FRENCH REVOLUTION

french revolution, the. among the many revolutions which from time to time have given a new direction to the political development of nations the french revolution stands out as at once the most dramatic in its incidents and the most momentous in its results. this exceptional character is, indeed, implied in the name by which it is known; for france has experienced many revolutions both before and since that of 1789, but the name "french revolution," or simply "the revolution," without qualification, is applied to this one alone. the causes which led to it: the gradual decay of the institutions which france had inherited from the feudal system, the decline of the centralized monarchy, and the immediate financial necessities that compelled the assembling of the long neglected states-general in 1789, are dealt with in the article on france: _history_. the successive constitutions, and the other legal changes which resulted from it, are also discussed in their general relation to the growth of the modern french polity in the article france (_law and institutions_). the present article deals with the progress of the revolution itself from the convocation of the states-general to the coup d'etat of the 18th brumaire which placed napoleon bonaparte in power. opening of the states-general. the elections to the states-general of 1789 were held in unfavourable circumstances. the failure of the harvest of 1788 and a severe winter had caused widespread distress. the government was weak and despised, and its agents were afraid or unwilling to quell outbreaks of disorder. at the same time the longing for radical reform and the belief that it would be easy were almost universal. the _cahiers_ or written instructions given to the deputies covered well-nigh every subject of political, social or economic interest, and demanded an amazing number of changes. amid this commotion the king and his ministers remained passive. they did not even determine the question whether the estates should act as separate bodies or deliberate collectively. on the 5th of may the states-general were opened by louis in the salle des menus plaisirs at versailles. barentin, the keeper of the seals, informed them that they were free to determine whether they would vote by orders or vote by head. necker, as director-general of the finances, set forth the condition of the treasury and proposed some small reforms. the tiers etat (third estate) was dissatisfied that the question of joint or separate deliberation should have been left open. it was aware that some of the nobles and many of the inferior clergy agreed with it as to the need for comprehensive reform. joint deliberation would ensure a majority to the reformers and therefore the abolition of privileges and the extinction of feudal rights of property. separate deliberation would enable the majority among the nobles and the superior clergy to limit reform. hence it became the first object of the tiers etat to effect the amalgamation of the three estates. conflict between the three estates. the conflict between those who desired and those who resisted amalgamation took the form of a conflict over the verification of the powers of the deputies. the tiers etat insisted that the deputies of all three estates should have their powers verified in common as the first step towards making them all members of one house. it resolved to hold its meetings in the salle des menus plaisirs, whereas the nobles and the clergy met in smaller apartments set aside for their exclusive use. it refrained from taking any step which might have implied that it was an organized assembly, and persevered in regarding itself as a mere crowd of individual members incapable of transacting business. meanwhile the clergy and the nobles began a separate verification of their powers. but a few of the nobles and a great many of the clergy voted against this procedure. on the 7th the tiers etat sent deputations to exhort the other estates to union, while the clergy sent a deputation to it with the proposal that each estate should name commissioners to discuss the best method of verifying powers. the tiers etat accepted the proposal and conferences were held, but without result. it then made another appeal to the clergy which was almost successful. the king interposed with a command for the renewal of the conferences. they were resumed under the presidency of barentin, but again to no purpose. on the 10th of june sieyes moved that the tiers etat should for the last time invite the first and second estates to join in the verification of powers and announce that, whether they did or not, the work of verifying would begin forthwith. the motion was carried by an immense majority. as there was no response, the tiers etat on the 12th named bailly provisional president and commenced verification. next day three cures of poitou came to have their powers verified. other clergymen followed later. when the work of verification was over, a title had to be found for the body thus created, which would no longer accept the style of the tiers etat. on the 15th sieyes proposed that they should entitle themselves the assembly of the known and verified representatives of the french nation. mirabeau, mounier and others proposed various appellations. but success was reserved for legrand, an obscure deputy who proposed the simple name of national assembly. withdrawing his own motion, sieyes adopted legrand's suggestion, which was carried by 491 votes to 90. the assembly went on to declare that it placed the debts of the crown under the safeguard of the national honour and that all existing taxes, although illegal as having been imposed without the consent of the people, should continue to be paid until the day of dissolution. the national assembly. oath of the tennis court. by these proceedings the tiers etat and a few of the clergy declared themselves the national legislature. then and thereafter the national assembly assumed full sovereign and constituent powers. nobles and clergy might come in if they pleased, but it could do without them. the king's assent to its measures would be convenient, but not necessary. this boldness was rewarded, for on the 19th the clergy decided by a majority of one in favour of joint verification. on the same day the nobles voted an address to the king condemning the action of the tiers etat. left to himself, louis might have been too inert for resistance. but the queen and his brother, the count of artois, with some of the ministers and courtiers, urged him to make a stand. a seance royale was notified for the 22nd and workmen were sent to prepare the salle des menus plaisirs for the ceremony. on the 20th bailly and the deputies proceeded to the hall and found it barred against their entrance. thereupon they adjourned to a neighbouring tennis court, where mounier proposed that they should swear not to separate until they had established the constitution. with a solitary exception they swore and the oath of the tennis court became an era in french history. as the ministers could not agree on the policy which the king should announce in the seance royale, it was postponed to the 23rd. the assembly found shelter in the church of st louis, where it was joined by the main body of the clergy and by the first of the nobles. at the seance royale louis made known his will that the estates should deliberate apart, and declared that if they should refuse to help him he would do by his sole authority what was necessary for the happiness of his people. when he quitted the hall, some of the clergy and most of the nobles retired to their separate chambers. but the rest, together with the tiers etat, remained, and mirabeau declared that, as they had come by the will of the nation, force only should make them withdraw. "gentlemen," said sieyes, "you are to-day what you were yesterday." with one voice the assembly proclaimed its adhesion to its former decrees and the inviolability of its members. in versailles and in paris popular feeling was clamorous for the assembly and against the court. during the next few days many of the clergy and nobles, including the archbishop of paris and the duke of orleans, joined the assembly. louis tamely accepted his defeat. he recalled necker, who had resigned after the seance royale. on the 27th he wrote to those clerical and noble deputies who still held out, urging submission. by the 2nd of july the joint verification of powers was completed. the last trace of the historic states-general disappeared and the national assembly was perfect. on the same day it claimed an absolute discretion by a decree that the mandates of the electors were not binding on its members. dismissal of necker. having failed in their first attempt on the assembly, the court party resolved to try what force could do. a large number of troops, chiefly foreign regiments in the service of france, were concentrated near paris under the command of the marshal de broglie. on mirabeau's motion the assembly voted an address to the king asking for their withdrawal. the king replied that the troops were not meant to act against the assembly, but intimated his purpose of transferring the session to some provincial town. on the same day he dismissed necker and ordered him to quit versailles. these acts led to the first insurrection of paris. the capital had long been in a dangerous condition. bread was dear and employment was scarce. the measures taken to relieve distress had allured a multitude of needy and desperate men from the surrounding country. among the middle class there already existed a party, consisting of men like danton or camille desmoulins, which was prepared to go much further than any of the leaders of the assembly. the rich citizens were generally fund-holders, who regarded the assembly as the one bulwark against a public bankruptcy. the duke of orleans, a weak and dissolute but ambitious man, had conceived the hope of supplanting his cousin on the throne. he strained his wealth and influence to recruit followers and to make mischief. the gardens of his residence, the palais royal, became the centre of political agitation. ever since the elections virtual freedom of the press and freedom of speech had prevailed in paris. clubs were multiplied and pamphlets came forth every hour. the municipal officers who were named by the crown had little influence with the citizens. the police were a mere handful. of the two line regiments quartered in the capital, one was swiss and therefore trusty; but the other, the gardes francaises, shared all the feelings of the populace. rioting in paris. fall of the bastille, july 14, 1789. on the 12th of july camille desmoulins announced the dismissal of necker to the crowd in the palais royal. warmed by his eloquence, they sallied into the street. part of broglie's troops occupied the champs elysees and the place louis quinze. after one or two petty encounters with the mob they were withdrawn, either because their temper was uncertain or because their commanders shunned responsibility. paris was thus left to the rioters, who seized arms wherever they could find them, broke open the jails, burnt the octroi barriers and soon had every man's life and goods at their discretion. citizens with anything to lose were driven to act for themselves. for the purpose of choosing its representatives in the states-general the third estate of paris had named 300 electors. their function once discharged, these men had no public character, but they resolved that they would hold together in order to watch over the interests of the city. after the seance royale the municipal authority, conscious of its own weakness, allowed them to meet at the hotel de ville, where they proceeded to consider the formation of a civic guard. on the 13th, when all was anarchy in paris, they were joined by flesselles, provost of the merchants, and other municipal officers. the project of a civic guard was then adopted. the insurrection, however, ran its course unchecked. crowds of deserters from the regular troops swelled the ranks of the insurgents. they attacked the hotel des invalides and carried off all the arms which were stored there. with the same object they assailed the bastille. the garrison was small and disheartened, provisions were short, and after some hours' fighting de launay the governor surrendered on promise of quarter. he and several of his men were, notwithstanding, butchered by the mob before they could be brought to the hotel de ville. as all paris was in the hands of the insurgents, the king saw the necessity of submission. on the morning of the 15th he entered the hall of the assembly to announce that the troops would be withdrawn. immediately afterwards he dismissed his new ministers and recalled necker. thereupon the princes and courtiers most hostile to the national assembly, the count of artois, the prince of conde, the duke of bourbon and many others, feeling themselves no longer safe, quitted france. their departure is known as the first emigration. new municipality of paris and national guard. revolution in the provinces. the capture of the bastille was hailed throughout europe as symbolizing the fall of absolute monarchy, and the victory of the insurgents had momentous consequences. recognizing the 300 electors as a temporary municipal government, the assembly sent a deputation to confer with them at the hotel de ville, and on a sudden impulse one of these deputies, bailly, lately president of the assembly, was chosen to be mayor of paris. the marquis lafayette, doubly popular as a veteran of the american war and as one of the nobles who heartily upheld the cause of the assembly, was chosen commandant of the new civic force, thenceforwards known as the national guard. on the 17th louis himself visited paris and gave his sanction to the new authorities. in the course of the following weeks the example of paris was copied throughout france. all the cities and towns set up new elective authorities and organized a national guard. at the same time the revolution spread to the country districts. in most of the provinces the peasants rose and stormed and burnt the houses of the _seigneurs_, taking peculiar care to destroy their title-deeds. some of the _seigneurs_ were murdered and the rest were driven into the towns or across the frontier. amid the universal confusion the old administrative system vanished. the intendants and sub-delegates quitted or were driven from their posts. the old courts of justice, whether royal or feudal, ceased to act. in many districts there was no more police, public works were suspended and the collection of taxes became almost impossible. the insurrection of july really ended the _ancien regime_. the 4th of august. disorder in the provinces led directly to the proceedings on the famous night of the 4th of august. while the assembly was considering a declaration which might calm revolt, the vicomte de noailles and the duc d'aiguillon moved that it should proclaim equality of taxation and the suppression of feudal burdens. other deputies rose to demand the repeal of the game laws, the enfranchisement of such serfs as were still to be found in france, and the abolition of tithes and of feudal courts and to renounce all privileges, whether of classes, of cities, or of provinces. amid indescribable enthusiasm the assembly passed resolution after resolution embodying these changes. the resolutions were followed by decrees sometimes hastily and unskilfully drawn. in vain sieyes remarked that in extinguishing tithes the assembly was making a present to every landed proprietor. in vain the king, while approving most of the decrees, tendered some cautious criticisms of the rest. the majority did not, indeed, design to confiscate property wholesale. they drew a distinction between feudal claims which did and did not carry a moral claim to compensation. but they were embarrassed by the wording of their own decrees and forestalled by the violence of the people. the proceedings of the 4th of august issued in a wholesale transfer of property from one class to another without any indemnity for the losers. parties in the assembly. the work of drafting a constitution for france had already been begun. parties in the assembly were numerous and ill-defined. the extreme right, who desired to keep the government as it stood, were a mere handful. the right who wanted to revive, as they said, the ancient constitution, in other words, to limit the king's power by periodic states-general of the old-fashioned sort, were more numerous and had able chiefs in cazales and maury, but strove in vain against the spirit of the time. the right centre, sometimes called the monarchiens, were a large body and included several men of talent, notably mounier and malouet, as well as many men of rank and wealth. they desired a constitution like that of england which should reserve a large executive power to the king, while entrusting the taxing and legislative powers to a modern parliament. the left or constitutionals, known afterwards as the feuillants, among whom barnave and charles and alexander lameth were conspicuous, also wished to preserve monarchy but disdained english precedent. they were possessed with feelings then widespread, weariness of arbitrary government, hatred of ministers and courtiers, and distrust not so much of louis as of those who surrounded him and influenced his judgment. republicans without knowing it, they grudged every remnant of power to the crown. the extreme left, still more republican in spirit, of whom robespierre was the most noteworthy, were few and had little power. mirabeau's independence of judgment forbids us to place him in any party. declaration of the rights of man. the royal veto. the first constitutional committee, elected on the 14th of july, had mounier for its reporter. it was instructed to begin with drafting a declaration of the rights of man. six weeks were spent by the assembly in discussing this document. the committee then presented a report which embodied the principle of two chambers. this principle contradicted the extreme democratic theories so much in fashion. it also offended the self-love of most of the nobles and the clergy who were loath that a few of their number should be erected into a house of lords. the assembly rejected the principle of two chambers by nearly 10 to 1. the question whether the king should have a veto on legislation was next raised. mounier contended that he should have an absolute veto, and was supported by mirabeau, who had already described the unlimited power of a single chamber as worse than the tyranny of constantinople. the left maintained that the king, as depositary of the executive, should be wholly excluded from the legislative power. lafayette, who imagined himself to be copying the american constitution, proposed that the king should have a suspensive veto. thinking that it would be politic to claim no more, necker persuaded the king to intimate that he was satisfied with lafayette's proposal. the suspensive veto was therefore adopted. as the king had no power of dissolution, it was an idle form. mounier and his friends having resigned their places in the constitutional committee, it came to an end and the assembly elected a new committee which represented the opinions of the left. removal of the royal family and assembly to paris. soon afterwards a fresh revolt in paris caused the king and the assembly to migrate thither. the old causes of disorder were still working in that city. the scarcity of bread was set down to conspirators against the revolution. riots were frequent and persons supposed hostile to the assembly and the nation were murdered with impunity. the king still had counsellors who wished for his departure as a means to regaining freedom of action. at the end of september the flanders regiment came to versailles to reinforce the gardes du corps. the officers of the gardes du corps entertained the officers of the flanders regiment and of the versailles national guard at dinner in the palace. the king, queen and dauphin visited the company. there followed a vehement outbreak of loyalty. rumour enlarged the incident into a military plot against freedom. those who wanted a more thorough revolution wrought up the crowd and even respectable citizens wished to have the king among them and amenable to their opinion. on the 5th of october a mob which had gathered to assault the hotel de ville was diverted into a march on versailles. lafayette was slow to follow it and, when he arrived, took insufficient precautions. at daybreak on the 6th some of the rioters made their way into the palace and stormed the apartment of the queen who escaped with difficulty. at length the national guards arrived and the mob was quieted by the announcement that the king had resolved to go to paris. the assembly declared itself inseparable from the king's person. louis and his family reached paris on the same evening and took up their abode in the tuileries. a little later the assembly established itself in the riding school of the palace. thenceforward the king and queen were to all intents prisoners. the assembly itself was subject to constant intimidation. many members of the right gave up the struggle and emigrated, or at least withdrew from attendance, so that the left became supreme. mirabeau and the court. mirabeau had already taken alarm at the growing violence of the revolution. in september he had foretold that it would not stop short of the death of both king and queen. after the insurrection of october he sought to communicate with them through his friend the comte de la marck. in a remarkable correspondence he sketched a policy for the king. the abolition of privilege and the establishment of a parliamentary system were, he wrote, unalterable facts which it would be madness to dispute. but a strong executive authority was essential, and a king who frankly adopted the revolution might still be powerful. in order to rally the sound part of the nation louis should leave paris, and, if necessary, he should prepare for a civil war; but he should never appeal to foreign powers. neither the king nor the queen could grasp the wisdom of this advice. they distrusted mirabeau as an unscrupulous adventurer, and were confirmed in this feeling by his demands for money. his correspondence with the court, although secret, was suspected. the politicians who envied his talents and believed him a rascal raised the cry of treason. in the assembly mirabeau, though sometimes successful on particular questions, never had a chance of giving effect to his policy as a whole. whether even he could have controlled the revolution is highly doubtful; but his letters and minutes drawn up for the king form the most striking monument of his genius (see mirabeau and montmorin de saint-herem). the assembly and the royal power. reorganization of france. early in the year 1790 a dispute with england concerning the frontier in north america induced the spanish government to claim the help of france under the family compact. this demand led the assembly to consider in what hands the power of concluding alliances and of making peace and war should be placed. mirabeau tried to keep the initiative for the king, subject to confirmation by the chamber. on barnave's motion the assembly decreed that the legislature should have the power of war and peace and the king a merely advisory power. mirabeau was defeated on another point of the highest consequence, the inclusion of ministers in the national assembly. his colleagues generally adhered to the principle that the legislative and executive powers should be totally separate. the left assumed that, if deputies could hold office, the king would have the means of corrupting the ablest and most influential. it was decreed that no deputy should be minister while sitting in the house or for two years after. ministers excluded from the house being necessarily objects of suspicion, the assembly was careful to allow them the least possible power. the old provinces were abolished, and france was divided anew into eighty departments. each department was subdivided into districts, cantons and communes. the main business of administration, even the levying of taxes, was entrusted to the elective local authorities. the judicature was likewise made elective. the army and the navy were so organized as to leave the king but a small share in appointing officers and to leave the officers but scanty means of maintaining discipline. even the cases in which the sovereign might be deposed were foreseen and expressly stated. monarchy was retained, but the monarch was regarded as a possible traitor and every precaution was taken to render him harmless even at the cost of having no effective national government. executive committees of the assembly. confiscation of church property. the assignats. the distrust which the assembly felt for the actual ministers led it to undertake the business of government as well as the business of reform. there were committees for all the chief departments of state, a committee for the army, a committee for the navy, another for diplomacy, another for finance. these committees sometimes asked the ministers for information, but rarely took their advice. even necker found the assembly heedless of his counsels. the condition of the treasury became worse day by day. the yield of the indirect taxes fell off through the interruption of business, and the direct taxes were in large measure withheld, for want of an authority to enforce payment. with some trouble necker induced the assembly to sanction first a loan of 30,000,000 livres and then a loan of 80,000,000 livres. the public having shown no eagerness to subscribe, necker proposed that every man should be invited to make a patriotic contribution of one-fourth of his income. this expedient also failed. on the 10th of october 1789 talleyrand, bishop of autun, proposed that the assembly should take possession of the lands of the church. in november the assembly enacted that they should be at the disposal of the nation, which would provide for the maintenance of the clergy. since the church lands were supposed to occupy one-fifth of france, the assembly thought that it had found an inexhaustible source of public wealth. on the security of the church lands it based a paper currency (the famous assignats). in december it ordered an issue to the amount of 400,000,000 livres. as the revenue still declined and the reforms enacted by the assembly involved a heavy outlay, it recurred again and again to this expedient. before its dissolution the assembly had authorized the creation of 1,800,000,000 livres of assignats and the depreciation of its paper had begun. finding that he had lost all credit with the assembly, necker resigned office and left france in september 1790. power of the municipalities and popular clubs. disaffection in the army. even the committees of the assembly had far less power than the new municipal authorities throughout france. they really governed so far as there was any government. often full of public spirit, they lacked experience and in a time of peculiar difficulty had no guide save their own discretion. they opened letters, arrested suspects, controlled the trade in corn, and sent their national guards on such errands as they thought proper. the political clubs which sprang up all over the country often presumed to act as though they were public authorities (see jacobins). the revolutionary journalists, desmoulins in his _revolutions de france et de brabant_, loustallot in his _revolutions de paris_, marat in his _ami du peuple_, continued to feed the fire of discord. amid this anarchy it became a practice for the national guards of different districts to form federations, that is, to meet and swear loyalty to each other and obedience to the laws made by the national assembly. at the suggestion of the municipality of paris the assembly decreed a general federation of all france, to be held on the anniversary of the fall of the bastille. the ceremony took place in the champ de mars (july 14, 1790) in presence of the king, the queen, the assembly, and an enormous concourse of spectators. it was attended by deputations from the national guards in every part of the kingdom, from the regular regiments, and from the crews of the fleet. talleyrand celebrated mass, and lafayette was the first to swear fidelity to the assembly and the nation. in this gathering the provincial deputations caught the revolutionary fever of paris. still graver was the effect upon the regular army. it had been disaffected since the outbreak of the revolution. the rank and file complained of their food, their lodging and their pay. the non-commissioned officers, often intelligent and hard-working, were embittered by the refusal of promotion. the officers, almost all nobles, rarely showed much concern for their men, and were often mere courtiers and triflers. after the festival of the federation the soldiers were drawn into the political clubs, and named regimental committees to defend their interests. not content with asking for redress of grievances, they sometimes seized the regimental chest or imprisoned their officers. in august a formidable outbreak at nancy was only quelled with much loss of life. desertion became more frequent than ever, and the officers, finding their position unbearable, began to emigrate. similar causes produced an even worse effect upon the navy. civil constitution of the clergy. by its rough handling of the church the assembly brought fresh trouble upon france. the suppression of tithe and the confiscation of church lands had reduced the clergy to live on whatever stipend the legislature might think fit to give them. a law of february 1790 suppressed the religious orders not engaged in education or in works of charity, and forbade the introduction of new ones. monastic vows were deprived of legal force and a pension was granted to the religious who were cast upon the world. these measures aroused no serious discontent; but the so-called civil constitution of the clergy went much further. old ecclesiastical divisions were set aside. henceforth the diocese was to be conterminous with the department, and the parish with the commune. the electors of the commune were to choose the cure, the electors of the department the bishop. every cure was to receive at least 1200 livres (about l50) a year. relatively modest stipends were assigned to bishops and archbishops. french citizens were forbidden to acknowledge any ecclesiastical jurisdiction outside the kingdom. the assembly not only adopted this constitution but decreed that all beneficed ecclesiastics should swear to its observance. as the constitution implicitly abrogated the papal authority and entrusted the choice of bishops and cures to electors who often were not catholics, most of the clergy declined to swear and lost their preferments. their places were filled by election. thenceforwards the clergy were divided into hostile factions, the constitutionals and the nonjurors. as the generality of frenchmen at that time were orthodox although not zealous catholics, the nonjurors carried with them a large part of the laity. the assembly was misled by its jansenist, protestant and free-thinking members, natural enemies of an established church which had persecuted them to the best of its power. the assembly, the colonies, and foreign powers. in colonial affairs the assembly acted with the same imprudence. eager to set an example of suppressing slavery, it took measures which prepared a terrible negro insurrection in st domingo. with regard to foreign relations the assembly showed itself well-meaning but indiscreet. it protested in good faith that it desired no conquests and aimed only at peace. yet it laid down maxims which involved the utmost danger of war. it held that no treaty could be binding without the national consent. as this consent had not been given to any existing treaty, they were all liable to be revised by the french government without consulting the other parties. thus the assembly treated the family compact as null and void. similarly, when it abolished feudal tenures in france, it ignored the fact that the rights of certain german princes over lands in alsace were guaranteed by the treaties of westphalia. it offered them compensation in money, and when this was declined, took no heed of their protests. again, in the papal territory of avignon a large number of the inhabitants declared for union with france. the assembly could hardly be restrained by mirabeau from acting upon their vote and annexing avignon. some time after his death it was annexed. the other states of europe did not admit the doctrines of the assembly, but peace was not broken. foreign statesmen who flattered themselves that france was sinking into anarchy and therefore into decay were content to follow their respective ambitions without the dread of french interference. attempt of louis xvi. to escape from paris. deprived of authority and in fact a prisoner, louis had for many months acquiesced in the decrees of the assembly however distasteful. but the civil constitution of the clergy wounded him in his conscience as well as in his pride. from the autumn of 1790 onwards he began to scheme for his liberation. himself incapable of strenuous effort, he was spurred on by marie antoinette, who keenly felt her own degradation and the curtailment of that royal prerogative which her son would one day inherit. the king and queen failed to measure the forces which had caused the revolution. they ascribed all their misfortunes to the work of a malignant faction, and believed that, if they could escape from paris, a display of force by friendly powers would enable them to restore the supremacy of the crown. but no foreign ruler, not even the emperor leopold ii., gave the king or queen any encouragement. whatever secrecy they might observe, the adherents of the revolution divined their wish to escape. when louis tried to leave the tuileries for st cloud at easter 1791, in order to enjoy the ministrations of a nonjuring priest, the national guards of paris would not let him budge. mirabeau, who had always dissuaded the king from seeking foreign help, died on the 2nd of april. finally the king and queen resolved to fly to the army of the east, which the marquis de bouille had in some measure kept under discipline. sheltered by him they could await foreign succour or a reaction at home. on the evening of the 20th of june they escaped from the tuileries. louis left behind him a declaration complaining of the treatment which he had received and revoking his assent to all measures which had been laid before him while under restraint. on the following day the royal party was captured at varennes and sent back to paris. the king's eldest brother, the count of provence, who had laid his plans much better, made his escape to brussels and joined the _emigres_. it was no longer possible to pretend that the revolution had been made with the free consent of the king. some republicans called for his deposition. afraid to take a course which involved danger both at home and abroad, the assembly decreed that louis should be suspended from his office. the club of the cordeliers (q.v.), led by danton, demanded not only his deposition but his trial. a petition to that effect having been exposed for signature on the altar in the champ de mars, a disturbance ensued and the national guard fired on the crowd, killing a few and wounding many. this incident afterwards became known as the massacre of the champ de mars. on the other hand, the leaders of the left, barnave and the lameths, felt that they had weakened the executive power too much. they would gladly have come to an understanding with the king and revised the constitution so as to strengthen his prerogative. they failed in both objects. louis and still more marie antoinette regarded them with incurable distrust. the constitutional act without any material change was voted on the 3rd of september. on the 14th louis swore to the constitution, thus regaining his nominal sovereignty. the national assembly was dissolved on the 30th. upon robespierre's motion it had decreed that none of its members should be capable of sitting in the next legislature. review of the work of the national assembly. if we view the work of the national assembly as a whole, we are struck by the immense demolition which it effected. no other legislature has ever destroyed so much in the same time. the old form of government, the old territorial divisions, the old fiscal system, the old judicature, the old army and navy, the old relations of church and state, the old law relating to property in land, all were shattered. such a destruction could not have been effected without the support of popular opinion. most of what the assembly did had been suggested in the _cahiers_, and many of its decrees were anticipated by actual revolt. in its constructive work many sound maxims were embodied. it asserted the principles of civil equality and freedom of conscience, it reformed the criminal law, and laid down a just scheme of taxation. not intelligence and public spirit but political wisdom was lacking to the national assembly. its members did not suspect how limited is the usefulness of general propositions in practical life. nor did they perceive that new ideas can be applied only by degrees in an old world. the constitution of 1791 was impracticable and did not last a year. the civil constitution of the clergy was wholly mischievous. in the attempt to govern, the assembly failed altogether. it left behind an empty treasury, an undisciplined army and navy, a people debauched by safe and successful riot. the legislative assembly. at the elections of 1791 the party which desired to carry the revolution further had a success out of all keeping with its numbers. this was due partly to a weariness of politics which had come over the majority of french citizens, partly to downright intimidation exercised by the jacobin club and by its affiliated societies throughout the kingdom. the legislative assembly met on the 1st of october. it consisted of 745 members. few were nobles, very few were clergymen, and the great body was drawn from the middle class. the members were generally young, and, since none had sat in the previous assembly, they were wholly without experience. the right consisted of the feuillants (q.v.). they numbered about 160, and among them were some able men, such as matthieu dumas and bigot de preamenau, but they were guided chiefly by persons outside the house, because incapable of re-election, barnave, duport and the lameths. the left consisted of the jacobins, a term which still included the party afterwards known as the girondins or girondists (q.v.)--so termed because several of their leaders came from the region of the gironde in southern france. they numbered about 330. among the extreme left sat cambon, couthon, merlin de thionville. the girondins could claim the most brilliant orators, vergniaud, guadet, isnard. inferior to these men in talent, brissot de warville, a restless pamphleteer, exerted more influence over the party which has sometimes gone by his name. the left as a whole was republican, although it did not care to say so. strong in numbers, it was reinforced by the disorderly elements in paris and throughout france. the remainder of the house, about 250 deputies, scarcely belonged to any definite party, but voted oftenest with the left, as the left was the most powerful. the court and the emigres. the left had three objects of enmity: first, the king, the queen and the royal family; secondly, the _emigres_; and thirdly, the clergy. the king could not like the new constitution, although, if left to himself, indolence and good nature might have rendered him passive. the queen throughout had only one thought, to shake off the impotence and humiliation of the crown; and for this end she still clung to the hope of foreign succour and corresponded with vienna. those _emigres_ who had assembled in arms on the territories of the electors of mainz and treves (trier) and in the austrian netherlands had put themselves in the position of public enemies. their chiefs were the king's brothers, who affected to consider louis as a captive and his acts as therefore invalid. the count of provence gave himself the airs of a regent and surrounded himself with a ministry. the _emigres_ were not, however, dangerous. they were only a few thousand strong; they had no competent leader and no money; they were unwelcome to the rulers whose hospitality they abused. the nonjuring clergy, although harassed by the local authorities, kept the respect and confidence of most catholics. no acts of disloyalty were proved against them, and commissioners of the national assembly reported to its successor that their flocks only desired to be let alone. but the anti-clerical bias of the legislative assembly was too strong for such a policy. the king's ministers, named by him and excluded from the assembly, were mostly persons of little mark. montmorin gave up the portfolio of foreign affairs on the 31st of october and was succeeded by de lessart. cahier de gerville was minister of the interior; tarbe, minister of finance; and bertrand de molleville, minister of marine. but the only minister who influenced the course of affairs was the comte de narbonne, minister of war. the king and the nonjurors. declaration of pillnitz. on the 9th of november the assembly decreed that the _emigres_ assembled on the frontiers should be liable to the penalties of death and confiscation unless they returned to france by the 1st of january following. louis did not love his brothers, and he detested their policy, which without rendering him any service made his liberty and even his life precarious; yet, loath to condemn them to death, he vetoed the decree. on the 29th of november the assembly decreed that every nonjuring clergyman must take within eight days the civic oath, substantially the same as the oath previously administered, on pain of losing his pension and, if any troubles broke out, of being deported. this decree louis vetoed as a matter of conscience. in either case his resistance only served to give a weapon to his enemies in the assembly. but foreign affairs were at this time the most critical. the armed bodies of _emigres_ on the territory of the empire afforded matter of complaint to france. the persistence of the french in refusing more than a money compensation to the german princes who had claims in alsace afforded matter of complaint to the empire. foreign statesmen noticed with alarm the effect of the french revolution upon opinion in their own countries, and they resented the endeavours of french revolutionists to make converts there. of these statesmen, the emperor leopold was the most intelligent. he had skilfully extricated himself from the embarrassments at home and abroad left by his predecessor joseph. he was bound by family ties to louis, and he was obliged, as chief of the holy roman empire, to protect the border princes. on the other hand, he understood the weakness of the habsburg monarchy. he knew that the austrian netherlands, where he had with difficulty restored his authority, were full of friends of the revolution and that a french army would be welcomed by many belgians. he despised the weakness and the folly of the _emigres_ and excluded them from his councils. he earnestly desired to avoid a war which might endanger his sister or her husband. in august 1791 he had met frederick william ii. of prussia at pillnitz near dresden, and the two monarchs had joined in a declaration that they considered the restoration of order and of monarchy in france an object of interest to all sovereigns. they further declared that they would be ready to act for this purpose in concert with the other powers. this declaration appears to have been drawn from leopold by pressure of circumstances. he well knew that concerted action of the powers was impossible, as the english government had firmly resolved not to meddle with french affairs. after louis had accepted the constitution, leopold virtually withdrew his declaration. nevertheless it was a grave error of judgment and contributed to the approaching war. in france many persons desired war for various reasons. narbonne trusted to find in it the means of restoring a certain authority to the crown and limiting the revolution. he contemplated a war with austria only. the girondins desired war in the hope that it would enable them to abolish monarchy altogether. they desired a general war because they believed that it would carry the revolution into other countries and make it secure in france by making it universal. the extreme left had the same objects, but it held that a war for those objects could not safely be entrusted to the king and his ministers. victory would revive the power of the crown; defeat would be the undoing of the revolution. hence robespierre and those who thought with him desired peace. the french nation generally had never approved of the austrian alliance, and regarded the habsburgs as traditional enemies. the king and queen, however, who looked for help from abroad and especially from leopold, dreaded a war with austria and had no faith in the schemes of narbonne. nor was france in a condition to wage a serious war. the constitution was unworkable and the governing authorities were mutually hostile. the finances remained in disorder, and assignats of the face value of 900,000,000 livres were issued by the legislative assembly in less than a year. the army had been thinned by desertion and was enervated by long indiscipline. the fortresses were in bad condition and short of supplies. in october leopold ordered the dispersion of the _emigres_ who had mustered in arms in the austrian netherlands. his example was followed by the electors of treves and mainz. at the same time they implored the emperor's protection, and the austrian chancellor kaunitz informed noailles the french ambassador that this protection would be given if necessary. narbonne demanded a credit of 20,000,000 livres, which the assembly granted. he made a tour of inspection in the north of france and reported untruly to the assembly that all was in readiness for war. on the 14th of january 1792 the diplomatic committee reported to the assembly that the emperor should be required to give satisfactory assurances before the 10th of february. the assembly put off the term to the 1st of march. in february leopold concluded a defensive treaty with frederick william. but there was no mutual confidence between the sovereigns, who were at that very time pursuing opposite policies with regard to poland. leopold still hesitated and still hoped to avoid war. he died on the 1st of march, and the imperial dignity became vacant. the hereditary dominions of austria passed to his son francis, afterwards the emperor francis ii., a youth of small abilities and no experience. the real conduct of affairs fell, therefore, to the aged kaunitz. in france narbonne failed to carry the king or his colleagues along with him. the king took courage to dismiss him on the 9th of march, whereupon the assembly testified its confidence in narbonne. de lessart having incurred its anger by the tameness of his replies to austrian dictation, the assembly voted his impeachment. war declared against austria. the king, seeing no other course open, formed a new ministry which was chiefly girondin. roland became minister of the interior, claviere of finance, de grave of war, and lacoste of marine. far abler and more resolute than any of these men was dumouriez, the new minister for foreign affairs. a soldier by profession, he had been employed in the secret diplomacy of louis xv. and had thus gained a wide knowledge of international politics. he stood aloof from parties and had no rigid principles, but held views closely resembling those of narbonne. he wished for a war with austria which should restore some influence to the crown and make himself the arbiter of france. the king bent to necessity, and on the 20th of april came to the assembly with the proposal that war should be declared against austria. it was carried by acclamation. dumouriez intended to begin with an invasion of the austrian netherlands. as this would awaken english jealousy, he sent talleyrand to london with assurances that, if victorious, the french would annex no territory. it was designed that the french should invade the netherlands at three points simultaneously. lafayette was to march against namur, biron against mons, and dillon against tournay. but the first movement disclosed the miserable state of the army. smitten with panic, dillon's force fled at sight of the enemy, and dillon, after receiving a wound from one of his own soldiers, was murdered by the mob of lille. biron was easily routed before mons. on hearing of these disasters lafayette found it necessary to retreat. this shameful discomfiture quickened all the suspicion and jealousy fermenting in france. de grave had to resign and was succeeded by servan. the austrian forces in the netherlands were, however, so weak that they could not take the offensive. austria demanded help from prussia under the recent alliance, and the claim was admitted. prussia declared war against france, and the duke of brunswick was chosen to command the allied forces, but various causes delayed action. austrian and prussian interests clashed in poland. the austrian government wished to preserve a harmless neighbour. the prussian government desired another partition and a large tract of polish territory. only after long discussion was it agreed that prussia should be free to act in poland, while austria might find compensation in provinces conquered from france. emeute of the 20th of june 1792. a respite was thus given and something was done to improve the army. meantime the assembly passed three decrees: one for the deportation of nonjuring priests, another to suppress the king's constitutional guard, and a third for the establishment of a camp of _federes_ near paris. louis consented to sacrifice his guard, but vetoed the other decrees. roland having addressed to him an arrogant letter of remonstrance, the king with the support of dumouriez dismissed roland, servan and claviere. dumouriez then took the ministry of war, and the other places were filled with such men as could be had. dumouriez, who cared only for the successful prosecution of the war, urged the king to accept the decrees. as louis was obstinate, he felt that he could do no more, resigned office on the 15th of june and went to join the army of the north. lafayette, who remained faithful to the constitution of 1791, ventured on a letter of remonstrance to the assembly. it paid no attention, for lafayette could no longer sway the people. the jacobins tried to frighten the king into accepting the decrees and recalling his ministers. on the 20th of june the armed populace invaded the hall of the assembly and the royal apartments in the tuileries. for some hours the king and queen were in the utmost peril. with passive courage louis refrained from making any promise to the insurgents. the failure of the insurrection encouraged a movement in favour of the king. some twenty thousand parisians signed a petition expressing sympathy with louis. addresses of like tenour poured in from the departments and the provincial cities. lafayette himself came to paris in the hope of rallying the constitutional party, but the king and queen eluded his offers of assistance. they had always disliked and distrusted lafayette and the feuillants, and preferred to rest their hopes of deliverance on the foreigner. lafayette returned to his troops without having effected anything. the girondins made a last advance to louis, offering to save the monarchy if he would accept them as ministers. his refusal united all the jacobins in the project of overturning the monarchy by force. the ruling spirit of this new revolution was danton, a barrister only thirty-two years of age, who had not sat in either assembly, although he had been the leader of the cordeliers, an advanced republican club, and had a strong hold on the common people of paris. danton and his friends were assisted in their work by the fear of invasion, for the allied army was at length mustering on the frontier. the assembly declared the country in danger. all the regular troops in or near paris were sent to the front. volunteers and _federes_ were constantly arriving in paris, and, although most went on to join the army, the jacobins enlisted those who were suitable for their purpose, especially some 500 whom barbaroux, a girondin, had summoned from marseilles. at the same time the national guard was opened to the lowest class. brunswick's famous declaration of the 25th of july, announcing that the allies would enter france to restore the royal authority and would visit the assembly and the city of paris with military execution if any further outrage were offered to the king, heated the republican spirit to fury. it was resolved to strike the decisive blow on the 10th of august. rising of the 10th of august. on the night of the 9th a new revolutionary commune took possession of the hotel de ville, and early on the morning