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    "source_title": "Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911)",
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    "chunk_id": "1911:inebriety:5795111ebcd6",
    "title": "INEBRIETY",
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    "verified_text": "inebriety, law of. the legal relations to which inebriety (lat. _in_, intensive, and _ebrietas_, drunkenness) gives rise are partly civil and partly criminal. i. _civil capacity._--the law of england as to the civil capacity of the drunkard is practically identified with, and has passed through substantially the same stages of development as the law in regard to the civil capacity of a person suffering from mental disease (see insanity). unless (see iii. _inf._) a modification is effected in his condition by the fact that he has been brought under some form of legal control, a man may, in spite of intoxication, enter into a valid marriage or make a valid will, or bind himself by a contract, if he is sober enough to know what he is doing, and no improper advantage of his condition is taken (cf. _matthews_ v. _baxter_, 1873, l.r. 8 ex. 132; _imperial loan co._ v. _stone_, 1892, 1 q.b. 599). the law is the same in scotland and in ireland; and the sale of goods act 1893 (which applies to the whole united kingdom) provides that where necessaries are sold and delivered to a person who by reason of drunkenness is incompetent to contract, he must pay a reasonable price for them; \"necessaries\" for the purposes of this provision mean goods suitable to the condition in life of such person and to his actual requirements at the time of the sale and delivery. under the roman law, and under the roman dutch law as applied in south africa, drunkenness, like insanity, appears to vitiate absolutely a contract made by a person under its influence (_molyneux_ v. _natal land and colonization co._, 1905, a.c. 555). in the united states, as in england, intoxication does not vitiate contractual capacity unless it is of such a degree as to prevent the person labouring under it from understanding the nature of the transaction into which he is entering (bouvier, _law dict._, s.v. \"drunkenness\"; and cf. _waldron_ v. _angleman_, 1004, 58 atl. 568; _fowler_ v. _meadow brook water co._, 1904, 57 atl. 959; 208 penn., 473). the same rule is by implication adopted in the indian contract act (act ix. of 1872), which provides (s. 12) that \"a person is ... of sound mind for the purpose of making a contract if, at the time when he makes it, he is capable of understanding it and of forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his interests.\" in some legal systems, however, habitual drunkenness is a ground for divorce or judicial separation (sweden, law of the 27th of april 1810; france, code civil, art. 231, _hirt_ v. _hirt_, dalloz, 1898, pt. ii., p. 4, and n. 4). ii. _criminal responsibility._--in english law, drunkenness, unlike insanity, was at one time regarded as in no way an excuse for crime. according to coke (co. litt., 247) a drunkard, although he suffers from acquired insanity, _dementia affectata_, is _voluntarius daemon_, and therefore has no privilege in consequence of his state; \"but what hurt or ill soever he doth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it.\" sir matthew hale (p.c. 32) took a more moderate view, viz. that a person under the influence of this voluntarily contracted madness \"shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right senses\"; and admitted the existence of two \"allays\" or qualifying circumstances: (1) _temporary_ frenzy induced by the unskilfulness of physicians or by drugging; and (2) _habitual_ or fixed frenzy. those early authorities have, however, undergone considerable development and modification. although the general principle that drunkenness is not an excuse for crime is still steadily maintained (see russell, _crimes_, 6th ed., i. 144; archbold, _cr. pl._, 23rd ed., p. 29), it is settled law that where a particular intent is one of the constituent elements of an offence, the fact that a prisoner was intoxicated at the time of its commission is relevant evidence to show that he had not the capacity to form that intent. drunkenness is also a circumstance of which a jury may take account in considering whether an act was premeditated, or whether a prisoner acted in self-defence or under provocation, when the question is whether the danger apprehended or the provocation was sufficient to justify his conduct or to alter its legal character. moreover, _delirium tremens_, if it produce such a degree of madness as to render a person incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, relieves him from criminal responsibility for any act committed by him while under its influence; and in one case at _nisi prius_ (_r._ v. _baines_, _the times_, 25th jan. 1886) this doctrine was extended by mr justice day to temporary derangement occasioned by drink. the law of