and a desire to preserve and serve them, will be taken for granted, as well as the fact that the development of a territory involves the exploitation of its native inhabitants to a greater or less degree. there will also be assumed the deter- mination on the part of the governing races to modify and if necessary to terminate the anti-social practices of their less de- sirable members, even where this directly or indirectly limits the exploitation of the “ natives.” further, while every people pre- sents its special problem, all these are but different aspects of the greater problem of adaptation, which must be worked out afresh in many instances if the widest range of physical and cultural types are to be given their best chance of survival and develop- ment within the conditions besetting them. hunting peoples —virst, there is no possible future for the few scattered remains of the hunting peoples that still exist; only in certain instances is the white man responsible for their disap- pearance, and at the time of the european colonisation of the tropics superior ‘‘ native” cultures were, in a number of in- stances, destroying these humbler groups with the same cer- tainty as our own. agricultural peoples —with regard to the agricultural peoples but recently in the stone age, it is yet too early to speak with confidence, for although the natives of the smaller islands of the pacific have been blotted out or exist only as degenerate remains, it is permissible to hope that under considered efforts those of the larger islands (such as new guinea) may not only survive but even enjoy a measure of happiness. methods.—as to method, there is little to guide us in the past, for though culture contact (see culture contact, psyclology of) is no new thing in history, the economic needs of today present entirely new conditions. moral ideas have also changed, and it is no longer possible to enslave or exterminate all peoples un- able or unready to adopt or adapt a higher civilisation. yet in spite of these apparently favourable factors there has been noth- anthropology, appliid ing before comparable with the persistence and energy with which the higher race is imposing itself on the backward peoples. for practical purposes, then, we can only be guided by the knowledge gained during comparatively few years, backed by the experience of our more successful administrators, the whole tempered by a quality of prevision and a capacity to “ think black ” which experience has not shown to be unduly common. yet there is this encouraging feature: those who have for some years been associated with ihe teaching of anthropology to african civil servants from the practical standpoint have been struck both by the quickness and avidity with which many of these men—some fresh from college, with no experience of natives— have assimilated the basic elements of native thought and custom, and in a number of instances by the definitely suc- cessful results of the methods set forth in the classroom when wittingly applied abroad. | use of existing knowledge—what then are the means by which the store of knowledge we already possess may be used, and how far is a practical rather than theoretic interest in native peoples likely to introduce new methods of acquiring knowledge, or eliminate methods known to be of scientific value? nothing suggests that the practical or applied outlook makes, or should make any change in the method of the field worker. for if it be urged that attention to any particular theory is likely to dis- tract the observer from a fair all-round study of facts, the reply is obvious that theory can only stimulate the field worker to fresh observations, which should neither limit his area of outlook nor discourage him from seeking the fullest knowledge of the folk he is investigating in their present and past environment. the more complete the apparatus of the observer, whether gov- ernment official, missionary or professional anthropologist, the more likely is he to form a complete picture of a people in which due weight is given to the activities both mental and physical of its members, enabling the administrator to foresce their behaviour as individuals, as members of a family or of a larger social group. unity and conplextiy of social life in the lower cultures.— ethnic and historical connections naturally are important, but stress must be laid from the practical point of view on the inter- action of existing ideas and customs. it is impossible to uncler- stand the ideas regulating inheritance and bride price—two most important matters with which the administrator 1s concerned —without at the same time inquiring into the religion, sociology and economics of his people. unforescen and undesired ends have resulted from arbitrary interference with native custom. _the native has a point of view of his own, and before sweeping away seemingly objectionable customs, the white man with knowledge of anthropology should seek to preserve the driving force which runs through native life, while changing those fea- tures which are anti-social according to civilised ideas, though in those cultures in which they occur they instigate much praise- worthy social activity. : head hunting.