of the 10th the insurgents assailed the tuileries. as the preparations of the jacobins had been notorious, some measures of defence had been taken. beside a few gentlemen in arms and a number of national guards the palace was garrisoned by the swiss guard, about 950 strong. the disparity of force was not so great as to make resistance altogether hopeless. but louis let himself be persuaded into betraying his own cause and retiring with his family under the shelter of the assembly. the national guards either dispersed or fraternized with the assailants. the swiss guard stood firm, and, possibly by accident, a fusillade began. the enemy were gaining ground when the swiss received an order from the king to cease firing and withdraw. they were mostly shot down as they were retiring, and of those who surrendered many were murdered in cold blood next day. the king and queen spent long hours in a reporter's box while the assembly discussed their fate and the fate of the french monarchy. little more than a third of the deputies were present and they were almost all jacobins. they decreed that louis should be suspended from his office and that a convention should be summoned to give france a new constitution. an executive council was formed by recalling roland, claviere and servan to office and joining with them danton as minister of justice, lebrun as minister of foreign affairs, and monge as minister of marine. the revolutionary commune of paris. the september massacres. when lafayette heard of the insurrection in paris he tried to rally his troops in defence of the constitution, but they refused to follow him. he was driven to cross the frontier and surrender himself to the austrians. dumouriez was named his successor. but the new government was still beset with danger. it had no root in law and little hold on public opinion. it could not lean on the assembly, a mere shrunken remnant, whose days were numbered. it remained dependent on the power which had set it up, the revolutionary commune of paris. the commune could therefore extort what concessions it pleased. it got the custody of the king and his family who were imprisoned in the temple. having obtained an indefinite power of arrest, it soon filled the prisons of paris. as the elections to the convention were close at hand, the commune resolved to strike the public with terror by the slaughter of its prisoners. it found its opportunity in the progress of invasion. on the 19th brunswick crossed the frontier. on the 22nd longwy surrendered. verdun was invested and seemed likely to fall. on the 1st of september the commune decreed that on the following day the tocsin should be rung, all able-bodied citizens convened in the champs de mars, and 60,000 volunteers enrolled for the defence of the country. while this assembly was in progress gangs of assassins were sent to the prisons and began a butchery which lasted four days and consumed 1400 victims. the commune addressed a circular letter to the other cities of france inviting them to follow the example. a number of state prisoners awaiting trial at orleans were ordered to paris and on the way were murdered at versailles. the assembly offered a feeble resistance to these crimes. danton can hardly be acquitted of connivance at them. roland hinted disapproval, but did not venture more. he with many other girondins had been marked for slaughter in the original project. the national convention. abolition of the monarchy. the elections to the convention were by almost universal suffrage, but indifference or intimidation reduced the voters to a small number. many who had sat in the national, and many more who had sat in the legislative assembly were returned. the convention met on the 20th of september. like the previous assemblies, it did not fall into well-defined parties. the success of the jacobins in overthrowing the monarchy had ended their union. thenceforwards the name of jacobin was confined to the smaller and more fanatical group, while the rest came to be known as the girondins. the jacobins, about 100 strong, formed the left of the convention, afterwards known from the raised benches on which they sat as the mountain (q.v.). the girondins, numbering perhaps 180, formed the right. the rest of the house, nearly 500 members, voted now on one side now on the other, until in the course of the terror they fell under the jacobin domination. this neutral mass is often termed the plain, in allusion to its seats on the floor of the house. the convention as a whole was republican, if not on principle, from the feeling that no other form of government could be established. it decreed the abolition of monarchy on the 21st of september. a committee was named to draft a new constitution, which was presented and decreed in the following june, but never took effect and was superseded by a third constitution in 1795. the actual government of france was by committees of the convention, but some months passed before it could be fully organized. jacobins and girondins. the inner history of the convention was strange and terrible. it turned on the successive schisms in the ruling minority. whichever side prevailed destroyed its adversaries only to divide afresh and renew the strife until the victors were at length so reduced that their yoke was shaken off and the mass of the convention, hitherto benumbed by fear, resumed its freedom and the government of france. the first and most memorable of these contests was the quarrel between jacobin and girondin. both parties were republican and democratic; both wished to complete the revolution; both were determined to maintain the integrity of france. but they differed in circumstances and temperament. although the leaders on both sides were of the middle class, the girondins represented the _bourgeoisie_, the jacobins represented the populace. the girondins desired a speedy return to law and order; the jacobins thought that they could keep power only by violence. the jacobins leant on the revolutionary commune and the mob of paris; the girondins leant on the thriving burghers of the provincial cities. despite their smaller number the jacobins were victors. they were the more resolute and unscrupulous. the girondins numbered many orators, but not one man of action. the jacobins controlled the parent club with its affiliated societies and the whole machinery of terror. the girondins had no organized force at their disposal. the jacobins perpetuated in a new form the old centralization of power to which france was accustomed. the girondins addressed themselves to provincials who had lost the power of initiative. they were termed federalists by their enemies and accused, unjustly enough, of wishing to dissolve the national unity. even in the first days of the convention the feud broke out. the girondins condemned the september massacres and dreaded the parisian populace. barbaroux accused robespierre of aiming at a dictatorship, and buzot demanded a guard recruited in the departments to protect the convention. in october louvet reiterated the charge against robespierre, and barbaroux called for the dissolution of the commune of paris. but the girondins gained no tangible result from this wordy warfare. for a time the question how to dispose of the king diverted the thoughts of all parties. it was approached in a political, not in a judicial spirit. the jacobins desired the death of louis, partly because they hated kings and deemed him a traitor, partly because they wished to envenom the revolution, defy europe and compromise their more temperate colleagues. the girondins wished to spare louis, but were afraid of incurring the reproach of royalism. at this critical moment the discovery of the famous iron chest, containing papers which showed that many public men had intrigued with the court, was disastrous for louis. members of the convention were anxious to be thought severe lest they should be thought corrupt. robespierre frankly demanded that louis as a public enemy should be put to death without form of trial. the majority shrank from such open injustice and decreed on the 3rd of december that louis should be tried by the convention. trial and execution of louis xvi. a committee of twenty-one was chosen to frame the indictment against louis, and on the 11th of december he was brought to the bar for the first time to hear the charges read. the most essential might be summed up in the statement that he had plotted against the constitution and against the safety of the kingdom. on the 26th louis appeared at the bar a second time, and the trial began. the advocates of louis could plead that all his actions down to the dissolution of the national assembly came within the amnesty then granted, and that the constitution had proclaimed his person inviolable, while enacting for certain offences the penalty of deposition which he had already undergone. such arguments were not likely to weigh with such a tribunal. the mountain called for immediate sentence of death; the girondins desired an appeal to the people of france. the galleries of the convention were packed with adherents of the jacobins, whose fury, not confined to words, struck terror into all who might incline towards mercy. in paris unmistakable signs announced a new insurrection, to be followed perhaps by new massacres. on the question whether louis was guilty none ventured to give a negative vote. the motion for an appeal to the people was rejected by 424 votes to 283. the penalty of death was adopted by 361 votes against 360 in favour of other penalties or of postponing at least the execution of the sentence. on the 21st of january 1793 louis was beheaded in the place de la revolution, now the place de la concorde. battle of valmy. between the deposition and the death of louis the war had run a surprising course. accompanied by king frederick william, brunswick had entered france with 80,000 men, of whom more than half were prussians, the best soldiers in europe. the disorder of france was such that many expected a triumphal march to paris. but the allies had opened the campaign late; they moved slowly; the weather broke, and sickness began to waste their ranks. dumouriez succeeded in rousing the spirit of the french; he occupied the defiles of the forest of argonne, thus causing the enemy to lose many valuable days, and when at last they turned his position, he retreated without loss. at valmy on the 20th of september the two armies came in contact. the affair was only a cannonade, but the french stood firm and the advance of the allies was stayed. brunswick had no heart for his work; the king was ill satisfied with the austrians, and both were alarmed by the ravages of disease among the soldiers. within ten days after the affair of valmy they began their retreat. dumouriez, who still hoped to detach prussia from austria, left them unmolested. when the enemy had quitted france, he invaded hainaut and defeated the austrians at jemappes on the 6th of november. in belgium a large party regarded the french as deliverers. dumouriez entered brussels without further resistance, and was soon master of the whole country. elsewhere the french were equally successful. with a slight force custine assailed the electorate of mainz. the common people were friendly, and he had no trouble in occupying the country as far as the rhine. the king of sardinia having shown a hostile temper, montesquiou made an easy conquest of savoy. at the close of 1792 the relative position of france and her enemies had been reversed. it was seen that the french were still able to wage war, and that the revolutionary spirit had permeated the adjoining countries, while the old governments of europe, jealous of one another and uncertain of the loyalty of their subjects, were ill qualified for resistance. the first coalition against france. intoxicated with these victories, the convention abandoned itself to the fervour of propaganda and conquest. the river scheldt had been closed to commerce by various treaties to which england and holland, neutral powers, were parties. without a pretence of negotiation the french government declared on the 16th of november that the scheldt was thenceforwards open. on the 19th a decree of the convention offered the aid of france to all nations which were striving after freedom--in other words, to the malcontents in every neighbouring state. not long afterwards the convention annexed savoy, with the consent, it should be added, of many savoyards. on the 15th of december the convention decreed that all peoples freed by its assistance should carry out a revolution like that which had been made in france on pain of being treated as enemies. towards great britain the executive council and the convention behaved with singular folly. there, in spite of a growing antipathy to the revolution, pitt earnestly desired to maintain peace. the conquest of the netherlands and the symptoms of a wish to annex that country made his task most difficult. but the french government underrated the strength of great britain, imagining that all englishmen who desired parliamentary reform desired revolution, and that a few democratic societies represented the nation. when monge announced the intention of attacking great britain on behalf of the english republicans, the british government and nation were thoroughly alarmed and roused; and when the news of the execution of louis xvi. was received, chauvelin, the french envoy, was ordered to quit england. france declared war against england and holland on the 1st of february and soon afterwards against spain. in the course of the year 1793 the empire, the kings of portugal and naples and the grand-duke of tuscany declared war against france. thus was formed the first coalition. france was not prepared to encounter so many enemies. administrative confusion had been heightened by the triumph of the jacobins. servan was succeeded as minister of war by pache who was incapable and dishonest. the army of dumouriez was left in such want that it dwindled rapidly. the commissioners of the convention plundered the netherlands with so little remorse that the people became bitterly hostile. the attempt to enforce a revolution of the french sort on the catholic and conservative belgians drove them to fury. by every unfair means the commissioners extorted the semblance of a popular vote in favour of incorporation, and france annexed the netherlands. this was the last outrage. when a new austrian army under the prince of coburg entered the country, dumouriez, who had invaded holland, was unable to defend belgium. on the 18th of march he was defeated at neerwinden, and a few days later he was driven back to the frontier. alike on public and personal grounds dumouriez was the enemy of the government. trusting in his influence over the army he resolved to lead it against the convention, and, in order to secure his rear, he negotiated with the enemy. but he could make no impression on his soldiers, and deserted to the austrians. events followed a similar course in the rhine valley. there also the french wore out the goodwill at first shown to them. they summoned a convention and obtained a vote for incorporation with france. but they were unable to hold their ground on the approach of a prussian army. by april they had lost the country with the exception of mainz, which was invested. france thus lay open to invasion from the east and the north. the convention decreed a levy of 300,000 men. rising in la vendee. about the same time began the first formidable uprising against the revolution, the war of la vendee, the region lying to the south of the lower loire and facing the atlantic. its inhabitants differed in many ways from the mass of the nation. living far from large towns and busy routes of commerce, they remained primitive in all their thoughts and ways. the peasants had always been on friendly terms with the gentry, and the agrarian changes made by the revolution had not been appreciated so highly as elsewhere. the people were ardent catholics, who venerated the nonjuring clergy and resented the measures taken against them. but they remained passive until the enforcement of the decree for the levy of 300,000 men. caring little for the convention and knowing nothing of events on the northern or eastern frontier, the peasants were determined not to serve and preferred to fight the republic at home. when once they had taken up arms they found gentlemen to lead and priests to exhort, and their rebellion became royalist and catholic. the chiefs were drawn from widely different classes. if bonchamps and la roche-jacquelin were nobles, stofflet was a gamekeeper and cathelineau a mason. as the country was favourable to guerilla warfare, and the government could not spare regular troops from the frontiers, the rebels were usually successful, and by the end of may had almost expelled the republicans from la vendee. the committee of public safety. danger without and within prompted the convention to strengthen the executive authority. that the executive and legislative powers ought to be absolutely separate had been an axiom throughout the revolution. ministers had always been excluded from a seat in the legislature. but the assemblies were suspicious of the executive and bent on absorbing the government. they had nominated committees of their own members to control every branch of public affairs. these committees, while reducing the ministers to impotence, were themselves clumsy and ineffectual. it may be said that since the first meeting of the states-general the executive authority had been paralysed in france. the convention in theory maintained the separation of powers. even danton had been forced to resign office when he was elected a member. but unity of government was restored by the formation of a central committee. in january the first committee of general defence was formed of members of the committees for the several departments of state. too large and too much divided for strenuous labour, it was reduced in april to nine members and re-named the committee of public safety. it deliberated in secret and had authority over the ministers; it was entrusted with the whole of the national defence and empowered to use all the resources of the state, and it quickly became the supreme power in the republic. under it the ministers were no more than head clerks. about the same time were instituted the deputies on mission in the provinces, who could overrule any local authority, and who corresponded regularly with the committee. france thus returned under new forms to its traditional government: a despotic authority in paris with all-powerful agents in the provinces. against disaffection the government was armed with formidable weapons: the committee of general security and the revolutionary tribunal. the committee of general security, first established in october 1792, was several times remodelled. in september 1793 the convention decreed that its members should be nominated by the committee of public safety. the committee of general security had unlimited powers for the prevention or discovery of crime against the state. the revolutionary tribunal was decreed on the 10th of march. it was an extraordinary court, destined to try all offences against the revolution without appeal. the jury, which received wages, voted openly, so that condemnation was almost certain. the director of the jury or public prosecutor was fouquier tinville. the first condemnation took place on the 11th of april. fall of the girondins. enmity between girondin and jacobin grew fiercer as the perils of the republic increased. danton strove to unite all partisans of the revolution in defence of the country; but the girondins, detesting his character and fearing his ambition, rejected all advances. the commune of paris and the journalists who were its mouthpieces, hebert and marat, aimed frankly at destroying the girondins. in april the girondins carried a decree that marat should be sent before the revolutionary tribunal for incendiary writings, but his acquittal showed that a jacobin leader was above the law. in may they proposed that the commune of paris should be dissolved, and that the _suppleants_, the persons elected to fill vacancies occurring in the convention, should assemble at bourges, where they would be safe from that violence which might be applied to the convention itself. barere, who was rising into notice by the skill with which he trimmed between parties, opposed this motion, and carried a decree appointing a committee of twelve to watch over the safety of the convention. then the commune named as commandant of the national guard, hanriot, a man concerned in the september massacres. it raised an insurrection on the 31st of may. on barere's proposal the convention stooped to dissolving the committee of twelve. the commune, which had hoped for the arrest of the girondin leaders, was not satisfied. it undertook a new and more formidable outbreak on the 2nd of june. enclosed by hanriot's troops and thoroughly cowed, the convention decreed the arrest of the committee of twelve and of twenty-two principal girondins. they were put under confinement in their own houses. thus the jacobins became all-powerful. revolt of the provinces. a tremor of revolt ran through the cities of the south which chafed under the despotism of the parisian mob. these cities had their own grievances. the jacobin clubs menaced the lives and properties of all who were guilty of wealth or of moderate opinions, while the representatives on mission deposed the municipal authorities and placed their own creatures in power. at the end of april the citizens of marseilles closed the jacobin club, put its chiefs on their trial and drove out the representatives on mission. in may lyons rose. the jacobin municipality was overturned, and challier, their fiercest demagogue, was arrested. in june the citizens of bordeaux declared that they would not acknowledge the authority of the convention until the imprisoned deputies were set free. in july toulon rebelled. but in the north the appeals of such girondins as escaped from paris were of no avail. even the southern uprising proved far less dangerous than might have been expected. the peasants, who had gained more by the revolution than any other class, held aloof from the citizens. the citizens lacked the qualities necessary for the successful conduct of civil war. bordeaux surrendered almost without waiting to be summoned. marseilles was taken in august and treated with great cruelty. lyons, where the royalists were strong, defended itself with courage, for the trial and execution of challier made the townsmen hopeless of pardon. toulon, also largely royalist, invited the english and spanish admirals, hood and langara, who occupied the port and garrisoned the town. at the same time the vendean war continued formidable. in june the insurgents took the important town of saumur, although they failed in an attempt upon nantes. at the end of july the republicans were still unable to make any impression upon the revolted territory. disunion of the allied powers. thus in the summer of 1793 france seemed to be falling to pieces. it was saved by the imbecility and disunion of the hostile powers. in the north the french army after the treason of dumouriez could only attempt to cover the frontier. the austrians were joined by british, dutch and prussian forces. had the allies pushed straight upon paris, they might have ended the war. but the desire of each ally to make conquests on his own account led them to spend time and strength in sieges. when conde and valenciennes had been taken, the british went off to assail dunkirk and the prussians retired into luxemburg. in the east the prussians and austrians took mainz at the end of july, allowing the garrison to depart on condition of not serving against the allies for a year. then they invaded alsace, but their mutual jealousy prevented them from going farther. thus the summer passed away without any decisive achievement of the coalition. meanwhile the committee of public safety, inspired by danton, strove to rebuild the french administrative system. in july the committee was renewed and danton fell out; but soon afterwards it was reinforced by two officers, carnot, who undertook the organization of the army, and prieur of the cote d'or, who undertook its equipment. administrators of the first rank, these men renovated the warlike power of france, and enabled her to deal those crushing blows which broke up the coalition. the reign of terror. the royalist and girondin insurrections and the critical aspect of the war favoured the establishment of what is known as the reign of terror. terrorism had prevailed more or less since the beginning of the revolution, but it was the work of those who desired to rule, not of the nominal rulers. it had been lawless and rebellious. it ended by becoming legal and official. while danton kept power terrorism remained imperfect, for danton, although unscrupulous, did not love cruelty and kept in view a return to normal government. but soon after danton had ceased to be a member of the committee of public safety robespierre was elected, and now became the most powerful man in france. robespierre was an acrid fanatic, and unlike danton, who only cared to secure the practical results of the revolution, he had a moral and religious ideal which he intended to force on the nation. all who rejected his ideal were corrupt; all who resented his ascendancy were traitors. the death of marat, who was stabbed by charlotte corday (q.v.) to avenge the girondins, gave yet another pretext for terrible measures of repression. in paris the armed ruffians who had long preyed upon respectable citizens were organized as a revolutionary army, and other revolutionary armies were established in the provinces. two new laws placed almost everybody at the mercy of the government. the law of the maximum, passed on the 17th of september, fixed the price of food and made it capital to ask for more. the law of suspects, passed at the same time, declared suspect every person who was of noble birth, or had held office before the revolution, or had any connexion with an _emigre_, or could not produce a card of _civisme_ granted by the local authority, which had full discretion to refuse. any suspect might be arrested and imprisoned until the peace or sent before the revolutionary tribunal. an earlier law had established in every commune an elective committee of surveillance. these bodies, better known as revolutionary committees, were charged with the enforcement of the law of suspects. on the 10th of october the new constitution was suspended and the government declared revolutionary until the peace. execution of the queen. the spirit of those in power was shown by the massacres which followed on the surrender of lyons in that month. in paris the slaughter of distinguished victims began with the trial of marie antoinette, who was guillotined on the 16th. twenty-one girondin deputies were next brought to the bar and, with the exception of valaze who stabbed himself, were beheaded on the last day of october, madame roland and other girondins of note suffered later. in november the duke of orleans, who had styled himself philippe egalite, had sat in the convention, and had voted for the king's death, went to the scaffold. bailly, barnave and many others of note followed before the end of the year. as the bloody work went on the pretence of trial became more and more hollow, the chance of acquittal fainter and fainter. the revolutionary tribunal was a mere instrument of state. knowing the slight foundation of its power the government deliberately sought to destroy all whose birth, political connexions or past career might mark them out as leaders of opposition. at the same time it took care to show that none was so obscure or so impotent as to be safe when its policy was to destroy. the disastrous effects of the terror were heightened by the financial mismanagement of the jacobins. assignats were issued with such reckless profusion that the total for the three years of the convention has been estimated at 7250 millions of francs. enormous depreciation ensued and, although penalties rising to death itself were denounced against all who should refuse to take them at par, they fell to little more than 1% of their nominal value. what were known as revolutionary taxes were imposed at discretion by the representatives on mission and the local authorities. a forced loan of 1000 millions was exacted from those citizens who were reputed to be prosperous. immense supplies of all kinds were requisitioned for the armies, and were sometimes allowed to rot unused. anarchy and state interference having combined to check the trade in necessaries, the government undertook to feed the people, and spent huge sums, especially on bread for the starving inhabitants of paris. as no regular budget was attempted, as accounts were not kept, and as audit was unknown, the opportunities for fraud and embezzlement were endless. even when due allowance has been made for the financial disorder which the convention inherited from previous assemblies, and for the war which it had to wage against a formidable alliance, it cannot be acquitted of reckless and wasteful maladministration. revolutionary legislation. the new calendar. notwithstanding the disorder of the time, the mass of new laws produced by the convention was extraordinary. a new system of weights and measures, a new currency, a new chronological era (that of the republic), and a new calendar were introduced (see the section _republican calendar_ below). a new and elaborate system of education was decreed. two drafts of a complete civil code were made and, although neither was enacted, particular changes of great moment were decreed. many of the new laws were stamped with the passions of the time. such were the laws which suppressed all the remaining bodies corporate, even the academies, and which extinguished all manorial rights without any indemnity to the owners. such too were the laws which took away the power of testation, placed natural children upon an absolute equality with legitimate, and gave a boundless freedom of divorce. it would be absurd, however, to dismiss all the legislative work of the convention as merely partisan or eccentric. much of it was enlightened and skilful, the product of the best minds in the assembly. to compete for power or even to express an opinion on public affairs was dangerous, and wholly to refrain from attendance might be construed as disaffection. able men who wished to be useful without hazarding their lives took refuge in the committees where new laws were drafted and discussed. the result of their labours was often decreed as a matter of course. whether the decree would be carried into effect was always uncertain. overthrow of the paris commune. fall of the dantonists. the ruling faction was still divided against itself. the commune of paris, which had overthrown the girondins, was jealous of the committee of public safety, which meant to be supreme. robespierre, the leading member of the committee, abhorred the chiefs of the commune, not merely because they conflicted with his ambition but from difference of character. he was orderly and temperate, they were gross and debauched; he was a deist, they were atheists. in november the commune fitted up notre dame as a temple of reason, selected an opera girl to impersonate the goddess, and with profane ceremony installed her in the choir. all the churches in paris were closed. danton, when he felt power slipping from his hands, had retired from public business to his native town of arcis-sur-aube. when he became aware of the feud between robespierre and the commune, he conceived the hope of limiting the terror and guiding the revolution into a sane course. he returned to paris and joined with robespierre in carrying the law of 14 frimaire (december 4), which gave the committee of public safety absolute control over all municipal authorities. he became the advocate of mercy, and his friend camille desmoulins pleaded for the same cause in the _vieux cordelier_. then the oppressed nation took courage and began to demand pardon for the innocent and even justice upon murderers. a sharp contest ensued between the dantonists and the commune, robespierre inclining now to this side, now to that, for he was really a friend to neither. his friend st just, a younger and fiercer man, resolved to destroy both. hebert and his followers in despair planned a new insurrection, but they were deserted by hanriot, their military chief. their doom was thus fixed. twenty leaders of the commune were arrested on the 17th of march 1794 and guillotined a week later. it was then danton's turn. he had several warnings, but either through over-confidence or weariness of life he scorned to fly. on the 30th he was arrested along with his friends desmoulins, delacroix, philippeaux and westermann. st just read to the convention a report on their case pre-eminent even in that day for its shameless disregard of truth, nay, of plausibility. before the revolutionary tribunal danton defended himself with such energy that st just took means to have him silenced. danton and his friends were executed on the 5th of april. supremacy of robespierre. for a moment the conflict of parties seemed at an end. none could presume to challenge the authority of the committee of public safety, and in the committee none disputed the leadership of robespierre. robespierre was at last free to establish the republic of virtue. on the 7th of may he persuaded the convention to decree that the french people acknowledged the existence of a supreme being and the immortality of the soul. on the 4th of june he was elected president of the convention, and from that time forward he appeared to be dictator of france. on the 8th the festival of the supreme being was solemnized, robespierre acting as pontiff amid the outward deference and secret jeers of his colleagues. but robespierre knew what a gulf parted him from almost all his countrymen. he knew that he could be safe only by keeping power and powerful only by making the terror more stringent. two days after the festival his friend couthon presented the crowning law of the terror, known as the law of 22 prairial. as the revolutionary tribunal was said to be paralysed by forms and delays, this law abolished the defence of prisoners by counsel and the examination of witnesses. thenceforward the impressions of judges and jurors were to decide the fate of the accused. for all offences the penalty was to be death. the leave of the convention was no longer required for the arrest of a member. in spite of some murmurs even this law was adopted. its effect was fearful. the revolutionary tribunal had hitherto pronounced 1200 death sentences. in the next six weeks it pronounced 1400. with robespierre's approval st just sketched at this time the plan of an ideal society in which every man should have just enough land to maintain him; in which domestic life should be regulated by law and all children over seven years should be educated by the state. pending this regeneration of society st just advised the rule of a dictator. the revolutionary war. republican successes. the growing ferocity of the terror appeared more hideous as the dangers threatening the government receded. the surrender of toulon in december 1793 closed the south of france to foreign enemies. the war in la vendee turned against the insurgents from the time when the veteran garrison of mainz came to reinforce the republican army. after a severe defeat at cholet on the 16th of october the royalists determined to cross the loire and raise brittany and anjou, where the chouans, or royalist partisans, were already stirring. they failed in an attempt on the little seaport of granville and in another upon angers. in december they were defeated with immense loss at le mans and at savenay. the rebellion would probably have died out but for the measures of the new republican general turreau, who wasted la vendee so horribly with his "infernal columns" that he drove the peasants to take up arms once more. yet turreau's crimes were almost surpassed by carrier, the representative on mission at nantes, who, finding the guillotine too slow in the destruction of his prisoners, adopted the plan of drowning them wholesale. in the autumn of 1793 the war against the coalition took a turn favourable to france. the energy of danton, the organizing skill of carnot, and the high spirit of the french nation, resolute at all costs to avoid dismemberment, had well employed the respite given by the sluggishness of the allies. in flanders the english were defeated at hondschoote (september 8) and the austrians at wattignies (october 15). in the east hoche routed the austrians at weissenburg and forced them to recross the rhine before the end of 1793. the summer of 1794 saw france victorious on all her frontiers. jourdan won the battle of fleurus (june 25), which decided the fate of the belgian provinces. the prussians were driven out of the eastern departments. against the spaniards and the sardinians the french were also successful. fall of robespierre. the 9th thermidor. under these circumstances government by terror could not endure. robespierre was not a man of action; he knew not how to form or lead a party; he lived not with his fellows but with his own thoughts and ambitions. he was hated and feared by most of the oligarchy. they laughed at his religion, resented his puritanism, and felt themselves in daily peril. his only loyal friends in the committee of public safety, couthon and st just, were themselves unpopular. robespierre professed consideration for the deputies of the plain, who were glad to buy safety by conforming to his will; but he could not reckon on their help in time of danger. by degrees a coalition against robespierre was formed in the mountain. it included old followers of danton like taillen, independent jacobins like cambon, some of the worst terrorists like fouche, and such a consummate time-server as barere. in the course of july its influence began to be felt. when st just proposed robespierre to the committees as dictator, he found no response. on the 8th thermidor (26th of july) robespierre addressed the convention, deploring the invectives against himself and the revolutionary tribunal and demanding the purification of the committees and the punishment of traitors. his enemies took the speech as a declaration of war and thwarted a proposal that it should be circulated in the departments. robespierre felt his ascendancy totter. he repeated his speech with more success to the jacobin club. his friends determined to strike, and hanriot ordered the national guards to hold themselves in readiness. robespierre's enemies called on the committee of public safety to arrest the traitors, but the committee was divided. on the morning of the 9th thermidor st just was beginning to speak in the convention when tallien cut him short. robespierre and all who tried to speak in his behalf were shouted down. the plain was deaf to robespierre's appeal. finally the convention decreed the arrest of robespierre, of his brother augustin, of couthon and of st just. but the commune and the jacobin club were on the alert. they sounded the tocsin, mustered their partisans, and released the prisoners. the convention outlawed robespierre and his friends and sent out commissioners to rally the citizens. it named barras, a deputy who had served in the royal army, to lead its forces. had robespierre possessed danton's energy, the result might have been doubtful. he did nothing himself and benumbed his followers. without an effort barras captured the hotel de ville. robespierre, whose jaw had been shattered by a pistol shot, was left in agony for the night. on the next morning he was beheaded along with his brother, couthon, st just, hanriot and seventeen more of his adherents. on the day after seventy-one members of the commune followed them to the scaffold. such was the revolution of the 9th thermidor (27th of july 1794) which ended the reign of terror. in a period of fifteen months, it has been calculated, about 17,000 persons had been executed in france under form of law. the number of those who were shot, drowned or otherwise massacred without the pretence of a trial can never be accurately known, but must be reckoned far greater. the number of persons arrested and imprisoned reached hundreds of thousands, of whom many died in their crowded and filthy jails. the names on the list of _emigres_ at the close of the terror were about 150,000. of these a small proportion had borne arms against their country. the rest were either harmless fugitives from destruction or had never quitted france and had been placed on the list simply in order that they might incur the penalties of emigration. every one of this multitude was liable to instant death if found in french territory. their relatives were subjected to various pains and penalties. all the property of those condemned to death and of _emigres_ was confiscated. the carnage of the terror spread far beyond the clergy and the nobility, beyond even the middle class, for peasants and artisans were among the victims. it spread far beyond those who could conspire or rebel, for bedridden old men and women and young boys and girls were often sacrificed. it made most havoc in the flower of the nation, since every kind of eminence marked men for death. by imbuing frenchmen with such a mutual hatred as nothing but the arm of despotic power could control the reign of terror rendered political liberty impossible for many years. the rule of the terrorists made inevitable the reign of napoleon. reaction after the terror. the fall of robespierre had consequences unforeseen by his destroyers. long kept mute by fear, the mass of the nation found a voice and demanded a total change of government. when once the reaction against jacobin tyranny had begun, it was impossible to halt. great numbers of prisoners were set at liberty. the commune of paris was abolished and the office of commandant of the national guard was suppressed. the revolutionary tribunal was reorganized, and thenceforwards condemnations were rare. the committees of public safety and general security were remodelled, in virtue of a law that one-fourth of their number should retire at the end of every month and not be re-eligible until another month had elapsed. somewhat later the convention declared itself to be the only centre of authority, and executive business was parcelled out among sixteen committees. most of the representatives on mission were recalled, and many office-holders were displaced. the trial of 130 prisoners sent up from nantes led to so many terrible disclosures that public feeling turned still more fiercely against the jacobins; carrier himself was condemned and executed; and in november the jacobin club was closed. in december 73 members of the convention who had been imprisoned for protesting against the violence done to the girondins on the 2nd of june 1793 were allowed to resume their seats, and gave a decisive majority to the anti-jacobins. soon afterwards the law of the maximum was repealed. a decree was passed in february 1795 severing the connexion of church and state and allowing general freedom of worship. at the beginning of march those girondin deputies who survived came back to their places in the convention. parties in the assembly after thermidor. but the return to normal life after the jacobin domination was not destined to be smooth or continuous. beside the remnant of terrorists, such as billaud varennes and collot d'herbois, who had joined in the revolt against robespierre, there were in the convention at that time three principal factions. the so-called independents, such as barras and merlin of douai, who were all jacobins, but had stood aloof from the internal conflicts of the party, hated royalism as much as ever and desired the continuance of the war which was essential to their power. the thermidorians, the immediate agents in robespierre's overthrow, such as tallien, had loudly professed jacobinism, but wanted to make their peace with the nation. they sought for an understanding with the girondins and feuillants, and some went so far as to correspond with the exiled princes. lastly, those members who had never been jacobins wanted a speedy return to legal government at home and therefore wished for peace abroad. while bent on preserving the civil equality introduced by the revolution, many of these men were indifferent as between constitutional monarchy and a republic. the government, mainly thermidorian, trimmed between moderates and independents, and for this reason its actions were often inconsistent. progress of the reaction. the jacobins were strong enough to carry a decree for keeping the anniversary of the execution of louis xvi. as a national festival. they could count on the populace, because work was still scarce, food was still dear, and a multitude of parisians knew not where to find bread. a committee having recommended the indictment of collot d'herbois and three other terrorists, there ensued the rising of the 12th germinal (april 1). the mob forced their way into the hall of the convention and remained there until the national guards of the wealthy quarters drove them out. by a decree of the convention the four accused persons were deported to cayenne, a new mode of dealing with political offenders almost as effective as the guillotine, while less apt to excite compassion. the national guard was reorganized so as to exclude the lowest class. the property of persons executed since the 10th of march 1793 was restored to their families. the signs of reaction daily became more unmistakable. worshippers crowded to the churches; the _emigres_ returned by thousands; and anti-jacobin outbreaks, followed by massacre, took place in the south. the despair of the jacobins produced a second rising in paris on the 1st prairial (may 20). again the mob invaded the convention, murdered a deputy named feraud who attempted to shield the president, and set his head on a pike. the ultra-jacobin members took possession and embodied their wishes in decrees. again the hall was cleared by the national guards, but order was restored in paris only by employing regular troops, a new precedent in the history of the revolution. paris was disarmed, and several leaders of the insurrection were sentenced to death. the revolutionary tribunal was suppressed. toleration was proclaimed for all priests who would declare their obedience to the laws of the state. royalists began to count upon the restoration of young louis the dauphin, otherwise louis xvii.; but his health had been ruined by persevering cruelty, and he died on the 10th of june. progress of the war. the thermidorian government also endeavoured to pacify the rebels of the west. its best adviser, hoche, recommended an amnesty and the assurance of religious freedom. on these terms peace was made with the vendeans at la jaunaie in february and with the chouans at la mabilais in april. some of the vendean leaders persevered in resistance until may, and even after their submission the peace was ill observed, for the royalists hearkened to the solicitations of the princes and their advisers. in the hope of rekindling the civil war a body of _emigres_ sailed under cover of the british fleet and landed on the peninsula of quiberon. they were presently hemmed in by hoche, and all who could not make their escape to the ships were forced to surrender at discretion (july 20). nearly 700 were executed by court-martial. yet the spirit of revolt lingered in the west and broke out time after time. against the coalition the republic was gloriously successful. (see french revolutionary wars.) in the summer of 1794 the french invaded spain at both ends of the pyrenees, and at the close of the year they made good their footing in catalonia and navarre. by the beginning of 1795 the rhine frontier had been won. against the king of sardinia alone they accomplished little. at sea the french had sustained a severe defeat from lord howe, and several of their colonies had been taken by the british. but great britain, when the netherlands were lost, could do little for her allies. even before the close of 1794 the king of prussia retired from any active part in the war, and on the 5th of april 1795 he concluded with france the treaty of basel, which recognized her occupation of the left bank of the rhine. the new democratic government which the french had established in holland purchased peace by surrendering dutch territory to the south of that river. a treaty of peace between france and spain followed in july. the grand duke of tuscany had been admitted to terms in february. the coalition thus fell into ruin and france occupied a more commanding position than in the proudest days of louis xiv. constitution of the year iii. the directory. but this greatness was unsure so long as france remained without a stable government. a constitutional committee was named in april. it resolved that the constitution of 1793 was impracticable and proceeded to frame a new one. the draft was submitted to the convention in june. in its final shape the constitution established a parliamentary system of two houses: a council of five hundred and a council of ancients, 250 in number. members of the five hundred were to be at least thirty years of age, members of the ancients at least forty. the system of indirect election was maintained but universal suffrage was abandoned. a moderate qualification was required for electors in the first degree, a higher one for electors in the second degree. when the 750 persons necessary had been elected they were to choose the ancients out of their own body. a legislature was to last for three years, and one-third of the members were to be renewed every year. the ancients had a suspensory veto, but no initiative in legislation. the executive was to consist of five directors chosen by the ancients out of a list elected by the five hundred. one director was to retire every year. the directors were aided by ministers for the various departments of state. these ministers did not form a council and had no general powers of government. provision was made for the stringent control of all local authorities by the central government. since the separation of powers was still deemed axiomatic, the directors had no voice in legislation or taxation, nor could directors or ministers sit in either house. freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of labour were guaranteed. armed assemblies and even public meetings of political societies were forbidden. petitions were to be tendered only by individuals or through the public authorities. the constitution was not, however, allowed free play from the beginning. the convention was so unpopular that, if its members had retired into private life, they would not have been safe and their work might have been undone. it was therefore decreed that two-thirds of the first legislature must be chosen out of the convention. insurrection of 13 vendemiaire. when the constitution was submitted to the primary assemblies, most electors held aloof, 1,050,000 voting for and only 5,000 voting against it. on the 23rd of september it was declared to be law. then all the parties which resented the limit upon freedom of election combined to rise in paris. the government entrusted its defence to barras; but its true man of action was young general bonaparte, who could dispose of a few thousand regular troops and a powerful artillery. the parisians were ill-equipped and ill-led, and on the 13th of vendemiaire (october 5) their insurrection was quelled almost without loss to the victors. no further resistance was possible. the convention dissolved itself on the 26th of october. balance of parties in the new legislature. the feeling of the nation was clearly shown in the elections. among those who had sat in the convention the anti-jacobins were generally preferred. a leader of the old right was sometimes chosen by many departments at once. owing to this circumstance, 104 places reserved to members of the convention were left unfilled. when the persons elected met they had no choice but to co-opt the 104 from the left of the convention. the new one-third were, as a rule, enemies of the jacobins, but not of the revolution. many had been members of the constituent or of the legislative assembly. when the new legislature was complete, the jacobins had a majority, although a weak one. after the council of the ancients had been chosen by lot, it remained to name the directors. for its own security the left resolved that all five must be old members of the convention and regicides. the persons chosen were rewbell, barras, la revelliere lepeaux, carnot and letourneur. rewbell was an able, although unscrupulous, man of action, barras a dissolute and shameless adventurer, la revelliere lepeaux the chief of a new sect, the theophilanthropists, and therefore a bitter foe to other religions, especially the catholic. severe integrity and memorable public services raised carnot far above his colleagues, but he was not a statesman and was hampered by his past. letourneur, a harmless insignificant person, was