scotland accepts, if it does not go somewhat beyond, the later developments of that of england in regard to criminal responsibility in drunkenness. indian law on the point is similar to the english (indian penal code, act. xlv. of 1860, ss. 85, 86; mayne, _crim. law of india_, ed. 1896, p. 391). in the united states the same view is the prevalent legal doctrine (see bishop, _crim. law_, 8th ed., i, ss. 397-416). the criminal code of queensland (no. 9 of 1899, art. 28) provides that a person who becomes intoxicated intentionally is responsible for any crime that he commits while so intoxicated, whether his voluntary intoxication was induced so as to afford an excuse for the commission of an offence or not. as in england, however, when an intention to cause a specific result is an element of an offence, intoxication, whether complete or partial, and whether intentional or unintentional, may be regarded for the purpose of ascertaining whether such intention existed or not. there is a similar provision in the penal code of ceylon (no. 2 of 1883, art. 79). the criminal codes of canada (1892, c. 29, ss. 7 et seq.) and new zealand (no. 56 of 1893, ss. 21 et seq.) are silent on the subject of intoxication as an excuse for crime. the criminal code of grenada (no. 2 of 1897, art. 51) provides that \"a person shall not, on the ground of intoxication, be deemed to have done any act involuntarily, or be exempt from any liability to punishment for any act: and a person who does an act while in a state of intoxication shall be deemed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his act.\" there is a similar provision in the criminal code of the gold coast colony (no. 12 of 1892, s. 54). under the french penal code (art. 64), \"_il n'y a ni crime, ni delit, lorsque le prevenu etait en etat de demence au temps de l'action ou lorsqu'il aura ete contraint par une force a laquelle il n' a pu resister_.\" according to the balance of authority (dalloz, _rep._ tit., peine, ss. 402 et seq.) intoxication is not assimilated to insanity, within the meaning of this article, but it may be and is taken account of by juries as an extenuating circumstance (ortolan, _droit penal_ i. s. 323: chauveau et helie i. s. 360). a provision in the german penal code (art. 51) that an act is not punishable if its author, at the time of committing it, was in a condition of unconsciousness, or morbid disturbance of the activity of his mind which prevented the free exercise of his will, has been held not to extend to intoxication (clunet, 1883, p. 311). but in germany as in france, intoxication may apparently be an extenuating circumstance. under the italian penal code (arts. 46-49) intoxication--unless voluntarily induced so as to afford an excuse for crime--may exclude or modify responsibility. so far only the question whether drunkenness is an excuse for offences committed under its influence has been dealt with. there remains the question how far drunkenness itself is a crime. mere private intoxication is not, either in england or in the united states (bishop, _crim. law_, 8th ed., i. s. 399) indictable as an offence at common law; but in all civilized countries public drunkenness is punishable when it amounts to a breach of the peace (see liquor laws) or contravention of public order; and modern legislation in many countries provides for deprivation of personal liberty for long periods in case of a frequent repetition of the offence. reference may be made in this connexion to the inebriates acts 1898, 1899 and 1900 (see iii. _inf._), and also to similar legislation in the british colonies and in foreign legal systems (e.g. cape of good hope, no. 32 of 1896; ceylon, licensing ordinance 1891, ss. 23, 24, 29; new south wales, vagrants punishment act 1866; massachusetts, acts of 1891, c. 427, 1893, cc. 414, 44; france, law of 23rd of jan. 1873, art. 6). iii. _state action in regard to inebriety._--this assumes a variety of forms. (a) measures regulating the punishment of occasional or habitual drunkenness by fines or short terms of imprisonment. (b) control in _penal_ establishments for lengthened periods. (c) laws prohibiting the sale of liquor to persons who are known inebriates: e.g. in england (licensing act 1902); ontario (rev. stats. 1897, c. 245, ss. 124, 125); new south wales (liquor act 1898, ss. 52, 53); cape of good hope (no. 28 of 1883, s. 89); new york (rev. stats. 1889-1892, c. 20, title iv.); california (act to prevent sale of liquor to drunkards, 1889); massachusetts (pub. stats., ed. 1902, c. 100, s. 9). (d) laws regulating the appointment of some person or persons to act as guardian or guardians, or who may be endowed with legal powers over the person and estate of an inebriate. thus in france (code civil, arts. 489 et seq.), germany (civil code, art. 6 (39)) and austria-hungary (_burgerliches gesetz-buch_, ss. 21, 269, 270, 273), an inebriate may be judicially interdicted if he is squandering his property and thereby exposing his family to future destitution. provision is also made for the interdiction of inebriates by the laws of nova scotia (rev. stats. 