—one of the best examples that can be cited is offered by head-hunting, a widespread habit which white civilisation cannot tolerate. yet its suppression was regarded by w. h. r. rivers as one of the main factors in the depopula- tion of melanesia. no one could be long in eddystone without recognising how great is the people's lack of interest in life, and to what an extent the zest has gone out of their lives. this lack of interest is largely due to the abolition of head-hunting by the british government. this practice formed the centre of a social and religious institution which took an all-pervading part in the lives of the people. the heads sought in the head-hunting expeditions were needed in order to propitiate the ancestral ghosts on such occasions as building a new house for a chief or making a new canoe, while they were also offered in sacrifice at the funeral of a chief. moreover, head-hunting was not only necessary for the due per- formance of the religious rites of the people, but it stood in the closest rclation to pursuits of an economic kind. the actual! head-hunting expedition only lasted a few wecks, and the actual fighting often only a few hours, but this was only the culminating point of a process last- ing over years. it was the rule that new canoes should be made for an expedition to obtain heads, and the manufacture of these meant work of an interesting kind lasting certainly for many months, probably for years. the process of canoe building was accompanied anthropology, applied throughout by rites and feasts which not only excited the liveliest interest but also acted as stimuli to various activities of horticulture and pig breeding. as the date fixed for the expedition approached, other rites and feasts were held, and these were still more frequent and on a larger scale after the return of a successful expedition. in stopping the practice of head-hunting, the rulers from an alien culture were abolishing an institution which had its roots in the religion of the people and spread its branches throughout nearly every aspect of their culture, and by this action they deprived the people of the greater part of their interest in life, while at the same time they undermined the religion of the people without any attempt to put another in its place.! this example is valuable from two standpoints. it demonstrates the interlocking of departmental activities, as a white man might be tempted to call them, in native life, and it furnishes the very type of practice which no white administration can permit. the z2passe seems absolute, yet in sarawak, where almost the same necessity for head-hunting exists, the difficulty has been overcome by sympathetic officials who have themselves taken charge of some of the old skull trophies of the people, and thereafter when the demand for the ceremonial! use of a skull arose one of the old skulls was lent to the community, the whole transaction being put on a business footing by the careful recording of skulls ‘‘ in’? and “ out.’”’ again, in an inland district of papua, where no man could hope to marry unless he had taken a skull, the officer in charge was able to persuade the tribe that the killing of a wild boar offered at least as good a test of luck and skill, and so was able to substitute the taking of a boar's head for that of a man (often a woman or child). the kula, the great trading expedition of the trobriand islanders, described by b. malinowski,? is another excellent example of the interlocking of native activities. from the administrator’s point of view there are no anti-social features in this complicated system of ceremonial ex- change, yet so sympathetic a governor as sir i[lubert murray states that it will surely be superseded by modern methods—no govern- ment, ‘“ however sympathetic, can keep it alive,” true, modern methods must eventually supersede the kula, but what attempts are being made to keep it in being, and if it 1s doomed what ingenuity is being exhibited in the attempt to keep up interest in the competitive garden making and canoe building and racing which play such an important part? importance of ceremonial—no one doubts the close rela- tionship between social organisation, ceremony, morals, economics and even ethics among ourselves; everyone recognises the psy- chological value of display, ceremonial and sport; yet in the administration of the backward races this common knowledge is too frequently ignored. what government at home would pre- sume to stop royal processions, the oxford and cambridge boat- race or public football matches? yet the corresponding ex- pressions reproduced by natives in dances, initiation ceremonies and public feasts are frequently suppressed, by the influence elther of the administrator or the missionary, long before it is understood whether they are harmful or not. active teaching is needed, now as much as ever, that the interests of people can- not be cut off with impunity, and the substitution of harmless for anti-social features in savage ritual and institutions is sound social psychotherapy. | positive interference.