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HOHENFRIEDBERG

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Source
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911) / britannica_1911
License
public_domain
Chunk ID
1911:hohenfriedberg:af3cf361363e
Section
Hash Algorithm
sha256
Stored Hash
47eb2d5ba02806254272bbfe751900569cbb72dd81707101a8f3f4f7592bba1f
Computed Hash
47eb2d5ba02806254272bbfe751900569cbb72dd81707101a8f3f4f7592bba1f
Normalizer
ggnorm 1.0
Observed
2026-02-08 18:43:06
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Verified Text

hohenfriedberg, or hohenfriedeberg, a village of silesia, about 6 m. from the small town of striegau. it gives its name to a battle (also called the battle of striegau) in the war of the austrian succession, fought on the 3rd of june 1745 between the prussians under frederick the great and the austrians and saxons commanded by prince charles of lorraine. in may the king, whose army had occupied extended winter quarters in silesia, had drawn it together into a position about neisse whence he could manoeuvre against the austrians, whether they invaded silesia by troppau or glatz, or joined their allies (who, under the duke of weissenfels, were on the upper elbe), and made their advance on schweidnitz, breslau or liegnitz. on the austrians concentrating towards the elbe, frederick gradually drew his army north-westward along the edge of the mountain country until on the 1st of june it was near schweidnitz. at that date the austro-saxons were advancing (very slowly owing to the poorness of the roads and the dilatoriness of the saxon artillery train) from waldenburg and landshut through the mountains, heading for striegau. after a few minor skirmishes at the end of may, frederick had made up his mind to offer no opposition to the passage of the allies, but to fall upon them as they emerged, and the prussian army was therefore kept concentrated out of sight, while only selected officers and patrols watched the debouches of the mountains. on the other hand the allies had no intention of delivering battle, but meant only, on emerging from the mountains, to take up a suitable camping position and thence to interpose between breslau and the king, believing that "the king was at his wits' end, and, once the army really began its retreat on breslau, there would be frightful consternation in its ranks." but in fact, as even the coolest observers noticed, the prussian army was in excellent spirits and eager for the "decisive affair" promised by the king. on the 3rd of june, watched by the invisible patrols, the austrians and saxons emerged from the hills at hohenfriedberg with bands playing and colours flying. their advanced guard of infantry and cavalry spread out into the plain, making for a line of hills spreading north-west from striegau, where the army was to encamp. but the main body moved slowly, and at last prince charles and weissenfels decided to put off the occupation of the line of hills till the morrow. the army bivouacked therefore in two separate wings, the saxons (with a few austrian regiments) between gunthersdorf and pilgramshain, the austrians near hausdorf. they were about 70,000 strong, frederick 65,000. [illustration: hohenfriedberg, june 4, 1745.] the king had made his arrangements in good time, aided by the enemy's slowness, and in the evening he issued simple orders to move. about 9 p.m. the prussians marched off from alt-jauernigk towards striegau, the guns on the road, the infantry and cavalry, in long open columns of companies and squadrons, over the fields on either side--a night march well remembered by contrast with others as having been executed in perfect order. meanwhile general dumoulin, who commanded an advanced detachment between striegau and stanowitz, broke camp silently and moved into position below the hill north-west of striegau, which was found to be occupied by saxon light infantry outposts. the king's orders were for dumoulin and the right wing of the main army to deploy and advance towards haslicht against the saxons, and for the left wing infantry to prolong the line from the marsh to gunthersdorf, covered by the left-wing cavalry on the plain near thomaswaldau. on the side of the austrians, the outlying hussars are said to have noticed and reported the king's movement, for the night was clear and starlit, but their report, if made, was ignored. at 4 a.m. dumoulin advanced on pilgramshain, neglecting the fire of the saxon outpost on the spitzberg, whereupon this promptly retired in order to avoid being surrounded. dumoulin then posted artillery on the slope of the hill and deployed his six grenadier battalions facing the village. the leading cavalry of the main army came up and deployed on dumoulin's left front in open rolling ground. meantime the duke of weissenfels had improvised a line of defence, posting his infantry in the marshy ground and about pilgramshain, and his cavalry, partly in front of pilgramshain and partly on the intervening space, opposite that of the prussians. but before the marshy ground was effectively occupied by the duke's infantry, his cavalry had been first shaken by the fire of dumoulin's guns on the spitzberg and a heavy battery that was brought up on to the grabener fuchsberg, and then charged by the prussian right-wing cavalry, and in the melee the allies were gradually driven in confusion off the battlefield. the cavalry battle was ended by 6.30