1900, c. 126, s. 2), manitoba (rev. stat. 1902, c. 103, ss. 30 et seq.), british columbia (rev. stat. 1897, c. 66), new south wales (inebriates act 1900, s. 5), tasmania (inebriates act 1885, no. 17, s. 23); canton of bale (trustee law of the 23rd of feb. 1880, s. 11), orange river colony (code laws, c. 108, s. 30), maryland (code general laws, c. 474, s. 47). (e) control for the purpose of reformation. legislation of this character provides reformatory treatment: (1) for the inebriate who makes a voluntary application for admission; (2) by compulsory seclusion for the inebriate who refuses consent to treatment and yet manages to keep out of the reach of the law; (3) for the inebriate who is a police-court recidivist, or who has committed crime, caused or contributed to by drink. the legislation of the cape of good hope (inebriates act 1896) and of north dakota (habitual drunkards act 1895) provides for the first of these methods of treatment alone. compulsory detention for ordinary inebriates only is provided for by the laws of delaware (act of 1898), massachusetts (rev. laws, c. 87), and of the cantons of berne (law of the 24th of nov. 1883) and bale (law of the 21st of feb. 1901). all three methods of treatment are in force in new south wales (inebriates act 1900), queensland (inebriates institutions act 1896) and south australia (inebriates act 1881). provision is made only for voluntary application and compulsory detention of ordinary inebriates in victoria (inebriates act 1890), tasmania (inebriates act 1885; inebriates hospitals act 1892) and new zealand (inebriates institutions act 1898). the legislation of the united kingdom (inebriates acts 1879-1900) deals both with voluntary application and with the committal of criminal inebriates or of police-court recidivists. a brief sketch of the english system must suffice. the inebriates acts of 1870-1900 deal in the first place with non-criminal, and in the second place with criminal, habitual drunkards. for the purposes of the acts the term \"habitual drunkard\" means \"a person who, not being amenable to any jurisdiction in lunacy, is notwithstanding, by reason of habitual intemperate drinking of intoxicating liquor, at times dangerous to himself or herself, or incapable of managing himself or herself and his or her affairs.\" a person would become amenable to the lunacy jurisdiction not only where habitual drunkenness made him a \"lunatic\" in the legal sense of the term, but where it created, such a state of disease and consequential \"mental infirmity\" as to bring his case within section 116 of the lunacy act 1890, the effect of which is explained in the article insanity. any \"habitual drunkard\" within the above definition may obtain admission to a \"licensed retreat\" on a written application to the licensee, stating the time (the maximum period is two years) that he undertakes to remain in the retreat. the application must be accompanied by the statutory declaration of two persons that the applicant is an habitual drunkard, and its signature must be attested by a justice of the peace who has satisfied himself as to the fact, and who is required to state that the applicant understood the nature and effect of his application. licences (each of which is subject to a duty and is impressed with a stamp of £5, and 10s. for every patient above ten in number) are granted for retreats by the borough council and the town clerk in boroughs, and elsewhere by the county council and the clerk of the county council. the maximum period for which a licence may be granted is two years, but licences may be renewed by the licensing authority on payment of a stamp duty of the same amount as on the original grant. when an habitual drunkard has once been committed to a retreat, he must remain in the retreat for the time that he has fixed in his application, subject to certain statutory provisions similar to those prescribed by the lunacy acts for asylums as to leave of absence and discharge; and he may be retaken and brought back to the retreat under a justice's warrant. the term of detention may be extended on its expiry, or an inebriate may be readmitted, on a fresh application, without any statutory declaration, and without the attesting justice being required to satisfy himself that the applicant is an habitual drunkard. licensed retreats are subject to inspection by an inspector of retreats appointed by the home secretary, to whom he makes an annual report. the home secretary is empowered to make rules and regulations for the management of retreats, and \"regulations and orders,\" not inconsistent with such rules, are to be prepared by the licensee within a month after the granting of his licence, and submitted to the inspector for approval. the rules now in force are dated as regards (a) england, 28th feb. 1902; (b) scotland, 14th april 1902; (c) ireland, 3rd feb. 1903. there are also