his admirer and follower. the division in the legislature was reproduced in the directory. rewbell, barras and la revelliere lepeaux had a full measure of the jacobin spirit; carnot and letourneur favoured a more temperate policy. character of the directory. with the establishment of the directory the revolution might seem closed. the nation only desired rest and the healing of its many wounds. those who wished to restore louis xviii. and the _ancien regime_ and those who would have renewed the reign of terror were insignificant in number. the possibility of foreign interference had vanished with the failure of the coalition. nevertheless the four years of the directory were a time of arbitrary government and chronic disquiet. the late atrocities had made confidence or goodwill between parties impossible. the same instinct of self-preservation which had led the members of the convention to claim so large a part in the new legislature and the whole of the directory impelled them to keep their predominance. as the majority of frenchmen wanted to be rid of them, they could achieve their purpose only by extraordinary means. they habitually disregarded the terms of the constitution, and, when the elections went against them, appealed to the sword. they resolved to prolong the war as the best expedient for prolonging their power. they were thus driven to rely upon the armies, which also desired war and were becoming less and less civic in temper. other reasons influenced them in this direction. the finances had been so thoroughly ruined that the government could not have met its expenses without the plunder and the tribute of foreign countries. if peace were made, the armies would return home and the directors would have to face the exasperation of the rank and file who had lost their livelihood, as well as the ambition of generals who could in a moment brush them aside. barras and rewbell were notoriously corrupt themselves and screened corruption in others. the patronage of the directors was ill bestowed, and the general maladministration heightened their unpopularity. military triumphs under the directory. bonaparte. the constitutional party in the legislature desired a toleration of the nonjuring clergy, the repeal of the laws against the relatives of the _emigres_, and some merciful discrimination toward the _emigres_ themselves. the directors baffled all such endeavours. on the other hand, the socialist conspiracy of babeuf was easily quelled (see babeuf, francois n.). little was done to improve the finances, and the _assignats_ continued to fall in value. but the directory was sustained by the military successes of the year 1796. hoche again pacified la vendee. bonaparte's victories in italy more than compensated for the reverses of jourdan and moreau in germany. the king of sardinia made peace in may, ceding nice and savoy to the republic and consenting to receive french garrisons in his piedmontese fortresses. by the treaty of san ildefonso, concluded in august, spain became the ally of france. in october naples made peace. in 1797 bonaparte finished the conquest of northern italy and forced austria to make the treaty of campo formio (october), whereby the emperor ceded lombardy and the austrian netherlands to the republic in exchange for venice and undertook to urge upon the diet the surrender of the lands beyond the rhine. notwithstanding the victory of cape st vincent, england was brought into such extreme peril by the mutinies in the fleet that she offered to acknowledge the french conquest of the netherlands and to restore the french colonies. the selfishness of the three directors threw away this golden opportunity. in march and april the election of a new third of the councils had been held. it gave a majority to the constitutional party. among the directors the lot fell on letourneur to retire, and he was succeeded by barthelemy, an eminent diplomatist, who allied himself with carnot. the political disabilities imposed upon the relatives of _emigres_ were repealed. priests who would declare their submission to the republic were restored to their rights as citizens. it seemed likely that peace would be made and that moderate men would gain power. coup d'etat of the 18th fructidor. barras, rewbell and la revelliere-lepeaux then sought help from the armies. although royalists formed but a petty fraction of the majority, they raised the alarm that it was seeking to restore monarchy and undo the work of the revolution. hoche, then in command of the army of the sambre and meuse, visited paris and sent troops. bonaparte sent general augereau, who executed the _coup d'etat_ of the 18th fructidor (september 4). the councils were purged, the elections in forty-nine departments were cancelled, and many deputies and other men of note were arrested. some of them, including barthelemy, were deported to cayenne. carnot made good his escape. the two vacant places in the directory were filled by merlin of douai and francois of neufchateau. then the government frankly returned to jacobin methods. the law against the relatives of _emigres_ was reenacted, and military tribunals were established to condemn _emigres_ who should return to france. the nonjuring priests were again persecuted. many hundreds were either sent to cayenne or imprisoned in the hulks of re and oleron. la revelliere lepeaux seized the opportunity to propagate his religion. many churches were turned into theophilanthropic temples. the government strained its power to secure the recognition of the _decadi_ as the day of public worship and the non-observance of sunday. liberty of the press ceased. newspapers were confiscated and journalists were deported wholesale. it was proposed to banish from france all members of the old _noblesse_. although the proposal was dropped, they were all declared to be foreigners and were forced to obtain naturalization if they would enjoy the rights of other citizens. a formal bankruptcy of the state, the cancelling of two-thirds of the interest on the public debt, crowned the misgovernment of this disastrous time. in the spring of 1798 not only a new third of the legislature had to be chosen, but the places of the members expelled by the revolution of fructidor had to be filled. the constitutional party had been rendered helpless, and the mass of the electors were indifferent. but among the jacobins themselves there had arisen an extreme party hostile to the directors. with the support of many who were not jacobins but detested the government, it bade fair to gain a majority. before the new deputies could take their seats the directors forced through the councils the law of the 22nd floreal (may 11), annulling or perverting the elections in thirty departments and excluding forty-eight deputies by name. even this _coup d'etat_ did not secure harmony between the executive and the legislature. in the councils the directors were loudly charged with corruption and misgovernment. the retirement of francois of neufchateau and the choice of treilhard as his successor made no difference in the position of the directory. while france was thus inwardly convulsed, its rulers were doubly bound to husband the national strength and practise moderation towards other states. since december 1797 a congress had been sitting at rastadt to regulate the future of germany. that it should be brought to a successful conclusion was of the utmost import for france. but the directors were driven by self-interest to new adventures abroad. bonaparte was resolved not to sink into obscurity, and the directors were anxious to keep him as far as possible from paris; they therefore sanctioned the expedition to egypt which deprived the republic of its best army and most renowned captain. coveting the treasures of bern, they sent brune to invade switzerland and remodel its constitution; in revenge for the murder of general duphot, they sent berthier to invade the papal states and erect the roman republic; they occupied and virtually annexed piedmont. in all these countries they organized such an effective pillage that the french became universally hateful. as the armies were far below the strength required by the policy of unbounded conquest and rapine, the first permanent law of conscription was passed in the summer of 1798. the attempt to enforce it caused a revolt of the peasants in the belgian departments. the priests were made responsible and some eight thousand were condemned in a mass to deportation, although much the greater part escaped by the goodwill of the people. few soldiers were obtained by the conscription, for the government was as weak as it was tyrannical. the second coalition. under these circumstances nelson's victory of aboukir (1st of august), which gave the british full command of the mediterranean and secluded bonaparte in egypt, was the signal for a second coalition. naples, austria, russia and turkey joined great britain against france. ferdinand of naples, rashly taking the offensive before his allies were ready, was defeated and forced to seek a refuge in sicily. in january 1799 the french occupied naples and set up the parthenopean republic. but the consequent dispersion of their weak forces only exposed them to greater peril. at home the directory was in a most critical position. in the elections of april 1799 a large number of jacobins gained seats. a little later rewbell retired. it was imperative to fill his place with a man of ability and influence. the choice fell upon sieyes, who had kept aloof from office and retained not only his immeasurable self-conceit but the respect of the public. sieyes felt that the directory was bankrupt of reputation, and he intended to be far more than a mere member of a board. he hoped to concentrate power in his own hands, to bridle the jacobins, and to remodel the constitution. with the help of barras he proceeded to rid himself of the other directors. an irregularity having been discovered in treilhard's election, he retired, and his place was taken by gohier. merlin of douai and la revelliere lepeaux were driven to resign in june. they were succeeded by moulin and ducos. the three new directors were so insignificant that they could give no trouble, but for the same reason they were of little service. french reverses. the directory discredited. such a government was ill fitted to cope with the dangers then gathering round france. the directors having resolved on the offensive in germany, the french crossed the rhine early in march, but were defeated by the archduke charles at stockach on the 25th. the congress at rastadt, which had sat for fifteen months without doing anything, broke up in april and the french envoys were murdered by austrian hussars. in italy the allies took the offensive with an army partly austrian, partly russian under the command of suvarov. after defeating moreau at cassano on the 27th of april, he occupied milan and turin. the republics established by the french in italy were overthrown, and the french army retreating from naples was defeated by suvarov on the trebbia. thus threatened with invasion on her german and italian frontiers, france was disabled by anarchy within. the finances were in the last distress; the anti-religious policy of the government kept many departments on the verge of revolt; and commerce was almost suspended by the decay of roads and the increase of bandits. there was no real political freedom, yet none of the ease or security which enlightened despotism can bestow. the terrorists lifted their heads in the council of five hundred. a law of hostages, which was really a new law of suspects, and a progressive income tax showed the temper of the majority. the jacobin club was reopened and became once more the focus of disorder. the jacobin press renewed the licence of hebert and marat. never since the outbreak of the revolution had the public temper been so gloomy and desponding. in this extremity sieyes chose as minister of police the old terrorist fouche, who best understood how to deal with his brethren. fouche closed the jacobin club and deported a number of journalists. but like his predecessors sieyes felt that for the revolution which he meditated he must have the help of a soldier. as his man of action he chose general joubert, one of the most distinguished among french officers. joubert was sent to restore the fortune of the war in italy. at novi on the 15th of august he encountered suvarov. he was killed at the outset of the battle and his men were defeated. after this disaster the french held scarcely anything south of the alps save genoa. the russian and austrian governments then agreed to drive the enemy out of switzerland and to invade france from the east. at the same time holland was assailed by the joint forces of great britain and russia. but the second coalition, like the first, was doomed to failure by the narrow views and conflicting interests of its members. the invasion of switzerland was baffled by want of concert between austrians and russians and by massena's victory at zurich on the 25th and 26th of september. in october the british and the russians were forced to evacuate holland. all immediate danger to france was ended, but the issue of the war was still in suspense. the directors had been forced to recall bonaparte from egypt. he anticipated their order and on the 9th of october landed at frejus. coup d'etat of the 18th brumaire. dazzled by his victories in the east the public forgot that the egyptian expedition was ending in calamity. it received him with an ardour which convinced sieyes that he was the indispensable soldier. bonaparte was ready to act, but at his own time and for his own ends. since the close of the convention affairs at home and abroad had been tending more and more surely to the establishment of a military dictatorship. feeling his powers equal to such an office he only hesitated about the means of attainment. at first he thought of becoming a director; finally he decided upon a partnership with sieyes. they resolved to end the actual government by a fresh _coup d'etat_. means were to be taken for removing the councils from paris to st cloud, where pressure could more easily be applied. then the councils would be induced to decree a provisional government by three consuls and the appointment of a commission to revise the constitution. the pretext for this irregular proceeding was to be a vast jacobin conspiracy. perhaps the gravest obstacles were to be expected from the army. of the generals, some, like jourdan, were honest republicans; others, like bernadotte, believed themselves capable of governing france. with perfect subtlety bonaparte worked on the feelings of all and kept his own intentions secret. on the morning of the 18th brumaire (november 9) the ancients, to whom that power belonged, decreed the transference of the councils to st cloud. of the directors, sieyes and his friend ducos had arranged to resign; barras was cajoled and bribed into resigning; gohier and moulins, who were intractable, found themselves imprisoned in the luxemburg palace and helpless. so far all had gone well. but when the councils met at st cloud on the following day, the majority of the five hundred showed themselves bent on resistance, and even the ancients gave signs of wavering. when bonaparte addressed the ancients, he lost his self-possession and made a deplorable figure. when he appeared among the five hundred, they fell upon him with such fury that he was hardly rescued by his officers. a motion to outlaw him was only baffled by the audacity of the president, his brother lucien. at length driven to undisguised violence, he sent in his grenadiers, who turned out the deputies. then the ancients passed a decree which adjourned the councils for three months, appointed bonaparte, sieyes and ducos provisional consuls, and named the legislative commission. some tractable members of the five hundred were afterwards swept up and served to give these measures the confirmation of their house. thus the directory and the councils came to their unlamented end. a shabby compound of brute force and imposture, the 18th brumaire was nevertheless condoned, nay applauded, by the french nation. weary of revolution, men sought no more than to be wisely and firmly governed. general estimate of the revolution. although the french revolution seemed to contemporaries a total break in the history of france, it was really far otherwise. its results were momentous and durable in proportion as they were the outcome of causes which had been working long. in france there had been no historic preparation for political freedom. the desire for such freedom was in the main confined to the upper classes. during the revolution it was constantly baffled. no assembly after the states-general was freely elected and none deliberated in freedom. after the revolution bonaparte established a monarchy even more absolute than the monarchy of louis xiv. but the desire for uniformity, for equality and for what may be termed civil liberty was the growth of ages, had been in many respects nurtured by the action of the crown and its ministers, and had become intense and general. accordingly it determined the principal results of the revolution. uniformity of laws and institutions was enforced throughout france. the legal privileges formerly distinguishing different classes were suppressed. an obsolete and burthensome agrarian system was abolished. a number of large estates belonging to the crown, the clergy and the nobles were broken up and sold at nominal prices to men of the middle or lower class. the new jurisprudence encouraged the multiplication of small properties. the new fiscal system taxed men according to their means and raised no obstacle to commerce within the national boundaries. every calling and profession was made free to all french citizens, and in the public service the principle of an open career for talent was adopted. religious disabilities vanished, and there was well-nigh complete liberty of thought. it was because napoleon gave a practical form to these achievements of the revolution and ensured the public order necessary to their continuance that the majority of frenchmen endured so long the fearful sacrifices which his policy exacted. that a revolution largely inspired by generous and humane feeling should have issued in such havoc and such crimes is a paradox which astounded spectators and still perplexes the historian. something in the cruelty of the french revolution may be ascribed to national character. from the time when burgundians and armagnacs strove for dominion down to the last insurrection of paris, civil discord in france has always been cruel. more, however, was due to the total dissolution of society which followed the meeting of the states-general. in the course of the revolution we can discover no well-organized party, no governing mind. mirabeau had the stuff of a great statesman, and danton was capable of statesmanship. but these men were not followed or obeyed save by accident or for a moment. those who seemed to govern were usually the sport of chance, often the victims of their colleagues. neither royalists nor feuillants nor girondins had the instinct of government. in the chaotic state of france all ferocious and destructive passions found ample scope. the same conditions explain the triumph of the jacobins. devoid of wisdom and virtue in the highest sense, they at least understood how power might be seized and kept. the reign of terror was the expedient of a party which knew its weakness and unpopularity. it was not necessary either to secure the lasting benefits of the revolution or to save france from dismemberment; for nine frenchmen out of ten were agreed on both of these points and were ready to lay down their lives for the national cause. in the history of the french revolution the influence which it exerted upon the surrounding countries demands peculiar attention. the french professed to act upon principles of universal authority, and from an early date they began to seek converts outside their own limits. the effect was slight upon england, which had already secured most of the reforms desired by the french, and upon spain, where the bulk of the people were entirely submissive to church and king. but in the netherlands, in western germany and in northern italy, countries which had attained a degree of civilization resembling that of france, where the middle and lower classes had grievances and aspirations not very different from those of the french, the effect was profound. fear of revolution at home was one of the motives which led continental sovereigns to attack revolution in france. their incoherent efforts only confirmed the jacobin supremacy. wherever the victorious french extended their dominion, they remodelled institutions in the french manner. their sway proved so oppressive that the very classes which had welcomed them with most fervour soon came to long for their expulsion. but revolutionary ideas kept their charm. under napoleon the essential part of the changes made by the republic was preserved in these countries also. moreover the effacement of old boundaries, the overthrow of ancestral governments, and the invocation, however hollow, of the sovereignty of the people, awoke national feeling which had slumbered long and prepared the struggle for national union and independence in the 19th century. see also france, sections _history_ and _law and institutions_. for the leading figures in the revolution see their biographies under separate headings. particular phases, facts, and institutions of the period are also separately dealt with, e.g. assignats, convention, the national, jacobins. bibliography.--the ms. authorities for the history of the french revolution are exceedingly copious. the largest collection is in the archives nationales in paris, but an immense number of documents are to be found in other collections in paris and the provinces. the printed materials are so abundant and varied that any brief notice of them must be imperfect. the condition of france and the state of public opinion at the beginning of the revolution may be studied in the printed collections of _cahiers_. the _cahiers_ were the statements of grievances drawn up for the guidance of deputies to the states-general by those who had elected them. in every _bailliage_ and _senechaussee_ each estate drew up its own cahier and the cahiers of the third estate were condensed from separate cahiers drawn up by each parish in the district. thus the cahiers of the third estate number many thousands, the greater part of which have not yet been printed. among the collections printed we may mention _les elections et les cahiers de paris en 1789_, by c. l. chassin (4 vols., paris, 1888); _cahiers de plaintes et doleances des paroisses de la province de maine_, by a. bellee and v. duchemin (4 vols., le mans, 1881-1893); _cahiers de doleances de 1789 dans le departement du pas-de-calais_, by h. loriquet (2 vols., arras, 1891); _cahiers des paroisses et communautes du bailliage d'autun_, by a. charmasse (autun, 1895). new collections are printed from time to time. a more general collection of cahiers than any above named is given in vols. i.-vi. of the _archives parlementaires_. the cahiers must not be read in a spirit of absolute faith, as they were influenced by certain models circulated at the time of the elections and by popular excitement, but they remain an authority of the utmost value and a mine of information as to old france. reference should also be made to the works of travellers who visited france at the outbreak of the revolution. among these arthur young's _travels in france during the years 1787, 1788 and 1789_ (2 vols., bury st edmunds, 1792-1794) are peculiarly instructive. for the history of the assemblies during the revolution a main authority is their _proces verbaux_ or journals; those of the constituent assembly in 75 vols., those of the legislative assembly in 16 vols.; those of the convention in 74 vols., and those of the councils under the directory in 99 vols. see also the _archives parlementaires_ edited by j. mavidal and e. laurent (paris, 1867, and the following years); the _histoire parlementaire de la revolution_, by p. j. b. buchez and p. c. roux (paris, 1838), and the _histoire de la revolution par deux amis de la liberte_ (paris, 1792-1803). the newspapers, of which a few have been mentioned in the text, were numerous. they are useful chiefly as illustrating the ideas and passions of the time, for they give comparatively little information as to facts and that little is peculiarly inaccurate. the ablest of the royalist journals was mallet du pan's _mercure de france_. pamphlets of the revolution period number many thousands. such pamphlets as mounier's _nouvelles observations sur les etats-generaux de france_ and sieyes's _qu'est-ce que le tiers etat_ had a notable influence on opinion. the richest collections of revolution pamphlets are in the bibliotheque nationale of paris and in the british museum. the contemporary memoirs, &c., already published are numerous and fresh ones are always coming forth. a few of the best known and most useful are, for the constituent assembly, the memoirs of bailly, of ferrieres, of malouet. the _correspondence of mirabeau with the count de la marck_, edited by bacourt (3 vols., paris, 1851), is especially valuable. dumont's _recollections of mirabeau_ and the _diary and letters of gouverneur morris_ give the impressions of foreigners with peculiar advantages for observing. for the legislative assembly and the convention the memoirs of madame roland, of bertrand de molleville, of barbaroux, of buzot, of louvet, of dumouriez are instructive. for the directory the memoirs of barras, of la revelliere lepeaux and of thibaudeau deserve mention. the memoirs of lafayette are useful. those of talleyrand are singularly barren, the result, no doubt, of deliberate suppression. the memoirs of the marquise de la rochejacquelein are important for the war of la vendee. the most notable jacobins have seldom left memoirs, but the works of robespierre and st just enable us to form a clearer conception of the authors. the correspondence of the count of mercy-argenteau, the imperial ambassador, with joseph ii. and kaunitz, and the correspondence of mallet du pan with the court of vienna, are also instructive. but the contemporary literature of the french revolution requires to be read in an unusually critical spirit. at no other historical crisis have passions been more fiercely excited; at none have shameless disregard of truth and blind credulity been more common. among later works based on these original materials the first place belongs to general histories. in french louis blanc's _histoire de la revolution_ (12 vols., paris, 1847-1862), and michelet's _histoire de la revolution francaise_ (9 vols., paris, 1847-1853), are the most elaborate of the older works. michelet's book is marked by great eloquence and power. in h. taine's _origines de la france contemporaine_ (paris, 1876-1894) three volumes are devoted to the revolution. they show exceptional talent and industry, but their value is impaired by the spirit of system and by strong prepossessions. f. a. m. mignet's _histoire de la revolution francaise_ (2 vols., paris, 1861), short and devoid of literary charm, has the merits of learning and judgment and is still useful. f. a. aulard's _histoire politique de la revolution francaise_ (paris, 1901) is a most valuable precis of political history, based on deep knowledge and lucidly set forth, although not free from bias. the volume on the revolution in lavisse and rambaud's _histoire generale de l'europe_ (paris, 1896) is the work of distinguished scholars using the latest information. in english, general histories of the revolution are few. carlyle's famous work, published in 1837, is more of a prose epic than a history, omitting all detail which would not heighten the imaginative effect and tinged by all the favourite ideas of the author. some fifty years later h. m. stephens published the first (1886) and second (1892) volumes of a _history of the french revolution_. they are marked by solid learning and contain much information. volume viii. of the _cambridge modern history_, published in 1904, contains a general survey of the revolution. the most notable german work is h. von sybel's _geschichte der revolutionszeit_ (5 vols., stuttgart, 1853-1879). it is strongest in those carts which relate to international affairs and foreign policy. there is an english translation. none of the general histories of the revolution above named is really satisfactory. the immense mass of material has not yet been thoroughly sifted; and the passions of that age still disturb the judgment of the historian. more successful have been the attempts to treat particular aspects of the revolution. the foreign relations of france during the revolution have been most ably unravelled by a. sorel in _l'europe et la revolution francaise_ (8 vols., paris, 1885-1904) carrying the story down to the settlement of vienna. five volumes cover the years 1789-1799. the financial history of the revolution has been traced by c. gomel, _histoire financiere de l'assemblee constituante_ (2 vols., paris, 1897), and r. stourm, _les finances de l'ancien regime et de la revolution_ (2 vols., paris, 1885). the relations of church and state are sketched in e. pressense's _l'eglise et la revolution francaise_ (paris, 1889). the general legislation of the period has been discussed by ph. sagnac, _la legislation civile de la revolution francaise_ (paris, 1898). the best work upon the social life of the period is the _histoire de la societe francaise sous la revolution_, by e. and j. de goncourt (paris, 1889). for military history see a. duruy, _l'armee royale en 1789_ (paris, 1888); e. de hauterive, _l'armee sous la revolution, 1789-1794_ (paris, 1894); a. chuquet, _les guerres de la revolution_ (paris, 1886, &c.). see also the memoirs and biographies of the distinguished soldiers of the republic and empire, too numerous for citation here. modern lives of the principal actors in the revolution are numerous. among the most important are _memoires de mirabeau_, by l. de montigny (paris, 1834); _les mirabeau_, by l. de lomenie (paris, 1889-1891); h. l. de lanzac de laborie's _jean joseph mounier_ (paris, 1889); b. mallet's _mallet du pan and the french revolution_ (london, 1902); robinet's _danton_ (paris, 1889); hamel's _histoire de robespierre_ (paris, 1865-1867) and _histoire de st-just_ (2 vols., brussels, 1860); a. bigeon, _sieyes_ (paris, 1893); _memoirs of carnot_, by his son (2 vols., paris, 1861-1864). for fuller information see m. tourneux, _les sources bibliographiques de l'histoire de la revolution francaise_ (paris, 1898, etc.), and _bibliographie de l'histoire de paris pendant la revolution_ (paris, 1890, etc.). (f. c. m.) _french republican calendar._--among the changes made during the revolution was the substitution of a new calendar, usually called the revolutionary or republican calendar, for the prevailing gregorian system. something of the sort had been suggested in 1785 by a certain riboud, and a definite scheme had been promulgated by pierre sylvain marechal (1750-1803) in his _almanach des honnetes gens_ (1788). the objects which the advocates of a new calendar had in view were to strike a blow at the clergy and to divorce all calculations of time from the christian associations with which they were loaded, in short, to abolish the christian year; and enthusiasts were already speaking of "the first year of liberty" and "the first year of the republic" when the national convention took up the matter in 1793. the business of drawing up the new calendar was entrusted to the president of the committee of public instruction, charles gilbert romme (1750-1795), who was aided in the work by the mathematicians gaspard monge and joseph louis lagrange, the poet fabre d'eglantine and others. the result of their labours was submitted to the convention in september; it was accepted, and the new calendar became law on the 5th of october 1793. the new arrangement was regarded as beginning on the 22nd of september 1792, this day being chosen because on it the republic was proclaimed and because it was in this year the day of the autumnal equinox. by the new calendar the year of 365 days was divided into twelve months of thirty days each, every month being divided into three periods of ten days, each of which were called _decades_, and the tenth, or last, day of each decade being a day of rest. it was also proposed to divide the day on the decimal system, but this arrangement was found to be highly inconvenient and it was never put into practice. five days of the 365 still remained to be dealt with, and these were set aside for national festivals and holidays and were called _sans-culottides_. they were to fall at the end of the year, i.e. on the five days between the 17th and the 21st of september inclusive, and were called the festivals of virtue, of genius, of labour, of opinion and of rewards. a similar course was adopted with regard to the extra day which occurred once in every four years, but the first of these was to fall in the year iii., i.e. in 1795, and not in 1796, the leap year in the gregorian calendar. this day was set apart for the festival of the revolution and was to be the last of the _sans-culottides_. each period of four years was to be called a _franciade_. +----------------------------------+----------------+---------------+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+---------------+ | an ii. | an iii. | an iv. | an v. | an vi. | an vii. | an viii. | an ix. | | 1793-1794 | 1794-1795. | 1795-1796. | 1796-1797. | 1797-1798. | 1798-1799. | 1799-1800. | 1800-1801. | +-----------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+---------------+ | 1 vendemiaire | 22 sept. 1793 | 22 sept. 1794 | 23 sept. 1795 | 22 sept. 1796| 22 sept. 1797 | 22 sept. 1798 | 23 sept. 1799 | 23 sept. 1800 | | 1 brumaire | 22 oct. " | 22 oct. " | 23 oct. " | 22 oct. " | 22 oct. " | 22 oct. " | 23 oct. " | 23 oct. " | | 1 frimaire | 21 nov. " | 21 nov. " | 22 nov. " | 21 nov. " | 21 nov. " | 21 nov. " | 22 nov. " | 22 nov. " | | 1 nivose | 21 dec. " | 21 dec. " | 22 dec. " | 21 dec. " | 21 dec. " | 21 dec. " | 22 dec. " | 22 dec. " | | 1 pluviose | 20 janv. 1794 | 20 janv. 1795 | 21 janv. 1796 | 20 janv. 1797| 20 janv. 1798 | 20 janv. 1799 | 21 janv. 1800 | 21 janv. 1801 | | 1 ventose | 19 fevr. " | 19 fevr. " | 20 fevr. " | 19 fevr. " | 19 fev. " | 19 fev. " | 20 fev. " | 20 fev. " | | 1 germinal | 21 mars " | 21 mars " | 21 mars " | 21 mars " | 1 mars " | 21 mars " | 22 mars " | 22 mars " | | 1 floreal | 20 avr. " | 20 avr. " | 20 avr. " | 20 avr. " | 20 avr. " | 20 avr. " | 21 avr. " | 21 avr. " | | 1 prairial | 20 mai " | 20 mai " | 20 mai " | 20 mai " | 20 mai " | 20 mai " | 21 mai " | 21 mai " | | 1 messidor | 19 juin " | 19 juin " | 19 juin " | 19 juin " | 19 juin " | 19 juin " | 20 juin " | 20 juin " | | 1 thermidor | 19 juil. " | 19 juil. " | 19 juil. " | 19 juil. " | 19 juil. " | 19 juil. " | 20 juil. " | 20 juil. " | | 1 fructidor | 18 aout " | 18 aout " | 18 aout " | 18 aout " | 18 aout " | 18 aout " | 19 aout " | 19 aout " | +-----------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+---------------+ |1 sans-culottides| 17 sept. 1794 | 17 sept. 1795 | 17 sept. 1796 | 17 sept. 1797| 17 sept. 1798 | 17 sept. 1799 | 18 sept. 1800 | 18 sept. 1801 | |6 " | | 22 " " | | | | 22 " " | | | +-----------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+---------------+ +---------------------------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+ | an x. | an xi. | an xii. | an xiii. | an xiv. | | 1801-1802. | 1802-1803. | 1803-1804. | 1804-1805. | 1805. | +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+ | 1 vendemiaire | 23 septembre 1801 | 23 septembre 1802 | 24 septembre 1803 | 23 septembre 1804 | 23 septembre 1805 | | 1 brumaire | 23 octobre " | 23 octobre " | 24 octobre " | 23 octobre " | 23 octobre " | | 1 frimaire | 22 novembre " | 22 novembre " | 23 novembre " | 22 novembre " | 22 novembre " | | 1 nivose | 22 decembre " | 22 decembre " | 23 decembre " | 22 decembre " | 22 decembre " | | 1 pluviose | 21 janvier 1802 | 21 janvier 1803 | 22 janvier 1804 | 21 janvier 1805 | | | 1 ventose | 20 fevrier " | 20 fevrier " | 21 fevrier " | 20 fevrier " | | | 1 germinal | 22 mars " | 22 mars " | 22 mars " | 22 mars " | | | 1 floreal | 21 avril " | 21 avril " | 21 avril " | 21 avril " | | | 1 prairial | 21 mai " | 21 mai " | 21 mai " | 21 mai " | | | 1 messidor | 20 juin " | 20 juin " | 20 juin " | 20 juin " | | | 1 thermidor | 20 juillet " | 20 juillet " | 20 juillet " | 20 juillet " | | | 1 fructidor | 19 aout " | 19 aout " | 19 aout " | 19 aout " | | +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+ | 1 sans-culottides | 18 septembre 1802 | 18 septembre 1803 | 18 septembre 1804 | 18 septembre 1805 | | | 6 " | | 23 " " | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+ some discussion took place about the nomenclature of the new divisions of time. eventually this work was entrusted to fabre d'eglantine, who gave to each month a name taken from some seasonal event therein. beginning with the new year on the 22nd of september the autumn months were _vendemiaire_, the month of vintage, _brumaire_, the months of fog, and _frimaire_, the month of frost. the winter months were _nivose_, the snowy, _pluviose_, the rainy, and _ventose_, the windy month; then followed the spring months, _germinal_, the month of buds, _floreal_, the month of flowers, and _prairial_, the month of meadows; and lastly the summer months, _messidor_, the month of reaping, _thermidor_, the month of heat, and _fructidor_, the month of fruit. to the days fabre d'eglantine gave names which retained the idea of their numerical order, calling them primedi, duodi, &c., the last day of the ten, the day of rest, being named decadi. the new order was soon in force in france and the new method was employed in all public documents, but it did not last many years. in september 1805 it was decided to restore the gregorian calendar, and the republican one was officially discontinued on the 1st of january 1806. it will easily be seen that the connecting link between the old and the new calendars is very slight indeed and that the expression of a date in one calendar in terms of the other is a matter of some difficulty. a simple method of doing this, however, is afforded by the table on the preceding page, which is taken from the article by j. dubourdieu in _la grande encyclopedie_. thus robespierre was executed on 10 thermidor an ii., i.e. the 28th of july 1794. the insurrection of 12 germinal an iii. took place on the 1st of april 1795. the famous 18 brumaire an viii. fell on the 9th of november 1799, and the _coup d'etat_ of 18 fructidor an v. on the 4th of september 1797. for a complete concordance of the gregorian and the republican calendars see stokvis, _manuel d'histoire_, tome iii. (leiden, 1889); also g. villain, "le calendrier republicain," in _la revolution francaise_ for 1884-1885. (a. w. h.*) french revolutionary wars (1792-1800), the general name for the first part of the series of french wars which went on continuously, except for some local and temporary cessations of hostilities, from the declaration of war against britain in 1792 to the final overthrow of napoleon in 1815. the most important of these cessations--viz. the peace of 1801-1803--closes the "revolutionary" and opens the "napoleonic" era of land warfare, for which see napoleonic campaigns, peninsular war and waterloo campaign. the naval history of the period is divided somewhat differently; the first period, treated below, is 1792-1799; for the second, 1799-1815, see napoleonic campaigns. france declared war on austria on the 20th of april 1792. but prussia and other powers had allied themselves with austria in view of war, and it was against a coalition and not a single power that france found herself pitted, at the moment when the "emigration," the ferment of the revolution, and want of material and of funds had thoroughly disorganized her army. the first engagements were singularly disgraceful. near lille the french soldiers fled at sight of the austrian outposts, crying _nous sommes trahis_, and murdered their general (april 29). the commanders-in-chief of the armies that were formed became one after another "suspects"; and before a serious action had been fought, the three armies of rochambeau, lafayette and luckner had resolved themselves into two commanded by dumouriez and kellermann. thus the disciplined soldiers of the allies had apparently good reason to consider the campaign before them a military promenade. on the rhine, a combined army of prussians, austrians, hessians and _emigres_ under the duke of brunswick was formed for the invasion of france, flanked by two smaller armies on its right and left, all three being under the supreme command of the king of prussia. in the netherlands the austrians were to besiege lille, and in the south the piedmontese also took the field. the first step, taken against brunswick's advice, was the issue (july 25) of a proclamation which, couched in terms in the last degree offensive to the french nation, generated the spirit that was afterwards to find expression in the "armed nation" of 1793-4, and sealed the fate of louis xvi. the duke, who was a model sovereign in his own principality, sympathized with the constitutional side of the revolution, while as a soldier he had no confidence in the success of the enterprise. after completing its preparations in the leisurely manner of the previous generation, his army crossed the french frontier on the 19th of august. longwy was easily captured; and the allies slowly marched on to verdun, which was more indefensible even than longwy. the commandant, colonel beaurepaire, shot himself in despair, and the place surrendered on the 3rd of september. brunswick now began his march on paris and approached the defiles of the argonne. but dumouriez, who had been training his raw troops at valenciennes in constant small engagements, with the purpose of invading belgium, now threw himself into the argonne by a rapid and daring flank march, almost under the eyes of the prussian advanced guard, and barred the paris road, summoning kellermann to his assistance from metz. the latter moved but slowly, and before he arrived the northern part of the line of defence had been forced. dumouriez, undaunted, changed front so as to face north, with his right wing on the argonne and his left stretching towards chalons, and in this position kellermann joined him at st menehould on the 19th of september. valmy. brunswick meanwhile had passed the northern defiles and had then swung round to cut off dumouriez from chalons. at the moment when the prussian manoeuvre was nearly completed, kellermann, commanding in dumouriez's momentary absence, advanced his left wing and took up a position between st menehould and valmy. the result was the world-renowned cannonade of valmy (september 20, 1792). kellermann's infantry, nearly all regulars, stood steady. the french artillery justified its reputation as the best in europe, and eventually, with no more than a half-hearted infantry attack, the duke broke off the action and retired. this trivial engagement was the turning-point of the campaign and a landmark in the world's history. ten days later, without firing another shot, the invading army began its retreat. dumouriez's pursuit was not seriously pressed; he occupied himself chiefly with a series of subtle and curious negotiations which, with the general advance of the french troops, brought about the complete withdrawal of the enemy from the soil of france. jemappes. meanwhile, the french forces in the south had driven back the piedmontese and had conquered savoy and nice. another french success was the daring expedition into germany made by custine from alsace. custine captured mainz itself on the 21st of october and penetrated as far as frankfurt. in the north the austrian siege of lille had completely failed, and dumouriez now resumed his interrupted scheme for the invasion of the netherlands. his forward movement, made as it was late in the season, surprised the austrians, and he disposed of enormously superior forces. on the 6th of november he won the first great victory of the war at jemappes near mons and, this time advancing boldly, he overran the whole country from namur to antwerp within a month. such was the prelude of what is called the "great war" in england and the "epopee" in france. before going further it is necessary to summarize the special features of the french army--in leadership, discipline, tactics, organization and movement--which made these campaigns the archetype of modern warfare. at the outbreak of the revolution the french army, like other armies in europe, was a "voluntary" long-service army, augmented to some extent in war by drafts of militia. the french army, 1792-1796. one of the first problems that the constituent assembly took upon itself to solve was the nationalization of this strictly royal and professional force, and as early as october 1789 the word "conscription" was heard in its debates. but it was decreed nevertheless that free enlistment alone befitted a free people, and the regular army was left unaltered in form. however, a national guard came into existence side by side with it, and the history of french army organization in the next few years is the history of the fusion of these two elements. the first step, as regards the regular army, was the abolition of proprietary rights, the serial numbering of regiments throughout the army, and the disbandment of the _maison du roi_. the next was the promotion of deserving soldiers to fill the numerous vacancies caused by the emigration. along with these, however, there came to the surface many incompetent leaders, favourites in the political clubs of paris, &c., and the old strict discipline became impossible owing to the frequent intervention of the civil authorities in matters affecting it, the denunciation of generals, and especially the wild words and wild behaviour of "volunteer" (embodied national guard) battalions. when war came, it was soon found that the regulars had fallen too low in numbers and that the national guard demanded too high pay, to admit of developing the expected field strength. arms, discipline, training alike were wanting to the new levies, and the repulse of brunswick was effected by manoeuvring and fighting on the old lines and chiefly with the old army. the cry of _la patrie en danger_, after giving, at the crisis, the highest moral support to the troops in the front, dwindled away after victory, and the french government contented itself with the half-measures that had, apparently, sufficed to avert the peril. more, when the armies went into winter quarters, the volunteers claimed leave of absence and went home. but in the spring of 1793, confronted by a far more serious peril, the government took strong measures. universal liability was asserted, and passed into law. yet even now whole classes obtained exemption and the right of substitution as usual forced the burden of service on the poorer classes, so that of the 100,000 men called on for the regular army and 200,000 for the volunteers, only some 180,000 were actually raised. desertion, generally regarded as the curse of professional armies, became a conspicuous vice of the defenders of the republic, except at moments when a supreme crisis called forth supreme devotion--moments which naturally were more or less prolonged in proportion to the gravity of the situation. thus, while it almost disappeared in the great effort of 1793-1794, when the armies sustained bloody reverses in distant wars of conquest, as in 1799, it promptly rose again to an alarming height. universal service of the "amalgam." while this unsatisfactory general levy was being made, defeats, defections and invasion in earnest came in rapid succession, and to deal with the almost desperate emergency, the ruthless committee of public safety sprang into existence. "the levy is to be universal. unmarried citizens and widowers without children of ages from 18 to 25 are to be called up first," and 450,000 recruits were immediately obtained by this single act. the complete amalgamation of the regular and volunteer units was decided upon. the white uniforms of the line gave place to the blue of the national guard in all arms and services. the titles of officers were changed, and in fact every relic of the old regime, save the inherited solidity of the old regular battalions, was swept away. this rough combination of line and volunteers therefore--for the "amalgam" was not officially begun until 1794--must be understood when we refer to the french army of hondschoote or of wattignies. it contained, by reason of its universality and also because men were better off in the army than out of it--if they stayed at home they went in daily fear of denunciation and the guillotine--the best elements of the french nation. to some extent at any rate the political _arrivistes_ had been weeded out, and though the informer, here as elsewhere, struck unseen blows, the mass of the army gradually evolved its true leaders and obeyed them. it was, therefore, an army of individual citizen-soldiers of the best type, welded by the enemy's fire, and conscious of its own solidarity in the midst of the revolutionary chaos. after 1794 the system underwent but little radical change until the end of the revolutionary period. its regiments grew in military value month by month and attained their highest level in the great campaign of 1796. in 1795 the french forces (now all styled national guard) consisted of 531,000 men, of whom 323,000 were infantry (100 3-battalion demi-brigades), 97,000 light infantry (30 demi-brigades), 29,000 artillery, 20,000 engineers and 59,000 cavalry. this novel army developed novel fighting methods, above all in the infantry. this arm had just received a new drill-book, as the result of a prolonged controversy (see infantry) between the advocates of "lines" and "columns," and this drill-book, while retaining the principle of the line, set controversy at rest by admitting battalion columns of attack, and movements at the "quick" (100-120 paces to the minute) instead of at the "slow" march (76). on these two prescriptions, ignoring the rest, the practical troop leaders built up the new tactics little by little, and almost unconsciously. the process of evolution cannot be stated exactly, for the officers learned to use and even to invent now one form, now another, according to ground and circumstances. but the main stream of progress is easily distinguishable. tactics. the earlier battles were fought more or less according to the drill-book, partly in line for fire action, partly in column for the bayonet attack. but line movements required the most accurate drill, and what was attainable after years of practice with regulars moving at the slow march was wholly impossible for new levies moving at 120 paces to the minute. when, therefore, the line marched off, it broke up into a shapeless swarm of individual firers. this was the form, if form it can be called, of the tactics of 1793--"horde-tactics," as they have quite justly been called--and a few such experiences as that of hondschoote sufficed to suggest the need of a remedy. this was found in keeping as many troops as possible out of the firing line. from 1794 onwards the latter becomes thinner and thinner, and instead of the drill-book form, with half the army firing in line (practically in hordes) and the other half in support in columns, we find the rear lines becoming more and more important and numerous, till at last the fire of the leading line (skirmishers) becomes insignificant, and the decision rests with the bayonets of the closed masses in rear. indeed, the latter often used mixed line and column formations, which enabled them not only to charge, but to fire close-order volleys--absolutely regardless of the skirmishers in front. in other words, the bravest and coolest marksmen were let loose to do what damage they could, and the rest, massed in close order, were kept under the control of their officers and only exposed to the dissolving influence of the fight when the moment arrived to deliver, whether by fire or by shock, the decisive blow. cavalry. artillery. engineers. the cavalry underwent little change in its organization and tactics, which remained as in the drill-books founded on frederick's practice. but except in the case of the hussars, who were chiefly alsatians, it was thoroughly disorganized by the emigration or execution of the nobles who had officered it, and for long it was incapable of facing the hostile squadrons in the open. still, its elements were good, it was fairly well trained, and mounted, and not overwhelmed with national guard drafts, and like the other arms it duly evolved and obeyed new leaders. in artillery matters this period, 1792-1796, marks an important progress, due above all to gribeauval (q.v.) and the two du teils, jean pierre (1722-1794) and jean (1733-1820) who were napoleon's instructors. the change was chiefly in organization and equipment--the great tactical development of the arm was not to come until the time of the _grande armee_--and may be summarized as the transition from battalion guns and reserve artillery to batteries of "horse and field." the engineers, like the artillery, were a technical and non-noble corps. they escaped, therefore, most of the troubles of the revolution--indeed the artillery and engineer officers, napoleon and carnot amongst them, were conspicuous in the political regeneration of france--and the engineers carried on with little change the traditions of vauban and cormontaingne (see fortification and siegecraft). both these corps were, after the revolution as before it, the best in europe, other armies admitting their superiority and following their precepts. in all this the army naturally outgrew its old "linear" organization. temporary divisions, called for by momentary necessities, placed under selected generals and released from the detailed supervision of the commander-in-chief, soon became, though in an irregular and haphazard fashion, permanent organisms, and by 1796 the divisional system had become practically universal. the next step, as the armies became fewer and larger, was the temporary grouping of divisions; this too in turn became permanent, and bequeathed to the military world of to-day both the army corps and the capable, self-reliant and enterprising subordinate generals, for whom the old linear organization had no room. the starting point of modern warfare. this subdivision of forces was intimately connected with the general method of making war adopted by the "new french," as their enemies called them. what astonished the allies most of all was the number and the velocity of the republicans. these improvised armies had in fact nothing to delay them. tents were unprocurable for want of money, untransportable for want of the enormous number of wagons that would have been required, and also unnecessary, for the discomfort that would have caused wholesale desertion in professional armies was cheerfully borne by the men of 1793-1794. supplies for armies of then unheard-of size could not be carried in convoys, and the french soon became familiar with "living on the country." thus 1793 saw the birth of the modern system of war--rapidity of movement, full development of national strength, bivouacs and requisitions, and force, as against cautious manoeuvring, small professional armies, tents and full rations, and chicane. the first represented the decision-compelling spirit, the second the spirit of risking little to gain a little. above all, the decision-compelling spirit was reinforced by the presence of the emissaries of the committee of public safety, the "representatives on mission" who practically controlled the guillotine. there were civil officials with the armies of the allies too, but their chief function was not to infuse desperate energy into the military operations, but to see that the troops did not maltreat civilians. such were the fundamental principles of the "new french" method of warfare, from which the warfare of to-day descends in the direct line. but it was only after a painful period of trial and error, of waste and misdirection, that it became possible for the french army to have evolved napoleon, and for napoleon to evolve the principles and methods of war that conformed to and profited to the utmost by the new conditions. those campaigns and battles of this army which are described in detail in the present article have been selected, some on account of their historical importance--as producing great results; others from their military interest--as typifying and illustrating the nature of the revolution undergone by the art of war in these heroic years. campaigns in the netherlands the year 1793 opened disastrously for the republic. as a consequence of jemappes and valmy, france had taken the offensive both in belgium, which had been overrun by dumouriez's army, and in the rhine countries, where custine had preached the new gospel to the sentimental and half-discontented hessians and mainzers. but the execution of louis xvi. raised up a host of new and determined enemies. england, holland, austria, prussia, spain and sardinia promptly formed the first coalition. england poured out money in profusion to pay and equip her allies' land armies, and herself began the great struggle for the command of the sea (see _naval operations_, below). neerwinden. in the low countries, while dumouriez was beginning his proposed invasion of holland, prince josias of saxe-coburg, the new austrian commander on the lower rhine, advanced with 42,000 men from the region of cologne, and drove in the various detachments that dumouriez had posted to cover his right. the french general thereupon abandoned his advance into holland, and, with what forces he could gather, turned towards the meuse. the two armies met at neerwinden (q.v.) on the 18th of march 1793. dumouriez had only a few thousand men more than his opponent, instead of the enormous superiority he had had at jemappes. thus the enveloping attack could not be repeated, and in a battle on equal fronts the old generalship and the old armies had the advantage. dumouriez was thoroughly defeated, the house of cards collapsed, and the whole of the french forces retreated in confusion to the strong line of border fortresses, created by louis xiv. and vauban.