-—frequently new regulations are intro- duced which undermine the native social structure of which the europeans had remained entirely in ignorance. there are tribes in africa in which chieftainship is unimportant but age classes are well developed. the govt. found difficulty in dealing with people among whom appeared no vested authority, and administrators appointed “ chiefs." the position of these men was anomalous, they had no native prestige, and appeared to be govern- ment servants. later researches brought to light the fact that an efficient form of government had been all but destroyed by the foreign appointment of chiefs. the age grade system, with its elabo- rate initiation ceremonies, had provided a sound basis for both civil and military organisation: the younger men formed one class, while civil administration was vested in an older grade. the elders com- plained that they no longer had any authority in the villages, the young men did as they chose, no longer respecting the age-class regulations and taboos, some so obviously useful, as that prohibiting the use of intoxicating liquors to the younger grades. later in places the system was resuscitated, but much harm had been done; for the authority of the elders had been undermined, the younger generation had lost respect for the elders, and the steady rise in social impor- tance that the age-class system provides had gone. kingship.—in other instances trouble has been caused by ignorance of the fact that a chief may belong to that exalted class of beings called by frazer ‘ divine kings,” or if not actu- 1 fssays on the depopulation of melanesia, p. 106 (1922). 2 argonauts of the western pacific (1922). | idl ally of this order be at least of semi-divine nature, and responsi- ble for rain and generally for the prosperity of the land. here it may be wise to recognise frankly the hierarchical superiority of the priest-king, and to appoint under him an administrative government chief; indeed, besides the priest-king there are often one or more men recognised by the tribe as executive officers in everyday affairs. i afagic —the administrator cannot ignore magic and sorcery, and it 1s useless for him to affirm that the british govt. cannot countenance a belief in sorcery; magic may be a fiction, but the belief in it is a potent reality in all the ruder cultures, and is not extinct in higher cultures. cases of death alleged to be caused by magic or by poison—the two often being synonymous—are continually brought before administrators, yet rarely is evi- dence produced against the magician which on the white man’s laws of evidence can lead to conviction. in parts of melanesia it is doubtful whether there is any authentic evidence for the use of poisons by a sorcerer; yet folk undoubtedly die as the result of his machinations; they die from no other ostensible cause, and their death is ascribed to magic. the sorcerer is not convicted, but if the people take the law into their own hands and kill him the govt. steps in and punishes the slayers, who according to the ideas of their peers have courageously performed a public duty. another factor which greatly adds to the difficulty of dealing reasonably and justly with sorcery and witchcraft is that gen- erally speaking the darker races are far more suggestible than ourselves; unfortunately, space is lacking to elaborate this state- ment or to set out a tithe of the evidence on which it is based.’ it is small wonder then that many natives believe that the govt. encourages sorcery; indeed, the relative immunity of the sorcerer from all vengeance in certain instances may actu- ally produce this result. but as a general plan of treatment, probably an ordinance of the kind in force in papua is useful, in which it is stated that though there is really no such thing as sorcery yet the practice is so harmful that it is treated as criminal. at any rate, the administrator is not the only person in a dilemma; witness the plaint of one tata ko, a well-known sorcerer, to capt. barton, then governor of papua: ‘ if a man falls sick his family come to me and ask me to make him well. if i don’t do something for him they say, ‘ tata ko, the sorcerer, desires to kill our brother,’ and they are angry and will perhaps try to kill me. if i do give them something they insist on paying me well for 1t; should i refuse to take their presents they would not understand it and they would think [ was trying to kill their friend, but when i do take what they give me, you arrest me on a charge of sorcery blackmail.’ magicians not charlatans.—in most instances magicians are not charlatans; though they may impose upon the credulity of their clients they do believe in their own power; they have inher- ited the gift and perfected their craft by means of hard training. though legislation may be useful, magic cannot be disposed of by law, for every death except perhaps of the very old is attrib- uted to magic, and it is only when a man has some appreciation of the natural causes of death and the benefits of medicine that he relies less upon magic. missionaries have long been aware that their best weapon is the hospital; administrators. should start clinics shortly after administrative posts, as in the case of the splendidly fitted hospital ship, with its medical officer and orderlies, placed by the sudan govt. in 1922 for service on the white nile and its tributaries. social side of magic.