BALFOUR

balfour, a.j.). it is sufficient to say that while mr balfour's sympathetic "send off" appeared to indicate his inclination towards mr chamberlain's programme, if only further support could be gained for it, his endeavour to keep the party together, and the violent opposition which gathered against mr chamberlain's scheme, combined to make his real attitude during the next two years decidedly obscure, both sections of the party--free-traders and tariff reformers--being induced from time to time to regard him as on their side. the tariff reform movement itself was now, however, outside the purely official programme, and mr chamberlain (backed by a majority of the unionist members) threw himself with impetuous ardour into a crusade on its behalf, while at the same time supporting mr balfour in parliament, and leaving it to him to decide as to the policy of going to the country when the time should be ripe. in his own words, he went in front of the unionist army as a pioneer, and if his army was attacked he would go back to it; in no conceivable circumstances would he allow himself to be put in any sort of competition, direct or indirect, with mr balfour, his friend and leader, whom he meant to follow (october 6). on october 6th he opened his campaign with a speech at glasgow. analysing the trade statistics as between 1872 and 1902, he insisted that british progress involved a relative decline compared with that of protectionist foreign countries like germany and the united states; great britain exported less and less of manufactured goods, and imported more and more; the exports to foreign countries had decreased, and it was only the increased exports to the colonies that maintained the british position. this was the outcome of the working of a one-sided free-trade system. now was the time, and it might soon be lost, for consolidating british trade relations with the colonies. if the mother country and her daughter states did not draw closer, they would inevitably drift apart. a further increase of l26,000,000 a year in the trade with the colonies might be obtained by a preferential tariff, and this meant additional employment at home for 166,000 workmen, or subsistence for a population of a far larger number. his positive proposals were: (1) no tax on raw materials; (2) a small tax on food other than colonial, e.g. two shillings a quarter on foreign corn but excepting maize, and 5% on meat and dairy produce excluding bacon; (3) a 10% general tariff on imported manufactured goods. to meet any increased cost of living, he proposed to reduce the duties on tea, sugar and other articles of general consumption, and he estimated that his scheme would in no case increase a working-man's expenditure, and in most cases would reduce it. "the colonies," he said, "are prepared to meet us; in return for a very moderate preference, they will give us a substantial advantage in their markets." this speech, delivered with characteristic vigour and imperialistic enthusiasm, was the type of others which followed in quick succession during the year. at greenock next day he emphasized the necessity of retaliating against foreign tariffs--"i never like being hit without striking back." the practice of "dumping" must be fairly met; if foreign goods were brought into england to undersell british manufacturers, either the fair wages clause and the factory acts and the compensation act would have to be repealed, or the workmen would have to take lower wages, or lose their work. "agriculture has been practically destroyed, sugar has gone, silk has gone, iron is threatened, wool is threatened, cotton will go! how long are you going to stand it?" on october 20th he spoke at newcastle, on the 21st at tynemouth, on the 27th at liverpool, insisting that free-trade had never been a working-class measure and that it could not be reconciled with trade-unionism; on november 4th at birmingham, on the 20th at cardiff, on the 21st at newport, and on december 16th at leeds. in all these speeches he managed to point his argument by application to local industries. in the leeds speech he announced that, with a view to drawing up a scientific model tariff, a non-political commission of representative experts would be appointed under the auspices of the tariff reform league to take evidence from every trade; it included many heads of businesses, and mr charles booth, the eminent student of social and industrial london, with sir robert herbert as chairman, and professor w.a.s. hewins as secretary. the name of "tariff commission," given to this voluntary and unofficial body, was a good deal criticized, but though flouted by the political free-traders it set to work in earnest, and accumulated a mass of evidence as to the real facts of trade, which promised to be invaluable to economic inquirers. on january 18th, 1904, mr chamberlain ended his series of speeches by a great meeting at the guildhall, in the city of london, the key-note being his exhortation to his audience to "think imperially." all this activity on mr chamberlain's part represented a great physical and intellectual feat on the part of a man now sixty-seven years of age; but his bodily vigour and comparatively youthful appearance were essential features of his personality. nothing like this campaign had been known in the political world since mr gladstone's midlothian days; and it produced a great public impression, stirring up both supporters and opponents. free-trade unionists like lord goschen and lord hugh cecil, and the liberal leaders--for whom mr asquith became the principal spokesman, though lord rosebery's criticisms also had considerable weight--found new matter in mr chamberlain's speeches for their contention that any radical change in the traditional english fiscal policy, established now for sixty years, would only result in evil. the broad fact remained that while mr chamberlain's activity gathered round him the bulk of the unionist members and an enthusiastic band of economic sympathizers, the country as a whole remained apathetic and unconvinced. one reason was the intellectual difficulty of the subject and the double-faced character of all arguments from statistics, which were either incomprehensible or disputable; another was the fact that substantially this was a political movement, and that tariff reform was, after all, only one in a complexity of political issues, most of which during this period were being interpreted by the electorate in a sense hostile to the unionist party. mr chamberlain had relied on his personal influence, which from 1895 to 1902 had been supreme; but his own resignation, and the course of events, had since 1903 made his personality less authoritative, and new interests--such as the opposition to the education