NILE

nile, battle of the). the british fleet re-entered the mediterranean to pursue and baffle napoleon. the destruction of the french squadron at the anchorage of aboukir on the 1st of august gave it the complete command of the sea. a second invasion of ireland on a smaller scale was attempted and to some extent carried out, while the great attack by egypt was in progress. one french squadron of four frigates carrying 1150 soldiers under general humbert succeeded in sailing from rochefort on the 6th of august. on the 22nd humbert was landed at killala bay, but after making a vigorous raid he was compelled to surrender at ballinamuck on the 8th of september. eight days after his surrender, another french squadron of one sail of the line and eight frigates carrying 3000 troops, sailed from brest under commodore bompart to support humbert. it was watched and pursued by frigates, and on the 12th of october was overtaken and destroyed by a superior british force commanded by sir john borlase warren, near tory island. from the close of 1798 till the _coup d'etat_ of the 18th brumaire (9th november) 1799, which established napoleon as first consul and master of france, the french navy had only one object--to reinforce and relieve the army cut off in egypt by the battle of the nile. the relief of the french garrison in malta was a subordinate part of the main purpose. but the supremacy of the british navy was by this time so firmly founded that neither egypt nor malta could be reached except by small ships which ran the blockade. on the 25th of april, admiral bruix did indeed leave brest, after baffling the blockading fleet of lord bridport, which was sent on a wild-goose chase to the south of ireland by means of a despatch sent out to be captured and to deceive. admiral bruix succeeded in reaching toulon, and his presence in the mediterranean caused some disturbance. but, though his twenty-five sail of the line formed the best-manned fleet which the french had sent to sea during the war, and though he escaped being brought to battle, he did not venture to steer for the eastern mediterranean. on the 13th of august he was back at brest, bringing with him a spanish squadron carried off as a hostage for the fidelity of the government at madrid to its disastrous alliance with france. on the day on which bruix re-entered brest, the 13th of august 1799, a combined russian and british expedition sailed from the downs to attack the french army of occupation in the batavian republic. the military operations were unsuccessful, and terminated in the withdrawal of the allies. but the naval part was well executed. vice-admiral mitchell forced the entrance to the texel, and on the 30th of august received the surrender of the remainder of the dutch fleet--thirteen vessels in the nieuwe diep--the sailors having refused to fight for the republic. in spite of the failure on land, the expedition did much to confirm the naval supremacy of great britain by the entire suppression of the most seamanlike of the forces opposed to it. authorities.--chevalier, _histoire de la marine francaise sous la premiere republique_ (paris, 1886); james's _naval history_ (london, 1837); captain mahan, _influence of sea power upon the french revolution and the empire_ (london, 1892). the french schemes of invasion are exhaustively dealt with in captain e. desbriere's _projets et tentatives de debarquements aux iles britanniques_ (paris, 1900, &c.). (d. h.) footnotes: [1] for the following operations see map in spanish succession war. [2] coburg refrained from a regular siege of conde. he wished to gain possession of the fortress in a defensible state, intending to use it as his own depot later in the year. he therefore reduced it by famine. during the siege of valenciennes the allies appear to have been supplied from mons. [3] henceforth to the end of 1794 both armies were more or less "in cordon," the cordon possessing greater or less density at any particular moment or place, according to the immediate intentions of the respective commanders and the general military situation. [4] in the course of this the column from bouchain, 4500 strong, was caught in the open at avesnes-le-sec by 5 squadrons of the allied cavalry and literally annihilated. [5] one of the generals at maubeuge, chancel, was guillotined. [6] each of the fifteen armies on foot had been allotted certain departments as supply areas, jourdan's being of course far away in lorraine. [7] liguria was not at this period thought of, even by napoleon, as anything more than a supply area. [8] vukassovich had received beaulieu's order to demonstrate with two battalions, and also appeals for help from argenteau. he therefore brought most of his troops with him. [9] we have seen that after tourcoing, taught by experience, souham posted vandamme's covering force 14 or 15 m. out. but napoleon's disposition was in advance of experience. [10] the proposed alliance with the sardinians came to nothing. the kings of sardinia had always made their alliance with either austria or france conditional on cessions of conquered territory. but, according to thiers, the directory only desired to conquer the milanese to restore it to austria in return for the definitive cession of the austrian netherlands. if this be so, napoleon's proclamations of "freedom for italy" were, if not a mere political expedient, at any rate no more than an expression of his own desires which he was not powerful enough to enforce. [11] on entering the territory of the duke of parma bonaparte imposed, besides other contributions, the surrender of twenty famous pictures, and thus began a practice which for many years enriched the louvre and only ceased with the capture of paris in 1814. [12] see c. von b.