[1] dumouriez, witnessing the failure of his political schemes, declared against the republic, and after a vain attempt to induce his own army to follow his example, fled (april 5) into the austrian lines. the leaderless republicans streamed back to valenciennes. there, however, they found a general. picot (comte de) dampierre was a regimental officer of the old army, who, in spite of his vanity and extravagance, possessed real loyalty to the new order of things, and brilliant personal courage. at the darkest hour he seized the reins without orders and without reference to seniority, and began to reconstruct the force and the spirit of the shattered army by wise administration and dithyrambic proclamations. moreover, he withdrew it well behind valenciennes out of reach of a second reverse. the region of dunkirk and cassel, the camp of la madeleine near lille, and bouchain were made the rallying points of the various groups, the principal army being at the last-named. but the blow of neerwinden had struck deep, and the army was for long incapable of service, what with the general distrust, the misconduct of the newer battalions, and the discontent of the old white-coated regiments that were left ragged and shoeless to the profit of the "patriot" corps. "beware of giving horses to the 'hussars of liberty,'" wrote carnot, "all these new corps are abominable." assembly of the allies. france was in fact defenceless, and the opportunity existed for the military promenade to paris that the allied statesmen had imagined in 1792. but coburg now ceased to be a purely austrian commander, for one by one allied contingents, with instructions that varied with the political aims of the various governments, began to arrive. moreover, he had his own views as to the political situation, fearing especially to be the cause of the queen's death as brunswick had been of the king's, and negotiated for a settlement. the story of these negotiations should be read in chuquet's _valenciennes_--it gives the key to many mysteries of the campaign and shows that though the revolutionary spirit had already passed all understanding, enlightened men such as coburg and his chief-of-staff mack sympathized with its first efforts and thought the constitution of 1791 a gain to humanity. "if you come to paris you will find 80,000 patriots ready to die," said the french negotiators. "the patriots could not resist the austrian regulars," replied coburg, "but i do not propose to go to paris. i desire to see a stable government, with a chief, king or other, with whom we can treat." soon, however, these personal negotiations were stopped by the emperor, and the idea of restoring order in france became little more than a pretext for a general intrigue amongst the confederate powers, each seeking to aggrandize itself at france's expense. "if you wish to deal with the french," observed dumouriez ironically to coburg, "talk 'constitution.' you may beat them but you cannot subdue them." and their subjugation was becoming less and less possible as the days went on and men talked of the partition of france as a question of the moment like the partition of poland--a pretension that even the emigres resented. coburg's plan of campaign was limited to the objects acceptable to all the allies alike. he aimed at the conquest of a first-class fortress--lille or valenciennes--and chiefly for this reason. war meant to the burgher of germany and the netherlands a special form of _haute politique_ with which it was neither his business nor his inclination to meddle. he had no more compunction, therefore, in selling his worst goods at the best price to the army commissaries than in doing so to his ordinary customers. it followed that, owing to the distance between vienna and valenciennes, and the exorbitant prices charged by carters and horse-owners, a mere concentration of austrian troops at the latter place cost as much as a campaign, and the transport expenses rose to such a figure that coburg's first duty was to find a strong place to serve as a market for the country-side and a depot for the supplies purchased, and to have it as near as possible to the front to save the hire of vehicles. as for the other governments which coburg served as best he could, the object of the war was material concessions, and it would be easy to negotiate for the cession of dunkirk and valenciennes when the british and austrian colours already waved there. the allies, therefore, instead of following up their advantage over the french field army and driving forward on the open paris road, set their faces westward, intending to capture valenciennes, le quesnoy, dunkirk and lille one after the other. dampierre at valenciennes. dampierre meanwhile grew less confident as responsibility settled upon his shoulders. quite unable to believe that coburg would bury himself in a maze of rivers and fortresses when he could scatter the french army to the winds by a direct advance, he was disquieted and puzzled by the austrian investment of conde. this was followed by skirmishes around valenciennes, so unfavourable to the french that their officers felt it would be madness to venture far beyond the support of the fortress guns. but the representatives on mission ordered dampierre, who was reorganizing his army at bouchain, to advance and occupy famars camp, east of valenciennes, and soon afterwards, disregarding his protests, bade him relieve conde at all costs. his skill, though not commensurate with his personal courage and devotion, sufficed to give him the idea of attacking coburg on the right bank of the scheldt while clerfayt, with the corps covering the siege of conde, was on the left, and then to turn against clerfayt--in fact, to operate on interior lines--but it was far from being adequate to the task of beating either with the disheartened forces he commanded. on the 1st of may, while clerfayt was held in check by a very vigorous demonstration, coburg's positions west of quievrain were attacked by dampierre himself. the french won some local successes by force of numbers and surprise, but the allies recovered themselves, thanks chiefly to the address and skill of colonel mack, and drove the republicans in disorder to their entrenchments. dampierre's discouragement now became desperation, and, urged on by the representatives (who, be it said, had exposed their own lives freely enough in the action), he attacked clerfayt on the 8th at raismes. the troops fought far better in the woods and hamlets west of the scheldt than they had done in the plains to the east. but in the heat of the action dampierre, becoming again the brilliant soldier that he had been before responsibility stifled him, risked and lost his life in leading a storming party, and his men retired sullenly, though this time in good order, to valenciennes. two days later the french gave up the open field and retired into valenciennes. dampierre's remains were by a vote of the convention ordered to be deposited in the pantheon. but he was a "ci-devant" noble, the demagogues denounced him as a traitor, and the only honour finally paid to the man who had tided over the weeks of greatest danger was the placing of his bust, in the strange company of those of brutus and marat, in the chamber of deputies. another pause followed, coburg awaiting the british contingent under the duke of york, and the republicans endeavouring to assimilate the reinforcements of conscripts, for the most part "undesirables," who now arrived. mutiny and denunciations augmented the confusion in the french camp. plan of campaign there was none, save a resolution to stay at valenciennes in the hope of finding an opportunity of relieving conde and to create diversions elsewhere by expeditions from dunkirk, lille and sedan. these of course came to nothing, and before they had even started, coburg, resuming the offensive, had stormed the lines of famars (may 24), whereupon the french army retired to bouchain, leaving not only conde[2] but also valenciennes to resist as best they could. the central point of the new positions about bouchain was called caesar's camp. here, surrounded by streams and marshes, the french generals thought that their troops were secure from the rush of the dreaded austrian cavalry, and mack himself shared their opinion. fall of valenciennes. custine now took command of the abjectly dispirited army, the fourth change of command within two months. his first task was to institute a severe discipline, and his prestige was so great that his mere threat of death sentences for offenders produced the desired effect. as to operations, he wished for a concentration of all possible forces from other parts of the frontier towards valenciennes, even if necessary at the cost of sacrificing his own conquest of mainz. but after he had induced the government to assent to this, the generals of the numerous other armies refused to give up their troops, and on the 17th of june the idea was abandoned in view of the growing seriousness of the vendean insurrection (see vendee). custine, therefore, could do no more than continue the work of reorganization. military operations were few. coburg, who had all this time succeeded in remaining concentrated, now found himself compelled to extend leftwards towards flanders,[3] for custine had infused some energy into the scattered groups of the republicans in the region of douai, lille and dunkirk--and during this respite the paris jacobins sent to the guillotine both custine and his successor la marliere before july was ended. both were "ci-devant" nobles and, so far as is ascertainable, neither was guilty of anything worse than attempts to make his orders respected by, and himself popular with, the soldiers. by this time, owing to the innumerable denunciations and arrests, the confusion in the army of the north was at its height, and no further attempt was made either to relieve valenciennes and conde, or to press forward from lille and dunkirk. conde, starved out as coburg desired, capitulated on the 10th of june, and the austrians, who had done their work as soldiers, but were filled with pity for their suffering and distracted enemies, marched in with food for the women and children. valenciennes, under the energetic general ferrand, held out bravely until the fire of the allies became intolerable, and then the civil population began to plot treachery, and to wear the bourbon cockade in the open street. ferrand and the representatives with him found themselves obliged to surrender to the duke of york, who commanded the siege corps, on the 28th of july, after rejecting the first draft of a capitulation sent in by the duke and threatening to continue the defence to the bitter end. impossible as this was known to be--for valenciennes seemed to have become a royalist town--ferrand's soldierly bearing carried the day, and honourable terms were arranged. the duke even offered to assist the garrison in repressing disorder. shortly after this the wreck of the field army was forced to evacuate caesar's camp after an unimportant action (aug. 7-8) and retired on arras. by this they gave up the direct defence of the paris road, but placed themselves in a "flank position" relatively to it, and secured to themselves the resources and reinforcements available in the region of dunkirk-lille. bouchain and cambrai, landrecies and le quesnoy, were left to their own garrisons. with this ended the second episode of the amazing campaign of 1793. military operations were few and spasmodic, on the one side because the allied statesmen were less concerned with the nebulous common object of restoring order in france than with their several schemes of aggrandisement, on the other owing to the almost incredible confusion of france under the regime of danton and marat. the third episode shows little or no change in the force and direction of the allied efforts, but a very great change in france. thoroughly roused by disaster and now dominated by the furious and bloodthirsty energy of the terrorists, the french people and armies at last set before themselves clear and definite objects to be pursued at all costs. houchard. jean nicolas houchard, the next officer appointed to command, had been a heavy cavalry trooper in the seven years' war. his face bore the scars of wounds received at minden, and his bravery, his stature, his bold and fierce manner, his want of education, seemed to all to betoken the ideal sans-culotte general. but he was nevertheless incapable of leading an army, and knowing this, carefully conformed to the advice of his staff officers berthelmy and gay-vernon, the latter of whom, an exceptionally capable officer, had been custine's chief of staff and was consequently under suspicion. at one moment, indeed, operations had to be suspended altogether because his papers were seized by the civil authorities, and amongst them were all the confidential memoranda and maps required for the business of headquarters. it was the darkest hour. the vendeans, the people of lyons, marseilles and toulon, were in open and hitherto successful revolt. valenciennes had fallen and coburg's hussar parties pressed forward into the somme valley. again the allies had the decision of the war in their own hands. coburg, indeed, was still afraid, on marie antoinette's account, of forcing the republicans to extremities, and on military grounds too he thought an advance on paris hazardous. but, hazardous or not, it would have been attempted but for the english. the duke of york had definite orders from his government to capture dunkirk--at present a nest of corsairs which interfered with the channel trade, and in the future, it was hoped, a second gibraltar--and after the fall of valenciennes and the capture of caesar's camp the english and hanoverians marched away, via tournai and ypres, to besiege the coast fortress. thereupon the king of prussia in turn called off his contingent for operations on the middle rhine. holland, too, though she maintained her contingent in face of lille (where it covered flanders), was not disposed to send it to join the imperialists in an adventure in the heart of france. coburg, therefore, was brought to a complete standstill, and the scene of the decision was shifted to the district between lille and the coast. dunkirk. thither came carnot, the engineer officer who was in charge of military affairs in the committee of public safety and is known to history as the "organizer of victory." his views of the strategy to be pursued indicate either a purely geographical idea of war, which does not square with his later principles and practice, or, as is far more likely, a profound disbelief in the capacity of the army of the north, as it then stood, to fight a battle, and they went no further than to recommend an inroad into flanders on the ground that no enemy would be encountered there. this, however, in the event developed into an operation of almost decisive importance, for at the moment of its inception the duke of york was already on the march. fighting _en route_ a very severe but successful action (lincelles, aug. 18) with the french troops encamped near lille, the anglo-hanoverians entered the district--densely intersected with canals and morasses--around dunkirk and bergues on the 21st and 22nd. on the right, by way of furnes, the british moved towards dunkirk and invested the east front of the weak fortress, while on the left the hanoverian field marshal v. freytag moved via poperinghe on bergues. the french had a chain of outposts between furnes and bergues, but freytag attacked them resolutely, and the defenders, except a brave handful who stood to cross bayonets, fled in all directions. the east front of bergues was invested on the 23rd, and freytag spread out his forces to cover the duke of york's attack on dunkirk, his right being opposite bergues and his centre at bambeke, while his left covered the space between roosbrugge and ypres with a cordon of posts. houchard was in despair at the bad conduct of his troops. but one young general, jourdan, anticipating houchard's orders, had already brought a strong force from lille to cassel, whence he incessantly harried freytag's posts. carnot encouraged the garrisons of dunkirk and bergues, and caused the sluices to be opened. the _moral_ of the defenders rose rapidly. houchard prepared to bring up every available man of the army of the north, and only waited to make up his mind as to the direction in which his attack should be made. the allies themselves recognized the extreme danger of their position. it was cut in half by the great morass, stretches of which extended even to furnes. neither dunkirk nor bergues could be completely invested owing to the inundations, and freytag sent a message to king george iii. to the effect that if dunkirk did not surrender in a few days the expedition would be a complete failure. as for the french, they could hardly believe their good fortune. generals, staff officers and representatives on mission alike were eager for a swift and crushing offensive. "'attack' and 'attack in mass' became the shibboleth and the catch-phrase of the camps" (chuquet), and fortresses and armies on other parts of the frontier were imperiously called upon to supply large drafts for the army of the north. gay-vernon's strategical instinct found expression in a wide-ranging movement designed to secure the absolute annihilation of the duke of york's forces. beginning with an attack on the dutch posts north and east of lille, the army was then to press forward towards furnes, the left wing holding freytag's left wing in check, and the right swinging inwards and across the line of retreat of both allied corps. at that moment all men were daring, and the scheme was adopted with enthusiasm. on the 28th of august, consequently, the dutch posts were attacked and driven away by the mobile forces at lille, aided by parts of the main army from arras. but even before they had fired their last shot the republicans dispersed to plunder and compromised their success. houchard and gay-vernon began to fear that their army would not emerge successfully from the supreme test they were about to impose on it, and from this moment the scheme of destroying the english began to give way to the simpler and safer idea of relieving dunkirk. the place was so ill-equipped that after a few days' siege it was _in extremis_, and the political importance of its preservation led not merely the civilian representatives, but even carnot, to implore houchard to put an end to the crisis at once. on the 30th, cassel, instead of ypres, was designated as the point of concentration for the "mass of attack." this surprised the representatives and carnot as much as it surprised the subordinate generals, all of whom thought that there would still be time to make the detour through ypres and to cut off the allies' retreat before dunkirk fell. but houchard and gay-vernon were no longer under any illusions as to the manoeuvring power of their forces, and the government agents wisely left them to execute their own plans. thirty-seven thousand men were left to watch coburg and to secure arras and douai, and the rest, 50,000 strong, assembled at cassel. everything was in houchard's favour could he but overcome the indiscipline of his own army. the duke of york was more dangerous in appearance than in reality--as the result must infallibly have shown had houchard and gay-vernon possessed the courage to execute the original plan--and freytag's covering army extended in a line of disconnected posts from bergues to ypres. hondschoote. against the left and centre of this feeble cordon 40,000 men advanced in many columns on the 6th of september. a confused outpost fight, in which the various assailing columns dissolved into excited swarms, ended, long after nightfall, in the orderly withdrawal of the various allied posts to hondschoote. the french generals were occupied the whole of next day in sorting out their troops, who had not only completely wasted their strength against mere outposts, but had actually consumed their rations and used up their ammunition. on the 8th, the assailants, having more or less recovered themselves, advanced again. they found wallmoden (who had succeeded freytag, disabled on the 6th) entrenched on either side of the village of hondschoote, the right resting on the great morass and the left on the village of leysele. here was the opportunity for the "attack in mass" that had been so freely discussed; but houchard was now concerned more with the relief of dunkirk than with the defeat of the enemy. he sent away one division to dunkirk, another to bergues, and a third towards ypres, and left himself only some 20,000 men for the battle. but wallmoden had only 13,000--so great was the disproportion between end and means in this ill-designed enterprise against dunkirk. [illustration: map of hondschoote. redrawn from a map in fortescue's _history of the british army_, by permission of macmillan & co., ltd.] houchard despatched a column, guided by his staff officer berthelmy, to turn the hanoverians' left, but this column lost its way in the dense country about loo. the centre waited motionless under the fire of the allied guns near hondschoote. in vain the representative delbrel implored the general to order the advance. houchard was obstinate, and ere long the natural result followed. though delbrel posted himself in front of the line, conspicuous by his white horse and tricoloured sash and plume, to steady the men, the bravest left the ranks and skirmished forward from bush to bush, and the rest sought cover. then the allied commander ordered forward one regiment of hessians, and these, advancing at a ceremonial slow march, and firing steady rolling volleys, scattered the republicans before them. at this crisis houchard uttered the fatal word "retreat," but delbrel overwhelmed him with reproaches and stung him into renewed activity. he hurried away to urge forward the right wing while jourdan rallied the centre and led it into the fight again. once more jourdan awaited in vain the order to advance, and once more the troops broke. but at last the exasperated delbrel rose to the occasion. "you fear the responsibility," he cried to jourdan; "well, i assume it. my authority overrides the general's and i give you the formal order to attack at once!" then, gently, as if to soften a rebuke, he continued, "you have forced me to speak as a superior; now i will be your aide-de-camp," and at once hurried off to bring up the reserves and to despatch cavalry to collect the fugitives. this incident, amongst many, serves to show that the representatives on mission were no mere savage marplots, as is too generally assumed. they were often wise and able men, brave and fearless of responsibility in camp and in action. jourdan led on the reserves, and the men fighting in the bushes on either side of the road heard their drums to right and left. jourdan fell wounded, but delbrel headed a wild irregular bayonet charge which checked the hanoverians, and houchard himself, in his true place as a cavalry leader, came up with 500 fresh sabres and flung himself on the allies. the hanoverians, magnificently disciplined troops that they were, soon re-formed after the shock, but by this time the fugitives collected by delbrel's troopers, reanimated by new hopes of victory, were returning to the front in hundreds, and a last assault on hondschoote met with complete success. hondschoote was a psychological victory. materially, it was no more than the crushing of an obstinate rearguard at enormous expense to the assailants, for the duke of york was able to withdraw while there was still time. houchard had indeed called back the division he had sent to bergues, and despatched it by loo against the enemy's rear, but the movement was undertaken too late in the day to be useful. the struggle was practically a front to front battle, numbers and enthusiasm on the one side, discipline, position and steadiness on the other. hence, though its strategical result was merely to compel the duke of york to give up an enterprise that he should never have undertaken, hondschoote established the fact that the "new french" were determined to win, at any cost and by sheer weight and energy. it was long before they were able to meet equal numbers with confidence, and still longer before they could freely oppose a small corps to a larger one. but the nightmare of defeats and surrenders was dispelled. the influence of houchard on the course of the operations had been sometimes null, sometimes detrimental, and only occasionally good. the plan and its execution were the work of berthelmy and gay-vernon, the victory itself was jourdan's and, above all, delbrel's. to these errors, forgiven to a victor, houchard added the crowning offence of failure, in the reaction after the battle, to pursue his advantage. his enemies in paris became more and more powerful as the campaign continued. menin. having missed the great opportunity of crushing the english, houchard turned his attention to the dutch posts about menin. as far as the allies were concerned hondschoote was a mere reverse, not a disaster, and was counterbalanced in coburg's eyes by his own capture of le quesnoy (sept. 11). the proximity of the main body of the french to menin induced him to order beaulieu's corps (hitherto at cysoing and linking the dutch posts with the central group) to join the prince of orange there, and to ask the duke of york to do the same. but this last meant negotiation, and before anything was settled houchard, with the army from hondschoote and a contingent from lille, had attacked the prince at menin and destroyed his corps (sept. 12-13). after this engagement, which, though it was won by immensely superior forces, was if not an important at any rate a complete victory, houchard went still farther inland--leaving detachments to observe york and replacing them by troops from the various camps as he passed along the cordon--in the hope of dealing with beaulieu as he had dealt with the dutch, and even of relieving le quesnoy. but in all this he failed. he had expected to meet beaulieu near cysoing, but the austrian general had long before gone northward to assist the prince of orange. thus houchard missed his target. worse still, one of his protective detachments chanced to meet beaulieu near courtrai on the 15th, and was not only defeated but driven in rout from menin. lastly, coburg had already captured le quesnoy, and had also repulsed a straggling attack of the landrecies, bouchain and other french garrisons on the positions of his covering army (12th).[4] houchard's offensive died away completely, and he halted his army (45,000 strong excluding detachments) at gaverelle, half-way between douai and arras, hoping thereby to succour bouchain, cambrai or arras, whichever should prove to be coburg's next objective. after standing still for several days, a prey to all the conflicting rumours that reached his ears, he came to the conclusion that coburg was about to join the duke of york in a second siege of dunkirk, and began to close on his left. but his conclusion was entirely wrong. the allies were closing on _their_ left inland to attack maubeuge. coburg drew in beaulieu, and even persuaded the dutch to assist, the duke of york undertaking for the moment to watch the whole of the flanders cordon from the sea to tournai. but this concentration of force was merely nominal, for each contingent worked in the interests of its own masters, and, above all, the siege that was the object of the concentration was calculated to last four weeks, i.e. gave the french four weeks unimpeded liberty of action. houchard was now denounced and brought captive to paris. placed upon his trial, he offered a calm and reasoned defence of his conduct, but when the intolerable word "coward" was hurled at him by one of his judges he wept with rage, pointing to the scars of his many wounds, and then, his spirit broken, sank into a lethargic indifference, in which he remained to the end. he was guillotined on the 16th of november 1793. after houchard's arrest, jourdan accepted the command, though with many misgivings, for the higher ranks were filled by officers with even less experience than he had himself, equipment and clothing was wanting, and, perhaps more important still, the new levies, instead of filling up the depleted ranks of the line, were assembled in undisciplined and half-armed hordes at various frontier camps, under elected officers who had for the most part never undergone the least training. the field states showed a total of 104,000 men, of whom less than a third formed the operative army. but an enthusiasm equal to that of hondschoote, and similarly demanding a plain, urgent and recognizable objective, animated it, and although jourdan and carnot (who was with him at gaverelle, where the army had now reassembled) began to study the general strategic situation, the committee brought them back to realities by ordering them to relieve maubeuge at all costs. wattignies. the allies disposed in all of 66,000 men around the threatened fortress, but 26,000 of these were actually employed in the siege, and the remainder, forming the covering army, extended in an enormous semicircle of posts facing west, south and east. thus the republicans, as before, had two men to one at the point of contact (44,000 against 21,000), but so formidable was the discipline and steadiness of manoeuvre of the old armies that the chances were considered as no more than "rather in favour" of the french. not that these chances were seriously weighed before engaging. the generals might squander their energies in the council chamber on plans of sieges and expeditions, but in the field they were glad enough to seize the opportunity of a battle which they were not skilful enough to compel. it took place on the 15th and 16th of october, and though the allied right and centre held their ground, on their left the plateau of wattignies (q.v.), from which the battle derives its name, was stormed on the second day, carnot, jourdan and the representatives leading the columns in person. coburg indeed retired in unbroken order, added to which the maubeuge garrison had failed to co-operate with their rescuers by a sortie,[5] and the duke of york had hurried up with all the men he could spare from the flanders cordon. but the dutch generals refused to advance beyond the sambre, and coburg broke up the siege of maubeuge and retired whence he had come, while jourdan, so far from pressing forward, was anxiously awaiting a counter-attack, and entrenching himself with all possible energy. so ended the episode of wattignies, which, alike in its general outline and in its details, gives a perfect picture of the character, at once intense and spasmodic, of the "new french" warfare in the days of the terror. to complete the story of '93 it remains to sketch, very briefly, the principal events on the eastern and southern frontiers of france. these present, in the main, no special features, and all that it is necessary to retain of them is the fact of their existence. what this multiplication of their tasks meant to the committee of public safety and to carnot in particular it is impossible to realize. it was not merely on the sambre and the scheldt, nor against one army of heterogeneous allies that the republic had to fight for life, but against prussians and hessians on the rhine, sardinians in the alps, spaniards in the pyrenees, and also (one might say, indeed, above all) against frenchmen in vendee, lyons, marseilles and toulon. on the rhine, the advance of a prussian-hessian army, 63,000 strong, rapidly drove back custine from the main into the valleys of the saar and the lauter. an austrian corps under wurmser soon afterwards invaded alsace. here, as on the northern frontier, there was a long period of trial and error, of denunciations and indiscipline, and of wholly trivial fighting, before the republicans recovered themselves. but in the end the ragged enthusiasts found their true leader in lazare hoche, and, though defeated by brunswick at pirmasens and kaiserslautern, they managed to develop almost their full strength against wurmser in alsace. on the 26th of december the latter, who had already undergone a series of partial reverses, was driven by main force from the lines of weissenburg, after which hoche advanced into the palatinate and delivered landau, and pichegru moved on to recapture mainz, which had surrendered in july. on the spanish frontier both sides indulged in a fruitless war of posts in broken ground. the italian campaign of 1793, equally unprofitable, will be referred to below. far more serious than either was the insurrection of vendee (q.v.) and the counter-revolution in the south of france, the principal incidents of which were the terrible sieges of lyons and toulon. campaign of 1794. for 1794 carnot planned a general advance of all the northern armies, that of the north (pichegru) from dunkirk-cassel by ypres and oudenarde on brussels, the minor army of the ardennes to charleroi, and the army of the moselle (jourdan) to liege, while between charleroi and lille demonstrations were to be made against the hostile centre. he counted upon little as regards the two armies near the meuse, but hoped to force on a decisive battle by the advance of the left wing towards ypres. coburg, on the other side, intended, if not forced to develop his strength on the ypres side, to make his main effort against the french centre about landrecies. this produced the siege of landrecies, which need not concern us, a forward movement of the french to menin and courtrai which resulted in the battles of tourcoing and tournai, and the campaign of fleurus, which, almost fortuitously, produced the long-sought decision. the first crisis was brought about by the advance of the left wing of the army of the north, under souham, to menin-courtrai. this advance placed souham in the midst of the enemy's right wing, and at last stimulated the allies into adopting the plan that mack had advocated, in season and out of season, since before neerwinden--that of _annihilating the enemy's army_. this vigorous purpose, and the leading part in its execution played by the duke of york and the british contingent, give these operations, to englishmen at any rate, a living interest which is entirely lacking in, say, the sieges of le quesnoy and landrecies. on the other side, the "new french" armies and their leaders, without losing the energy of 1793, had emerged from confusion and inexperience, and the powers of the new army and the new system had begun to mature. thus it was a fair trial of strength between the old way and the new. in the second week of may the left wing of the army of the north--the centre was towards landrecies, and the right, fused in the army of the ardennes, towards charleroi--found itself interposed at menin-courtrai-lille between two hostile masses, the main body of the allied right wing about tournai and a secondary corps at thielt. common-sense, therefore, dictated a converging attack for the allies and a series of rapid radial blows for the french. in the allied camp common-sense had first to prevail over routine, and the emperor's first orders were for a raid of the thielt corps towards ypres, which his advisers hoped would of itself cause the french to decamp. but the duke of york formed a very different plan, and feldzeugmeister clerfayt, in command at thielt, agreed to co-operate. their proposal was to surround the french on the lys with their two corps, and by the 15th the emperor had decided to use larger forces with the same object. [illustration: sketch of french positions about courtrai, tourcoing & lille may 16th., 1794] mack's "annihilation plan." on that day coburg himself, with 6000 men under feldzeugmeister kinsky from the central (landrecies) group, entered tournai and took up the general command, while another reinforcement under the archduke charles marched towards orchies. orders were promptly issued for a general offensive. clerfayt's corps was to be between rousselaer and menin on the 16th, and the next day to force its way across the lys at werwick and connect with the main army. the main army was to advance in four columns. the first three, under the duke of york, were to move off, at daylight on the 17th, by dottignies, leers and lannoy respectively to the line mouscron-tourcoing-mouveaux. the fourth and fifth under kinsky and the archduke charles were to defeat the french corps on the upper marque, and then, leaving lille on their left and guaranteeing themselves by a cordon system against being cut off from tournai (either by the troops just defeated or by the lille garrison), to march rapidly forward towards werwick, getting touch on their right with the duke of york and on their left with clerfayt, and thus completing the investing circle around souham's and moreau's isolated divisions. speed was enjoined on all. picked volunteers to clear away the enemy's skirmishers, and pioneers to make good difficult places on the roads, were to precede the heads of the columns. then came at the head of the main body the artillery with an infantry escort. all this might have been designed by the japanese for the attack of some well-defined russian position in the war of 1904. outpost and skirmisher resistance was to be overpowered the instant it was offered, and the attack on the closed bodies of the enemy was to be initiated by a heavy artillery fire at the earliest possible moment. but in 1904 the russians stood still, which was the last thing that the revolutionary armies of 1794 would or could do. mack's well-considered and carefully balanced combinations failed, and doubtless helped to create the legend of his incapacity, which finds no support either in the opinion of coburg, the representative of the old school, or in that of scharnhorst, the founder of the new. souham, who commanded in the temporary absence of pichegru, had formed his own plan. finding himself with the major part of his forces between york and clerfayt, he had decided to impose upon the former by means of a covering detachment, and to fall upon clerfayt near rousselaer with the bulk of his forces. this plan, based as it was on a sound calculation of time, space, strength and endurance, merits close consideration, for it contains more than a trace of the essential principles of modern strategy, yet with one vital difference, that whereas, in the present case, the factor of the enemy's independent will wrecked the scheme, napoleon would have guaranteed to himself, before and during its development, the power of executing it in spite of the enemy. the appearance of fresh allied troops (kinsky) on his right front at once modified these general arrangements. divining coburg's intentions from the arrival of the enemy near pont-a-marque and at lannoy, he ordered bonnaud (lille group, 27,000) to leave enough troops on the upper marque to amuse the enemy's leftmost columns, and with every man he had left beyond this absolute minimum to attack the left flank of the columns moving towards tourcoing, which his weak centre (12,000 men at tourcoing, mouscron and roubaix) was to stop by frontal defence. no role was as yet assigned to the principal mass (50,000 under moreau) about courtrai. vandamme's brigade was to extend along the lys from menin to werwick and beyond, to deny as long as possible the passage to clerfayt. this second plan failed like the first, because the enemy's counter-will was not controlled. all along the line coburg's advance compelled the french to fight as they were without any redistribution. but the french were sufficiently elastic to adapt themselves readily to unforeseen conditions, and on coburg's side too the unexpected happened. when clerfayt appeared on the lys above menin, he found werwick held. this was an accident, for the battalion there was on its way to menin, and vandamme, who had not yet received his new orders, was still far away. but the battalion fought boldly, clerfayt sent for his pontoons, and ere they arrived vandamme's leading troops managed to come up on the other side. thus it was not till 1 a.m. on the 18th that the first austrian battalions passed the lys. on the front of the main allied group the "annihilation plan" was crippled at the outset by the tardiness of the archduke's (fifth or left) column. on this the smooth working of the whole scheme depended, for coburg considered that he must _defeat_ bonnaud before carrying out his intended envelopment of the menin-courtrai group (the idea of "binding" the enemy by a detachment while the main scheme proceeded had not yet arisen). the allied general, indeed, on discovering the backwardness of the archduke, went so far as to order all the other columns to begin by swerving southward against bonnaud, but these were already too deeply committed to the original plan to execute any new variation. the rightmost column (hanoverians) under von dem bussche moved on mouscron, overpowering the fragmentary, if energetic, resistance of the french advanced posts. next on the left, lieutenant field marshal otto moved by leers and watrelos, driving away a french post at lis (near lannoy) on his left flank, and entered tourcoing. but meantime a french brigade had driven von dem bussche away from mouscron, so that otto felt compelled to keep troops at leers and watrelos to protect his rear, which seriously weakened his hold on tourcoing. the third column, led by the duke of york, advanced from templeuve on lannoy, at the same time securing its left by expelling the french from willems. lannoy was stormed by the british guards under sir r. abercromby with such vigour that the cavalry which had been sent round the village to cut off the french retreat had no time to get into position. beyond lannoy, the french resistance, still disjointed, became more obstinate as the ground favoured it more, and the duke called up the austrians from willems to turn the right of the french position at roubaix by way of a small valley. once again, however, the guards dislodged the enemy before the turning movement had taken effect. a third french position now appeared, at mouvaux, and this seemed so formidable that the duke halted to rest his now weary men. the emperor himself, however, ordered the advance to be resumed, and mouvaux too was carried by abercromby. it was now nightfall, and the duke having attained his objective point prepared to hold it against a counter attack. kinsky meanwhile with the fourth column had made feints opposite pont-a-tressin, and had forced the passage of the marque near bouvines with his main body. but bonnaud gave ground so slowly that up to 4 p.m. kinsky had only progressed a few hundred paces from his crossing point. the fifth column, which was behind time on the 16th, did not arrive at orchies till dawn on the 17th, and had to halt there for rest and food. thence, moving across country in fighting formation, the archduke made his way to pont-a-marque. but he was unable to do more, before calling a halt, than deploy his troops on the other side of the stream. so closed the first day's operations. the "annihilation plan" had already undergone a serious check. the archduke and kinsky, instead of being ready for the second part of their task, had scarcely completed the first, and the same could be said of clerfayt, while von dem bussche had definitively failed. only the duke of york and otto had done their share in the centre, and they now stood at tourcoing and mouvaux isolated in the midst of the enemy's main body, with no hope of support from the other columns and no more than a chance of meeting clerfayt. coburg's entire force was, without deducting losses, no more than 53,000 for a front of 18 m., and only half of the enemy's available 80,000 men had as yet been engaged. mack sent a staff officer, at 1 a.m., to implore the archduke to come up to lannoy at once, but the young prince was asleep and his suite refused to wake him. matters did not, of course, present themselves in this light at souham's headquarters, where the generals met in an informal council. the project of flinging bonnaud's corps against the flank of the duke of york had not received even a beginning of execution, and the outposts, reinforced though they were from the main group, had everywhere been driven in. all the subordinate leaders, moreover (except bonnaud), sent in the most despondent reports. "councils of war never fight" is an old maxim, justified in ninety-nine cases in a hundred. but this council determined to do so, and with all possible vigour. the scheme was practically that which coburg's first threat had produced and his first brusque advance had inhibited. vandamme was to hold clerfayt, the garrison of lille and a few outlying corps to occupy the archduke and kinsky, and in the centre moreau and bonnaud, with 40,000 effectives, were to attack the tourcoing-mouvaux position in front and flank at dawn with all possible energy. battle of tourcoing. the first shots were fired on the lys, where, it will be remembered, clerfayt's infantry had effected its crossing in the night. vandamme, who was to defend the river, had in the evening assembled his troops (fatigued by a long march) near menin instead of pushing on at once. thus only one of his battalions had taken part in the defence of werwick on the 17th, and the remainder were by this chance massed on the flank of clerfayt's subsequent line of advance. vandamme used his advantage well. he attacked, with perhaps 12,000 men against 21,000, the head and the middle of clerfayt's columns as they moved on lincelles. clerfayt stopped at once, turned upon him and drove him towards roncq and menin. still, fighting in succession, rallying and fighting again, vandamme's regiments managed to spin out time and to commit clerfayt deeper and deeper to a false direction till it was too late in the day to influence the battle elsewhere. v. dem bussche's column at dottignies, shaken by the blow it had received the day before, did nothing, and actually retreated to the scheldt. on the other flank, kinsky and the archduke charles practically remained inactive despite repeated orders to proceed to lannoy, kinsky waiting for the archduke, and the latter using up his time and forces in elaborating a protective cordon all around his left and rear. both alleged that "the troops were tired," but there was a stronger motive. it was felt that belgium was about to be handed over to france as the price of peace, and the generals did not see the force of wasting soldiers on a lost cause. there remained the two centre columns, otto's and the duke of york's. the orders of the emperor to the duke were that he should advance to establish communication with clerfayt at lincelles. having thus cut off the french courtrai group, he was to initiate a general advance to crush it, in which all the allied columns would take part, clerfayt, york and otto in front, von dem bussche on the right flank and the archduke and kinsky in support. these airy schemes were destroyed at dawn on the 18th. macdonald's brigade carried tourcoing at the first rush, though otto's guns and the volleys of the infantry checked its further progress. malbrancq's brigade swarmed around the duke of york's entrenchments at mouvaux, while bonnaud's mass from the side of lille passed the marque and lapped round the flanks of the british posts at roubaix and lannoy. the duke had used up his reserves in assisting otto, and by 8 a.m. the positions of roubaix, lannoy and mouvaux were isolated from each other. but the allies fought magnificently, and by now the republicans were in confusion, excited to the highest pitch and therefore extremely sensitive to waves of enthusiasm or panic; and at this moment clerfayt was nearing success, and vandamme fighting almost back to back with malbrancq. otto was able to retire gradually, though with heavy losses, to leers, before macdonald's left