statutory provisions, similar to those of the lunacy acts, as to offences--(i.) by licensees failing to comply with the requirements of the acts; (ii) by persons ill-treating patients, or helping them to escape, or unlawfully supplying them with intoxicating liquor; (iii.) by patients refusing to comply with the rules. the home secretary may (i.) authorize the establishment of \"state inebriate reformatories,\" to be paid for out of moneys provided by parliament; and (ii.) sanction \"certified inebriates' reformatories\" on the application of any borough or county council, or any person whatever, if satisfied concerning the reformatory and the persons proposing to maintain it. an inspector of certified inebriate reformatories has been appointed. regulations for state inebriate reformatories and for certified inebriate reformatories have been made, dated as follows: _state inebriate reformatories_:--england, 21st of june 1901, 29th of dec. 1903, 29th of april 1904; scotland, 9th of march 1900; ireland, 16th of march 1899, 16th of april 1901, 10th of feb. 1904. _certified inebriate reformatories_:--england, model regulations, 17th of dec. 1898; scotland, regulations, 14th of feb. 1899; ireland, model regulations, 29th of april 1899. any person convicted on indictment of an offence punishable with imprisonment or penal servitude (i.e. of any non-capital felony and of most misdemeanours), if the court is satisfied from the evidence that the offence was committed under the influence of drink, or that drink was a contributing cause of the offence, may, if he admits that he is, or is found by the jury to be, an habitual drunkard, in addition to or in substitution for any other sentence, be ordered to be detained in a state or certified inebriate reformatory, the managers of which are willing to receive him. again, any habitual drunkard who is found drunk in any public place, or who commits any other of a series of similar offences under various statutes, after having within twelve months been convicted at least three times of a similar offence, may, on conviction on indictment, or, if he consent, on summary conviction, be sent for detention in any certified inebriate reformatory. the expenses of prosecuting habitual drunkards under the above provisions are payable out of the local rates upon an order to that effect by the judge of assize or chairman of quarter-sessions if the prosecution be on indictment, or by a court of summary jurisdiction if the offence is dealt with summarily. authorities.--as to the history of legislation on the subject see parl. paper no. 242 of 1872; 1893 c. 7008. see also wyatt paine, _inebriate reformatories and retreats_ (london, 1899); blackwell, _inebriates acts_, 1879-1898 (london, 1899); wood renton, _lunacy_ (london and edinburgh, 1896); kerr, _inebriety_ (3rd ed., london, 1894). an excellent account of the systems in force in other countries for the treatment of inebriates will be found in parl. pap. (1902), cd. 1474. (a. w. r.) infallibility (fr. _infaillibilite_ and _infallibilite_, the latter now obsolete, med. lat. _infallibilitas_, _infallibilis_, formed from fallor, to make a mistake), the fact or quality of not being liable to err or fail. the word has thus the general sense of \"certainty\"; we may, e.g., speak of a drug as an infallible specific, or of a man's judgment as infallible. in these cases, however, the \"infallibility\" connotes certainty only in so far as anything human can be certain. in the language of the christian church the word \"infallibility\" is used in a more absolute sense, as the freedom from ail possibility of error guaranteed by the direct action of the spirit of god. this belief in the infallibility of revelation is involved in the very belief in revelation itself, and is common to all sections of christians, who differ mainly as to the kind and measure of infallibility residing in the human instruments by which this revelation is interpreted to the world. some see the guarantee, or at least the indication, of infallibility in the consensus of the church (_quod semper, ubique, et ab omnibus_) expressed from time to time in general councils; others see it in the special grace conferred upon st peter and his successors, the bishops of rome, as heads of the church; others again see it in the inspired scriptures, god's word. this last was the belief of the protestant reformers, for whom the bible was in matters of doctrine the ultimate court of appeal. to the translation and interpretation of the scriptures men might bring a fallible judgment, but this would be assisted by the direct action of the spirit of god in proportion to their faith. as for infallibility, this was a direct grace of god, given only to the few. \"what ever was perfect under the sun,\" ask the translators of the authorized version (1611) in their preface, \"where apostles and apostolick men, that is, men endued with an extraordinary measure of god's spirit, and privileged with the privilege of infallibility, had not their hand?