—yet, however perfect administration, magic cannot die a sudden death; and this has its advantages, for magic has its social as well as its anti-social side. white magic will persist, and in melanesia, for instance, its bene- fits are well secn in connection with the kula. in the trobriand is. the specialists in magic are experts in the various crafts, in gardening and canoe building, etc., and it is under their auspices that the good traditions of gardening and building are maintained. though no canoe could sail unless the appropriate magic had been performed at each stage of its construction, good magic would never be used to counteract the effects of bad material or bad workmanship. thus, the continual magical observances guarantee a careful selection and tests of material, and are an incentive to good work. a successful re ee °c. g. seligman, anthropology and psychology, j.r.a.t. (1924). *c. g, seligman, afelanesians of british new guinea (1910). 142 trading expedition is the result of good magic, and, just as magic is the most important regulator of the kula, so is it of prime importance in garden work. the islanders, like most natives, are notoriously unthrifty, and it is doubtful if any native would cultivate sufficiently for his needs if left to individual responsibility. for man does not live by bread alone, and a garden which will make a fine display and be much talked of appeals to the mass of the population more than the knowledge of a supply against famine. african cases.—again in africa, where the evil side of magic is so prominent, it also has its beneficial side. many events bring a curse or thahu. the consequences of the thahu are severe. many of the breaches of custom producing thahu may seem to us ridiculous or hampering, yet mr. c. w. hobley notes that in about one-third of the instances the thaku is brought upon the offender, or brought upon a third party, by the intentional act of the offender, who “‘ goes about with the burden of the misdeed on his conscience, and this worries him so much that he gradually gets thin and ill. it therefore ends by his confessing to the elders and begging them to free him from the curse.’” practical suggestions—in order to save the backward races from extinction and enable them to adapt to new circumstances two courses seem advisable: (a) that all government servants, and others—especially missionaries—coming into direct con- tact with natives should take as part of their preparatory studies a course in anthropology; (6) that every government should ap- point trained anthropologists, in order to make detailed investi- gations and to act, when needed, as advisers to the administra- tion. each of these plans has its definite sphere of usefulness, and calls for further consideration. training—anthropology.—apart from a degree in anthropology, which as matters stand at present it is idle to expect more than a small minority to possess, the preparatory course in anthropology may be of two kinds: a six to twelve months’ course at one of the universities —actually three academic terms—in which, besides the social anthropology which is of prime importance from the adminis- trative standpoint, a certain amount of technology and_ physical anthropology will also be taught. if three terms be taken the course will in fact be, or approximate to, that required for a diploma in anthropology. such a course, if more stress than is sometimes the case be laid upon practical difficulties and details, is no doubt excel- lent in those few instances in which a man has already a strong, almost a ‘natural’ interest in anthropology; but this plan yields disappointing results when applied as hitherto to men who have had no foreign experience. better results appear to be obtained by the plan applied to the preliminary training in native modes of thought of the men selected by the colonial office as african civil servants. a course, known as the tropical african services course, gives an intensive training for two six-weekly periods, with a short holiday between them, in jaw, accounts, tropical products, tropical hygiene and sanitation, ethnol- ogy and the principles of african languages. _ less than a dozen lec- tures are given in ethnology, but these have been carefully thought out to show the special characteristics of savage—especially african —thought, and the practical difficulties which the beginner will have to face, the actual syllabus being roughly as follows:— some fundamental conceptions; definitions; race and language; methods; the classificatory system and clan organisation; awe; mana; taboo; magic; the cult of the dead, its simple and more complex manifestations; developments in the higher religions; heroes; divine kings and gods; animism; polytheism; persistence of both beliefs in the higher cultures, and their importance in the more advanced religions; the relation existing between man and animals; totemism; anima! cults; the part played by occupation and environment in the expression of religions; migrations and cultural ‘contacts; the fusion of peoples and the formation of sub- races; some social and religious complexes. experience shows that a certain small number of men will be suff- ciently interested to study the tribes they live among and to record their habits and customs, or at least to keep in touch with their teachers. a further development is for the colonial govt. to pay the expenses (fees and sustenance