column was able to storm watrelos, or daendels' brigade, still farther towards the scheldt, could reach his rear. the resistance of the austrians gave breathing space to the english, who held on to their positions till about 11.30, attacked again and again by bonnaud, and then, not without confusion, retired to join otto at leers. with the retreat of the two sorely tried columns and the suspension of clerfayt's attack between lincelles and roncq, the battle of tourcoing ended. it was a victory of which the young french generals had reason to be proud. the main attack was vigorously conducted, and the two-to-one numerical superiority which the french possessed at the decisive point is the best testimony at once to souham's generalship and to vandamme's bravery. as for the allies, those of them who took part in the battle at all, generals and soldiers, covered themselves with glory, but the inaction of two-thirds of coburg's army was the bankruptcy declaration of the old strategical system. the allies lost, on this day, about 4000 killed and wounded and 1500 prisoners besides 60 guns. the french loss, which was probably heavier, is not known. the duke of york defeated, souham at once turned his attention to clerfayt, against whom he directed all the forces he could gather after a day's "horde-tactics." the austrian commander, however, withdrew over the river unharmed. on the 19th he was at rousselaer and ingelminster, 9 or 10 m. north of courtrai, while coburg's forces assembled and encamped in a strong position some 3 m. west and north-west of tournai, the hanoverians remaining out in advance of the right on the espierre. souham's victory, thanks to his geographical position, had merely given him air. the allies, except for the loss of some 5500 men, were in no way worse off. the plan had failed, but the army as a whole had not been defeated, while the troops of the duke of york and otto were far too well disciplined not to take their defeat as "all in the day's work." souham was still on the lys and midway between the two allied masses, able to strike each in turn or liable to be crushed between them in proportion as the opposing generals calculated time, space and endurance accurately. souham, therefore, as early as the 19th, had decided that until clerfayt had been pushed back to his old positions near thielt he could not deal with the main body of the allies on the side of tournai, and he had left bonnaud to hold the latter while he concentrated most of his forces towards courtrai. this move had the desired effect, for clerfayt retired without a contest, and on the 21st of may souham issued his orders for an advance on coburg's army, which, as he knew, had meantime been reinforced. vandamme alone was left to face clerfayt, and this time with outposts far out, at ingelminster and roosebeke, so as to ensure his chief, not a few hours', but two or three days' freedom from interference. battle of tournai. pichegru now returned and took up the supreme command, souham remaining in charge of his own and moreau's divisions. on the extreme right, from pont-a-tressin, only demonstrations were to be made; the centre, between baisieux and estaimbourg, was to be the scene of the holding attack of bonnaud's command, while souham, in considerably greater density, delivered the decisive attack on the allied right by st leger and warcoing. at helchin a brigade was to guard the outer flank of the assailants against a movement by the hanoverians and to keep open communication with courtrai in case of attack from the direction of oudenarde. the details of the allied position were insufficiently known owing to the multiplicity of their advanced posts and the intricate and densely cultivated nature of the ground. the battle of tournai opened in the early morning of the 22nd and was long and desperately contested. the demonstration on the french extreme right was soon recognized by the defenders to be negligible, and the allied left wing thereupon closed on the centre. there bonnaud attacked with vigour, forcing back the various advanced posts, especially on the left, where he dislodged the allies from nechin. the defenders of templeuve then fell back, and the attacking swarms--a dissolved line of battle--fringed the brook beyond templeuve, on the other side of which was the allies' main position, and even for a moment seized blandain. meanwhile the french at nechin, in concert with the main attack, pressed on towards ramegnies. macdonald's and other brigades had forced the espierre rivulet and driven von dem bussche's hanoverians partly over the scheldt (they had a pontoon bridge), partly southward. the main front of the allies was defined by the brook that flows between templeuve and blandain, then between ramegnies and pont-a-chin and empties into the scheldt near the last-named hamlet. on this front till close on nightfall a fierce battle raged. pichegru's main attack was still by his left, and pont-a-chin was taken and retaken by french, austrians, british and hanoverians in turn. between blandain and pont-a-chin bonnaud's troops more than once entered the line of defence. but the attack was definitively broken off at nightfall and the republicans withdrew slowly towards lannoy and leers. they had for the first time in a fiercely contested "soldier's battle" measured their strength, regiment for regiment, against the allies, and failed, but by so narrow a margin that henceforward the army of the north realized its own strength and solidity. the army of the revolution, already superior in numbers and imbued with the decision-compelling spirit, had at last achieved self-confidence. but the actual decision was destined by a curious process of evolution to be given by jourdan's far-distant army of the moselle, to which we now turn. the army of the moselle had been ordered to assemble a striking force on its left wing, without prejudicing the rest of its cordon in lorraine, and with this striking force to operate towards liege and namur. its first movement on arlon, in april, was repulsed by a small austrian corps under beaulieu that guarded this region. but in the beginning of may the advance was resumed though the troops were ill-equipped and ill-fed, and requisitions had reduced the civil population to semi-starvation and sullen hostility. we quote jourdan's instructions to his advanced guard, not merely as evidence of the trivial purpose of the march as originally planned, but still more as an illustration of the driving power that made the troops march at all, and of the new method of marching and subsisting them. jourdan's movement on liege. its commander was "to keep in mind the purpose of cutting the communications between luxemburg and namur, and was therefore to throw out strong bodies against the enemy daily and at different points, to parry the enemy's movements by rapid marches, to prevent any transfer of troops to belgium, and lastly to seek an occasion for giving battle, for cutting off his convoys and for seizing his magazines." so much for the purpose. the method of achieving it is defined as follows. "general hatry, in order to attain the object of these instructions, will have with him the minimum of wagons. he is to live at the expense of the enemy as much as possible, and to send back into the interior of the republic whatever may be useful to it; he will maintain his communications with longwy, report every movement to me, and when necessary to the committee of public safety and to the minister of war, maintain order and discipline, and firmly oppose every sort of pillage." how the last of these instructions was to be reconciled with the rest, hatry was not informed. in fact, it was ignored. "i am far from believing," wrote the representative on mission gillet, "that we ought to adopt the principles of philanthropy with which we began the war." at the moment when, on these terms, jourdan's advance was resumed, the general situation east of the scheldt was as follows: the allies' centre under coburg had captured landrecies, and now (may 4) lay around that place, about 65,000 strong, while the left under kaunitz (27,000) was somewhat north of maubeuge, with detachments south of the sambre as far as the meuse. beyond these again were the detachment of beaulieu (8000) near arlon, and another, 9000 strong, around trier. on the side of the french, the army of the moselle (41,000 effectives) was in cordon between saargemund and longwy; the army of the ardennes (22,000) between beaumont and givet; of the army of the north, the right wing (38,000) in the area beaumont--maubeuge and the centre (24,000) about guise. in the aggregate the allied field armies numbered 139,000 men, those of the french 203,000. tactically the disproportion was sufficient to give the latter the victory, if, strategically, it could be made effective at a given time and place. but the french had mobility as a remedy for over-extension, and though their close massing on the extreme flanks left no more than equal forces opposite coburg in the centre, the latter felt unable either to go forward or to close to one flank when on his right the storm was brewing at menin and tournai, and on his left kaunitz reported the gathering of important masses of the french around beaumont. thus the initiative passed over to the french, but they missed their opportunity, as coburg had missed his in 1793. pichegru's right was ordered to march on mons, and his left to master the navigation of the scheldt so as to reduce the allies to wagon-drawn supplies--the latter an objective dear to the 18th-century general; while jourdan's task, as we know, was to conquer the liege or namur country without unduly stripping the cordon on the saar and the moselle. jourdan's orders and original purpose were to get beaulieu out of his way by the usual strategical tricks, and to march through the ardennes as rapidly as possible, living on what supplies he could pick up from the enemy or the inhabitants. but he had scarcely started when beaulieu made his existence felt by attacking a french post at bouillon. thereupon jourdan made the active enemy, instead of namur, his first object. the movement of the operative portion of the army of the moselle began on the 21st of may from longwy through arlon towards neufchateau. irregular fighting, sometimes with the austrians, sometimes with the bitterly hostile inhabitants, marked its progress. beaulieu was nowhere forced into a battle. but fortune was on jourdan's side. the austrians were a detachment of coburg's army, not an independent force, and when threatened they retired towards ciney, drawing jourdan after them in the very direction in which he desired to go. on the 28th the french, after a vain detour made in the hope of forcing beaulieu to fight--"les esclaves n'osent pas se mesurer avec des hommes libres," wrote jourdan in disgust,--reached ciney, and there heard that the enemy had fallen back to a strongly entrenched position on the east bank of the meuse near namur. jourdan was preparing to attack them there, when considerations of quite another kind intervened to change his direction, and thereby to produce the drama of charleroi and fleurus--which military historians have asserted to be the foreseen result of the initial plan. the method of "living on the country" had failed lamentably in the ardennes, and jourdan, though he had spoken of changing his line of supply from arlon to carignan, then to mezieres and so on as his march progressed, was still actually living from hand to mouth on the convoys that arrived intermittently from his original base. when he sought to take what he needed from the towns on the meuse, he infringed on the preserves of the army of the ardennes.[6] the advance, therefore, came for the moment to a standstill, while beaulieu, solicitous for the safety of charleroi--in which fortress he had a magazine--called up the outlying troops left behind on the moselle to rejoin him by way of bastogne. at the same moment (29th) jourdan received new orders from paris--(a) to take dinant and charleroi and to clear the country between the meuse and the sambre, and (b) to attack namur, either by assault or by regular siege. in the latter case the bulk of the forces were to form a covering army beyond the place, to demonstrate towards nivelles, louvain and liege, and to serve at need as a support to the right flank of the ardennes army. from these orders and from the action of the enemy the campaign at last took a definite shape. charleroi. when the army of the moselle passed over to the left bank of the meuse, it was greeted by the distant roar of guns towards charleroi and by news that the army of the ardennes, which had already twice been defeated by kaunitz, was for the third time deeply and unsuccessfully engaged beyond the sambre. the resumption of the march again complicated the supply question, and it was only slowly that the army advanced towards charleroi, sweeping the country before it and extending its right towards namur. but at last on the 3rd of june the concentration of parts of three armies on the sambre was effected. jourdan took command of the united force (army of the sambre and meuse) with a strong hand, the 40,000 new-comers inspired fresh courage in the beaten ardennes troops, and in the sudden dominating enthusiasm of the moment pillaging and straggling almost ceased. troops that had secured bread shared it with less fortunate comrades, and even the liegois peasantry made free gifts of supplies. "we must believe," says the french general staff of to-day, "that the idea symbolized by the tricolour, around which marched ever these sansculottes, shoeless and hungry, unchained a mysterious force that preceded our columns and aided the achievement of military success." friction, however, arose between jourdan and the generals of the ardennes army, to whom the representatives thought it well to give a separate mission. this detachment of 18,000 men was followed by another, of 16,000, to keep touch with maubeuge. deducting another 6000 for the siege of charleroi, when this should be made, the covering army destined to fight the imperialists dwindled to 55,000 out of 96,000 effectives. even now, we see, the objective was not primarily the enemy's army. the republican leaders desired to strike out beyond the sambre, and as a preliminary to capture charleroi. they would not, however, risk the loss of their connexion with maubeuge before attaining the new foothold. meanwhile, tourcoing and tournai had at last convinced coburg that pichegru was his most threatening opponent, and he had therefore, though with many misgivings, decided to move towards his right, leaving the prince of orange with not more than 45,000 men on the side of maubeuge-charleroi-namur. jourdan crossed the sambre on the 12th of june, practically unopposed. charleroi was rapidly invested and the covering army extended in a semicircular position. for the fourth time the allies counter-attacked successfully, and after a severe struggle the french had to abandon their positions and their siege works and to recross the sambre (june 16). but the army was not beaten. on the contrary, it was only desirous of having its revenge for a stroke of ill-fortune, due, the soldiers said, to the fog and to the want of ammunition. the fierce threats of st just (who had joined the army) to _faire tomber les tetes_ if more energy were not shown were unnecessary, and within two days the army was advancing again. on the 18th jourdan's columns recrossed the river and extended around charleroi in the same positions as before. this time, having in view the weariness of his troops and their heavy losses on the 16th, the prince of orange allowed the siege to proceed. his reasons for so doing furnish an excellent illustration of the different ideas and capacities of a professional army and a "nation in arms." "the imperial troops," wrote general alvintzi, "are very fatigued. we have fought nine times since the 10th of may, we have bivouacked constantly, and made forced marches. further, we are short of officers." all this, it need hardly be pointed out, applied equally to the french. charleroi, garrisoned by less than 3000 men, was intimidated into surrender (25th) when the third parallel was barely established. thus the object of the first operations was achieved. as to the next neither jourdan nor the representatives seem to have had anything further in view than the capture of more fortresses. but within twenty-four hours events had decided for them. coburg had quickly abandoned his intention of closing on his right wing, and (after the usual difficulties with his allies on that side) had withdrawn 12,000 austrians from the centre of his cordon opposite pichegru, and made forced marches to join the prince of orange. on the 24th of june he had collected 52,000 men at various points round charleroi, and on the 25th he set out to relieve the little fortress. but he was in complete ignorance of the state of affairs at charleroi. signal guns were fired, but the woods drowned even the roar of the siege batteries, and at last a party under lieutenant radetzky made its way through the covering army and discovered that the place had fallen. the party was destroyed on its return, but radetzky was reserved for greater things. he managed, though twice wounded, to rejoin coburg with his bad news in the midst of the battle of fleurus. on the 26th jourdan's army (now some 73,000 strong) was still posted in a semicircle of entrenched posts, 20 m. in extent, round the captured town, pending the removal of the now unnecessary pontoon bridge at marchiennes and the selection of a shorter line of defence. fleurus. coburg was still more widely extended. inferior in numbers as he was, he proposed to attack on an equal front, and thus gave himself, for the attack of an entrenched position, an order of battle of three men to every two yards of front, all reserves included. the allies were to attack in five columns, the prince of orange from the west and north-west towards trazegnies and monceau wood, quasdanovich from the north on gosselies, kaunitz from the north-east, the archduke charles from the east through fleurus, and finally beaulieu towards lambusart. the scheme was worked out in such minute detail and with so entire a disregard of the chance of unforeseen incidents, that once he had given the executive command to move, the austrian general could do no more. if every detail worked out as planned, victory would be his; if accidents happened he could do nothing to redress them, and unless these righted themselves (which was improbable in the case of the stiffly organized old armies) he could only send round the order to break off the action and retreat. in these circumstances the battle of fleurus is the sum rather than the product of the various fights that took place between each allied column and the french division that it met. the prince of orange attacked at earliest dawn and gradually drove in the french left wing to courcelles, roux and marchiennes, but somewhat after noon the french, under the direction for the most part of kleber, began a series of counterstrokes which recovered the lost ground, and about 5, without waiting for coburg's instructions, the prince retired north-westward off the battlefield. the french centre division, under morlot, made a gradual fighting retreat on gosselies, followed up by the quasdanovich column and part of kaunitz's force. no serious impression was made on the defenders, chiefly because the brook west of mellet was a serious obstacle to the rigid order of the allies and had to be bridged before their guns could be got over. kaunitz's column and championnet's division met on the battlefield of 1690. the french were gradually driven in from the outlying villages to their main position between heppignies and wangenies. here the allies, well led and taking every advantage of ground and momentary chances, had the best of it. they pressed the french hard, necessitated the intervention of such small reserves as jourdan had available, and only gave way to the defenders' counterstroke at the moment they received coburg's orders for a general retreat. on the allied left wing the fighting was closer and more severe than at any point. beaulieu on the extreme left advanced upon velaine and the french positions in the woods to the south in several small groups of all arms. here were the divisions of the army of the ardennes, markedly inferior in discipline and endurance to the rest, and only too mindful of their four previous reverses. for six hours, more or less, they resisted the oncoming allies, but then, in spite of the example and the despairing appeals of their young general marceau, they broke and fled, leaving beaulieu free to combine with the archduke charles, who carried fleurus after obstinate fighting, and then pressed on towards campinaire. beaulieu took command of all the allied forces on this side about noon, and from then to 5 p.m. launched a series of terrible attacks on the french (lefebvre's division, part of the general reserve, and the remnant of marceau's troops) above campinaire and lambusart. the disciplined resolution of the imperial battalions, and the enthusiasm of the french revolutionaries, were each at their height. the austrians came on time after time over ground that was practically destitute of cover. villages, farms and fields of corn caught fire. the french grew more and more excited--"no retreat to-day!" they called out to their leaders, and finally, clamouring to be led against the enemy, they had their wish. lefebvre seized the psychological moment when the fourth attack of the allies had failed, and (though he did not know it) the order to retreat had come from coburg. the losses of the unit that delivered it were small, for the charge exactly responded to the moral conditions of the moment, but the proportion of killed to wounded (55 to 81) is good evidence of the intensity of the momentary conflict. so ended the battle. coburg had by now learned definitely that charleroi had surrendered, and while the issue of the battle was still doubtful--for though the prince of orange was beaten, beaulieu was in the full tide of success--he gave (towards 3 p.m.) the order for a general retreat. this was delivered to the various commanders between 4 and 5, and these, having their men in hand even in the heat of the engagement, were able to break off the battle without undue confusion. the french were far too exhausted to pursue them (they had lost twice as many men as the allies), and their leader had practically no formed body at hand to follow up the victory, thanks to the extraordinary dissemination of the army. tourcoing, tournay and fleurus represent the maximum result achievable under the earlier revolutionary system of making war, and show the men and the leaders at the highest point of combined steadiness and enthusiasm they ever reached--that is, as a "sansculotte" army. fleurus was also the last great victory of the french, in point of time, prior to the advent of napoleon, and may therefore be considered as illustrating the general conditions of warfare at one of the most important points in its development. the sequel of these battles can be told in a few words. the austrian government had, it is said, long ago decided to evacuate the netherlands, and coburg retired over the meuse, practically unpursued, while the duke of york's forces fell back in good order, though pursued by pichegru through flanders. the english contingent embarked for home, the rest retired through holland into hanoverian territory, leaving the dutch troops to surrender to the victors. the last phase of the pursuit reflected great glory on pichegru, for it was conducted in midwinter through a country bare of supplies and densely intersected with dykes and meres. the crowning incident was the dramatic capture of the dutch fleet, frozen in at the texel, by a handful of hussars who rode over the ice and browbeat the crews of the well-armed battleships into surrender. it was many years before a prince of orange ruled again in the united provinces, while the austrian whitecoats never again mounted guard in brussels. the rhine campaign of 1794, waged as before chiefly by the prussians, was not of great importance. general v. mollendorf won a victory at kaiserslautern on the 23rd of may, but operations thereafter became spasmodic, and were soon complicated by coburg's retreat over the meuse. with this event the offensive of the allies against the french revolution came to an inglorious end. poland now occupied the thoughts of european statesmen, and austria began to draw her forces on to the east. england stopped the payment of subsidies, and prussia made the peace of basel on the 5th of april 1795. on the spanish frontier the french under general dugommier (who was killed in the last battle) were successful in almost every encounter, and spain, too, made peace. only the eternal enemies, france and austria, were left face to face on the rhine, and elsewhere, of all the allies, sardinia alone (see below under _italian campaigns_) continued the struggle in a half-hearted fashion. the operations of 1795 on the rhine present no feature of the revolutionary wars that other and more interesting campaigns fail to show. austria had two armies on foot under the general command of clerfayt, one on the upper rhine, the other south of the main, while mainz was held by an army of imperial contingents. the french, jourdan on the lower; pichegru on the upper rhine, had as usual superior numbers at their disposal. jourdan combined a demonstrative frontal attack on neuwied with an advance in force via dusseldorf, reunited his wings beyond the river near neuwied, and drove back the austrians in a series of small engagements to the main, while pichegru passed at mannheim and advanced towards the neckar. but ere long both were beaten, jourdan at hochst and pichegru at mannheim, and the investment of mainz had to be abandoned. this was followed by the invasion of the palatinate by clerfayt and the retreat of jourdan to the moselle. the position was further compromised by secret negotiations between pichegru and the enemy for the restoration of the bourbons. the meditated treason came to light early in the following year, and the guilty commander disappeared into the obscure ranks of the royalist secret agents till finally brought to justice in 1804. the campaign of 1796 in germany the wonder of europe now transferred itself from the drama of the french revolution to the equally absorbing drama of a great war on the rhine. "every day, for four terrible years," wrote a german pamphleteer early in 1796, "has surpassed the one before it in grandeur and terror, and to-day surpasses all in dizzy sublimity." that a manoeuvre on the lahn should possess an interest to the peoples of europe surpassing that of the reign of terror is indeed hardly imaginable, but there was a good reason for the tense expectancy that prevailed everywhere. france's policy was no longer defensive. she aimed at invading and "revolutionizing" the monarchies and principalities of old europe, and to this end the campaign of 1796 was to be the great and conclusive effort. the "liberation of the oppressed" had its part in the decision, and the glory of freeing the serf easily merged itself in the glory of defeating the serf's masters. but a still more pressing motive for carrying the war into the enemy's country was the fact that france and the lands she had overrun could no longer subsist her armies. the directory frankly told its generals, when they complained that their men were starving and ragged, that they would find plenty of subsistence beyond the rhine. on her part, austria, no longer fettered by allied contingents nor by the expenses of a far distant campaign, could put forth more strength than on former campaigns, and as war came nearer home and the citizen saw himself threatened by "revolutionizing" and devastating armies, he ceased to hamper or to swindle the troops. thus the duel took place on the grandest scale then known in the history of european armies. apart from the secondary theatre of italy, the area embraced in the struggle was a vast triangle extending from dusseldorf to basel and thence to ratisbon, and carnot sketched the outlines in accordance with the scale of the picture. he imagined nothing less than the union of the armies of the rhine and the riviera before the walls of vienna. its practicability cannot here be discussed, but it is worth contrasting the attitude of contemporaries and of later strategical theorists towards it. the former, with their empirical knowledge of war, merely thought it impracticable with the available means, but the latter have condemned it root and branch as "an operation on exterior lines." jourdan and moreau. the scheme took shape only gradually. the first advance was made partly in search of food, partly to disengage the palatinate, which clerfayt had conquered in 1795. "if you have reason to believe that you would find some supplies on the lahn, hasten thither with the greater part of your forces," wrote the directory to jourdan (army of the sambre-and-meuse, 72,000) on the 29th of march. he was to move at once, before the austrians could concentrate, and to pass the rhine at dusseldorf, thereby bringing back the centre of the enemy over the river. he was, further, to take every advantage of their want of concentration to deliver blow after blow, and to do his utmost to break them up completely. a fortnight later moreau (army of the rhine-and-moselle, 78,000) was ordered to take advantage of jourdan's move, which would draw most of the austrian forces to the mainz region, to enter the breisgau and suabia. "you will attack austria at home, and capture her magazines. you will enter a new country, the resources of which, properly handled, should suffice for the needs of the army of the rhine-and-moselle." jourdan, therefore, was to take upon himself the destruction of the enemy, moreau the invasion of south germany. the first object of both was to subsist their armies beyond the rhine, the second to defeat the armies and terrorize the populations of the empire. under these instructions the campaign opened. jourdan crossed at dusseldorf and reached the lahn, but the enemy concentrated against him very swiftly and he had to retire over the river. still, if he had not been able to "break them up completely," he had at any rate drawn on himself the weight of the austrian army, and enabled moreau to cross at strassburg without much difficulty. the austrians were now commanded by the archduke charles, who, after all detachments had been made, disposed of some 56,000 men. at first he employed the bulk of this force against jourdan, but on hearing of moreau's progress he returned to the neckar country with 20,000 men, leaving feldzeugmeister v. wartensleben with 36,000 to observe jourdan. in later years he admitted himself that his own force was far too small to deal with moreau, who, he probably thought, would retire after a few manoeuvres. the archduke's plan. but by now the two french generals were aiming at something more than alternate raids and feints. carnot had set before them the ideal of a decisive battle as the great object. jourdan was instructed, if the archduke turned on moreau, to follow him up with all speed and to bring him to action. moreau, too, was not retreating but advancing. the two armies, moreau's and the archduke's, met in a straggling and indecisive battle at malsch on the 9th of july, and soon afterwards charles learned that jourdan had recrossed the rhine and was driving wartensleben before him. he thereupon retired both armies from the rhine valley into the interior, hoping that at least the french would detach large forces to besiege the river fortresses. disappointed of this, and compelled to face a very grave situation, he resorted to an expedient which may be described in his own words: "to retire both armies step by step without committing himself to a battle, and to seize the first opportunity to unite them so as to throw himself with superior or at least equal strength on one of the two hostile enemies." this is the ever-recurring idea of "interior lines." it was not new, for frederick the great had used similar means in similar circumstances, as had souham at tourcoing and even dampierre at valenciennes. nor was it differentiated, as were napoleon's operations in this same year, by the deliberate use of a small containing force at one point to obtain relative superiority at another. a general of the 18th century did not believe in the efficacy of superior numbers--had not frederick the great disproved it?--and for him operations on "interior lines" were simply successive blows at successive targets, the efficacy of the blow in each case being dependent chiefly on his own personal qualities and skill as a general on the field of battle. in the present case the point to be observed is not the expedient, which was dictated by the circumstances, but the courage of the young general, who, unlike wartensleben and the rest of his generals, unlike, too, moreau and jourdan themselves, surmounted difficulties instead of lamenting them. on the other side, carnot, of course, foresaw this possibility. he warned the generals not to allow the enemy to "use his forces sometimes against one, sometimes against the other, as he did in the last campaign," and ordered them to go forward respectively into franconia and into the country of the upper neckar, with a view to seeking out and defeating the enemy's army. but the plan of operations soon grew bolder. jourdan was informed on the 21st of july that if he reached the regnitz without meeting the enemy, or if his arrival there forced the latter to retire rapidly to the danube, he was not to hesitate to advance to ratisbon and even to passau if the disorganization of the enemy admitted it, but in these contingencies he was to detach a force into bohemia to levy contributions. "we presume that the enemy is too weak to offer a successful resistance and will have united his forces on the danube; we hope that our two armies will act in unison to rout him completely. each is, in any case, strong enough to attack by itself, and nothing is so pernicious as slowness in war." evidently the fear that the two austrian armies would unite against one of their assailants had now given place to something like disdain. neresheim. this was due in all probability to the rapidity with which moreau was driving the archduke before him. after a brief stand on the neckar at cannstadt, the austrians, only 25,000 strong, fell back to the rauhe alb, where they halted again, to cover their magazines at ulm and gunzburg, towards the end of july. wartensleben was similarly falling back before jourdan, though the latter, starting considerably later than moreau, had not advanced so far. the details of the successive positions occupied by wartensleben need not be stated; all that concerns the general development of the campaign is the fact that the hitherto independent leader of the "lower rhine army" resented the loss of his freedom of action, and besides lamentations opposed a dull passive resistance to all but the most formal orders of the prince. many weeks passed before this was overcome sufficiently for his leader even to arrange for the contemplated combination, and in these weeks the archduke was being driven back day by day, and the german principalities were falling away one by one as the french advanced and preached the revolutionary formula. in such circumstances as these--the general facts, if not the causes, were patent enough--it was natural that the confident paris strategists should think chiefly of the profits of their enterprise and ignore the fears of the generals at the front. but the latter were justified in one important respect; their operating armies had seriously diminished in numbers, jourdan disposing of not more than 45,000 and moreau of about 50,000. the archduke had now, owing to the arrival of a few detachments from the black forest and elsewhere, about 34,000 men, wartensleben almost exactly the same, and the former, for some reason which has never been fully explained but has its justification in psychological factors, suddenly turned and fought a long, severe and straggling battle above neresheim (august 11). this did not, however, give him much respite, and on the 12th and 13th he retired over the danube. at this date wartensleben was about amberg, almost as far away from the other army as he had been on the rhine, owing to the necessity of retreating round instead of through the principality of bayreuth, which was a prussian possession and could therefore make its neutrality respected. hitherto charles had intended to unite his armies on the danube against moreau. his later choice of jourdan's army as the objective of his combination grew out of circumstances and in particular out of the brilliant reconnaissance work of a cavalry brigadier of the lower rhine army, nauendorff. this general's reports--he was working in the country south and south-east of nurnberg, wartensleben being at amberg--indicated first an advance of jourdan's army from forchheim through nurnberg to the _south_, and induced the archduke, on the 12th, to begin a concentration of his own army towards ingolstadt. this was a purely defensive measure, but nauendorff reported on the 13th and 14th that the main columns of the french were swinging away to the east against wartensleben's front and inner flank, and on the 14th he boldly suggested the idea that decided the campaign. "if your royal highness will or can advance 12,000 men against jourdan's rear, he is lost. we could not have a better opportunity." when this message arrived at headquarters the archduke had already issued orders to the same effect. lieutenant field marshal count latour, with 30,000 men, was to keep moreau occupied--another expedient of the moment, due to the very close pressure of moreau's advance, and the failure of the attempt to put him out of action at neresheim. the small remainder of the army, with a few detachments gathered _en route_, in all about 27,000 men, began to recross the danube on the 14th, and slowly advanced north on a broad front, its leader being now sure that at some point on his line he would encounter the french, whether they were heading for ratisbon or amberg. meanwhile, the directory had, still acting on the theory of the archduke's weakness, ordered moreau to combine the operations with those of bonaparte in italian tirol, and jourdan to turn both flanks of his immediate opponent, and thus to prevent his joining the archduke, as well as his retreat into bohemia. and curiously enough it was this latter, and not moreau's move, which suggested to the archduke that his chance had come. the chance was, in fact, one dear to the 18th century general, catching his opponent in the act of executing a manoeuvre. so far from "exterior lines" being fatal to jourdan, it was not until the french general began to operate against wartensleben's _inner_ flank that the archduke's opportunity came. amberg and wurzburg. the decisive events of the campaign can be described very briefly, the ideas that directed them having been made clear. the long thin line of the archduke wrapped itself round jourdan's right flank near amberg, while wartensleben fought him in front. the battle (august 24) was a series of engagements between the various columns that met; it was a repetition in fact of fleurus, without the intensity of fighting spirit that redeems that battle from dulness. success followed, not upon bravery or even tactics, but upon the pre-existing strategical conditions. at the end of the day the french retired, and next morning the archduke began another wide extension to his left, hoping to head them off. this consumed several days. in the course of it jourdan attempted to take advantage of his opponent's dissemination to regain the direct road to wurzburg, but the attempt was defeated by an almost fortuitous combination of forces at the threatened point. more effective, indeed, than this indirect pursuit was the very active hostility of the peasantry, who had suffered in jourdan's advance and retaliated so effectually during his retreat that the army became thoroughly demoralized, both by want of food and by the strain of incessant sniping. defeated again at wurzburg on the 3rd of september, jourdan continued his retreat to the lahn, and finally withdrew the shattered army over the rhine, partly by dusseldorf, partly by neuwied. in the last engagement on the lahn the young and brilliant marceau was mortally wounded. far away in bavaria, moreau had meantime been driving latour from one line of resistance to another. on receiving the news of jourdan's reverses, however, he made a rapid and successful retreat to strassburg, evading the prince's army, which had ascended the rhine valley to head him off, in the nick of time. this celebrated campaign is pre-eminently strategical in its character, in that the positions and movements anterior to the battle preordained its issue. it raised the reputation of the archduke charles to the highest point, and deservedly, for he wrested victory from the most desperate circumstances by the skilful and resolute employment of his one advantage. but this was only possible because moreau and jourdan were content to accept strategical failure without seeking to redress the balance by hard fighting. the great question of this campaign is, why did moreau and jourdan fail against inferior numbers, when in italy bonaparte with a similar army against a similar opponent won victory after victory against equal and superior forces? the answer will not be supplied by any theory of "exterior and interior lines." it lies far deeper. so far as it is possible to summarize it in one phrase, it lies in the fact that though the directory meant this campaign to be the final word on the revolutionary war, for the nation at large this final word had been said at fleurus. the troops were still the nation; they no longer fought for a cause and for bare existence, and moreau and jourdan were too closely allied in ideas and sympathies with the misplaced citizen soldiers they commanded to be able to dominate their collective will. in default of a cause, however, soldiers will fight for a man, and this brings us by a natural sequence of ideas to the war in italy. the war in italy 1793-97 hitherto we have ignored the operations on the italian frontier, partly because they were of minor importance and partly because the conditions out of which napoleon's first campaign arose can be best considered in connexion with that campaign itself, from which indeed the previous operations derive such light as they possess. it has been mentioned that in 1792 the french overran savoy and nice. in 1793 the sardinian army and a small auxiliary corps of austrians waged a desultory mountain warfare against the army of the alps about briancon and the army of italy on the var. that furious offensive on the part of the french, which signalized the year 1793 elsewhere, was made impossible here by the counter-revolution in the cities of the midi. saorgio. in 1794, when this had been crushed, the intention of the french government was to take the offensive against the austro-sardinians. the first operation was to be the capture of oneglia. the concentration of large forces in the lower rhone valley had naturally infringed upon the areas told off for the provisioning of the armies of the alps (kellermann) and of italy (dumerbion); indeed, the sullen population could hardly be induced to feed the troops suppressing the revolt, still less the distant frontier armies. thus the only source of supply was the riviera of genoa: "our connexion with this district is imperilled by the corsairs of oneglia (a sardinian town) owing to the cessation of our operations afloat. the army is living from hand to mouth," wrote the younger robespierre in september 1793. vessels bearing supplies from genoa could not avoid the corsairs by taking the open sea, for there the british fleet was supreme. carnot therefore ordered the army of italy to capture oneglia, and 21,000 men (the rest of the 67,000 effectives were held back for coast defence) began operations in april. the french left moved against the enemy's positions on the main road over the col di tenda, the centre towards ponte di nava, and the right along the riviera. all met with success, thanks to massena's bold handling of the centre column. not only was oneglia captured, but also the col di tenda. napoleon bonaparte served in these affairs on the headquarter staff. meantime the army of the alps had possessed itself of the little st bernard and mont cenis, and the republicans were now masters of several routes into piedmont (may). but the alpine roads merely led to fortresses, and both carnot and bonaparte--napoleon had by now captivated the younger robespierre and become the leading spirit in dumerbion's army--considered that the army of the alps should be weakened to the profit of the army of italy, and that the time had come to disregard the feeble neutrality of genoa, and to advance over the col di tenda. napoleon in 1794. napoleon's first suggestion for a rapid condensation of the french cordon, and an irresistible blow on the centre of the allies by tenda-coni,[7] came to nothing owing to the waste of time in negotiations between the generals and the distant committee, and meanwhile new factors came into play. the capture of the pass of argentera by the right wing of the army of the alps suggested that the main effort should be made against the barrier fortress of demonte, but here again napoleon proposed a concentration of effort on the primary and economy of force in the secondary objective. about the same time, in a memoir on the war in general, he laid down his most celebrated maxim: "the principles of war are the same as those of a siege. fire must be concentrated on one point, and as soon as the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing." in the domain of tactics he was and remains the principal exponent of the art of breaking the equilibrium, and already he imagined the solution of problems of policy and strategy on the same lines. "austria is the great enemy; austria crushed, germany, spain, italy fall of themselves. we must not disperse, but concentrate our attack." napoleon argued that austria could be effectively wounded by an offensive against piedmont, and even more effectively by an ulterior advance from italian soil into germany. in pursuance of the single aim he asked for the appointment of a single commander-in-chief to hold sway from bayonne to the lake of geneva, and for the rejection of all schemes for "revolutionizing" italy till after the defeat of the arch-enemy. operations, however, did not after all take either of these forms. the younger robespierre perished with his brother in the _coup d'etat_ of 9th thermidor, the advance was suspended, and bonaparte, amongst other leading spirits of the army of italy, was arrested and imprisoned. profiting by this moment, austria increased her auxiliary corps. an austrian general took command of the whole of the allied forces, and pronounced a threat from the region of cairo (where the austrians took their place on the left wing of the combined army) towards the riviera. the french, still dependent on genoa for supplies, had to take the offensive at once to save themselves from starvation, and the result was the expedition of dego, planned chiefly by napoleon, who had been released from prison and was at headquarters, though unemployed. the movement began on the 17th of september; and although the austrian general colloredo repulsed an attack at dego (sept. 21) he retreated to acqui, and the incipient offensive of the allies ended abruptly. the first months of the winter of 1794-1795 were spent in re-equipping the troops, who stood in sore need after their rapid movements in the mountains. for the future operations, the enforced condensation of the army on its right wing with the object of protecting its line of supply to genoa and the dangers of its cramped situation on the riviera suggested a plan roughly resembling one already recommended by napoleon, who had since the affair of dego become convinced that the way into italy was through the apennines and not the alps. the essence of this was to anticipate the enemy by a very early and rapid advance from vado towards carcare by the ceva road, the only good road of which the french disposed and which they significantly called the _chemin de canon_. scherer and kellermann. the plan, however, came to nothing; the committee, which now changed its personnel at fixed intervals, was in consequence wavering and non-committal, troops were withdrawn for a projected invasion of corsica, and in november 1794 dumerbion was replaced by scherer, who assembled only 17,000 of his 54,000 effectives for field operations, and selected as his line of advance the col di tenda-coni road. scherer, besides being hostile to any suggestion emanating from napoleon, was impressed with the apparent danger to his right wing concentrated in the narrow riviera, which it was at this stage impossible to avert by a sudden and early assumption of the offensive. after a brief tenure scherer was transferred to the spanish frontier, but kellermann, who now received command of the army of italy in addition to his own, took the same view as his predecessor--the view of the ordinary general. but not even the scherer plan was put into execution, for spring had scarcely arrived when the prospect of renewed revolts in the south of france practically paralysed the army. this encouraged the enemy to deliver the blow that had so long been feared. the combined forces, under devins,--the sardinians, the austrian auxiliary corps and the newly arrived austrian main army,--advanced together and forced the french right wing to evacuate vado and the genoese littoral. but at this juncture the conclusion of peace with spain released the pyrenees armies, and scherer returned to the army of italy at the head of reinforcements. he was faced with a difficult situation, but he had the means wherewith to meet it, as napoleon promptly pointed out. up to this, napoleon said, the french commanded the mountain crest, and therefore covered savoy and nice, and also oneglia, loano and vado, the ports of the riviera. but now that vado was lost the breach was made. genoa was cut off, and the south of france was the only remaining resource for the army commissariat. vado must therefore be retaken and the line reopened to genoa, and to do this it was essential first to close up the over-extended cordon--and with the greatest rapidity, lest the enemy, with the shorter line to move on, should gather at the point of contact before the french--and to advance on vado. further, knowing (as every one knew) that the king of sardinia was not inclined to continue the struggle indefinitely, he predicted that this ruler would make peace once the french army had established itself in his dominions, and for this the way into the interior, he asserted, was the great road savona-ceva. but napoleon's mind ranged beyond the immediate future. he calculated that once the french advanced the austrians would seek to cover lombardy, the piedmontese turin, and this separation, already morally accomplished, it was to be the french general's task to accentuate in fact. next, sardinia having been coerced into peace, the army of italy would expel the austrians from lombardy, and connect its operations with those of the french in south germany by way of tirol. the supply question, once the soldiers had gained the rich valley of the po, would solve itself. loano. this was the essence of the first of four memoranda on this subject prepared by napoleon in his paris office. the second indicated the means of coercing sardinia--first the austrians were to be driven or scared away towards alessandria, then the french army would turn sharp to the left, driving the sardinians eastward and north-eastward through ceva, and this was to be the signal for the general invasion of piedmont from all sides. in the third paper he framed an elaborate plan for the retaking of vado, and in the fourth he summarized the contents of the other three. having thus cleared his own mind as to the conditions and the solution of the problem, he did his best to secure the command for himself. the measures recommended by napoleon were translated into a formal and detailed order to recapture vado. to napoleon the miserable condition of the army of italy was the most urgent incentive to prompt action. in scherer's judgment, however, the army was unfit to take the field, and therefore _ex hypothesi_ to attack vado, without thorough reorganization, and it was only in november that the advance was finally made. it culminated, thanks once more to the resolute massena, in the victory of loano (november 23-24). but scherer thought more of the destitution of his own army than of the fruits of success, and contented himself with resuming possession of the riviera. meanwhile the mentor whose suggestions and personality were equally repugnant to scherer had undergone strange vicissitudes of fortune--dismissal from the