\" in modern protestantism, on the other hand, the idea of an infallible authority whether in the church or the bible has tended to disappear, religious truths being conceived as valuable only as they are apprehended and made real to the individual mind and soul by the grace of god, not by reason of any submission to an external authority. (see also inspiration.) at the present time, then, the idea of infallibility in religious matters is most commonly associated with the claim of the roman catholic church, and more especially of the pope personally as head of that church, to possess the privilege of infallibility, and it is with the meaning and limits of this claim that the present article deals. the substance of the claim to infallibility made by the roman catholic church is that the church and the pope cannot err when solemnly enunciating, as binding on all the faithful, a decision on a question of faith or morals. the infallibility of the church, thus limited, is a necessary outcome of the fundamental conception of the catholic church and its mission. every society of men must have a supreme authority, whether individual or collective, empowered to give a final decision in the controversies which concern it. a community whose mission it is to teach religious truth, which involves on the part of its members the obligation of belief in this truth, must, if it is not to fail of its object, possess an authority capable of maintaining the faith in its purity, and consequently capable of keeping it free from and condemning errors. to perform this function without fear of error, this authority must be infallible in its own sphere. the christian church has expressly claimed this infallibility for its formal dogmatic teaching. in the very earliest centuries we find the episcopate, united in council, drawing up symbols of faith, which every believer was bound to accept under pain of exclusion, condemning heresies, and casting out heretics. from nicaea and chalcedon to florence and trent, and to the present day, the church has excluded from her communion all those who do not profess her own faith, i.e. all the religious truths which she represents and imposes as obligatory. this is infallibility put into practice by definite acts. the infallibility of the pope was not defined until 1870 at the vatican council; this definition does not constitute, strictly speaking, a dogmatic innovation, as if the pope had not hitherto enjoyed this privilege, or as if the church, as a whole, had admitted the contrary; it is the newly formulated definition of a dogma which, like all those defined by the councils, continued to grow into an ever more definite form, ripening, as it were, in the always living community of the church. the exact formula for the papal infallibility is given by the vatican council in the following terms (constit. _pastor aeternus_, cap. iv.); \"we teach and define as a divinely revealed dogma, that the roman pontiff, when he speaks _ex cathedra_--i.e. when, in his character as pastor and doctor of all christians, and in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he lays down that a certain doctrine concerning faith or morals is binding upon the universal church,--possesses, by the divine assistance which was promised to him in the person of the blessed saint peter, that same infallibility with which the divine redeemer thought fit to endow his church, to define its doctrine with regard to faith and morals; and, consequently, that these definitions of the roman pontiff are irreformable in themselves, and not in consequence of the consent of the church.\" a few notes will suffice to elucidate this pronouncement. (a) as the council expressly says, the infallibility of the pope is not other than that of the church; this is a point which is too often forgotten or misunderstood. the pope enjoys it in person, but solely _qua_ head of the church, and as the authorized organ of the ecclesiastical body. for this exercise of the primacy as for the others, we must conceive of the pope and the episcopate united to him as a continuation of the apostolic college and its head peter. the head of the college possesses and exercises by himself alone the same powers as the college which is united with him; not by delegation from his colleagues, but because he is their established chief. the pope when teaching _ex cathedra_ acts as head of the whole episcopal body and of the whole church. (b) if the divine constitution of the church has not changed in its essential points since our lord, the mode of exercise of the various powers of its head has varied; and that of the supreme teaching power as of the others. this explains the late date at which the dogma was defined, and the assertion that the dogma was already contained in that of the papal primacy established by our lord himself in the person of st peter. a certain dogmatic development is not denied, nor an evolution in the direction of a centralization in the hands of the