act, to the heavy taxation, and to chinese labour in the transvaal, and indignation over the revelations concerned with the war--were monopolizing attention, to the weakening of his hold on the public. the revival in trade, and the production of new statistics which appeared to stultify mr chamberlain's prophecies of progressive decline, enabled the free-trade champions to reassure their audiences as to the very foundation of his case, and to represent the whole tariff reform movement as no less unnecessary than risky. moreover, the split in the unionist party brought the united liberal party in full force into the field, and at last the country began to think that the danger of irish home rule was practically over, and that a liberal majority might be returned to power in safety, with the prospect of providing an alternative government which would assure commercial repose (lord rosebery's phrase), relief from extravagant expenditure, and--as the working-classes were led to believe--a certain amount of labour legislation which the tory leaders would never propose. on the other hand the colonies took a great interest in the new movement, though without putting any such pressure on the home public as mr chamberlain might have expected. at the opening of 1904 he was officially invited by mr deakin, the prime minister of the commonwealth, to pay a visit to australia, in order to expound his scheme, being promised an enthusiastic welcome "as the harbinger of commercial reciprocity between the mother country and her colonies." mr chamberlain, however, declined; his work at home was too pressing. from the end of mr chamberlain's series of expository speeches on his scheme of tariff reform, onwards during the various fiscal debates and discussions of 1904, it is unnecessary to follow events in detail. the scheme was now before the country, and mr chamberlain was anxious to take its verdict. time was not on his side at his age, and if he had to be beaten at one election he was anxious to get rid of the other issues which would encumber the popular vote, and to press on to a second when he would be on the attacking side. but he would make no move which would embarrass mr balfour in parliament, and adhered to his promise of loyalty. the result was a long drawn out interval, while the government held on and its supporters became more embittered over their differences. mr chamberlain needed a rest, and was away in italy and egypt from march to may, and again in november. he made three important speeches at welbeck (august 4), at luton (october 5), and at limehouse (december 15), but he had nothing substantial to add to his case, and the party situation continued in all its embarrassments. mr balfour's introduction of his promise (at edinburgh on october 3) to convene an imperial conference after the general election if the unionists came back to power, in order to discuss a scheme for fiscal union, represented an academic rather than a practical advance, since the by-elections showed that the unionists were certain to be defeated. the one important new development concerned the liberal-unionist organization. in january some correspondence was published between mr chamberlain and the duke of devonshire, dating from the previous october, as to difficulties arising from the central liberal-unionist organization subsidizing local associations which had adopted the programme of tariff reform. the duke objected to this departure from neutrality, and suggested that it was becoming "impossible with any advantage to maintain under existing circumstances the existence of the liberal-unionist organization." mr chamberlain retorted that this was a matter for a general meeting of delegates to decide; if the duke was outvoted he might resign his presidency; for his own part he was prepared to allow the local associations to be subsidized impartially, so long as they supported the government, but he was not prepared for the violent disruption, which the duke apparently contemplated, of an association so necessary to the success of the unionist cause. the duke was in a difficult position as president of the organization, since most of the local associations supported mr chamberlain, and he replied that the differences between them were vital, and he would not be responsible for dividing the association into sections, but would rather resign. mr chamberlain then called a general meeting on his own responsibility in february, when a new constitution was proposed; and in may, at the annual meeting of the liberal-unionist council, the free-food unionists, being in a minority, retired, and the association was reorganized under mr chamberlain's auspices, lord lansdowne and lord selborne (both of them cabinet ministers) becoming vice-presidents. on july 14th the reconstituted liberal-unionist organization held a great demonstration in the albert hall, and mr chamberlain's success in ousting the duke of devonshire and the other free-trade members of the old liberal-unionist party, and imposing his own fiscal policy upon the liberal-unionist caucus, was now complete. during the spring and summer of 1905 mr chamberlain's more active supporters were in favour of forcing a dissolution by leaving the government in a minority, but he himself preferred to leave matters to take their course, so long as the prime minister was content to be publicly identified with the policy of eventually fighting on tariff reform lines. speaking at the albert hall in july mr chamberlain pushed somewhat further than before his "embrace" of mr balfour; and in the autumn, when foreign affairs no longer dominated the attention of the government, the crisis rapidly came to a head. in reply to mr balfour's appeal for the sinking of differences (newcastle, november 14), mr chamberlain insisted at bristol (november 21) on the adoption of his fiscal policy; and mr balfour resigned on december 4. on the ground that he no longer retained the confidence of the party. at the crushing unionist defeat in the general election which followed in january 1906, mr chamberlain was triumphantly returned for west birmingham, and all the divisions of birmingham returned chamberlainite members. amid the wreck of the party--mr balfour and several of his colleagues themselves losing their seats--he had the consolation of knowing that the tariff reformers won the only conspicuous successes of the election. but he had no desire to set himself up as leader in mr balfour's place, and after private negotiations with the ex-prime minister, a common platform was arranged between them, on which mr balfour, for whom a seat was found in the city of london, should continue to lead the remnant of the party. the formula was given in a letter from mr balfour of february 14th (see