headquarters' staff, expulsion from the list of general officers, and then the "whiff of grapeshot" of 13th vendemiaire, followed shortly by his marriage with josephine, and his nomination to command the army of italy. these events had neither shaken his cold resolution nor disturbed his balance. napoleon in command. the army of italy spent the winter of 1795-1796 as before in the narrow riviera, while on the one side, just over the mountains, lay the austro-sardinians, and on the other, out of range of the coast batteries but ready to pounce on the supply ships, were the british frigates. on bonaparte's left kellermann, with no more than 18,000, maintained a string of posts between lake geneva and the argentera as before. of the army of italy, 7000 watched the tenda road and 20,000 men the coast-line. there remained for active operations some 27,000 men, ragged, famished and suffering in every way in spite of their victory of loano. the sardinian and austrian auxiliaries (colli), 25,000 men, lay between mondovi and ceva, a force strung out in the alpine valleys opposed kellermann, and the main austrian army (commanded by beaulieu), in widely extended cantonments between acqui and milan, numbered 27,000 field troops. thus the short-lived concentration of all the allied forces for the battle against scherer had ended in a fresh separation. austria was far more concerned with poland than with the moribund french question, and committed as few of her troops as possible to this distant and secondary theatre of war. as for piedmont, "peace" was almost the universal cry, even within the army. all this scarcely affected the regimental spirit and discipline of the austrian squadrons and battalions, which had now recovered from the defeat of loano. but they were important factors for the new general-in-chief on the riviera, and formed the basis of his strategy. napoleon's first task was far more difficult than the writing of memoranda. he had to grasp the reins and to prepare his troops, morally and physically, for active work. it was not merely that a young general with many enemies, a political favourite of the moment, had been thrust upon the army. the army itself was in a pitiable condition. whole companies with their officers went plundering in search of mere food, the horses had never received as much as half-rations for a year past, and even the generals were half-starved. thousands of men were barefooted and hundreds were without arms. but in a few days he had secured an almost incredible ascendancy over the sullen, starved, half-clothed army. "soldiers," he told them, "you are famished and nearly naked. the government owes you much, but can do nothing for you. your patience, your courage, do you honour, but give you no glory, no advantage. i will lead you into the most fertile plains of the world. there you will find great towns, rich provinces. there you will find honour, glory and riches. soldiers of italy, will you be wanting in courage?" such words go far, and little as he was able to supply material deficiencies--all he could do was to expel rascally contractors, sell a captured privateer for l5000 and borrow l2500 from genoa--he cheerfully told the directory on the 28th of march that "the worst was over." he augmented his army of operations to about 40,000, at the expense of the coast divisions, and set on foot also two small cavalry divisions, mounted on the half-starved horses that had survived the winter. then he announced that the army was ready and opened the campaign. the first plan, emanating from paris, was that, after an expedition towards genoa to assist in raising a loan there, the army should march against beaulieu, previously neutralizing the sardinians by the occupation of ceva. when beaulieu was beaten it was thought probable that the piedmontese would enter into an alliance with the french against their former comrades. a second plan, however, authorized the general to begin by subduing the piedmontese to the extent necessary to bring about peace and alliance, and on this napoleon acted. if the present separation of the allies continued, he proposed to overwhelm the sardinians first, before the austrians could assemble from winter quarters, and then to turn on beaulieu. if, on the other hand, the austrians, before he could strike his blow, united with colli, he proposed to frighten them into separating again by moving on acqui and alessandria. hence carcare, where the road from acqui joined the "cannon-road," was the first objective of his march, and from there he could manoeuvre and widen the breach between the allied armies. his scattered left wing would assist in the attack on the sardinians as well as it could--for the immediate attack on the austrians its co-operation would of course have been out of the question. in any case he grudged every week spent in administrative preparation. the delay due to this, as a matter of fact, allowed a new situation to develop. beaulieu was himself the first to move, and he moved towards genoa instead of towards his allies. the gap between the two allied wings was thereby widened, but it was no longer possible for the french to use it, for their plan of destroying colli _while beaulieu was ineffective_ had collapsed. opening movements. in connexion with the genoese loan, and to facilitate the movement of supply convoys, a small french force had been pushed forward to voltri. bonaparte ordered it back as soon as he arrived at the front, but the alarm was given. the austrians broke up from winter quarters at once, and rather than lose the food supplies at voltri, bonaparte actually reinforced massena at that place, and gave him orders to hold on as long as possible, cautioning him only to watch his left rear (montenotte). but he did not abandon his purpose. starting from the new conditions, he devised other means, as we shall see, for reducing beaulieu to ineffectiveness. meanwhile beaulieu's plan of offensive operations, such as they were, developed. the french advance to voltri had not only spurred him into activity, but convinced him that the bulk of the french army lay east of savona. he therefore made voltri the objective of a converging attack, not with the intention of destroying the french army but with that of "cutting its communications with genoa," and expelling it from "the only place in the riviera where there were sufficient ovens to bake its bread." (beaulieu to the aulic council, 15 april.) the sardinians and auxiliary austrians were ordered to extend leftwards on dego to close the gap that beaulieu's advance on genoa-voltri opened up, which they did, though only half-heartedly and in small force, for, unlike beaulieu, they knew that masses of the enemy were still in the western stretch of the riviera. the rightmost of beaulieu's own columns was on the road between acqui and savona with orders to seize monte legino as an advanced post, the others were to converge towards voltri from the genoa side and the mountain passes about campofreddo and sassello. the wings were therefore so far connected that colli wrote to beaulieu on this day "the enemy will never dare to place himself between our two armies." the event belied the prediction, and the proposed minor operation against granaries and bakeries became the first act of a decisive campaign. on the night of the 9th of april the french were grouped as follows: brigades under garnier and macquard at the finestre and tenda passes, serurier's division and rusca's brigade east of garessio; augereau's division about loano, meynier's at finale, laharpe's at savona with an outpost on the monte legino, and cervoni's brigade at voltri. massena was in general charge of the last-named units. the cavalry was far in rear beyond loano. colli's army, excluding the troops in the valleys that led into dauphine, was around coni and mondovi-ceva, the latter group connecting with beaulieu by a detachment under provera between millesimo and carcare. of beaulieu's army, argenteau's division, still concentrating to the front in many small bodies, extended over the area acqui-dego-sassello. vukassovich's brigade was equally extended between ovada and the mountain-crests above voltri, and pittoni's division was grouped around gavi and the bocchetta, the two last units being destined for the attack on voltri. farther to the rear was sebottendorf's division around alessandria-tortona. on the afternoon of the 10th beaulieu delivered his blow at voltri, not, as he anticipated, against three-quarters of the french army, but against cervoni's detachment. this, after a long irregular fight, slipped away in the night to savona. discovering his mistake next morning, beaulieu sent back some of his battalions to join argenteau. but there was no road by which they could do so save the detour through acqui and dego, and long before they arrived argenteau's advance on monte legino had forced on the crisis. on the 11th (a day behind time), this general drove in the french outposts, but he soon came on three battalions under colonel rampon, who threw himself into some old earthworks that lay near, and said to his men, "we must win or die here, my friends." his redoubt and his men stood the trial well, and when day broke on the 12th bonaparte was ready to deliver his first "napoleon-stroke." montenotte. the principle that guided him in the subsequent operations may be called "superior numbers at the decisive point." touch had been gained with the enemy all along the long line between the tenda and voltri, and he decided to concentrate swiftly upon the nearest enemy--argenteau. augereau's division, or such part of it as could march at once, was ordered to mallare, picking up here and there on the way a few horsemen and guns. massena, with 9000 men, was to send two brigades in the direction of carcare and altare, and with the third to swing round argenteau's right and to head for montenotte village in his rear. laharpe with 7000 (it had become clear that the enemy at voltri would not pursue their advantage) was to join rampon, leaving only cervoni and two battalions in savona. serurier and rusca were to keep the sardinians in front of them occupied. the far-distant brigades of garnier and macquard stood fast, but the cavalry drew eastward as quickly as its condition permitted. in rain and mist on the early morning of the 12th the french marched up from all quarters, while argenteau's men waited in their cold bivouacs for light enough to resume their attack on monte legino. about 9 the mists cleared, and heavy fighting began, but laharpe held the mountain, and the vigorous massena with his nearest brigade stormed forward against argenteau's right. a few hours later, seeing augereau's columns heading for their line of retreat, the austrians retired, sharply pressed, on dego. the threatened intervention of provera was checked by augereau's presence at carcare. [illustration: sketch of the positions occupied on the night of april 14th.] millesimo. montenotte was a brilliant victory, and one can imagine its effects on the but lately despondent soldiers of the army of italy, for all imagined that beaulieu's main body had been defeated. this was far from being the case, however, and although the french spent the night of the battle at cairo-carcare-montenotte, midway between the allied wings, only two-thirds of argenteau's force, and none of the other divisions, had been beaten, and the heaviest fighting was to come. this became evident on the afternoon of the 13th, but meanwhile bonaparte, eager to begin at once the subjugation of the piedmontese (for which purpose he wanted to bring serurier and rusca into play) sent only laharpe's division and a few details of massena's, under the latter, towards dego. these were to protect the main attack from interference by the forces that had been engaged at montenotte (presumed to be beaulieu's main body), the said main attack being delivered by augereau's division, reinforced by most of massena's, on the positions held by provera. the latter, only 1000 strong to augereau's 9000, shut himself in the castle of cossaria, which he defended _a la_ rampon against a series of furious assaults. not until the morning of the 14th was his surrender secured, after his ammunition and food had been exhausted. argenteau also won a day's respite on the 13th, for laharpe did not join massena till late, and nothing took place opposite dego but a little skirmishing. during the day bonaparte saw for himself that he had overrated the effects of montenotte. beaulieu, on the other hand, underrated them, treating it as a mishap which was more than counterbalanced by his own success in "cutting off the french from genoa." he began to reconstruct his line on the front dego-sassello, trusting to colli to harry the french until the voltri troops had finished their detour through acqui and rejoined argenteau. this, of course, presumed that argenteau's troops were intact and colli's able to move, which was not the case with either. not until the afternoon of the 14th did beaulieu place a few extra battalions at argenteau's disposal "to be used only in case of extreme necessity," and order vukassovich from the region of sassello to "make a diversion" against the french right with _two_ battalions. dego. thus argenteau, already shaken, was exposed to destruction. on the 14th, after provera's surrender, massena and laharpe, reinforced until they had nearly a two-to-one superiority, stormed dego and killed or captured 3000 of argenteau's 5500 men, the remnant retreating in disorder to acqui. but nothing was done towards the accomplishment of the purpose of destroying colli on that day, save that serurier and rusca began to close in to meet the main body between ceva and millesimo. moreover, the victory at dego had produced its usual results on the wild fighting swarms of the republicans, who threw themselves like hungry wolves on the little town, without pursuing the beaten enemy or even placing a single outpost on the acqui road. in this state, during the early hours of the 15th, vukassovich's brigade,[8] marching up from sassello, surprised them, and they broke and fled in an instant. the whole morning had to be spent in rallying them at cairo, and bonaparte had for the second time to postpone his union with serurier and rusca, who meanwhile, isolated from one another and from the main army, were groping forward in the mountains. a fresh assault on dego was ordered, and after very severe fighting, massena and laharpe succeeded late in the evening in retaking it. vukassovich lost heavily, but retired steadily and in order on spigno. the killed and wounded numbered probably about 1000 french and 1500 austrians, out of considerably less than 10,000 engaged on each side--a loss which contrasted very forcibly with those suffered in other battles of the revolutionary wars, and by teaching the army of italy to bear punishment, imbued it with self-confidence. but again success bred disorder, and there was a second orgy in the houses and streets of dego which went on till late in the morning and paralysed the whole army. this was perhaps the crisis of the campaign. even now it was not certain that the austrians had been definitively pushed aside, while it was quite clear that beaulieu's main body was intact and colli was still more an unknown quantity. but napoleon's intention remained the same, to attack the piedmontese as quickly and as heavily as possible, beaulieu being held in check by a containing force under massena and laharpe. the remainder of the army, counting in now rusca and serurier, was to move westward towards ceva. this disposition, while it illustrates the napoleonic principle of delivering a heavy blow on the selected target and warding off interference at other points, shows also the difficulty of rightly apportioning the available means between the offensive mass and the defensive system, for, as it turned out, beaulieu was already sufficiently scared, and thought of nothing but self-defence on the line acqui-ovada-bocchetta, while the french offensive mass was very weak compared with colli's unbeaten and now fairly concentrated army about ceva and montezemolo. on the afternoon of the 16th the real advance was begun by augereau's division, reinforced by other troops. rusca joined augereau towards evening, and serurier approached ceva from the south. colli's object was now to spin out time, and having repulsed a weak attack by augereau, and feeling able to repeat these tactics on each successive spur of the apennines, he retired in the night to a new position behind the cursaglia. on the 17th, reassured by the absence of fighting on the dego side, and by the news that no enemy remained at sassello, bonaparte released massena from dego, leaving only laharpe there, and brought him over towards the right of the main body, which thus on the evening of the 17th formed a long straggling line on both sides of ceva, serurier on the left, echeloned forward, augereau, joubert and rusca in the centre, and massena, partly as support, partly as flank guard, on augereau's right rear. serurier had been bidden to extend well out and to strive to get contact with massena, i.e. to encircle the enemy. there was no longer any idea of waiting to besiege ceva, although the artillery train had been ordered up from the riviera by the "cannon-road" for eventual use there. further, the line of supply, as an extra guarantee against interference, was changed from that of savona-carcare to that of loano-bardinetto. when this was accomplished, four clear days could be reckoned on with certainty in which to deal with colli. san michele. the latter, still expecting the austrians to advance to his assistance, had established his corps (not more than 12,000 muskets in all) in the immensely strong positions of the cursaglia, with a thin line of posts on his left stretching towards cherasco, whence he could communicate, by a roundabout way, with acqui. opposite this position the long straggling line of the french arrived, after many delays due to the weariness of the troops, on the 19th. a day of irregular fighting followed, everywhere to the advantage of the defenders. napoleon, fighting against time, ordered a fresh attack on the 20th, and only desisted when it became evident that the army was exhausted, and, in particular, when serurier reported frankly that without bread the soldiers would not march. the delay thus imposed, however, enabled him to clear the "cannon-road" of all vehicles, and to bring up the dego detachment to replace massena in the valley of the western bormida, the latter coming in to the main army. further, part at any rate of the convoy service was transferred still farther westward to the line albenga-garessio-ceva. nelson's fleet, that had so powerfully contributed to force the french inland, was becoming less and less innocuous. if leadership and force of character could overcome internal friction, all the success he had hoped for was now within the young commander's grasp. mondovi. twenty-four thousand men, for the first time with a due proportion of cavalry and artillery, were now disposed along colli's front and beyond his right flank. colli, outnumbered by two to one and threatened with envelopment, decided once more to retreat, and the republicans occupied the cursaglia lines on the morning of the 21st without firing a shot. but colli halted again at vico, half-way to mondovi (in order, it is said, to protect the evacuation of a small magazine he had there), and while he was in this unfavourable situation the pursuers came on with true republican swiftness, lapped round his flanks and crushed him. a few days later (27th april), the armistice of cherasco put an end to the campaign before the austrians moved a single battalion to his assistance. the "napoleon touch." the interest of the campaign being above all napoleonic, its moral must be found by discovering the "napoleon touch" that differentiated it from other revolutionary campaigns. a great deal is common to all, on both sides. the austrians and sardinians worked together at least as effectively as the austrians, prussians, british and dutch in the netherlands. revolutionary energy was common to the army of italy and to the army of the north. why, therefore, when the war dragged on from one campaign to another in the great plains of the meuse and rhine countries, did napoleon bring about so swift a decision in these cramped valleys? the answer is to be found partly in the exigencies of the supply service, but still more in napoleon's own personality and the strategy born of it. the first, as we have seen, was at the end of its resources when beaulieu placed himself across the genoa road. action of some sort was the plain alternative to starvation, and at this point napoleon's personality intervened. he would have no quarter-rations on the riviera, but plenty and to spare beyond the mountains. if there were many thousand soldiers who marched unarmed and shoeless in the ranks, it was towards "the promised land" that he led them. he looked always to the end, and met each day as if with full expectation of attaining it before sunset. strategical conditions and "new french" methods of war did not save bonaparte in the two crises--the dego rout and the sullen halt of the army at san michele--but the personality which made the soldiers, on the way to montenotte, march barefoot past a wagon-load of new boots. we have said that napoleon's strategy was the result of this personal magnetism. later critics evolved from his success the theory of "interior lines," and then accounted for it by applying the criterion they had evolved. actually, the form in which the will to conquer found expression was in many important respects old. what, therefore, in the theory or its application was the product of napoleon's own genius and will-power? a comparison with souham's campaign of tourcoing will enable us to answer this question. to begin with, souham found himself midway between coburg and clerfayt almost by accident, and his utilization of the advantages of his position was an expedient for the given case. napoleon, however, placed himself _deliberately_ and by fighting his way thither, in an analogous situation at carcare and cairo. military opinion of the time considered it dangerous, as indeed it was, for no theory can alter the fact that had not napoleon made his men fight harder and march farther than usual, he would have been destroyed. the effective play of forces on interior lines depends on the two conditions that the outer enemies are not so near together as to give no time for the inner mass to defeat one before the arrival of the other, and that they are not so far apart that before one can be brought to action the other has inflicted serious damage elsewhere. neither condition was fully met at any time in the montenotte campaign. on the 11th napoleon knew that the attack on voltri had been made by a part only of the austrian forces, yet he flung his own masses on montenotte. on the 13th he thought that beaulieu's main body was at dego and colli's at millesimo, and on this assumption had to exact the most extraordinary efforts from augereau's troops at cossaria. on the 19th and 20th he tried to exclude the risks of the austrians' intervention, and with this the chances of a victory over them to follow his victory over colli, by transferring the centre of gravity of his army to ceva and garessio, and fighting it out with colli alone. it was not, in fact, to gain a position on interior lines--with respect to _two_ opponents--that napoleon pushed his army to carcare. before the campaign began he hoped by using the "cannon-road" to destroy the piedmontese _before the austrians were in existence at all_ as an army. but on the news from voltri and monte legino he swiftly "concentrated fire, made the breach, and broke the equilibrium" at the spot where the interests and forces of the two allies converged and diverged. the hypothesis in the first case was that the austrians were practically non-existent, and the whole object in the second was to breach the now connected front of the allies ("strategic penetration") and to cause them to break up into two separate systems. more, having made the breach, he had the choice (which he had not before) of attacking _either_ the austrians or the sardinians, as every critic has pointed out. indeed the austrians offered by far the better target. but he neither wanted nor used the new alternative. his purpose was to crush piedmont. "my enemies saw too much at once," said napoleon. singleness of aim and of purpose, the product of clear thinking and of "personality," was the foundation-stone of the new form of strategy. relative superiority. in the course of subduing the sardinians, napoleon found himself placed on interior lines between two hostile masses, and another new idea, that of "relative superiority." reveals itself. whereas souham had been in superior force (90,000 against 70,000), napoleon (40,000 against 50,000) was not, and yet the army of italy was always placed in a position of relative superiority (at first about 3 to 2 and ultimately 2 to 1) to the immediate antagonist. "the essence of strategy," said napoleon in 1797, "is, with a weaker army, always to have more force at the crucial point than the enemy. but this art is taught neither by books nor by practice; it is a matter of tact." in this he expressed the result of his victories on his own mind rather than a preconceived formula which produced those victories. but the idea, though undefined, and the method of practice, though imperfectly worked out, were in his mind from the first. as soon as he had made the breach, he widened it by pushing out massena and laharpe on the one hand and augereau on the other. this is mere common sense. but immediately afterwards, though preparing to throw all available forces against colli, he posted massena and laharpe at dego to guard, not like vandamme on the lys against a real and pressing enemy, but against a _possibility_, and he only diminished the strength and altered the position of this containing detachment in proportion as the austrian danger dwindled. later in his career he defined this offensive-defensive system as "having all possible strength at the decisive point," and "being nowhere vulnerable," and the art of reconciling these two requirements, in each case as it arose, was always the principal secret of his generalship. at first his precautions (judged by events and not by the probabilities of the moment) were excessive, and the offensive mass small. but the latter was handled by a general untroubled by multiple aims and anxieties, and if such self-confidence was equivalent to 10,000 men on the battlefield, it was legitimate to detach 10,000 men to secure it. these 10,000 were posted 8 m. out on the dangerous flank, not almost back to back with the main body as vandamme had been,[9] and although this distance was but little compared to those of his later campaigns, when he employed small armies for the same purpose, it sufficed in this difficult mountain country, where the covering force enjoyed the advantage of strong positions. of course, if colli had been better concentrated, or if beaulieu had been more active, the calculated proportions between covering force and main body might have proved fallacious, and the system on which napoleon's relative superiority rested might have broken down. but the point is that such a system, however rough its first model, had been imagined and put into practice. this was napoleon's individual art of war, as raiding bakeries and cutting communications were beaulieu's speciality. napoleon made the art into a science, and in our own time, with modern conditions of effective, armament and communications, it is more than possible that moreaus and jourdans will prove able to practise it with success. but in the old conditions it required a napoleon. "strategy," said moltke, "is a system of expedients." but it was the intense personal force, as well as the genius, of napoleon that forged these expedients into a _system_. the first phase of the campaign satisfactorily settled, napoleon was free to turn his attention to the "arch-enemy" to whom he was now considerably superior in numbers (35,000 to 25,000). the day after the signature of the armistice of cherasco he began preparing for a new advance and also for the role of arbiter of the destinies of italy. many whispers there were, even in his own army, as to the dangers of passing on without "revolutionizing" aristocratic genoa and monarchical piedmont, and of bringing venice, the pope and the italian princes into the field against the french. but bonaparte, flushed with victory, and better informed than the malcontents of the real condition of italy, never hesitated. his first object was to drive out beaulieu, his second to push through tirol, and his only serious restriction the chance that the armistice with piedmont would not result in a definitive treaty. beaulieu had fallen back into lombardy, and now bordered the po right and left of valenza. to achieve further progress, napoleon had first to cross that river, and the point and method of crossing was the immediate problem, a problem the more difficult as napoleon had no bridge train and could only make use of such existing bridges as he could seize intact.[10] if he crossed above valenza, he would be confronted by one river-line after another, on one of which at least beaulieu would probably stand to fight. but quite apart from the immediate problem, napoleon's intention was less to beat the austrians than to dislodge them. he needed a foothold in lombardy which would make him independent of, and even a menace to, piedmont. if this were assured, he could for a few weeks entirely ignore his communications with france and strike out against beaulieu, dethrone the king of sardinia, or revolutionize parma, modena and the papal states according to circumstances. piacenza. milan, therefore, was his objective, and tortona-piacenza his route thither. to give himself every chance, he had stipulated with the piedmontese authorities for the right of passing at valenza, and he had the satisfaction of seeing beaulieu fall into the trap and concentrate opposite that part of the river. the french meantime had moved to the region alessandria-tortona. thence on the 6th of may bonaparte, with a picked body of troops, set out for a forced march on piacenza, and that night the advanced guard was 30 m. on the way, at castel san giovanni, and laharpe's and the cavalry divisions at stradella, 10 m. behind them. augereau was at broni, massena at sale and serurier near valenza, the whole forming a rapidly extending fan, 50 m. from point to point. if the piacenza detachment succeeded in crossing, the army was to follow rapidly in its track. if, on the other hand, beaulieu fell back to oppose the advanced guard, the valenza divisions would take advantage of his absence to cross there. in either case, be it observed, the austrians were to be _evaded_, not brought to action. on the morning of the 7th, the swift advanced guard under general dallemagne crossed at piacenza,[11] and, hearing of this, bonaparte ordered every division except serurier's thither with all possible speed. in the exultation of the moment he mocked at beaulieu's incapacity, but the old austrian was already on the alert. this game of manoeuvres he understood; already one of his divisions had arrived in close proximity to dallemagne and the others were marching eastward by all available roads. it was not until the 8th that the french, after a series of partial encounters, were securely established on the left bank of the po, and beaulieu had given up the idea of forcing their most advanced troops to accept battle at a disadvantage. the success of the french was due less to their plan than to their mobility, which enabled them first to pass the river before the austrians (who had actually started a day in advance of them) put in an appearance, and afterwards to be in superior numbers at each point of contact. but the episode was destined after all to culminate in a great event, which napoleon himself indicated as the turning-point of his life. "vendemiaire and even montenotte did not make me think myself a superior being. it was after lodi that the idea came to me.... that first kindled the spark of boundless ambition." lodi. the idea of a battle having been given up, beaulieu retired to the adda, and most of his troops were safely beyond it before the french arrived near lodi, but he felt it necessary to leave a strong rearguard on the river opposite that place to cover the reassembly of his columns after their scattered march. on the afternoon of the 10th of may, bonaparte, with dallemagne, massena and augereau, came up and seized the town. but 200 yds. of open ground had to be passed from the town gate to the bridge, and the bridge itself was another 250 in length. a few hundred yards beyond it stood the austrians, 9000 strong with 14 guns. napoleon brought up all his guns to prevent the enemy from destroying the bridge. then sending all his cavalry to turn the enemy's right by a ford above the town, he waited two hours, employing the time in cannonading the austrian lines, resting his advanced infantry and closing up massena's and augereau's divisions. finally he gave the order to dallemagne's 4000 grenadiers, who were drawn up under cover of the town wall, to rush the bridge. as the column, not more than thirty men broad, made its appearance, it was met by the concentrated fire of the austrian guns, and half way across the bridge it checked, but bonaparte himself and massena rushed forward, the courage of the soldiers revived, and, while some jumped off the bridge and scrambled forward in the shallow water, the remainder stormed on, passed through the guns and drove back the infantry. this was, in bare outline, the astounding passage of the bridge of lodi. it was not till after the battle that napoleon realized that only a rearguard was in front of him. when he launched his 4000 grenadiers he thought that on the other side there were four or five times that number of the enemy. no wonder, then, that after the event he recognized in himself the flash of genius, the courage to risk everything, and the "tact" which, independent of, and indeed contrary to all reasoned calculations, told him that the moment had come for "breaking the equilibrium." lodi was a tactical success in the highest sense, in that the principles of his tactics rested on psychology--on the "sublime" part of the art of war as saxe had called it long ago. the spirit produced the form, and lodi was the prototype of the napoleonic battle--contact, manoeuvre, preparation, and finally the well-timed, massed and unhesitating assault. the absence of strategical results mattered little. many months elapsed before this bold assertion of superiority ceased to decide the battles of france and austria. milan. next day, still under the vivid tactical impressions of the bridge of lodi, he postponed his occupation of the milanese and set off in pursuit of beaulieu, but the latter was now out of reach, and during the next few days the french divisions were installed at various points in the area pavia-milan-pizzighetone, facing outwards in all dangerous directions, with a central reserve at milan. thus secured, bonaparte turned his attention to political and military administration. this took the form of exacting from the neighbouring princes money, supplies and objects of art, and the once famished army of italy revelled in its opportunity. now, however, the directory, suspicious of the too successful and too sanguine young general, ordered him to turn over the command in upper italy to kellermann, and to take an expeditionary corps himself into the heart of the peninsula, there to preach the republic and the overthrow of princes. napoleon absolutely refused, and offered his resignation. in the end (partly by bribery) he prevailed, but the incident reawakened his desire to close with beaulieu. this indeed he could now do with a free hand, since not only had the milanese been effectively occupied, but also the treaty with sardinia had been ratified. but no sooner had he resumed the advance than it was interrupted by a rising of the peasantry in his rear. the exactions of the french had in a few days generated sparks of discontent which it was easy for the priests and the nobles to fan into open flames. milan and pavia as well as the countryside broke into insurrection, and at the latter place the mob forced the french commandant to surrender. bonaparte acted swiftly and ruthlessly. bringing back a small portion of the army with him, he punished milan on the 25th, sacked and burned binasco on the 26th, and on the evening of the latter day, while his cavalry swept the open country, he broke his way into pavia with 1500 men and beat down all resistance. napoleon's cruelty was never purposeless. he deported several scores of hostages to france, executed most of the mob leaders, and shot the french officer who had surrendered. in addition, he gave his 1500 men three hours' leave to pillage. then, as swiftly as they had come, they returned to the army on the oglio. from this river napoleon advanced to the banks of the mincio, where the remainder of the italian campaign was fought out, both sides contemptuously disregarding venetian neutrality. it centred on the fortress of mantua, which beaulieu, too weak to keep the field, and dislodged from the mincio in the action of borghetto (may 30), strongly garrisoned before retiring into tirol. beaulieu was soon afterwards replaced by dagobert siegmund, count von wurmser (b. 1724), who brought considerable reinforcements from germany. at this point, mindful of the narrow escape he had had of losing his command, bonaparte thought it well to begin the resettlement of italy. the scheme for co-operating with moreau on the danube was indefinitely postponed, and the army of italy (now reinforced from the army of the alps and counting 42,000 effectives) was again disposed in a protective "zone of manoeuvre," with a strong central reserve. over 8000 men, however, garrisoned the fortresses of piedmont and lombardy, and the effective blockade of mantua and political expeditions into the heart of the peninsula soon used up the whole of this reserve. moreover, no siege artillery was available until the austrians in the citadel of milan capitulated, and thus it was not till the 18th of july that the first parallel was begun. almost at the same moment wurmser began his advance from trent with 55,000 men to relieve mantua. siege of mantua. the protective system on which his attack would fall in the first instance was now as follows:--augereau (6000) about legnago, despinoy (8000) south-east of verona, massena (13,000) at verona and peschiera, with outposts on the monte baldo and at la corona, sauret (4500) at salo and gavardo. serurier (12,000) was besieging mantua, and the only central reserve was the cavalry (2000) under kilmaine. the main road to milan passed by brescia. sauret's brigade, therefore, was practically a detached post on the line of communication, and on the main defensive front less than 30,000 men were disposed at various points between la corona and legnago (30 m. apart), and at a distance of 15 to 20 m. from mantua. the strength of such a disposition depended on the fighting power and handiness of the troops, who in each case would be called upon to act as a rearguard to gain time. yet the lie of the country scarcely permitted a closer grouping, unless indeed bonaparte fell back on the old-time device of a "circumvallation," and shut himself up, with the supplies necessary for the calculated duration of the siege, in an impregnable ring of earthworks round mantua. this, however, he could not have done even if he had wished, for the wave of revolt radiating from milan had made accumulations of food impossible, and the lakes above and below the fortress, besides being extremely unhealthy, would have extended the perimeter of the circumvallation so greatly that the available forces would not suffice to man it. it was not in this, but in the absence of an important central reserve that bonaparte's disposition is open to criticism, which indeed could impugn the scheme in its entirety, as overtaxing the available resources, more easily than it could attack its details. [illustration: operations around mantua 1796-7. positions of the night of 2-3 august 1796 shown approximately.] if bonaparte has occasionally been criticized for his defensive measures, wurmser's attack procedure has received almost universal condemnation, as to the justice of which it may be pointed out[12] that the object of the expedition was not to win a battle by falling on the disunited french with a well-concentrated army, but to overpower one, any one, of the corps covering the siege, and to press straight forward to the relief of mantua, i.e. to the destruction of bonaparte's batteries and the levelling of his trench work. the old principle that a battle was a grave event of doubtful issue was reinforced in the actual case by beaulieu's late experiences of french elan, and as a temporary victory at one point would suffice for the purpose in hand, there was every incentive to multiply the points of contact. the soundness of wurmser's plan was proved by the event. new ideas and new forces, undiscernible to a man of seventy-two years of age, obliterated his achievement by surpassing it, but such as it was--a limited use of force for a limited object--the venture undeniably succeeded. the austrians formed three corps, one (quasdanovich, 18,000 men) marching round the west side of the lake of garda on gavardo, salo and the brescia road, the second (under wurmser, about 30,000) moving directly down the adige, and the third (davidovich, 6000) making a detour by the brenta valley and heading for verona by vicenza. on the 29th quasdanovich attacked sauret at salo, drove him towards desenzano, and pushed on to gavardo and thence into brescia. wurmser expelled massena's advanced guard from la corona, and captured in succession the monte baldo and rivoli posts. the brenta column approached verona with little or no fighting. news of this column led napoleon early in the day to close up despinoy, massena and kilmaine at castelnuovo, and to order augereau from legnago to advance on montebello (19 m. east of verona) against davidovich's left rear. but after these orders had been despatched came the news of sauret's defeat, and this moment was one of the most anxious in napoleon's career. he could not make up his mind to give up the siege of mantua, but he hurried augereau back to the mincio, and sent order after order to the officers on the lines of communication to send all convoys by the cremona instead of by the brescia road. more, he had the baggage, the treasure and the sick set in motion at once for marcaria, and wrote to serurier a despatch which included the words "perhaps we shall recover ourselves ... but i must take serious measures for a retreat." on the 30th he wrote: "the enemy have broken through our line in three places ... sauret has evacuated salo ... and the enemy has captured brescia. you see that our communications with milan and verona are cut." the reports that came to him during the morning of the 30th enabled him to place the main body of the enemy opposite massena, and this, without in the least alleviating the gravity of the situation, helped to make his course less doubtful. augereau was ordered to hold the line of the molinella, in case davidovich's attack, the least-known factor, should after all prove to be serious; massena to reconnoitre a road from peschiera through castiglione towards orzinovi, and to stand fast at castelnuovo opposite wurmser as long as he could. sauret and despinoy were concentrated at desenzano with orders on the 31st to clear the main line of retreat and to recapture brescia. the austrian movements were merely the continuation of those of the 29th. quasdanovich wheeled inwards, his right finally resting on montechiaro and his left on salo. wurmser drove back massena to the west side of the mincio. davidovich made a slight advance. relief of mantua. in the late evening bonaparte held a council of war at roverbella. the proceedings of this council are unknown, but it at any rate enabled napoleon to see clearly and to act. hitherto he had been covering the siege of mantua with various detachments, the defeat of any one of which might be fatal to the enterprise. thus, when he had lost his main line of retreat, he could assemble no more than 8000 men at desenzano to win it back. now, however, he made up his mind that the siege could not be continued, and bitter as the decision must have been, it gave him freedom. at this moment of crisis the instincts of the great captain came into play, and showed the way to a victory that would more than counterbalance the now inevitable failure. serurier was ordered to spike the 140 siege guns that had been so welcome a few days before, and, after sending part of his force to augereau, to establish himself with the rest at marcaria on the cremona road. the field forces were to be used on interior lines. on the 31st sauret, despinoy, augereau and kilmaine advanced westward against quasdanovich. the first two found the austrians at salo and lonato and drove them back, while with augereau and the cavalry bonaparte himself made a forced march on brescia, never halting night or day till he reached the town and recovered his depots. meantime serurier had retired (night of july 31), massena had gradually drawn in towards lonato, and wurmser's advanced guard triumphantly entered the fortress (august 1). lonato and castiglione. the austrian general now formed the plan of crushing bonaparte between quasdanovich and his own main body. but meantime quasdanovich had evacuated brescia under the threat of bonaparte's advance and was now fighting a long irregular action with despinoy and sauret about gavardo and salo, and bonaparte, having missed his expected target, had brought augereau by another severe march back to montechiaro on the chiese. massena was now assembled between lonato and ponte san marco, and serurier was retiring quietly on marcaria. wurmser's main body, weakened by the detachment sent to mantua, crossed the mincio about valeggio and goito on the 2nd, and penetrated as far as castiglione, whence massena's rearguard was expelled. but a renewed advance of quasdanovich, ordered by wurmser, which drove sauret and despinoy back on brescia and lonato, in the end only placed a strong detachment of the austrians within striking distance of massena, who on the 3rd attacked it, front to front, and by sheer fighting destroyed it, while at the same time augereau recaptured castiglione from wurmser. on the 4th sauret and despinoy pressed back quasdanovich beyond salo and gavardo. one of the austrian columns, finding itself isolated and unable to retreat with the others, turned back to break its way through to wurmser, and was annihilated by massena in the neighbourhood of lonato. on this day augereau fought his way towards solferino, and wurmser, thinking rightly or wrongly that he could not now retire to the mincio without a battle, drew up his whole force, close on 30,000 men, in the plain between solferino and medole. the finale may be described in very few words. bonaparte, convinced that no more was to be feared from quasdanovich, and seeing that wurmser meant to fight, called in despinoy's division to the main body and sent orders to serurier, then far distant on the cremona road, to march against the left flank of the austrians. on the 5th the battle of castiglione was fought. closely contested in the first hours of the frontal attack till serurier's arrival decided the day, it ended in the retreat of the austrians over the mincio and into tirol whence they had come. thus the new way had failed to keep back wurmser, and the old had failed to crush napoleon. each was the result of its own conditions. in former wars a commander threatened as napoleon was, would have fallen back at once to the adda, abandoning the siege in such good time that he would have been able to bring off his siege artillery. instead of this bonaparte hesitated long enough to lose it, which, according to accepted canons was a waste, and held his ground, which was, by the same rules, sheer madness. but revolutionary discipline was not firm enough to stand a retreat. once it turned back, the army would have streamed away to milan and perhaps to the alps (cf. 1799), and the only alternative to complete dissolution therefore was fighting. as to the manner of this fighting, even the principle of "relative superiority" failed him so long as he was endeavouring to cover the siege and again when his chief care was to protect his new line of retreat and to clear his old. in this period, viz. up to his return from brescia on the 2nd of august, the only "mass" he collected delivered a blow in the air, while the covering detachments had to fight hard for bare existence. once released from its trammels, the napoleonic principle had fair play. he stood between wurmser and quasdanovich, ready to fight either or both. the latter was crushed, thanks to local superiority and the resolute leading of massena, but at castiglione wurmser actually outnumbered his opponent till the last of napoleon's precautionary dispositions had been given up, and serurier brought back from the "alternative line of retreat" to the battlefield. the moral is, again, that it was not the mere fact of being on interior lines that gave napoleon the victory, but his "tact," his fine appreciation of the chances in his favour, measured in terms of time, space, attacking force and containing power. all these factors were greatly influenced by the ground, which favoured the swarms and columns of the french and deprived the brilliant austrian cavalry of its power to act. but of far greater importance was the mobility that napoleon's personal force imparted to the french. napoleon himself rode five horses to death in three days, and augereau's division marched from roverbella to brescia and back to montechiaro, a total distance of nearly 50 m., in about thirty-six hours. this indeed was the foundation of his "relative superiority," for every hour saved in the time of marching meant more freedom to destroy one corps before the rest could overwhelm the covering detachments and come to its assistance. wurmser's plan for the relief of mantua, suited to its purpose, succeeded. but when he made his objective the french field army, he had to take his own army as he found it, disposed for an altogether different purpose. a properly, combined attack of convergent columns framed _ab initio_ by a good staff officer, such as mack, might indeed have given good results. but the success of such a plan depends principally on the assailant's original possession of the initiative, and not on the chances of his being able to win it over to his own side when operations, as here, are already in progress. when the time came to improvise such a plan, the initiative had passed over to napoleon, and the plan was foredoomed. by the end of the second week in august the blockade of mantua had been resumed, without siege guns. but still under the impression of a great victory gained, bonaparte was planning a long forward stride. he thought that by advancing past mantua directly on trieste and thence onwards to the semmering he could impose a peace on the emperor. the directory, however, which had by now focussed its attention on the german campaign, ordered him to pass through tirol and to co-operate with moreau, and this plan, bonaparte, though protesting against an alpine venture being made so late in the year, prepared to execute, drawing in reinforcements and collecting great quantities of supplies in boats on the adige and lake garda. wurmser was thought to have posted his main body near trent, and to have detached one division to bassano "to cover trieste." the french advanced northward on the 2nd, in three disconnected columns (precisely as wurmser had done in the reverse direction at the end of july)--massena (13,000) from rivoli to ala, augereau (9000) from verona by hill roads, keeping on his right rear, vaubois (11,000) round the lake of garda by riva and torbole. sahuguet's division (8000) remained before mantua. the french divisions successfully combined and drove the enemy before them to trent. there, however, they missed their target. wurmser had already drawn over the bulk of his army (22,000) into the val sugana, whence, with the bassano division as his advanced guard, he intended once more to relieve mantua, while davidovich with 13,000 (excluding detachments) was to hold tirol against any attempt of bonaparte to join forces with moreau. thus austria was preparing to hazard a second (as in the event she hazarded a third and a fourth) highly trained and expensive professional army in the struggle for the preservation of a fortress, and we must conclude that there were weighty reasons which actuated so notoriously cautious a body as the council of war in making this unconditional venture. while mantua stood, napoleon, for all his energy and sanguineness, could not press forward into friuli and carniola, and