allowance) of men with adminis- trative experience who are keen enough to spend two to jour months’ leave working intensively at anthropology at one of the universities. few have so far availed themselves of this plan, yet such are their knowledge and keenness that this scheme is likely to prove of the utmost value both administratively and scientifically, one feature of special importance being that such students have a knowledge of at least some native language, and so are in a position to apply the technical knowledge they have gained directly on their return to africa. in france, the institut d' ethnologie and the faculles et eta- 1c, w. hobley, bantu beliefs and magic, p. 142 (1922). anthropology, applied blissements publics d’ enseignement superieur of the university of paris provide instruction in the various branches of ethnography and linguistics, having special regard to the french colonies. instruction is given in the languages of the native populations of the french possessions, arabic, berber, the sudanese lan- guages, malagasy, as well as the more important languages of the far east, siamese, annamese and cambodian. the social, family and religious organisation of islam and the social habits and religious beliefs of the natives of the french colonies are described and compared by a band of experts of european reputation. in austria, instruction in languages and, to a lesser degree, in ethnology, is given to missionaries at the missionary college of st. gabriel, near vienna. professional anthropologists the appointment of profes- sional anthropologists stands on a different footing. no argu- ments need be employed in favour of their administrative and scientific value. the ordinary official has neither the leisure nor the training, even if he has the desire, to make intensive investi- gations, and as time goes on and means of communication im- prove, and his journeys take place increasingly by car, he will have less and less opportunity of meeting his people unofficially and studying them at first hand. a further difficulty that stands in the way of the administrative official is that the native knows that his attitude to many customs such as human sacrifice, cannibalism and black magic must be hostile, and however sympathetic he may be he is still regarded as the man in author- ity. the anthropologist stays at native villages remote from government headquarters, and, once he has been able to gain the confidence of the people and let them know that his only object is to learn, one of the chief obstacles to obtaining reliable information will be removed. anthropology as a profession pre- sents a vicious circle. there are few men ready to become gov- ernment anthropologists, though the machinery for training them exists at our universities. men are not trained because there are no prospects; and then, when opportunities offer, there are insufficient candidates available. should it be possible to an- ticipate a regular demand the men would soon be forthcoming. encouragement to anthropological research has been given by the sudan govt.; the gold coast and nigeria have ap- pointed as anthropologists officers who had qualified by taking courses in anthropology. there is a trained government anthro- pologist in papua, and chairs in anthropology have been founded in the union of south africa and at sydney, where special train- ing is provided for administrative officers in papua. such action shows the trend of enlightened opinion, but the advantages that anthropological knowledge offers are appreciated only in minute proportion in comparison with needs and opportunities. all governments have their experts in geology, botany, agriculture and zoology in its many branches: it is a strange paradox that so often man alone should be unstudied. physical problems.—turning to the physical side, it may be useful to recall the old saying, ‘‘ god made the white man, god made the black man, but the devil made the mulatto,” if only to consider how far this proverb embodies a truth, and, if it does, how the facts are to be faced in practice. there are broadly two types of racial combination. in the first, the races coming to- gether are so far apart as to make hybridisation a real breaking down of the inherent characters of each, while in the second the fewer differences present offer only a moderate variability as a basis for recombination and selection which may be quite de- sirable. the latter, socially constituting the “ melting pot,” is perhaps best represented in history, and can best be appreciated anthropologically by a study of the velkerwandcrungen, with the broad result that an outburst of vigour and capacity is found to follow the mixture of peoples belonging to the same great racial groups. from the political standpoint this form of mis- cegenation has become of increased importance since the open- ing of the 2zoth century. mixed marriages —the proverb is intended to apply to moral values, and before accepting it it is necessary to remember that such children are almost invariably relegated to the inferior race (in practice, the mother’s) for their upbringing, and so are antimony—antioch college socially and morally at a grave disadvantage, except where a sufficient number of mixed unions occur, when a hybrid