HEDON

hedon, a municipal borough in the holderness parliamentary division of the east riding of yorkshire, england, 8 m. e. of hull by a branch of the north-eastern railway. pop. (1901), 1010. it stands in a low-lying, flat district bordering the humber. it is 2 m. from the river, but was formerly reached by a navigable inlet, now dry, and was a considerable port. there is a small harbour, but the prosperity of the port has passed to hull. the church of st augustine is a splendid cruciform building with central tower. it is early english, decorated and perpendicular, the tower being of the last period. the west front is particularly fine, and the church, with its noble proportions and lofty clerestories, resembles a cathedral in miniature. there are a manufacture of bricks and an agricultural trade. the corporation consists of a mayor, 3 aldermen and 9 councillors; and possesses a remarkable ancient mace, of 15th-century workmanship. area, 321 acres. according to tradition the men of hedon received a charter of liberties from king aethelstan, but there is no evidence to prove this or indeed to prove any settlement in the town until after the conquest. the manor is not mentioned in the domesday survey, but formed part of the lordship of holderness which william the conqueror granted to odo, count of albemarle. a charter of henry ii., which is undated, contains the first certain evidence of settlement. by it the king granted to william, count of albemarle, free borough rights in hedon so that his burgesses there might hold of him as freely and quietly as the burgesses of york or lincoln held of the king. an earlier charter granted to the inhabitants of york shows that these rights included a trade gild and freedom from many dues not only in england but also in france. king john in 1200 granted a confirmation of these liberties to baldwin, count of albemarle, and hawisia his wife and for this second charter the burgesses themselves paid 70 marks. in 1272 henry iii. granted to edmund, earl of lancaster, and avelina his wife, then lord and lady of the manor, the right of holding a fair at hedon on the eve, day, and morrow of the feast of st augustine and for five following days. after the countess's death the manor came to the hands of edward i. in 1280 it was found by an inquisition that the men of hedon "were few and poor" and that if the town were demised at a fee-farm rent the town might improve. the grant, however, does not appear to have been made until 1346. besides this charter edward iii. also granted the burgesses the privilege of electing a mayor and bailiffs every year. at that time hedon was one of the chief ports in the humber, but its place was gradually taken by hull after that town came into the hands of the king. hedon was incorporated by charles ii. in 1661, and james ii. in 1680 gave the burgesses another charter granting among other privileges that of holding two extra fairs, but of this they never appear to have taken advantage. the burgesses returned two members to parliament in 1295, and from 1547 to 1832 when the borough was disfranchised. see _victoria county history, yorkshire_; j. r. boyle, _the early history of the town and port of hedon_ (hull and york, 1895); g. h. park, _history of the ancient borough of hedon_ (hull, 1895). hedonism (gr. [greek: hedone], pleasure, from [greek: hedys], sweet, pleasant), in ethics, a general term for all theories of conduct in which the criterion is pleasure of one kind or another. hedonistic theories of conduct have been held from the earliest times, though they have been by no means of the same character. moreover, hedonism has, especially by its critics, been very much misrepresented owing mainly to two simple misconceptions. in the first place hedonism may confine itself to the view that, as a matter of observed fact, all men do in practice make pleasure the criterion of action, or it may go further and assert that men ought to seek pleasure as the sole human good. the former statement takes no view as to whether or not there is any absolute good: if merely denies that men aim at anything more than pleasure. the latter statement admits an ideal, _summum bonum_--namely, pleasure. the second confusion is the tacit assumption that the pleasure of the hedonist is necessarily or characteristically of a purely physical kind; this assumption is in the case of some hedonistic theories a pure perversion of the facts. practically all hedonists have argued that what are known as the "lower" pleasures are not only ephemeral in themselves but also productive of so great an amount of consequent pain that the wise man cannot regard them as truly pleasurable; the sane hedonist will, therefore, seek those so-called "higher" pleasures which are at once more lasting and less likely to be discounted by consequent pain. it should be observed, however, that this choice of pleasures by a hedonist is