immunity from a republican visitation was above all else important for the vienna statesmen, governing as they did more or less discontented and heterogeneous populations that had not felt the pressure of war for a century and more. the austrians, so far as is known, desired no more than to hold their own. they no longer possessed the superiority of _moral_ that guarantees victory to one side when both are materially equal. there was therefore nothing to be gained, commensurate with the risk involved, by fighting a battle in the open field. _in italien siegt nicht die kavallerie_ was an old saying in the austrian army, and therefore the austrians could not hope to win a victory of the first magnitude. the only practicable alternative was to strengthen mantua as opportunities offered themselves, and to prolong the passive resistance as much as possible. napoleon's own practice in providing for secondary theatres of war was to economize forces and to delay a decision, and the fault of the austrians, viewed from a purely military standpoint, was that they squandered, instead of economizing, their forces to gain time. if we neglect pure theory, and regard strategy as the handmaiden of statesmanship--which fundamentally it is--we cannot condemn the vienna authorities unless it be first proved that they grossly exaggerated the possible results of bonaparte's threatened irruption. and if their capacity for judging the political situation be admitted, it naturally follows that their object was to preserve mantua _at all costs_--which object wurmser, though invariably defeated in action, did in fact accomplish. bassano. when massena entered trent on the morning of the 5th of september, napoleon became aware that the force in his front was a mere detachment, and news soon came in that wurmser was in the val sugana about primolano and at bassano. this move he supposed to be intended to cover trieste, being influenced by his own hopes of advancing in that direction, and underestimating the importance, to the austrians, of preserving mantua. he therefore informed the directory that he could not proceed with the tirol scheme, and spent one more day in driving davidovich well away from trent. then, leaving vaubois to watch him, napoleon marched augereau and massena, with a rapidity he scarcely ever surpassed, into the val sugana. wurmser's rearguard was attacked and defeated again and again, and wurmser himself felt compelled to stand and fight, in the hope of checking the pursuit before going forward into the plains. half his army had already reached montebello on the verona road, and with the rear half he posted himself at bassano, where on the 8th he was attacked and defeated with heavy losses. then began a strategic pursuit or general chase, and in this the mobility of the french should have finished the work so well begun by their tactics. but napoleon directed the pursuers so as to cut off wurmser from trieste, not from mantua. massena followed up the austrians to vicenza, while augereau hurried towards padua, and it was not until late on the 9th that bonaparte realized that his opponent was heading for mantua via legnago. on the 10th massena crossed the adige at ronco, while augereau from padua reached montagnara. sahuguet from mantua and kilmaine from verona joined forces at castellaro on the 11th, with orders to interpose between wurmser and the fortress. wurmser meantime had halted for a day at legnago, to restore order, and had then resumed his march. it was almost too late, for in the evening, after having to push aside the head of massena's column at cerea, he had only reached nogara, some miles short of castellaro, and close upon his rear was augereau, who reached legnago that night. on the 12th, eluding sahuguet by a detour to the southward, he reached mantua, with all the columns of the french, weary as most of them were, in hot pursuit. after an attempt to keep the open field, defeated in a general action on the 15th, the relieving force was merged in the garrison, now some 28,000 in all. so ended the episode of bassano, the most brilliant feature of which as usual was the marching power of the french infantry. this time it sufficed to redeem even strategical misconceptions and misdirections. between the 5th and the 11th, besides fighting three actions, massena had marched 100 m. and augereau 114. feldzeugmeister alvintzi was now appointed to command a new army of relief. this time the mere distribution of the troops imposed a concentric advance of separate columns, for practically the whole of the fresh forces available were in carniola, the military frontier, &c., while davidovich was still in tirol. alvintzi's intention was to assemble his new army (29,000) in friuli, and to move on bassano, which was to be occupied on the 4th of november. meantime davidovich (18,000) was to capture trent, and the two columns were to connect by the val sugana. all being well, alvintzi and davidovich, still separate, were then to converge on the adige between verona and legnago. wurmser was to co-operate by vigorous sorties. at this time napoleon's protective system was as follows: kilmaine (9000) investing mantua, vaubois (10,000) at trent, and massena (9000) at bassano and treviso, augereau (9000) and macquard (3000) at verona and villafranca constituting, for the first time in these operations, important mobile reserves. hearing of alvintzi's approach in good time, he meant first to drive back davidovich, then with augereau, massena, macquard and 3000 of vaubois's force to fall upon alvintzi, who, he calculated, would at this stage have reached bassano, and finally to send back a large force through the val sugana to attack davidovich. this plan practically failed. caldiero. instead of advancing, vaubois was driven steadily backward. by the 6th, davidovich had fought his way almost to roveredo, and alvintzi had reached bassano and was there successfully repelling the attacks of massena and augereau. that night napoleon drew back to vicenza. on the 7th davidovich drove in vaubois to corona and rivoli, and alvintzi came within 5 m. of vicenza. napoleon watched carefully for an opportunity to strike out, and on the 8th massed his troops closely around the central point of verona. on the 9th, to give himself air, he ordered massena to join vaubois, and to drive back davidovich at all costs. but before this order was executed, reports came in to the effect that davidovich had suspended his advance. the 10th and 11th were spent by both sides in relative inaction, the french waiting on events and opportunities, the austrians resting after their prolonged exertions. then, on the afternoon of the 11th, being informed that alvintzi was approaching, napoleon decided to attack him. on the 12th the advanced guard of alvintzi's army was furiously assailed in the position of caldiero. but the troops in rear came up rapidly, and by 4 p.m. the french were defeated all along the line and in retreat on verona. napoleon's situation was now indeed precarious. he was on "interior lines," it is true, but he had neither the force nor the space necessary for the delivery of rapid radial blows. alvintzi was in superior numbers, as the battle of caldiero had proved, and at any moment davidovich, who had twice vaubois's force, might advance to the attack of rivoli. the reserves had proved insufficient, and kilmaine had to be called up from mantua, which was thus for the third time freed from the blockaders. again the alternatives were retreat, in whatever order was possible to republican armies, and beating the nearest enemy at any sacrifice. napoleon chose the latter, though it was not until the evening of the 14th that he actually issued the fateful order. the austrians, too, had selected the 15th as the date of their final advance on verona, davidovich from the north, alvintzi via zevio from the south. but napoleon was no longer there; leaving vaubois to hold davidovich as best he might, and posting only 3000 men in verona, he had collected the rest of his small army between albaro and ronco. his plan seems to have been to cross the adige well in rear of the austrians, to march north on to the verona-vicenza highway, and there, supplying himself from their convoys, to fight to the last. on the 15th he had written to the directory, "the weakness and the exhaustion of the army causes me to fear the worst. we are perhaps on the eve of losing italy." in this extremity of danger the troops passed the adige in three columns near ronco and albaredo, and marched forward along the dikes, with deep marshes and pools on either hand. if napoleon's intention was to reach the dry open ground of s. bonifacio in rear of the austrians, it was not realized, for the austrian army, instead of being at the gates of verona, was still between caldiero and s. bonifacio, heading, as we know, for zevio. thus alvintzi was able, easily and swiftly, to wheel to the south. arcola. the battle of arcola almost defies description. the first day passed in a series of resultless encounters between the heads of the columns as they met on the dikes. in the evening bonaparte withdrew over the adige, expecting at every moment to be summoned to vaubois's aid. but davidovich remained inactive, and on the 16th the french again crossed the river. massena from ronco advanced on porcile, driving the austrians along the causeway thither, but on the side of arcola, alvintzi had deployed a considerable part of his forces on the edge of the marshes, within musket shot of the causeway by which bonaparte and augereau had to pass, along the austrian front, to reach the bridge of arcola. in these circumstances the second day's battle was more murderous and no more decisive than the first, and again the french retreated to ronco. but davidovich again stood still, and with incredible obstinacy bonaparte ordered a third assault for the 17th, using indeed more tactical expedients than before, but calculating chiefly on the fighting powers of his men and on the exhaustion of the enemy. massena again advanced on porcile, robert's brigade on arcola, but the rest, under augereau, were to pass the alpone near its confluence with the adige, and joining various small bodies which passed the main stream lower down, to storm forward on dry ground to arcola. the austrians, however, themselves advanced from arcola, overwhelmed robert's brigade on the causeway and almost reached ronco. this was perhaps the crisis of the battle, for augereau's force was now on the other side of the stream, and massena, with his back to the new danger, was approaching porcile. but the fire of a deployed regiment stopped the head of the austrian column; massena, turning about, cut into its flank on the dike; and augereau, gathering force, was approaching arcola from the south. the bridge and the village were evacuated soon afterwards, and massena and augereau began to extend in the plain beyond. but the austrians still sullenly resisted. it was at this moment that bonaparte secured victory by a mere ruse, but a ruse which would have been unprofitable and ridiculous had it not been based on his fine sense of the moral conditions. both sides were nearly fought out, and he sent a few trumpeters to the rear of the austrian army to sound the charge. they did so, and in a few minutes the austrians were streaming back to s. bonifacio. this ended the drama of arcola, which more than any other episode of these wars, perhaps of any wars in modern history, centres on the personality of the hero. it is said that the french fought without spirit on the first day, and yet on the second and third bonaparte had so thoroughly imbued them with his own will to conquer that in the end they prevailed over an enemy nearly twice their own strength. the climax was reached just in time, for on the 17th vaubois was completely defeated at rivoli and withdrew to peschiera, leaving the verona and mantua roads completely open to davidovich. but on the 19th napoleon turned upon him, and combining the forces of vaubois, massena and augereau against him, drove him back to trent. meantime alvintzi returned from vicenza to san bonifacio and caldiero (november 21st), and bonaparte at once stopped the pursuit of davidovich. on the return of the french main body to verona, alvintzi finally withdrew, wurmser, who had emerged from mantua on the 23rd, was driven in again, and this epilogue of the great struggle came to a feeble end because neither side was now capable of prolonging the crisis. alvintzi renewed his advance in january 1797 with all the forces that could be assembled for a last attempt to save mantua. at this time 8000 men under serurier blockaded mantua, massena (9000) was at verona, joubert (vaubois's successor) at rivoli with 10,000, augereau at legnago with 9000. in reserve were rey's division (4000) between brescia and montechiaro, and victor's brigade at goito and castelnuovo. on the other side, alvintzi had 9000 men under provera at padua, 6000 under bayalic at bassano, and he himself with 28,000 men stood in the tirol about trent. this time he intended to make his principal effort on the rivoli side. provera was to capture legnago on the 9th of january, and bayalic verona on the 12th, while the main army was to deliver its blow against the rivoli position on the 13th. rivoli. the first marches of this scheme were duly carried out, and several days elapsed before napoleon was able to discern the direction of the real attack. augereau fell back, skirmishing a little, as provera's and bayalic's advance developed. on the 11th, when the latter was nearing verona, alvintzi's leading troops appeared in front of the rivoli position. on the 12th bayalic with a weak force (he had sent reinforcements to alvintzi by the val pantena) made an unsuccessful attack on verona, provera, farther south, remaining inactive. on the 13th napoleon, still in doubt, launched massena's division against bayalic, who was driven back to san bonifacio; but at the same time definite news came from joubert that alvintzi's main army was in front of la corona. from this point begins the decisive, though by no means the most intense or dramatic, struggle of the campaign. once he felt sure of the situation napoleon acted promptly. joubert was ordered to hold on to rivoli at all costs. rey was brought up by a forced march to castelnuovo, where victor joined him, and ahead of them both massena was hurried on to rivoli. napoleon himself joined joubert on the night of the 13th. there he saw the watch-fires of the enemy in a semicircle around him, for alvintzi, thinking that he had only to deal with one division, had begun a widespread enveloping attack. the horns of this attack were as yet so far distant that napoleon, instead of extending on an equal front, only spread out a few regiments to gain an hour or two and to keep the ground for massena and rey, and on the morning of january 14th, with 10,000 men in hand against 26,000, he fell upon the central columns of the enemy as they advanced up the steep broken slopes of the foreground. the fighting was severe, but bonaparte had the advantage. massena arrived at 9 a.m., and a little later the column of quasdanovich, which had moved along the adige and was now attempting to gain a foothold on the plateau in rear of joubert, was crushed by the converging fire of joubert's right brigade and by massena's guns, their rout being completed by the charge of a handful of cavalry under lasalle. the right horn of alvintzi's attack, when at last it swung in upon napoleon's rear, was caught between massena and the advancing troops of rey and annihilated, and even before this the dispirited austrians were in full retreat. a last alarm, caused by the appearance of a french infantry regiment in their rear (this had crossed the lake in boats from salo), completed their demoralization, and though less than 2000 had been killed and wounded, some 12,000 austrian prisoners were left in the hands of the victors. rivoli was indeed a moral triumph. after the ordeal of arcola, the victory of the french was a foregone conclusion at each point of contact. napoleon hesitated, or rather refrained from striking, so long as his information was incomplete, but he knew now from experience that his covering detachment, if well led, could not only hold its own without assistance until it had gained the necessary information, but could still give the rest of the army time to act upon it. then, when the centre of gravity had been ascertained, the french divisions hurried thither, caught the enemy in the act of manoeuvring and broke them up. and if that confidence in success which made all this possible needs a special illustration, it may be found in napoleon's sending murat's regiment over the lake to place a mere two thousand bayonets across the line of retreat of a whole army. alvintzi's manoeuvre was faulty neither strategically in the first instance nor tactically as regards the project of enveloping joubert on the 14th. it failed because joubert and his men were better soldiers than his own, and because a french division could move twice as fast as an austrian, and from these two factors a new form of war was evolved, the essence of which was that, for a given time and in a given area, a small force of the french should engage and hold a much larger force of the enemy. the remaining operations can be very briefly summarized. provera, still advancing on mantua, joined hands there with wurmser, and for a time held serurier at a disadvantage. but hearing of this, napoleon sent back massena from the field of rivoli, and that general, with augereau and serurier, not only forced wurmser to retire again into the fortress, but compelled provera to lay down his arms. on the 2nd of february 1797, after a long and honourable defence, mantua, and with it what was left of wurmser's army, surrendered. leoben. the campaign of 1797, which ended the war of the first coalition, was the brilliant sequel of these hard-won victories. austria had decided to save mantua at all costs, and had lost her armies in the attempt, a loss which was not compensated by the "strategic" victories of the archduke. thus the republican "visitation" of carinthia and carniola was one swift march--politically glorious, if dangerous from a purely military standpoint--of napoleon's army to the semmering. the archduke, who was called thither from germany, could do no more than fight a few rearguard actions, and make threats against napoleon's rear, which the latter, with his usual "tact," ignored. on the rhine, as in 1795 and 1796, the armies of the sambre-and-meuse (hoche) and the rhine-and-moselle (moreau) were opposed by the armies of the lower rhine (werneck) and of the upper rhine (latour). moreau crossed the river near strassburg and fought a series of minor actions. hoche, like his predecessors, crossed at dusseldorf and neuwied and fought his way to the lahn, where for the last time in the history of these wars, there was an irregular widespread battle. but hoche, in this his last campaign, displayed the brilliant energy of his first, and delivered the "series of incessant blows" that carnot had urged upon jourdan the year before. werneck was driven with ever-increasing losses from the lower lahn to wetzlar and giessen. thence, pressed hard by the french left wing under championnet, he retired on the nidda, only to find that hoche's right had swung completely round him. nothing but the news of the armistice of leoben saved him from envelopment and surrender. this general armistice was signed by bonaparte, on his own authority and to the intense chagrin of the directory and of hoche, on the 18th of april, and was the basis of the peace of campo formio. napoleon in egypt within the scope of this article, yet far more important from its political and personal than from its general military interest, comes the expedition of napoleon to egypt and its sequel (see also egypt: _history_; napoleon, &c.). a very brief summary must here suffice. napoleon left toulon on the 19th of may 1798, at the same time as his army (40,000 strong in 400 transports) embarked secretly at various ports. nelson's fleet was completely evaded, and, capturing malta _en route_, the armada reached the coast of egypt on the 1st of july. the republicans stormed alexandria on the 2nd. between embabeh and gizeh, on the left bank of the nile, 60,000 mamelukes were defeated and scattered on the 21st (battle of the pyramids), the french for the most part marching and fighting in the chequer of infantry squares that afterwards became the classical formation for desert warfare. while his lieutenants pursued the more important groups of the enemy, napoleon entered cairo in triumph, and proceeded to organize egypt as a french protectorate. meantime nelson, though too late to head off the expedition, had annihilated the squadron of admiral brueys. this blow severed the army from the home country, and destroyed all hope of reinforcements. but to eject the french already in egypt, military invasion of that country was necessary. the first attempts at this were made in september by the turks as overlords of egypt. napoleon--after suppressing a revolt in cairo--marched into syria to meet them, and captured el arish and jaffa (at the latter place the prisoners, whom he could afford neither to feed, to release, nor to guard, were shot by his order). but he was brought to a standstill (march 17-may 20) before the half-defensible fortifications of acre, held by a turkish garrison and animated by the leadership of sir w. sidney smith (q.v.). in may, though meantime a turkish relieving army had been severely beaten in the battle of mount tabor (april 16, 1799), napoleon gave up his enterprise, and returned to egypt, where he won a last victory in annihilating at aboukir, with 6000 of his own men, a turkish army 18,000 strong that had landed there (july 25, 1799). with this crowning tactical success to set against the syrian reverses, he handed over the command to kleber and returned to france (august 22) to ride the storm in a new _coup d'etat_, the "18th brumaire." kleber, attacked by the english and turks, concluded the convention of el arish (january 27, 1800), whereby he secured free transport for the army back to france. but this convention was disavowed by the british government, and kleber prepared to hold his ground. on the 20th of march 1800 he thoroughly defeated the turkish army at heliopolis and recovered cairo, and french influence was once more in the ascendant in egypt, when its director was murdered by a fanatic on the 14th of june, the day of marengo. kleber's successor, the incompetent menou, fell an easy victim to the british expeditionary force under sir ralph abercromby in 1801. the british forced their way ashore at aboukir on the 8th of march. on the 21st, abercromby won a decisive battle, and himself fell in the hour of victory (see alexandria: _battle of 1801_). his successor, general hely hutchinson, slowly followed up this advantage, and received the surrender of cairo in july and of alexandria in august, the debris of the french army being given free passage back to france. meantime a mixed force of british and native troops from india, under sir david baird, had landed at kosseir and marched across the desert to cairo. the war of the second coalition in the autumn of 1798, while napoleon's egyptian expedition was in progress, and the directory was endeavouring at home to reduce the importance and the predominance of the army and its leaders, the powers of europe once more allied themselves, not now against the principles of the republic, but against the treaty of campo formio. russia, austria, england, turkey, portugal, naples and the pope formed the second coalition. the war began with an advance into the roman states by a worthless and ill-behaved neapolitan army (commanded, much against his will, by mack), which the french troops under championnet destroyed with ease. championnet then revolutionized naples. after this unimportant prelude the curtain rose on a general european war. the directory which now had at its command neither numbers nor enthusiasm, prepared as best it could to meet the storm. four armies, numbering only 160,000, were set on foot, in holland (brune, 24,000); on the upper rhine (jourdan, 46,000); in switzerland, which had been militarily occupied in 1798 (massena, 30,000); and in upper italy (scherer, 60,000). in addition there was championnet's army, now commanded by macdonald, in southern italy. all these forces the directory ordered, in january and february 1799, to assume the offensive. stokach. jourdan, in the constance and schaffhausen region, had only 40,000 men against the archduke charles's 80,000, and was soon brought to a standstill and driven back on stokach. the archduke had won these preliminary successes with seven-eighths of his army acting as one concentrated mass. but as he had only encountered a portion of jourdan's army, he became uneasy as to his flanks, checked his bold advance, and ordered a reconnaissance in force. this practically extended his army while jourdan was closing his, and thus the french began the battle of stokach (march 25) in superior numbers, and it was not until late in the day that the archduke brought up sufficient strength (60,000) to win a victory. this was a battle of the "strategic" type, a widespread straggling combat in which each side took fifteen hours to inflict a loss of 12% on the other, and which ended in jourdan accepting defeat and drawing off, unpursued by the magnificent austrian cavalry, though these counted five times as many sabres as the french. the french secondary army in switzerland was in the hands of the bold and active massena. the forces of both sides in the alpine region were, from a military point of view, mere flank guards to the main armies on the rhine and the adige. but unrest, amounting to civil war, among the swiss and grison peoples tempted both governments to give these flank guards considerable strength.[13] massena in switzerland. the austrians in the vorarlberg and grisons were under hotze, who had 13,000 men at bregenz, and 7000 commanded by auffenberg around chur, with, between them, 5000 men at feldkirch and a post of 1000 in the strong position of the luziensteig near mayenfeld. massena's available force was about 20,000, and he used almost the whole of it against auffenberg. the rhine was crossed by his principal column near mayenfeld, and the luziensteig stormed (march 6), while a second column from the zurich side descended upon disentis and captured its defenders. in three days, thanks to massena's energy and the ardent attacking spirit of his men, auffenberg's division was broken up, oudinot meanwhile holding off hotze by a hard-fought combat at feldkirch (march 7). but a second attack on feldkirch made on the 23rd by massena with 15,000 men was repulsed and the advance of his left wing came to a standstill. behind auffenberg and hotze was bellegarde in tirol with some 47,000 men. most of these were stationed north of innsbruck and landeck, probably as a sort of strategic reserve to the archduke. the rest, with the assistance of the tirolese themselves, were to ward off irruptions from italy. here the french offensive was entrusted to two columns, one from massena's command under lecourbe, the other from the army of italy under dessolle. simultaneously with massena, lecourbe marched from bellinzona with 10,000 men, by the san bernadino pass into the splugen valley, and thence over the julier pass into the upper engadine. a small austrian force under major-general loudon attacked him near zernetz, but was after three days of rapid manoeuvres and bold tactics driven back to martinsbruck, with considerable losses, especially in prisoners. but ere long the country people flew to arms, and lecourbe found himself between two fires, the levies occupying zernetz and loudon's regulars martinsbruck. but though he had only some 5000 of his original force left, he was not disconcerted, and, by driving back the levies into the high valleys whence they had come, and constantly threatening loudon, he was able to maintain himself and to wait for dessolles. the latter, moving up the valtelline, by now fought his way to the stelvio pass, but beyond it the defile of tauffers (s.w. of glurns) was entrenched by loudon, who thus occupied a position midway between the two french columns, while his irregulars beset all the passes and ways giving access to the vintschgau and the lower engadine. in this situation the french should have been destroyed in detail. but as usual their speed and dash gave them the advantage in every manoeuvre and at every point of contact. lecourbe and dessolles in tirol. on the 25th lecourbe and dessolles attacked loudon at nauders in the engadine and tauffers in the vintschgau respectively. at nauders the french passed round the flanks of the defence by scrambling along the high mountain crests adjacent, while at tauffers the assailants, only 4500 strong, descended into a deep ravine, debouched unnoticed in the austrians' rear, and captured 6000 men and 16 guns. the austrian leader with a couple of companies made his way through glurns to nauders, and there, finding himself headed off by lecourbe, he took to the mountains. his corps, like auffenberg's, was annihilated. this ended the french general offensive. jourdan had been defeated by the archduke and forced or induced to retire over the rhine. massena was at a standstill before the strong position of feldkirch, and the austrians of hotze were still massed at bregenz, but the grisons were revolutionized, two strong bodies of austrians numbering in all about 20,000 men had been destroyed, and lecourbe and dessolles had advanced far into tirol. a pause followed. the austrians in the mountains needed time to concentrate and to recover from their astonishment. the archduke fell ill, and the vienna war council forbade his army to advance lest tirol should be "uncovered," though bellegarde and hotze still disposed of numbers equal to those of massena and lecourbe. massena succeeded jourdan in general command on the french side and promptly collected all available forces of both armies in the hilly non-alpine country between basel, zurich and schaffhausen, thereby directly barring the roads into france (berne-neuchatel-pontarlier and basel-besancon) which the austrians appeared to desire to conquer. the protection of alsace and the vosges was left to the fortresses. there was no suggestion, it would appear, that the rhine between basel and schaffhausen was a flank position sufficient of itself to bar alsace to the enemy. it is now time to turn to events in italy, where the coalition intended to put forth its principal efforts. at the beginning of march the french had 80,000 men in upper italy and some 35,000 in the heart of the peninsula, the latter engaged chiefly in supporting newly-founded republics. of the former, 53,000 formed the field army on the mincio under scherer. the austrians, commanded by kray, numbered in all 84,000, but detachments reduced this figure to 67,000, of whom, moreover, 15,000 had not yet arrived when operations began. they were to be joined by a russian contingent under the celebrated suvarov, who was to command the whole on arrival, and whose extraordinary personality gives the campaign its special interest. kray himself was a resolute soldier, and when the french, obeying the general order to advance, crossed the adige, he defeated them in a severely fought battle at magnano near verona (march 5), the french losing 4000 killed and wounded and 4500 taken, out of 41,000. the austrians lost some 3800 killed and wounded and 1500 prisoners, out of 46,000 engaged. the war, however, was undertaken not to annihilate, but to evict the french, and, probably under orders from vienna, kray allowed the beaten enemy to depart. suvarov. suvarov appeared with 17,000 russians on the 4th of april. his first step was to set russian officers to teach the austrian troops--whose feelings can be imagined--how to attack with the bayonet, his next to order the whole army forward. the allies broke camp on the 17th, 18th and 19th of april, and on the 20th, after a forced march of close on 30 m., they passed the chiese. brescia had a french garrison, but suvarov soon cowed it into surrender by threats of a massacre, which no one doubted that he would carry into execution. at the same time, dissatisfied with the marching of the austrian infantry, he sent the following characteristic reproof to their commander: "the march was in the service of the kaiser. fair weather is for my lady's chamber, for dandies, for sluggards. he who dares to cavil against his high duty (_der grosssprecher wider den hohen dienst_) is, as an egoist, instantly to vacate his command. whoever is in bad health can stay behind. the so-called reasoners (_raisonneurs_) do no army any good...." one day later, under this unrelenting pressure, the advanced posts of the allies reached cremona and the main body the oglio. the pace became slower in the following days, as many bridges had to be made, and meanwhile moreau, scherer's successor, prepared with a mere 20,000 men to defend lodi, cassano and lecco on the adda. on the 26th the russian hero attacked him all along the line. the moral supremacy had passed over to the allies. melas, under suvarov's stern orders, flung his battalions regardless of losses against the strong position of cassano. the story of 1796 repeated itself with the roles reversed. the passage was carried, and the french rearguard under serurier was surrounded and captured by an inferior corps of austrians. the austrians (the russians at lecco were hardly engaged) lost 6000 men, but they took 7000 prisoners, and in all moreau's little army lost half its numbers and retreated in many disconnected bodies to the ticino, and thence to alessandria. everywhere the italians turned against the french, mindful of the exactions of their commissaries. the strange cossack cavalry that western europe had never yet seen entered milan on the 29th of april, eleven days after passing the mincio, and next day the city received with enthusiasm the old field marshal, whose exploits against the turks had long invested him with a halo of romance and legend. here, for the moment, his offensive culminated. he desired to pass into switzerland and to unite his own, the archduke's, hotze's and bellegarde's armies in one powerful mass. but the emperor would not permit the execution of this scheme until all the fortresses held by the enemy in upper italy should have been captured. in any case, macdonald's army in southern italy, cut off from france by the rapidity of suvarov's onslaught, and now returning with all speed to join moreau by force or evasion, had still to be dealt with. suvarov's mobile army, originally 90,000 strong, had now dwindled, by reason of losses and detachments for sieges, to half that number, and serious differences arose between the vienna government and himself. if he offended the pride of the austrian army, he was at least respected as a leader who gave it victories, but in vienna he was regarded as a madman who had to be kept within bounds. but at last, when he was becoming thoroughly exasperated by this treatment, macdonald came within striking distance and the active campaign recommenced. in the second week of june, moreau, who had retired into the apennines about gavi, advanced with the intention of drawing upon himself troops that would otherwise have been employed against macdonald. he succeeded, for suvarov with his usual rapidity collected 40,000 men at alessandria, only to learn that macdonald with 35,000 men was coming up on the parma road. when this news arrived, macdonald had already engaged an austrian detachment at modena and driven it back, and suvarov found himself between moreau and macdonald with barely enough men under his hand to enable him to play the game of "interior lines." but at the crisis the rough energetic warrior who despised "raisonneurs," displayed generalship of the first order, and taking in hand all his scattered detachments, he manoeuvred them in the napoleonic fashion. the trebbia. on the 14th macdonald was calculated to be between modena, reggio and carpi, but his destination was uncertain. would he continue to hug the apennines to join moreau, or would he strike out northwards against kray, who with 20,000 men was besieging mantua? from alessandria it is four marches to piacenza and nine to mantua, while from reggio these places are four and two marches respectively. piacenza, therefore, was the crucial point if macdonald continued westward, while, in the other case, nothing could save kray but the energetic conduct of hohenzollern's detachment, which was posted near reggio. this latter, however, was soon forced over the po, and ott, advancing from cremona to join it, found himself sharply pressed in turn. the field marshal had hoped that ott and hohenzollern together would be able to win him time to assemble at parma, where he could bring on a battle whichever way the french took. but on receipt of ott's report he was convinced that macdonald had chosen the western route, and ordering ott to delay the french as long as possible by stubborn rearguard actions and to put a garrison into piacenza under a general who was to hold out "on peril of his life and honour," he collected what forces were ready to move and hurried towards piacenza, the rest being left to watch moreau. he arrived just in time. when after three forced marches the main body (only 26,000 strong) reached castel san giovanni, ott had been driven out of piacenza, but the two joined forces safely. both suvarov and macdonald spent the 17th in closing up and deploying for battle. the respective forces were allies 30,000, french 35,000. suvarov believed the enemy to be only 26,000 strong, and chiefly raw italian regiments, but his temperament would not have allowed him to stand still even had he known his inferiority. he had already issued one of his peculiar battle-orders, which began with the words, "the hostile army will be taken prisoners" and continued with directions to the cossacks to spare the surrendered enemy. but macdonald too was full of energy, and believed still that he could annihilate ott before the field marshal's arrival. thus the battle of the trebbia (june 17-19) was fought by both sides in the spirit of the offensive. it was one of the severest struggles in the republican wars, and it ended in macdonald's retreat with a loss of 15,000 men--probably 6000 in the battle and 9000 killed and prisoners when and after the equilibrium was broken--for suvarov, unlike other generals, had the necessary surplus of energy after all the demands made upon him by a great battle, to order and to direct an effective pursuit. the allies lost about 7000. macdonald retreated to parma and modena, harassed by the peasantry, and finally recrossed the apennines and made his way to genoa. the battle of the trebbia is one of the most clearly-defined examples in military history of the result of moral force--it was a matter not merely of energetic leading on the battlefield, but far more of educating the troops beforehand to meet the strain, of ingraining in the soldier the determination to win at all costs. "it was not," says clausewitz, "a case of losing the key of the position, of turning a flank or breaking a centre, of a mistimed cavalry charge or a lost battery ... it is a pure trial of strength and expense of force, and victory is the sinking of the balance, if ever so slightly, in favour of one side. and we mean not merely physical, but even more moral forces." to return now to the alpine region, where the french offensive had culminated at the end of march. their defeated left was behind the rhine in the northern part of switzerland, the half-victorious centre athwart the rhine between mayenfeld and chur, and their wholly victorious right far within tirol between glurns, nauders and landeck. but neither the centre nor the right could maintain itself. the forward impulse given by suvarov spread along the whole austrian front from left to right. dessolles' column (now under loison) was forced back to chiavenna. bellegarde drove lecourbe from position to position towards the rhine during april. there lecourbe added to the remnant of his expeditionary column the outlying bodies of massena's right wing, but even so he had only 8000 men against bellegarde's 17,000, and he was now exposed to the attack of hotze's 25,000 as well. the luziensteig fell to hotze and chur to bellegarde, but the defenders managed to escape from the converging austrian columns into the valley of the reuss. having thus reconquered all the lost ground and forced the french into the interior of switzerland, bellegarde and hotze parted company, the former marching with the greater part of his forces to join suvarov, the latter moving to his right to reinforce the archduke. only a chain of posts was left in the rhine valley between disentis and feldkirch. the archduke's operations now recommenced. action of zurich. charles and hotze stood, about the 15th of may, at opposite ends of the lake of constance. the two together numbered about 88,000 men, but both had sent away numerous detachments to the flanks, and the main bodies dwindled to 35,000 for the archduke and 20,000 for hotze. massena, with 45,000 men in all, retired slowly from the rhine to the thur. the archduke crossed the rhine at stein, hotze at balzers, and each then cautiously felt his way towards the other. their active opponent attempted to take advantage of their separation, and an irregular fight took place in the thur valley (may 25), but massena, finding hotze close on his right flank, retired without attempting to force a decision. on the 27th, having joined forces, the austrians dislodged massena from his new position on the toss without difficulty, and this process was repeated from time to time in the next few days, until at last massena halted in the position he had prepared for defence at zurich. he had still but 25,000 of his 45,000 men in hand, for he maintained numerous small detachments on his right, behind the zurcher see and the wallen see, and on his left towards basel. these 25,000 occupied an entrenched position 5 m. in length; against which the austrians, detaching as usual many posts to protect their flanks and rear, deployed only 42,000 men, of whom 8000 were sent on a wide turning movement and 8000 held in reserve 4 m. in rear of the battlefield. thus the frontal attack was made with forces not much greater than those of the defence and it failed accordingly (june 4). but massena, fearing perhaps to strain the loyalty of the swiss to their french-made constitution by exposing their town to assault and sack, retired on the 5th. he did not fall back far, for his outposts still bordered the limmat and the linth, while his main body stood in the valley of the aar between baden and lucerne. the archduke pressed massena as little as he had pressed jourdan after stokach (though in this case he had less to gain by pursuit), and awaited the arrival of a second russian army, 30,000 strong, under korsakov, before resuming the advance, meantime throwing out covering detachments towards basel, where massena had a division. thus for two months operations, elsewhere than in italy, were at a standstill, while massena drew in reinforcements and organized the fractions of his forces in alsace as a skeleton army, and the austrians distributed arms to the peasantry of south germany. in the end, under pressure from paris, it was massena who resumed active movements. towards the middle of august, lecourbe, who formed a loose right wing of the french army in the reuss valley, was reinforced to a strength of 25,000 men, and pounced upon the extended left wing of the enemy, which had stretched itself, to keep pace with suvarov, as far westward as the st gothard. the movement began on the 14th, and in two days the austrians were driven back from the st gothard and the furka to the line of the linth, with the loss of 8000 men and many guns. at the same time an attempt to take advantage of massena's momentary weakness by forcing the aar at dottingen near its mouth failed completely (august 16-17). only 200 men guarded the point of passage, but the austrian engineers had neglected to make a proper examination of the river, and unlike the french, the austrian generals had no authority to waste their expensive battalions in forcing the passage in boats. no one regarded this war as a struggle for existence, and no one but suvarov possessed the iron strength of character to send thousands of men to death for the realization of a diplomatic success--for ordinary men, the object of the coalition was to upset the treaty of campo formio. this was the end of the archduke's campaign in switzerland. though he would have preferred to continue it, the vienna government desired him to return to germany. an anglo-russian expedition was about to land in holland,[14] and the french were assembling fresh forces on the rhine, and, with the double object of preventing an invasion of south germany and of inducing the french to augment their forces in alsace at the expense of those in holland, the archduke left affairs in switzerland to hotze and korsakov, and marched away with 35,000 men to join the detachment of sztarray (20,000) that he had placed in the black forest before entering switzerland. his new campaign never rose above the level of a war of posts and of manoeuvres about mannheim and philippsburg. in the latter stage of it lecourbe commanded the french and obtained a slight advantage. suvarov ordered to switzerland. suvarov's last exploit in italy coincided in time, but in no other respect, with the skirmish at dottingen. returning swiftly from the battlefield of the trebbia, he began to drive back moreau to the riviera. at this point joubert succeeded to the command on the french side, and against the advice of his generals, gave battle. equally against the advice of his own subordinates, the field marshal accepted it, and won his last great victory at novi on the 13th of august, joubert being killed. this was followed by another rapid march against a new french "army of the alps" (championnet) which had entered italy by way of the mont cenis. but immediately after this he left all further operations in italy to melas with 60,000 men and himself with the russians and an austrian corps marched away, via varese, for the st gothard to combine operations against massena with hotze and korsakov. it was with a heavy heart that he left the scene of his battles, in which the force of his personality had carried the old-fashioned "linear" armies for the last time to complete victory. in the early summer he had himself suggested, eagerly and almost angrily, the concentration of his own and the archduke's armies in switzerland with a view, not to conquering that country, but to forcing jourdan and massena into a grand decisive battle. but, as we have seen, the vienna government would not release him until the last italian fortress had been reoccupied, and when finally he received the order that a little while before he had so ardently desired, it was too late. the archduke had already left switzerland, and he was committed to a resultless warfare in the high mountains, with an army which was a mere detachment and in the hope of co-operating with two other detachments far away on the other side of switzerland. as for the reasons which led to the issue of such an order, it can only be said that the bad feeling known to exist between the austrians and russians induced england to recommend, as the first essential of further operations, the separate concentration of the troops of each nationality under their own generals. still stranger was the reason which induced the tsar to give his consent. it was alleged that the russians would be healthier in switzerland than the men of the southern plains! from such premises as these the allied diplomats evolved a new plan of campaign, by which the anglo-russians under the duke of york were to reconquer holland and belgium, the archduke charles to operate on the middle rhine, suvarov in switzerland and melas in piedmont--a plan destitute of every merit but that of simplicity. battle of zurich. it is often said that it is the duty of a commander to resign rather than undertake an operation which he believes to be faulty. so, however, suvarov did not understand it. in the simplicity of his loyalty to the formal order of his sovereign he prepared to carry out his instructions to the letter. massena's command (77,000 men) was distributed, at the beginning of september, along an enormous s, from the simplon, through the st gothard and glarus, and along the linth, the zuricher see and the limmat to basel. opposite the lower point of this s, suvarov (28,000) was about to advance. hotze's corps (25,000 austrians), extending from utznach by chur to disentis, formed a thin line roughly parallel to the lower curve of the s, korsakov's russians (30,000) were opposite the centre at zurich, while nauendorff with a small austrian corps at waldshut faced the extreme upper point. thus the only completely safe way in which suvarov could reach the zurich region was by skirting the lower curve of the s, under protection of hotze. but this detour would be long and painful, and the ardent old man preferred to cross the mountains once for all at the st gothard, and to follow the valley of the reuss to altdorf and schwyz--i.e. to strike vertically upward to the centre of the s--and to force his way through the french cordon to zurich, and if events, so far as concerned his own corps, belied his optimism, they at any rate justified his choice of the shortest route. for, aware of the danger gathering in his rear, massena gathered up all his forces within reach towards his centre, leaving lecourbe to defend the st gothard and the reuss valley and soult on the linth. on the 24th he forced the passage of the limmat at dietikon. on the 25th, in the second battle of zurich, he completely routed korsakov, who lost 8000 killed and wounded, large numbers of prisoners and 100 guns. all along the line the allies fell back, one corps after another, at the moment when suvarov was approaching the foot of the st gothard. suvarov in the alps. on the 21st the field marshal's headquarters were at bellinzona, where he made the final preparations. expecting to be four days _en route_ before he could reach the nearest friendly magazine, he took his trains with him, which inevitably augmented the difficulties of the expedition. on the 24th airolo was taken, but when the far greater task of storming the pass itself presented itself before them, even the stolid russians were terrified, and only the passionate protests of the old man, who reproached his "children" with deserting their father in his extremity, induced them to face the danger. at last after twelve hours' fighting, the summit was reached. the same evening suvarov pushed on to hospenthal, while a flanking column from disentis made its way towards amsteg over the crispalt. lecourbe was threatened in rear and pressed in front, and his engineers, to hold off the disentis column, had broken the devil's bridge. discovering this, he left the road, threw his guns into the river and made his way by fords and water-meadows to goschenen, where by a furious attack he cleared the disentis troops off his line of retreat. his rearguard meantime held the ruined devil's bridge. this point and the tunnel leading to it, called the urner loch, the russians attempted to force, with the most terrible losses, battalion after battalion crowding into the tunnel and pushing the foremost ranks into the chasm left by the broken bridge. but at last a ford was discovered and the bridge, cleared by a turning movement, was repaired. more broken bridges lay beyond, but at last suvarov joined the disentis column near goschenen. when altdorf was reached, however, suvarov found not only lecourbe in a threatening position, but an entire absence of boats on the lake of the four cantons. it was impossible (in those days the axenstrasse did not exist) to take an army along the precipitous eastern shore, and thus passing through one trial after another, each more severe than the last, the russians, men and horses and pack animals in an interminable single file, ventured on the path leading over the kinzig pass into the muotta thal. the passage lasted three days, the leading troops losing men and horses over the precipices, the rearguard from the fire of the enemy, now in pursuit. and at last, on arrival in the muotta thal, the field marshal received definite information that korsakov's army was no longer in existence. yet even so it was long before he could make up his mind to retreat, and the pursuers gathered on all sides. fighting, sometimes severe, and never altogether ceasing, went on day after day as the allied column, now reduced to 15,000 men, struggled on over one pass after another, but at last it reached ilanz on the vorder rhine (october 8). the archduke charles meanwhile had, on hearing of the disaster of zurich, brought over a corps from the neckar, and for some time negotiations were made for a fresh combined operation against massena. but these