com- munity, with its own social habits and values, is established, allowing a fair estimate to be formed of the physical and mental qualities of its members. fhe reheboth community—the only all-round study of such a community is that of prof. eugen fischer of the reheboth community of southwest africa.! this consists of the descend- ants, some 150 in number, through five or more generations, of the hybrid offspring of a group of trek boers and hottentot women, and includes the offspring of a number of unions with members of the parent races. the genealogies are not always easy to follow, but the reheboth bastards show extreme varia- bility, and are divided into ‘“ european,” “hottentot ” and “ in- termediate ” groups. they are a strong, healthy and fruitful people, taller than either parent race, 1. e., they show a common indication of hybrid vigour. there is no predominance of herit- age from either race, but the inheritance of facial characters and colour is described as alternate, and in spite of the three groups there is no special tendency for the inheritance of groups of characters the unit elements of which are combined in either parent race. psychologically the most important observation is that the hottentot mentality predominates; there is neither european energy nor steadfastness of will. further, though several sub- jects show a fairly high degree of intelligence, the bastards live entirely in the present; they are typically augenblickmenschen, while this character is not compensated by any special power of imagination or in the arts and crafts, in which they are dis- tinctly weak. other groups.—as instances of other hybrid groups, with their own adequate social organisation, certain arab tribes of the sudan carrying much black blood, the mixed european-chinese population of the straits settlements, and the negro-amerind hybrid population of guiana may be added. owing to lack of precise knowledge of the building up of these groups little of importance can be said on the physical side, for terms having no precise connotation are used; e.g., it is obvious that there is a vast difference genetically and socially between the tall dolichocephalic dinka and we short mesaticephals of the bahr-el-ghazal, though both would be classed as ‘‘ negroes ” by arabs and europeans; i hile with regard to the arab stocks there can be no certainty whether any particular strain carries armenoid blood. all that can be said at present is that the members of these tribes appear to have adapted themselves admirably to their mode of life, which is predominantly arab, socially, economically and religiously, and that the majority of individuals appear to present an intermediate type with regard to two of the most easily observed characters, namely skin colour and breadth of nose, though striking individual variations occur, e.g., a “ black ’ skin may be associated with a face and nose almost typically caucasian. further, darkness of skin tends to be predominant, and there are certain families in which this tendency is so marked that it would perhaps be fair to speak of these as exhibiting dominance in the true mendelian sense. mentally and morally these tribes are arab, not negro; thus socially and morally the inferior stock may be said to have been improved by the mixture. how far the arab has suffered must remain an open question, and whether the improvement may not be in part due to the direct influence of islam. it is at least worth noting that the reconquest of the sudan demonstrated the truth of an observation made years before in arabia by robertson smith, namely that not the pure arab but the mixed arab-negro population exhibits the quality of religious fanaticism. in both the other two examples quoted, whatever the physical differences between the races concerned, they stand on equal or more nearly equal jlevel. the mental and physical alertness of the mixed chinese-white population of singapore is striking, and they form a definite social class furnishing miny highly e:hcient civil servants and clerks. generally, mongoliin traits of feature predominated, and it appeared that the mongolian eye, at least in the f.1. genera- tion, was dominant, as it was in malay-melancsian matings observed in new guinea. it may indeed be found that mongolian-white matings give particularly interesting, and perhaps desirable, com- binations. in one japanese-white marriage the children (all female) exhibited a high degree of hybrid vigour, considerable artistic ability, and in type approximated to polynesian; unfortunately, they passed out of observation before maturity, and it can be stated as a matter of experience that five other children, the result of two japancse- white matings, did not reproduce this type. with regard to the negro-amerind mixture of guiana, there seems ' die reheboth bastards und das bastardierungsproblem beim menschen (jena, 1913). 143 no doubt that a definite type has been produced which has largely taken to a special mode of life as boatmen on the rivers, for which it is well fitted, and that this hybrid population exhibits much of the physical efficiency of the negro without his laziness and excitability. for books on the subject see the bibliography to the article anthro- pology and the works quoted in the text. (cs 5y)