conditioned not by "moral" (absolute) but by prudential (relative) considerations. the earliest and the most extreme type of hedonism is that of the cyrenaic school as stated by aristippus, who argued that the only good for man is the sentient pleasure of the moment. since (following protagoras) knowledge is solely of momentary sensations, it is useless to try, as socrates recommended, to make calculations as to future pleasures, and to balance present enjoyment with disagreeable consequences. the true art of life is to crowd as much enjoyment as possible into every moment. this extreme or "pure" hedonism regarded as a definite philosophic theory practically died with the cyrenaics, though the same spirit has frequently found expression in ancient and modern, especially poetical, literature. the confusion already alluded to between "pure" and "rational" hedonism is nowhere more clearly exemplified than in the misconceptions which have arisen as to the doctrine of the epicureans. to identify epicureanism with cyrenaicism is a complete misunderstanding. it is true that pleasure is the _summum bonum_ of epicurus, but his conception of that pleasure is profoundly modified by the socratic doctrine of prudence and the eudaemonism of aristotle. the true hedonist will aim at a life of enduring rational happiness; pleasure is the end of life, but true pleasure can be obtained only under the guidance of reason. self-control in the choice of pleasures with a view to reducing pain to a minimum is indispensable. "of all this, the beginning, and the greatest good, is prudence." the negative side of epicurean hedonism was developed to such an extent by some members of the school (see hegesias) that the ideal life is held to be rather indifference to pain than positive enjoyment. this pessimistic attitude is far removed from the positive hedonism of aristippus. between the hedonism of the ancients and that of modern philosophers there lies a great gulf. practically speaking ancient hedonism advocated the happiness of the individual: the modern hedonism of hume, bentham and mill is based on a wider conception of life. the only real happiness is the happiness of the community, or at least of the majority: the criterion is society, not the individual. thus we pass from egoistic to universalistic hedonism, utilitarianism, social ethics, more especially in relation to the still broader theories of evolution. these theories are confronted by the problem of reconciling and adjusting the claims of the individual with those of society. one of the most important contributions to the discussion is that of sir leslie stephen (_science of ethics_), who elaborated a theory of the "social organism" in relation to the individual. the end of the evolution process is the production of a "social tissue" which will be "vitally efficient." instead, therefore, of the criterion of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," stephen has that of the "health of the organism." life is not "a series of detached acts, in each of which a man can calculate the sum of happiness or misery attainable by different courses." each action must be regarded as directly bearing upon the structure of society. a criticism of the various hedonistic theories will be found in the article ethics (_ad fin._). see also, beside works quoted under cyrenaics, epicurus, &c., and the general histories of philosophy, j. s. mackenzie, _manual of ethics_ (3rd ed., 1897); j. h. muirhead, _elements of ethics_ (1892); j. watson, _hedonistic theories_ (1895); j. martineau, _types of ethical theory_ (2nd ed., 1886); f. h. bradley, _ethical studies_ (1876); h. sidgwick, _methods of ethics_ (6th ed., 1901); jas. seth, _ethical principles_ (3rd ed., 1898); other works quoted under ethics. heel. (1) (o. eng. _hela_, cf. dutch _hiel_; a derivative of o. eng. hoh, hough, hock), that part of the foot in man which is situated below and behind the ankle; by analogy, the calcaneal part of the tarsus in other vertebrates. the heel proper in digitigrades and ungulates is raised off the ground and is commonly known as the "knee" or "hock," while the term "heel" is applied to the hind hoofs. (2) (a variant of the earlier _hield_; cf. dutch _hellen_, for _helden_), to turn over to one side, especially of a ship. it is this word probably, in the sense of "tip-up," used particularly of the tilting or tipping of a cask or barrel of liquor, that explains the origin of the expression "no heel-taps," a direction to the drinkers of a toast to drain their glasses and leave no dregs remaining. "tap" is a common word for liquor, and a cask is said to be "heeled" when it is tipped and only dregs or muddy liquor are left. this suits the actual sense of the phrase better than the explanations which connect it with tapping the "heel" or bottom of the glass (see _notes and queries_, 4th series, vols. xi.-xii., and 5th series, vol. i.).