came to nothing, for the archduke and suvarov could not agree, either as to their own relations or as to the plan to be pursued. practically, suvarov's retreat from altdorf to ilanz closed the campaign. it was his last active service, and formed a gloomy but grand climax to the career of the greatest soldier who ever wore the russian uniform. marengo and hohenlinden the disasters of 1799 sealed the fate of the directory, and placed bonaparte, who returned from egypt with the prestige of a recent victory, in his natural place as civil and military head of france. in the course of the campaign the field strength of the french had been gradually augmented, and in spite of losses now numbered 227,000 at the front. these were divided into the army of batavia, brune (25,000), the army of the rhine, moreau (146,000), the army of italy, massena (56,000), and, in addition, there were some 100,000 in garrisons and depots in france. most of these field armies were in a miserable condition owing to the losses and fatigues of the last campaign. the treasury was empty and credit exhausted, and worse still--for spirit and enthusiasm, as in 1794, would have remedied material deficiencies--the conscripts obtained under jourdan's law of 1798 (see conscription) came to their regiments most unwillingly. most of them, indeed, deserted on the way to join the colours. a large draft sent to the army of italy arrived with 310 men instead of 10,250, and after a few such experiences, the first consul decided that the untrained men were to be assembled in the fortresses of the interior and afterwards sent to the active battalions in numerous small drafts, which they could more easily assimilate. besides accomplishing the immense task of reorganizing existing forces, he created new ones, including the consular guard, and carried out at this moment of crisis two such far-reaching reforms as the replacement of the civilian drivers of the artillery by soldiers, and of the hired teams by horses belonging to the state, and the permanent grouping of divisions in army corps. the army of reserve. as early as the 25th of january 1800 the first consul provided for the assembly of all available forces in the interior in an "army of reserve." he reserved to himself the command of this army,[15] which gradually came into being as the pacification of vendee and the return of some of brune's troops from holland set free the necessary nucleus troops. the conscription law was stringently reenforced, and impassioned calls were made for volunteers (the latter, be it said, did not produce five hundred useful men). the district of dijon, partly as being central with respect to the rhine and italian armies, partly as being convenient for supply purposes, was selected as the zone of assembly. chabran's division was formed from some depleted corps of the army of italy and from the depots of those in egypt. chambarlhac's, chiefly of young soldiers, lost 5% of its numbers on the way to dijon from desertion--a loss which appeared slight and even satisfactory after the wholesale _debandade_ of the winter months. lechi's italian legion was newly formed from italian refugees. boudet's division was originally assembled from some of the southern garrison towns, but the units composing it were frequently changed up to the beginning of may. the cavalry was deficient in saddles, and many of its units were new formations. the consular guard of course was a _corps d'elite_, and this and two and a half infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade coming from the veteran "army of the west" formed the real backbone of the army. most of the newer units were not even armed till they had left dijon for the front. such was the first constitution of the army of reserve. we can scarcely imagine one which required more accurate and detailed staff work to assemble it--correspondence with the district commanders, with the adjutant-generals of the various armies, and orders to the civil authorities on the lines of march, to the troops themselves and to the arsenals and magazines. no one but napoleon, even aided by a berthier, could have achieved so great a task in six weeks, and the great captain, himself doing the work that nowadays is apportioned amongst a crowd of administrative staff officers, still found time to administer france's affairs at home and abroad, and to think out a general plan of campaign that embraced moreau's, massena's and his own armies. the army of the rhine, by far the strongest and best equipped, lay on the upper rhine. the small and worn-out army of italy was watching the alps and the apennines from mont blanc to genoa. between them switzerland, secured by the victory of zurich, offered a starting-point for a turning movement on either side--this year the advantage of the flank position was recognized and acted upon. the army of reserve was assembling around dijon, within 200 m. of either theatre of war. the general plan was that the army of reserve should march through switzerland to close on the right wing of the army of the rhine. thus supported to whatever degree might prove to be necessary, moreau was to force the passage of the rhine about schaffhausen, to push back the austrians rapidly beyond the lech, and then, if they took the offensive in turn, to hold them in check for ten or twelve days. during this period of guaranteed freedom the decisive movement was to be made. the army of reserve, augmented by one large corps of the army of the rhine, was to descend by the splugen (alternatively by the st gothard and even by tirol) into the plains of lombardy. magazines were to be established at zurich and lucerne (not at chur, lest the plan should become obvious from the beginning), and all likely routes reconnoitred in advance. the army of italy was at first to maintain a strict defensive, then to occupy the austrians until the entry of the reserve army into italy was assured, and finally to manoeuvre to join it. [illustration: map of italian campaigns 1794-1800.] moreau, however, owing to want of horses for his pontoon train and also because of the character of the rhine above basel, preferred to cross below that place, especially as in alsace there were considerably greater supply facilities than in a country which had already been fought over and stripped bare. with the greatest reluctance bonaparte let him have his way, and giving up the idea of using the splugen and the st gothard, began to turn his attention to the more westerly passes, the st bernard and the simplon. it was not merely moreau's scruples that led to this essential modification in the scheme. at the beginning of april the enemy took the offensive against massena. on the 8th melas's right wing dislodged the french from the mont cenis, and most of the troops that had then reached dijon were shifted southward to be ready for emergencies. by the 25th berthier reported that massena was seriously attacked and that he might have to be supported by the shortest route. bonaparte's resolution was already taken. he waited no longer for moreau (who indeed so far from volunteering assistance, actually demanded it for himself). convinced from the paucity of news that massena's army was closely pressed and probably severed from france, and feeling also that the austrians were deeply committed to their struggle with the army of italy, he told berthier to march with 40,000 men at once by way of the st bernard unless otherwise advised. berthier protested that he had only 25,000 effectives, and the equipment and armament was still far from complete--as indeed it remained to the end--but the troops marched, though their very means of existence were precarious from the time of leaving geneva to the time of reaching milan, for nothing could extort supplies and money from the sullen swiss. napoleon's plan of campaign. at the beginning of may the first consul learned of the serious plight of the army of italy. massena with his right wing was shut up in genoa, suchet with the left wing driven back to the var. meanwhile moreau had won a preliminary victory at stokach, and the army of reserve had begun its movement to geneva. with these data the plan of campaign took a clear shape at last--massena to resist as long as possible; suchet to resume the offensive, if he could do so, towards turin; the army of reserve to pass the alps and to debouch into piedmont by aosta; the army of the rhine to send a strong force into italy by the st gothard. the first consul left paris on the 6th of may. berthier went forward to geneva, and still farther on the route magazines were established at villeneuve and st-pierre. gradually, and with immense efforts, the leading troops of the long column[16] were passed over the st bernard, drawing their artillery on sledges, on the 15th and succeeding days. driving away small posts of the austrian army, the advance guard entered aosta on the 16th and chatillon on the 18th and the alarm was given. melas, committed as he was to his riviera campaign, began to look to his right rear, but he was far from suspecting the seriousness of his opponent's purpose. bard. infinitely more dangerous for the french than the small detachment that melas opposed to them, or even the actual crossing of the pass, was the unexpected stopping power of the little fort of bard. the advanced guard of the french appeared before it on the 19th, and after three wasted days the infantry managed to find a difficult mountain by-way and to pass round the obstacle. ivrea was occupied on the 23rd, and napoleon hoped to assemble the whole army there by the 27th. but except for a few guns that with infinite precautions were smuggled one by one through the streets of bard, the whole of the artillery, as well as a detachment (under chabran) to besiege the fort, had to be left behind. bard surrendered on the 2nd of june, having delayed the infantry of the french army for four days and the artillery for a fortnight. the military situation in the last week of may, as it presented itself to the first consul at ivrea, was this. the army of italy under massena was closely besieged in genoa, where provisions were running short, and the population so hostile that the french general placed his field artillery to sweep the streets. but massena was no ordinary general, and the first consul knew that while massena lived the garrison would resist to the last extremity. suchet was defending nice and the var by vigorous minor operations. the army of reserve, the centre of which had reached at ivrea the edge of the italian plains, consisted of four weak army corps under victor, duhesme, lannes and murat. there were still to be added to this small army of 34,000 effectives, turreau's division, which had passed over the mont cenis and was now in the valley of the dora riparia, moncey's corps of the army of the rhine, which had at last been extorted from moreau and was due to pass the st gothard before the end of may, chabran's division left to besiege bard, and a small force under bethencourt, which was to cross the simplon and to descend by arona (this place proved in the event a second bard and immobilized bethencourt until after the decisive battle). thus it was only the simplest part of napoleon's task to concentrate half of his army at ivrea, and he had yet to bring in the rest. the problem was to reconcile the necessity for time, which he wanted to ensure the maximum force being brought over the alps, with the necessity for haste, in view of the impending fall of genoa and the probability that once this conquest was achieved, melas would bring back his 100,000 men into the milanese to deal with the army of reserve. as early as the 14th of may he had informed moncey that from ivrea the army of reserve would move on milan. on the 25th of may, in response to berthier's request for guidance, the first consul ordered lannes (advanced guard) to push out on the turin road, "in order to deceive the enemy and to obtain news of turreau," and duhesme's and murat's corps to proceed along the milan road. on the 27th, after lannes had on the 26th defeated an austrian column near chivasso, the main body was already advancing on vercelli. the march to milan. very few of napoleon's acts of generalship have been more criticized than this resolution to march on milan, which abandoned genoa to its fate and gave melas a week's leisure to assemble his scattered forces. the account of his motives he dictated at st helena (_nap. correspondence_, v. 30, pp. 375-377), in itself an unconvincing appeal to the rules of strategy as laid down by the theorists--which rules his own practice throughout transcended--gives, when closely examined, some at least of the necessary clues. he says in effect that by advancing directly on turin he would have "risked a battle against equal forces without an assured line of retreat, bard being still uncaptured." it is indeed strange to find napoleon shrinking before _equal_ forces of the enemy, even if we admit without comment that it was more difficult to pass bard the second time than the first. the only incentive to go towards turin was the chance of partial victories over the disconnected austrian corps that would be met in that direction, and this he deliberately set aside. having done so, for reasons that will appear in the sequel, he could only defend it by saying in effect that he might have been defeated--which was true, but not the napoleonic principle of war. of the alternatives, one was to hasten to genoa; this in napoleon's eyes would have been playing the enemy's game, for they would have concentrated at alessandria, facing west "in their natural position." it is equally obvious that thus the enemy would have played _his_ game, supposing that this was to relieve genoa, and the implication is that it was not. the third course, which napoleon took, and in this memorandum defended, gave his army the enemy's depots at milan, of which it unquestionably stood in sore need, and the reinforcement of moncey's 15,000 men from the rhine, while at the same time moncey's route offered an "assured line of retreat" by the simplon[17] and the st gothard. he would in fact make for himself there a "natural position" without forfeiting the advantage of being in melas's rear. once possessed of milan, napoleon says, he could have engaged melas with a light heart and with confidence in the greatest possible results of a victory, whether the austrians sought to force their way back to the east by the right or the left bank of the po, and he adds that if the french passed on and concentrated south of the po there would be no danger to the milan-st gothard line of retreat, as this was secured by the rivers ticino and sesia. in this last, as we shall see, he is shielding an undeniable mistake, but considering for the moment only the movement to milan, we are justified in assuming that his object was not the relief of genoa, but the most thorough defeat of melas's field army, to which end, putting all sentiment aside, he treated the hard-pressed massena as a "containing force" to keep melas occupied during the strategical deployment of the army of reserve. in the beginning he had told massena that he would "disengage" him, even if he had to go as far east as trent to find a way into italy. from the first, then, no direct relief was intended, and when, on hearing bad news from the riviera, he altered his route to the more westerly passes, it was probably because he felt that massena's containing power was almost exhausted, and that the passage and reassembly of the reserve army must be brought about in the minimum time and by the shortest way. but the object was still the defeat of melas, and for this, as the austrians possessed an enormous numerical superiority, the assembly of all forces, including moncey's, was indispensable. one essential condition of this was that the points of passage used should be out of reach of the enemy. the more westerly the passes chosen, the more dangerous was the whole operation--in fact the mont cenis column never reached him at all--and though his expressed objections to the st bernard line seem, as we have said, to be written after the event, to disarm his critics, there is no doubt that at the time he disliked it. it was a _pis aller_ forced upon him by moreau's delay and massena's extremity, and from the moment at which he arrived at milan he did, as a fact, abandon it altogether in favour of the st gothard. lastly, so strongly was he impressed with the necessity of completing the deployment of all his forces, that though he found the austrians on the turin side much scattered and could justifiably expect a series of rapid partial victories, napoleon let them go, and devoted his whole energy to creating for himself a "natural" position about milan. if he sinned, at any rate he sinned handsomely, and except that he went to milan by vercelli instead of by lausanne and domodossola[18] (on the safe side of the mountains), his march is logistically beyond cavil. napoleon's immediate purpose, then, was to reassemble the army of reserve in a zone of manoeuvre about milan. this was carried out in the first days of june. lannes at chivasso stood ready to ward off a flank attack until the main army had filed past on the vercelli road, then leaving a small force to combine with turreau (whose column had not been able to advance into the plain) in demonstrations towards turin, he moved off, still acting as right flank guard to the army, in the direction of pavia. the main body meanwhile, headed by murat, advanced on milan by way of vercelli and magenta, forcing the passage of the ticino on the 31st of may at turbigo and buffalora. on the same day the other divisions closed up to the ticino,[19] and faithful to his principles napoleon had an examination made of the little fortress of novara, intending to occupy it as a _place du moment_ to help in securing his zone of manoeuvre. on the morning of the 2nd of june murat occupied milan, and in the evening of the same day the headquarters entered the great city, the austrian detachment under vukassovich (the flying right wing of melas's general cordon system in piedmont) retiring to the adda. duhesme's corps forced that river at lodi, and pressed on with orders to organize crema and if possible orzinovi as temporary fortresses. lechi's italians were sent towards bergamo and brescia. lannes meantime had passed vercelli, and on the evening of the 2nd his cavalry reached pavia, where, as at milan, immense stores of food, equipment and warlike stores were seized. napoleon was now safe in his "natural" position, and barred one of the two main lines of retreat open to the austrians. but his ambitions went further, and he intended to cross the po and to establish himself on the other likewise, thus establishing across the plain a complete barrage between melas and mantua. here his end outranged his means, as we shall see. but he gave himself every chance that rapidity could afford him, and the moment that some sort of a "zone of manoeuvre" had been secured between the ticino and the oglio, he pushed on his main body--or rather what was left after the protective system had been provided for--to the po. he would not wait even for his guns, which had at last emerged from the bard defile and were ordered to come to milan by a safe and circuitous route along the foot of the alps. melas's movements. at this point the action of the enemy began to make itself felt. melas had not gained the successes that he had expected in piedmont and on the riviera, thanks to massena's obstinacy and to suchet's brilliant defence of the var. these operations had led him very far afield, and the protection of his over-long line of communications had caused him to weaken his large army by throwing off many detachments to watch the alpine valleys on his right rear. one of these successfully opposed turreau in the valley of the dora riparia, but another had been severely handled by lannes at chivasso, and a third (vukassovich) found itself, as we know, directly in the path of the french as they moved from ivrea to milan, and was driven far to the eastward. he was further handicapped by the necessity of supporting ott before genoa and elsnitz on the var, and hearing of lannes's bold advance on chivasso and of the presence of a french column with artillery (turreau) west of turin, he assumed that the latter represented the main body of the army of reserve--in so far indeed as he believed in the existence of that army at all.[20] next, when lannes moved away towards pavia, melas thought for a moment that fate had delivered his enemy into his hands, and began to collect such troops as were at hand at turin with a view to cutting off the retreat of the french on ivrea while vukassovich held them in front. it was only when news came of moncey's arrival in italy and of vukassovich's fighting retreat on brescia that the magnitude and purpose of the french column that had penetrated by ivrea became evident. melas promptly decided to give up his western enterprises, and to concentrate at alessandria, preparatory to breaking his way through the network of small columns--as the disseminated army of reserve still appeared to be--which threatened to bar his retreat. but orders circulated so slowly that he had to wait in turin till the 8th of june for elsnitz, whose retreat was, moreover, sharply followed up and made exceedingly costly by the enterprising suchet. ott, too, in spite of orders to give up the siege of genoa at once and to march with all speed to hold the alessandria-piacenza road, waited two days to secure the prize, and agreed (june 4) to allow massena's army to go free and to join suchet. and lastly, the cavalry of o'reilly, sent on ahead from alessandria to the stradella defile, reached that point only to encounter the french. the barrage was complete, and it remained for melas to break it with the mass that he was assembling, with all these misfortunes and delays, about alessandria. his chances of doing so were anything but desperate. on the 5th of june murat, with his own corps and part of duhesme's, had moved on piacenza, and stormed the bridge-head there. duhesme with one of his divisions pushed out on crema and orzinovi and also towards pizzighetone. moncey's leading regiments approached milan, and berthier thereupon sent on victor's corps to support murat and lannes. meantime the half abandoned line of operations, ivrea-vercelli, was briskly attacked by the austrians, who had still detachments on the side of turin, waiting for elsnitz to rejoin, and the french artillery train was once more checked. on the 6th lannes from pavia, crossing the po at san cipriano, encountered and defeated a large force, (o'reilly's column), and barred the alessandria-parma main road. opposite piacenza murat had to spend the day in gathering material for his passage, as the pontoon bridge had been cut by the retreating garrison of the bridge-head. on the eastern border of the "zone of manoeuvre" duhesme's various columns moved out towards brescia and cremona, pushing back vukassovich. meantime the last divisions of the army of reserve (two of moncey's excepted) were hurried towards lannes's point of passage, as murat had not yet secured piacenza. on the 7th, while duhesme continued to push back vukassovich and seized cremona, murat at last captured piacenza, finding there immense magazines. meantime the army, division by division, passed over, slowly owing to a sudden flood, near belgiojoso, and lannes's advanced guard was ordered to open communication with murat along the main road stradella-piacenza. "moments are precious" said the first consul. he was aware that elsnitz was retreating before suchet, that melas had left turin for alessandria, and that heavy forces of the enemy were at or east of tortona. he knew, too, that murat had been engaged with certain regiments recently before genoa and (wrongly) assumed o'reilly's column, beaten by lannes at san cipriano, to have come from the same quarter. whether this meant the deliverance or the surrender of genoa he did not yet know, but it was certain that massena's holding action was over, and that melas was gathering up his forces to recover his communications. hence napoleon's great object was concentration. "twenty thousand men at stradella," in his own words, was the goal of his efforts, and with the accomplishment of this purpose the campaign enters on a new phase. napoleon's dispositions. montebello. on the 8th of june, lannes's corps was across, victor following as quickly as the flood would allow. murat was at piacenza, but the road between lannes and murat was not known to be clear, and the first consul made the establishment of the connexion, and the construction of a third point of passage midway between the other two, the principal objects of the day's work. the army now being disseminated between the alps, the apennines, the ticino and the chiese, it was of vital importance to connect up the various parts into a well-balanced system. but the napoleon of 1800 solved the problem that lay at the root of his strategy, "concentrate, but be vulnerable nowhere," in a way that compares unfavourably indeed with the methods of the napoleon of 1806. duhesme was still absent at cremona. lechi was far away in the brescia country, bethencourt detained at arona. moncey with about 15,000 men had to cover an area of 40 m. square around milan, which constituted the original zone of manoeuvre, and if melas chose to break through the flimsy cordon of outposts on this side (the risk of which was the motive for detaching moncey at all) instead of at the stradella, it would take moncey two days to concentrate his force on any battlefield within the area named, and even then he would be outnumbered by two to one. as for the main body at the stradella, its position was wisely chosen, for the ground was too cramped for the deployment of the superior force that melas might bring up, but the strategy that set before itself as an object 20,000 men at the decisive point out of 50,000 available, is, to say the least, imperfect. the most serious feature in all this was the injudicious order to lannes to send forward his advanced guard, and to attack whatever enemy he met with on the road to voghera. the first consul, in fact, calculated that melas could not assemble 20,000 men at alessandria before the 12th of june, and he told lannes that if he met the austrians towards voghera, they could not be more than 10,000 strong. a later order betrays some anxiety as to the exactitude of these assumptions, warns lannes not to let himself be surprised, indicates his line of retreat, and, instead of ordering him to advance on voghera, authorizes him to attack any corps that presented itself at stradella. but all this came too late. acting on the earlier order lannes fought the battle of montebello on the 9th. this was a very severe running fight, beginning east of casteggio and ending at montebello, in which the french drove the austrians from several successive positions, and which culminated in a savage fight at close quarters about montebello itself. the singular feature of the battle is the disproportion between the losses on either side--french, 500 out of 12,000 engaged; austrians, 2100 killed and wounded and 2100 prisoners out of 14,000. these figures are most conclusive evidence of the intensity of the french military spirit in those days. one of the two divisions (watrin's) was indeed a veteran organization, but the other, chambarlhac's, was formed of young troops and was the same that, in the march to dijon, had congratulated itself that only 5% of its men had deserted. on the other side the soldiers fought for "the honour of their arms"--not even with the courage of despair, for they were ignorant of the "strategic barrage" set in front of them by napoleon, and the loss of their communications had not as yet lessened their daily rations by an ounce. meanwhile, napoleon had issued orders for the main body to stand fast, and for the detachments to take up their definitive covering positions. duhesme's corps was directed, from its eastern foray, to piacenza, to join the main body. moncey was to provide for the defence of the ticino line, lechi to form a "flying camp" in the region of orzinovi-brescia and cremona, and another mixed brigade was to control the austrians in pizzighetone and in the citadel of piacenza. on the other side of the po, between piacenza and montebello, was the main body (lannes, murat and part of victor's and duhesme's corps), and a flank guard was stationed near pavia, with orders to keep on the right of the army as it advanced (this is the first and only hint of any intention to go westward) and to fall back fighting should melas come on by the left bank. one division was to be always a day's march behind the army on the right bank, and a flotilla was to ascend the po, to facilitate the speedy reinforcement of the flank guard. farther to the north was a small column on the road milan-vercelli. all the protective troops, except the division of the main body detailed as an eventual support for the flank guard, was to be found by moncey's corps (which had besides to watch the austrians in the citadel of milan) and chabran's and lechi's weak commands. on this same day bonaparte tells the minister of war, carnot, that moncey has only brought half the expected reinforcements and that half of these are unreliable. as to the result of the impending contest napoleon counts greatly upon the union of 18,000 men under massena and suchet to crush melas against the "strategic barrage" of the army of reserve, by one or other bank of the po, and he seems equally confident of the result in either case. if genoa had held out three days more, he says, it would have been easy to count the number of melas's men who escaped. the exact significance of this last notion is difficult to establish, and all that could be written about it would be merely conjectural. but it is interesting to note that, without admitting it, napoleon felt that his "barrage" might not stand before the flood. the details of the orders of the 9th to the main body (written before the news of montebello arrived at headquarters) tend to the closest possible concentration of the main body towards casteggio, in view of a decisive battle on the 12th or 13th. [illustration: map.] napoleon's advance. but another idea had begun to form itself in his mind. still believing that melas would attack him on the stradella side, and hastening his preparations to meet this, he began to allow for the contingency of melas giving up or failing in his attempt to re-establish his communication with the mantovese, and retiring on genoa, which was now in his hands and could be provisioned and reinforced by sea. on the 10th napoleon ordered reserve ammunition to be sent from pavia, giving serravalle, which is south of novi, as its probable destination. but this was surmise, and of the facts he knew nothing. would the enemy move east on the stradella, north-east on the ticino or south on genoa? such reports as were available indicated no important movements whatever, which happened to be true, but could hardly appear so to the french headquarters. on the 11th, though he thereby forfeited the reinforcements coming up from duhesme's corps at cremona, napoleon ordered the main body to advance to the scrivia. lapoype's division (the right flank guard), which was observing the austrian posts towards casale, was called to the south bank of the po, the zone around milan was stripped so bare of troops that there was no escort for the prisoners taken at montebello, while information sent by chabran (now moving up from ivrea) as to the construction of bridges at casale (this was a feint made by melas on the 10th) passed unheeded. the crisis was at hand, and, clutching at the reports collected by lapoype as to the quietude of the austrians toward valenza and casale, bonaparte and berthier strained every nerve to bring up more men to the voghera side in the hope of preventing the prey from slipping away to genoa. on the 12th, consequently, the army (the _ordre de bataille_ of which had been considerably modified on the 11th) moved to the scrivia, lannes halting at castelnuovo, desaix (who had just joined the army from egypt) at pontecurone, victor at tortona with murat's cavalry in front towards alessandria. lapoype's division, from the left bank of the po, was marching in all haste to join desaix. moncey, duhesme, lechi and chabran were absent. the latter represented almost exactly half of berthier's command (30,000 out of 58,000), and even the concentration of 28,000 men on the scrivia had only been obtained by practically giving up the "barrage" on the left bank of the po. even now the enemy showed nothing but a rearguard, and the old questions reappeared in a new and acute form. was melas still in alessandria? was he marching on valenza and casale to cross the po? or to acqui against suchet, or to genoa to base himself on the british fleet? as to the first, why had he given up his chances of fighting on one of the few cavalry battlegrounds in north italy--the plain of marengo--since he could not stay in alessandria for any indefinite time? the second question had been answered in the negative by lapoype, but his latest information was thirty-six hours old. as for the other questions, no answer whatever was forthcoming, and the only course open was to postpone decisive measures and to send forward the cavalry, supported by infantry, to gain information. marengo. on the 13th, therefore, murat, lannes and victor advanced into the plain of marengo, traversed it without difficulty and carrying the villages held by the austrian rearguard, established themselves for the night within a mile of the fortress. but meanwhile napoleon, informed we may suppose of their progress, had taken a step that was fraught with the gravest consequences. he had, as we know, no intention of forcing on a decision until his reconnaissance produced the information on which to base it, and he had therefore kept back three divisions under desaix at pontecurone. but as the day wore on without incident, he began to fear that the reconnaissance would be profitless, and unwilling to give melas any further start, he sent out these divisions right and left to find and to hold the enemy, whichever way the latter had gone. at noon desaix with one division was despatched southward to rivalta to head off melas from genoa and at 9 a.m. on the 14th,[21] lapoype was sent back over the po to hold the austrians should they be advancing from valenza towards the ticino. thus there remained in hand only 21,000 men when at last, in the forenoon of the 14th the whole of melas's army, more than 40,000 strong, moved out of alessandria, not southward nor northward, but due west into the plain of marengo (q.v.). the extraordinary battle that followed is described elsewhere. the outline of it is simple enough. the austrians advanced slowly and in the face of the most resolute opposition, until their attack had gathered weight, and at last they were carrying all before them, when desaix returned from beyond rivalta and initiated a series of counterstrokes. these were brilliantly successful, and gave the french not only local victory but the supreme self-confidence that, next day, enabled them to extort from melas an agreement to evacuate all lombardy as far as the mincio. and though in this way the chief prize, melas's army, escaped after all, marengo was the birthday of the first empire. one more blow, however, was required before the second coalition collapsed, and it was delivered by moreau. we have seen that he had crossed the upper rhine and defeated kray at stokach. this was followed by other partial victories, and kray then retired to ulm, where he reassembled his forces, hitherto scattered in a long weak line from the neckar to schaffhausen. moreau continued his advance, extending his forces up to and over the danube below ulm, and winning several combats, of which the most important was that of hochstadt, fought on the famous battlegrounds of 1703 and 1704, and memorable for the death of la tour d'auvergne, the "first grenadier of france" (june 19). finding himself in danger of envelopment, kray now retired, swiftly and skilfully, across the front of the advancing french, and reached ingolstadt in safety. thence he retreated over the inn, moreau following him to the edge of that river, and an armistice put an end for the moment to further operations. this not resulting in a treaty of peace, the war was resumed both in italy and in germany. the army of reserve and the army of italy, after being fused into one, under massena's command, were divided again into a fighting army under brune, who opposed the austrians (bellegarde) on the mincio, and a political army under murat, which re-established french influence in the peninsula. the former, extending on a wide front as usual, won a few strategical successes without tactical victory, the only incidents of which worth recording are the gallant fight of dupont's division, which had become isolated during a manoeuvre, at pozzolo on the mincio (december 25) and the descent of a corps under macdonald from the grisons by way of the splugen, an achievement far surpassing napoleon's and even suvarov's exploits, in that it was made after the winter snows had set in. hohenlinden. in germany the war for a moment reached the sublime. kray had been displaced in command by the young archduke john, who ordered the denunciation of the armistice and a general advance. his plan, or that of his advisers, was to cross the lower inn, out of reach of moreau's principal mass, and then to swing round the french flank until a complete chain was drawn across their rear. but during the development of the manoeuvre, moreau also moved, and by rapid marching made good the time he had lost in concentrating his over-dispersed forces. the weather was appalling, snow and rain succeeding one another until the roads were almost impassable. on the 2nd of december the austrians were brought to a standstill, but the inherent mobility of the revolutionary armies enabled them to surmount all difficulties, and thanks to the respite afforded him by the archduke's halt, moreau was able to see clearly into the enemy's plans and dispositions. on the 3rd of december, while the austrians in many disconnected columns were struggling through the dark and muddy forest paths about hohenlinden, moreau struck the decisive blow. while ney and grouchy held fast the head of the austrian main column at hohenlinden, richepanse's corps was directed on its left flank. in the forest richepanse unexpectedly met a subsidiary austrian column which actually cut his column in two. but profiting by the momentary confusion he drew off that part of his forces which had passed beyond the point of contact and continued his march, striking the flank of the archduke's main column, most of which had not succeeded in deploying opposite ney, at the village of mattempost. first the baggage train and then the artillery park fell into his hands, and lastly he reached the rear of the troops engaged opposite hohenlinden, whereupon the austrian main body practically dissolved. the rear of richepanse's corps, after disengaging itself from the austrian column it had met in the earlier part of the day, arrived at mattempost in time to head off thousands of fugitives who had escaped from the carnage at hohenlinden. the other columns of the unfortunate army were first checked and then driven back by the french divisions they met, which, moving more swiftly and fighting better in the broken ground and the woods, were able to combine two brigades against one wherever a fight developed. on this disastrous day the austrians lost 20,000 men, 12,000 of them being prisoners, and 90 guns. marengo and hohenlinden decided the war of the second coalition as rivoli had decided that of the first, and the revolutionary wars came to an end with the armistice of steyer (december 25, 1800) and the treaty of luneville (february 9, 1801). but only the first act of the great drama was accomplished. after a short respite europe entered upon the napoleonic wars. bibliography.--by far the most important modern works are a. chuquet's _guerres de la revolution_ (11 monographs forming together a complete history of the campaigns of 1792-93), and the publications of the french general staff. the latter appear first, as a rule, in the official "revue d'histoire" and are then republished in separate volumes, of which every year adds to the number. v. dupuis' _l'armee du nord 1793_; coutanceau's _l'armee du nord 1794_; j. colin's _education militaire de napoleon_ and _campagne de 1793 en alsace_; and c. de cugnac's _campagne de l'armee de reserve 1800_ may be specially named. among other works of importance the principal are c. von b(inder)-k(rieglstein), _geist und stoff im kriege_ (vienna, 1896); e. gachot's works on massena's career (containing invaluable evidence though written in a somewhat rhetorical style); ritter von angeli, _erzherzog karl_ (vienna, 1896); f. n. maude, _evolution of modern strategy_; g. a. furse, _marengo and hohenlinden_; c. von clausewitz, _feldzug 1796 in italien_ and _feldzug 1799_ (french translations); h. bonnal, _de rosbach a ulm_; krebs and moris, _campagnes dans les alpes_ (paris, 1891-1895); yorck von wartenburg, _napoleon als feldherr_ (english and french translations); f. bouvier, _bonaparte en italie 1796_; kuhl, _bonaparte's erster feldzug_; j. w. fortescue, _hist. of the british army_, vol. iv.; g. d. v. scharnhorst, _ursache des glucks der franzosen 1793-1794_ (reprinted in a. weiss's _short german military readings_, london, 1892); e. d'hauterive, _l'armee sous la revolution_; c. rousset, _les volontaires_; max jahns, _das franzosische heer_; shadwell, _mountain warfare_; works of colonel camon (_guerre napoleonienne_, &c.); austrian war office, krieg gegen die franz. revolution 1792-1797 (vienna, 1905); archduke charles, _grundsatze der strategie_ (1796 campaign in germany), and _gesch. des feldzuges 1799 in deutschl. und der schweiz_; v. zeissberg, _erzherzog karl_; the old history called _victoires et conquetes des francais_ (27 volumes, paris, 1817-1825); m. hartmann, _anteil der russen am feldzug 1799 in der schweiz_ (zurich, 1892); danelewski-miliutin, _der krieg russlands gegen frankreich unter paul i._ (munich, 1858); german general staff, "napoleons feldzug 1796-1797" (suppl. _mil. wochenblatt_, 1889), and _pirmasens und kaiserslautern_ ("kriegsgesch. einzelschriften," 1893). (c. f. a.) naval operations the naval side of the wars arising out of the french revolution was marked by unity, and even by simplicity. france had but one serious enemy, great britain, and great britain had but one purpose, to beat down france. other states were drawn into the strife, but it was as the allies, the enemies and at times the victims, of the two dominating powers. the field of battle was the whole expanse of the ocean and the landlocked seas. the weapons, the methods and the results were the same. when a general survey of the whole struggle is taken, its unity is manifest. the revolution produced a profound alteration in the government of france, but none in the final purposes of its policy. to secure for france its so-called "natural limits"--the rhine, the alps, the pyrenees and the ocean; to protect both flanks by reducing holland on the north and spain on the south to submission; to confirm the mighty power thus constituted, by the subjugation of great britain, were the objects of the republic and of napoleon, as they had been of louis xiv. the naval war, like the war on land, is here considered in the first of its two phases--the revolutionary (1792-99). (for the napoleonic phase (1800-15), see napoleonic campaigns.) the revolutionary war began in april 1792. in the september of that year admiral truguet sailed from toulon to co-operate with the french troops operating against the austrians and their allies in northern italy. in december latouche treville was sent with another squadron to cow the bourbon rulers of naples. the extreme feebleness of their opponents alone saved the french from disaster. mutinies, which began within ten days of the storming of the bastille (14th of july 1789), had disorganized their navy, and the effects of these disorders continued to be felt so long as the war lasted. in february 1793 war broke out with great britain and holland. in march spain was added to the list of the powers against which france declared war. her resources at sea were wholly inadequate to meet the coalition she had provoked. the convention did indeed order that fifty-two ships of the line should be commissioned in the channel, but it was not able in fact to do more than send out a few diminutive and ill-appointed squadrons, manned by mutinous crews, which kept close to the coast. the british navy was in excellent order, but the many calls made on it for the protection of world-wide commerce and colonial possessions caused the operations in the channel to be somewhat languid. lord howe cruised in search of the enemy without being able to bring them to action. the severe blockade which in the later stages of the war kept the british fleet permanently outside of brest was not enforced in the earlier stages. lord howe preferred to save his fleet from the wear and tear of perpetual cruising by maintaining his headquarters at st helens, and keeping watch on the french ports by frigates. the french thus secured a freedom of movement which in the course of 1794 enabled them to cover the arrival of a great convoy laden with food from america (see first of june, battle of). this great effort was followed by a long period of languor. its internal defects compelled the french fleet in the channel to play a very poor part till the last days of 1796. squadrons were indeed sent a short way to sea, but their inefficiency was conspicuously displayed when, on the 17th of june 1795, a much superior number of their line of battle ships failed to do any harm to the small force of cornwallis, and when on the 22nd of the same month they fled in disorder before lord bridport at the isle de groix. operations of a more decisive character had in the meantime taken place both in the mediterranean and in the west indies. in april 1793 the first detachment of a british fleet, which was finally raised to a strength of 21 sail of the line, under the command of lord hood, sailed for the mediterranean. by august the admiral was off toulon, acting in combination with a spanish naval force. france was torn by the contentions of jacobins and girondins, and its dissensions led to the surrender of the great arsenal to the british admiral and his spanish colleague don juan de langara, on the 27th of august. the allies were joined later by a contingent from naples. but the military forces were insufficient to hold the land defences against the army collected to expel them. high ground commanding the anchorage was occupied by the besieging force, and on the 18th of december 1793 the allies retired. they carried away or destroyed thirty-three french vessels, of which thirteen were of the line. but partly through the inefficiency and partly through the ill-will of the spaniards, who were indisposed to cripple the french, whom they considered as their only possible allies against great britain, the destruction was not so complete as had been intended. twenty-five ships, of which eighteen were of the line, were left to serve as the nucleus of an active fleet in later years. fourteen thousand of the inhabitants fled with the allies to escape the vengeance of the victorious jacobins. their sufferings, and the ferocious massacre perpetrated on those who remained behind by the conquerors, form one of the blackest pages of the french revolution. the spanish fleet took no further part in the war. lord hood now turned to the occupation of corsica, where the intervention of the british fleet was invited by the patriotic party headed by pascual paoli. the french ships left at toulon were refitted and came to sea in the spring of 1794, but admiral martin who commanded them did not feel justified in giving battle, and his sorties were mere demonstrations. from the 25th of january 1794 till november 1796 the british fleet in the mediterranean was mainly occupied in and about corsica, securing the island, watching toulon and co-operating with the allied austrians and piedmontese in northern italy. it did much to hamper the coastwise communications of the french. but neither lord hood, who went home at the end of 1794, nor his indolent successor hotham, was able to deliver an effective blow at the toulon squadron. the second of these officers fought two confused actions with admiral martin in the gulf of lyons on the 16th of march and the 12th of july 1795, but though three french ships were cut off and captured, the baffling winds and the placid disposition of hotham united to prevent decisive results. a new spirit was introduced into the command of the british fleet when sir john jervis, afterwards earl saint vincent, succeeded hotham in november 1795. jervis came to the mediterranean with a high reputation, which had been much enhanced by his recent command in the west indies. in every war with france it was the natural policy of the british government to seize on its enemy's colonial possessions, not only because of their intrinsic value, but because they were the headquarters of active privateers. the occupation of the little fishing stations of st pierre and miquelon (14th may 1793) and of pondicherry in the east indies (23rd aug. 1793) were almost formal measures taken at the beginning of every war. but the french west indian islands possessed intrinsic strength which rendered their occupation a service of difficulty and hazard. in 1793 they were torn by dissensions, the result of the revolution in the mother country. tobago was occupied in april, and the french part of the great island of san domingo was partially thrown into british hands by the creoles, who were threatened by their insurgent slaves. during 1794 a lively series of operations, in which there were some marked alternations of fortune, took place in and about martinique and guadaloupe. the british squadron, and the contingent of troops it carried, after a first repulse, occupied them both in march and april, together with santa lucia. a vigorous counter-attack was carried out by the terrorist victor hugues with ability and ferocity. guadaloupe and santa lucia were recovered in august. yet on the whole the british government was successful in its policy of destroying the french naval power in distant seas. the seaborne commerce of the republic was destroyed. the naval supremacy of great britain was limited, and was for a time menaced, in consequence of the advance of the french armies on land. the invasion of holland in 1794 led to the downfall of the house of orange, and the establishment of the batavian republic. war with great britain under french dictation followed in january 1795. in that year a british expedition under the command of admiral keith elphinstone (afterwards lord keith) occupied the dutch colony at the cape (august-september) and their trading station in malacca. the british colonial empire was again extended, and the command of the sea by its fleet confirmed. but the necessity to maintain a blockading force in the german ocean imposed a fresh strain on its naval resources, and the hostility of holland closed a most important route to british commerce in europe. in 1795 spain made peace with france at basel, and in september 1796 re-entered the war as her ally. the spanish navy was most inefficient, but it required to be watched and therefore increased the heavy strain on the british fleet. at the same time the rapid advance of the french arms in italy began to close the ports of the peninsula to great britain. its ships were for a time withdrawn from the mediterranean. poor as it was in quality, the spanish fleet was numerous. it was able to facilitate the movements of french squadrons sent to harass british commerce in the atlantic, and a concentration of forces became necessary. it was the more important because the cherished french scheme for an attack on the heart of the british empire began to take shape. while spain occupied one part of the british fleet to the south, and holland another in the north, a french expedition, which was to have been aided by a dutch expedition from the texel, was prepared at brest. the dutch were confined to harbour by the vigilant blockade of admiral duncan, afterwards lord camperdown. but in december 1796 a french fleet commanded by admiral morard de galle, carrying 13,000 troops under general hoche, was allowed to sail from brest for ireland, by the slack management of the blockade under admiral colpoys. being ill-fitted, ill-manned and exposed to constant bad weather the french ships were scattered. some reached their destination, bantry bay, only to be driven out again by north-easterly gales. the expedition finally returned after much suffering, and in fragments, to brest. yet the year 1797 was one of extreme trial to great britain. the victory of sir john jervis over the spaniards near cape saint vincent on the 14th of february (see saint