pope of the exercise of his powers as primate; it is merely required that this evolution should be well understood and considered as legitimate. (c) as a matter of fact the infallibility of the pope, when giving decisions in his character as head of the church, was generally admitted before the vatican council. the only reservation which the most advanced gallicans dared to formulate, in the terms of the celebrated declaration of the clergy of france (1682), had as its object the irreformable character of the pontifical definitions, which, it was claimed, could only have been acquired by them through the assent of the church. this doctrine, rather political than theological, was a survival of the errors which had come into being after the great schism, and especially at the council of constance; its object was to put the church above its head, as the council of constance had put the ecumenical council above the pope, as though the council could be ecumenical without its head. in reality it was gallicanism alone which was condemned at the vatican council, and it is gallicanism which is aimed at in the last phrase of the definition we have quoted. (d) infallibility is the guarantee against error, not in all matters, but only in the matter of dogma and morality; everything else is beyond its power, not only truths of another order, but even discipline and the ecclesiastical laws, government and administration, &c. (e) again, not all dogmatic teachings of the pope are under the guarantee of infallibility; neither his opinions as private instructor, nor his official allocutions, however authoritative they may be, are infallible; it is only his _ex cathedra_ instruction which is guaranteed; this is admitted by everybody. but when does the pope speak _ex cathedra_, and how is it to be distinguished when he is exercising his infallibility? as to this point there are two schools, or rather two tendencies, among catholics: some extend the privilege of infallibility to all official exercise of the supreme _magisterium_, and declare infallible, e.g. the papal encyclicals.[1] others, while recognizing the supreme authority of the papal _magisterium_ in matters of doctrine, confine the infallibility to those cases alone in which the pope chooses to make use of it, and declares positively that he is imposing on all the faithful the obligation of belief in a certain definite proposition, under pain of heresy and exclusion from the church; they do not insist on any special form, but only require that the pope should clearly manifest his will to the church. this second point of view, as clearly expounded by mgr joseph fessler (1813-1872), bishop of st polten, who was secretary to the vatican council, in his work _die wahre und die falsche unfehlbarkeit der papste_ (french trans. _la vraie et la fausse infaillibilite_, paris, 1873), and by cardinal newman in his \"letter to the duke of norfolk,\" is the correct one, and this is clear from the fact that it has never been blamed by the ecclesiastical authority. those who hold the latter opinion have been able to assert that since the vatican council no infallible definition had yet been formulated by the popes, while recognizing the supreme authority of the encyclicals of leo xiii. it is remarkable that the definition of the infallibility of the pope did not appear among the projects (_schemata_) prepared for the deliberations of the vatican council (1869). it doubtless arose from the proposed forms for the definitions of the primacy and the pontifical _magisterium_. the chapter on the infallibility was only added at the request of the bishops and after long hesitation on the part of the cardinal presidents. the proposed form, first elaborated in the conciliary commission _de fide_, was the object of long public discussions from the 50th general congregation (may 13th, 1870) to the 85th (july 13th); the constitution as a whole was adopted at a public session, on the 18th, of the 535 bishops present, two only replied \"_non placet_\"; but about 50 had preferred not to be present. the controversies occasioned by this question had started from the very beginning of the council, and were carried on with great bitterness on both sides. the minority, among whom were prominent cardinals rauscher and schwarzenberg, hefele, bishop of rotterdam (the historian of the councils) cardinal mathieu, mgr dupanloup, mgr maret, &c., &c., did not pretend to deny the papal infallibility; they pleaded the inopportuneness of the definition and brought forward difficulties mainly of an historical order, in particular the famous condemnation of pope honorius by the 6th ecumenical council of constantinople in 680. the majority, in which cardinal manning played a very active part, took their stand on theological reasons of the strongest kind; they invoked the promises of our lord to st peter: \"thou art peter, and upon this rock will i build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against her\"; and again, \"i have prayed