-k., _geist und stoff_, pp. 449-451. [13] the assumption by later critics (clausewitz even included) that the "flank position" held by these forces relatively to the main armies in italy and germany was their _raison d'etre_ is unsupported by contemporary evidence. [14] for this expedition, which was repulsed by brune in the battle of castricum, see fortescue's _hist. of the british army_, vol. iv., and sachot's _brune en hollande_. [15] he afterwards appointed berthier to command the army of reserve, but himself accompanied it and directed it, using berthier as chief of staff. [16] only one division of the main body used the little st bernard. [17] when he made his decision he was unaware that bethencourt had been held up at arona. [18] this may be accounted for by the fact that napoleon's mind was not yet definitively made up when his advanced guard had already begun to climb the st bernard (12th). napoleon's instructions for moncey were written on the 14th. the magazines, too, had to be provided and placed before it was known whether moreau's detachment would be forthcoming. [19] six guns had by now passed fort bard and four of these were with murat and duhesme, two with lannes. [20] it is supposed that the foreign spies at dijon sent word to their various employers that the army was a bogy. in fact a great part of it never entered dijon at all, and the troops reviewed there by bonaparte were only conscripts and details. by the time that the veteran divisions from the west and paris arrived, either the spies had been ejected or their news was sent off too late to be of use. [21] on the strength of a report, false as it turned out, that the austrian rearguard had broken the bridges of the bormida. french west africa (_l'afrique occidentale francaise_), the common designation of the following colonies of france:--(1) senegal, (2) upper senegal and niger, (3) guinea, (4) the ivory coast, (5) dahomey; of the territory of mauretania, and of a large portion of the sahara. the area is estimated at nearly 2,000,000 sq. m., of which more than half is saharan territory. the countries thus grouped under the common designation french west africa comprise the greater part of the continent west of the niger delta (which is british territory) and south of the tropic of cancer. it embraces the upper and middle course of the niger, the whole of the basin of the senegal and the south-western part of the sahara. its most northern point on the coast is cape blanco, and it includes cape verde, the most westerly point of africa. along the guinea coast the french possessions are separated from one another by colonies of great britain and other powers, but in the interior they unite not only with one another but with the hinterlands of algeria and the french congo. [illustration: map of french west africa and adjacent territories.] in physical characteristics french west africa presents three types: (1) a dense forest region succeeding a narrow coast belt greatly broken by lagoons; (2) moderately elevated and fertile plateaus, generally below 2000 ft., such as the region enclosed in the great bend of the niger; (3) north of the senegal and niger, the desert lands forming part of the sahara (q.v.). the most elevated districts are futa jallon, whence rise the senegal, gambia and niger, and gon--both massifs along the south-western edge of the plateau lands, containing heights of 5000 to 6000 ft. or more. among the chief towns are timbuktu and jenne on the niger, porto novo in dahomey, and st louis and dakar in senegal, dakar being an important naval and commercial port. the inhabitants are for the most part typical negroes, with in senegal and in the sahara an admixture of berber and arab tribes. in the upper senegal and futa jallon large numbers of the inhabitants are fula. the total population of french west africa is estimated at about 13,000,000. the european inhabitants number about 12,000. the french possessions in west africa have grown by the extension inland of coast colonies, each having an independent origin. they were first brought under one general government in 1895, when they were placed under the supervision of the governor of senegal, whose title was altered to meet the new situation. between that date and 1905 various changes in the areas and administrations of the different colonies were made, involving the disappearance of the protectorates and military territories known as french sudan and dependent on senegal. these were partly absorbed in the coast colonies, whilst the central portion became the colony of upper senegal and niger. at the same time the central government was freed from the direct administration of the senegal and niger countries (decrees of oct. 1902 and oct. 1904). over the whole of french west africa is a governor-general, whose headquarters are at dakar.[1] he is assisted by a government council, composed of high functionaries, including the lieutenant-governors of all colonies under his control. the central government, like all other french colonial administrations, is responsible, not to the colonists, but to the home government, and its constitution is alterable at will by presidential decree save in matters on which the chambers have expressly legislated. to it is confided financial control over the colonies, responsibility for the public debt, the direction of the departments of education and agriculture, and the carrying out of works of general utility. it alone communicates with the home authorities. its expenses are met by the duties levied on goods and vessels entering and leaving any port of french west africa. it may make advances to the colonies under its care, and may, in case of need, demand from them contributions to the central exchequer. the administration of justice is centralized and uniform for all french west africa. the court of appeal sits at dakar. there is also a uniform system of land registration adopted in 1906 and based on that in force in australia. subject to the limitations indicated the five colonies enjoy autonomy. the territory of mauretania is administered by a civil commissioner under the direct control of the governor-general. the colony of senegal is represented in the french parliament by one deputy. since the changes in administration effected in 1895 the commerce of french west africa has shown a steady growth, the volume of external trade increasing in the ten years 1895-1904 from l3,151,094 to l6,238,091. in 1907 the value of the trade was l7,097,000; of this 53% was with france. apart from military expenditure, about l600,000 a year, which is borne by france, french west africa is self-supporting. the general budget for 1906 balanced at l1,356,000. there is a public debt of some l11,000,000, mainly incurred for works of general utility. see senegal, french guinea, ivory coast and dahomey. for anglo-french boundaries east of the niger see sahara and nigeria. for the constitutional connexion between the colonies and france see france: _colonies_. an account of the economic situation of the colonies is given by g. francois in _le gouvernement general de l'afrique occidentale francaise_ (paris, 1908). consult also the annual _report on the trade, agriculture, &c. of french west africa_ issued by the british foreign office. a map of french west africa by a. meunier and e. barralier (6 sheets on the scale 1:2,000,000) was published in paris, 1903. footnote: [1] the organization of the new government was largely the work of e. n. roume (b. 1858), governor-general 1902-1907, an able and energetic official, formerly director of asian affairs at the colonial ministry.