for thee, peter, that thy faith fail not; and do thou in thy turn confirm thy brethren\"; they showed the popes, in the course of the ages, acting as the guardians and judges of the faith, arousing or welcoming dogmatic controversies and authoritatively settling them, exercising the supreme direction in the councils and sanctioning their decisions; they explained that the few historical difficulties did not involve any dogmatic defect in the teaching of the popes; they insisted upon the necessity of a supreme tribunal giving judgment in the name of the whole of the scattered church; and finally, they considered that the definition had become opportune for the very reason that under the pretext of its inopportuneness the doctrine itself was being attacked. the definition once proclaimed, controversies rapidly ceased; the bishops who were among the minority one after the other formulated their loyal adhesion to the catholic dogma. the last to do so in germany was hefele, who published the decrees of the 10th of april 1871, thus breaking a long friendship with dollinger; in austria, where the government had thought good to revive for the occasion the royal _placet_, mgr haynald and mgr strossmayer delayed the publication, the former till the 15th of september 1871, the latter till the 26th of december 1872. in france the adhesion was rapid, and the publication was only delayed by some bishops in consequence of the disastrous war with prussia. though no bishops abandoned it, a few priests, such as father hyacinthe loyson, and a few scholars at the german universities refused their adhesion. the most distinguished among the latter was dollinger, who resisted all the advances of mgr scherr, archbishop of munich, was excommunicated on the 17th of april 1871, and died unreconciled, though without joining any separate group. after him must be mentioned friedrich of munich, several professors of bonn, and reinkens of breslau, who was the first bishop of the \"old catholics.\" these professors formed the \"committee of bonn,\" which organized the new church. it was recognized and protected first in bavaria, thanks to the minister freiherr johann von lutz, then in saxony, baden, wurttemberg, prussia, where it was the pretext for, if not the cause of, the kulturkampf, and finally in switzerland, especially at geneva. for the theological aspects of the dogma of infallibility, see, among many others, l. billot, s.j., _de ecclesia christi_ (3 vols., rome, 1898-1900); or g. wilmers, s.j., _de christi ecclesia_ (regensburg, 1897). the most accessible popular work is that of mgr fessler already mentioned. for the history of the definition see vatican council; also papacy, gallicanism, febronianism, old catholics, &c. (a. bo.*) footnote: [1] it was in this sense that it was understood by dollinger, who pointed out that the definition of the dogma would commit the church to all past official utterances of the popes, e.g. the syllabus of 1864, and therefore to a war _a outrance_ against modern civilization. this view was embodied in the circular note to the powers, drawn up by dollinger and issued by the bavarian prime minister prince hohenlohe-schillingsfurst on april 9, 1869. it was also the view universally taken by the german governments which supported the _kulturkampf_ in a greater or less degree.--ed. infamy (lat. _infamia_), public disgrace or loss of character. infamy (_infamia_) occupied a prominent place in roman law, and took the form of a censure on individuals pronounced by a competent authority in the state, which censure was the result either of certain actions which they had committed or of certain modes of life which they had pursued. such a censure involved disqualification for certain rights both in public and in private law (see a. h. j. greenidge, _infamia, its place in roman public and private law_, 1894). in english law infamy attached to a person in consequence of conviction of some crime. the effect of infamy was to render a person incompetent to give evidence in any legal proceeding. infamy as a cause of incompetency was abolished by an act of 1843 (6 & 7 vict. c. 85). the word \"infamous\" is used in a particular sense in the english medical act of 1858, which provides that if any registered medical practitioner is judged by the general medical council, after due inquiry, to have been guilty of infamous conduct in any professional respect, his name may be erased from the medical register. the general medical council are the sole judges of whether a practitioner has been guilty of conduct infamous in a professional respect, and they act in a judicial capacity, but an accused person is generally allowed to appear by counsel. any action which is regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by a man's professional brethren--such, for example, as issuing advertisements in order to induce people to consult him in preference to other practitioners--may be found infamous.",
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